DYNAMICS OF FORMAL PEACE INFRASTRUCTURE MOTIVATING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUSTAINABLE PEACE BUILDING IN MOMBASA COUNTY, KENYA

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A Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the conferment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

August, 2022

DECLARATION

"This thesis my original work prepared with no other than the indicated sources and support, and has not been presented elsewhere for a degree or any other award.

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ABSTRACT

Global experience with sustainable peacebuilding has been diverse since the term was formally introduced to the world by the United Nations in 1992. Since then, peacebuilding has been implemented in the absence of a universally accepted approach or clear criteria for success. Multiple actors have conceptualised and implemented peacebuilding to correspond with their contexts and needs. The 2008 Kenya Government directive that each County should have a peacebuilding entity brought into the limelight the work of the Peacebuilding Committees in Kenya. However, the ability of these Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees to foster sustainable peacebuilding has not been exhaustively interrogated. The overall objective of this study was to investigate the dynamics that motivate the implementation of sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County. The specific objectives were; 1) examine the influence of the policy framework of the formal peacebuilding infrastructure in fostering sustainable peacebuilding; 2) evaluate the strategies applied by the Sub-county peacebuilding committees in advancing sustainable peacebuilding; and 3) assess the operational challenges and opportunities for sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County. The conceptual framework was based on Galtung's Theory of Peacebuilding, Galtung's Theory of Structural Violence, Lederach's Conflict Transformation Theory and the Conceptual Framework of the Infrastructure for Peace (I4P). The study population was the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, Government officials in Mombasa and the NSC in Nairobi, the Youth, villagers, NGOs and CBOs. The study adopted a descriptive survey research design and applied both convenience and purposive sampling techniques. A sample size of was 392 selected as follows;113 Committee members, 11 County and National administrators, 185 youth, 7 reformed youth, 72 community members and 4 NGO representatives, who were all affiliated to the peacebuilding committees. Data were collected through semi-structured questionnaires, key informant interview (KII) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) guides as well as observation checklists. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used for data analysis. Findings revealed that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees enjoyed policy support through County administrative structures, however, their potential for fostering sustainable peacebuilding was hamstrung by lack of financing, a poorly informed public and poor coordination of peacebuilding activities in the County. The study found out that the lack of basic peacebuilding knowledge and overreliance on County administration officials and NGOs to convene peacebuilding activities curtailed the leadership role of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. Youth were found to be an important factor in the County peacebuilding agenda, however, there was no policy or programmatic strategy for their involvement. The study established that sustainable peacebuilding opportunities exist through the peacebuilding partners already working in the County, and through the Terms of Reference of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees issued by the Government of Kenya, through the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC). The study concludes that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees experience weakened agency because of the National Government's policy of not resourcing them. The overall conclusion is that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees potential for fostering sustainable peacebuilding is compromised under the current policy framework, which has also compounded the operational challenges for the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. The study recommends a review of the operational and resourcing policy for the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees and an elaboration of a youth engagement strategy in the County peacebuilding agenda. Further, research in the area of comparative studies of the different approaches to peacebuilding is recommended in order to find out the best approaches for sustainable peacebuilding for Mombasa County, and by extension, Kenya.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ii
PLAGIARISM STATEMENT iii
COPYRIGHT iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v
ABSTRACT vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS vii
LIST OF TABLES xi
LIST OF FIGURES xii
LIST OF APPENDICES xiii
CHAPTER ONE:INTRODUCTION 1
1.1. Background to the Study 1
1.1.1 The Conceptual Understanding of Peacebuilding 4
1.1.2 The Emergence of Formal Local Peacebuilding Committees and Infrastructures for Peace. 8
1.2 Statement of the Problem 14
1.3 Research Objectives 14
1.4 Research Questions 15
1.5 Justification of the study. 15
1.5.1 Academic Justification 17
1.5.2 Philosophical Justification 18
1.5.3 Policy Justification 19
1.6 Scope of the study 20
1.7 Chapter Summary 21
CHAPTER TWO:LITERATURE REVIEW 23
2.1 Policy Frameworks motivating Sustainable Peacebuilding. 23
2.1.1 Global Peacebuilding Frameworks and Policies. 25
2.1.2 The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. 35
2.1.3 Global Peacebuilding Stakeholders Influencing Local Peacebuilding. 37
2.1.4 United Kingdom's Support for Peacebuilding. 38
2.1.5 United States' Support for Peacebuilding. 41
2.1.6. European Union's Support for Peacebuilding. 47
2.1.7 Policy Frameworks for Peacebuilding in Africa. 49
2.1.8 Precolonial Peacebuilding in Africa 53
2.1.9 African Union and Peacebuilding in Africa. 58
2.1.10 Regional Organisations and Peacebuilding in Africa. 64
2.1.11 ECOWAS and Peacebuilding in Africa. 65
2.1.12 IGAD and Peacebuilding in Africa. 70
2.1.13 The East African Community and Peacebuilding in Africa. 74
2.1.14 Kenya Peacebuilding Architecture and Policy Framework. 78

2.1.15 Local Peace Committees (LPCs) and Peacebuilding in Africa 84
2.1.16 Background of Local Peace Committees in Kenya 90
2.2 Strategies of Sustainable Peacebuilding and Implications for Local Peacebuilding Committees..... 95
2.2.1 Preventive Diplomacy..... 96
2.2.2. Conflict Early Warning..... 107
2.2.3 Mediation as a Peacebuilding strategy..... 117
2.3 Challenges and Opportunities for Peace Committees in Fostering Sustainable Peacebuilding. 127
2.3.1 Opportunities for sustainable peacebuilding..... 135
2.4. Gaps in the Peacebuilding Literature..... 137
2.5 Conceptual Framework..... 139
2.5.1. Galtung's Theory of Peacebuilding 140
2.5.2 Galtung's Concept of Structural Violence..... 144
2.5.3 Lederach's Conflict Transformation Theory 148
2.5.4 The Infrastructure for Peace Framework. 153
2.6 Conceptual Model..... 160
CHAPTER THREE:RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 164
3.1. Research Design..... 164
3.2. Study Area. 166
3.3 Study Population..... 171
3.4 Sample Size and sampling technique..... 172
3.5 Data Collection Procedures..... 175
3.6 Data Analysis..... 178
3.7 Validity. 178
3.8 Pilot Study and Reliability..... 179
3.9. Limitations of the Study..... 182
3.10. Ethical Considerations 183
3.11. Chapter Summary 184
CHAPTER FOUR:POLICY FRAMEWORK OF FORMAL PEACE INFRASTRUCTURE IN MOMBASA COUNTY 185
4.1. Socio-demographic characteristics of the Sub-county Peace Committees..... 185
4.1.1. Age Profile of Sub-county Peace Committees in Mombasa County..... 188
4.1.2. Gender of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee respondents..... 195
4.1.3. Level of education..... 201
4.1.4. Occupation status of the respondents..... 203
4.1.5. Composition of the Sub-county Peace Committees..... 205
4.2 Members' Understanding of the Role of Sub-county Peace Committees 209
4.3 Policy Framework of formal peace infrastructure and sustainable peace..... 214

4.3.1 Awareness of the National Policy Framework by Mombasa Sub-county Peacebuilding infrastructure. 214
4.3.3 Adequacy of Guidance on Peacebuilding within the Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Policy 220
4.3.4 Training of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee Members on policy framework 222
4.4. Conflict Analysis Undertaken by Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. 227
4.5. Causes of conflict in Mombasa County 229
4.5.1 Illegal Drug Abuse and Peddling 231
4. 5.2 Historical injustices 235
4.5.3 Poverty 240
4.5.4. Youth Radicalisation 246
4.5.6 Juvenile gangs 249
4.5.7 Clashing cultural and religious beliefs 254
4.5.8 Gender-based violence 255
4.5.9 The *Wabara* Phenomenon as a Source of conflict 256
4.6 Chapter Summary 259
CHAPTER FIVE:STRATEGIES OF SUB-COUNTY PEACEBUILDING COMMITTEES IN ADVANCING SUSTAINABLE PEACEBUILDING IN MOMBASA. 261
5.1 Peacebuilding Strategies Deployed by Mombasa Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees. 261
1.2. Peacebuilding Strategies in Mombasa County During Times of Conflict 262
5.2.1 Community Dialogue 264
5.2.2 Ad Hoc Peace Meetings 267
5.2.3 Community Sensitisation by Social Media (WhatsApp Groups) 268
5.2.4 Peace *Barazas* 269
5.3. Peacebuilding Strategies in times of No Conflict 273
5.3.1. Civic Education 274
5.3.2 Radio Peace Talks 276
5.3.3 Cultural Events 277
5.3.4 The *Nyumba Kumi* (Ten Homes) Initiative and Peacebuilding 279
5.4. Peacebuilding Education 282
5.5 Collaborative efforts –working with other peace stakeholders in Mombasa County 285
5.5.1. Human Rights and Peacebuilding in Mombasa 291
5.6. Youth engagement in peacebuilding 298
5.6.1. Tackling Youth radicalisation as a Peacebuilding Strategy 301
5.6.2. Youth economic empowerment as a peacebuilding strategy 303
5.6.3. Engaging Youth in Peacebuilding Through Civic Education 308
5.7. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaboration with Security and Law Enforcement Authorities for Peacebuilding 311

5.8. Sub-county Peacebuilding Committee assessment of their Peacebuilding Success 316

5.9. Chapter Summary 322

CHAPTER SIX:CHALLENGES AND OPPRUNITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACEBUILDING IN MOMBASA COUNTY 326

6.1 Stakeholders' Recognition and Support to District Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa County 326

6.2. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees Lack of Financial and Other Resources for Peacebuilding Activities 332

6.3 Internal Inefficiency and Environmental Challenges faced by Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees 341

6.4. Challenges of Visibility 346

6.5. Sustainable Peacebuilding Opportunities in Mombasa County 354

6.5.1 Sustainable Peacebuilding Opportunity through Community Peace Education 359

6.5.2 Sustainable Peacebuilding Opportunity through Networking and Partnership Building 361

6.5.3. Sustainable Peacebuilding Opportunity through Early Response and Early Warning to Conflict 364

6.5.4 Sustainable Peacebuilding Opportunity through Public/Community Participation and Ownership 366

6.5.5 Sustainable Peacebuilding Opportunity through Application of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms (Village Elders as a resource) 369

6.5.6 Sustainable Peacebuilding Opportunity through facilitation (the Honest Broker role) 371

6.6 Chapter Summary 374

CHAPTER SEVEN:SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 377

7.1 Summary of Findings 377

7.2. Conclusions 384

7.3. Recommendations 388

7.4. Suggestions for Further research 390

REFERENCES 393

APPENDICIES 460

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3. 1 Sample size and sampling technique.....174
Table 3. 2 Reliability Results for District Peace Committees in Sustainable Peacebuilding in Kilifi County, Kenya.....181
Table 4. 1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the study population.....185
Table 4. 2 Membership of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees.....205
Table 4. 3 Awareness of the Role of LPCs ..... **Error! Bookmark not defined.**
Table 4. 4 Awareness of other peacebuilding Policies regularly 215
Table 4.5 Whether LPC Have Structures… ……..….223
Table 4. 6 Conflict analysis undertaken by LPCs 226
Table 5. 1: Entities that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborate with 286
Table 5. 2 Youth engagement in maintaining peace in Mombasa County.....298
Table 5. 3: Whether strategies for peacebuilding have been successful 318
Table 6. 1 Ability of DPC to undertake duties as specified in their terms of reference.....356

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2. 1: The Big Picture of Conflict Transformation……..….151
Figure 2.2 Conceptual Model Showing interaction of variables.....161
Figure 3. 1 Map of Mombasa County 167
Figure 4. 1 Description of LPC membership ..... **Error! Bookmark not defined.**
Figure 4.2 Respondents' Understanding of the role of Peacebuilding Committees .....**Error! Bookmark not defined.**
Figure 4. 3 Training of Members of peacebuilding committees .....**Error! Bookmark not defined.**
Figure 4.4 Causes of Conflict in Mombasa County……..…228
Figure 4.5 The WaBara Phenomenon…… …….255
Figure 5. 1 Strategies for maintaining peace during conflict in Mombasa County.....**Error! Bookmark not defined.**
Figure 5. 2 Peacebuilding strategies during times of no Conflict ..271**Error! Bookmark not defined.**
Figure 5. 3 Conduct of Regular Peacebuilding Education 281
Figure 5. 4 Collaboration with other peacebuilding Stakeholders 285
Figure 5. 5. Areas of collaboration.....289
Figure 5. 6 Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaboration with law enforcement for peacebuilding activities 311
Figure 5. 7 DPC Collaboration with Law Enforcement Agencies 31311
Figure 6. 1 Support to Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees by all stakeholders in Mombasa County 328
Figure 6. 2 Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees lack of sufficient financial resources for peacebuilding activities 333
Figure 6. 3 DPC Members' perception of sources of funding.....337
Figure 6. 4 Internal Inefficiencies of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees.....342
Figure 6. 5. Environmental Challenges facing Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees....347

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix 1. 1 Consent Form 460
Appendix 1. 2:Local Peace Committee Questionnaire (County and Sub-county).....461
Appendix 1. 3:Observation Checklist 477
Appendix 1. 4: Focus Group Guide.....479
Appendix 1. 5 Key Informant Interview Guide 4800
Appendix 1. 6 Approval letter by DPS (MMUST) 482
Appendix 1. 7:NACOSTI Research Lisence.....483
Appendix 1.8 Research Authorization from County Government of Mombasa.....484
Appendix 1. 9: Research Authorization from Mombasa County Director of Education 485

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACM	Authoritarian conflict management
ALRMP	Arid Lands Resource Management Project
ANC	African National Congress
APSA	Africa Peace and Security Architecture
AU	Africa Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CDI	Conflict Dynamics International
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWERU	Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit
CEWS	The African Union Continental Early Warning System
CIPK	Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CREDO	Constitution & Reform Education Consortium
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration

DFID	Department for International Development
DPC	District Peace Committee
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DTF	District Task Force
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Cease-Fire Operation Monitoring Operation Group
ECPF	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
EWER	Early warning and early response
FEWER	Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IMPACT	Initiative to Measure Peace and Conflict Outcomes
ILO	International Labour Organization
IPPSHAR	IGAD Promoting Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa Region
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KECOSCE	Kenya Community Support Centre
KMYA	Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance

KNDR	Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation process
LICODEP	Likoni Development Programme
LPCs	Local Peace Committees
MI-PAREC	Ministry for Peace Under the Cross
MMR	Mixed Methods Research
MoPR	Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation (Nepal)
MOSPAIS	Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
MUHURI	Muslims for Human Rights
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NCPBC	National Cohesion and Peace Building Commission
NPA	National Peace Accord
NPBC	National Peace Building Commission
NPPBCM	National Policy on Peace-Building and Conflict Management
NSC	National Steering Committee on Conflict Management and Peacebuilding
OAU	Organization of African Unity

ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD/DAC	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development /Development Assistance Committee
PBCR	Peace Building and Reconciliation Program
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PEV	Post-Election Violence
PSC	Peace and Security Council
RECs	Regional Economic entities
RMs	Regional Mechanisms
RWPL	Rural Women Peace Link
SADC	South Africa Development Corporation
SADES-K	Safeguarding Democratic Space in Kenya
TJRC	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
TJR	Truth Justice and Reconciliation
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Africa Mission in Somalia
UNPBC	United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United Stated Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
VE	Violent Extremism
WPDC	Wajir Peace and Development Committee

OPERATIONALSATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

The following concepts have been operationally defined in the context of the subject under study as follows:

Dynamics of peacebuilding; in this study refers to the factors that interact to cause changes in the peacebuilding agenda of Mombasa County, including the influence of the National Peacebuilding Policy, the range and effectiveness of peacebuilding strategies employed and the challenges and opportunities for peacebuilding. Peacebuilding dynamics are also influenced by perceptions of the community about their conflicts, the role of policy makers and the interaction between the two.

Conflict: in this study will mean situation in which the desired end or preferred outcomes appear to be incompatible between two parties. In Mombasa County, conflict operates at different levels of society, that is, the family unit, the neighbourhoods, the village/ward level and at the county level. Conflict is also seen the inter-community level where communities of different ethnic background engage in conflict of politicised ethnicity and competition for resources, especially land.

Conflict Early Warning: this study adopts the 2009 OECD/DAC definition which reads, "Early warning is a process that (a) alerts decision makers to the potential outbreak, escalation and resurgence of violent conflict; and (b) promotes an understanding among decision makers of the nature and impacts of violent conflict" (Nyheim, 2015). In Mombasa County conflict early warning is undertaken to help the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to sense and report on potential conflict and also as part of

the national conflict early warning system which is reported to County and National administration

Conflict Management: implies the employment of appropriate strategies of the District Peace Committees to prevent and overcome any causes of conflict in Mombasa County.

Formal Peacebuilding Infrastructure: implies the local peace committees that have been established and which are functioning under the direct supervision of the Government through the County Commissioner and their sub-county officials. These entities are subject to the National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (Sessional Paper No. 5 of 2014). They are also referred to as District Peace Committees (Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees)

an interest in the peace of the community

Kenya's Infrastructure for Peace (I4P): refers to the network of government, civil society and community institutions that operate at the national and local levels to promote peace and reconciliation. This included Local- Peace Committees, Sub-county Peace Committees, National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC) the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC).

Local peacebuilding: refers to peacebuilding initiatives owned and led by people in their context, whether initiated by locals or organisations that have an interest in the peace of the local area.

Mombasa Peacebuilding Infrastructure: the term applies to the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees that are currently functional in Mombasa County. These are Nyali DPC, Kisauni DPC, Mvita DPC, Likoni DPC, Changamwe DPC and Jomvu DPC.

Peace: means the absence of violent conflict in the County communities of Mombasa.

Peacebuilding: in this study peacebuilding refers to initiatives that foster and support sustainable structures and processes, strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence

and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation of violent conflict, and foster harmonious co-existence in Mombasa County. In some references, peacebuilding is operationalised as an approach that recognizes the need for reconciliation and conflict resolution. It is proactive in dealing with conflict, rather than reactive.

Peacebuilding Capacity: refers to the technical ability of peace committees at all levels to undertake peacebuilding activities, as demonstrated by the ability of the members of the peace committees and materials available to them to carry out peace activities in Mombasa County.

Peacebuilding Strategy: means the method or combination of methods applied by Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, SPCs and LPCs to achieve desired peace outcomes in Mombasa County.

Peacebuilding Challenges: refers to the obstacles that hinder the development of self-sustaining and durable peace in Mombasa County.

Peacebuilding Opportunities: in this study it means, the set of circumstances, events or deliberate occasions set up in order to facilitate peacebuilding in Mombasa County. Peacebuilding opportunities arise from events such as public *Barazas*, ad hoc community meetings or organised festivals. Circumstances such security operations have also been used as peacebuilding opportunities in Mombasa County.

Preventive Diplomacy: this study adopted the United Nation's definition of Preventive Diplomacy, as the use of diplomatic channels to prevent disagreements from becoming violent clashes and to contain violent conflicts when they do break out.

Policy Framework: meaning a statute or other formal arrangement that gives an LPC the primary responsibility and authority to carry out peacebuilding activities. The National

Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management recognises the importance of institutional arrangements for peacebuilding and delineates certain processes, functions, and responsibilities for all peacebuilding actors

Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, refers to locally based conflict transformation institutions formed in Kenya's Sub-counties. Before the promulgation of Kenya's new Constitution in 2010 these entities were known as District Peace Committees, abbreviated as DPCs, a term that is still in use. Therefore, DPC shall mean Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees.

Sustainable Peace, in this study refers the activities that eliminate the possibility of an outbreak, escalation or continuation of conflict. This study adopts the UN General Assembly resolution 2282 of April 2016 which states that 'sustaining peace' is a 'goal and a process that builds a common vision of a society, encompasses the needs of all segments of the population through activities that preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict (UN Security Council Res. 2282 (27 April 2016)

Sustainable Peacebuilding: in this study is defined as approaches that are capable of reconciling multiple, simultaneous and often contradicting demands for peace and that aim at long-term dividends of peace rather than short-term stabilisation.

C HAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the background of the study is presented, the problem statement elaborated, and the study objectives and the corresponding research questions raised. The chapter also provides the study justifications and scope. It ends with a chapter summary of the main arguments raised.

1.1. Background to the Study

To deal effectively with peacebuilding, many countries have put in place systems and mechanisms to serve as vehicles for peacebuilding at national and sub-national level. These entities are known generally as local peacebuilding committees (LPCs). Globally, the role of these local peacebuilding entities is to support peacebuilding efforts in their communities using different approaches in the management conflict. Olivier & Odendaal, cited in Issifu (2016) posit that the role of LPCs, is designed to promote and enable participatory peace making and peacebuilding processes at the level of a district, municipality, town, or hamlet. Depending on how they came to be, LPCs may use advocacy, mediation, negotiation, agreement, consensus building, awareness raising, capacity development in the community, or even empowerment strategies to deal with conflict (Issifu, 2016; Nganje, 2021).

Kenya's peacebuilding agenda has benefitted from a long history of local peacebuilding committees; however, it was the unprecedented post-election violence of 2007/8 and the subsequent signing of the National Accord that gave new impetus to Kenya's local peacebuilding entities. Under agenda four (4) of the National Accord, several reforms were undertaken including

the revamping of the National Secretariat for Peace Building and Conflict Management (known as the National Steering Committee-NSC) with a mandate to coordinate peacebuilding and conflict management interventions in Kenya. This process led to the drafting of the National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (2015) and the emergence of a stronger national peace architecture in which local Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees (in some cases they are still referred to as DPCs) took the front seat. The Government issued an order that every County and Sub-county should have a peacebuilding entity, and if possible all the way to the smallest administrative unit. The composition of local peacebuilding entities as required by the new political dispensation (Constitution of Kenya, 2010) brought new dynamics that have increased the visibility of the local peacebuilding entities, but perhaps not their efficiency.

The NSC then elaborated the National Policy on Peace-Building and Conflict Management (NPBCM 2010) which put emphasis on community-driven peace processes. In accordance with the new policy, representatives from communities, civil society, and the government would collaborate to prevent a variety of conflicts, such as those involving resources, religion, international borders, and wildlife, in a way that was participatory, sensitive to cultural differences, open to scrutiny, and accountable (Kioko 2016; Issifu, 2016). However, despite this seemingly clear mandate, questions about their true value in peacebuilding remains unexplored and unclarified. The main problem with these entities seems to emanate from their rapid formation, without any needs assessment being done. Many were small entities that were rapidly transformed into Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees without the requisite review of the nature of peace in their counties. In the case of Mombasa County, where long-drawn conflicts persist, there is no clear evidence of the increase in peace in the County (Kioko, 2016). Rakodi *et al* (2000) who trace

conflict in Mombasa since the arrival of the early Portuguese explorers argue that the root-causes of conflict in the County remain unaddressed.

Academic interest is now growing in this area with the main question being; what is the potential of these entities in fostering sustainable peacebuilding, be they informal (Chopra, 2008; Mungai *et al,* 2020; Adan, 2020) or formal (Ernstorfer, 2018; Nganje, 2021; Muigua, 2021). As earlier noted, these entities are supposed to work in inclusive peace making and peacebuilding processes. How effectively can they do this? The new set up of local peacebuilding entities under the National Policy on Peace-Building and Conflict Management (NPBCM 2010) has raised policy, operational and programmatic questions, which form the basis of this research.

The development and launching of the National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (2015), and the Standard Guidelines and Terms of Reference for Peace Structures (revised in 2016) set a new direction in Kenya's peacebuilding agenda for the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. These entities that were hitherto seen as part of the county administration became the focus of county, sub-county and even ward level peacebuilding. However, the effectiveness of these entities in fostering sustainable peacebuilding remains opaque because of the manner in which they operate, and also because little has been done by way of evaluating their work.

One of the earliest reviews of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees conducted by Okumu (2010) found out that the impetus for establishing peace committees was the desire to deal with recurrent conflicts in Kenya. Before 2010, the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were known as

District Peacebuilding Committees (DPCs) and were almost exclusively composed of well-known and reputable persons in their communities (business people, church leaders and community notables) and retired civil servants (Okumu, 2010). Their moral standing in their communities gave them the power to push the peace agenda and, in some cases, this worked very well (Nganje, 2021; Chivasa, 2022). However, can these entities really foster sustainable peacebuilding in their communities? Van Tongeren (2012) avers that local peace committees (LPCs) have had an influence on local communities in many sectarian strife nations by reducing violence, resolving communal issues, and enabling local stakeholders to become peacebuilders. If this is so, can their work translate into a national peacebuilding agenda? These questions remain as more and more countries embrace the idea of national infrastructures for peace.

Before narrowing down on the work of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, an understanding of how peacebuilding is conceived and understood is necessary and is tackled in the next section of this chapter.

1.1.1 The Conceptual Understanding of Peacebuilding

The conceptual understanding of peacebuilding is credited to Galtung whose works in the 1970s pioneered the academic interest in this field. Galtung coined the term "peacebuilding" in his work "Three Approaches to Peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding" to differentiate the different phases and manifestations of peace. According to Galtung, the concept of peacebuilding is all-encompassing and includes, generates, and supports the complete range of procedures, strategies, and phases required to turn conflict into more enduring, peaceful relationships. Galtung further identified peace in terms of "negative peace", which is defined as the absence of violence

or war and “positive peace” which he saw as the integration of human society and removal of structures that perpetuate conflict. Arguing that peacemaking and peacekeeping are elements of maintaining peace without addressing the root causes (and therefore gaining negative peace), Galtung proposes that peacebuilding is essentially an associative approach to conflict and can help address the direct, structural and cultural causes of violence, and can therefore be seen as a movement towards positive peace (Cravo, 2017).

The modern definition of peacebuilding is consequently an effort to establish a lasting peace by addressing the "root causes" of violent conflict and mobilizing local capacities for peaceful conflict management and resolution. This view is further elaborated by Lederach *et al* (2007:9) state that;

> peacebuilding is the development of constructive personal, group, and political relationships across ethnic, religious, class, national, and racial boundaries. It aims to resolve injustice in nonviolent ways and to transform the structural conditions that generate deadly conflict. Conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and transformation, and post-conflict reconciliation are all part of peacebuilding (Lederach et al 2007:9)

The idea that peacebuilding must be fundamentally transformative has driven new scholarship in this area, because of the belief that peacebuilding must touch the core of social life, politically, economically and culturally. There is also both programmatic and academic agreement that peacebuilding is a long-term endeavour that must take a long-term position in any intervention. In this regard, Matanga, cited in Okoth *et al* (2018) summarises this idea by stating that peacebuilding,

> therefore, becomes a long-term and a phased process that entails the entrenchment of fundamental structural changes in society that reduce, if not eliminate, causes and symptoms of social injustice in society (Matanga, 2018:17)

The realisation that peacebuilding interventions were not building the peace set in motion a series of introspective works within the United Nations and other stakeholder on what could be done differently. In the words of Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding, "sustaining peace" means,

> to move beyond looking at peace and conflict in a sectorial way, instead, it advocates more flexible, content appropriate and demand-driven approaches, while acknowledging peacebuilding as a political activity that must avoid templates, formulas and one-size-fits-all solutions. Sustaining peace also requires breaking silos and combatting fragmentation at the intergovernmental, strategic and operational levels including in the field; further exploring the interlinkages between the political and security, development and human rights pillars…" (Global Peace Operations Review, 2016, accessed from the internet on August 5 2021).

With the gradual waning of the Westerner domination in global affairs, and the rise of a new axis of power, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), a new pragmatism is taking shape, and along with it many of the issues that were previously dominated by the West (Armijo, 2007). The new line of thinking that is now gaining momentum in peacebuilding is the "Adaptive Peacebuilding" which has been advanced by de Coning (2018). In this new era, the old liberal thinking that peace is achieved and sustained by the Western democratic and free-market approach has been debunked and instead, de Coning (2018) proposes that countries should be assisted to sustain their peace processes by strengthening the resilience of local social institutions, and by investing in social cohesion. In this regard, donors, including the UN and international

peacebuilders, make a collective effort to engage in a structured process of conflict prevention and sustaining the peace by focusing on local institutions (de Coning, 2018).

This approach has rekindled previous arguments in which various scholars have called for a different approach to peacebuilding, with the understanding that peacebuilding is not solely a technical matter to be solved with a well-designed project with inputs and outputs, but a political problem which must be solved politically. This is what Galtung (1976) refers to as “social integration” and Lederach (2003) refers to as “the understanding of underlying relational and structural patterns". De Coning (2018) continues to make the case that the adaptive peacebuilding strategy is one of process facilitation, stimulating those social processes that promote self-organization and increase societal resilience. As a practical application of facilitative peacebuilding, the USAID "People-to-People" (P2P) approach to peacebuilding is an example. It must be understood that the P2P approach recognises that creating better understanding does not imply an agreement between parties, but a realization of the existence of different experiences and perceptions, which need not be antagonistic.

De Coning concludes by arguing that the “Adaptive Peacebuilding” approach must recognise that there are limitations in every approach, especially as complex as peacebuilding. The tools that are available for peacebuilding such as conflict analysis and needs assessments may not always yield the full understanding of the situation but are a good place to start. Just as important, peacebuilding should not be seen in terms of “success” or “failure” but as a continuous process which adapts to situations as society evolves (learning and continuous adaptation). Citing Ricigliano, de Coning (2018) states that,

> you never win in peacebuilding in the sense that you can declare victory and stop investing in sustaining peace. You can achieve and celebrate milestones along the way, but we need to recognize that these are always potentially reversible. Moving away from focusing on 'problems' and 'solutions' enables peacebuilders to focus on the quality and sustainability of the engagement with the communities and stakeholders necessary to sustain the peace (de Coning, 2018:313).

The foregoing discussions raise more questions than answers in the conceptual and understanding of peacebuilding. The classical understanding of peacebuilding is that it is part of a continuum which starts with peacemaking, followed by peacekeeping, and then peacebuilding. This rather simplified view may serve as a framework but does not represent the reality of peace. In many instances, societies may be undergoing different conflicts at with manifestations and periodicity and therefore all these components of peace may be undertaken at the same time. The boundaries between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are not always as clear-cut as suggested by Galtung's three approaches model. This is even more problematic for societies that have been in conflict over a long period of time.

1.1.2 The Emergence of Formal Local Peacebuilding Committees and Infrastructures for Peace.

Historically, local peacebuilding committees have functioned as informal spaces where villagers meet, discuss and resolve their conflicts by applying a range of traditional, bottom-up methods of peacebuilding (Mungai *et al,* 2020). These structures still function in the same manner, however, the realisation by national Governments that these entities were a viable partner in peacebuilding led to their rapid formalisation and co-option into Government peace and structures. This was the case of Kenya's Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) which originally came out of

the desire to strengthen social cohesion of local communities in search for sustainable peace, but later got absorbed into the Wajir County peacebuilding agenda (Nganje, 2020). Formal peacebuilding committees are therefore local peacebuilding institutions that have been accorded Government recognition and either coopted into formal Government peace and security systems or supported to foster peacebuilding on their own. Over time, local peacebuilding committees have expanded and formed networks that are now known as the national infrastructures for peace (I4P).

Kumar, referenced in Giessmann (2016) defines I4P as a network of interdependent systems, resources, values, and abilities shared by institutions from the public sector, the private sector, and the community that foster consultation and dialogue, avert conflict, and enable peaceful resolution of disputes when societal violence arises. Van Tongeren, mentioned in Giessmann (2016), on the other hand, views I4P as dialogue-driven and cooperative problem-solving methods to conflict within societies, employing institutional structures that are suitable for each country's culture at the local, district, and national levels. The key to the I4P debate is the recognition that sustainable peacebuilding is dependent on functioning institutions that have the ability to broker, realise and sustain the peace. In this debate, Giessmann (2016) argues that Local Peace Committees such as Kenya's DPC and other peace structures at the local level stand the best chance.

In Kenya, like in other parts of Africa, local peace committees arose from the desires of local communities to respond and manage conflict amongst themselves. In many instances, as was the case of Wajir County, it was the continued conflict and the poor response by the national Government that led to the formation of an informal structure for local peacebuilding which later became a huge and formal peacebuilding and security structure after the Government took it over

in 1995 (Ndegwa, 2001). The formation of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) started when a group of local market women, reacting to the persistent conflict that affected their communities came together and started to strategise on how to bring peace to their communities. They started informal meetings to discuss peace and over time they invited men and other members of the community to join. Before long, the seemingly innocuous meeting gathered steam and became a proper peacebuilding committee giving voice to women, youth and elders in matters of peace in Wajir (Ndegwa, 2001; Åkerdahl, 2013; Konde, 2019; Nganje, 2021)

The Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) has been cited as the perfect example of a local peacebuilding entity that arose out of the community in response to recurrent violent conflict that had virtually crippled local life in Wajir County. Through persistent effort and careful inclusion of warring parties, and adoption of different voices, Wajir Peace Initiative eventually spurred a county-wide program of local peacebuilding entities that are to be found in all parts of Kenya. The growth of the local peace infrastructure in Kenya has been credited to this initiative. Local peace infrastructures can grow out of a felt need of the people affected by conflict, or out of Government policy in that direction.

Peacebuilding in Wajir County, however, can be described only as work in progress. Much still needs to be done to ensure that there is sustainable peacebuilding in Wajir County. Abdi (2015) in a review article for the Crisis Group (an international NGO working in peacebuilding) notes that the breed of peacemakers that the Wajir Peace and Development Committee relied on; the *Al-Fatah* Council of Elders is dying off because of age and are not being replaced by the same caliber of peacebuilders. *Al-Fatah* has been usurped into the new County Peace Forum (CPF), which is a

60-member council of elders, but which has no equal respect or experience that the *Al-Fatah* commanded. Karienye and Warfa (2020) note that the underlying causes of conflict in the County, that is, clannism, political influence, constituency boundaries, unequal sharing of county resources and competition over water and pasture are still persistent, and therefore peacebuilding is still a major challenge. Unless these issues are addressed fully, peacebuilding in the County will still be unsustainable.

For instance, the National Peace Accord (NPA) that was signed in South Africa in 1991 supported the creation of a national network of peace committees that were tasked with promoting discussion, fostering tolerance, and resolving conflict through problem-solving and mediation techniques Nganje (2021). Whether instantaneous as in Wajir or policy directed, as was the case in South Africa, local peacebuilding entities have borrowed heavily from traditional forms of conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Africa. This has therefore made it easier for the authorities to institute such structures because they are not an entirely new phenomenon in African societies.

Peacebuilding in today's South Africa is still challenged by its legacy of apartheid which institutionalised structural violence through racism and economic domination of the minority whites over the majority indigenous people. The country is implemented a foreign policy agenda of peacebuilding through contributing to African peacebuilding initiatives (Nyunykonge, 2017), but domestically as noted by Spies (2002) peacebuilding is carried out by the National Peace Committee and Secretariat, the 11 Regional Peace Committees and 263 Local Peace Committees, supported by some 18,000 peace monitors. The Secretariat is the creation of the National Peace

Accord (NPA) which brought an end to violence and a political settlement (also known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa CODESA) (Spies, 2002)

The South African Secretariat is implementing the National Peace Campaign (NPC) which has greatly contributed to peacebuilding in South Africa, but not addressed the problems of apartheid, factionalism and the culture of ethnicised political violence under the so-called self defence units in the townships. For both Kenya and South Africa, Government and civil society involvement in peacebuilding is strong and in some cases is the main player. However, while in South Africa the National Peace Committee and Secretariat is an implementer, with its own Peace Monitors, the Kenyan NSC is simply a coordinating body and much of the peacebuilding management left for the County Commissioners and their staff, all the way to the Ward level. Kenya has no national campaign comparable to the South African National Peace Campaign, even though the *Uwiano* Platform is a national campaign. So, while the two programs, cannot be compared, each has been designed to meet its own stated needs at the country level. The South African NPA seems to be more coordinated because of running one national campaign, in comparison to NSC which has no national campaign.

Literature on local peacebuilding in Kenya points to two distinct but complementary systems (Muigua, 2021). On the one hand is the civil society-led local peacebuilding systems which has been in operation for a long time. Here, faith-based organisations, NGOs (both local and foreign), Youth Groups, Women's Groups and other special interest groups have been leading the work of peacebuilding in Kenya. Some of their initiatives have been big enough even to absorb part of Government as their partners. These peacebuilding entities far predate the formal peacebuilding

structures in Kenya (Siangole, 2020; Elfversson, 2016; Konde, 2019). The formal Government-led, security-oriented local peace committees (LPCs) which are based in County, Sub-county and Ward administration structures are a later entry, most of which came into being after the 2007/8 post-election violence (Muigwa, 2019; Githaiga, 2020). It is instructive to note that these structures have collaborated in their efforts of peacebuilding. All these entities, whether formal or informal have enjoyed considerable support from the local and international community, for example, the UN, World Bank, EU and other bilateral organisations such as USAID, DFID, DANIDA, JICA, SIDA and also international NGOs, for example, Peace Direct and AFCS. Faith-based peacebuilding has been a strong feature in Kenya, led by NCCK, Catholic Church and now increasingly by SUPKEM.

Even with about 235 formal LPCs working at the Sub-county level in Kenya, and many more informal peacebuilding infrastructures in support, the literature suggests that the country still has serious peacebuilding challenges. At the operational level, local peacebuilding structures have been judged as weak in conceptualising and executing peacebuilding strategies. At the structural level, the process of institutionalisation has threatened local agency, and introduced a top-down relationship that has disempowered the local peace committees (Githaiga, 2020). Basing their argument on the loss of control, Githaiga, citing Magotsi (2014) asserts that institutionalisation limits the authority of local level engagement thereby reducing the degree of sustainability of the intervention. Local peacebuilding structures have been affected by a lack of resources. While the Kenyan NSC seems to have placed very high expectations on the LPCs, the entities remain under resources and therefore weak in terms of operational capacity. Furthermore, as Nganje (2020) notes, these organizations lack enforcement skills and are best useful in the context of low-key

community problems that may be resolved through negotiation, mediation, or other problem-solving techniques.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Mombasa County poses a major peacebuilding challenge for Kenya, and the East African region because of its long history of conflict and economic importance to Kenya and the East African region. Rakodi *et al* (2020) have argued that conflict dynamics are structural in nature. The introduction of Government-supported Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees to drive community-led peacebuilding does not seem to have contributed to peacebuilding (National Steering Committee (NSC), 2010; Rakodi *et al*, 2020; County Government of Mombasa, 2020). The problem of sustainable peacebuilding remains, hence the need to identify and interrogate the dynamics that contribute to this problem.

1.3 Research Objectives

The general objective of the study was to investigate the dynamics of the formal peacebuilding infrastructure that motivate the implementation of sustainable peacebuilding by the formal peace infrastructure in Mombasa County . The specific objectives were to:

i. Examine the influence of the Kenya National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management framework on the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa County.
ii. Evaluate the strategies applied by the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in fostering peacebuilding for sustainable peace in Mombasa County.

iii. Identify and evaluate the operational challenges and opportunities for sustainable peacebuilding through the work of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa County.

1.4 Research Questions

The study was guided by the following research questions:

i. How does the existing policy framework influence Mombasa's formal peacebuilding infrastructure in convening, advocacy, dialogue and networking for sustainable peace?

ii. Why are the strategies employed by the peacebuilding infrastructure in fostering sustainable peace efforts in Mombasa County able or unable to foster sustainable peacebuilding?

iii. How do the identified operational challenges impact the peacebuilding infrastructure's ability to maximise opportunities to foster sustainable peacebuilding efforts in Mombasa County?

1.5 Justification of the study.

The study of peacebuilding in Kenya has grown in the last five years, covering both formal and informal peacebuilding entities, but the literature is still small, in comparison to other areas of interest such as peacekeeping, security sector reforms and peacemaking. The assumption that there is a direct relationship between peacebuilding activities and actual peace in societies has been questioned by several scholars. Citing the case of Liberia, Shilue and Fagen (2014) argue that the inadequate response to problems that were created by the civil war between 1989-2003 greatly reduced the potential for lasting peace in that country. Similarly, Bowd and Chikwanha (2010)

argue that perhaps the biggest challenge in Africa today is to design successful policy responses that support a long-term peacebuilding agenda.

In Kenya, having developed its own peacebuilding policy in 2010, the question as to whether this policy been beneficial to support sustainable peacebuilding is yet to be answered. What is more, a survey of the literature reveals that peacebuilding strategies applied across the country seem to address the symptoms rather than root causes of conflict. Rohwerder (2015) has pointed to persistent problems such as social fragmentation, the use ethnic affiliation for political mobilisation, corruption, impunity and inequity in land ownership and emerging extremism as issues that continue to hamper peace. The question to be answered is whether Kenya's peacebuilding policy has in any way ameliorated any of these problems.

Given the presence of all these issues raised by Rohwerder (2015) in Mombasa County, the areas becomes as good study area to try and answer these questions. Some literature directly concerned with local peacebuilding in Mombasa County include; NSC (2010), review of local peacebuilding entities in Mombasa; a Conflict Analysis Report commissioned by DANIDA's Peace, Security and Stability (PSS) Programme-Kenya 2016-2020; a research paper done by Mohamed (2015) on the Underlying Dynamics of Al-Shabaab's Recruitment of Muslim Youth. These works have analysed different pieces of peacebuilding but not delved into the interface between policy and strategies as tools for sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County.

1.5.1 Academic Justification

Academic interest in peacebuilding is justified by the fact that research fulfils a very important concern which is to bridge the gap between practice and the conceptualisation of peacebuilding interventions. This is important when considering the question of local level peacebuilding because the efforts of peacebuilding are supposed to percolate and make a difference at the grassroots level. The truth of this theory can only be ascertained by research and academic evaluation. When it comes to local peacebuilding committees, much emphasis has been put in the bottom-up advantage of local peacebuilding approaches as opposed top-down to the programs supported by international peacebuilding organisations. There is still a wide gap in the literature in understanding the dynamics that either link or sperate these two approaches, and whether a hybrid of the two could foster sustainable peacebuilding (Neufeldt *et al* (2020).

This study set out to fill this gap by examining the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees from a policy framework perspective in order to fill this gap in the academic literature. The study further examined the peacebuilding strategies used by the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees from the angle of prescription or necessity in order to arrive at a more accurate assessment of the efficacy of these entities. By putting these two aspects of Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees assessment, the study hoped to fill this academic gap in the study of peace and conflict studies. Moreover, Paffenholz (2021) has argued that the assumption of cause-effect problem-solving approaches to peacebuilding is now obsolete, because peacebuilding has so many moving parts that it cannot follow a linear route. Mombasa County offers an opportunity for testing some of these assumptions because old and new threats to peace have converged to make the County a peacebuilding challenge. Emerging literature is demonstrating that peacebuilding does not follow

a conventional line, from violence to negotiations, to an agreement which is then implemented. This realisation of the dynamism of peacebuilding needs to be continuously interrogated, hence the need for tenacious academic interest in peacebuilding.

1.5.2 Philosophical Justification

An African proverb credited to the Somali people says that *"the best bed that a man can sleep on is peace".* The proverb reflects a community's philosophical approach to peace and likens peace to a state of tranquility, in which, even though sleep may increase a person's vulnerability, peace makes it possible for one to sleep. The analogy of the bed connotes a culture of peace in which the society cultivates a broad consensus of peace which allows hope to turn into trust. The question then becomes; can local peacebuilding foster a culture of peace? A culture of peace has been debated by, among others, de Rivera (2004), who argues that a culture of peace demands the following conditions; education for the peaceful resolution of conflict, eradication of poverty, reduction of inequalities, and environmental sustainability, tolerance, free flow of information and democratic participation. In pursuing a culture of peace through Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees, the National Government has put in place the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management which envisions a Kenyan peacebuilding architecture in which all stakeholders have an equal say in their peace through equitable participation.

This rather susceptible view of peacebuilding falters in the face of the realities of peacebuilding within Kenyan communities. A culture of peace does not assume the non-existence of conflict, but rather a consistent and sustainable way of ensuring that conflicts do not become violent by instituting mechanisms, both formal and informal that ensure that these conflicts do not escalate

into violence (Ericksun, 2021). However, Bar-Tal (2009) argues that the challenge for the culture of peace is to be found in the temporary resolution of conflict through approaches like mediation and negotiation and the lack true reconciliation that changes societal view of conflict. Reconciliation in peacebuilding has been applied in many countries through Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in places like South Africa, Chile, Canada, El Salvador, Sierra Leone and while they have supported national healing, their successes have been questioned on account of failing to reconcile people through missed opportunities to hold criminals accountable and in some cases dismissing mass crimes as social ills (Stanley, 2001). This study attempted to view Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa as one way of building a culture for peace given the long history of conflict in the County.

1.5.3 Policy Justification

Kenya has developed and is implementing the National Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Policy of 2011. The optimistic argument in the policy document is that a multi-sectoral, multi-pronged approach to peacebuilding will somehow guarantee a peaceful nation. At the same time, Mombasa County has elaborated its policy framework for preventing and countering violent extremism, (MCAP/PCVE) based on the Kenya National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) by the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). Both policies need to be informed by credible knowledge of the efficacy of the peacebuilding infrastructure in the county. Kenya has been a beneficiary of foreign assistance in its peacebuilding efforts for a long time, starting from the UN, and the EU and from bilateral such as USAID, DfID. The interest from international benefactors comes with intended and unintended consequences, which at times distorts policy. For, example, the UN has been criticized and praised in equal measure for the intended and

unintended outcomes of peacebuilding (Tschigri, 2004; Gisselquist, 2018). This also explored the perspectives of Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees regarding partnerships and how these arrangements either supported or hindered their work.

1.6 Scope of the study

The study examined the dynamics of the formal peacebuilding infrastructure, and how these combine to influence the attainment of sustainable peace in Mombasa County. The period covered under the study is 2010-2021 because this is the time when most of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees came into being, under the new terms of reference issued by the National Steering Committee. Data collection was done on various dates between August 2021 and February 2022. Mombasa County provides an excellent opportunity for interrogating sustainable peacebuilding approaches given its long history of conflict and elaborate attempts at sustainable peacebuilding. As has already been alluded to, the county has serious challenges with politically motivated conflicts, a serious and increasing problem with youth radicalisation and an internationalised illegal drugs trafficking problem (Rakodi, 2000; Kahuthia-Gatu *et al* 2013).

The study focused on both positive and negative aspects of peace because much of the work done under Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees result in the quelling of conflict in the communities without necessarily addressing the underlying causes of the problem. However, the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees also proactively address underlying causes of conflict and therefore can be said to be addressing some elements of positive peace. Herath (2016) in identifying the manifestations of negative peace posits that efforts to achieve negative peace usually emphasise on controlling, containing, and reducing actual and potential violence or war through temporary

means. Negative peace addresses immediate symptoms rather than the long-term. While some of the work delineated for Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees touches on pursuit of justice for peacebuilding, the bulk of their work is to support maintain peace under the status quo, thereby focusing on managing conflict rather than tackling underlying causes of conflict. That said, the work of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees is primarily that of prevention, even though this role is mixed with some conflict resolution responsibilities but at the end of the day, these committees are seen as successful only if there is no conflict in their areas of work. This study is therefore to be seen in light of conflict prevention which is the first phase of peacebuilding.

Geographically, the study covered all the six sub-counties (that is, Mvita, Changamwe, Likoni, Kisauni, Jomvu and Nyali) all of which have an active LPC, functioning under the County Peace and Security framework. There are thirty Ward Peace Committees that work with an elaborate number of non-governmental and grass-roots peace initiatives focusing on general peacebuilding, prevention of youth radicalisation, and women's and household peace participation. It is instructive to note however that the tourism industry is vulnerable to problems many issues such as political instability, terrorism, economic downturns and industrial actions. In such cases loss of jobs means increased poverty and this cascades into insecurity as people turn to illegal activities to make a living (Muna, 2017; Akama, 1999).

1.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter set the stage for this study. The chapter has traced the origins of peacebuilding as a concept and as a practice and narrows down to definitional and conceptual problems in the ever-changing arena of peacebuilding. The chapter has delved into the background of the study,

statement of the problem, research objectives as well as research questions. It has also explicated the study justification, academic, policy and philosophy as well as the scope of the study. It concludes that because peacebuilding draws from many disciplines, it is perhaps better to view it as a growing science but one that requires studies that are more empirical to develop some theories. The stage of the scope of the study is set, which will be explored in chapter two, which is the literature review. A key lesson coming out of the chapter is that while Mombasa County is a potential hotbed for conflict due to socio-political factors, it is also a place for concerted peacebuilding that needs to be studied and properly documented. This therefore, leads to reviewing the relevant literature with the view to identifying gaps, the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews the literature on peacebuilding in line with the stated specific objectives of the study. The review is presented from the global, regional and national perspectives according to the identified peacebuilding approaches. Identified approaches are: Policy Frameworks, Peacebuilding Strategies and, Challenges to Sustainable Peacebuilding. The chapter presents the literature from a critical point of view, by drawing different viewpoints on how policies influence the outcomes of local peacebuilding. The chapter also presents the conceptual framework underpinned by several frameworks; Johan Galtung's Theory of Peacebuilding and Structural Violence Theory; Lederach's Conflict Transformation Theory and the Infrastructure for Peace conceptual framework, which is emerging as another way of understanding the role of peace structures in supporting sustainable peacebuilding.

2.1 Policy Frameworks motivating Sustainable Peacebuilding.

All peacebuilding interventions are usually undertaken under some form of policy perspective, whether written specifically for peacebuilding or whether riding on other existing policies. The development of policy is a complex process that does not have a particular format or a predictable direction (Koduah *et al*, 2015). The influence of policy is however immutable because policies provide guidance, consistency, accountability, efficiency and clarity on an organisation's role in a particular matter and essentially ensure that not part of an issue is left to chance. The history of policy development in Africa, in all aspects of socioeconomic development, is however strongly influenced by, among other things, politics, finance and donors (Koduah *et al*, 2015).

A report of the Life and Peace Institute, edited by Connolly et al (2020) posits that the global peacebuilding space is best described by the existence of policy frameworks and processes which have been used to implement peacebuilding interventions. It is assumed that policy should provide guidance, consistency, accountability, efficiency and clarity, but this assumption has not been evident in conflict countries as many of them struggle under weak institutional frameworks to implement peacebuilding activities. Citing the case of Kosovo, Eckhard and Dijkstra (2017) demonstrate how donor influence and weak internal systems can distort the outcomes of peacebuilding because of contested mandates, poor national control and inability to meet competing demands of different peacebuilding partners. Some policy documents are designed as "guidelines" and positioned as such. The term "guidelines" suggest that these policies are just for guidance instead of directing, but in some cases where they influence funding such as the JICA *Thematic Guidelines on Peacebuilding,* they have been a powerful tool for peacebuilding. Japan's assistance to peacebuilding as a foreign policy instrument is informed by its own history and has had success and failures in different parts of the world (Ashizawa, 2014)

The desired goal of many peacebuilding policies is to ground peacebuilding interventions in local realities and traditions, however, this has been a rather difficult feat to achieve, because of two reasons. First, rarely do donor policies match the national policies in anticipated outcomes. Therefore, in situations where donor funding rules prevail, peacebuilding interventions tend to ignore local realities. Debiel and Rink (2016) have argued that empirical realities on the ground does not always coincide with the assumptions behind peacebuilding interventions, and this is the reason for continuous mistakes in peacebuilding interventions. This is the reality and the literature is replete with examples of peacebuilding failures the world over (Dodge, 2021).

The second issue is that even at the country level, the agenda of national level stakeholders is often at odds with those of the sub-county stakeholders or local villagers (Richmond, 2012). National agendas are usually dominated by security concerns while local resident concerns might be that of economic survival. At the very minimum, locals are supposed to "buy-in" on national policies but champions of local ownership argue that peacebuilding supposed to be designed and managed by local people. In the middle of this is to be found the national elites who are happy with the buy-in because projects then become easier to manage (Donais, 2014). In the end, peacebuilding still ends up being the agenda of the elite rather than of the local people. It can be argued therefore that peacebuilding policies rarely promote local ownership.

2.1.1 Global Peacebuilding Frameworks and Policies.

Global peacebuilding frameworks include the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Development Goal 16); the 2016 twin Security Council and General Assembly resolutions (S/RES/2282 and A/RES/70/262). In addition to the SDGs, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, (UNSCR/1325); the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda and the Youth, Peace, and Security Agenda (UNSCR/2250 and 2419), spell out the agency of young people and their capacity to contribute to peace, the Sustaining Peace Agenda (United Nations Security Council Resolution [UNSCR] 2282, the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and State-building, or the New Deal, and the global peacebuilding funding and financing.

These frameworks have guided peacebuilding interventions across the world since the formal introduction of peacebuilding as a concept in the global peace agenda. The trend in these global

frameworks has been to steer peacebuilding towards the liberal peace model which puts emphasis on issues such as democratisation, free markets and human rights, yet somehow attempting to infuse and promote local participation. This has been a difficult approach because liberal peace concepts, important as they are, often do not support local agency in peacebuilding due to its top-down approach and exclusionist approach to peacebuilding. Further, the liberal peace theory that prosperity somehow prevents conflict has not been borne out in reality (Tanabe, 2017). This has been a major weakness of the liberal policy approach to peacebuilding.

After much criticism of the narrow, often inadequate approach of liberal peacebuilding, there seem to be a new trend in policy frameworks in favour of more inclusive approaches that expand the constituency for peacebuilding and thus increasing the chances of sustainable peace (Selby, 2013; Richmond, 2015; Tanabe, 2017;). Otherwise known as "Hybrid Peacebuilding" as argued by Richmond and Mac Ginty (2014), this idea proposes the amalgamation of local and liberal practices of peacebuilding. In many ways the emergence of modern local peacebuilding committees reflects the hybrid nature of peacebuilding in which local peacebuilding approaches and institutions are merged with formal peacebuilding entities which are able to apply both the law and tradition to resolve conflict and create peace. Much support for hybridity in peacebuilding has come from sociologists who argue that precolonial societies had perfected their peacebuilding methods long before colonialism appeared and insisted in defining peace in their own terms (Boege, 2011).

Regardless of the position taken in the new trend of global peacebuilding frameworks, a major positive outcome has been the mainstreaming of two groups of peacebuilding stakeholders who

have previously been "unseen" or "problematised" in this discourse, that is, youth and women. These two groups are now central to peacebuilding and policies have been developed focusing on them. Regarding the youth, both UNSCR resolutions 2250 (2015), on Youth and Peace, and Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women and Sustainable Peace speak to the inclusivity of these two key groups. Resolution 2250, in particular calls for member countries;

> to consider ways to increase the inclusive representation of youth in decision-making at all levels in local, national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict, including institutions and mechanisms to counter violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, and, as appropriate, to consider establishing integrated mechanisms for meaningful participation of youth in peace processes and dispute-resolution (S/RES/2250/2015:3).

The role of young people in sustainable peacebuilding is a contemporary debate with opinions differing because youth are to be found on both sides of peace. The involvement of young people, particularly young men, in violent and extremist groups has created the impression that youth is generally a threat to global security and stability. The facts however point to only a minority rather than the majority being a threat to peace (IANYD, 2016), and the policy trend is towards more recognition of youth as a potential ally rather threat to peacebuilding. The Organisation of African Youth (2014) argues that the inclusion of young people in peacebuilding processes redirects the energies of young people to the implementation of constructive peace projects thereby ensuring that there is sustainable peacebuilding. The threshold conditions for peacebuilding that involves youth however must include interrelated and mutually reinforcing opportunities both at the individual and community level.

After Security Council Resolution 2250, the UN's Working Group on Youth and Peacebuilding, which is part of the Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development, produced a Practice Note to suggest to funders and Policymakers should consider when planning programs to encourage young people to get involved in peacebuilding in conformity with the Guiding Principles and Resolution 2250. Specifically, the practise note discusses the issues of quality and sustainability of peacebuilding interventions, evidence-based peacebuilding interventions involving youth and the interconnectedness of peacebuilding with other development processes.

This holistic approach demonstrated the evolving policy atmosphere in peacebuilding at the global level. Based on the UNSCR 2250, other youth peacebuilding frameworks have been developed, such as the African Union Continental Framework for Youth, Peace and Security (undated) whose objective is to facilitate the meaningful engagement and participation of African youth in all spectrums of peace and security at national, regional and continental levels. Kenya has also elaborated the Kenya Youth Development Policy (2019) in which youth will be engaged in promoting peace and fight radicalisation through education and increased employment opportunities. The inclusion of youth in peace negotiation from the beginning has also proven to be beneficial if their support for future peacebuilding interventions will be required. In the case of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), South Sudanese youth were involved in the negotiations in 2017 and this inclusion helped shape the conversation that broadened the addition of non-political stakeholders in the implementation mechanisms. Youth inclusion resulted in the establishment of a national youth ministry run by youth and the prioritization of youth participation in all processes for implementing peace (Malish, 2021)

The role of women in peacebuilding has also received increased global policy attention with the adoption of Resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325:2000) on Women's Peace and Security (WPS). The resolution set out to reaffirm the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction. Resolution 1325 has been praised as the single most important resolution in recent time which has in turn spurred the inclusion of women in many aspects of socio-economic development, beyond the original agreements in the resolution. The resolution urges all member states to,

> ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict (S/RES/1325 (2000:2).

Traditionally women have been seen in the context of victims of conflict because by far they often bear the brunt of conflict. Agbajobi (2010) in reviewing the role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding has argued that conflicts often force women to organise themselves and take on roles that under normal circumstances they would not. For this reason, paying special attention to the different experiences of women and men is critical in designing successful peacebuilding programmes. However, the prevalence of gender-based violence, restricted opportunities for participation in public affairs and poverty have restricted the potential of women to be fully engaged in peacebuilding.

The recognition of the unique role that women play in peacebuilding is perhaps summarised quite aptly by Linborg (2017), in a report on peacebuilding in Colombia, who notes that women who

participate in peace processes were usually focused less on the spoils of the war and more on reconciliation, economic development, education and transitional justice, which are all critical elements of sustained peace. In the same report, Lindborg notes that resolution 1325 has played a key role in increasing the role of women in peacebuilding and that before the passage of the this, a review of 664 peace agreements from 1990-2000 by U.N. Women noted that only 11% of them included any reference to women's security and inclusion. And from 1992 to 2011, only 4% of signatories and less than 10% of negotiators were women. Krause *et al.* (2018) argue in addition, that women's participation in peace negotiations leads to better accord content, higher agreement implementation rates, and longer-lasting peace. Reviewing data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, from 1975 until 2011, Krause *et al* demonstrate that women's participation leads to durable peace, however, few women are ever allowed to engage in direct access to peace negotiations.

One of the major criticisms of the UN WPS agenda is its mistaken definition of women as a homogenous group and its failure to appreciate the different experiences of women on both sides of conflict and security. Hudson (2013) argues that the language used in WPS positions women as "natural peacemakers", thus reducing the opportunity to elevate the contribution of women in public spaces as leaders or decision-makers. So, in certain ways, WPS restricts women's contribution to the global peacebuilding agenda. The WPS agenda has also been wrongfully assumed to bring a unified voice to the peace process. This is not borne out in reality because of the different experiences and capabilities of women in different parts of the world. The domestication of the WPS, as had been done in Kenya, for example, somehow addresses this

problem but the assumption of a united women's voice in the WPS is still seen as misleading (Hudson 2013).

Another noticeable trend in peacebuilding has been the increase in coalitions and partnerships building in peacebuilding interventions. The advantage of partnerships in peacebuilding is clear and accepted by all peacebuilding stakeholders. Nearly all international policy frameworks give provision for some kind of partnership and coalition building in peacebuilding. Both UN Security Council Resolutions A/70/262 and S/2016/2282, and Sustainable Development Goal 17, target 17, recognise that the scale and nature of sustaining peace need strong, strategic and durable partnerships (Coalition Resource, 2017).

Partnerships and coalitions touch on a key peacebuilding problem which is the notion that peacebuilding has been dominated by "outsiders" who come to support "insiders" to return to peace after a conflict. Over time the dichotomy of "outsiders" (foreigners) versus "insiders" (locals) has affected peacebuilding, especially when peacebuilding is seen as an "outsider" initiative. In addition, as argued by Kolk and L'Enfant (2015) the different typologies of partnerships at different levels, that is,. local, national and international, and the unique contributions of each level of partnerships have not been scrutinised fully and their contribution to peacebuilding fully appreciated.

Partnership building also shifts the discussion of peacebuilding from simply addressing root causes of conflict and reducing the chances of recidivism, but also community resilience and a focus on coalitions around preventive rather than reactive peacebuilding operations. While it is the primary

responsibility of Member States to sustain peace, today's realities dictate that neighbouring countries must collaborate to ensure that cross-border and cross-country peace is also maintained. At the continental level, Forti and Singh (2019) provide the example of the UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, which is managed through the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). As a result of this relationship, the UN-AU Annual Conference on peace and security meets to review progress on peacebuilding across the continent. The authors note that the AU-UN relationship varies across many peace and security issues, however on peacebuilding, the potential for working towards a collective approach to conflict prevention and crisis management is strong.

Some of the lessons learned in partnerships and coalition building for peacebuilding are summarised by Coalition Resource (2017) in their report on coalition building. The organisation concludes that an approach in which donors are seen as working in accompaniment to supplement the work of local partners works the best for peacebuilding. Secondly, in cases where an international NGO is supporting peacebuilding, a remote "hands-off" partnership works best. Kolk and L'Enfant (2015) conclude in their research that building relationships requires time, patience and careful interactions, and specific capabilities on the part of the organisations and individuals involved. In other words, partnerships can make or break peacebuilding efforts, unless there are clear roles and responsibilities spelt out in the partnership formation from the beginning.

Partnerships and networking will continue to set the policy agenda peacebuilding for the foreseeable future. At the global level, peacebuilding partnerships can ensure that peacebuilding resources are available for deployment when needed. Not only do partnerships make programmatic

sense, they also promote the idea of shared responsibility in peacebuilding. However, partnerships can be both a programmatic success or recipe for failure, when not clearly defined and roles and responsibilities delineated. There are many emerging partnerships configurations for example between donors and governments; donors and NGOs (both local and international), NGOs and NGOs/CBO an at the lowest level, locals and CBOs. At the UN, there has been a call, since 2018 for "guidelines on system-wide engagement with civil society for sustaining peace" (UN-Secretary General; Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/72/707-S/2018/43, 2018). All these are necessary however, whether or how they can promote sustainable peacebuilding is subject to further debate.

While these developments are ongoing, certain residual issues about peacebuilding need to be brought to the fore. The problem of peacebuilding language continues to distort the potential impact of peacebuilding. It has itself contributed to the confusion in peacebuilding discourse. Connolly *et al* (2020) argue that the language reflects relationships of power in which the poor conflict wrecked countries of the Global South are seen as inferior to the more peaceful, richer Global North, who are the benefactors of peacebuilding. Therefore, terms such as "global" refer implicitly to those in the Global North, specifically Western Europe and the United States of America while "local", on the other hand, refers to individuals and groups living largely in the Global South, especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Connolly further argues that labels such as "partner", "participant" and "beneficiary", are not neutral, but instead imply a provider and recipient relationship. Menkhaus, cited in Tønnesson (2007) argues that when it comes to definitions, 'international society' is used to denote outsiders and does not include local actors implying that peacebuilding is still seen very much through the "we" and "them" divide. The language in USAID's peacebuilding approach, for example, states that,

> USAID works with local partners and field missions to address the legacy of violence through activities such as support to local and regional peace processes, restorative justice programs, ethnic dialogue, interfaith peacebuilding, inclusive and legitimate governance structures and grassroots reconciliation (USAID 2021).

The statement is clearly and specifically meant for the countries in the global south where terms like “local” “grassroots” and “ethnic” are usually used to refer to recipients who receive USAID support. USAID works almost exclusively in the Global South; Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Peacebuilding support by most donor countries focuses on Africa, Asia and Latin America, the so-called “countries in conflict” or “recovering from conflict”. These regions have traditionally been conflict areas and might continue to be so for the foreseeable future because most issues that precipitate their conflicts remain largely ignored. A major policy direction in future support to these regions will depend on how "conflict" and "peacebuilding" are defined. Sherriff et al (2018) argue that policy change towards more "local peacebuilding", in line with United Nations Resolution 2282 will influence peacebuilding support to include efforts before, during and after violent conflict, rather than the old way of peacebuilding support which focused on rapid democratisation, free and globalised markets and rule of law through external intervention. This is a notable critical policy shift that not only redefines peacebuilding but also the resources that will be put behind peacebuilding. This trend was also argued by Lotz (2012), under the Aid Effectiveness debate in which changing patterns for peacebuilding support seem to be focusing more on how peacebuilding funding could be used more effectively, but less on what impact they are having on the ground. The next section examines select policy instruments for peacebuilding.

2.1.2 The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission.

The UN system's continuous responsibility for leading the global peacebuilding effort resulted in the founding of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PCB) in 2005, whose primary mandate is to propose integrated solutions for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and to bring together all key actors behind evidence-based peacebuilding. The United Nations perspective on peacebuilding is contained in its strategy entitled *Sustaining Peace* (2017) which is a term that emerged from the 2015 review of the UN peacebuilding architecture. In the document, the UN defines sustaining peace as a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society which incorporates activities for preventing the outbreak of, and escalation, or continuation of conflict. In this strategy, the UN recognises that the *Sustaining Peace Agenda* requires an inclusive strategy that supports the diverse range partners and a multi-dimensional approach such as the protection for civilians under threat and strengthening institutions, as well as the rule of law, general development and the respect for human rights all levels (UN, 2017). These are the same principles that guided the formation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

The PBC came into existence in June 2006, after being established during the 66th United Nations plenary in accordance with Articles 7,22 and 29 of the UN Charter. Together with the Peacebuilding Support Office (PSO) and a multi-donor fund called Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), it forms the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA). Since its creation, the PBC has evolved into a policy instrument through which the UN plays a leading advisory role in the global peacebuilding agenda. In particular, PBC works in post-conflict countries to identify potential risks to and gaps in peacebuilding, including in funding, and monitoring the level of national commitment to peacebuilding.

Since its inception, the PBC has put peacebuilding on the global peace agenda by supporting countries to build their peacebuilding infrastructures. Success in Sierra Leone, Burundi, and the Central African Republic was testimony to its ability to lead peacebuilding interventions, by providing funding and technical advice. In all of these countries, PBC was able to promote inclusive political dialogue that guaranteed peaceful transactions of national business such as elections and the establishment of the rule of law. Iro (2009) in a study examining lessons learned from PBC work in Sierra Leone argues that PBC was able to focus international attention on Sierra Leone's recovery process, focusing on mutual dialogue and mobilising financial support for the country. However, Rugumamu (2009) points out that in both Burundi and Sierra Leone, the lack of authority to implement peacebuilding strategies did hamper to some extent, the success of PBC. The PBC has no authority to require any independent donor working in the same peacebuilding field to restructure their respective strategies to fit into its plans even if the same seem to duplicate, or undermine the work of other peacebuilding actors.

However, even with the PBC in place, peacebuilding in the UN system remains fragmented, poorly coordinated and under-resourced. Slotin (2010) argues that in judging the policy contribution of the UN PBC, one should perhaps take the “glass half full” view because the PBC has had some success in some countries. The PBC represents all UN’s major organs and financiers and therefore it is an ideal place for the promotion of strategic coordination by forging a political consensus among key players. Ross and Schomerus (2020) argue that global peacebuilding support is being provided in the context of rising and ever-changing conflicts, and managed by a wide range of local and international players. The broad consensus that seems to be emerging is that peacebuilding needs to be broad-based political and economic settlements, have widely recognised

the legitimacy and reduce the space for recidivism. However, this has not been the case due to the increasing complexity of conflict, and the lack of "strategic outcomes" which could sustain the peace. The Peace Building Commission, like other UN agencies has come under serious criticism because it failed to scale up meaningful peacebuilding. The main point of contention is that the way it was formulated and eventually created makes the PBC weak and rather ineffective peacebuilding instrument (Rugumamu, 2009). A key lesson coming out of peacebuilding support is that a country's vested interest comes first in any peacebuilding support (Lemay-Hebert and Toupin, 2011), and secondly, the growing multi-polarity in peacebuilding has created avenues for belligerents in many conflicts to seek alternative rivals to support their cause. Ross and Schomerus (2020), further argue that the management of the peacebuilding process and the people who eventually get invited to the table hold the key to sustainable peacebuilding.

2.1.3 Global Peacebuilding Stakeholders Influencing Local Peacebuilding.

This section of the literature review presents and discusses the influence of major peacebuilding stakeholders from the global level. These organisations have together driven the Global Peacebuilding agenda because of their financial might. Some of these institutions are set up to act as the foreign policy implementers of their countries and therefore peacebuilding support provided by the same organisation is usually part of foreign policy (Boyce, 2002).

Peacebuilding support does not reside in one global organ however, the global north and multi-lateral organs controlled by them, such as the World Bank, IMF, and ICRC provide the bulk of peacebuilding interventions (Cutillo, 2006). On top of that, key bi-lateral organs such as the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) the European Union (EU), USAID,

UKAID, AUSAID, SIDA, GIZ, and JICA all play a key role in peacebuilding in their spheres of influence. Lately, China International Development Cooperation Agency has also entered the field of foreign aid, with the view to placing China among world influencers. Peacebuilding support has normally been provided as a foreign policy tool, and within the context of "fragile" countries. All these institutions are strongly grounded in the liberal peacebuilding paradigm that focuses on democratisation and marketisation, with the assumption that democratic governance and the free market will offer greater economic development and therefore guarantee lasting peace (Natorski, 2011). This has not been borne out in reality.

2.1.4 United Kingdom's Support for Peacebuilding.

The Government of the United Kingdom (UK) is a major global player in conflict management and has been visible through the old Department for International Development (DFID) and now the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) which took over from DFID in 2020. Peace intervention support is a clearly stated foreign policy tool for the UK as it is for most developed countries. For the UK, there is a strong recognition that conflict threatens its economy by disrupting commerce, creating refugees and disturbing the global status quo. In the Government's policy statement, the focus is on stabilisation of countries that benefit from FCDO funding for peace. By stabilising these countries, FCDO seeks to establish lasting peace based on consent, flexibility and responsiveness (UK Stabilisation Unit 2018). Conflict prevention was first brought to the fore in the UK Government White Paper *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century* (UK Government 1997).

The 2011 strategy known as "Building Stability Overseas Strategy" outlined the UK's framework for conflict prevention and resolution for sustainable development (BSOS). The doctrine asserts that resolving disputes and fostering stability were in the UK's moral and political best interests. In order to prevent and manage conflict, the strategy placed a strong emphasis on employing what has been proven to work, reputable institutions, inclusive politics, and the need for conversation. The Building Stability Framework, released in 2016, which placed more emphasis on addressing poverty while addressing conflict, replaced the BSOS. Five pillars of sustained stability were highlighted by DFID as part of its strategy: equitable power structures, inclusive economic development, formal and informal conflict resolution procedures, legitimate and effective state and non-state institutions, and a favorable regional environment (Green, 2018).

As has been seen before, peacebuilding is a foreign policy tool which is meant first and foremost to guarantee and secure UK's foreign interest abroad. Regarding definition, the UK's view is that peacebuilding,

> includes measures to address underlying causes of conflict, such as social, political or economic exclusion based on ethnicity, religion or gender or unequal power relations between the centre and periphery. It entails responding to drivers or triggers of conflict, such as youth unemployment, economic shocks or access to light weapons. And it requires dealing with the devastating effects of violent conflict, to enable communities to recover and reconcile, and prevent today's effects from becoming tomorrow's causes(UK Government, 2010;14)

A closer study of the definition reveals the position that the UK Government takes on matters of peacebuilding. By concentrating on socio-economic and political processes without the historical antecedents is akin to applying band-aid to a festering wound. Much of the conflicts that the UK Government is responding to today are deeply rooted in a colonial history in which the UK was

the main author. Between 1600-1997, the British Empire was a network of colonies, dependencies and territories that were exploited for everything from manpower in terms of slaves, raw materials, especially minerals and produce for the benefit of the Kingdom. Much of indigenous land was alienated for this to happen. This system has remained undisturbed in many countries and thus the underlying causes of modern conflict remain unresolved (Muzondidya, 2010).

In many instances, the UK Government has supported peacebuilding through the policy of stabilisation. The problem with the policy of stabilisation without addressing other issues that precipitate conflict is that it rarely succeeds. Most stabilisation efforts are short-term interventions that address one aspect of conflict without having the total picture in view. As noted by peacebuilding stakeholders, DFID, for example entered into the problem of Somali with the view of short-term stabilisation to counter terrorism by arming the Government but ignoring the fact the it was the corrupt Governance that brought the conflict in the first place. Secondly as noted by SafeWorld (an international NGO working in peacebuilding), UK Government's strategy does not anticipate or even have a conflict prevention strategy (SafeWorld, 2020). In May 2021, the UK announced a huge amount of money for UN peace interventions including a wide range of partners; Government, International and NGOs. Despite this, it has been noted that historically, the Government's involvement has been uneven because the strategic promise in successive UK government policy documents to prevent conflict and build peace has failed to translate into operational practice and impact (Krieger, 2006).

2.1.5 United States' Support for Peacebuilding.

Given its influence through its foreign assistance implementer, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and its use of peacebuilding as an instrument for foreign policy, the United States Government (USG) is likely the most conspicuous. USAID is a separate department of the US federal government that is largely in charge of managing development and humanitarian aid for civilians abroad. President Kennedy enacted the Foreign Assistance Act into law in 1961 and established USAID by executive order. USAID's foreign assistance program has changed over the years; from a humanitarian assistance organisation in the 60s to an agency focused on free-market policies, democracy and sustainable development as its main way of providing development assistance, and thus build the peace.

The legal framework for USAID is to be found in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961which was meant to address conflict in other parts of the world through promoting dialogue and economic opportunities for greater understanding (USAID, 2011). Based on the FAA, the US Government has elaborated policies for supporting peacebuilding which are contained in several policy frameworks including; the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act (public law 15-441), the Global Fragility Act (public law 116-94) and the Women, Peace, and Security Act (public law 115-68), among others. But even with such elaborate policy frameworks, peacebuilding support under USAID has been judged as weak, fragmented and thinly spread across many agencies.

Using its global influence, the US Government through USAID and other agencies strategic support to peacebuilding is supposed to be inclusive peacebuilding and reconciliation in countries

that are either in or coming out of conflict. The working definition of peacebuilding for USAID is articulated thus,

> immediate intervention to build momentum in support of the peace process including peace negotiations, building citizen security, promoting reconciliation and expanding democratic political process. (cited in Barnett et al 2007:8).

USAID work in peacebuilding is termed as "people-to-people" strategy and is premised on the belief that countries that have weak political institutions tend to suffer chronic instability and under development (USAID, 2011). It is assumed that communities that can demonstrably reconcile their differences are more likely to improve their capacity to manage conflict, and demand commitment, accountability, and transparency from their Governments. The program operates in at least 42 countries supporting 330 peacebuilding programs in the amount of USD 230 million.

To coordinate its efforts to pinpoint and examine the causes of conflict, USAID established the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) in September 2002. In order to incorporate conflict reduction and management into USAID's assessments, strategies, and programs, the Office supports early interventions that address the causes and effects of instability and violent conflict. The CMM acts as the Agency's focal point for technical knowledge in peacebuilding by strengthening the ability of partners and USAID operational units for conflict management and mitigation, creating and implementing cutting-edge conflict analysis methodologies, and otherwise supporting Mission needs for research and program support on important conflict issues.

The US Government (USG) policy has been shaped by many years of involvement in the affairs of other countries, starting from Korea to Afghanistan, often to “stabilise” these countries but in essence, to safeguard its self-interest and contain the spread of political ideologies that the US did not like such as Communism and Socialism. All American Government Administrations, since 1917 have upheld the idea that a peaceful world could only be secured by democratically elected Governments, and for this reason, the US has been active in promoting and even imposing "democracy" in other countries as long as it helped to advance the interests of the United States. Since the Al-Qaeda attack on the US, the country has embarked on ensuring that overseas instability does not impact on national security, therefore peacebuilding support is intended to guarantee security at home. This is the essence of the Patriot Act, passed in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) (Lazarus and Gawerc, 2015).

The literature USAID's contribution to peacebuilding across the globe is voluminous, and shows how this “stabilisation” and “democratisation” policy dominates its interventions. This is done with what the US Government calls “like minded” Governments. In Afghanistan for example, a USD 16 million peacebuilding project implemented from 2015 to 2021 was designed to deliver a wide range of peacebuilding activities including the training of youth on nonviolent action and peacebuilding methods, supporting community peacebuilding across 33 provinces, women's civic and political engagement, community sports and response to COVID-19. Entitled *The Promoting Conflict Resolution, Peace-Building, and Enhanced Governance for Peace and Stability in Afghanistan,* the program had the four standard USAID peacebuilding objectives; strengthening the capacity to mitigate conflict; improving cooperation for peace, security, and development;

enhancing the rule of law; and, increasing understanding of critical development, peace, and stability issues through fellowships, research and analysis.

Despite these peacebuilding efforts, the Taliban-led resistance to the US-backed Government in Kabul remained strong during this period, and, thanks to the ill-advised policy of the Trump administration, overtook Kabul on 15 August 2021. President Ashraf Ghani fled to Uzbekistan, leaving behind a chaotic situation which has not been made any better by the Taliban retrogressive administration. This fall called into question peacebuilding efforts such as the one led by the US Government between 2015 and 2021. Some of the criticism of the failure of the US was that the U.S-backed Government fell because the country's government was hopelessly corrupt, and its values were incompatible with democracy. The lesson learned however is that the policy of selective engagement with the so-called "like-minded" governments does not always work.

The U.S. Government (USG) unveiled its strategy in 2019 to advance peacebuilding through involving more women. The goal of the policy, known as the United States Strategy on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), is to increase women's meaningful involvement in conflict prevention and resolution, countering violent extremism (CVE) and terrorism, and establishing post-conflict peace and stability. The policy statement was created with the knowledge that, despite the fact that catastrophes and conflict affect women and girls unfavorably and disproportionately throughout the world, women are still underrepresented in efforts to prevent and resolve conflict as well as in efforts to establish peace after a conflict or to recover from one. Women are equal partners in the avoidance of violent conflict, the provision of relief and recovery efforts, and the establishment of long-lasting peace, according to the Women WPS as a policy framework.

The Department of State announced that during the program's first evaluation, which took place in July 2021, that it had assisted more than 14,000 women in enhancing their capacity for peace and reconciliation, trained more than 43,000 women in the security and criminal justice fields, and helped almost 488,000 people access assistance for gender-based violence. All of these initiatives are essential for long-term peacebuilding. UN resolution 1325 on women and peace and security from October 2000 has been supported by the USG's WPS.

However, this program, like other USAID support to peacebuilding has been criticised as weak, and too short in objectives. The habitual disregard of indigenous systems in places where they are working has been a major undoing of USAID peacebuilding support. Watchdog NGOs, such as MADRE in the US have been critical of the USG's policy because while it calls for the empowering of women with "tools and capabilities", it ignores the fact that women peacebuilders in many war-torn countries have effectively done local level peacebuilding for a long time without the USG's WPS interventions. MADRE notes that the Women Peace and Security strategy failed to address the problem of US foreign policy of militarism and arming of Governments which in some cases has led to the escalation of conflict and lack of peace. The WPS strategy also places US interest first by stating that it is US interest in any conflict that will advise the WPS (USG, WPS 2019).

Even in its infancy, the People-to-People approach in the USG WPS strategy has come under criticism because of the assumptions under which it operates. Somehow, there is a linear argument in the WPS that developing tools and increasing capacities somehow lead to sustainable peace. According to this formula, individuals and institutions seen as most likely to bring peace are supported with tools and resources to support the peacebuilding process in a general program that

might be termed "local peacebuilding". Lefranc (2011) argues that post-conflict conditions and contexts do not transition towards peace through political and social engineering as predictably as envisioned on the USG WPS. Secondly, the size of these programs and the transitory nature of funding support make them quite ineffective in sustaining peace gains. Call and Couzens (2007) on this point, argue that peacebuilding support tends to be underpinned by an "implicit universalism" under which a few privileged formal institutions and individuals are given preference over informal or traditional structures. The number of people reached by the P2P could be argued to be insignificant compared to the total need for peacebuilding initiatives in conflict countries.

Perhaps the most telling weakness of US support to peacebuilding is the selective position taken by the US Government choosing whom to support for peacebuilding. The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) set out the United States priority to work primarily with countries where state failure would magnify threats to the American homeland. The policy called for empowering the so-called "reform-minded" governments, people, and civil society. This policy became law in 2019 and authorised selective engagement with Governments for peacebuilding. While on the surface the policy seems to be noble, the practice has been to work with countries that are themselves oppressive and war-oriented as long as the support produces US security partners abroad and reduces the threat to the US homeland. Given its power of reach, the US Government's support to global peacebuilding can be argued to be self-centred and therefore supportive of only those programs that translate into US domestic security. This has missed out on ensuring the at the Global level US leadership is strategically and proactively spearheading peacebuilding that eventually influences global peace.

2.1.6. European Union's Support for Peacebuilding.

The European Union (EU) is a special alliance of 28-member states where members have pooled their sovereignties in some policy areas and unified their legal systems on a broad variety of social, political, and economic matters. Although European integration started to take shape in the 1950s, the Maastricht Treaty laid the groundwork for the modern union in 1992. The Lisbon Treaty (also known as the Reform Treaty), which gave the EU its current organization and authority in 2007, increased the EU's effectiveness and legitimacy (Tindemans, 1976). According to the theory that nations that collaborate on economic development are less likely to go to war with one another, the original European Economic Community (EEC) was created solely to promote economic union. Its creators believed that by combining sovereignty in some areas (mainly economic ones initially), integration would promote interdependence and render the possibility of another European conflict inconceivable (CRS Report, 2018). Students of the Union have argued that the EU is made up of states following diverse agendas as a result of the United Kingdom's departure from the union on January 31, 2020, which exposed some of the issues the union faces (Fabbrini, 2005).

Under the overall umbrella of the Common Security and Defense Policy, (CSDP) the EU has become a veritable peacebuilder in the world, working with Governments, the UN and many NGOs across the board. Stamnes (2016), points out that the publication in 2001, of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (the so-called Gothenburg programme), was a policy direction for the EU which set the stage for actions to prevent violent conflict. The policy recognised that poverty was a driving cause of violent conflict. In 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) formulated a set of strategic priorities for the EU, including how the EU would

cooperate with the UN. The ESS maintains that peace-building and long-term poverty reductions are essential to the EU's success in peacebuilding and security.

The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 extended this strategy by reaffirming the EU's objectives to "preserve peace, avoid wars, and strengthen international security" (Treaty on European Union, Art. 21(2)). But it was the EU's failure to address the wars in the former Yugoslavia that prompted a reconsideration of what the EU could actually do to peacebuilding. The EU now takes a holistic view of peacebuilding, and with the creation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) in 2007, the EU enhanced its capacity to respond to peacebuilding, crisis management, conflict prevention, peacebuilding as well as global and trans-regional emerging threats (Bergmann, 2018). However, as Mac Ginty (2017) argues, the EU is a huge technocratic institution with many departments and procedures, which has negatively impacted the organisation's ability to connect with the local realities in sustainable peacebuilding.

Much as the EU emphasises the principles of local ownership in conflict prevention work, this is a tough call given the way the EU operates. A significant shortcoming of the EU’s peacebuilding approach has been the continued application of the liberal approach to peacebuilding across its programs (Stamnes 2016). The liberal peacebuilding strategy contends that strong institutions, which uphold human rights and the rule of law, increase the likelihood of peace in a nation. This strategy has drawn criticism for being overly top-down in its approach and obsessed with creating state institutions while ignoring crucial social dimensions of the current conflict dynamics (Paris, 2010; Zambakari, 2016; Tanabe, 2017).

Liberal peacebuilding has also frequently relied on templates and been a programmatic-technocratic endeavor that pays little attention to the unique local circumstances (Zambakari, 2016). The majority of peacebuilding players communicate more with state leaders, governments, and elites and give little, if any, thought to the opinions of the local communities who advocate for liberal ideals as the only means of fostering peace. The EU's peacebuilding efforts are focused on the conventional top-down state-building goals of creating an efficient state apparatus, enhancing state governance, reforming the security sector, and controlling borders. While this is positive on the one hand, it also undermines efforts to achieve a lasting peace.

The EU's support to peacebuilding has also been criticised to being rather hands-off despite providing he sums of money. For example, in 2022, under the European Peace Facility (EPF) support to Africa through the African Union, €600 million for peace and security, for the period 2022-2024, under which the AU, can request any amount necessary under the terms and conditions of the AU-EU Summit Declaration in 2022. Earmarked funds such as these may be catalytic for peace but rarely responds to local needs. The EU is in itself a peacebuilding initiative among European nations and therefore any peacebuilding funding must first meet EUs security needs at home and abroad. The literature established that EUs approach is mostly on a state-to-state level and in some cases, the EU has worked with oppressive states as long as their stability is beneficial to the EU.

2.1.7 Policy Frameworks for Peacebuilding in Africa.

Peacebuilding in Africa has been viewed as unfinished business that is characterised by what Shaw (2003) argues to be conflict situations with diversities in both causes and courses. This situation

has been traced back to Africa's colonial legacy, emerging problems due to poor governance, and contested nationalities. Conflict prevention, early warning systems, mediation, conflict management, post-conflict rebuilding, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), human rights, and justice are just a few of the aspects of peacebuilding that have been prominent in the African landscape. Women's, youth, religion, humanitarianism, grassroots organizations, and regional and continental bodies are all covered in this specialized program. Even with all these interventions, Africa is still considered a conflict continent in need of constant outside help to consolidate peace. In comparison to other continents, Africa has had the biggest challenge to peace and perhaps the most intense attempts at peacebuilding due to long periods of conflicts, that have tended to be very costly in terms of human and other resources (Jackson, 2000).

Students of history have argued that in terms of global affairs, Africa is largely influenced by institutions that were created without Africa's indigenous peoples' participation during colonial times. Even today, the global affairs of which Africa is part are dominated by two principal global political and economic institutions, the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, which have come at high political and economic costs (Akonor, 2007). In addition, there are global instruments such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights adopted in 1948 by which the entire international community, including the African States, is assessed and measured.

Despite these obvious institutional challenges, Africa has collaborated with partners and attempted to support peacebuilding whenever necessary. For, example, Dzinesa and Curtis (2012) observe

that by 2011, of the sixteen United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in the world, seven were in Africa. The first five countries on the agenda of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) were all in Africa: Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea-Bissau, and Liberia. The first four cases before the International Criminal Court (ICC) were also all African: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, and the CAR. This situation paints a picture of a continent with serious peace challenges, but also one which has attempted to build peace.

A considerable part of resources, including official development assistance, have been diverted from development to emergency services as a result of the numerous violent inter- and intra-state wars that have occurred in Africa. According to Aremu (2010), the history of Africa as a continent is rife with violence, to the point where it can be said that the main river circulating across Africa is war. This is not unusual in long-drawn-out conflict. As was the case with the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, what starts as a modest internal issue often escalates and swiftly becomes global in scope. The effects of the end of the Cold War and its aftermath, as well as the globalization and liberalization of the world economy, stand out among the international issues because they have led to a sense of political and economic instability in Africa. This reasoning must therefore be used while talking about peacebuilding.

The quality of governance and respect of institutions determines the level of peace and stability in a country (Werner, 2019). This is true for Africa, as it is for any other part of the world, but this point is critical for Africa because most conflicts have arisen out of "governance issues". Fashagba and Oshewolo (2014) argue that while some students of peace see good governance as the result

of peace, others emphasise that good governance is a requirement for sustainable peace. Either way, the one cannot exist without the other. In some cases, the "democratic deficit", as defined by the monopoly of power by a few, has been identified as the cause of state failure, hence violent conflict (Raz, 2018). In some cases, conflict has been precipitated by ethnic identity in the multi-ethnic nature of countries whose borders were arbitrarily drawn in complete disregard for indigenous communities or the way they organised their affairs. composition (Gbenenye, 2016).

Student of African peace and conflict studies have argued that the problem of Africa is more in the poor management of the independent economies and the continued external exploitation of Africa's wealth. Aapenguo (2010) on the other hand argues that it is the politicisation of ethnicity rather than ethnicity that has stoked the attitudes of perceived exclusion that are the source of conflict. When ethnic differences are elevated to be barriers to advancement, then they become conflict triggers. The susceptibility of some African societies to this manipulation by opportunistic politicians has complicated conflict and peacebuilding. Whichever way this point is argued, exclusion from the political and economic process and lack of genuine access to national institutions of governance due to politicised ethnicity have contributed greatly to conflicts in Africa. This situation does not seem to be reducing when the case of Somalia, Kenya and even Rwanda is considered.

Much blame has been put on the Continent’s colonial past, and loss of traditional institutions for peace, with some degree of accuracy, however the literature on peacebuilding is very thin on the issues of current conflict drivers, namely, corruption, bad governance, politicised ethnicity, illiteracy, disease and poor economic management that has left many African countries under the

mercy of entities such as the IMF. Domestic policies which hare intolerant to dissenting views has created the politics of power, as in the case of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda and destroyed the base for peace. Many counties that seem to be at peace are actually power kegs that can be ignited by very small conflicts. This was seen in Kenya in 2007/8 and is being witnessed in South Africa today. These challenges portray Africa as a peacebuilding nightmare and this image will persist until the Continent comes to grips with the actual conflict drivers. To understand why and how Africa got to the current situation in peacebuilding, it is prudent to review the evolution of peacebuilding in Africa.

2.1.8 Precolonial Peacebuilding in Africa

A historical review of peacebuilding in Africa reveals evidence of conflict management and peacebuilding practices that evolved within traditional African societies as documented by, among others Muigua, (2017) and Waindim, (2018). Peace was ensured by village peace structures; some more elaborate than others, but appropriate enough to ensure lasting peace. Unwritten and much-respected customary laws held the society together in situations where peace could not be enforced by the use of the police as in the modern state. A common feature of traditional peacebuilding was the emphasis on social solidarity. Murithi (2006), and Isike and Uzodike (2011) point out one such tradition was the feminist ethic system known as *'ubuntu'* (humanity).

Ubuntu which is originally a Zulu expression meaning, "I am because We are". Ubuntu is about togetherness, relationships and how actions in one part of the society have an impact on others and society. It holds that all humans are interdependent, and therefore positive social relations and peacebuilding become everyone's business. In the original Nguni expression, the term is clearer

because it means a *person is a person through other persons.* The term resonates with many African languages and life philosophies because this is how many African societies lived their lives. The philosophical basis of ubuntu is to be found in the belief and acceptance of our common humanity, a sense of being part of the whole human family (Murithi, 2006).

The key to ubuntu peacebuilding was the expression of guilt and remorse, on the part of the offender and the granting of forgiveness on the part of the aggrieved (Akinola & Uzodike, 2017). Ujomu and Bature (2018), argue that *Ubuntu* served as a viable basis for peacebuilding because it set in place a set of moral values that were sufficient to sustain moral order. *Ubuntu* upheld peace and promoted humane, compassionate and productive interaction and interrelations between human beings using rules of cooperation, consensus, communication and compassion as directing principles. Ujomu and Bature (2018), argue that the principles of *Ubuntu*; human dignity, compassion and justice can still be applied to peacebuilding today because these values are still relevant. Isike and Uzodike (2011) argue the same point that *Ubuntu* can still be built into peacebuilding in Africa because of the great value it had in human dignity and fairness.

Two important factors must be discussed when examining peacebuilding in precolonial Africa are; the role of religion in peacebuilding and the contribution of women in peacebuilding. The role that women have played in post-colonial Africa in peacebuilding is neither new nor unexpected. Nwoye, cited in Ibok and Ogar (2018) analysed the role of women and peace in traditional Africa in Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Namibia, Somali, and Tanzania, and discovered that women played a key role in traditional conflict resolution and peace-building practices in Africa south of the Sahara. Shulika (2016) in reviewing the role of women in peacebuilding argues

that women exercised decision-making competence that served diverse political, socioeconomic and security goals, and therefore the role of women is recognised now as it was in pre-colonial times. The agency of women's role in peacebuilding, which in post-colonial Africa has become a contended phenomenon, was indeed a duty in pre-colonial society. Women played a key role in the economy and family stability of their societies and were therefore not passive consumers of social goods. Shulika (2016) argues that the role of women in the survival and continuance of the family through childbearing, economic activities such as food production and child instruction placed the woman in a position of influencing the peace process of her society.

This high elevation of women in African societies has also been argued by Sudarkasa (1986), who observes that while some students of history have placed women in a position of "jural minors", this is a distorted view because many pre-colonial societies elevated women to high places.

Women were queens, high priests, and holders of important offices in their societies. To demonstrate the depth to which women would go to build the peace, Mohammed, cited in (Ibok and Ogar, 2018) provides an example of how Somalis maidens (known as *Heerin*) from one of the warring clans would visit the opposing clan and declare their intention to be married there. As a result of no clan wanting to hurt their in-laws in such a circumstance, this action would quickly stabilize the situation and initiate a peace process that ultimately settled dispute. According to Ntahobari and Basilisa (2003), women in Burundi were socialized from an early age to be open-minded, adaptable, and tolerant because they were seen as bridge-builders and symbols of unification between various families, clans, communities, and ethnic groups through the institution of marriage.

Okoro (2013), adds to this debate by stating that conflict in today's African societies can be traced to the dislodgement of women from their traditional role as peacebuilders. Using the case of Igbo society, Okoro (2013) asserts that the "dual-sex" political system of the community ensured that Igbo women undertook their peacebuilding roles seriously without infringing on the other sex's role in society. However, the advent of colonialism diminished and placed women at the fringe of social issues thus robbing the community of the stabilising role of women in administering justice and building peace. It must be noted however that women too had their fair share of breaking, rather than building the peace.

Religion has always been an important factor in conflict and peacebuilding in precolonial and even post-colonial Africa. Silverstri and Mayall (2015), argue that literature is replete with examples of religion as an escalator of conflict while at the same time a strong factor in restoring peace and assisting in peacebuilding. The vast body of literature shows that religion has normally played an important part in preventing and resolving conflict. Ludovic and Tonlieu (2021) argues that in today's Africa the role of religion must be seen from a wider perspective as it intertwines with public policy to influence the daily lives of people. In pre-colonial periods, this was also true. According to Igboin (2011), in African traditional thinking, God is the source of all explanations. Mbiti makes the claim that "God is the explanation of man's creation and sustenance; it is as though God existed for the sake of man," as cited in Igboin (2011). According to this belief system, God's agents are in charge of upholding the rule of law and maintaining social order, and as a result, both natural and supernatural forces have an impact on how society is governed. These forces rewarded those who did the right thing while punishing those who did the wrong thing.

Appiah-Thompson (2020), using examples of the Akan people from Ghana contends that religious traditions were passed on orally from generation to generation in the form of proverbs, symbols and mores, which contained practical wisdom for peaceful coexistence. In Yorubaland a three-tier justice system of the Bale (arbitrator at the family unit), the *Mogaji* (arbitrator at the extended family unit) and the *Baale* (the chief-of-ward/quarter) ensured that whatever the conflict, an appropriate solution was found for it Ajayi & Buhari (2014). This system ensured peace at the family, clan level and community levels. The most serious cases were referred to the Chief-in-council (*Igbimo Ilu*), the highest traditional institution for conflict resolution, which had powers to even pass a death sentence when it was necessary.

Many African countries have revived or resorted to traditional structures to chart modern pathways to peace. In Botswana, the *Kgotla* system (Moumakwa, 2010), and the Acholi *Mato Oput* (Szy, 2018) are a few examples of enduring conflict resolution and peacebuilding mechanisms that are still in use. Most recently, the Rwanda system of *Gacaca* courts provides an example of a traditional system that was harnessed to solve a national crisis (Wielanga & Harris, 2011, Clark, 2007). *Gacaca* (literally meaning grass) is a traditional form of justice that can be described as a community based restorative justice system that was practiced in Rwanda in the pre-colonial era.

After the 1994 Rwanda genocide, in which over a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu were brutally killed, the Gacaca court system was revived by the RPF Government to facilitate community-based access to justice and reconciliation as a way to lasting peacebuilding. In this system, villagers participated in the trials, either as victims, perpetrators, witnesses or spectators. The courts were headed by the *Inyangamugayo* – "people of integrity"- who were suggested and elected by the

local community (Gasanabo *et al* 2020). Community members did not only observe the proceedings but also actively participated and their testimonies directly influenced the trial and subsequently the verdict. In the Rwandan case, uncovering the truth was important since victims wanted to hear about the fate of their relatives and to understand the root causes of the violence. This way, closure was easier to arrive at and thus people became more forgiving.

While the *Gacaca* system was largely seen as a success by accelerating access to justice other students of Rwanda's history have argued differently. Haberstock (2014) concludes that the Gacaca system as was constructed in the post-1994 Genocide was largely ineffective in providing non-partisan justice and the requisite reconciliation that was seen as the necessary condition for lasting peace in Rwanda. In the traditional construction of Gacaca, the system was supposed to reconcile and restore the balance of relationships in the community but the modern Gacaca system under the state was a highly politicised, system which was designed to accelerate prosecutions and punish the guilty. It would appear that the traditional role was shifted to include functions that traditionally belonged elsewhere. This view is however dispelled by students of Rwanda genocide who concede that while gacaca might have been over-praised, the system had great value for the Rwandese healing process (Clark, 2014)

2.1.9 African Union and Peacebuilding in Africa.

Eight years after its official launch, the African Union declared the year 2010 as the "African Year of Peace and Security," and launched a campaign urging people to "Make Peace Happen." This was the culmination of many years of often-catastrophic failure in peacebuilding under the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU was largely regarded as a failure in African peace

and security affairs because its resolutions were, by design, non-binding (Boateng, 2021). Kibet (2009) has argued that the failure of the OAU was due to internal inconsistencies of the organisation, compounded by the fact that it was founded on the principle of "non-interference" into the internal affairs of African nations. Because of this, many conflicts were left to the country-level protagonists, even though they had spilt over to other African countries. The OAU's failure in Nigeria during the Biafran war was overwhelming evidence of the impotence of the OAU to act as a peacebuilder in Africa. As summarised by Akuchu (1977:39), “OAU failed to distinguish its role in conflict resolution and did not recognise the difference between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Instead, OAU relied on peaceful settlement, in which persuasive diplomacy and mediation were employed liberally but obviously with little impact”.

Some failures of the OAU had far-reaching ramifications for the concerned countries and Africa as a whole. Sesay (1991) provides an example of failure in Chad, which not only failed to secure the peace but also led to the overthrow of a legitimate Government. The OAU was disbanded and the African Union was established in July 2002 with the goal of creating an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa that would have a voice in international affairs as a result of these and other failures (AU, 2003). Three of the objectives listed in the African Union's Constitutive Act and Protocol on Amendments to its Constitutive Act are specifically related to peacebuilding: 1) Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; 2) Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular involvement, and good governance; and 3) Promote and defend human and peoples' rights in line with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

The work of the AU is implemented through; 1) The Assembly of Heads of State and Government; 2) Executive Council; 3) the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC); 4) Specialised Technical Committees (STCs); 4) the Peace and Security Council, and 5) The African Union Commission. The AU structure promotes the participation of African citizens and civil society through the Pan-African Parliament and the Economic, Social & Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). Two other structures make up the African Union; The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Peer Review Mechanism. The AU is now implementing Agenda 2063 which is a strategic framework for Africa's long term socio-economic and integrative transformation. (AU, 2020).

Okumu (2009) argues that the reasons for the formation of the AU in July 2002 was to foster peace and stability. The Protocol relating to the establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Council (PCS) was adopted on 9 July 2002 and entered into force in December 2003. The PSC became operational in early 2004. The PSC Protocol, together with the PSC Rules of Procedure, and the AU Constitutive Act form the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), under which the AU has undertaken to promote peace, security and stability in Africa. Dersso (2014) points out that APSA is the policy and institutional framework that the AU established as a tool for implementing decisions taken in all aspects of peace, including conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding as well as post-conflict reconstruction.

Among the many responsibilities regarding peace and security, the PSC is mandated to undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding functions and to resolve conflicts wherever and whenever they have occurred (AU, 2020). The PSC Protocol further established the Panel of the Wise (PoW),

the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace Fund. These organs form what is now commonly referred to as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (Ncube, 2020). The AU peacebuilding policy is contained in the framework known as *Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework* (PCRD) which was adopted in the Gambia in 2006.

In the forward of the policy document, then Chairman of the African Union Commission, Alpha Konare wrote,

> the development of the AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) and the decision by the Executive Council to establish the necessary mechanisms and processes for its implementation is further witness to the resolve and commitment of the AU to comprehensively and decisively address the recovery and reconstruction needs of countries and communities emerging from conflict (African Union, 2006:iv)

These words reflected the desires of many Africans who have seen the suffering and destitution that persistent conflicts have brought in Africa. In keeping with Africa's aspiration for rejuvenation and progress, the goal of this strategy was to strengthen the timeliness, efficacy, and coordination of initiatives in post-conflict nations and establish the groundwork for social justice and enduring peace. To be more precise, the strategy was designed to: 1) uphold the status quo and prevent violence from resuming; 2) assist in addressing the causes of conflict; 3) stimulate and expedite planning and implementation of rebuilding efforts; and 4) improve complementarities and coordination between and among various players involved in PCRD processes (AU, 2016). The Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy is backed by three other significant documents: the Five-year Results-based Framework on PCRD, the Guidelines Note for the

Implementation of the African Union Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy, and a Policy Brief on the African Union's Quick Impact Project implementation.

While the PCRD does not specifically spell out peacebuilding, it nevertheless elaborates certain activities and interventions that amount to sustainable peace. Paragraph 14 defines Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) as,

> a comprehensive set of measures that seek to: address the needs of countries emerging from conflict, including the needs of affected populations; prevent escalation of disputes; avoid a relapse into violence; address the root causes of conflict, and consolidate sustainable peace. (AU, 2016:5).

Other chapters that touch on peacebuilding are as follows: Chapter 18, on inclusivity; Chapter 19, on peace dividends; Chapter 23(b, i), on population security; Chapter 27, on emergency; Chapter 27, emergency response after disasters: Chapter 31, on basic human needs and Chapter 40, on human rights. All these chapters are put together to bring the PCRD to the level of a sustainable peacebuilding policy such as the AU has never produced before. De Carvalho *et al* (undated) point out the PCRD was formulated at the time when there was a global review of how peacebuilding should be done. De Carvalho *et al* (undated) further argue the PCRD attempted to move away from the view that that peacebuilding was simply a range of post-conflict projects and initiatives but a mixture of non-linear, highly complex, multidimensional and long-term processes that are essentially political and local (De Carvalho *et al.* undated p2). This position, therefore, moves peacebuilding to the level of pre and post-conflict undertaking.

Even with the PCRD in place, the peacebuilding terrain in Africa under the AU cannot be said to have improved by much. Khadiagala (2021) argues that the AU faces tremendous obstacles in realising the vision and objectives articulated in the PCRD policy because of the poor resource base for peacebuilding and the confusing environment in which multiple actors and competing interests rule the day. The continental consensus has not significantly changed the peacebuilding practice, in which foreign interests and funding seem to dominate the agenda. Moreover, as Khadiagala (2021) sees it, this situation defeats the notion that peacebuilding should be locally owned and stunted the momentum of resource mobilisation for peacebuilding. This poor resource base was also noted earlier by Williams (2009) who also saw great hope in the PCRD because of the interest shown by AU member countries and the rigour with which the policy was written and adopted. Sherriff *et al* (2018) however, conclude that peacebuilding support is likely to change in the future to be more accountable and productive as the world moves into a new geopolitical order.

De Carvalho *et al* (2016) point out that the PCRD policy is a comprehensive and inclusive peacebuilding instrument, however from an implementation point of view, PCRD has faced major challenges because the PCRD is more a political than a technical process. Because of this, the coordination of peacebuilding activities has become a major problem for PCRD. Due to a lack of human, financial, and technical resources, PCRD initiatives in nations including the Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi, Mali, and Somalia have suffered. Additionally, their actions have not attracted nearly as much interest as peace support activities. Even when donors showed an interest in supporting PCRD at the AU, they were constrained by the unit's inability to carry out peacebuilding initiatives (Ncube, 2020).

Ncube (2020) further argues that the creation of a dedicated organ for the PCRD policy would have strengthened the policy and expanded the interest in its implementation. That said, it is important to note that the implementation of PCRD is going on through the various AU missions and liaison offices. According to a report by Amani Africa (2020), there are AU Missions in Somalia (AMISOM); in South Sudan (AUMISS); Mali and Sahel (MISAHEL); Liaison Offices in Burundi, CAR, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cote D'Ivoire, Sudan, Madagascar and Guinea Bissau as well as a Technical Support Team (AUTSTG) in The Gambia. In these countries, the AU is engaged in a wide range of peacebuilding activities including supporting the implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan (STP); the Revitalized Agreement for Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan; and the 2015 Algiers Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and the Sahel (Amani Africa, 2020).

2.1.10 Regional Organisations and Peacebuilding in Africa.

Other African regional and sub-regional economic communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC have also implemented peacebuilding modelled after the PSC and the PCRD. Adetual *et al* (2016) note that the UN charter recognises and encourages regional intuitions to take appropriate action on matters relating to international peace and security, provided their activities are consistent with the purpose and principles of the UN. African RECs have been involved long before the AU PCRD and have made significant contributions to peacebuilding through their policies. The expansion of the roles and responsibilities of African regional organizations to include responsibility for peacebuilding and conflict management, according to Adetual et al. (2016), adds legitimacy to the effectiveness of regional integration. However, this also raises some challenges, particularly when they appear to contradict the AU PCRD policy. Over and above their

original missions as economic organizations, African RECs have progressively assumed a key role in conflict resolution and peace assistance operations.

Over the years, the AU has learned to depend on the existing regional organisations as its building blocks to peace and security. The organisations are: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Southern African Development Community (SADC). Each of these RECs has different circumstances and different capacities therefore, they cannot be reviewed in comparison. Nevertheless, their involvement in peacebuilding has created important lessons for peacebuilding that need to be considered. Adetula *et al* (2016) argue that the records of IGAD and ECOWAS concerning promoting peace, stability and development in their respective regions are mixed. In some instances, the strategies used have been counterintuitive and appear to be more about employing military might to enforce rather than build the peace.

2.1.11 ECOWAS and Peacebuilding in Africa.

The ECOWAS has had perhaps the longest and most intense involvement in peacebuilding because of the nature of conflict in the West African region. ECOWAS was established in 1975 under an economic mandate. Ani and Amusan (2016) trace the origins of ECOWAS from the early when the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) sponsored a summit of East African Heads of State in 1968, Following the summit, two heads of state, Gowon of Nigeria and Eyadema of Togo then signed an agreement to of cooperation, this giving seed to the initial

stages of ECOWAS. In 1975, after a series of consultations in the region, sixteen heads of State in West Africa signed the "Treaty of Lagos" that officially launched the ECOWAS as an economic cooperation mechanism. In 1993, a review of its mandate added peace and security, which as Anan (2014) argues, was necessitated by long conflicts in West Africa that had brought many of its economies to the brink of collapse. Climate change, food insecurity, poverty, breaches of human rights, poor governance and corruption, racial marginalization, and the proliferation of small guns are some of the causes of these conflicts. Despite the fact that the ECOWAS region is not uniform, Odobo et al. (2016) contend that both at the national and international levels, poverty, underdevelopment, violence, and crime are shared cross-cutting characteristics among nations in the region. Therefore, a regional strategy for maintaining peace and resolving conflicts made logical.

It is instructive to note that the West Africa region continues to struggle with old and new forms of conflict and insecurity, including violent extremism, communal violence, piracy, farmer-herder conflicts and election-related violence, smuggling gang wars (GTZ, 2021). New conflict in the Sahel region affects the West African countries of Mali, Niger and Mauritania and the continuous low-intensity conflicts within countries that are supposed to be stable such as Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal keep the ECOWAS region in constant war footing that is counterproductive. Obi, cited in Anan (2014) argues that the conflicts in West Africa are deep and complex, and are rooted in the interplay of many factors including history, socio-economic crises, authoritarianism exercised by military juntas, international forces, and local struggles against all these vices. To this set of problems must be added the double-edged sword of the youth bulge, which Ismail (2015) argues brings socio-economic, political and security challenges because their exposure to modern

trappings and consumerism have created unbridled expectations and a crisis of rising expectations. At the same time, West African youth bring with them the potential for economic growth due to vigour, education and industry.

In light of this, ECOWAS created and approved two policy documents, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) of 2008 and the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 2001, that are aimed at preventing conflicts in the area. Both papers remind security institutions in Member States to uphold fundamental democratic governance norms in order to preserve peace (ECOWAS, 2016). *The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework* (ECPF, 2016) was created to serve as a comprehensive operational conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategy that allows the ECOWAS system and Member States to draw on human and financial resources at the regional (including civil society and the commercial sector) and international levels in their attempts to creatively transform conflict (ECOWAS, 2016). ECOWAS established an ECFP secretariat in 2014 to assist in the coordination of the ECPF implementation process within the ECOSAW commission. The ECPF has fourteen components, twelve of which can be said to be directly linked to peacebuilding or are contributory interventions to sustainable peacebuilding. These are; (1) early warning; (2) preventive diplomacy; (3); (4) media; (5) natural resource governance; and (6) cross-border initiatives, (7) governance; (8) practical disarmament; (9) women, peace and security; (10) youth empowerment; (11) humanitarian assistance; and (12) peace education.

Atuobi (2010) points out that ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework comes after earlier initiatives by the organisation to promote stability in the sub-region, were judged as having done

poorly. These included; *the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978), the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense (1982); ECOWAS Revised Treaty (1993); the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security; the Declaration of Political Principles(1991);* and the *Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001).* ECPF came into being to consolidate and improve on the delivery of these earlier protocols. Lucey and Arewa (2016) argue that the ECPF is a comprehensive peacebuilding instrument that was developed to streamline the region's peace agenda by removing structural and operational difficulties in peace operations. A key element in the ECPF has been the ability to mobilise ECOWAS peace resources such as the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) and the many Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) at the operational and tangible political will at the policy level to influence the peace direction in the region. Sterling (2011) argues that ECOWAS has responded with some degree of firmness to the threats of peace in the region, as exemplified in the case of Guinea, Niger and Côte d'Ivoire. However, the ad-hoc nature of the response in the absence of a coherent action plan for peace and security does not guarantee sustainable peacebuilding.

With specific reference to the ECPF, Atuobi (2011) argues that despite the opportunities available for the ECPF to spearhead the course of sustainable peacebuilding in the region, the potential for the ECPF has not been realised because of the lack of commitment of member states of ECOWAS to the implementation of documents they have signed. On the other hand, however, Uzoechina (2008), while cautious about the application of the term "state fragility", has argued that fragility is defined as a series of weaknesses in state institutions and the inability to respond to emergencies has an impact on conflict and by implication, on peace instruments like the ECPF.

Another challenge for the ECPF is the lack of financial resources, which coincidentally cuts across many other functions of ECOWAS. However, in 2018, the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Mr Jean-Claude Brou, and the United Nations (UN) Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, Mr Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, signed an MOU, whose purpose was to strengthen cooperation between the ECOWAS Commission and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in support of peacebuilding and sustaining peace in West Africa (Kabia, 2016).

The role of civil society (CSOs) in governance and peacebuilding continues to generate mixed reactions from experts, given the inability of CSOs to enforce their will. CSOs have been praised and condemned almost in equal measure in peacebuilding. White, cited in Opoku (2007), defines civil society as the realm between the state and the household. This realm is often voluntary and is formed by members in order to further their interest. ECOWAS's collaboration with civil society (CSOs) in pursuing sustainable peace has been judged successful. Both the United Nations and the AU recognise the important role of the CSOs. Opoku (2007) notes that ECOWAS has since 2001, collaborated with CSOs to implement ECOWAS Early Warning System, even though this has not improved the capacity of ECOWAS to respond promptly to emerging conflicts or stop ongoing ones, due to structural hurdles between the system and the capacity for early response.

A concrete example of CSO collaboration has been with the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) to strengthen the capacity of stakeholders in the region to mediate peace at local and national levels (Eze, 2021). Opoku (2007) argues that over and above the normative area of cooperation, the ECOWAS/WANEP cooperation has resulted in periodic policy briefs, which highlight conflict issues and help ECOWAS to act promptly. ECOWAS also collaborates

with another CSO network, the West Africa Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) to build capacity for ECOWAS in addressing broad human security issues in the sub-region.

The takeaways from the development of the two case studies highlight the regional activity of WANEP and how it has helped to reshape the regionalization of peacebuilding in West Africa. On the other side, WACSOF has worked hard over the years to establish itself as a respectable and regionally active civil society voice in West Africa. However, WACSOF has struggled with identity issues and a lackluster presence in the region. As a result, there has been a constant clamor to reinstate WACSOF so that it can reclaim its role in West Africa. One cannot ignore the role of regional identities of the two organizations and how they were created to appreciate their unique regional identities, even though WANEP and WACSOF have developed as regional civil society actors in their rights.

2.1.12 IGAD and Peacebuilding in Africa.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is another regional organisation that has contributed significantly to peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa. IGAD was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGAD) which was founded in 1986. In 1983 and 1984, six countries in the Horn of Africa - Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda sought the support of the United Nations to establish an intergovernmental body for the development and drought control in the Horn region. This resulted in the formation of IGADD in 1986. On 21 March 1996 in Nairobi the Assembly of Heads of State and Government amended the IGADD Charter and established IGAD with expanded areas of regional cooperation and a special focus on the widespread famine, ecological degradation and

economic hardship caused by persistent droughts. Eritrea became the 7th member but suspended its membership in 2007 to protest Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia.

IGADs responsibility in conflict prevention, management and resolution (CPMR) is managed through two peacebuilding policy instruments; the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), established in 2002 and the IGAD Capacity-Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT). These policy tools are based on the understanding that without peace and stability in the East and Horn of Africa region, IGAD will not be able to successfully address environmental degradation, drought, famine, poverty, and underdevelopment (Bereketeab, 2019). The CEWARN is a governmental and non-governmental organization network with complementary missions in local, national, and regional peace and development issues. An IGAD tool for gathering and exchanging information on potentially violent conflicts, as well as their emergence and intensification, is CEWARN. With this knowledge, IGAD members are expected to deal with the issue effectively before it worsens.

Additionally, the rebuilt IGAD was given new mandates for economic integration, collaboration, and conflict resolution. Concerned about the numerous conflicts plaguing the area, IGAD began conflict prevention, management, and resolution (CPMR) programs, and over time, as Adetula et al. (2016) contend, migration and refugee issues, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, regional integration, and conflict prevention, mediation, and management issues all became significant and vital parts of IGAD's mandate. Bereketeab (2019) observes the same development and contends that IGAD's primary concerns are now regional security, stability, and peace. In order to achieve this, IGAD has established partnerships with the AU, EU, UN, and other regional and global

organizations. Since 2013, IGAD has contributed to AMISOM, the African Union Mission in Somalia, and the peacekeeping efforts in South Sudan (Bereketeab,2019).

In terms of policy and institutional development, the establishment and operationalisation of CEWARN can be considered one of IGAD's most significant achievements. The office of the United Nations Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) defines an early warning system as an integrated system of hazard monitoring and prediction so that appropriate early action can be undertaken. IGAD'S CEWARN operates from Addis Ababa and cooperates with regional early warning units, or CEWARUs, based in each IGAD member country (Dersso, 2014). The structure of CEWARN is very elaborate and works through a complex web of national government organisations, sub-regional and even community levels.

Taking into consideration the very elaborate terms of reference of CEWARN. The question that arises is; how has it worked for IGAD? Opinions differ on this question. Aseto (2013) argues that, despite its presence in the Horn of Africa, CEWARN has not been a useful tool. CEWARN has been unable to accurately predict conflicts in the IGAD region because of the unpredictable nature of human beings, on whose behaviours conflict revolves. Since starting operations in 2003, CEWARN, according to Elowson and de Albuquerque (2016), has restricted its work to areas that were deemed politically less sensitive and non-intrusive into member nations' domestic affairs in terms of both subject matter and geographic extent. However, the scope of CEWARN's activity has increased since 2012, and it now includes gathering, analyzing, and disseminating early warning data in areas covered by Africa's early warning system, such as political governance, socioeconomics, the environment, and the spread of armed conflict in the IGAD. As noted by

Kasaija (2013), CEWARNs potential, in the same way as ECOWAS early warning system has potential that can only be enjoyed if there is political will. Many times, Governments are deeply implicated in conflicts and therefore CEWARN can be only as good as the political will to facilitate and utilise the information generated by the system. This is critical especially for Kenya where pastoralist conflicts are very complicated situations which are at once very complicated political, cultural and economic conflicts.

In 2006, IGAD created the Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT) to build national capacities in the IGAD region to combat terrorism and promote regional security cooperation. ICPAT operates in five main areas including; enhancing judicial capacity; optimizing interdepartmental cooperation; enhancing border control; providing training, sharing information and best practices; and promoting strategic cooperation. ICPAT collaborates with the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC), to increase community capacity for counter-terrorism. Under ICPAT, IGAD not only supports antiterrorism interventions in the region but also supports joint criminal extradition (IGAD, 2021). Weldesellassie (2011) argues that the major shortcoming of IGAD has been institutional weakness and reliance on donor funding to undertake its work. This problem affects nearly all the undertakings of the African Union. IGAD is no different where for example, the ICPAT is funded by, among others, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. The problem with this kind of situation is that there is likely always to be a discrepancy between what the organisations plan and what they can achieve given their funding situation (Thobejane *et al* 2018).

2.1.13 The East African Community and Peacebuilding in Africa.

The East African Community (EAC) is also another AU affiliated organisation that has developed and is implementing its peacebuilding policy. Six Partner States make up the EAC, a regional intergovernmental organization: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of Uganda. Its main office is in Tanzania's Arusha. The Treaty for East African Co-operation, which was signed in June 1967 by the presidents of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, established the first community that took over from the East African Common Services Organization on December 1, 1967. Through a mediation agreement, this organization was disbanded in 1977, with the stipulation that Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania look into potential areas of future cooperation.

The Agreement for the Establishment of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Cooperation was signed by the three countries in 1993. On 30 November 1993, the Secretariat of the Permanent Tripartite Commission was established in the EAC Headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania, and full East African Co-operation operations began on 14 March 1996. Through a treaty, the commission was raised to a full cooperation agreement in 1997. The Treaty comes into force on July 7, 2000, establishing the East African Community. The community has 177 million residents and a collective GDP of $193 billion.

According to Chikwanha (2007) the conflict in the East African region is both a product of state weaknesses in managing the transition from colonial rule to independence, and the failure to institute democracy instead of authoritarianism. Access to water and resources is yet another source of conflict and a threat to peace in the EAC region. Elowson and de Albuquerque (2016)

argue that the region suffers from humanitarian emergencies, natural disasters, extreme poverty and famine, not to mention interstate, intrastate and non-state conflicts. Regarding the River Nile, Kagwanja (2007) has argued that the next potential problem is the control of the Nile, which, under an archaic colonial treaty developed by the British, is claimed by Egypt and Sudan. Not only is this a danger and potentially an international conflict situation, but might threaten peace within the region as well. The wrangles between Kenya and Uganda over the borders and resources of Lake Victoria, especially *Migingo* Island pose yet another threat to peace in the region (Rossi, 2016).

The EAC peace policy is contained in the East African Community Peace and Security Protocol published in 2013 under Article 124 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, which recognises the need for peace and security within the East African Partner States. The protocol identifies key areas of cooperation for sustainable peace to be realized in the EAC region. These include: (a) conflict prevention, management and resolution; (b) prevention of genocide; (c) combating terrorism; (d) combating and suppressing piracy; (e) peace support operations; (f) disaster risk reduction, management and crisis response; (g) management of refugees; (h) control of proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons; (i) combating transnational and cross border crimes; including drug and human trafficking, illegal migration, money laundering, cybercrime and motor vehicle theft; (j) addressing and combating cattle rustling; and (k) Prisons and Correctional Services including exchange of prisoners, detention, custody and rehabilitation of offenders (EAC, 2013).

Article 8 of the protocol is clear on the peacebuilding responsibility of EAC and state that,

> the Partner States shall formulate a joint mechanism for the operationalisation of peace support operations within the context of the Charter of the United Nations, the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Treaty. The Partner States shall conduct peace support operations within the Community under a conflict prevention, management and resolution framework (EAC, 2013:10).

Peacebuilding in the EAC region is not the sole responsibility of the organisation because there are other AU-affiliated organisations such as IGAD and COMESA. However, as far back as 1990, the EAC had taken peacebuilding as a key activity and taken steps, for example, to resolve, the Kenya-Uganda border clashes among the Pokot, Sebei, Turkana, and Karamajong communities. In this particular case, the Memorandum of Understanding on Common Defence and Security provides specifically for the establishment of border committees to stabilize the border areas.

The role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in peacebuilding in the EAC region predates that of Governments and that of the ECA by far. A rich crop of literature exists on the role of civil society in peace processes in Africa (Omach, 2016; Issifu, 2017). The Kenya County Devolution Toolkit describes civil society as organised voluntary non-state institutions which are formed and led by the citizens to champion their interests and concerns. Sometimes they are formed as activist groups to press for the interest of the public against the authorities. Civil society involvement helps to bring a broad range of social and political interests to the negotiating table, making the process more inclusive, participatory and sustainable.

CSOs have been part and parcel of the development dialogue in the EAC and have played a supportive, sometimes adversarial role in the fields of health, education, governance, agriculture and empowerment advocacy. Because of their flexibility, CSOs have been able to adapt to changes in the environment thus always finding relevance. The one area in which civil society has become increasingly active and increased its relevance has been peacebuilding. Paffenholz (2009), argues that civil society organisations do have an important role in reducing violence, and building the necessary, though not positioned for building sustainable peace. This might explain why most civil society peacebuilding interventions tend to be short-term projects, and are often confined to a small part of a community. However, the context of their work is very important, especially the effect that may arise through the behaviour of Governments or donors who often have a significant influence on the CSOs. Many governments in the region view CSOs with suspicion and sometimes subject civil society leaders to severe harassment and intimidation (Mendeloson, 2015)

The East African Community has put in place the Consultative Dialogue Framework (CDF) for Private Sector and Civil Society to facilitate dialogue between the EAC and civil society partners to facilitate dialogue and exchange of ideas for the good of all the partners (EAC, 2021). This forum is in support of the Non-Governmental Organisation Coalition for East Africa (NGOCEA) which is the organisation through which EAC collaborates with civil society in the region. The EAC established its Department of Gender, Community Development and Civil Society to liaise with CSOs from the region. From a policy perspective, it is evident the EAC is committed to civil society cooperation and integration in their work, especially in governance and economic development. Another organisation the East African Civil Society Organisations Forum (EACSOF) also works with the EAC in support of EAC integration and cooperation. With a special

focus on the EAC, Reinold (2019) finds that cooperation with CSOs is varied and largely dependent on support from member states; allies in the respective organisation's bureaucracy; and characteristics of the CSOs themselves, especially their mandate.

2.1.14 Kenya Peacebuilding Architecture and Policy Framework.

Kenya's peacebuilding architecture is structured around Governmental institutions (such as peacebuilding committees (formal and informal), national security forces and county administration) and Non-Governmental institutions (NGOs), international and regional partners, and a host of local peacebuilding stakeholders functioning at the community and village level to ensure peace and security. Peacebuilding in Kenya is guided by the Sessional Paper No. 5 of 2014 on the National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management. This elaborate document lays out how Kenya Government hopes to ensure sustainable peace in the country and beyond. The vision of the policy,

> is to enhance coordination in prevention, mitigation and management of conflicts as well as sustained peacebuilding processes in the most participatory, culturally sensitive, inclusive, transparent and accountable manner. This policy framework is the Government's deliberate effort towards developing a comprehensive, legal and administrative mechanism to govern peacebuilding and conflict management processes in the country (GOK, 2015: xi).

The policy itself was a long time in the making because of the long processes of consultation that the policy had to go through. Peacebuilding stakeholders, such as the Kenya Peace Conference (KPC), which is a network of organizations committed to peace in Kenya acknowledges that the process, though long, was necessary.

In 2018, the Government passed the National Cohesion and Peacebuilding Bill (2018) which provided for the establishment of the National Cohesion and Peace Building Commission. Peacebuilding is defined in the Act as,

> non-military measures and interventions targeted at any community in Kenya for (a) achieving sustainable peace; (b) resolving an ongoing inter-communal or intra-communal conflict; (c) reconciling communities; or (d) reducing or eliminating the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening the social, economic, environmental, cultural and political capacities of the community (GoK 2016:3).

Before the publishing of the Sessional Paper No. 5 of 2014 on the National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, the Government had established the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC) as a multi-agency organisation with the mandate to coordinate all peace-related activities in Kenya (GOK, 2010). Over time, the NSC has taken on a technical and advisory role on behalf of the Government. The organisation also doubles up as Kenya's Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit (CEWERU) for the implementation of the CEWARN Protocol acceded to by the IGAD Members States in 2002. Among the many responsibilities that the NSC has, one of the most important is to enhance the coordination of peacebuilding and conflict management programmes among stakeholders at the National and County level. This responsibility brings all Local Peacebuilding under the purview of the NSC, be they Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees (also known as District Peacebuilding Committees) or any other, functioning at the county, sub-county and local level. In collaboration with other stakeholders, the NSC is also tasked with developing, implementing, interpreting, and reviewing policies, strategies, laws, regulations, standards, guidelines, and mechanisms governing

peacebuilding and conflict management, as well as domesticating and implementing international instruments and regional declarations, regional protocols, agreements, and mechanisms governing peacebuilding and conflict management. By doing so, NCS establishes Kenya's peacebuilding agenda.

Kenya's peace policy envisages an institutional framework that ensures that peacebuilding is sustainable. At the National Government level, the responsible Ministry shall establish a National Peace Council to oversee all peace activities in the country. A National Peace Secretariat, whose functions will be similar to those currently being performed by the National Steering Committee (NSC), shall assist the Council. At the County level, the structure will be repeated such that there shall be a County Peace Council (with membership from the administration, Member of Parliament (MP), civil society, faith-based organisations, elders, minority groups and the youth). The County Peace Council shall be assisted by a secretariat similar to the NSC, assisted by a County Peace Secretariat. At the frontlines, the policy proposes the institutionalisation of traditional local peace committees that will evolve from *ad hoc* councils of elders who traditionally are the guarantors of peace in their communities to the new formal structures that the Government can work with. The policy directs that these local peace committees shall be guided by standard guidelines and terms of reference and function like any other formal structure. The policy recognised that local peace committees have the advantage of utilising traditional dispute resolution mechanisms that play an important role in sustainable peacebuilding.

Adan & Pkalya (2006) trace the development of Kenyan local peacebuilding committees to the early 1990s in Wajir, with the establishment of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee

(WPDC) in 1995. This was done out of the deep frustrations felt by many residents at the failure of the government to resolve conflict in and among the different Somali clans living in Northern Kenya. In 1994, market women, led by one Dekha Ibrahim, a peace crusader in the County, organized themselves into a peace group and brought in other clan members to strategise on how to bring peace. This mediation and reconciliation process expanded into the county, among clan members, youth and even Government officers and in 1995, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee was created as part of the district security committee. Currently based mostly in the Wajir District of northeastern Kenya, WPDC is a network of 27 governmental and non-governmental organizations that represent a wide range of people, including businesswomen, elders, and religious leaders. Conflict prevention and resolution using both conventional and contemporary methods is the main instrument of WPDC. Local peacebuilding committees have been credited with reducing violence wherever they exist, as was the case in the often turbulent Northern and Coast provinces in the beginning of 2008 (van Tongeren, 2011).

Complementing the work of the Government in peacebuilding are Kenyan Civil Society organisations (CSOs) whose work predates Government efforts in peacebuilding. The long history of successful peacebuilding in the NGO sector forms part and parcel of the national peace agenda. One of the winning strategies employed by NGOs has been mediation and networking at various levels to achieve lasting peace. Kirimi (2018), in reviewing peacebuilding networks in Kenya has argued that by functioning as networks, organizations increase their capability to penetrate communities and areas that would otherwise not be easy for single entities to reach. As an example of a functioning network, Kirimi cites the Peace and Development Network Trust (PeaceNet

Kenya), an umbrella network organization bringing together individuals and groups from across the country for the coordination of peacebuilding in Kenya.

Faith-based organisations have had a long history of conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Kenya and at times have acted to help communities alongside, and sometimes despite Government peacebuilding efforts. Muchanga (2019) and Chepkorir (2019) argue that religious response to conflict and peacebuilding is founded on the biblical principles of peace, love and justice. Examining the role of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), Githigaro (2012) argues that the nature of today's conflicts which overrun the grasp of traditional diplomacy, religious actors all over the globe are getting involved in peacemaking because they have the potential to access people at the individual and the community level where conflicts are felt the most. The real accomplishment of NCCK was its capacity to facilitate the pooling of resources, indicating that FBOs are essential participants in such alliances as a result of their propensity for public credibility and their capacity to carry out long-term initiatives for community healing and reconciliation. (Githigaro 2012, Magondu, 2012, Musyoki, 2020). However, Muchanga (2019) posits that conflict presents serious cleric challenges because often the clergy is unprepared or unwilling to deal with violent conflict. This is an important point of discussion because history shows that clergy have sometimes not been innocent in conflicts. For example, Delipero (2020) argues in the case of Rwanda that the 1994 genocide occurred in one of Africa's most Christian regions, where 90% identify themselves as either Catholic, Protestant, or Seventh-day Adventist Church

Of rising importance in Kenya is the Islamic faith's contribution to Kenya's peacebuilding agenda. This is because many conflicts which have been seen as religion-based have taken place in areas where Islam is the predominant religion. Colonialism which gave Christianity the latitude it enjoyed over Islam in the colonial economy is partly responsible for the grievances that Muslims express today. However, several Islamic organisations are now at the forefront of peacebuilding in Kenya. NGOs in Mombasa County came together as the Coast Peace Initiative and are now working with partners such as the Coast Inter-Faith Council of Clerics (CICC) Trust to mobilise communities against extremism and violence. In Nairobi, the Eastleigh Fellowship Center brings together Christians and Muslims come together for dialogue. The centre hosts sports programming for youth, with basketball teams consisting of Muslims and Christians, and offers peace training for youth, with the support of World Faiths Development Dialogue (Parsitau, 2020).

Within the context of formal infrastructure for peace (I4P), Local Peacebuilding Committees have been the glue that holds all the pieces together, so to speak. Local Peacebuilding Committees have been the centre-piece in the "local turn" debate in peacebuilding which, is an attempt to put local communities at the centre of their peacebuilding efforts (Ondendaal, 2010; Nganje, 2020; Adan and Pkalya 2006). Amid their popularity, certain questions have arisen. For example, where should the line be drawn between justice and peace? Under what kind of policy frameworks should local peacebuilding committees operate? Irene (2018) argues that over time, two main categories of local peace committees have emerged; the formal state-recognised Local Peacebuilding Committees and the informal ones that normally operate at the grassroots level, both of which are very important and have been useful in sustainable peacebuilding.

Kenya's peacebuilding agenda has been tested by the militaristic response to the terrorist group, Al-Shabaab which has been a thorn in the flesh because of its indiscriminate killings in the Country (Lind *et al,* 2017). On 16 October 2011, Kenyan troops entered Somalia to launch a military offensive against al-Shabaab. Titled Operation *Linda Nchi* (Protect the Country), the operation was necessitated by the constant armed raids that al-Shabaab had been conducting in Kenya since 2008. Anderson and McNight (2015) argue that rather than eradicate al-Shabaab, the blowback from the invasion has been very costly for Kenya with bombings in Nairobi, Garissa and Mombasa. It has been argued that the group has maximized on local political wrangles to make incursions and gain favour in Kenya, among the disgruntled populace in the Coast and North Eastern.

To respond to terrorism more effectively, Kenya passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 30 of 2012 (revised in 2019). A major problem with the implementation of the anti-terrorism act has been the response of the Kenyan security forces. The method of choice has been the carrying out of collective punishment often in naked violation of any human rights. Mass arrests are carried out indiscriminately, often netting the innocent while the culprits go Scott free (Wakube *et al*, 2017) Programs such as *Usalama* Watch undoubtedly alienated Kenya's Somalis and Muslims and was deeply felt in Garissa and other parts of Kenya. It can be argued, therefore, that the response to terrorism, even with a clear Anti-terrorism Act has not gained nor built the peace (Torbjörnsson and Jonsson, 2016)

2.1.15 Local Peace Committees (LPCs) and Peacebuilding in Africa

Both formal and informal Local Peacebuilding Committees work side by side in Africa to support the peacebuilding process. Nganje (2021) argues that informal peacebuilding structures grew out

of necessity to fill the void left by national and international peacebuilders who often leave because of the end of a peacebuilding project or simple inability to continue. The Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) in Kenya serves as an excellent example where, in 1995, locals rose to fill the peacebuilding gap left by donors who had pulled out. Although it would later be part of the larger district peace agenda, the Wajir peace movement was initiated and led by local peace crusaders within the conflict-affected communities. Chivasa (2015) also provides excellent insight into informal peace committees in Zimbabwe with the conclusion that informal LCPs can solve local problems because they live with the conflicts in the villages, can apply culture-specific solutions, and do involve the voices of all concerned. However, Chivasa notes that the flexibility of these Local Peacebuilding Committees is overshadowed by the unavailability of clear procedures and no standardised ways of the creation of the committees.

In Burundi, Local Peacebuilding Committees such as the Kibimba Peace Committee, established in 1994, emerged as informal mechanisms for dialogue, conflict management, reconciliation, and social rehabilitation to complement the official Arusha Peace Process that ended a decade-long civil war. Burundi also benefitted from the traditional institutions of conflict management, namely the *bashingantahe*, which also played a role in the peace process. These informal structures have been effective in restoring trust among rival Hutu and Tutsi, and rebuilding the social fabric of a community that had been beleaguered by inter-ethnic atrocities for many years (Nganje, 2021) However, a key challenge that all these informal Local Peacebuilding Committees have is the lack of the ability to maintain their gains of peace due to lack of resources to do so.

While informal peacebuilding committees still seem to relevance in Africa, the peacebuilding literature however, seems to be pointing to formal Local Peacebuilding Committees as the future of sustainable peacebuilding. This shift is important because of the changing nature of conflict globally and locally which has necessitated the review of what local peacebuilding should look like. Different countries have employed Local Peacebuilding Committees in various ways as part of their I4P based on their culture, institutional traditions and particular needs. Generally, many I4P have included Local Peace Committees focusing on violence reduction, promoting dialogue, problem-solving, community building and reconciliation (Odendaal, 2010)

The trend toward formal Local Peacebuilding Committees has taken hold among peacebuilding stakeholders, at the global, continental and even nationally in Kenya, partly because of the need for accountable entities in the new I4P agenda, but also because of the "local turn" debate that has now become official policy for peacebuilding donors such the European Union, USAID and the UN (Ejdus & Juncos, 2017). This policy shift has given new prominence to Local Peacebuilding Committees, many of which are now being given official recognition and being made part of the official infrastructure for peace (I4P) in many countries. The literature is a bit more robust for African Local Peacebuilding Committees than elsewhere but even in Asia and Latin America, formalisation of Local Peacebuilding Committees has been done at different levels. Bret & Florez (2016) provide the example of Colombia where, even though still facing conflict, local-level peacebuilding initiatives (LPBIs) have proven to have an important impact on the causes and consequences of armed conflict.

Nganje (2020) claims that South Africa was the first country in Africa to institutionalize local peace committees and give them a statutory mandate to localize a national peace process. A nationwide network of peace committees was established by the National Peace Accord (NPA), which was signed in 1991 as part of South Africa's political transition. These committees were tasked with fostering communication, fostering tolerance, and resolving conflicts in the newly independent South Africa through mediation and problem-solving techniques. Between 1991 and 1994, the Local Peacebuilding Committees were in operation. Osemeren & Osemeren have stated that the Local Peacebuilding Committees were not as successful as was anticipated in terms of their ability to prevent deaths caused by political violence in the last stages of the apartheid fight; nonetheless, the overall conclusion was that the local peace committees were successful in preventing various potentially violent situations, including the strengthening of local discussion and problem-solving mechanisms. Indeed, in South Africa, the importance of Local Peacebuilding Committees has recently come to light as a result of widespread xenophobic violence that broke out in 2008 and resulted in the deaths of over 60 individuals in key urban centers throughout the country. The Action Support Centre (ASC), a Johannesburg-based NGO, worked to revive Local Peacebuilding Committees in major hotspots of xenophobic conflict in townships and impoverished suburbs around Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Durban (Beetar, 2019).

Ghana built a peace architecture in 2005 with assistance from the UNDP, consisting of national, regional, and district peace councils with the purpose of fostering communication (Odendaal, 2010; van Tongeren, 2011). According to Ghana's experience, the formalization of Local Peacebuilding Committees has successfully assisted in mediating the country's democratic transition (Kumar 2011). The sub-regional process for preventing, de-escalating, and resolving

pastoral and related disputes along Ethiopia's borders with Kenya, Somalia, and South Sudan is significantly localized in Ethiopia by local peace committees. Local Peacebuilding Committees, who are a part of the IGAD Early Warning system, in turn receive financial, technical, and material help from IGAD's Rapid Response Fund. The formalization of the committees is necessary for this stage of peacebuilding since it calls for a certain degree of acceptance of the relevant Local Peacebuilding Committees. Chivasa notes that Local Peacebuilding Committees have taken center stage in peacebuilding in the instance of Zimbabwe. These organizations aid in the micro- and macro-level building of peace via cooperation, coexistence, and tolerance. Additionally, Mashonaland West province peace committees contributed by raising awareness of gender issues and conflict resolution in communities, as well as violence against women and children (Chivasa 2017).

The National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC), which was entrusted with creating a national conflict management and peacebuilding policy and coordinating several peacebuilding projects, including Local Peacebuilding Committees, was founded by the government of Kenya in 2001. This marked the beginning of attempts to formalize local peacebuilding organizations in Kenya (Nganje, 2020). However, it was the prolonged post-election violence that occurred in 2008 that prompted Kenya to review its national peace architecture and place a stronger emphasis on building peace on the shoulders of already-existing peacebuilding organizations like local peace committees. The creation of county peace committees around the nation was encouraged by the 2008 National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement that put an end to the conflict. Since then, peace committees have been established and given the necessary resources in practically every district in Kenya with the assistance of outside donors like the

USAID. Despite uneven results, the Local Peacebuilding Committees have developed into important parts of a developing national architecture for peacebuilding and conflict management. According to a *Kituo Cha Sheria* assessment, there was significantly less post-election violence in the counties where a County Peace Committee was present in 2007–2008. The then-District Peace Committees (Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees) were instrumental in preventing violent violence in unstable areas during the referendum in 2010.

Nganje (2020) identifies two significant problems in the debate over the institutionalisation of local peace committees (Local Peacebuilding Committees). The first is that once these committees receive recognition, they are unable to resist the influence of the formal institutions and procedures of the current government. Their ability to function effectively depends much on the type and quality of their interactions with the formal government institutions and procedures. But this also means that state and elected officials frequently manipulate the Local Peacebuilding Committees. Githaiga (2017) points out that the process of institutionalising the infrastructure for peace removed the initiative for peace from the affected communities and placed it in the hand of the state, thus silencing local voices. Peacebuilding then becomes a top-down approach that does not reverberate with the locals. At the LPC level, the voice of the locals and the ability to coordinate many intervening, and sometimes unharmonious interests at the local level is what makes the difference. That said, the role of the state is still very critical in sustainable peacebuilding as argued by Irene & Majekodunmi (2017).

The second major challenge has to do with the peacemaking tools of trade available for the Local Peacebuilding Committees. The peacebuilding methods of local peace committees sometimes go contrary to state processes, especially where peace is to be negotiated because of violent conflict. Chopra (2009) argues that the obligation to prosecute serious crimes can sometimes contradict the measures necessary to reestablish peace in society. This is very common in the arid north-eastern Kenya where the populace has relied on traditional-Islamic laws to manage their conflict. Part of this problem comes from the incompatibility of official legal processes with local socio-cultural norms. Therefore, the notion of "justice" in the courts can be at variance with what local communities consider "just." This dilemma can scuttle the peace process as explained by Abdi (2015), citing the case of the Wajir District's local peacemakers, the Al-Fatah group. The group was singly credited with peace Wajir and surrounding counties due to its application of local peacemaking mechanisms, known as *heer*. But Al-Fatah also applies *diya* which is the payment of blood money to resolve deadly conflicts (Ibrahim 2018). Kenya's penal code requires death by hanging if one is found guilty of murder.

2.1.16 Background of Local Peace Committees in Kenya

Before the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, the Government of Kenya embraced the District Peace Committee (DPC) Framework, which envisaged at least one District Peace Committee (Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees) per district, supported by smaller peace committees at Division and location levels. With the strengthening of local peacebuilding agency under the new constitution, the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC) took over the mantel and has pushed the local peacebuilding agenda through policy and programmatic support. The NSC describes Local Peace Committees as,

> community representative institutions at various administrative levels… (which) bring together stakeholders who work on peace and security issues in the district. These entities combine traditional dispute resolution mechanisms involving traditional elders, women and religious leaders on the one hand and formal mechanisms for conflict resolution including those by government administrative and security agencies on the other. (Adan and Pkalya, 2006).

Peacebuilding is not a new phenomenon in Kenya. Precolonial African traditional justice systems ensured the peace and engaged in peacebuilding through traditional jurisprudence (Muigua, 2017; Wig, 2016). The birth of Kenya's modern local peace committees originated in Wajir County (North Eastern Kenya) in the early 1990s when a group of women met at a market in 1993 and started talking about how to resolve the problem of insecurity and constant conflicts involving the different communities in the then Wajir District. This drive was partly due to perceived apathetic response to the very bad security situation in Wajir. Interest in the collaborative peace process grew and by 1995, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee was formed, with the merger of different peace committees, and incorporating members from all government departments, religious leaders, NGO representatives, traditional chiefs and security officers (Menkhaus, 2008; Hedditch, 2016; van Tongeren, 2013; Pkalya, 2013).

Other districts soon followed suit, and with Riam Turkana Peace Committee (TDPDC) being formed in 2001, Isiolo District and Mandera Peace Committee, (IDPCRC), in 2001, Samburu District Peace and Development Committee (SDPDC), in 2003, including Ijara and Marakwet. Most Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees formed before 2009, were effectively part and parcel of the Provincial Administration system and were invariably chaired by the then District Commissioners (DCs). After the 2008 post-election violence the National Accord and

Reconciliation Act of 2008 recommended the formation of District Peace Committees in all districts (Menkhaus, 2008). At least 250 sub-county Peacebuilding Committees are active in Kenya and are manned by different people of varying socioeconomic and educational backgrounds, and partnered with both local and international peacebuilding stakeholders.

At the point of officially accepting the local peace committees as part and parcel of the country's peace infrastructure, it was decided that their work would be non-compensatory. It was argued that doing volunteer work for the realisation of "own peace" would yield better results rather than treating local peace committee work as another scheme of service. NSC has however facilitated some Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to access office space, acquire furniture and provided training in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. For encouragement, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have been rewarded for their work through Head of State commendations, and many of them hold the HSC title (Head of State Commendation) title. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have no legal framework, even though they operate under National Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management, Sessional Paper No. 5 of 2014. The goal of this study is to improve coordination in conflict prevention, mitigation, and management as well as long-term peacebuilding in a way that is participatory, culturally aware, open, and accountable. This vision places Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees and other peacebuilding organizations in the center of Kenya's peace agenda and will provide the nation's peacebuilding and conflict management efforts a legal and administrative framework.

Kenya's peacebuilding agenda is also anchored in: the Constitution of Kenya (2010), Executive Order No. 2 of May 2013; on the organisation of the Government of the Republic of Kenya.

Executive Order No. 1 of May 2016; on the Structure of the National Executive, Circular No. 4 of 2008 on National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement, the 2000 Protocol on the Establishment of a CEWARN for the IGAD Member States, the East African Community Peace and Security Protocol, 2014 and the Scheme of Service for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management personnel approved by the Public Service Commission in November 2014, and the Draft National Peace Council Bill, 2016.

The terms of reference of the Sub-county Peace Committees did not take formal shape until after 2009 when the newly established National Steering Committee brought together the established Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to attempt to harmonise the work of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees and in the process, strengthen the country's infrastructure for peace. The National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC) is an inter-agency committee with its secretariat in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government. It brings together relevant Government and Non-Governmental, NGOs, Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs), Media, and Bilateral and Multilateral partners who are stakeholders in Kenya's peace agenda. NSC also doubles up as the Conflict Early Warning and Resource Unit (CEWERU) for the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) Mechanism (NSC, 2013).

The Terms of Reference (ToRs) stipulate that the membership to a local peace committee shall be determined by local circumstances but should, as far as possible adhere to the constitutional two-thirds gender rule, encourage diversity and be non-discriminatory. Every administrative unit shall determine how many members should form the committee but this should not be more than 15,

drawn from community representatives working on peace, CSOs, women, youth, and people living with disabilities, the private sector and other stakeholders who may be useful to the committee (NSC, 2016). County commissioners and their assistants serve as the patrons of the peace committee while the Security and Intelligence Services serve as Ex-Officio members (NSC, 2016). Peace committees are urged to conduct elections every three years and should not be influenced by the electoral cycle of the country. At the policy level, the approval of the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management in 2012 by the Government signaled a new intent to raise peacebuilding to new heights however, the lack of legislation and the need for clarification of roles between the National Cohesion and Integration Committee (NCIC) and the NSC still hampers sustainable peacebuilding.

A consultative meeting organised by NSC in 2013 to review the performance of local peace committees concluded that these entities had indeed managed to promote peace in the country by facilitating community dialogue, coordinating peace work, reducing tension at the community level and enabling more rapid response to conflict. In some cases, for example, in Nakuru, the local peace committees facilitated dialogue between two previously warring communities to steer the County towards peaceful 2013 elections (NSC, 2013). However, the report concedes that peacebuilding is an unfinished business in the country. Reconciliation and trauma healing for people who have suffered the effect of violent conflict has not been completed and therefore the country seems to be in a state of negative peace. As both the impact of climate change and the emerging Covid-19 pandemic continue to damage the global economy, old conflicts in Kenya associated with access to natural resources and cross border conflicts will only increase (Mustalista, 2020). But perhaps the major problem affecting sustainable peacebuilding in Kenya

is the lack of adequate support for local peace committees to be effective in their work (NSC (2013).

2.2 Strategies of Sustainable Peacebuilding and Implications for Local Peacebuilding Committees.

This section examines the strategies for peacebuilding with the view to determining whether they support sustainable peacebuilding. The logic applied in this section is to examine the global experiences in peacebuilding strategies at the global level, followed by experiences in the African region and then tie this to the literature in Kenya. Peacebuilding strategies are examined critically with the view to determining why they work and why they don't. Peacebuilding strategies are linked to conflict prevention because the fundamental function of peacebuilding is to address those root causes of s conflict and to "stem in the bud" issues that will act as a seed for the next conflict (Filipov 2006). However, sustaining the gains of peace has been one of the most difficult challenges in peacebuilding. Recurrent conflicts across the world have put to question the strategies and approaches to peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding strategies are still influenced by the UNSG 1992 proposal which described peacebuilding as,

> action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:11).

Peacebuilding strategies can be defined as those approaches that support communities to address root causes of conflict and the local capacities for change (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). The choice of strategy will determine whether a country, or sub-national unit can build a just and lasting peace.

In the case of the Global South where peacebuilding is often heavily dependent on donor funding, the dilemma is frequently the choice between donor-preferred strategies and those that might work for the local recipients. In this study, three peacebuilding strategies are discussed in detail; preventive diplomacy, mediation and conflict early warning. These three encompass the work that Mombasa Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees are engaged in as they endeavour to build sustainable peace in Mombasa County.

2.2.1 Preventive Diplomacy

Preventive Diplomacy (PD) is encapsulated within diplomacy. Diplomacy is a term that has been used to mean many things, but as a noun, it refers to the profession, activity, or skill of managing international relations, by a country's representatives living abroad, or those sent on particular diplomatic missions. Özçelik (2006) describes Preventive Diplomacy to mean actions and institutions that are used to keep brooding political disputes between countries from turning into full scale wars. Nathan (2018) on the other hand see preventive diplomacy as diplomatic action to prevent conflicts into flaring up and keeping the lid small scales to remain as such. Both definitions seem to agree on the "preventive" nature of PD, however, the timing of PD is key to its success or failure. Often, PD is deployed rather late when disputing parties have started fighting or when an originally small problem becomes a major conflict. At such times, PD has been a weak strategy. In 2011, Ban Ki-Moon added the idea of the timing of PD activities arguing that preventive diplomacy should be deployed at the earliest possible time for it to have any impact.

The context of PD has changed since Dag Hammarskjöld articulated it in the UN in the early 1960s. As argued by Djibom (2016), the United Nations Secretary-General, set the international

standard for the model of preventive diplomacy but others have taken it over and implemented it to suit their circumstances. Preventive Diplomacy (PD) is today being conducted by a broad array of actors, using a wider range of tools spurred by different interests (UNSG, 2011). Much of the literature seems to use "preventive diplomacy", "conflict prevention" and "preventive action" interchangeably to refer to mechanisms that the international community uses to avert a descent into war or widespread conflict. However, "preventive diplomacy" uses mediation and resolution while conflict prevention is a broader concept referring to the monitoring, containment and reduction of risk factors that lead to war or conflict.

The UN has continued to champion PD in nearly all its peace missions. Nathan *et al (*2018) argue that PD makes sense from a sustainability perspective because preventive diplomacy is a form of operational conflict prevention and takes place in moments of acute crisis where the risk of large-scale violence is imminent. Using the examples of UN preventive diplomacy across the world, Nathan *et al (*2018) point out that success depends on a very good understanding of the conflict parties' perspectives on violence and non-violent courses of action. The UN has been able to use its advantage to cause de-escalation of certain conflicts that would have otherwise turned into bigger problems. Nathan *et al (*2018) provide an example of Malawi, where the UN-funded and deployed experts to support the national dialogue and in Nigeria where the UN-funded and supported the National Peace Committee and the Independent National Electoral Commission during the 2015 elections in Nigeria and in Sudan elections which contributed to the successful referendum for southern Sudan. In each of these cases, it was the leverage of the UN, employing preventive diplomacy to avert potential catastrophes.

As the title implies, preventive diplomacy is anticipatory in the sense that preventive action is supposed to prevent rather than correct a problem. In peacebuilding, Preventive Diplomacy is therefore supposed to anticipate and prevent conflict from occurring, and if it does, then, prevent escalation. However, the experience in preventive diplomacy has been that it is often a latecomer, seen more within the context of peacekeeping rather than conflict prevention. As the field has grown, there appears to be a need to understand the nuances between operational and structural prevention, because they determine the success or failure of preventive diplomacy (Mancini (Ed), 2011). Hara, cited in Mancini (Ed 2011) points out the difficult problem of PD when it comes to coordination. Failure in Darfur, Western Sahara, and Madagascar was occasioned by the proliferation of uncoordinated diplomats who seemed more in competition rather than cooperation through a coherent diplomatic strategy.

The European Union (EU), which itself is a conflict prevention project, has been an active player in preventive diplomacy for the prevention of conflict. Banim and Pejsova (2017) point out the EU considers prevention of violent conflict as its EU's raison d'être. According to the EU Global Strategy of 2016, the organisation focuses on pre-emptive peacebuilding and diplomacy with a focus on early preventive diplomacy. This strategy has guided the EU's global involvement in PD, but more specifically in East Asia. The EU's interest in preventive diplomacy in East Asia comes from the economic and trading interest that European countries have in that region. The leading organisation that has been at the forefront of preventive diplomacy in Asia is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Prasetyono (2007) posits that the creation of ASEAN from the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 was driven by the regional need to manage inter-state relations, manage border security, and specify modalities for the engagement of external powers in the

region. It is instructive, however, to note that the region is far from peaceful because of unresolved borders and maritime competition. Indeed, there is almost no ASEAN country that does not have a border issue with a neighbouring country or countries.

On the African continent, the African Union has embraced Preventive Diplomacy as a pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Preventive Diplomacy is outlined in the APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 which was adopted in 2013 that builds on the achievements and challenges resulting from the implementation of the previous APSA Roadmap (2011-2013). The APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 details the AU's vision in the five strategic peace and security areas: Conflict prevention (incl. early warning and preventive diplomacy), crisis/conflict management (including African standby Force and mediation), post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, strategic security issues (such as illegal flows of Small and Light Weapons, Improvised Explosive Devises, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, disarmament, counter-terrorism, illicit financial flows as well as transnational organised crime and cybercrime) and coordination and partnerships. In addition, cross-cutting issues are covered by the Roadmap.

The mantra of "African solutions for African Problems," has bolstered the African Union's primacy in responding to conflicts on the continent (Hara, 2014). The mantra also enabled other AU-affiliated organisations such as NEPAD to engage in preventive diplomacy (Anani-Isaac and Anyoku, 2019). However, the application of PD has not been smooth for the AU and other stakeholders. The advent of divisive multiparty politics in Africa simply brought to the fore the deep divisions in Africa and birthed conflicts that do not seem to have a clear end . The factors that precipitate such violence are multifaceted and diverse, and they range from flawed or failed

elections to structural issues such as poor governance, exclusionary political practices, and poverty (Adolfo, 2013)

African Union has relied heavily upon one of its main pillars of preventive diplomacy, known as the Panel of the Wise (PoW). The idea of the Panel of the Wise was mooted in 1991 during a "Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA)". At this time the call was for the creation of an "Africa's Elders Council for Peace". This entity is what became the "Panel of the Wise" (PoW) created specifically to support the efforts of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, particularly in conflict prevention. In creating the Panel of the Wise, the African Union recognised the importance of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and their continued relevance in preventing and mediating disputes and conflicts in contemporary Africa (AU, 2014).

The stature and respect that each member of the PoW carries has enabled the panel to succeed in peacebuilding through preventive diplomacy, more than expert knowledge. Each member of the panel PoW is highly respected and has made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development in Africa. While taking credit for peaceful negotiations of contested elections, such as in Kenya, under the leadership of the late Kofi Annan, it is important to note that PoW can only make recommendations on a direction to be taken and cannot enforce the same. That said the importance of preventive diplomacy cannot be overstated. This point is critical when one considered that preventive diplomacy in Africa has faced many challenges, some structural and others political (Gerenge, 2015).

Members of the SADC are required by the organization's 2001 "Protocol on Politics, Defense, and Security Co-operation" to support the peaceful resolution of disputes through preventive diplomacy, negotiation, conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration, and adjudication by international tribunals. National sovereignty is "paramount" for SADC member nations, which has led to a political culture that favors soft power strategies like mediation. Hara (2011) notes that, when speaking about Africa more broadly, "the sovereignty of individual member nations is no longer considered an absolute obstacle to interference inside the region." Hara points out that the 'non-indifference' principle, which is inscribed in the AU Charter's 2000 Constitutive Act, has been put into practice on a number of occasions but contends that the AU's institutional capacity to engage in conflict prevention is still limited. A problem faced by many regional organizations engaged in preventive diplomacy is a lack of resources and capacity (Hara, 2011)

On the other hand, Strachan (2013) argues that perhaps because of long-standing conflicts on the continent, Africa is best placed to employ preventive diplomacy. In fact, several regional organizations, like the SADC, have explicit requirements for their members in terms of preventive diplomacy. Members of SADC are required to support the peaceful resolution of disputes through preventive diplomacy, negotiation, conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration, and adjudication by international tribunals, according to the SADC "Protocol on Politics, Defense, and Security Co-operation." The 1999 Protocol Relating to the System for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, on the other hand, expanded ECOWAS' conflict prevention mechanism. The Council of Elders, the Defense and Security Commission, and the Mediation and Security Council are the three main institutions that make up the ECOWAS Mechanism, and they are largely responsible for overseeing elections and mediating conflicts

(Bekoe and Mengistu, 2002). Similar to this, IGAD decided in 2019 to adopt *The Protocol to the Agreement establishing IGAD on Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation*, which will act as the major road map for member states to effectively, efficiently, and transparently develop interventions, dispatch envoys or mediators, and largely engage in conflict prevention, management, and resolution in the area. Hara (2011) contends that the AU's institutional ability to participate in conflict prevention is still constrained. A problem faced by many regional organizations engaged in preventive diplomacy is a lack of resources and capacity.

Kenya has had a role in the application of Preventive Diplomacy both as a domestic policy and as a regional partner in the peace discourse of East Africa and other parts of the continent as well. This section starts with a review of the conflict situation in Kenya to set the background for the application of Preventive Diplomacy as a peacebuilding strategy in the country. Much has been written on the conflict situation in Kenya and the strategies for peacebuilding that have been employed over the years. Rohweder (2015) summarises the conflict situation in Kenya as characterised by overlapping conflicts complicated by a large ethnic diversity, high levels of inter-communal violence, sexual and gender-based violence; cycles of election-related violence; and increasing numbers of terrorist attacks. The conflict dynamics that complicate Kenya's conflict situation include; politicised ethnicity, discrimination and marginalisation: corruption and impunity; the long-standing land issue and the menace of terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab who have maximised ethnicity and poor Government response to attack the country at will. Much of the literature has concentrated on conflict resolving recommendations that include addressing inequality, reforming the security sector, tackling corruption and engaging in conflict-sensitive development (Ajulu, 2002; Onguny and Gillies, 2019; Heider, 2020).

Literature on the response to conflict in Kenya is a mixture of encouraging reviews on the one hand and, on the other, criticism for the missed chances and poor coordination of the response. On the positive side, Ernstorfer (2018) has argued that Kenya has a strong peacebuilding sector with many dedicated organisations working on peacebuilding, especially from the Civil Society. However, there is not a single network that can act as a convener and facilitator of Kenyan civil society organizations for peacebuilding efforts at large. The problem is further complicated by varying degrees of trust and fierce competition for resources. Among the many strategies that have been applied to Kenya in conflict response, Preventive Diplomacy has been the strategy of choice. The next section examines this subject more closely.

Khadiagala (1995) argues that Preventive Diplomacy can succeed if applied consistently with clear coordination and without policy shift from the promoters of the strategy. Using the case of Kenya, Khadiagala argues that PD became a serious peacebuilding strategy in Kenya when it became clear that the one-party political system under the Kenya African National Union (KANU) under Kenya's second president Daniel arap Moi was leading the country into a political disaster. However, PD as pursued by Western countries, which incidentally constituted the bulk of Kenya's development donors only served to entrench the KANU Government who responded to the demand for political reform by reluctantly instituting a multi-party system and then proceeding to dismantle it through devious machinations of "political defections", intensification of ethnic conflicts and patronage of notable opposition figures. The result of PD though not fully successful in Kenya at least moved Kenya to create a more tolerant political space.

Preventive Diplomacy brought Kenya back from the brink after the contentious 2007/2008 multi-party elections that plunged the country into a near civil war. The post-election violence that erupted in Kenya in December 2007 caused the deaths of over one thousand people and left more than three hundred thousand people internally displaced in their own country. The central issue was the flawed election results which gave Kibaki the win despite having won less than half of the parliamentary than those won by the Odinga-led ODM. It is instructive to note that Kenya had experienced post-election violence before 2008 but this was the first time that the spectre of splitting the country into two loomed real and possible. Newspapers reported widespread looting, the burning of property, massacres, sexual violence, beatings, intimidation, and threats.

In 2008, the UN-led by Kofi Annan managed to mediate between warring parties in Kenya and developed a process for a peaceful transition of power. The negotiations led to the "Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government" which was signed by President Mwai Kibaki and the Honorable Raila Odinga on February 28th 2008, putting an end to the crisis which had threatened to destroy the nation, much to the astonishment of the world. It was perhaps the sheer weight of the negotiators that led to a quick and peaceful resolution of the conflict. Kenya witnessed a rush of high-level mediators including; US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazier, Desmond Tutu, Benjamin Mkapa, Mozambique's Joachim Chissano, Graça Machel, Botswana's Katumile Masire, and Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda; the then African Union Chairman and Ghanaian President, John Kufuor, Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni also arrived. The mediation process, which began three weeks after the postelection violence erupted across Kenya, was led by the Panel of Eminent African Personalities; former President Benjamin

Mkapa of Tanzania, former South African First Lady Graça Machel. Kofi Annan was the Chairperson.

After the negotiations, Kofi Annan had this to say in a summary of the negotiations, and to chart the way forward with credible elections.

> recognising that there is a serious crisis in the country we concluded that a political settlement is a necessary … to manage and implement expeditiously a broad reform agenda and other mechanisms that will address the root causes of the crisis and deepen and broaden Kenyan democratic foundations. Such reforms and mechanisms will comprise, but are not limited to, the following: Comprehensive Constitutional reforms; Comprehensive electoral reform - including of the electoral laws, the electoral commission and dispute resolution mechanisms; A truth, justice and reconciliation commission
>
> (reliefweb.int/report/Kenya. Accessed on February 16 2022).

The creation of the Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission in 2008 was to follow up on the negotiations. In assessing the viability of the peaceful settlement of the Kenya crisis, Lindenmayer and Kaye (2009) argue that an important lesson in PD is that keeping to the tenets and the spirit of the negotiation is necessary for PD to work. It is undebatable that PD is usually a necessary but not a sufficient step to sustainable peacebuilding. This is what later threatened to reverse the peaceful outcome of the Annan-led agreement because the PNU-led Government later failed to honour many of the agreements on which they signed.

As a concrete example, Lalbahadur (2016) discusses the situation between Malawi and Tanzania's dispute over Lake Malawi as yet another case of preventive diplomacy at work in Africa. In this case, the prospect of oil below lake Malawi brought this long-standing border dispute to a head in

September 2012, when potential oil reserves were discovered along the northern border of Lake Malawi (known as Lake Nyasa in Tanzania and Mozambique). Border skirmishes are not uncommon between the two countries but these have been low in intensity. The Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, which saw Germany trade territory in East Africa with the UK for the vital Zanzibar island of Heligoland, established the boundaries of the region, which is at the center of the dispute (Nombo, 2020).Malawi claims that the border should be east of Lake Malawi while Tanzania argues that the border is in the middle of the lake.

The Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, which specifies that the border is on the Tanzanian shoreline of Lake Malawi, is the source of the ambiguity in the border's demarcation. This is a deviation from international law, which specifies that the border for transboundary freshwater is in the center of the body of water (Zotto, 2013). Tanzania sent military patrols along the lake after the Malawian government granted prospecting rights to a British oil company in 2012. As a result, tensions between the two countries reached a breaking point. Concerned SADC officials, backed by the president of South Africa, started pressuring the two nations to agree to an AU-led initiative under the African Tribunal. Although Tanzania and Malawi had serious reservations about the SADC proposal, Malawi insisted that the case be brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, the prohibitive costs associated with taking the matter to the ICJ persuaded both Malawi and Tanzania's governments to accept this course of action. Although the case is still seeking resolution, there was briefly some optimism that preventive diplomacy could be able to resolve a threat to that region of Africa and possibly beyond.

2.2.2. Conflict Early Warning.

Conflict Early Warning and Response Systems (EWR) is a critical and important peacebuilding strategy that has been applied across the globe to forewarn and forearm. The term borrows from a Latin saying *'praemonitus, praemunitus'* loosely translated as 'forewarned is forearmed', and is accredited to English author, Abraham Tucker who used it in the form of the proverb in *The Light of Nature Pursued, 1768: "Knowing that forewarned is forearmed.* (The Phrase Finder, accessed through the internet on April 1 2021). In today's application, the concept has two components; early warning and early response. The importance of the system to peacebuilding is that it contributes to signaling the potential for emerging, potential or ongoing conflict and provides information that might be used to change the course or direction of a conflict. It is relevant as an important part of all the three different stages of the conflict; pre-conflict, in-conflict and post-conflict. In summary, early warning is about assessing the likelihood of violent conflict, the possibility of a resurgence or escalation of violence, and identifying the windows and opportunities for peace as early as possible (Buchanan-Smith, 2000).

Brazzola and Helander (2018) give a historical account of the development of Early Warning and Response (EWR) from the disaster management perspective and argue that in 1998, the first-ever international Early Warning Conference (EWC'98) was held in Potsdam, Germany to discuss the state-of-the-art knowledge on EWS. Five years later, in 2003, a second conference (EWC II) was held in Bonn, Germany to lay ground on how to integrate early warning into relevant public policy. It was underlined that even though warnings were based on technical information and monitoring of risks, there was need for corresponding public policy that guarantee that technical risks forecasts

were translated into warnings and that action was taken in response to the warnings. This position also ensured that early warning became a political process as well (Brazzola and Helander 2018)

Original definitions of EWR continue to underpin the work of the system whereby emphasis has been on the role for Early Warning as a tool for predicting violence and informing decision-makers on the appropriate preventive action. The 1997 definition of early warning by the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) is,

> The systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for; a) anticipating the escalation of violent conflict; b) the development of strategic responses to these crises; and c) the presentation of options to critical actors for decision-making. (Nyheim, 2015:5).

There are other definitions of early warning. OECD/DAC definition which considered the greater appreciation of the application of early warning to different phases of conflict, modified it to emphasise on action that need to be taken by decision-makers once the early warning has been issued (Nyheim, 2015). Rohwerder (2015) on the other hand describes conflict early warning as a data collection, risk analysis and provision of information to stakeholders who can use the information for a particular purpose. The World Bank describes early warning as a process that informs, warns and advised decision-makers to the potential outbreak, escalation and resurgence of violent conflict. The view of the Bank is also that Early Warning has to be systematic and produce both qualitative and quantitative data (Wulf and Debiel (2009).

This reasoning reveals three key Early Warning components: Identifying emerging dangers, analyzing their nature and outlining potential scenarios, and disseminating warning analyses to

decision-makers are the first three steps in the process. But who are the decision-makers who need to be convinced and what must they do? This question which emanates from the non-use or misuse of early warning data is raised by Matveeva (2005). His argument is that non-use of early warning data is caused by the lack of response capacity among those who receive data. Matveeva (2005) notes further that the question of who the "responsible authority" is in EWR systems is central to the effectiveness of early warning and process and must be decided on firmly.

The historical account of EWR is important because the push for EWR was not from disaster management only. Bächler *et al*, cited in Wulf and Debiel (2009) argue that the idea of early warning systems for the prevention of violent conflict dates back to the 1950s, initially within intelligence gathering and military reconnaissance, and then applied to the natural disasters, humanitarian emergencies, human rights violations tracking, the spread of diseases and economic crises. The end of the Cold War changed the idea of conflict early warning and catapulted it into a global policy agenda, spurred into life by the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Falklands War occurred 1982 and in 1994, with the Rwandan genocide. All these events which were seen as preventable in hind sight took place because early warning and response (EWR) was either completely absent or provided and completely ignored.

The premise of early warning has been called into doubt in light of the evolving nature of warfare, the rise of new security issues, and a generally underfunded global architecture for peace and security. This is because the utility value of early warning information has not been proven Wulf and Debiel (2009). A pertinent question regarding early warning is; how early is early? When the

conflict that ended up toppling President Mobutu is considered, then it is clear that unless acted upon in the right time, early warning information is completely useless.

At the global level, the UN has continued to champion EWR systems through its vast inter-agency system albeit with some appreciable difficulty. As late as 2019, observers of the UN EWR system were concerned that the UN had not maximised its global reach to make EWR more effective. Within the UN Secretariat, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) is primarily in charge of peacekeeping and preventative action, with a mandate to find future or ongoing conflicts that the Organization could help to avert or resolve (UN, 2004).

Miskel and Norton (1998) in a study of the Rwanda-Burundi-Zaire (RBZ) border crisis of 1996 argue that,

> the brutal truth of the matter is that any early-warning system would have practical utility only to the extent that international organizations or major powers are willing to act on receiving the early-warning information the system produces. Even if a system were devised to provide convincingly and reliably accurate information about impending humanitarian crises, early warning will never be more than a lonely shout in the night if the major powers or international organizations like the UN fail to take preventive measures or neglect to initiate measures that might mitigate the severity of crises that are not preventable (Miskel and Norton (1998:317)

The intended beneficiaries in this case, the hundreds of thousands of refugees in Zaire, returned to Rwanda on their own without any support just as the Western powers agreed to act. It is widely acknowledged that the UN's various departments have historically lacked efficient coordination and information flow, much like many other huge bureaucracies. This has negatively affected early

warning information flow and action within the UN. As argued by Dorn and Matloff (2000), there needs to be a change in the UN early warning systems to work in a more proactive rather than reactive mode as far as EWR is concerned.

One of the concrete products of the EU EWR system is the production of Global Conflict Indexes to inform early warning analysis and recommendations. The Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission created the Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI), which serves as the quantitative foundation for the EU's conflict early warning system. The Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI) represents the statistical risk of violent conflict in a given country in the next one to four years, considering the necessity for policy-makers to prioritize activities toward conflict prevention (Halkia et al 2019). The crucial concern with early warning, as was argued elsewhere in this section, is prompt action.

Since 2019, the European Union Institute for Security Studies had issued several early warning alerts that pointed to a rapid deterioration of security in Ethiopia's Tigray region and identified the 2020 summer elections as potential triggers of violence. Yet as these predictions seemed to turn into reality neither the EU nor the AU was able to prevent the escalation of violence. The Tigray regional government disobeyed Ethiopian Prime Minister Mr. Abiy by holding regional parliamentary elections in September 2020 despite his nationwide postponement due to the coronavirus pandemic. A few weeks later, the Ethiopian president cut off assistance to the area, and conflict erupted. Ethiopia's overall FSI score of 101.1 in 2017 made it a volatile country and yet not even the African Union and European Union were able to stop the war. The downplaying of the information on the ground added to the speed at which the war broke out. Even the Global

Peace Index (GPI) produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, which still showed Ethiopia failing in terms of peace did not stir action on the part of the EU and AU. Indexes are highly useful formats for analysts and decision-makers to evaluate a country's situation, but their true value is in the timely use. If left for some time they become too blunt to use (McConaghy, 2012).

The 2002 convention that formed the Peace and Security Council included provisions for the development of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The Early Warning System provides useful intelligence in order to foresee and avert violent conflict (Wulf and Debiel, 2009:14). According to Article 12 of the PCS Protocol, the system is supposed to monitor situations that might erupt into full-scale conflict. CEWS is structured across the continent and at the sub-regional level. It consists of 'The Situation Room,' which is an observation and monitoring centre at the AU's headquarters in Addis Ababa, and also uses the Sub-regional organisations' systems that have early warning systems, such as the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) and IGAD's CEWARN and SADC's Mediation Support Unit (CPR-EMSA). CEWS responsibility is to,

> develop an early warning module based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators which shall be used to analyse developments within the continent and to recommend the best course for action (AU, 2002:17).

1) Collection and analysis of conflict data based on an indicators module are the primary outputs required of the CEWS. Collaboration and coordination with relevant parties, such as the RECs, the UN (specifically the Security Council and Secretariat), civil society organizations, and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa, are necessary to produce effective

early-warning reports to facilitate engagement with decision-makers (IPI, 2012). Following the development of gender-based indicators by the CEWS and the AU Women, Gender and Development Directorate, the collection of conflict information must also reflect a gender perspective.

The African CEWS was established due to the numerous conflicts that exist on the continent, despite the fact that early warning is crucial in practically every circumstance. According to Gnanguenon (2021), the ongoing wars on the continent, including those in Somalia, the Mano River region (Liberia and Sierra Leone), and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, were the driving forces behind the creation of a CEWS that would address threats to human security in Africa. The EU Conflict Early Warning System (EWS), a mechanism for EU decision-makers to manage risk variables and prioritize resources accordingly, and this are quite dissimilar. The Africa Media Monitor (AMM), the Africa Reporter, and Oxford Analytica are some of the analytical and news sources used by the CEWS. The AMM is a data-gathering tool that makes it easier to acquire data in real-time and in all four of the AU working languages from a wide range of sources.

The lack of adequate human and financial resources has prevented CEWS in Africa from achieving many of the elaborate and lofty goals that have been established for it (Tlalka, 2016). According to a 2010 analysis of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), CEWS needed more people, better tools, and enhanced analytical skills from staff (AU, 2010). Therefore, it would seem that the CEWS is still a long way from being a trustworthy system for continental conflict early warning. However, it is reassuring to see that Africa takes the subject of conflict early warning seriously given its cooperation with regional early warning systems like the ECOWAS Early

Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), IGAD's CEWARN, and SADC's Mediation Support Unit (CPR-EMSA).

A proactive approach to conflict prevention, the Kenya National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (NCEWERS) was introduced in late November 2010. Its goal is to collect data from the general population using SMS 108 and peace mechanisms like Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. At the local and governmental levels, violence is predicted and prevented through early warning systems. Through the UWIANO Platform for Peace, the system, in accordance with the NSC, helped to ensure the peaceful transition to the 2010 referendum and the 2013 general elections. It has also been crucial in identifying the disputes at the community level and providing guidance on how to create long-lasting responses. The system, which is a domestication of the IGAD-CEWARN mechanism, is regarded in the area as best practice. As a result, the NSC has hosted high-level delegations from a number of countries, including South Sudan, Ethiopia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Ghana, and Uganda. To obtain vital data from the field, the system makes use of the current District Peace Committees (Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees), Peace Monitors, and other pertinent parties (NSC, 2021).

While it is commendable that conflict early warning systems are in place, the proper utilisation of the information for addressing conflict is a point of debate. Babaud and Ndung'u (2012) argue in the case of the EU-supported conflict early warning support for Kenya that in general, conflict early warning suffers from the problem of responding to weak, community-level signals which are sometimes dismissed as "local disturbances". Babaud and Ndung'u draw the conclusion that, with regard to the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya, evaluations of the EU environment were more

concerned with the overall state of the nation than with conflict dynamics at the local level. The Kenya case study revealed that the EU's approach to dealing with weak signals and local-level dynamics—which are both the results of and the origins of tensions—was less methodical. Although local staff may be well-versed in these dynamics, this information is not routinely recorded to allow for a preventive response. The authors contend that a significant obstacle to producing and utilizing conflict early warning data has been the absence of suitable monitoring and analytical frameworks.

An important feature of the Kenya National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (NCEWERS) has been its attempt to be as inclusive as possible. In 2016, NSC initiated a move to include peace stakeholders within the NCEWERS which is made up of civil society, informal groups such as *chamas* (defined as an informal self-help group), youth groups, councils of elders, religious councils as well as grassroots persons to ensure that conflict early warning and early responses are effective. In keeping with the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and the recognition of the role that women have played in Kenya's peace journey, the NSC set out to ensure that the NCEWERS was fully engendered by 2016, so as to maximise on the potential of the system based on the increased role that both men and women could play in early warning (NSC, 2016). NSC further argue that the exclusion of women from early warning processes resulted in limited attention to women's needs in conflict-affected contexts, especially those related the sexual violence. By fully incorporating gender issues in the NCEWERS, the Government through NSC has ensured that the system is more complete (NSC, 2016).

The second feature of Kenya's NCEWERS has been the leveraging of technology in increasing the efficiency of the system. Musila (2013) provides an example of the "*Uwiano* Platform for Peace" which is a unique partnership of Government and Non-Governmental peace stakeholders in the country that served as an early warning electronic platform and a peacebuilding forum. *Uwiano* is a Swahili word meaning "cohesion". The platform was launched in July 2010 to ensure that the Kenyan referendum leading to a new constitution was violence-free (Musila, 2013). Uwiano works through a toll-free short message system (SMS) to collect information from the public and relay the same to security authorities. *Uwiano* however, expanded its activities to include peacebuilding and outreach programs such as County Peace tents, security alerts to police, conflict mediation by village elders and the formation of peace committees.

Despite all the good intentions*, Uwiano* platform has not been able to stem the trend in hate speech and other threats to peace because it cannot control social media platforms. Even the launching of the International Day for Countering Hate Speech in 2022 and the inauguration of the "Let Peace Win" campaign, did not deter hate mongers during the 2022 election in Kenya. In an article published on June 27, 2022, the *Christian Science Monitor* highlighted how social media platforms such as TikTok, Twitter, and Meta were being used to promote political disinformation, hate speech, and incitement against ethnic communities ahead of August elections. In one instance, a political candidate was compared to Hitler and it was implied that if elected, he would wage war against other ethnic groups. Over a six-month period, more than 130 TikTok videos with hate and misinformation were found, and they received more than 4 million views in total. With this kind of media reach, *Uwiano* finds itself incapable of stemming hate speech as a threat to peace.

2.2.3 Mediation as a Peacebuilding strategy.

Mediation has been used as a conflict resolution and peacebuilding strategy for a long time. Among the earliest recorded acts of mediation was in 20 BC when it is reported that following the war against Rome, the Kushites sent mediators to Caesar Augustus to negotiate peace. Mediation is one of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms which refers to any means of settling disputes without litigation or going to court. Other ADR methods are; neutral evaluation, negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration**.** Papagianni (2010) in a review of the role of mediation argues that mediation and political engagement by third parties can contribute to peacebuilding by strengthening the political processes in countries exiting civil conflict, even though it might not be ideal for long-term political solutions. This is because the role of the mediator is to work toward peace agreements that serve as frameworks for the opening up of the political process as opposed dictating what the way forward should be.

The European Union defines mediation to include matters of confidentiality and facilitative communication. The European Union Handbook for Mediation Lawmaking defines mediation as a

> structured and confidential process in which an impartial third person, known as a mediator, assists the parties by facilitating the communication between them to resolve issues in dispute (EU, 2009:10).

Likewise, the World Bank, whose support for global peacebuilding includes mediation, in a publication titled *Mediation Essentials,* looks at mediation simply as "facilitated negotiation". This dentition recognises the fact that disputants have the right to negotiate their side of the conflict until some amicable solution is found. The UN on the other hand sees mediation as an important

means for the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts. Chapter VI Article 33 on Pacific Settlement of Disputes, states the first choice of dispute resolution will be negotiation, mediation and other peaceful means. In the UN guidelines, mediation is defined as,

> a process whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements... (T)he premise of mediation is that in the right environment, conflict parties can improve their relationships and move towards cooperation. Mediation outcomes can be limited in scope, dealing with a specific issue to contain or manage a conflict, or can tackle a broad range of issues in a comprehensive peace agreement (UN, 2012:4).

The success of any mediation depends very much on the style and approach of the mediator. There are many approaches to mediation and at times the process may stand or fall purely on the personality of the mediator. Waehlisch *et al* (2008), differentiate three types of mediation; the power-based mediation in which the mediator can apply a "sticks and carrots" method to reach a goal; the interest-based, problem-solving mediation in which the mediator focuses on generating creative options for an agreement that satisfies the underlying interests of all parties as a basis for conflict resolution; and finally the transformative, long-term mediation in which mediators intervene on different levels to change the relationship between the parties, as well as their perceptions of themselves and other parties. According to the logic of transformative mediation, conflict resolution is a long-term process, which happens through the empowerment and recognition of a broad variety of actors in conflict societies (Waehlisch *et al* (2008),).

Students of mediation argue that the difference between success or failure of mediation depends on the mandate that the mediator is given at the time that mediation is supposed to begin. A mandate can be defined as the official order to do something or undertake an assignment. The

mandate is a vital component in mediation and shapes the process and outcome of peacemaking Nathan (2017). At the global level, mandates are usually passed in resolutions in the United Nations Security Council, the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council or sub-regional bodies that attempt to resolve specific conflicts. Once a mandate has been passed, the mediator has the legitimacy and authority to set the parameters of the mediation and start the work. Nathan cites the example of UN Resolution 435 of 1978 which legitimised the mediation to end South Africa's occupation of Namibia. The process was initiated in the 1970s by a group of Western countries to broker independence for Namibia but the process was not legitimate in the eyes of African countries until the UN issued the mandate through a resolution in 1978. It is important to note that mandates can also limit a mediator's flexibility and can greatly complicate the mediation process.

The UN mediation support has been assigned to the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). The Department has in turn put in place the United Nations Standby Team of Mediation Experts which is a group of experts established in 2008 that can be deployed to assist mediators in the field by providing expert advice (UN, 2019). The Department has also published the United Nations Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States (1992) to further develop the understanding and practice of mediation. Lanz and Eleiba (2018) note that the UN Guidance highlights preparedness as a fundamental part of effective mediation. While this argument seems adequate in supporting the mediation responsibility of the UN, the reality is that the UN has largely failed in its mediation role because of the ideological divide in the Security Council between the superpowers who hold veto powers.

The issue of mediation is critical to Africa, given the weight of conflict and the potential for lasting peace through mediation. Govender and Ngandu (2009) argue that in the context of Africa, it is critical to take a long-term view of mediation and to develop the necessary relationships that would sustain the proceeds of mediation. Citing Mitchell Govender and Ngandu (2009) who see the product of mediation as a compromise or a settlement of issues between conflicting parties, have argued that compromise and settlements have featured greatly in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Africa due to the usually very high level of animosity and mistrust whenever conflict occurs in communities and even at the national level.

The African Union places mediation at the centre of its peacebuilding agenda. Article 3 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council outlines the anticipation and prevention of conflict, and peacemaking, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. To carry out effective mediation, the AU has established the Mediation Support Unit to support mediators through capacity building, mediation process, documentation and research. Lanz *et al* (2017) citing Whitfield argue that the rise of dedicated mediation support units (MSUs) in the UN and AU has increased the effectiveness of mediation and also spurred the establishment of MSUs in other regional bodies such as the EU and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

De Carvalho and Bustamante (2020) have argued that Africa's demanding and busy mediation environment is driven by an aggressive environment marked by increased political violence as well as a need for the prevention, resolution, and management of conflicts on the continent through peaceful means. This need for peace "brewed at home" supports the AU's promise of encouraging

home-grown solutions for African conflicts. The authors note further that the deployment of prominent Africans such as former heads of state has proven more to conclude peace agreements than non-African third parties, and these agreements were also more likely to be durable. This practice reflects African-owned responses, which, on the one hand, have been flexible and adaptable, and on the other exposed the need to strengthen regional and sub-regional organisations in their capacity to mediate conflicts.

The case of AU mediation failure in Central Africa Republic (CAR) has been blamed on the short-term and unsustainable strategies that were applied. Zahar and Mechoulan (2017) point to the fact that Central Africa Republic (CAR) has been a country in turmoil since the 1960s. In 2012, violence broke out in CAR, when groups from the North, identifying themselves as ex-Seleka (Islamic group) mounted a coup against President Bozizé. The ensuing conflict quickly took on a religious turn as Christians formed their group called Anti-Balaka (self-defense) forces, to respond to the Muslim ex-Seleka. The successive coup d'états of 2013 and the massacres that followed led to an intervention by an international military presence, MINUSCA, initially through the auspices of the African Union (AU), with the support of France, and in turn by the United Nations (UN). The period from 2014 to 2016 was supposed to usher in a time of peace but did not resolve the underlying structural problems of lack of adequate infrastructure; rampant corruption and poverty; and porous borders which threatened the stability of CAR.

The mediation process in CAR was led by Burkina Faso's Moussa Nébié, who received a list of 115 different demands with the main problem being that of devolution, which the government was resistant to because of the fear that groups would use to consolidate their grip on provinces they

control, particularly in the case of the large ex-Seleka factions in the north and east of the country. The AU-led efforts were undercut by a parallel Russian-Sudanese initiative which sucked oxygen from the AU's efforts and provoked tensions between on the one hand the AU, the UN and the EU, which supported the AU track, and on the other Sudan, Russia and President Touadéra. Zahar and Mechoulan (2017) argue further that even the approach of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR (MINUSCA) to local mediation has been mainly reactive, thereby appearing to be without a long-term vision.

African Union mediation efforts have also been affected by current global health problems and Covid-19 has been perhaps the most devastating. In July 2020, African Union Commission Chairperson Mohamed Al Hacen Lebatt released a list of AU stalled or discontinued mediation initiatives that would have an impact on peacebuilding in Africa. These efforts include Somalia where AU was continuing peace work through African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). At the same time, the mediation efforts undertaken by South Africa and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in South Sudan to support the implementation of the peace and reconciliation agreement have also been affected by COVID-19. It is important to note, however, that these conflicts predate Covid-19 and therefore while the epidemic might be liable for some delays, the responsibility lies with conflicting parties in Africa many of whom seem hell-bent on prolonging conflict at the expense of peace and development in their countries and Africa as a whole.

Mediation has also been carried out by African Union's regional partners, namely ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC and EAC. The ECOWAS mediation to bring peace to the region is captured in

several protocols and documents. These include the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defense, Article 17; Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security. In Article 58 of this protocol, ECOWAS committed itself to "employ, where appropriate, good offices, conciliation, meditation and other methods of peaceful settlement of disputes." Under Article 4 of the Mechanism, the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Mediation and Security Council, and the ECOWAS Commission have specific roles to play in mediation and conflict prevention, resolution, and management in West Africa. In line with this responsibility, the president of the ECOWAS Commission deploys fact-finding and mediation missions and appoints members of the Council of Wise. The Commission established the Mediation Facilitation Division (MFD) in June 2015 to backstop mediation efforts by international organisations, such as the African Union Commission (AUC) and the United Nations (UN).

The nature of conflict in West Africa has greatly influenced the kind of mediation that ECOWAS has been able to mount. Odobo *et al* (2017) argue that the root causes of conflicts in Africa are usually traceable to the colonial era when Europeans scrambled for territories and created countries with scant regard for ethnic boundaries. However, the defining feature of West African conflict is corruption, poverty, underdevelopment, political instability, electoral violence, arms proliferation, military incursion in governance; drug trafficking, territorial disputes; the problem of leadership, resurgence of religion and ethnoreligious conflict, secessionist tendencies, and the inability of the states to provide and/or guarantee security for the people.

ECOWAS has engaged in many mediation missions in West Africa to stop, forestall or eliminate conflict. Odigie (2020) points out that often ECOWAS has been drawn into mediating elections disputes and rivalries by politicians who chose not to reconcile. This was, for example, the case of Togo in 2017, in which ECOWAS mission mediated the problems caused by the Gnassingbés, who had attempted to create a kleptocracy in Togo. ECOWAS mandated Presidents Nana Akufo-Addo and Alpha Condé to assist the Togolese government and political stakeholders in the implementation of constitutional reforms which somehow resolved the Togolese problem. Mediation in West Africa has been also aided by the threat of force as was the case of ECOWAS mediation in the Gambia in 2016, when the former Gambian President Jammeh who attempted to reverse the results of an election he had lost. ECOWAS immediately set in motion a process of mediation between Jammeh and the winning opposition coalition, which was set to fail. It was only after realising that the military option by ECOWAS was real that the Gambian President finally capitulated and allowed the winner to ascend to power.

Babatunde (2017) in examining the threat of the use of force in the Gambia argues that this action was justifiable even though it was in clear breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which urges member countries to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. In the case of The Gambia however, with the winning President already sworn in in Dakar, Senegal, Jammeh had taken a position that called for something more than mediation.

In the Southern and Eastern African region both SADC and IGAD have been involved in the mediation of conflict, to some degree of success. The Eastern Africa region, especially the Horn has been the centre of some of the longest conflicts in the world. The civil war between the central government and the Eritrean secessionists ran for 30 years (1961-1991), and the North-South conflict in Sudan that began after the country's independence in 1956 continued until 2005 when the Compressive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed. It resumed in 1983 of post-independence policies of the South Sudan Government. Olika (2008) argues that much as the problems in the horn of Africa have their roots in the colonial era, the persistent lack of security in the Horn of Africa lies in the socio-economic and political policies of the post-colonial regimes. East Africa and the Horn region have passed through server and devastating civil and inter-state conflicts which have served to marginalise the region as resources are deployed to fight a war rather than develop the region. The collapse of the Government of Somalia under Siad Barre in 1991 led to the diffusion of power to warlords who have only escalated the insecurity in the Horn of Africa. Scholars have argued that religion and ethnicity seem to have been at the centre of conflict in the Horn region. This is the mediation terrain in which the IGAD has worked to bring peace and security.

IGAD mediation mandate is captured in the *Letter of Instrument to Amend the IGADD Charter/Agreement s*igned on 21 March 1996 in Nairobi, in which the Assembly of Heads of State and Government declared that IGAD would also promote peace and stability, as well as create mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of inter-State and intra-State conflicts in the region through dialogue. This new objective was translated into an IGAD Strategic Guidelines on Mediation for IGAD Mediators which came into effect in 2017 (International Crisis

Group 2015). However, IGAD's conflict mediation predates the guidelines because the organisation had been mediating peace since the 1990s. South Sudan and Somalia remain good examples of the good intentions of IGAD in peacebuilding, but both countries also point to the challenges of mediating peace in a volatile situation such as South Sudan and Somalia.

IGAD's mediation process to resolve Sudan's long-running second-civil war (1983-2005) was launched in the early 1990s when Kenya was IGAD's chair. IGAD's mediation which was a five-year process was led by General Lazaro Sumbeiywo who brought together the then President of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir and Colonel John Garang to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 which effectively ended over two decades of conflict. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). IGAD's mediation capability has been reviewed by several scholars who conclude that the organisation was weak in both approach and quality of mediation (Healy, 2019).

The foregoing points to the value of mediation as a peacebuilding strategy, but also the serious shortcoming of the approach as a peacebuilding tool. Being a process that is dependent on the personal skills of the mediator it can be powerful and yield immediate results. This was seen in the case of Kenya in the PEV of 2008. The skills of the lead mediator, Kofi Annan brought back Kenya from the brink of total disaster. As Papagianni (2010) summarises it, mediation by third parties opens the room for a political process that allows the conflicting parties to agree on a process. In Africa and Kenya in particular, mediation has been a tool of choice for peacebuilding (Lindenmayer, 2009). However, the process is full of uncertainties and has been criticised as

suitable on for short-term gains. This then introduces the issues of challenges to peacebuilding which is tackled in the next section of the literature review.

2.3 Challenges and Opportunities for Peace Committees in Fostering Sustainable Peacebuilding.

The challenges that Local Peacebuilding Committees face in building and sustaining peace are many and can be seen from different levels, for example, policy, operations and attribution. In many cases, these challenges come from unresolved issues being dragged into new peacebuilding programs. Kosovo provides a good example where the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which was established by Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1244 to govern Kosovo went into the program with many unresolved issues. At the heart of the matter is the unresolved legitimacy of the Balkans. (Demjaha, 2017) has argued that the refusal of Serbia to recognise the independence of Kosovo served to heighten tension and challenge all peacebuilding efforts that have been mounted by UNMIK. Because of this situation, Kosovo Albanians are afraid of losing their freedom, Serbia fears losing Kosovo, and Kosovo Serbs worry about revenge being the minority in that country.

Local Peace Committee infrastructures continue to operate in a world defined by ever-changing and ever-growing conflict, and in some cases have to contend with the challenges of working under the so-called "victors' peace". Richmond, observes that the notion of "victor's peace" is the notion that peace comes from a military victory and is dominated by the victor in a conflict. This is the oldest understanding of the concept of peace and has been the way peace and peacebuilding have

been defined. This notion is important even for local peacebuilding for the fact that even when not manifest, peacebuilding is somehow linked to the idea of the dominant entity (Richmond, 2006).

While peacebuilding has concentrated in the Global South, certain parts of the Global North have been supported by global institutions to build peace after devastating conflict. Kosovo provides an example where the international peacebuilding partners such as the UN and NATO combined effort to implement a peacebuilding program after the war in Serbia in 1999, and the challenges thereof. When NATO forces defeated and removed Serbian forces from Kosovo, the the UN Security Council adopted the Resolution S/RES/1244, which created the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with the mandate of supporting peacebuilding in collaboration with other partners. This was supposed to be achieved against the backdrop on a contested nationhood, whereby Serbia still have not recognised the independence of Kosovo.

The main challenge, as argued by Brovina (2017) had to do with the lack of coordination of the many partners on the ground an overlapping mandate whereby, (NATO/KFOR) had the task to secure peace, while the other hand UNMIK had the responsibility to establish a working Government, protect human rights of Albanian Kosovars, building a stable political system, and arrange a settlement with Serbia in connection with independence for Kosovo. UNMIK's mission had the peacebuilding elements especially in connection with the peaceful settlement of issues between Serbia and Kosovo. In this regard, and on the issue of establishing a stable political system with working institutions UNMIK has been seen as a failure. The main reason for this failure seemed to be that UNMIK did not involve local population in their decision-making on key issues of governance and administration (Lemay-Hébert, 2009).

The Asian continent has been associated with two things in recent times; a remarkable economic growth that has substantially improved the welfare and social well-being of people in the region; and some of the world's most violent interstate and subnational conflicts fueled by uneven resource distribution, ethnic and religious tensions, violent extremism, and/or urban crime (Mulakala (ed), 2019). Recognising the nexus between conflict and development, the UN, international development partners and NGOs have funded programs that address the underlying causes of conflict while building the necessary conditions for peace. In 2010 for example, UNDP rolled out the N-Peace program in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka, in line with Security Council Resolution 1325 which was adopted to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts. Resolution 1325 also calls on all parties to a conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, in situations of armed conflict. In regions where gender-based violence is so rampant, this matter becomes an important part of the peacebuilding agenda.

The generally-held belief that economic growth can lead to peace seems to have met with some doubt in the Asian continent because as argued by North *et al,* cited in Mulakala (ed), 2019), uneven economic growth in one country can be cause for conflict rather than peace. For those groups who feel they have been denied access to the dividends of growth and development, violence might seem the only pathway to change, especially where ethnicity or religion defines who benefits and who is excluded. In Indonesia, the Free Aceh insurgency movement emerged in the late 1970s because of the discovery of gas reserves in Lhokseumawe and the exploitation of the same to the exclusion of the Aceh people. The movement argued that the Indonesian state had

siphoned local resources to fuel a national economic miracle while excluding the Acehnese from its benefits. As long as economic growth continues to be seen as a source of inequality, it will continue to foment discontent and cause conflict, thereby challenging peacebuilding.

In Asia, violent extremism has continued to confound peacebuilding in almost all countries. Schwoebel (2017) argues that violent extremism is driven by complex historical, cultural, political, psychological and economic factors but often without the corresponding response mechanisms to effectively counter this problem. Even though they are generally small in numbers, violent extremists are capable of doing great damage and harm whenever they choose to strike. Ryacudu (2018) using the case of Indonesia demonstrates how Al-Qaeda and Islamic State-inspired extremists have caused havoc in South East Asia with attacks in Thamrin in Indonesia in 2016 and laying siege in Marawi, in the Philippines in 2017. The new operating style of groups inspired by the Islamic States in which graphic videos of executions and beheadings are shown to the public seems to have moved terrorism onto a different scale. The three countries most affected by the recent acts of terrorism are the Philippines. Malaysia and Indonesia have adopted a Trilateral Cooperative Agreement to tackle the problem of violent extremism in the region. These acts of conflict however continue to threaten the peace and reduce the effectiveness of peacebuilding in the region.

The challenges faced by Local Peacebuilding Committees are not isolated from the global experience which has been concluded in many instances as inadequate and unsustainable. Öjendal *et al* (2017) have argued that past peacebuilding efforts have been critiqued as unstainable given the recurrence of conflict in many countries. Öjenda *et al* (2017*)* argue that most peacebuilding

operations have excluded local peacebuilding committees which means that Local Peacebuilding Committees have been unable to come to the table and be considered as part of the peacebuilding teams. Local Peacebuilding Committees have often been delegated to peripheral activities such as providing logistics or availing meeting venues, which, important as they are, do not add up to substantive peacebuilding. This lack of substantive engagement of Local Peacebuilding Committees does not augur well for sustainable peacebuilding at the local level. Local peacebuilding can often be at odds with international peacebuilding efforts and increase rather than reduce conflict. The lack of interest in the capacity of Local Peacebuilding Committees from international actors such as the UN has also contributed to many challenges that Local Peacebuilding Committees face in their responsibilities for peacebuilding at the local level.

At the policy level, the question as to the position of Local Peacebuilding Committees has become an issue for discussion. Kioko (2019) and Nganje (2021) both tackle the question of the nature of Local Peacebuilding Committees and whether they should be retained as formal or informal structures. This question becomes a pertinent point of discussion when countries begin to build their infrastructures for peace (I4P). When Local Peacebuilding Committees become part of the formal Governance structure, they are often seen as part of the system and may be associated with the politics of the day. Whether in or out of the I4P system, Local Peacebuilding Committees are always hampered by the politics of the day which may hinder their contribution to the peacebuilding agenda in their countries (Griesman 2016; Kumar 2011; van Tongeren 2011).

Kenya's I4P is composed of peace committees (at the county, sub-county, ward and village level); The National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC); The

National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC); The National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons. All these entities interact differently with Local Peacebuilding Committees and often independently of each other. As argued by Åkerdahl (2013) Local Peacebuilding Committees can be a positive addition to the national I4P by keeping the down and even eliminating violence, solving community problems and empowering local actors to become peacebuilders. At the same time, Kenya has many informal local peace committees that function alongside the formal ones. In a study focusing on informal peace committees in Nairobi, Kenya, Mungai *et al* (2020) conclude that these informal structures, which are often small, can prevent the eruption or escalation of violence at the very lowest levels of the society. These structures often work within cultural norms and values which therefore gives them the moral authority to instill peace in their communities.

Often, the creation of Government-led Local Peacebuilding Committees has resulted in acquiescence to national priorities and the shrinking of operating space for other interested parties, for example, civil society at the local level. This problem is further exacerbated by the tendency of major international peace donors such as the UN and the World Bank, to conflate the national level with the local and deal only with national entities. Having accepted national ownership as the guiding principle in global peacebuilding policy, their support to the national level hardly reaches the Local Peacebuilding Committees, and peacebuilding remains state-centric, supported by Government-led Local Peacebuilding Committees. Moreover, locals hardly get the opportunity to be consulted in such matters, and therefore these Local Peacebuilding Committees tend to be unrepresentative of the local realities. Shinoda (2018) in a review of state-building versus peacebuilding argues that in fact the two issues are sometimes intertwined to a degree that there is

no way of distinguishing between the two. It must be appreciated, as argued by Öjendal et al (2017) that local institutions do not necessarily represent a coherent body of thought. Local peacebuilding entities represent different interests and philosophies. This means that all voices that may have a stake in the peacebuilding process must be given a chance at the table.

Nganje (2021) provides a good example of Ethiopia where Local Peacebuilding Committees have been made part and parcel of the national I4P. Since 2009, Ethiopia's Local Peacebuilding Committees became an integral part of the state's conflict prevention and resolution mechanism. For example, Local Peacebuilding Committees in Ethiopia's border areas that border Kenya and Somalia have been integrated into the sub-regional mechanism for conflict early warning and early response under the auspices of IGAD. Local peace committees play a significant role in localizing the mandate of IGAD for preventing, de-escalating, and resolving pastoral and related conflicts along the country's borders with Kenya, Somalia, and South Sudan. Local Peacebuilding Committees in turn receive financial, technical, and material support from IGAD's Rapid Response Fund.

The lack of peacebuilding technical capacity is perhaps one of the most telling of all challenges for local peacebuilding. Members of Local Peacebuilding Committees are generally technically very weak because selection to the LPC is not based on peacebuilding knowledge but other considerations such as stature in the community or post held. A United Nations report (2010) states that peacebuilding measures cannot be localised in practice if local actors do not have the capacity to engage in all phases of planning and implementation. However, Miklian *et al* (2011) in a review of the problems of working at the local level argues that most international

organisations fail at partnering with local level operators because of a fundamental disconnect between the reason of 'going local' and the reality of 'local ownership' of peacebuilding at the local level. Sometimes Local Peacebuilding Committees are used as fronts for outsider initiatives and therefore local ownership becomes a gimmick by outsiders to obtain local buy-in (de Coning 2013).

The legitimacy of Local Peacebuilding Committees is important because this is a challenge which goes to determine whether or not an LPC can indeed facilitate sustainable peacebuilding. Odendaal (2012) argues that legitimacy to a large extent depends on where the LPC received its mandate from. Using examples of African countries, Odendaal points to Ethiopia which havening established a national peace structure and is reputed to have succeeded in securing the peace in many local communities but of course with the help of a heavy hand. Chopra (2014), in the case of Kenya's arid North-eastern counties, argues that local peace committees derive their strength from their deep roots in various local socio-cultural systems. These systems are not always compatible with national systems which might want to follow certain formal processes. This is where the problem begins between Government-initiated Local Peacebuilding Committees and community-originated ones. Åkerdahl (2013) has added to this concern by arguing that Local Peacebuilding Committees that have been started by Government seem to have changed the idea of peacebuilding from the bottom to that of building peace from the top. This also introduces some difficulties for the LPC at the local level. Either way, this is a very important question for Mombasa County which has quite a number of both types of Local Peacebuilding Committees.

The financing of sustainable peacebuilding is probably the most difficult area to navigate for both Government and Local Peacebuilding Committees. Globally, the bulk of peacebuilding funding comes from foreign aid, also known as Official Development Assistance (ODA). A 2018 report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development shows that in 2016 just 2% of total gross ODA went to conflict prevention and associated activities. At the Global level, the UN created the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) in 2006, but the performance of the PBF has been below expectations, especially in mobilising funds for peacebuilding. The question of financing peacebuilding activities also raises the issue of what is fundable and what is not, in terms of ODA. Using several country examples, Boyse (2000) demonstrates how inflexibility, conflicting priorities and selective funding has affected peacebuilding across the world. In June 2015 the AU members undertook to achieve at least 20% of its peace funding needs, leaving 80% to come from donors (Connolly 2016). This is a programming nightmare for a continent that in 2017 alone experienced 18 state-based conflicts (Bakken & Rustad 2018). The deficit in funding peacebuilding affects both the infrastructure for peace (I4P) and actual peacebuilding activities on the ground. In Kenya, LPC funding is difficult to ascertain for sure due to the wide range of partnerships but Kenya has been a popular place for peacebuilding support because of its chronic instability and also the politico-economic role it plays in the region.

2.3.1 Opportunities for sustainable peacebuilding.

The literature points to two issues that have greatly contributed to the increase in peacebuilding opportunities for countries in conflict. Local peacebuilding entities are in of themselves the prime opportunity of sustainable peacebuilding. Nganje (2021) argues that the “local turn” debate and the recognition of local peacebuilding entities as key players in peace has increased the agency of

local peacebuilding committees. The prospect of home-grown solutions through the "local turn" has also been attractive because of perceived lower cost of delivering peacebuilding results. This is perhaps why there was a rush to institutionalise and recognise local peacebuilding entities in many countries including Ghana in 2005 and Kenya in 2008.

With recognition came the legitimisation of local peacebuilding committees which was both political and legal. These two policy directions taken in countries such as Kenya led to even greater opportunities for local peacebuilding entities because they came with the backing of policy makers who suddenly saw the potential of these entities for advancing their peace agenda. The legal recognition of Local Peacebuilding Committees led to the creation of local policy frameworks to guide the work of local peacebuilding entities, even requiring them to be registered and get a Government license to operate. For example, Kenya produced a peacebuilding policy and law.

The policy is the *Sessional Paper No. 05 of 2014 on National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management.* The policy is supported by a national law on peacebuilding; *The National Cohesion and Peace Building Bill* (amended in 2021) which spells out the structures of the national peace architecture. Ghana established the National Peace Council (NPC) infrastructure, which is supported by Parliamentary Act 818 of 2011 (Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014), while Ethiopia produced a comprehensive peacebuilding policy in 2012 titled; *Towards A Comprehensive Peace-Building Policy And Strategy For Ethiopia* (UNDP, 2012). These policy documents have supported local peacebuilding in these countries with some degree of success.

However, the political recognition, while opening opportunities for Local Peacebuilding Committees, have come at a cost. Odendaal (2012) argues that national peace committees (NPCs) have the daunting task of coordinating peacebuilding while at the same time, managing tensions and political manipulation by divergent political agendas both at the local level and at the national level. This matter is also noted by Nganje (2021). Political manipulation aside, Ojendal *et al* (2017) argue local peacebuilding entities are sometimes ignored in peacebuilding planning and only included when their presence could add legitimacy to the issue at hand. At the same time, the authors argue, not all actors at the local level might be committed to peacebuilding. For this problem to be addresses local peacebuilding entities must be involved in peacebuilding planning from the start.

2.4. Gaps in the Peacebuilding Literature.

The review of the literature on sustainable peacebuilding through local peacebuilding committees revealed that much still needed to be understood by way of the efficacy and efficiency of local peacebuilding committees in fostering sustainable peacebuilding in their localities. Local Peacebuilding Committees gained prominence under the "local turn" phenomenon, which emphasised peacebuilding from below. However, even with the mushrooming of these entities, and the creation of policies in support for their work, their capacity to foster sustainable peace remains opaque and at times inconsistent with the expected outcomes of local level peacebuilding. Mungai *et al* (2020) argue in the case of informal peacebuilding committees that these entities function sub-optimally due to lack of resources, lack of requisite education for peacebuilding and poor support of would-be partners on the ground. These same issues obtained for the formal peacebuilding entities that were the subject of this study. The literature is scant on exactly why

formal peacebuilding entities also experience reduced agency, especially from a policy review perspective.

This study there set out to fill this gap by critically examining the influence of policy framework for local peacebuilding in Mombasa and by extension, Kenya. Literature review on policy also served to unearth the contribution of previously "problematised" groups such as youth and women who play a critical role in sustainable peacebuilding but who are rarely included in policy analyses. At the same time, the knowledge gap in terms of peacebuilding coordination, management and funding at the local level was also revealed and appropriate questions fielded to fill this void. It is only by examining the policy frameworks that credible conclusion can be offered on policy stewardship for sustainable peacebuilding in Kenya.

The literature is scant on peacebuilding strategies especially what works and why. The debate on peacebuilding strategies revolves around locally designed strategies as opposed to those that are seen as coming from the outside, even though they might be set to achieve the same outcomes. Sustainable peacebuilding is in essence sustained dialogue between conflicting individuals and communities. However, how this can be facilitated and maintained and conditions under which it works is less understood. Regarding preventive diplomacy, the literature provides many examples of the "prominent persons" approach as the most popular way of handling conflict and building the peace, however, this seems to be a high-level activity. The literature is weak on how this approach can work at the community level, yet many prominent people are often sent to warring communities for preventive diplomacy. Opiyo (2012) has argued that preventive diplomacy required local-level cooperation. The literature regarding PD at local level provides little evidence

on how this can be accomplished at the local level. The study set out to evaluate the value of preventive diplomacy for peacebuilding because Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees are expected to carry out preventive peacebuilding activities by reaching out to conflicting communities through proactive peacebuilding activities. The literature review also revealed gaps in the understanding of the policy foundation of the strategies that local peacebuilding committees apply in peacebuilding. Literature is scant on whether these strategies are anchored in policy, so as to determine the level of accountability that should be put on local peacebuilding committees. The degree to which policy creates the facilitative atmosphere for peacebuilding strategies also remains opaque with the review of the literature.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

The following section presents the conceptual framework for this study by examining two theories of peacebuilding, namely Galtung's Theory of Peacebuilding and Lederach's Conflict Transformation Theory. The section also presents an infrastructure for peace framework which explains the conceptual underpinnings of this new line of understanding conflict transformation. The selection of these theories is justified because they present the theoretical foundations of sustainable peacebuilding, which as Coleman (2012) argues, exists in a state where the probability of using destructive conflict, oppression and violence to solve problems is so low that it does not enter into any party's strategy, while the probability of using cooperation, dialogue and collaborative problem-solving to promote social justice and well-being is so high that it governs the social organization and life. Cravo (2017) observes that the goal of creating the conditions for self-sustaining peace to prevent a return to conflict has not been easy because the transition from conflict to sustainable peace is not straightforward.

Few countries can truly claim to be conflict-free, however, sustainable peacebuilding is possible. Church and Rogers (2006) argue that answers to what makes peacebuilding successful have been difficult to emerge, in part because of the importance of the intangible dimensions of peacebuilding such as relationships, identity values and culture. When considered together with contextual issues, peacebuilding becomes a rather complex undertaking which is hard to define with clarity. The difficulty of peacebuilding conceptualisation and definition notwithstanding, students of peacebuilding have advanced several theories and concepts to explain peacebuilding and the impact thereof. Two of these have been selected for discussion in this study.

2.5.1. Galtung's Theory of Peacebuilding.

Galtung's thinking about peace is a long history of lifelong engagement with peace as a concept and the whole question of how the world could experience peace without any threat to that peace. In 1967, Galtung wrote that to write about peace is to write about everything and nothing. By this, Galtung attempted to express the all-encompassing nature of peace because it cannot be separated from life as we know it. Galtung began by suggesting that peace was an umbrella concept and a general expression of human desires, and that which is ultimately to be pursued (Galtung, 1967). Galtung further suggested that peace could not be given only one special meaning for to do so, then it would lose it encompassing meaning. Therefore, Galtung argues, peace cannot mean simply the absence of organized group violence, but it must respond to their lived experiences so that they can endow it with the meanings that are important to them. Further, Galtung expounded on the idea of peace from three arguments; peace as equilibrium, peace as the absence of violence

and peace as cooperation among nations and groups. The ideas have influenced peace thinking for a long time.

The idea of peace as all all-encompassing concept has been argued by Anderson (2004) who argues that peace has two dimensions, that is, violence and harmony, and that both dimensions express certain condition in which peace can then be defined as a condition in which individuals, families, groups, communities, and nations experience low levels of violence and, because of this, can engage in mutually harmonious relationships. The idea of peace, not being completely devoid of violence then brings up the idea of how peace can be approached. Galtung also recognised that peace can stand for a specific issue, in the sense that it can be defined to mean peace that is imposed from above, in the form of state power and authority (Galtung, 1967).

In 1975, Galtung coined the term “peacebuilding” in his pioneering work "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding. In this treatise, Galtung attempted to place peace in the context of a world that was changing rapidly against the backdrop of WWII which left millions dead and a world very terrified of another similar experience. In the three approaches, Galtung distinguishes the three ideas of peace starting from peacekeeping, which is the exercise of keeping physical distance between two belligerents to peacemaking which is the implementation of peace agreements without attempting to address the root causes of conflict. These two represent what Galtung called negative peace, which is hard to sustain. In Galtung’s view, the ideal situation is to have positive peace because this is the only peace that is self-sustaining. Galtung therefore came up with the term peacebuilding which he defines as the process of creating self-supporting structures in society that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives

conflict. This definition moves the idea of peace from the traditional peacekeeping and peacemaking both of which Galtung saw as having shortcomings in a world needing sustainable peace. Galtung's view of peace is that it must be positive for it to be sustainable.

According to Galtung, conflicts erupt because of the failure to meet basic human need, not because of scarcity but because of bad policies which introduce inequity in society and perpetuate structural violence. In this situation, peace would then represent the reduction or removal the deleterious impact of these bad policies. Peace according to Galtung has a structure which, if applied correctly should address the root causes conflict and build the way to sustainable peacebuilding. This conceptualisation of peace has not been received without criticisms. Cravo (2017) points out some omissions in Galtung's peace theory, for example the lack of clarity on what criteria is to be used in measuring equitable distribution of state resources. Galtung is also criticised for seemingly suggesting that the reasons behind violence and conflict are purely economic and political. This has not been borne out in today's where faith-based conflicts have also emerged.

Cravo (2018) points out that Galtung's thinking inspired the UN to consider the possibility of truly peaceful world, perhaps encouraged by the end of the Cold War, but faced with the reality of the dramatic increase in the number of violent conflicts. In 1992, the UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali presented his *Agenda for Peace* in which was outlined the idea of post-conflict peacebuilding. The agenda had both the negative task of preventing the resumption of hostilities and the positive task of addressing the root causes of global conflict. The *Agenda for Peace (1992)* also recognised that transforming conflict required dealing with economic despair, social injustice and political oppression (UN, 1992). The Agenda defined peacebuilding purely as a post-conflict

affair while Galtung's concept talked about addressing the root causes, which by implication meant some consideration of proactive action against conflict.

While defining its sphere of work, as post conflict intervention tool, the UN Agenda for Peace by implication was advocating for top-down approaches to peacebuilding, an approach that has failed in nearly all peacebuilding attempts (Lefranc 2013). As King & Mathews (2012) argue, the Agenda did not meet expectations due to various reasons. Moreover, the rise of the right to protect (R2P) and regional approaches to peacebuilding, such as the new African Union Peace and Security Architecture have overtaken the clean-cut top-down preventive diplomacy as was originally designed. Most telling has been the dismal failure of peacebuilding interventions in countries like Somalia, South Sudan which have shown that local peacebuilding approaches have an edge over other approaches.

In 2000, Galtung further advanced his thinking in peacebuilding by introducing the TRANSCEND method of peaceful conflict transformation. According to Galtung, the TRANSCEND method is based on the core idea that to prevent violence and develop the creative potential of a conflict, there has to be transformation. The root of the method is to understanding of conflict as incompatible goals, and incompatible parties. The separation of people and the problem to be solved is achieved through dialogue based on empathy, non-violence and joint creativity (Galtung, 2000).

2.5.2 Galtung's Concept of Structural Violence.

The concept of structural violence is tackled in this study because of its relevance in the understanding of conflict drivers that continue to pose a threat to peace, in Kenya, and particularly in Mombasa County. Sometimes referred to as institutional violence, this concept has gained traction because of its ability to explain violence beyond the everyday connotation that the term carries. Structural violence can be described as any situation in which a society promotes inequity through explicit or implicit practices, laws and regulations. In his research paper entitled "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," (Galtung, 1969:168) argued that

> "Violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisations". Galtung, 1969:168

Galtung further argued that the inequality in the distribution of power is a clear manifestation of structural violence. Dilts *et al* (2012), posit that structural violence, is everything that hinders individuals from developing their capabilities, dispositions, or possibilities to meet their basic needs. On the other hand, Christie (1997), arguing from a human needs theory, posits that structural violence occurs when economic and political structures systematically deprive certain segments of society in meeting their basic needs, such as security, identity, well-being, and self-determination.

In 1971, Galtung further argued that structural violence can be seen in very many situations and therefore there is no one description of structural violence (Galtung and Hoivik, 1971). In comparing direct and structural violence, Galtung and Hoivik argued that while the former can be

described by the number of deaths it causes, structural violence is on describable by the number of years lost, or opportunities denied. This is an important measure because of the spread of structural violence especially in the Global South. Moyo (2008) in a study of structural violence in Zimbabwe argues, for example, that structural violence is entwined in familial relations because the power system is imbedded in the family structure. As in many communities, family violence is expressed in the form of threats, shaming and humiliation but this can escalate into physical violence. The problem with structural violence is that it is almost always invisible, embedded in pervasive social structures are the bedrock of society (Winter and Leighton, 2001). The authors conclude by stating that whenever people are denied access to society's resources, physical and psychological violence exists.

Lee (2019) argues that although less visible, structural violence is by far the most lethal form of violence, through causing excess suffering and death. Lee further posits that structural violence grows exponentially as unequal power differentials are used to create more unequal structures. This leads to a self-perpetuating system which serves to hide and normalize certain types of violence. Structural violence has been noted to contribute to homicides, suicides, mass murders, and war. Structural violence has been studied in many disciples such medicine, sociology, economic and political science. As more interest in explain violence has grown, other researchers have expanded on the meaning of the structural violence. For example, Dutta *et al* (2016) argues that structural violence normalises marginalisation, exclusion, and exploitation and therefore closely tied to cultural violence which is a systematic assault on the human dignity and self-worth. This then finds its expression in language, language, ideology, and knowledge production. The history of minorities in countries like India, the USA and places where a large part of the

population finds itself marginalised, is full of examples of language and ideology is used against them and is normalised by laws, religious beliefs and social regulations (Deliege, 1993)

Structural violence produces and reproduces episodes of human rights abuse in almost all its forms because of its insidious nature. In South Africa provides an example where long after the collapse of the apartheid regime and ascendance of a democratically elected Government to power, the legacy of apartheid which perpetuated both direct and structural violence against the majority still lingers. Taking a human rights perspective, Evans (2016) argues that the continued lack of access to land for most South Africans, post-apartheid, is, in fact structural violence in continuation of apartheid. Evans (2016) makes a case for the application of transformative justice, over and above what the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was able to achieve with the reconciliation exercise that helped heal the nation. With much of global conflict taking place in Africa, Clempson (2012) argues that the most plausible explanation of this situation is by viewing conflict on the continent as structural. African conflicts are caused by social and economic conditions that have engrained themselves in the systems over a long period (Clempson, 2012).

Structural violence has been studied in Kenya by many students of peacebuilding, for example, Roberts (2009), Murithi (2008) and Ochieng (2010). Murithi (2008), using the example of post-election violence in 2008, argues that the election seemed to have been a trigger of deep-seated structural violence in Kenya, as demonstrated by continued poor governance and corruption that has kept the majority landless, poor, unemployed and hungry. The same conclusion was arrived at by Sifuma (2011) who, in a study of post-election structural violence in Kenya argues that the post-election violence was caused by inadequate structures that did not address the plight of many

Kenyans such as equitable distribution of resources, access to land, discrimination of women, entrenched corruption and impunity, marginalisation of minority communities, poverty and unemployment among the youth. The author further suggested that perpetrators of structural violence need to be held accountable for their crimes if the country is to move forward.

Mombasa County has been determined to suffer from poverty and historical injustices which can be defined as structural violence (Otieno, 2019). A rapid assessment in Mombasa County, in June 2017 under the Crime and Violence Prevention Training (CVPT) project of the Kenya Accountable Devolution Program found that Mombasa County's troubled history of conquest and subjugation, has contributed to marginalisation of the indigenous population in terms of lack of access to land, education, and citizenship rights, all of which have been defined as structural violence. These factors have greatly contributed to the current challenges around youth unemployment and associated dangers such as petty crimes and gang activity. Marginalisation and land grievances feed into the radicalisation narratives which results in the recruitment of youth into terrorism activities. In the same vein, Mtuku *et al* (2021) argues that youth criminality in Mombasa can also be viewed from a structural violence perspective where youth are also victims of marginalisation and unfavourable environments, which constrain life choices, making violent crime a frequent path. Moreover, as studies have shown, criminal justice approaches have failed these youths through inconsistent, corrupt and brutal approach by police serves (Chitembwe *et al* 2021)

Galtung's concept of structural violence has been criticised by students of sociology, economics, and other disciplines because the subject touches on many aspects of life. Among these are critics are those who question how structural violence is seen and understood at the local level. What

might appear as abhorrent to one person might just be the opposite. In the case of mass violence, Keim (2009) argues that while much of the violence in Africa is explained by Western historians on the basis of cultures of violence in Africa, the role of colonialism and the expropriation of land that precipitated some of these problems are ignored or underplayed. It was the role of the Belgians in Rwanda that entrenched the Hutu/Tutsi divide, thus planting the seed for the 1994 genocide (Aptt, 2022). To further explain this point, Clempson (2012) has also pointed to the fact that some of the policies of IMF and World Bank which restrict public investment in Africa have been the cause of poverty and destitution. At the same time however, it is important to note that individual responsibility for some manifestation of structural violence (Heilinger, 2021)

2.5.3 Lederach's Conflict Transformation Theory

In Lederach's (2003) definition, conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationship. Lederach, cited in Miall (2001) stated that,

> Conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily "see" the setting and the people in it as the "problem" and the outsider as the "answer". Rather, we understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and building on people and resources within the setting (Lederach, 2003:15)

(Lederach 1995). Lederach (1995b: 17), further argues that this process provides transformative human construction and reconstruction of social organisation and realities. Conflict transformation

involves the complete change of the situations that support violence, in comparison to the other two approaches to peace that is, conflict resolution and conflict management, which do not seek to uproot conflict as it were.

Lederach (1996) argues that social conflict transforms social norms, and affects social organisation. It also affects the self so that at the individual level, one may start questioning their life and beliefs. If this be the case, Lederach contends that to overcome conflict, society must adopt a way to understand the root causes of conflict and how to deal with it in a holistic way, hence conflict transformation. Lederach cited in Miall (2001) presents a persuasive case for the comprehensive view of conflict transformation by arguing that peacebuilding is a long-term transformation of a war system into a peace system.

Lederach (2003) likens conflict transformation with the workings of a human being who has a head, heart, arms and feet. These components are similar to those in society where different dynamics operate in what can be called "social interaction". The head, argues Lederach refers to the conceptual view of conflict, how it is thought about and therefore prepare to approach conflict. The approach to conflict is influenced by attitudes, perceptions, and orientations. According to Lederach, the capacity to envision and react positively to conflict creates the potential for transformative result. A transformational approach recognizes that conflict is a normal and a continuous dynamic within human relationships, which has ebbs and flows.

The heart is the center of our hidden emotions, intuitions, and spiritual life, in the same way some of our social relations which are visible and those that are invisible. Lederach points out that

conflict flows from life and therefore the issues upon which people fight need careful consideration. The hands are capable of building things and we need to inject constructive solutions to conflicts. Legs and feet represent the place where we touch the ground, and therefore, where thought and heartbeat translate into response, direction, and momentum. Conflict transformation needs to be responsive to real-life challenges, needs, and realities. In essence a transformational view engages must help reduce violence and increase justice in human relationships (Lederach, 2003)

Lederach's (2013) conflict transformation model presented in figure 2.1 captures the broad spectrum of conflict transformation. The model is presented in three "inquiries", each representing a specific area of conflict.



Figure 2.1 The Big Picture of Conflict Transformation.

Source: Lederach ,2013

Inquiry 1: The Presenting Situation: The first point of inquiry is the presenting situation. It is the actual conflict and the main question to be answered here, what is the immediate problem to be solved and what is the context of the problem?

Inquiry 2: The Horizon of the Future: The second point of inquiry is the horizon of the future, and how that should look like. Lederach counsels that while the present conflict acts as the impetus toward change, the horizon of the future is a set of possibilities of what could be constructed and built.

Inquiry 3: The Development of Change Processes: The final major inquiry is the design and support of change processes. This broader component requires that the response to conflict be seen as the development of change processes that attend to the web of interconnected needs, relationships, and patterns. The change processes should address both the immediate problems and the broader relational and structural patterns, and ensure not only to promote short-term solutions, but also build platforms capable of promoting long-term social change.

In this model, Lederach's argument is that transformation is a process structure. The most important consideration in this inquiry is to envision what kind of partnerships will be ideal to carry this vision. Lederach argues that the presenting patterns of how things are now and have been in the past provide a context in which the issues in a dispute rise toward the surface. This knowledge is important because the potential for change lies in the ability of the conflict transformation actors to recognize, understand, and redress what has happened, and create new structures and ways of interacting in the future.

To bring conflict transformation into reality, Engell and Jacobsen provide the example of during the political crisis of 2015–2016, after the unconstitutional re-election of President Nkurunziza for a third term. This sparked riots by most Burundians who were opposed to this move. As a result of the protests the government also shut down the country's internet and telephone network, closed all of the country's universities and government officials publicly referred to the protesters as "terrorists. To respond to the Burundian crisis, the international community tried to change the situation by facilitating intra-Burundi dialogue but failed because of the resistance of the Burundian Government. This example demonstrated the point about the problem of imposing transformational agendas on situations that the receipts might not appreciate or even desire.

In the case of Kenya, Frazer & Ghettas (2013) provide an example of how context-specific conflict transformation can change the direction of a conflict. By 1992, Wajir County was facing famine, resource-based conflict and an impending election that threatened to tear the community apart. The traditional peacebuilding system had broken down. On top of this, the Government had imposed a curfew to contain the situation. A group of women decided to liaise their male counterparts in order to get the traditional system back on track, change the administration and enlist the help of Somali religious leaders to be part of the restoration of the traditional peace system. The group's approach to the conflict was to draw on traditional conflict resolution mechanisms which focused on the restoration of the relationship between victim and offender. This system relies on extensive use of dialogue and mediators from within the communities. In order to overcome the problem of mediation, they decided to meet monthly to discuss emerging issues and deciding how to solve them before they became big problems.

A key lesson coming out of the Wajir experience was that customary law can work hand in hand with formal, national law, thus making the elders part of the peacebuilding system. What later became the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) was the success of blending the traditional and formal peacebuilding systems together. As a transformative agenda, WPDC succeeded because of inclusivity; of not only the elders, but also of women and youth. This is what Lederach means by the web of interconnected needs, relationships, and patterns, and therefore it can be concluded that a sustainable transformative approach suggests that the key lies in the relationship of the involved parties, with all that the term encompasses at the psychological, spiritual, social, economic, political and military level (Lederach 1995) .

In conclusion, conflict resolution focuses on the change in the characteristics of a conflict by inducing change in the parties' relationship through improving mutual understanding. It is about the way that societies move from violence to non-violence and the means used to get there. Its goal is to build just, sustainable societies that resolve differences nonviolently. To achieve this, the direct and structural causes of conflict must be addressed. Over the years, the term conflict transformation has come to signify specific approaches in the practice and training in peacebuilding (Botes 2001). Ryan (2007) argues that a conflict transformational approach to peace is a radical and dynamic, empowerment the 'ordinary' person to participate in peace interventions.

2.5.4 The Infrastructure for Peace Framework.

Infrastructure for peace as a framework for understanding the role of local peace committees arose from the criticism of international peacebuilding interventionism that mostly took post-conflict as the starting point of peacebuilding. This approach was influenced by the United Nations definition

of peacebuilding as proposed by UN Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali in a report to the UN Security Council titled "*An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping* (UN Department of Public Information, 1992). In this report, the Secretary General defined peacebuilding as post-conflict action that will support structures which strengthen and solidify peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

Coming at the tail end of the Cold War, the Agenda for Peace was designed to steer the world into an era of peace, human rights and social justice in greater freedom. Most peacebuilding interventions supported by the West, based on this liberal thinking however failed to secure the peace because they did not address the underlying issues of continued conflict, focusing instead on democratisation, market-based economic reforms and strengthening state reforms (Zambakari, 2016). One of the key issues in continued conflict was the failure to set up systems that would guarantee the sustainability of peacebuilding after the end of peacebuilding projects had ended. A glaring omission in this approach was the lack of local agency.

This realisation led to a new line of critical thinking on peacebuilding and led to the rise of the "local turn" in peacebuilding which as argued by Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) represents a departure from the Western liberal thinking of peacebuilding and focuses on the experiences of peacebuilding from the Global South. As also argued by Leewuen *et al* (2018), local structures be they committees, councils at village, county or country level have become important strategic tools of national and international development organisations for enhancing local peacebuilding. These organisations form the Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) and are a suitable entry point to engage with the local dynamics of violent conflict, promote peaceful co-existence, and address local roots of

conflict. Similar recognition is given to local peace structures in a report to the United Nations; "*Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 2000"*, popularly known as the "Brahimi Report" which recommended to the Security Council that the Secretary General should support the establishment of post conflict peace-building structures as part of efforts by the United Nations system to achieve a lasting peaceful solution to conflicts. This resolution led to UN support to set up local entities for peacebuilding in many countries, undertake training and ensure that these entities had both the legal and political support of their countries. Together, these entities form the local infrastructure for peace.

The link between I4P and "local turn" is that locally built peace needs supportive structures to ensure longevity. The ideological base for the "local turn" finds its roots in the growing realisation that peacebuilding can be better sustained if it has local roots and is seen by the locals as their own undertaking. Infrastructure for peace has attracted the attention of peacebuilding researchers, for example van Tongeren (2011, 2013), Irene (2018), Githaiga (2020), Alihodžić (2012), Chuma & Ojielo (2012), among others.

Infrastructure for Peace has been defined as a dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values, and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peace-building in a society (Kumar and de la Haye, 2012). This definition was adopted in Kenya, in 2010 in a peace working group meeting and reflects the evolution of peacebuilding theory and practice, which merge in this conceptual framework now known as "infrastructure for peace". Van Tongeren cited in Irene and Majekodunmi (2017) defines them as institutional structures or mechanisms for preventing and addressing conflicts at local, regional,

national and global level. Infrastructure for Peace (I4P) underpins the idea of conflict transformation which has gained currency because of encouraging results from locally led and participatory peacebuilding practices in countries emerging from conflict, Kenya included.

The idea of infrastructure for peace (I4P) is rooted in the understanding that conflicts are usually not limited to the primary protagonists alone, nor are they caused by one problem. In a conflict situation, political, social and economic issues converge to put society in conflict, and the same may permeate different levels of the society. The implication is that the response to conflict must also be multi-faceted. Secondly, peacebuilding cannot be strictly a post-conflict intervention, as was seen by Boutros-Ghali (1992) but unfolds before, during and after conflict. As argued by van Tongeren (2011), establishing and infrastructure for peace supports a process of problem-solving approach to conflict, based on dialogue and non-violence, and ensures that a country can find internal solutions, to specific conflicts and tensions through mediated consensus or multi-stakeholder dialogue. The infrastructure for peace may be established in the form of a national, district or local peace council comprised of trusted and highly respected persons of integrity who can bridge political divides and who possess competence and experience in transforming conflicts, a national peace platform, a government bureau, department or ministry of peacebuilding (van Tongeren, 2011)

Infrastructure for Peace was first advanced by Lederach in the 1980s when he argued that the support mechanisms to sustain the peacebuilding process required both conceptual and practical development. Citing the case of Nicaragua, Lederach (2012) argues that the challenge in situations where countries were emerging from conflict was how to develop long-lasting support for

peacebuilding that would sustain the social, cultural and political change processes necessary for sustained peace. It is for this reason that Lederach (2012) proposed the idea of an infrastructure for peace as a core ingredient of a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding. In support of the idea of "infrastructure" Lederach (2012) argues that previous peacebuilding efforts, which were built on the perception of post conflict interventions tended to "projectise" peacebuilding into short-term projects resulting in isolated and disjointed peacebuilding. Therefore, to succeed in sustainable peacebuilding, an infrastructure for peace must have a long-term vision and support in terms of resources.

Infrastructure for peace has been useful not only as a conceptual framework but also as a practical approach to peacebuilding as had been proposed by Lederach. For example, van Tongeren (2011) cites several cases of South Africa, Kenya and the Philippines as countries that have deliberately built infrastructures for peace in support of their peace agendas. South Africa was among the first to begin constructing an infrastructure for peace, which comprised several Local peace committees (Local Peacebuilding Committees) which were supposed to reduce violence as the country moved towards the 1994 elections. The main objectives of the committees were to create trust and reconciliation between community leaders, to prevent violence and to resolve disputes. The Local Peacebuilding Committees were a product of the National Peace Accord signed in 1991 between the principal protagonists in South Africa's conflict. In Ghana between 1980 and 2002, the northern part of the country was being torn apart by political conflict. The slaying of the King of Dagbon (*Yaa Naa Yakubu Andani II*) prompted the establishment of the Northern Peace Advocacy Council as a mediation and conflict resolution mechanism to deal with the issues of trust among

the factions and restore confidence and relationship. With the help of the United Nations the Government of Ghana expanded the ides of the Council to other parts of the country.

Kenya is cited as a unique example of a bottom-up approach to building an infrastructure for peace. In 1993, a group of women of the Wajir district of Kenya brought together people affected by violence to sensitize the population to the need and possibility for peace. After a while, convinced that peace was possible, civil society actors worked with the District Commissioner and a Member of Parliament to formalize the peace committee which eventually became the Wajir Peace and Development Committee, with the District Commissioner as chairperson. This idea lead to the formation of the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management. Following this post-election violence, the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 recommended the establishment of district peace committees in all of Kenya's districts. The foregoing speaks to Lederach's original hypothesis that local peace agreements need a structure to sustain and support the expected outcomes.

Lederach (2012) further argues that the institutionalisation of infrastructure for peace, such as the one that has been done in Kenya through the creation of District Peace Committees (Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees) holds both promise and significant challenge. The promise is in the commitment to long-term investment in peacebuilding rather than the short-term oft-unsuccessful projects that do little to build the peace in the country. The promise is also toward institutionalised capacity, clarity of functions and roles that support peacebuilding in the long-run. However, the challenge arises from the bureaucratic nature of such institutions especially if they are tied to policy instruments that are less influential in the affairs of the country.

Lasting peace requires people, communities and leaders with the skills, capacities and opportunities to work together to reconcile societal divisions that precipitate conflict. Peacebuilding practitioners support I4P in part because it offers these possibilities (World Bank 2011). In order for this to happen, there is always almost a tendency to institutionalise these infrastructures for peace. Alihodžić (2013) argues that local peacebuilding formations are usually dependent on the state and other formal institutions in order to function. This dependency may result in an imbalanced relationship because of the power that state agencies wield as compared to the local peacebuilding entities. Students of peacebuilding have argued that while institutionalisation should, in theory enhance the capacity of local peacebuilding infrastructure.

However, the same process threatens local agency by removing the independence of the local peace structure. Githaiga (2020) citing the case of Kenya has argued that institutionalisation creates financial and programmatic demands that make local agency unsustainable. Secondly, institutionalisation changes the meaning of local, because the resulting I4P becomes an outside idea brought in by the authorities. Githaiga further notes that institutionalisation reduces autonomy and introduces certain responsibilities on the part of the members of the I4P such as collecting information for the Government but without compensation. Institutionalisation of peacebuilding has been characterised by innumerable by meetings and reliance on external funding which in the author's view, yield no peace.

Building infrastructure for peace has come with challenges and these have been experienced the world over. African peacebuilding structures have not been set up to deal with the major drivers of conflict in Africa, such as contested political transitions, violent extremism, inter and intra-state

rivalry, and the struggle for natural resources such as grazing land. Poor coordination among donors who support peacebuilding, especially in Africa creates challenges for peacebuilding structures that have to deal with multiple partners who seek to shape their peacebuilding process. Africa (2020) argues that formal peacebuilding processes are typically driven by large, well-resourced actors who normally focus on elites and ignore the grassroots level often find innovative and more sustainable ways of peacebuilding. Definitions of what constitutes peacebuilding that fails to include these localised initiatives are often a missed opportunity for sustainable peace. This is particularly important in relation to women, who tend to be left out of formal peace processes, and whose value in peacebuilding is therefore underestimated.

2.6 Conceptual Model.

The conceptual model of this research was based on the peacebuilding dynamics that influence the implementation of sustainable peacebuilding strategies in Mombasa County. Peacebuilding dynamics has been defined as policies, strategies, challenges and opportunities that the Sub-county peacebuilding committees interact with or encounter as they go about their business of peacebuilding in Mombasa County. Freire and Lopes (2013) in the case of Timor-Leste argue that peace interventions are never implemented in vacuum, and therefor they are bound to cause friction with prevailing and or underlying drivers of conflict including persistent political cleavages, ethnic and community divisions, and social and economic inequalities. These issues were also interrogated in the study.

THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL



Figure 2. 2: Conceptual Model Showing interaction of variables

Source: Researcher, 2022

The independent variables in this study were : National Policy Framework on Peacebuilding; which in this study refers to the guidelines, rules and regulations under which the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees operate. These are spelled out in the Sessional Paper No. 5 of 2014 on National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (published in 2015);Peacebuilding Strategies; which, in this study refer to the activities and approaches that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees apply in their endeavours to foster sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County, focusing on preventive missions, mediation and early warning; Operational Challenges and opportunities; which in this study refer to obstacles that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees face in their endeavours to foster sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County, and the opportunities that either come their way or those that they create as they work in peacebuilding and the dependent variable was sustainable peace as manifest through various indicators such as, but not limited to societal harmony, peaceful settlement of disputes, reconciliation, cohesion, dialogue, less youth delinquency. Additionally, intervening variables were Normative roles of Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees, partnerships at county and sub-county level, peacebuilding committee members training and competence and community cooperation with peacebuilding committees

2.7 Chapter Summary

Chapter two began with a brief review of the international literature on peacebuilding and argued that while the literature on peacebuilding is growing, not much is known exactly how local peacebuilding works and what it would take to sustain it. The experience of the AU is by and large limited to what member countries allow it to do, and often this role has been overshadowed by the UN which, because of resources and global mandate, has been seen as the more capable entity.

Kenya's peacebuilding agenda which for a long time was delegated to NGOs, donors and foreign governments is taking shape under a new peace policy which, lays strong emphasis on local peacebuilding, and when implemented, will greatly enhance the national peacebuilding agenda and effectiveness. The review of peacebuilding and conflict theories has been done with the view to creating a framework for the proposed research. These reviews set the ground for establishing a theoretical framework that has shaped this research project. The next chapter, chapter three, delves on research methodology.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents and discusses research methodology within the sustainable peacebuilding research paradigm as well as the analysis of district peace committees in Mombasa County. In essence, this chapter delves into research design, Study Areas, study population, sample size and sampling technique, data collection Instruments, data analysis and presentation. It also explicates the limitations of the study, validity and reliability, and ethical Consideration and it ends with a chapter summary.

3.1. Research Design.

A research design can be defined as a plan that a researcher adopts before data collection commences in order to achieve the research objective in a valid way. Asenahabi (2019) posits that essence of research design is to translate a research problem into data that can be analysed so as to provide relevant answers to a research question at in the most efficient manner. The considerations that go into choosing a design include careful analysis of statement of the problem, the research questions to be answered and a thorough review of the literature. Akhtar (2016) argues that a research is valid when the conclusion arrived at is accurate or true. A research design is the conceptual blueprint within which research is conducted, which a plan of action, the outline data of collection, measurement and analysis. The ultimate guide to a research designing is the type of evidence required to answer the research question in a reasonable way.

This study adopted the descriptive survey design, because of the opportunity that the method offers for studying LPCs. Aggarwal and Ranganathan (2019) define the descriptive research design as a method that allows the researcher to study and describe the distribution of one or more variables in a study sample at one specific point in time without trying to make inferences or causal statements. The primary advantage of a descriptive study is that it is easy to conduct, can yield information quickly and required less intrusion into the respondent's daily routine. Mugenda and Mugenda, cited in Asenahabi (2019) point out that survey method is the process of collecting data from a sample group so as to determine the status of that group as per that time with respect to one or more variables. Dulock (1993) defines the descriptive design as having at least four characteristics; to describe systematically and accurately the facts and characteristics of a given population or area of interest; to provide an accurate portrayal or account of characteristics of a particular individual, situation or group, and discover new meaning; to portray the characteristics of persons, situations, or groups and the frequency with which certain phenomenon and to answer questions based on the ongoing events of the present. Taken together, these characteristics give a more complete description of the descriptive survey design.

This study took into consideration the versatility of the design as enabling the researcher to describe systematically and accurately the facts and characteristics of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. This study aimed to provide, as accurately as possible, the description of formal peacebuilding entities in Mombasa County and assess their ability to effectively foster a sustainable peacebuilding agenda for Mombasa County. The study design also offered the researcher the opportunity to study the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in their current status in a naturalistic setting because the study subjects were selected on the basis that they

possessed the information relevant to this study. The results of this study will be used as the basis for further research on how formal peacebuilding structures such as Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees can foster sustainable peacebuilding in a place like Mombasa County.

The data collection exercise was guided by the objectives of the research. Data were collected through four methods: Key Informant Interviews (KII), Focus Group Discussions, Semi-structured Questionnaires and an Observation checklist. Secondary data was also collected through the perusal of relevant documents help by Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, their partners and the National Steering Committee. such as annual reports, end of project reports and minutes of meetings.

3.2. Study Area.

This research was done in Mombasa County. The county was selected because of the persistent land-based and ethnic conflicts that has been witnessed in the County, and which, unlike other parts of Kenya, has the potential of internationalising domestic conflict due to the emerging illicit drug trafficking and the advent of international terrorism that have both taken root in the County (Onguny, 2019; Rakodi *et al.* 2000; Botha, 2014). Mombasa County has a long history of many peacebuilding attempts amid new and old challenges, however, not much of it has been studied. Apart from a few studies by students of peace such as Anambia (2018), most of the literature is very recent and mostly focusing on the religious dimension of peacebuilding as studies by Mwangi (2020), Mohamed (2017) and Alice et al (2020). None of these studies have focused on the work of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in fostering peacebuilding in the County. Most of the literature of the literature in Mombasa County's peacebuilding is by way of project reports

produced by peacebuilding partners working in Mombasa, such as Search for Common Ground, County Government of Mombasa, Coast Interfaith Council of Cleric, The Kenya Community Support Center (KECOSCE), and the Justice, Human Rights and Dignity Organisation (JUHUDI).



Figure 3. 1 Map of Mombasa County

Source: GIS Expert, prepared from Kenya National Bureaus of Statistics 2021

Mombasa County lies to the east of Kenya, along the Indian Ocean Coast (Lat: -4.043740, Long: 39.658871), and is the premier trading port for Kenya and East Africa, as well as the premier destination for tourists, both local and international. In Kiswahili, Mombasa is called "*Kisiwa Cha Mvita*", which means "Island of War" due to the many violent changes in its administration over the years. Many nationalities have had a say on the Island at one time or another; Africans, Persians, Arabs, Portuguese and British as far back as the 6th century AD. Mombasa County is host to Kenya's second-largest city of Mombasa, which is cosmopolitan with almost all Kenyan people living here. The County has six sub-counties which also act as electoral constituencies: Mvita, Changamwe, Kisauni, Jomvu, Nyali and Likoni.

The economy of the county can be described as mixed with agriculture, manufacturing, maritime activities and tourism being the mainstay of the County. Among these, tourism which contributes to 68% of the wage employment is the leading employer generating both formal and informal employment. Others economic activities are fishing, farming of sisal, sugarcane, cashew nuts, and coconuts and livestock farming. Much of the farming of foodstuff is for subsistence at the household level. Various manufacturing firms have set up base in the County including cement companies, petroleum refining, food processing, salt production (County Government of Mombasa, 2021).

The history of the county can be traced back to the 16th century. From about the 8th to the 16th century Mombasa was the centre of the Arab slave trade and they attempted to stamp their control on the Island and later on the mainland. The Portuguese later came, led by Vasco da Gama who is said to be the first known European to visit Mombasa. His goal was to spread Christianity and

expand Portugal's trade with India. Mombasa became Portugal's main trading centre of spices, cotton and coffee, and they built Fort Jesus as their protection as well as a trading centre. Mombasa was later taken over by Omani Arabs and then in 1895, the British took over, established the British East African Protectorate and effectively colonised Mombasa, which was to remain its capital from 1887 to 1907.

The British quickly consolidated their control over Mombasa and the whole of East Africa and built a railway line in the early 1900s from Mombasa to Uganda. This increased the importance of Mombasa as a port city, which it is up to today. In the middle of the exchange of power between the Portuguese, the British and Omani Arabs was the issue of land which had been taken from indigenous Mijikenda people who were treated as irrelevant in the power struggle. Kanyinga (2000), in a paper titled *The Politics of Land Rights and Squatting in Coastal Kenya,* argues that the land problem started with the Arab slave trade in the 19th century when Kenya's coastal region was loosely federated to the Sultanate of Zanzibar and which continued when the region became a British protectorate. Huge sisal plantations were created in former indigenous lands without any compensation. As time went by, the absence of a comprehensive land policy on the Mijikenda who has lost land worsened, and the locals found themselves as squatters on their land. Subsequent Governments in independent Kenya did little to solve the problem, thus driving many locals to continued poverty. Rakodi *et. al* (2000) summarise the problem of conflict in Mombasa today as associated with urban poverty that has created the breeding ground for radicalisation, political patronage and corruption. The unresolved land issues and lack of basic services have also affected the peace of the county and built the road to youth radicalisation.

In 1997, elections-based violence in the Likoni area was based on the feeling of residents that people who migrated from the upcountry influenced the elections to continue dominating the county. Indigenous Mijikenda people, therefore, decided to evict them. During the violence that followed, some 100 people are thought to have lost their lives (HRW 2013). In Kisauni, the chronic land problem occasioned by absentee landlords and land grabbing has already led to confrontations between the residents (many of who are squatters) and the security forces. Because of these problems, vigilante and secessionist groups such as Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) have been seen in the County. Mombasa has also been affected by terrorism and is considered vulnerable to the Al-Shabaab threat. Another more insidious problem in Mombasa County is the drug menace that has introduced a new class of influencers, the drug lords. With much money to buy elections, they have been known to sponsor violence against unfavourable candidates.

Mombasa's conflict problem cannot be divorced from the 2007/8 post-election conflict because the real drivers of the conflict have remained unresolved since Kenya's independence in 1963. These include exclusionary and oppressive rule, the use of ethnicity for political ends, inequitable distribution and access to vital resources, corruption, limited democratic space, limited rule law, and lack of respect for fundamental rights. The suffering, death, and displacement has been associated with cyclic electoral problems witnessed in Kenya since the return of multiparty politics in 1992. The post-election violence in 2007 and 2008 differed only in geographic scope and impact on lives, communities, and the economy. Ethnicity continues to play an inordinate role in Kenyan political life and the 2008 post-election violence played out largely on ethnic lines, fueled by grievances over land, privilege, and inequality (Gathiaka, 2021).

Recent research has established that heavy-handed security response to disturbances in Mombasa, and the "guilty-by-association" approach by security operators in Mombasa has led to a lack of trust, between the community and government, thereby hampering the prevention and countering of violent extremism (VE). This approach has left vulnerable populations more susceptible to the influence of radicalisation, a fact that has had serious implications for peacebuilding in Mombasa County (Kimamo, 2017). However, the Mombasa County administration has elaborated a strategy for countering extremism which is currently being implemented.

Mombasa County enjoys a wide range of partnerships from NGOs and FBOs such as the Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP), *Ilishe Trust*, the Coast Provincial Peace Forum, Muslims for Human Rights and Catholic Justice and Peace Commission and Inuka! Programs run by donors also contribute to the county peace agenda, for example, Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE), which is a USAID-funded program that provides policy support for local peace committees to increase community capacity for peaceful dialogue. The County Dialogue forums, which are part of the Electoral Violence and Conflict Management Program supported by USAID, are also part of the peacebuilding agenda of the county.

3.3 Study Population.

The study population comprised Mombasa Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees and the other peacebuilding stakeholders associated with the peacebuilding committees. This was decided upon in order to ensure that the views of the other stakeholders who contribute to the peacebuilding dynamics were not left out. The stakeholders were identified as ; Government officials at county and national level, youths, villagers, including those in the *Nyumba Kumi* program. At the time of

field work, the population of the committees was 250 and 113 were recruited into the study. Senior Government officials in Mombasa County including Sub-county Commissioners, Security personnel and Ward Administrators totaled 51 and 11 were recruited into the study (including 1 from the national level). Because of the very mobile and unpredictable nature of youth stakeholders, the study could not ascertain the exact number of youths who collaborate with the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, therefore the study relied on the *maskan* contacts and register maintained by village elders (*Wazee wa Vijiji)* to identify youths for the study. From this, 185 youths belonging to different *maskans* were identified and recruited into the study. This process also helped to identify 7 reformed youth who were included into the study as well. Similarly, to arrive at a random sample of villagers, the researcher utilised the Nyumba Kumi register at the ward level to identify and recruit 72 members of households who were recruited into the study. Through working with the Chairpersons of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, 4 representatives of NGOs that collaborate with the committees were also identified and recruited into the study. A total of 392 respondents participated in the study.

3.4 Sample Size and sampling technique.

The total sample size for the study was 392 respondents and was sampled from seven categories of respondents as presented in table 3. 1. The study adopted different sampling technique because of the different kinds of respondents envisaged and the sensitivity of the information being sought. This is in line with similar studies in peacebuilding such as Muchanga (2019) which applied different sampling techniques for the different study populations in a study on Peacebuilding in Kakamega, entitled *Peacebuilding in Kenya; The Catholic Church's Contribution* (2019). Mixed method sampling is a unique way of ensuring that a study can maximise on different sampling

techniques to answer pertinent study questions. Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2007) argue that when the purpose of sampling is to gain insight into an issue, then non-probability sampling can be used. In this study, convenience sampling was applied for the selection of the respondents from the Sub-county peacebuilding committee because of their relatively small number and availability driven by the fact that membership into these committees is voluntary and the researcher had to depend on both their availability and willingness to participate.

Convenience sampling has been used in peacebuilding studies, for example, by Opollo (2011) in a study entitled "*The role of international non-governmental organizations in empowering local NGOs in conflict management and peace building: the case of Care International in Kenya"*, by Moyo-Nyoni and Kiyala (2022) in a study on women empowerment and peacebuilding in rural Zimbabwe, and Kiprono (2018) in a study entitled, *Relationship Between Cattle Rustling and Development: A Case Study of Tot and Tunyo Divisions of Elgeyo Marakwet County; Kenya: 1963 To 2012.* Internationally, a study in Lebanon by Nassif, (2016) entitled *Building a Peace Culture: Peace Education Possibilities in Schools in Lebanon. A Qualitative Study* also utilised convenience sampling as a data collection design. The other method used was purposive sampling to identify respondents who would be subject to focus group discussion and key informant interview. Palinkas *et al* (2015) point out that this method is widely used for the identification and selection of information-rich cases related to the phenomenon of interest. In this study, the senior government officials, youths and village elders were considered information-rich in terms of the work of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees. This method has also been applied in peacebuilding research by, for example, Mutie (2010), Mohamed (2011) and Kahuthia (2011) all of whom were researching peacebuilding at doctoral level.

Table 3. 1 Study Population, Sample size and Sampling Technique

Category of respondents	Study population	Method of data collection	Sample size	Sampling Technique
Members of Mombasa Peacebuilding infrastructure	250	Semi-structured Questionnaire	113	Convenience
Key Informant Interviewees i. County Administration County security officials and Ward administration	51	KII	10	Purposive
Key Informant Interview with NSC in Nairobi	2	KII	1	Convenience
Youth Groups i. Jomvu youths (3 groups) ii. Kisauni youths (4 groups) iii. Mvita Youths (3 group) iv. Likoni youths (5 groups) v. Nyali Youths (3 groups) vi. Changamwe youths (3 groups)	Unspecified	Focus Group discussion guides	185 (21 FGD Groups)	Purposive
Reformed Youths	Unspecified	KII	7	Convenience
Village elders and women's groups i. Majengo mixed group (males and females- 3 groups) ii. Jomvu mixed group (males and females-3 groups) iii. Kisauni mixed groups (males and females-3 groups)	35 Nyumba Kumi Groups	Focus Group discussion guides	72 (9 FGD Groups)	Purposive
NGOs and other partners	11	KII	4	Purposive
Total number of respondents			392	

Source:Field Data,2021

3.5 Data Collection Procedures and Tools.

The study utilised both primary and secondary data collection techniques. Data collection was done between August 2021 and March, 2022. Out of the total study sample of 392, 113 respondents who were the core members of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees were subjected to the semi-structured questionnaire, 20 respondents were interviewed through Key Informant guides, and the balance of the respondents were interviewed in Focus Group Discussions in 32 focus groups. Quantitative data presented in the study is therefore for 133 respondents while the qualitative data were analysed for thematic information which was used to support and reinforce the findings from the semi-structured questionnaires. The study utilised four data collection tools, namely: Semi-structured questionnaire, Focus Group Discussion Guide, Key Informant Discussion Guilde and Obeservation Tool.

Semi-structured questionnaires. This can be described as a data collection tool that allows the researcher to collect information in a flexible manner so that different facets of the research question can be explored. A semi-structured questionnaire supports that asking of a combination of predetermined questions and questions that are not predetermined so that the respondent is prompted to answer in their own way. When this method is applied, more comprehensive data is generated. Adejimi *et al* (2010) argue that the application of semi-structured questionnaires has become popular because of the versatility of the tool in eliciting as much information as possible on a subject matter.

The Focus Group discussion guide (FGD guide). A focus group discussion can be described as a free-flowing discussion involving an average of 8-10 people on a topic that is guided by carefully

predetermined questions. Nyumba *et al* (2010) posit that this method is most useful when the researcher is interested in gaining an in-depth understanding of a social issue. In this research, peacebuilding being a sensitive social issue, focus group discussions were deemed as appropriate.

The Key Informant Discussion Guide. A key informant interview can be described as a qualitative in-depth interview with someone who has first-hand or expert knowledge on the subject under discussion. The Key Informant discussion guide is supposed to guide these discussions in a systematic manner. Key informant interviews collects information from a wide range of people, usually community leaders, professionals, or residents who can shed light on an issue. Kumar (1989) argues that the number of key informants can range from 15 to 35 so as to ensure that the topic is exhausted effectively

The Observation checklist. The research also employed an observation check-list to observe Sub-county Peacebuilding Committee meetings. The observation checklist is a list of predetermined items which the researcher checks against expected outcomes. Observation checklists have been used in both scientific and social science settings to gauge how the subject of the observation is performing against a set of expected outcomes (Pickering *et al*, 2013)

Plate 3.1 Researcher in consultation with thesis supervisor

Field Data,2021

Plate 3.2: Researcher with respondents during data collection

Field Data,2021

Plate 3.3: Researcher with respondents during data collection

Field Data,2021

3.6 Data Analysis.

Quantitative data were analysed using version SPSS 24 and 26. These were then presented in charts, graphs in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Qualitative data were analysed through coding and categorising so as to identifying significant patterns, and draw meaning from the data.

3.7 Validity.

Validity refers to the extent to which a study instrument actually measures the construct of interest. Leung (2015) posits that validity must measure the appropriateness of the tools, processes, and data. Validity is also concerned with critical issues such as whether the research question is valid for the research objectives and whether the choice of methodology is appropriate for answering the research question. The researcher undertook a two-step validity process. First, all the survey

instruments were discussed in detail with the study supervisors, who are the subject matter experts and each question agreed upon. This process ensured that the study stayed as close as possible to the stated research objectives. Secondly, the researcher undertook a pilot study which is described in the next section.

3.8 Pilot Study and Reliability.

Reliability refers to how consistently a method measure a subject of interest. A measurement is considered reliable if the same result can be consistently achieved by using the same methods under the same circumstances. This study set out to do a pilot study in order to ascertain the reliability of research instruments through test-retest method. Connely (2008) describes as a pilot study as a small-sample study conducted as a prelude to a larger scale study, but is designed to guide the future study. The lessons learned in the pilot study can prevent major problems that could not be anticipated before collecting patient data in the clinical setting.

A sample of 84 was selected from the Majengo area of Mtwapa town, Kilifi County, which is about 20 kilometres from Mombasa. The site was selected due to the cultural and socio-economic similarity with Mombasa County. The justification for the selected sample was based on a review of the literature on sampling for pilot studies whereby Connely (2008) suggests that a 10% sample of the projected study figure should suffice to provide information that guides the parent study. There are different views on this matter, for example, Hertzog (2008) cautioned that different studies require different sampling considerations, but the 10% figure seems reasonable enough. The reliability measure for the pilot study is presented in the ensuing paragraphs.

Reliability Measure for Multi-Item Scales: Total scale variance = sum of item variances and all item co-variances:

[k/(k-1)] * [1- (sum of item variances/total scale variance).

Where k = number of items Range between 0 and 1

Criteria for assessment,

≥ 0.70 = adequate reliability for group comparisons

≥ 0.90 = adequate reliability for individual monitoring.

The results of the statements are presented in table 3.2.

Table 3. 2 Reliability Results for District Peace Committees in Sustainable Peacebuilding in Kilifi County, Kenya

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix

	Role of LPCs in peacebuilding	Policy advocacy on LPCs' role in Peacebuilding	Conflict Analysis by LPCS	Causes of Conflict in Kilifi County	Awareness of policy framework	Strategies adopted in maintaining peace	Challenges facing Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in fostering sustainable peacebuilding
Role of LPCs in peacebuilding	1.000	.968	.750	.910	.580	.934	.835
Policy advocacy on LPCs role in Peacebuilding	.968	1.000	.775	.940	.562	.905	.862
Conflict Analysis by LPCS	.750	.775	1.000	.824	.435	.701	.898
Causes of Conflict in Kilifi County	.910	.940	.824	1.000	.528	.850	.917
Awareness of policy framework	.580	.562	.435	.528	1.000	.621	.485
Strategies adopted in maintaining peace	.934	.905	.701	.850	.621	1.000	.780
Challenges facing Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in fostering sustainable peacebuilding	.835	.862	.898	.917	.485	.780	1.000

Source: Field Data,2021

The results indicated that the statements on the role of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, policy advocacy of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, conflict analysis by Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees Causes of conflict, awareness of policy framework, strategies adopted before conflict after conflict as well as challenges facing Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in fostering sustainable peacebuilding had an alpha value of above 0.70 that is 0.959 and thus the instruments were reliable.

3.9. Limitations of the Study

This study was hampered in general by poor record keeping of peacebuilding partners on the ground, leading to reliance on verbal information on key issues such as the actual number of youths who are considered members of Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees. As a result, an inordinate amount of time was spent on tracking members youth and village elders to be recruited into the study. In the end, through explanation and reassurances that the research was only meant to gain insights in the peacebuilding agenda of Mombasa County, the researcher with the support of Chiefs and village elders was able to recruit respondents.

The study had anticipated the non-availability of key informants (KIIs), especially Senior Government officials due to bureaucratic demands of making appointments. This proved to be the case. However, the researcher managed to reach some of the who were able to provide the needed information on the perspectives of the Government on the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees' contribution to peacebuilding in Mombasa County. A major problem encountered during data collection was the security threat posed by Al-Shabaab suspects who were confronted by police in Likoni Sub-county, on August 28th 2021, attempting to cross into the Island. The

County administration then issued a moratorium on any public functions, unless otherwise authorised. This order disrupted data collection through FGDs which had been scheduled but was later overcome by contacting Officers Commanding Police Stations in Likoni and Changamwe who then detailed two village elders to assist the researcher .

3.10. Ethical Considerations

Ethics are the moral principles that govern a person's behaviour. Ethics can also be defined as as standards of right and wrong that prescribe what humans ought to do, usually in terms of rights, obligations, benefits to society, fairness, or specific virtues. Showcat and Parveen (2017) argue that even though certain legal requirements are placed on the researcher, moral values about respect and honesty are important in research. Fouka and Mantzorou (2011), argue that all human activities are governed by individual, community and social values, and in research, the protection of dignity of respondents in critical. A key consideration in research is the informed consent of the respondent because studies that deal with personal information are sensitive and must be handled with outmost care. Informed consent is a procedure through which a competent subject, after having received and understood all the research-related information, can voluntarily provide his or her willingness to participate. Nijhawan *et al* (2013) posit that informed consent is an ethical and legal requirement and is embedded in the principles of Nuremberg Code. In this study, the researcher strictly followed ethical because of the sensitivity of the research question.

All protocols necessary for the approval of the study were observed and sought in good time. The researcher first obtained approval from the School of Graduate Studies of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST) to proceed with the research. An application

was then made to the National Commission for Science and Technology Innovation (NACOSTI) which gave the permit and authorisation for the study. The researcher then proceeded to Mombasa County and contacted the Office of the County Commissioner and the Office of the County Education Officer to obtain authorisation for field work. It was only after this was done that the field work began. During field work, all respondents were provided with full information about the aims, methods, objectives, significance and anticipated benefits of the study to enable them to participate with full knowledge of the implications of their involvement. Respondents then signed a consent form before the interview started.

3.11. Chapter Summary

This chapter addressed the research design, the study area, study population, sampling and sample size, limitations of the study, and ethical considerations. The study used the descriptive survey design based on quantitative and qualitative data collection methods. Qualitative data was collected using semi-structured interview guides while quantitative data were collected using semi-structured questionnaires. The chapter summary leads to presentation and discussion of study findings according to the specific objectives, starting with the first specific objective, which forms the subject of Chapter four.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLICY FRAMEWORK OF FORMAL PEACE INFRASTRUCTURE IN MOMBASA COUNTY

This chapter presents the findings and discussions on the policy framework of the Mombasa County formal peace infrastructure, which comprises six Sub-county Peace Committees (SPCs). The chapter begins with the demographics of the respondents, including their understanding of their roles in peacebuilding. This chapter also lays the ground for subsequent discussion on peacebuilding strategies.

4.1. Socio-demographic characteristics of the Sub-county Peace Committees

Socio-demographics refer to a combination of social and demographic information that define the population under study. The importance of socio-demographic characteristics has been established across the social and physical sciences because of their influence on the behaviour of populations under study. In peacebuilding, socio-demographic characteristics have been examined by, for example, Avornyo and Sekyi (2015) who, in the case of Cape Coast, Ghana found out that women were not given the opportunity to contribute towards peace in Ghana. On the other hand, Juan and Nyumbe (2012) in examining the role of women as peacebuilders in South Sudan using age, marital status and occupation found out that women played a big role in peace building activities in South Sudan, but they efforts went unrecognised by the government and community due lack of education unfavourable traditional beliefs and lack of proper presentation of women in the higher positions in government. Both studies suggest that certainly, gender is an important factor in peacebuilding in these communities.

In this study, age, gender, education, occupation were selected for establishing the socio-economic status of the respondents. The results are illustrated in table 4.1.

Table 4. 1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the study population

	Age (N=113)	**Frequency (100%)**
20-25 years	26	23.0
26-30 Years	36	31.9
31-35 Years	17	15.0
36-40 Years	9	8.0
41-45 Years	7	6.2
46-50 Years	18	15.9
	Gender (N=113)	**Per cent (100%)**
Male	58	51.33
Female	55	48.67
	Education Level (N=113)	**Percent (100%)**
Primary	41	36.3
Secondary	40	35.4
Tertiary	28	24.8
University	4	3.5
	Occupation (N=113)	**Percent (100%)**
Unemployed	50	44.2
Employed	11	9.7
Self-employed	52	46.0

	Income Level	
	N=113	**Percent 100%**
Below 1000	50	44.2
1000-5000	33	29.2
5000-10000	19	16.8
Above 10000	8	9.1

	Religion	
	N-113	**%**
Muslim	76	67.2
Non-muslims	37	32.7

Source; Field data, 2021

4.1.1. Age Profile of Sub-county Peace Committees in Mombasa County

The age profile of the study respondents is presented in table 4.1. The study found out that, out of 113 respondents, 23.0% (N=26) were between 20-25 years, 31.9% (N=36) were 26-30 years, 15.0% (N=17) were 31-35 years, 8% (N=9) were 36-40 years, 6.2% (N=7) were between 41-45 years, 11.5% (N=13) were between 46-50 years and those above 50 years were 4.4% (N=5). From the data above, the age profile of the Mombasa peacebuilding infrastructure seems to be that of 35 years and below, in other words, youthful. Age was argued to be an important factor in the study from two points of view. First was the adherence to the policy guidelines that now require Sub-county Peace Committees to include people of different ages, especially youths in their midst. Secondly, age is a factor in the peacebuilding agenda because some of the strategies that are commonly used such as inter-community dialogue require the counsel of older people.

This finding is consistent with other findings as far as formal peace structures are concerned because as the guidelines suggest, members are supposed to be drawn from, among others, CSOs, women, youth, differently-abled persons and the private sector. People from these organisations tend to be young because they are in the working-age bracket. The age profile of Mombasa Sub-county Peace Committees falls within the definition of youth in Kenya. The Kenya National Youth Policy defines youth as a person aged 18 years and who has not reached the age of 35 years (Kenya Youth Policy, 2018:vi). Youth are an important part of the peacebuilding agenda in Kenya because they are at once the perpetrators of many actions that threaten peace, but is also the best opportunity for sustainable peace. The role of youth in peacebuilding has been gradually accepted as countries and communities accept that youth have a critical role to play in peace. The UN Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security recognises the importance of youth and notes that young people

play an important and positive role in the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security. Resolution 2250 identified identifies five key pillars for youth participation and action in peacebuilding which are; participation, protection, prevention, partnerships and reintegration, as well as the institutionalisation of the youth, peace and security agenda. These are critical policy directions that each UN member country that seeks to increase youth participation in peacebuilding must have at the core of their peacebuilding policy.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 (UNSCR 2250) was the first resolution on youth, peace and security. Adopted by the UN Security Council in 2015, the resolution emphasizes the importance of youth as agents of change in the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. The goal of the resolution is to foster youth participation and leadership in peace and security issues; prevent violence and build peace, and promote gender equality and young people's economic empowerment. Kenya has integrated elements of Resolution 2250 as exemplified by the policy statement in the *Kenya Youth Development Policy (2019)*. The policy notes that youth involvement in criminal activities may be induced by high poverty levels, idleness and disillusionment occasioned by increased unemployment rates. Kenya Government therefore states that,

> the Youth shall be included in the peacebuilding processes in decision making on matters related to peacebuilding. Inclusion and participation of young people enhance their capabilities and allows them to improve their lives as well as those of their communities. Further, engagement of youth in these and other constructive processes keeps them constructively pre-occupied thus averting/reducing their vulnerability to involvement in unlawful acts . (GoK, Youth Development Policy 2019:58)

The role of youth and contribution to peacebuilding has been examined by many students, for example, del Felice and Wisler (2007) and Ozcelik *et al* (2021). In the work done by Ozcelik *et al* (2021), various youth-led peacebuilding initiatives across the world are highlighted. For example, the Rwandan youth-led project titled *Never Again Rwanda* (NAR) has established platforms to engage youth to promote peace in post-genocide Rwanda. NAR focuses on youth engagement within the community, to create spaces for peace. The project creates works specifically with youth from Genocide survival, ex-perpetrator and returnee backgrounds. This platform has greatly increased youth participation in peacebuilding in Rwanda (Ozcelik *et al,* 2021).

The motivation for youth to be involved in peacebuilding in Mombasa is not only based on their desire for a peaceful life, but also on the fact that many have seen the devastation of conflict first-hand, either as perpetrators or as victims. Among the youth who are now active members of the Sub-county Peace Committees are to be found a group known as "reformed youth". Reformed Youths are those who were former criminal or suspected to have been former members of ganga, including Al-Shabaab, but have now reformed and are part of the Sub-county Peace Committees. Their man role in the Sub-county Peace Committees is to discourage other youth from joining gangs or any militant group. Focus group discussions were held with this group who kept pointing to idleness and easy access to drugs as the main cause of criminality.

One responded narrated,

> back in 2013–2014, I completed my high school level and overall attained a B+. I was very much interested in pursuing nautical science … but unfortunately in 2015, my mother became a single parent and I was forced to drop out of school…villagers knew that I was educated, robbers came to me for unlocking stolen phones and they paid for my services later I decided to be part of the robbers. …I was arrested many times. It came a point when one of my closest friends was shot in the robbery process in Nyali and died and two of his friends were arrested and sentenced for life after an attempt to rob from an Arab *Pudjan* (rich man). I sat down and saw that I am heading to the wrong direction and I decided to get back to God and by good luck, we relocated to another village, then I joined peacebuilding… I am grateful because I get job opportunities and some community organisations take us to speak to the youths in different places like Kisauni and Likoni, we tell them what is right and what is wrong and I am grateful because I am safe. That is why I'm in peacebuilding. (Interview with reformed youth, Nyali, 23 August 2021)

The narrative of this respondent is typical of almost all youth who find themselves in distress with the law in Mombasa County. They are usually fairly well educated, usually come from broken homes, have no gainful employment and therefore criminality becomes attractive as they search for any means of survival. In this case the respondent was part of an elaborate criminal system which recruits young people who have technical knowledge and can be used to change mobile phone system, circumvent security surveillance and even use firearms in the process of committing crimes. The response to youth criminality is however a cause of concern, especially regarding police action.

In Mombasa County, youth criminality involves both males and females. In some instances, the involvement of females belies the notion of the docile innocent and obedient girls of the coastal region. A reformed female gang member had this to say during an in-depth interview in which this

study found that female gang members were just as equally involved in criminality as their male counterparts,

> when breaking into people's houses, I assisted in ferrying stolen goods. In bars, I would pick a target, mostly men, seduce them and into their drinks add "mchele" (a drug that causes victims to slowly lose consciousness). Before the victim gets unconscious I would take him away from the crowed to where my friends were, with the help of my friends we would rob variables items mostly phones, cash, watches, golden necklaces and rings…we had our leader who was the mastermind who planned for all robbery activities. He was shot dead by the police in his hiding…one day the police invaded us and shot dead some of us but I managed to escape. An innocent boy was shot dead that day, he was a friend to one of us who had come to pay his friend a visit. Some of my friends have been arrested and are now in prison and some have become disabled in the robbery process. Only a few of us are left. I am happy to be in Nyali peacebuilding committee (KII interview with female youth, Nyali, August 23, 2021)

Even though there is appreciation for reformed youth and the whole reformation process, it is instructive to note that the journey to the Sub-county Peace Committees for these youth, as was with many youth members was through criminality hence the term "reformed youth". The Mombasa Sub-county Peace Committees have taken advantage of reformed youths' desire to live peacefully to recruit them as part of the County peacebuilding agenda. Youth-serving organisations such as JUHUDI (Justice, Humanity, and Dignity Center) have been made part of the peacebuilding structure to expand the partnership for peacebuilding in Mombasa and also give youth a chance to actively participate in peacebuilding in Mombasa. While JUHUDI is not purely a peacebuilding organisation, its mandate which includes ending poverty and injustice makes it an ideal partner to the peacebuilding process in the Mombasa. The desire to end criminality and the

encouragement of the Sub-county Peace Committees for youth participation has led to many youth-led initiatives and partnerships for peacebuilding.

The study found out that there were more than 100 youth-led initiatives at the villages and *"maskan"* levels, all of which are contributing in one way or another to the peace agenda of the county. A maskan can be described as an abode or a street corner where youth hang out with good and bad intentions. Youth clubs functioning out of these *maskans* include; Manyatta Youth Entertainment; *Manyunyu* (Drizzle); *Okoa* Mtopanga (Save Mtopanga); Dream Achievers; Kadzandani Youth Group; Simple Swaggers; *Chapa Kazi* (loosely translated as work hard); Maweni Divas; Pwani Youth Network; Ukiwa Art Troupe; Stretchers Youth Organisation; Life is Precious. These youth groups do not focus on peacebuilding alone but work across many youth-related issues including adolescent sexual and reproductive health, human rights, child rights, Income Generating Activities (IGAs), substance abuse, primary healthcare and environmental sanitation, historical injustices .

Youth agency in peacebuilding is however not as straightforward as rehabilitation and greater involvement. Cardozo *et al* (2016) using data from Pakistan, Myanmar, South Africa and Uganda argue that non-formal involvement of youth in peacebuilding has come with little benefit because of the inattention that is usually paid to the realities and contexts of the everyday life of youth. The lived experiences of youth often undermine and even reverse their agency in peacebuilding. As a result, the authors argue that there is a need for more nuanced framings of youth and their contexts, and see youth as agents of peacebuilding, and not merely as a threat to peace.

Youth seems to be fully engaged in peacebuilding in Mombasa however the impact that their participation may have is yet to be assessed. In general, where young people are engaged, especially males, the impression created is that peacebuilding is successful, although the degree of success is inconclusive and somewhat subjective. Information gathered from coopted youth in Changamwe and Jomvu research areas is a case in point. The youth felt that their role in peacebuilding was significant and, in some cases, innovative. A youth group leader from Likoni had the following observations on how youth support peacebuilding,

> in our way of working, it uses a multi-stakeholder approach. We come up with an innovative project or a program and we make sure we involve all these stakeholders we have in the community. We also involved the private sector. We try to encompass these people in the programs that we do. Peace is like the centre of every community without peace people cannot even access the hospital. To them, it has been like a one and one communication, if they have an initiative they want to run they reach out to us because we are part of the stakeholder in Likoni and if we have an initiative that has more of peacebuilding, trying to preach peace in the community we reach out to them. (FGD with youth respondent, Likoni, January 10, 2022)

On the other hand, other peacebuilders remain skeptical about the value of youth in peacebuilding;

> Youths are lazy they don't want to get tired; they just want politicians and other people who misuse them because they give them money. youths getting something that they have not worked for, to them that is an achievement. Taking of parenting, parents fail to discipline their children. Parents fail to take their responsibilities as parents, they are busy searching for money and forget about their children and that is why if someone dies, their children sell all their properties and, in the end, they end up being criminals (FGD with village elders, Mvita, September 9, 2021)

Darwish and Close (2016) in a report on peacebuilding in the Eastern part Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) argue that in some societies, young men are seen as protectors of land and community, and therefore, youth who did not participate in activities that protect the community,

some of which includes violence were seen as “useless” to the community. However, in the case of Eastern DRC, youth were trained to successfully mediate conflicts which gave them a new identity as community protectors. Not only did this approach change the image of young people but it also addressed the lingering question of gender roles in peacebuilding.

From the literature review, it was established that youth agency in peacebuilding is now a global phenomenon enjoying support from the UN, through the Resolution 2250 on Youth Peace and Security, and on the African continent through the African Union 10-year Plan For The Continental Framework on Youth, Peace And Security ((YPS) 2020-2029). In Kenya, the Government has elaborated the Kenya Youth Development Policy (2019) which has key provisions on youth peace and security. The policy supports the inclusion of youth as specific stakeholders in community driven security and peace building initiatives. In Mombasa, youth peacebuilding agency is supported by the County Government and numerous community-led partnership projects such as the *Inuka* Project. However, the high rate of recruitment of youth into criminal gangs remain a subject of much worry.

4.1.2. Gender of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee respondents

The study sought to ascertain the nature of representation in the Sub-county Peace Committees and whether the gender of the members could have any impact on peacebuilding in Mombasa County. The representation of both men and women is supported under the Kenyan Constitution (2010) in the spirit of equality and equity. The study sought to establish the level of gender representation in the County Sub-county Peace Committees and determine if at all there was an over-representation of one gender over the other, and the implications thereof. As shown in table

4.1 the study found that, out of 113 respondents, 51.33% (N=58) were males and 48.67% (N=55) were females. This reflects an almost balanced representation of both genders in the District Peace Committees. The recommendation from the National Steering Committee is that at the minimum, Sub-county Peace Committees should follow the two-thirds gender rule in membership recruitment as recommended by the Constitution of Kenya. In this case, the Mombasa peace infrastructure has surpassed the constitutional minimum.

Speake (2013) in a paper on a gendered approach to peacebuilding argues that women and men have differential experiences during and post-conflict due to many socio-cultural factors which sometimes tend to ignore the contribution of women to peacebuilding. The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, however, reaffirmed the importance of women's participation and involvement at all levels of the peace and security agenda, thus levelling the playing field to allow and acknowledge more women's participation in peace and security.

In 2012, the Government of Kenya committed itself to addressing and responding to the immediate and long-term needs of women in peace and security by developing and adopting a National Action Plan (KNAP) on UNSCR 1325, which sought to address the role of women and security, with the view to removing socio-cultural barriers that insubordinate women's contribution to peace and security. Now in its second generation, KNAP, was aptly titled *'Kuhusisha Wanawake ni Kudumisha Amani'* ('to involve women is to sustain peace'), and was anchored on the pillars of participation and promotion, prevention of violence, protection, recovery and relief. This national commitment has been reflected in the formation of local peace committees as well.

In the case of Mombasa Sub-county Peace Committees, this is an important point for discussion given the finding that young men are substantially represented. It is therefore important that the role of men is not overshadowed by that of women. Kioko (2017) in his study on local peace committees and *Nyumba Kumi* in Narok County similarly found that, unlike the male-dominated indigenous peace entities, the members of the Local Peace Committees in Narok County included women, and young people. The gender profile of the Mombasa Sub-county Peace Committees brings to the fore, the importance of women in peacebuilding. Diaz and Tordjman in a report titled *"Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence"* (UN Women, 2012) note that since the 2000 UNSCR on Women and Peace, only marginal progress had been made concerning the number of women included in formal peace processes. Despite this, women have been influential in directing peace processes in their communities as exemplified by the market women who started the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (Hedditch, 2016; Konde, 2019; Nganje, 2021).

In general, the expectation was that Sub-county Peace Committees would be dominated by men as has been the practice in many local peace committees (Chivasa and Harris, 2019). The issue of men's domination has also been discussed by Chopra (2018) in a review of peacebuilding structures in North-Easter Kenya. In this review, the author observes that in the systems of arid lands societies, peace committees find their strength in local power dynamics wielded by individuals considered senior and superior to others by their communities. In this case, women and youth are excluded and often discouraged from participating in peacebuilding meetings. Even when the authorities have attempted to democratise the process of representation, the bias has been towards the election of gatekeepers and politicians (usually men) rather than women youth (Chopra, 2018).

Women have participated in some key peacebuilding processes in the past. Examples from the Republic of El Salvador in the 1990s, with the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), in the Republic of South Africa in the mid-1990s, where the Women's National Commission demanded that 50 per cent of participants in the Multi-Party Negotiating Process be women, and in Northern Ireland Women's Coalition successfully built bridges between Catholics and Protestants and promoted reconciliation and reintegration of political prisoners. However, results like these have been few and far in between, and the reality is that progress in integrating women fully into peacebuilding has been slow. In some instances, women's participation is frowned upon for cultural or religious reasons.

Given the strong influence of Islam in Mombasa County standing at 41% (as opposed to 10% in Kenya) the expectation was that the participation of women in such matters as peacebuilding would be restricted. Our finding was just the opposite and indeed of the six sub-county peace committees that make up the Mombasa peace infrastructure, two of the biggest and most active peace committees (Nyali and Kisauni Local Peace Committees) were women-led. An interview with one of the women chairs of the peace committee confirms this:

> I was drawn into this work as a mother and a social activist because of what I saw happening to our youth...youth criminal gangs operate openly. Patenting is also and there are a lot of divorces and single parenting. Working with the police, we first agreed that they would not shoot to kill and that made our work easier because the youth were able to trust us and provide information. We reduced the number of criminals gangs from 78 and now maybe only two or three and still functioning. This county is very different and the peace in Nyali is not the same as peace in Likoni. (KII Interview with Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee member, Nyali, 28 August 2021).

The role that each gender plays is very important in peacebuilding however, students of peacebuilding have argued that where women have been given a prominent role, peacebuilding tends to be more fruitful, and the peace more lasting. Women do suffer and are often the victims of conflict, but they are often the most influential voices of peace and use what agency they have within the frame of their roles as women to implement peace. Muigwa (2020) has advanced the idea that women's role in peacebuilding in Kenya is not only possible but necessary due to the societal gendered division of labour which makes women interact more with the environment and are therefore the best to be at the forefront in tackling resource-based conflicts, which are often the source of conflict in Kenya.

Gorman and Chauzal (2019) provide an example whereby in Mali, where a security crisis has been simmering since 2012. Women's voices are increasing every day through legislation and other processes such as the ratification of CEDAW, and the Maputo Protocol. The authors conclude in their study that while not always visible within formal structures, women in Mali form important opinions about peace and security in their country and retain a paramount influence over husbands and sons. In this study, women's opinions were found to reflect local priorities and could influence how the country responds to peacebuilding. Gender is therefore an important part of the peace process.

In the focus group discussions (FGDs) held with one of the women's groups the study found out that women saw their role as the link between the community and the authorities when it comes to peacebuilding matters in Mombasa. *Kisimani* Women's Group is part of the Nyali Sub-County

Peacebuilding Committee and has an active membership of more than 50 women, most of whom act as volunteer peacebuilders in their communities.

One of the respondents made the following point,

> We address issues, we receive complains from people, listen to them, and do referrals where necessary to the chiefs and the police and we also do awareness in public *Barazas*, (public meetings) we do *maskani* (maskani is a place usually frequented by young who use them as hangouts) visits and reform youths and also link reformed youths with possible donors, funders and well-wishers who need to help them. (FGD with Women's Group, Mvita, Nov 11, 2021)

Another female member of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee added that,

> When we get out of chiefs *Barazas*, we go back home and combine with other village elders, call villagers, and tell them what is happening in the community, we do tell parents to speak to their children because if something happens to them no one is to be blamed but them, Villagers inform us on suspected criminals and we respond effectively. (FGD with Women's Group, Mvita, Nov 11, 2021)

The referral practice falls within the core responsibilities of the Sub-county Peace Committees, because they do not have enforcement capability. As Nganje (2021) argues, local peace committees are not set up for conflict situations that require the enforcement of peace. They are however designed for consensus-building forums and listening and referrals form part of the consensus-building. In 2021, during the commemoration of the UNSC Resolution 1325 in Isiolo County Kenya, and in further strengthening of the Kenya National Action Plan on Women's Peace and Security, a women's peace network called the National Women's Peace Committee Network was formed with the support of UN Women (UN Women, 2021). The network brings together

women in leadership in the country's county peace structures. A government report indicates that since the inception of the action plan, female participation in County Peace Committees has seen a two-fold increase from 14% in 2013 to 29% in 2019. The initiative will connect local level action to the national agenda and advocate for women's meaningful participation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding while serving as an early warning and rapid response mechanism

4.1.3. Level of education

The study sought to ascertain the level of education of local peace committee respondents and whether the level of education influences peacebuilding in Mombasa County. The study found that, out of 113, 36.3% (N=41) had attained primary education, 35.4% (N=40) had attained secondary education, 24.8% (N=28) had attained tertiary education and 3.5% (N-=4) had attained university education. The results are illustrated in table 4.1. It can be concluded that in Mombasa Sub-county Peace Committees, members have at least primary education with a good number having secondary school education. The level of education is important in peacebuilding because of the expectation that members of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee will be able to read and understand official communications on peacebuilding which is usually communicated in English, the official language of the Government of Kenya.

In this study, educational attainment of the peacebuilding committees was investigated in order to answer the question of competency in grasping the needs of formal peacebuilding. Jenkins (2013) posits that peacebuilding competency in necessary in order for peacebuilding to take root in a society. These competencies include; analysis, responsiveness, prevention, envisioning and transformation (Jenkins, 2013). From a competency perspective, the Sub-county Peace

Committees seem to have members who have the basic education that can enable them grasp the needs of formal peacebuilding. Not only are the members of the Sub-county Peace Committees supposed to understand the needs of formal peacebuilding but they are required to disseminate peace education as well. This was confirmed by a key informant who said this on how Sub-county Peace Committees work,

> they have been spreading peace messages in the community most of the time they walk from village to village preaching peace during elections period. Other times they used posters, other times they combined with DCCS and the chiefs and walk around Kisauni preaching peace. They mostly did that in 2017 general elections they called people for *Barazas* and talked to them on the importance of peace and asked them to stop tribalism and religion related issues. That is what mostly what they were doing before corona came but now they have started doing that again (FGD with Women's Group, Mvita, Nov 11, 2021)

Education was also seen as a peace facilitator because of the opportunity that it creates for youth in the society. Parents usually invest in the education of their children in order to better their chances in life and this was expressed by some parents when discussing the education of their children, as follows,

> Education is everything. Educated people have no jobs and you are a criminal, where will you get that job with no education? These boys of ours should be taken to school. We have different types of schools, carpentry, tailoring and others. Criminal youths should be helped in those areas other than telling them they will be shot dead. Criminal gangs have their meetings. They can change when educated. They are capable. We need to help them. (FGD interview with village elder, Likoni, January 10, 2022)

Education is an important ingredient in peacebuilding because of the range of possibilities that it offers in peacebuilding. Novelli and Smith (2011) in a report on the role of education in peacebuilding argued that education influences the processes of socialization and identity formation and act as an important vehicle for social cohesion. In times of conflict, education can provide knowledge and skills for immediate protection, while in the long run, create the values and attitudes that form the basis for conflict transformation. The authors also argue that bad education can also undermine all these processes and, therefore, therefore there is need to ensure that it is delivered effectively and equitably and is a driver of peace rather than war. If this argument is accepted then the FGD summary about the importance of education as cited, establishes the importance of education in peacebuilding.

4.1.4. Occupation status of the respondents

The study sought to find out the occupation status of Local Peace Committee respondents and whether it influenced the workings of peacebuilding policies in Mombasa County. The study found out that, out of 113 respondents, 44.2% (N=50) were unemployed, 11.9% (N=11) were employed and 46% (N=52) were self-employed. The results are illustrated in table 4.1. Occupation status speaks to the time that a member of the Sub-county peacebuilding committee could devote to peacebuilding activities in the county. Von der Goltz and Harborne (2021) in a review of the importance of jobs in the peace process of South Sudan have argued that work is an important component of any peacebuilding process, especially where shocks like the covid-19 pandemic has exhausted the coping capacity of families and strained resources. On the other hand, Izzi (2020) argues that while employment programmes are a common tool in the strategies for countries emerging from conflict, the results are mixed because for most African youth, the main problem

is not unemployment per se, but rather jobs that are precarious, unpredictable and low paying. A good example in Kenya has been the *Kazi kwa Vijana* (Youth Employment) which the Government of Kenya established to keep youth busy be cleaning their environments under the the National Hygiene Program which has been blemished by claims of low payments to the youth, mismanagement and nepotism (The Star Newspaper, June 2022). The case of *Kazi kwa Vijana* is not final because the program is still unfolding but as summarised by a respondent in the verbatim, it offered some hope to the youth in Mombasa County,

> when government brought *kazi mtaani*, crime rate went down because youths were engaged, now that *kazi mtaani* is no more they have gone back to their usual activities. The government should bring back *kazi mtaani* to engage the youths. (FGD session with Women leaders, Nyali, December 9 2021)

This point is important to this study because as has been established, most members of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees are young, and mostly self-employed or unemployed. It could mean that either they could devote more time to peacebuilding or none at all. Youth idleness and unemployment has been seen as a factor in radicalisation and therefore can be argued to play an important role in the peace agenda of Mombasa County. As noted by Izzi (2020), the issue of youth employment has become critical because of the rise of radicalisation and extremism which has put to the test policies that are meant to respond to these menaces through youth engagement. Responding to the threat to peace through employment opportunities will continue to be an approach for a long time to but its effect on how Sub-county peacebuilding committees manage the peacebuilding agenda remains to be seen.

4.1.5. Composition of the Sub-county Peace Committees

The composition of a Local Peace Committee determines its success or failure because it is the membership that determines how the entity will function, the reach it might have and the partnerships that it will be able to build on the ground. Odendaal (2010) posits that a local peacebuilding committee is an inclusive entity operating at sub-national level and includes the different community sections in conflict, and has the task of promoting peace within its own context. In this regard, the composition of this entity becomes an important consideration. The study sought to ascertain how the membership of Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee was formed and the status of each member. The result is presented in figure 4.1.

Out of 113 local peace committee respondents, 19.47% (N=22) responded that they were NGO representatives, 9.75% (N=1) government representatives, 27.43% (N=31) were youth representatives, 13.27% (N=15) were women representatives, 7.96% (N=9) were special group representatives, 14.16% (N=16) were community representatives, 3.54% (N=4) were donor representatives and 4.425% (N=5) were volunteer members. This varied representation on Mombasa County Peacebuilding Committees indicated that each peacebuilding constituency has a voice in the peace agenda of the County.



Figure 4. 1 Description of local peace committee membership

Source: Field Data,2021

The study sought to find out how members enter into the peacebuilding committees. The majority, 57.5 (N=65) indicated that they had been elected to the peacebuilding committees, while 42.5% (N=48). Odendaal (2010) argues that local peace committees function well when there is a core body of members who can occupy the middle ground and counter ensure that the peace committee can facilitate its work. In this study, almost 60% of the members sitting in Mombasa peacebuilding committees were elected to the committee, with the implication that they competed with others to sit on the committee. At the same time, Mombasa Sub-county Peace Committees have a large population 42% of those who were selected by their constituencies to sit in the Sub-county Peace Committees, these include donor representatives, NGOs, Government and other stakeholders. This

demonstrates the interest in the Sub-county Peace Committees because of the potential that peacebuilding stakeholders perhaps see in the Sub-county Peace Committees.

Table 4. 2 Membership of Sub-county Peace Committees

	Membership	
	N=113	**Percent**
Elected	65	57.5
Selected	48	42.5

Source: field data, 2021

The Government of Kenya, through the National Steering Committee has set the criteria for membership of local peace structures. It states that the composition of the Peace Committees shall vary depending on the local circumstance but as far as possible, take into consideration the principle of two-thirds majority, diversity and non-discrimination. The total number of people to be included in the peace structures was left to the administrative authorities on the ground but the recommended was 15 people drawn from community representatives, CSOs, Women, Youth, people with disabilities, the private sector and other institutions. The Government placed the responsibility of monitoring the work of the Sub-county Peace Committees on the County Commissioners, while other officers such as Intelligence Services, the Police act as Ex-Officio members of the local peace structures.

The literature on the issue of whether members of local peacebuilding committees should or should not be compensated for their time is still ongoing. This is because local peacebuilding mechanisms were founded on the voluntary nature of traditional peacebuilding, which did not offer monetary appreciation for those who served as peacemakers. However, traditional peacebuilders were rewarded with respect and authority which is not the case in modern times. Focus group discussions with government officials, villagers, women's and youth groups seemed to confirm the problem of compensation for work done by members of the Mombasa peacebuilding infrastructure. As one senior government official argued;

> the spirit of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee was that when I nominate somebody from the locality, I nominate someone who is earning his living already, it is not like we are picking people for employment, we are reaching out to the community where you live; you are a teacher, where you leave, you are a pastor, we are taking advantage of your position and being a teacher and you are living in that locality, you are the first-hand consumer of the peaceful environment. To me it was a deliberate move, the only thing we do now, we can only provide incentives which differentiate these persons from that person who is not really in this office. (KII interview with Government official, Kisauni, March 10, 2022)

This lack of remuneration was also evident among the other Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee partners did not share the same logical view about working without pay. As a respondent opined;

> the government should recognize them, even if they will not be paid, they should at least be given a token of appreciation because they do a lot of work. Their work exceeds those in the office. They need to be given something so that they can effectively respond to issues. These people risk their life, especially when walking at night to go and resolve issues. They are attacked and beaten because they don't have money to give out when attacked by thieves (FGD with Women's Group, Kisauni, Nov 13, 2021).

The debate about payment for peacebuilding work in Kenya comes from the policy position that peacebuilding is voluntary because the communities in which the Sub-county Peace Committees work are the first consumers of peace. This being the case, the Government argues, paying members of the Sub-county Peace Committees would be akin to paying communities for their own peace. Khabure (2014), in a blog about Sub-county Peace Committees however, observes that money issues are more complicated than simple remuneration of Sub-county Peace Committees. Sub-county Peace Committees when having no funds of their own have had to rely in NGOs for support and where these NGOs pay sitting allowances, the concentration of work then focuses on that particular NGO. Literature on the question of remuneration is scant and this is one area that needs to be explored further.

4.2 Members' Understanding of the Role of Sub-county Peace Committees

Effective peacebuilding depends upon committee members' understanding of the role that they are supposed to play and have been trained in that role. The study sought to investigate whether members understood the role of Sub-county Peace Committees and also whether had been trained to understand their roles. The results are presented in Table 4.2

Table 4. 3 Understanding of the Role of local peace committees

	Whether members understand the role of their local peace committees		Whether members have been trained to understand their roles in local peace committees	
	Frequency	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Strongly disagree	3	2.7	11	9.7
Disagree	4	3.5	31	27.4
Undecided	13	11.5	5	5.3
Agree	49	43.4	51	45.1
Strongly Disagree	44	38.9	14	12.4

Source: Field Data, 2021

The respondents were almost unanimous that they understood the role of their local peacebuilding committee. 38.94% (N=44) strongly agreed while 43.36%, (N=49) agreed with the question of members' understanding of the role of their Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee. Only11.5% (N=13) were undecided as to whether they understood the role of their committee or not. Cumulatively 82.3% of the members of the Sub-county peacebuilding committees indicated that they understood the role that they were supposed to play in building sustainable peace in Mombasa County. The understanding of peacebuilding roles by members of local peacebuilding entities is important in any peacebuilding discourse. Issifu (2016) argues in support of local peacebuilding committees that they have been able to play a key role in maintaining, managing and resolving long-drawn-out conflicts in Africa, however it must be noted that this experience countered by experiences in other parts of Africa where local peacebuilding entities have been unable to deliver lasting peacebuilding due to opposing local, regional and international interests. This has been

established by van Leeuwen *et al* (2019) in the case of Burundi and Eastern Democratic Pubic of Congo.

The study further sought to find out if the respondents could enumerate the roles, starting from what they thought to be the most important role followed by the least important in that order. The results are contained in figure 4.2.



Fig. 4.2 Respondents Understanding of the Role of Sub-county Peace Committees

Source: Field Data, 2021

From the responses, the responses, 29.2% (N=33) saw the most important role as that of setting up *Barazas* (public meetings usually chaired by the chief), followed by sensitisation of the community towards peace*,* 27.3% (N=31), followed by initiation of peace campaigns and programs, followed 23.9% (N=27), followed by collaborating with village elders to solve problems 14.1% (N=16), and finally, facilitating yearly peace rallies 5.3% (6). It is instructive to note that these activities are not mutually exclusive but rather the information was given on the basis of what the respondents felt were the most important role their committee should be engaged in.

The most important role as seen by the respondents was the setting up of these public meetings (*Barazas*), followed by sensitisation of the community towards peace. These two activities are very critical in the national peacebuilding agenda. The national policy framework states that the local peace committees shall, among other responsibilities, promote peace education, and facilitate community dialogues. (Standard Guidelines and TOR for Peace Structures in Kenya, GoK, 2016). The two most important activities as reported by the study respondents are addressed in the standard ToRs produced by the Government through the National Steering Committee (NSC). Mombasa's peacebuilding structure has taken advantage of public meetings to spread the message of peace and even used the same to resolve community tension. With the formalization of local peacebuilding committees, their convening role has now come under scrutiny because of the responsibilities they now carry officially. The Kenya Government Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution, for example, see the work of local peace in

> Bringing together traditional dispute resolution mechanisms involving elders, women, youth and interfaith leaders on the one hand and formal mechanisms for conflict resolution including those by Government administrative and security agencies and Non-Governmental organisations on the other (NSC, 2015:23).

Local peace committees, therefore, have a huge convening role because they have to ensure that these mechanisms make enough sense to establish and maintain the peace. Nganje (2020) argues that local peace committees should be seen as inclusive and participatory social spaces that facilitate dialogue and mutual understanding for constructive problem-solving. This rather idealistic view of local peace committees creates a problem for these entities which more often than not are least equipped to facilitate dialogue. Government response to most conflicts is usually with its security apparatus (police and army).

Secondly, local peacebuilding committees such as the Sub-county Peace Committees in Mombasa county are limited by scope and what they can do and achieve. From the literature review, it was established that Nganje (2020) argues that even the most generous assessment of the scope of the Local Peace Committee must accept that they cannot resolve issues that are rooted in the socio-economic and political structure of the state. That said, Sub-county Peace Committees in Mombasa have delved into supporting youth to access start-up funds for youth businesses. The author avers further that even in cases where the local peace committee are formalised, it would be naïve to expect them to make any significant contribution to resolving conflicts, especially in the absence of a commitment by the relevant authorities to address the underlying causes of conflict. Also, as Odendaal (2010) has observed, local peace committees cannot succeed where there is no political will towards peace. He observes that a local peace committee can play a role in mitigating the effects of violent conflicts in their communities but are often powerless in transforming the dynamics of the conflict and bringing about sustainable peace.

4.3 Policy Framework of formal peace infrastructure and sustainable peace

This section of the study presents the findings on the policy framework under which the formal Peacebuilding infrastructure in Mombasa County functions. This is a Kenya National policy and is supposed to guide the work of all Government-instituted or supported peacebuilding structures at the County and Sub-county level. The policy came into being after a long and arduous struggle in the country to deal with longstanding inter-ethnic tension, land-related conflict and election-related violence which came to head in 2008. For a long time, it was the counties of North-Eastern Kenya that posed a threat to peace through incidents of cattle rustling fuelled by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. However, the political violence of 2007–08, showed the bankruptcy of the country in dealing with such high levels of violence, the weakness of its early warning and response, and poor mediation, and security deployment, which has been complicated by the rise of terrorism. The policy was meant to set in place a peacebuilding infrastructure and agenda to move the country towards sustainable peace under the National Steering Committee.

4.3.1 Awareness of the National Policy Framework by Mombasa Sub-county Peacebuilding infrastructure.

Policy framework of formal peace infrastructure serve the function of defining and providing the direction that any peace intervention should take. Torjman (2005) argues that there are at least two levels of public policy. The first is concerned with the legislation, programs and practices that govern the substantive aspects of public intervention. The second type of policy focuses largely on administrative procedures and the parameters of a public undertaking. These aspects of policy can be contained in one document, in which case it becomes a comprehensive policy, or in several

documents. The development and implementation of public policy on peacebuilding has taken on a new dimension as countries in conflict find themselves under pressure to deliver lasting peace even as conflicts become localised and get entrenched at the local level.

Ponzio (2012) in a review of policy frameworks argues that strategic policy frameworks are relatively new and therefore the extent to which they can influence peacebuilding is something still to be studied. Different countries have had different experiences and one of the ways of ensuring policy stewardship is to study them and share lessons learned. One of the most important lessons learnt is that rushed and inadequate conflict analysis in the design phase of these policies have negatively impacted their role in peacebuilding. On its part, the UN has been at the forefront of supporting and often overseeing the implementation of peacebuilding policies in conflict countries through mechanisms such as the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) with emphasis on coordination, coherence and management. The main challenge has been the poor implementation of peacebuilding frameworks, especially in Africa, as noted by Lotze and de Coning (2012).

Kenya's policy framework for the formal peace infrastructure is found and elaborated in the Sessional Paper No.5 of 2014 on Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution published by the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Development. Its preamble states that the policy is a broad set of principles of guidelines and objectives that inform the authoritative allocation of resources, values, practices, norms and strategies (GoK, 2015: vii). The policy represents a culmination of a lengthy consultative process which began in 2005 to strengthen, coordinate, and integrate various conflict management initiatives by Government and non-state actors (NGOs), including the private

sector. The vision of the policy is to enhance coordination in the prevention, mitigation and management of conflicts as well as sustained policy framework of formal peace infrastructure processes in the most participatory, culturally sensitive, inclusive, transparent and accountable manner (KIPPRA, 2014).

The law that governs policy framework of formal peace infrastructure in Kenya is the National Cohesion and Peace Building Bill of 2018 which, among other things introduces the legal structure foreseen in sustainable peacebuilding in Kenya. Both law and policy on peacebuilding serve as the building blocks of Kenya's peacebuilding agenda. The two documents have not been accepted by all stakeholders for various reasons. For example, in July 2021, the Federation of Women Lawyers-Kenya (FIDA-Kenya), as stakeholders in the Country's peacebuilding agenda, opposed the 2018 Bill on the grounds that it was similar to the older National Cohesion and Peace Building Act No. 12 of 2008. FIDA stated that the parent bill of 2008 was adequate and that the amendment would result only in the duplication of duties by both the National Cohesion and Integration Commission and the new proposed National Cohesion and Peace Building Commission. FIDA's point was raised because the peacebuilding arena in Kenya is full of duplicatious programs by both Government and NGOs to the extent that peacebuilding is distorted and confusing. As it stands much of the National Cohesion and Peace Building Bill of 2018 peacebuilding has not been achieved and peacebuilding is still being coordinated by the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management.

For this study, respondents were asked to state whether they were aware of the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, and further to give their opinion as to whether the policy

provided them with enough guidance. Respondents were further asked to indicate whether they were aware of other peacebuilding policies. The results are contained in table 4.4.

Table 4.4 Awareness of Other Peacebuilding Policies

Awareness of policy framework	Whether LPCs are aware of Kenya national policy on peace building and conflict management		Whether National Policy on Peacebuilding and conflict provides guidance on how to conduct peacebuilding activities in Mombasa County		Whether LPC is aware of other peacebuilding policies and documents in Kenya	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagree	22	19.5	21	18.6	16	14.2
Disagree	41	36.3	51	45.1	33	29.2
Undecided	14	12.4	5	4.4	15	13.3
Agree	31	27.4	31	27.4	30	26.5
Strongly Agree	5	4.4	5	4.4	19	16.8
Total	113	100.0	113	100.0	113	100.0

Source: Field data, 2021

The study found out that out of the 113 respondents, 19.47% (N=22) strongly disagreed with the question, 36.28% (N=41) disagreed, 12.4% (N=14) were undecided, 27.43% (N=3) agreed to the inquiry and 4.2% (N=5) strongly agreed that they were aware of the policy. Cumulatively, 68.2% (N=77) were unaware of the policy and only 32.8% (N=36) indicated that they were aware of the policy. This finding shows that awareness of the policy that is supposed to guide the work of the peacebuilding infrastructure in Mombasa County was very low. The low level of awareness is not surprising because Kenya, like many African countries, has carried out peacebuilding as post-

conflict projects supported by donor countries or has responded to conflict through security apparatus, in which case the applicable policies were those of security rather than peacebuilding. Peacebuilding policies are therefore a new approach to consolidating the peace dividend which is rarely portrayed as such. In general, policy awareness on almost any issue in Kenya has been very low. For example, Kaleli *et al* (2021) found poor awareness of public policy when examining the role of public relations in sensitizing the public on Government Projects in Kenya.

Peacebuilding activities in Kenya are still held under the auspices of the County Peace and Security Committee, therefore the image of peacebuilding is that of the security of the community and not necessarily their peace. Secondly, there is usually a heavy representation of the national security apparatus in most of the peacebuilding operations in Kenya. This study got the impression that any matter to be clarified on the peacebuilding policy falls under the purview of the County Administration. As summarised by a public administrator during the KII,

> we have a policy document that is creating the vacuum between Sub-county Peace Committees and the *Ngao* (public administration). We need structure and policies to guide them. In the recruitment, we need to recruit people with no other role and develop them in that area of being a DCP member so that they can fully dedicate and support the work we are doing in peacebuilding. We need to train them on what we want to achieve. If we do so, we are going to have better end results. (KII interview with Sub-county administrator , Nyali September, 30 2021)

Gray-Johnson (2009) posits that the efforts to integrate peacebuilding as a component of key policies and strategies in many post-conflict countries started in 2006 when most of the UN military missions shifted from peacekeeping to include peacebuilding as part of the new UN peacebuilding architecture. This new move came after the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding

Commission to deal specifically with states facing post-conflict reconstruction. At the same time, through the efforts of the World Bank, countries began using the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) to incorporate peacebuilding and conflict management as specific outcomes (Klem, 2004).

In the case of Kenya, Ernstofer (2020), notes that it is one of the few countries with a national peacebuilding strategy, however, the implementation of the strategy is still weak. There are several entities at the government level in charge of various levels of peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities, composed of the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission. In the office of the President, there is a Presidential Adviser on Social Cohesion, Peace and Conflict Resolution, whose job is to foster trust-building between civil society and the state. Because of the different players, the policy atmosphere is confused with various multi-stakeholder peacebuilding efforts coordinated by different groups with changing levels of membership, leadership, effectiveness, and impact. It is almost a situation of too many cooks spoiling the broth.

The difficulties of coordinating with numerous and duplicative peacebuilding efforts on the ground have been blamed for poor peacebuilding outcomes. As noted in the ensuing lines, unregulated activities often end up confusing people as competing organisations hold workshop after workshop sometimes in adjacent venues and without reference to each other. Githaiga (2020) has argued that the road to peacebuilding in Kenya is paved with meeting after meeting, training and workshops in pricey venues meant more for visibility than actual peacebuilding.

As a senior government official noted,

> We need to have a work plan with the NGOs so that we can know for sure NGO A today has trained these, we expect tomorrow NGO B will train these, other than having one-day training on GBV with NGO A and tomorrow we have the same GBV training with NGO B. If we have clear work plan we can get to advise them. (KII interview with Sub-county administrator, Nyali September 30, 2022)

Uncoordinated peacebuilding activities across the world have been noted to cause more problems than simply wastage of resources. Gregorian *et al* (2019) using the case of Kosovo during the 2010 peacebuilding period argue that the use of informal coordination fueled negative dynamics that undermined peacebuilding goals. This is because peacebuilding activities relate in complex, non-linear dynamics that often clash both in program and management activities. In this study, the authors propose the use of complex adaptive systems (CAS) to improve coordination of a multi-stakeholder peacebuilding program. Coordination has been a problem of not just local peacebuilding entities but also at the level of the UN.

4.3.3 Adequacy of Guidance on Peacebuilding within the Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Policy

The study sought to investigate whether members of the peacebuilding infrastructure felt that the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management provides adequate guidance on how to conduct peacebuilding activities in Mombasa County. This question was based on the elaborate Standard Guidelines and Terms of Reference that have been developed by the National Steering Committee (NSC) for local peacebuilding committees (NSC, 2016). Out of 113, 18.58% (N=21)

strongly disagreed, 45.13% (N=51) disagreed, 4.4.% (N=5) were undecided, 27.43% (N=31) agreed to the inquiry and 5(4.42 %) strongly agreed. Cumulatively 68% (N=76) indicated the policy did not provide enough guidance.

An examination of the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (2015) shows that it is a fairly detailed document with a clear vision, mission and peacebuilding strategies. It sets out to address policy gaps in Kenya's peacebuilding agenda through; the setting up of institutional framework for peacebuilding; facilitate capacity building; and enhance funding to peacebuilding at all levels (GoK, 2015, p26). The policy further addresses issues conflict early warning (CEWARN), resource-based conflicts, banditry, land conflicts and human-wildlife conflicts. The document further sets out strategies for mobilising community strength through *Nyumba Kumi,* traditional peacebuilding structures, civic education and post-conflict recovery. This document is further supported by an elaborate Standard Guidelines and Terms of Reference for District Peace Committees issues by the NSC (revised in 2016). The guidelines spell out the steps and manner in which the peace structures are supposed to work.

The high number of committee members (68% (N=76) who indicated that the policy does not provide enough guidance could be admitting their non-engagement with both the policy document and the guidelines, more than the paucity of information in both documents. Peacebuilding policies are a recent addition into the policy space and many people who are supposed to work with them are usually unaware. In general, the dissemination of peacebuilding policies, like other Government-led initiatives has been judged as poor. For example, Ajulor (2018) in examining the challenges of policy implementation in Africa argues that policies suffer the problems of

unrealistic goal setting, political patronage, neglect of target beneficiaries and lack of consideration of policy environment. Neglect of policy beneficiaries has sometimes meant poor dissemination of the policy documents so that the intended users are unaware of the policies they are supposed to work with. This is an important point for consideration because it is reflective of the problem of peacebuilding at the community level.

4.3.4 Training of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee Members on policy framework

The purpose of the capacity building for peacebuilding structures is to ensure that peacebuilding committees have the capacity to perform their duties. Specifically, the NSC capacity building is carried out in order to; 1) Strengthen the capacity of the peace committee members to respond to conflict issues; 2) Improve and strengthen coordination among the peace and security stakeholders; 3) Enhance the Peace Committees' capacity on Early Warning and Early Response (EWER), conflict transformation and community dialogue; 4) Reconstitution of Peace Committees at the grassroots level and promote ownership and efficiencies in decision making in matters peace and security; 5) Improve modalities for effective engagement with the National and County Governments and other stakeholders in the peace and security sector (NSC, 2020). This responsibility has been carried out by NSC and other peacebuilding supporters in Kenya.

The study sought to find out whether members of Mombasa Sub-counties Peacebuilding Committees had been trained in peacebuilding. Of the 113 respondents, 45.1% (N=51) agreed that they had been trained, while 12.4% (N=14) strongly agreed with the proposition that they had been trained to understand the role of their peacebuilding committee. However, a significant proportion, 27.4% (N=31) disagreed with the question as to whether they had been trained, while another 9.7%

(N=11) strongly disagreed and the last 5.3% (N=5) were undecided on the question of training. Cumulatively, 57.5% stated that they had been trained to understand their roles, but another 42.5% had not been trained. This is a significant number which speaks to the readiness of the peacebuilding committee to effectively carry out its work. To fully understand the issue of capacity building, the study posed the question of topics that the respondents had been trained in. The results are contained in figure 4.3.



Figure 4.2 :Training of Members of peacebuilding committees

Source: Field Data 2021

From the foregoing responses, it would appear that the capacity building for Mombasa County's peace infrastructure is in line with the training that is carried out by the NSC. Most of the respondents had received training in peacebuilding as reported by 27.4% (N=30), followed by

ethics in peacebuilding as reported by 19.5% (N=22) followed by gender perspectives in peacebuilding and early warning (15.0%, N=17) for each, followed by peace negotiations and mediation (13%, N=13), followed by countering violent extremism (8.9%, N=10) and lastly self-defense (2.7%, N=4). The antecedent numbers represent the areas in which the majority of the members of the peacebuilding infrastructure have been trained and are not mutually exclusive. The training of the leadership of the sub-county peacebuilding committee is an important issue as was confirmed by a senior Government respondent when talking about sub-county peacebuilding committee,

> The National Steering Committee which is the body set up to train the sub-county peacebuilding committee has trained some, but not all of them have been trained. The chairs of the DCPs have been trained and they understand the work, the policies behind the DCPs and those that have not been trained, we have been engaging them, me, and my security committee, we usually meet them at their local levels and explain their work (KII interview with Government official, Jomvu, March 9 2022)

During the focus group discussions, it was determined that the above were not the only topics or areas of training that have been carried out among the members of the peacebuilding infrastructure. Among the young members of the committees, training on entrepreneurship, life skills, dangers of drug abuse, theatre and communications skills, human rights, social accountability, food security and nutrition have all been part of the peacebuilding agenda in Mombasa County. Certain programs in the county peacebuilding agenda such as the one run by a collaborating partner called "Search for Common Ground" has focused on the capacity of youth to engage in policy dialogue as part of improving the role of youth in peacebuilding.

A key question that the study was concerned with was whether the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees had put in place systems that allowed them to work effectively. Three major areas were explored; adequate structures such as office space, recognised officials who run the affairs of the committee, whether these officials were changed regularly through a credible process and whether the Sub-county Peace Committees had a workplan. The results are contained in table 4.5.

Table 4. 2 Whether Local Peace Committees have structures, workplan and office bearers are changed regularly

	Whether Local Peace Committees have structures that facilitate peace work		**Whether office bearers are changed regularly through a credible process**		**Whether Local Peace Committees have a work plan for peace work in Mombasa County**	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Strongly Disagree	5	4.4	11	9.7	13	11.5
Disagree	7	6.2	9	7.8	17	15.0
Undecided	3	2.7	7	6.2	9	7.9
Agree	67	59.3	59	52.2	63	55.8
Strongly Agree	31	27.4	27	23.9	11	9.8
Total	113	100.0	113	100.0	113	100.0

Source: Field data, 2021

On the question of the presence of adequate systems, the majority of the respondents 59.3% (N=67) expressed the view that there were structures in place for effective work, while 27.4% (N=31) strongly agreed. Cumulatively 86.7% of the respondents agreed with the inquiry that there were

recognised officials in place to facilitate their work. Cumulatively, only 13% (N=15) felt that there were no structures in place for the effective functioning of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee. Similarly, on the question of whether office bearers were changed regularly through a credible process, the majority of respondents seemed to agree with the proposition. 52.2% (N=59) agreed and 23.9% (N=27) agreed strongly. However, there was a significant number who disagreed with the proposition, as 23.7% (N=27) seemed to think that office-bearers are not changed regularly through a credible process. Government guidelines on the tenure of office as per the *Standard Guidelines and ToR for Peace Structures in Kenya, 2016,* is 3 years, which was supposed to guard against the peace infrastructure being dominated by a few individuals and being caught in the politics of the day.

On the question of the Peacebuilding Committee having and implementing a workplan, the picture changed significantly. Cumulatively, 65.6% (N=74) either agreed or agreed strongly with the proposition that the sub-county peacebuilding committee had a workplan for their work while another cumulative 34.4% (N=39) responded that there was no workplan. The picture that emerges from this analysis is that, while respondents saw their Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee as having recognised office bearers, the issues of management and operations are less clear because as will be seen in the results from the focus group discussions, Mombasa Sub-county Peace Committees do not have designated offices and at times, the same people have continued to occupy offices for a long time.

A follow-up question regarding the registration of the Local Peace Committees peaks to how the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee has positioned itself within the larger county peacebuilding

agenda. Each sub-county peacebuilding committee functions under the Sub-county commissioner who is the patron, and therefore require no registration. Their funds are controlled through the Provincial Administration mechanism, like other Government departments. However, the Peacebuilding Committees that feel they could source additional funds to carry out their work are required by law to register and most have registration certificates from the Ministry of Public Service, Youth, and Gender Affairs. Through this registration, they can apply for funds from any willing donor, and as a requirement submit annual returns to the Ministry. The study found that, out of 113 respondents, 71.68% (N=81) stated that their committee had been registered and 28.32% (N=32) were of the contrary opinion. This trend points to the issue of resources for Sub-county Peace Committees which will be reviewed in the coming sections.

4.4. Conflict Analysis Undertaken by Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees.

This section examines the issue of conflict analysis as the basis of Mombasa Peace Infrastructure work in peacebuilding. While the National Steering Committee (NSC) does not place conflict analysis as a major function of local peace committees, their ToR includes elements of conflicts analysis because they are supposed to enhance conflict early warning and response, document and keep records of peace processes and interventions and also monitor, evaluate and report on peace in their areas of operation. All these can only happen when there is some clear understanding of the conflict situation in a given area.

The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) defines conflict analysis as a structured inquiry into the causes and potential direction of a conflict. The main advantage of conflict analysis is to identify opportunities for managing or resolving disputes without recourse to violent action. The

key questions in a conflict analysis are usually built around questions such as; what are the historical antecedents; who are the actors who influence conflict (what is their motivation); what are the causes; and what are the trends? Kriesberg and Neu (2018) in a review of the literature on conflict analysis and resolution (CAR) argue that conflicts are inevitable and often necessary to improve peoples' rights. The authors argue that in fact, it is the parties in conflict who can determine how constructively or destructively they will conduct the conflict. Therefore, conflict analysis must bear in mind that even in the process of analysis, there are positive opportunities that can begin to address the conflict without waiting for a formal process. Secondly, there may be other parties with an indirect interest in the conflict whose immediate or future interests may influence the direction of the conflict. The study sought to investigate whether the Mombasa peacebuilding infrastructure had undertaken conflict analysis and ascertain the causes of conflict in Mombasa County. The results are presented in Table 4.6.

Table 4. 3 Conflict analysis undertaken by Sub-county Peacebuilding Committee

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	11	9.7	9.7	9.7
Disagree	12	10.6	10.6	20.4
Undecided	5	4.4	4.4	24.8
Agree	51	45.1	45.1	69.9
Strongly Agree	34	30.1	30.1	100.0
Total	113	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Data, 2021

Out of 113, 9.7% (N=11) strongly disagreed that conflict analysis has been undertaken in Mombasa County, 10.6% (N=12) disagreed, while 4.4% (N=5) were undecided. However, a cumulative 75% (N=84) agreed that conflict analysis had been undertaken. The significance of this finding is perhaps more in the understanding of the term "conflict analysis" than whether or not the Mombasa peacebuilding infrastructure had undertaken any conflict analysis. This point is buttressed by the fact that when further asked to state how often conflict occurred in their locality, a majority of 75% (N=85) answered that conflict occurred either daily or weekly in their locality.

4.5. Causes of conflict in Mombasa County

Justino (2011) in a study on the impact of armed civil conflict on household welfare and policy responses, posits that conflicts introduce drastic changes at the household level due to loss of life, injury or migration and also result in loss of property or ability to engage in gainful economic activity. At the same time, there are indirect effects such as changes in households' surroundings, including networks and access to services. However, policy response does not always capture or respond to the needs of families that suffer from conflict. Bar-Nahum *et al* (2020) citing the case of Palestine argue that violent conflict often substantially impairs the availability, access and stability of food and this severely compromises the welfare of communities.

Conflicts influence policy formulation and therefore establishment of the causes of conflict in Mombasa County was key to this study. The study question on the peacebuilding infrastructure was to list the causes of conflict in the county and the results are illustrated in figure 4.4 .



Fig 4.4 Causes of Conflict in Mombasa County

Source: Field Data, 2021

As per the foregoing results , the five most mentioned causes of conflict in Mombasa County were drug peddling, by 19.4% (N=22) of the respondent, historical injustices, 17.7% (N=20), poverty, 16.8% (N=19), unemployment, 15% (N=17) and then youth radicalisation 13.3% (N=15). Other causes of conflict though no less important followed the above three and gender-based violence was mentioned by 6.2% (N=7) of the respondents, followed by political incitement, 4.4% (N=5),

juvenile gang, 3.5% (N=4) and lastly clashing religious beliefs, 3.5% (N=4). The causes are discussed briefly in the following section.

4.5.1 Illegal Drug Abuse and Peddling

Illegal drug peddling was mentioned by the majority of respondents as the biggest cause of conflict in Mombasa County (19.4% (N=22). This finding was not surprising because the County is a major transit and consumer point for hard drugs. However, opinions differ as to whether drugs can be connected to the conflict in the coast. The connecting point to drug peddling seems to be youth idleness and parental failure to rein in their drug-using children. As was observed by a key informant, there is more to drugs in Mombasa County than just the availability and peddling

> to me, drug abuse on the coast is not something that I can take it as a threat to peace, to me here in Mvita drug is a lifestyle, right from childhood you will find children being socialized into drugs…fighting it has been a bit hard, it has been more like a social issue and socially accepted. Today to arrest a costal child, it is the parents who will come out with arms, did you see my child smoking, did you see my child doing this? that informs you then that the community has accepted these while me as an outsider I'm seeing it as a problem, the community are not seeing it as a problem and that is why you find a mother, son and husband seated chewing miraa… As we criminalize drug abuse there is resistance, that resistance … they are becoming peace spoilers because they are not agreeing with what government agencies are doing so to defend their territory now, they become spoiler and they are becoming even more aggressive. **(**Key Informant Interview with Government official, March 10, 2022)

This observation about community tolerance to drugs agrees with Masudi (2011) in a study examining the factors that influence drug use in Mombasa found that ease of access and availability of cannabis among community members is a contributing factor to its greater use. The chewing of

khat (a natural shrub whose leaves are chewed mainly for their psychostimulant and euphoric effects) is accepted socially but this does not reduce its position as a drug). The study also found that the majority of drug users start to use at a youthful age between 15 to 30 years of age and a significant proportion of the users start using at old age. However, in one FGD, it was clear to the respondents how drugs lead to conflict;

> drugs addicts have conflict back home because that is a habit that not all family members entertained. Dependent drug users lack money to buy drugs and they end up stealing or getting money from other sources which are not conventional. A family will always want to protect their image if one of their children is a thief and that causes conflict between one family to the other families.(FGD with reformed youth Changamwe, August, 30 2021).

Further, the FGD discussants averred that parents and politicians seem to turn a blind eye, if not directly encouraging their children and friends to abuse drugs.

> Parents defend their children who use drugs and that causes conflicts. Children are sent to go buy drugs and, in the end, they also start using these drugs. The government does not enforce the law. Leaders in society defend friends and people who use drugs. (FGD with reformed youth Changamwe, August, 30 2021).

The FGD views also agree with a study carried out by Hali (2017) in metropolitan Kano, Nigeria, which found that the predisposing factors of substance abuse included parental protection, drug availability and peer pressure. The current study also found that parental protection was a factor in drug abuse. An observation worth noting in the case of Mombasa was the new turn in the introduction of new drugs in the market. In a report on the *"Status of Alcohol and Drug Abuse in The Coast Region, Kenya"*, the National Authority Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse (NACADA) observed an increasing trend in newly "emergent" drugs over and above the

commonly abused drugs such as alcohol, tobacco, bhang, miraa, heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine (Meth) (NACADA, 2013 and 2016). These new drugs are trafficked by organised gangs who also actively recruit users (even primary school children) by first giving it to them freely and later charging high process for the same once the users are hooked. Substance abuse has been negatively associated with school absenteeism and poor performance (KIPPRA, 2019).

The intersection between drug abuse and peddling and conflict is at the point when traffickers of illegal drugs begin exercising territorial control, either for ease of transiting their drugs or for the market. Reitano (2020) argues that illicit economies that are formed by either the production or selling of illegal drugs create a sense of "warlordism" and corruption that inevitably leads to conflict. This has been the story of Afghanistan, Colombia and other countries where illegal drugs abound. The arrest and subsequent extradition of two Kenyans; Baktash and Ibrahim Akasha who were the leaders of a sophisticated international drug trafficking network based in Kenya elevated the country into the narco-world. Sometimes they used violence against those who posed a threat to their enterprise. In 2014, the brothers got arrested after unknowingly selling heroin and two kilograms of methamphetamine to US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers. Their enterprise ended when they were expelled from Kenya to the USA and received lengthy prison terms for drug trafficking (Reuters, January 11, 2020).

The sentiments of villagers who have witnessed the problem of drugs summarise the feelings of many respondents who attended the FGD sessions, and the verdict seems to point to the

Government's weak response. When asked to state their view on who was to blame for the drug problem in Mombasa County, the response was,

> The government is reluctant to tackle drugs. Drugs are sold at a very high rate than before, heroin is imported. The government takes no action to fight the selling of these drugs. We report those who sell drugs but no actions are taken. Government knows those who sell drugs but they take no action. The government should get rid of drugs by arresting suppliers. Children are used in the transportation of drugs by the elderly people who sell these drugs. (FGD with Village Elders, Jomvu Nov 13 2021)

Government response to illicit drugs and drug trafficking in Kenya has been a subject of much debate, because the illicit drug problem seems to be increasing despite the elaborate system put in place. The national response is guided by the National Alcohol and Drug Abuse Policy (2018) which provides a framework for sustainable, multi-sectoral and balanced approach in the management of alcohol and drug abuse (ADA), the Tobacco Control Act of 2007, the National Authority Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse (NACADA), the Support for Addictions Prevention and Treatment in Africa (SAPTA) organisation, UNODC and many NGOs and CBOs who are working in prevention, treatment and rehabilitation of drug abusers in Kenya.

The weak link in the response to the drug menace in Kenya seems to be in the enforcement of the laws that prevent the importation and movement and sale of drugs in Kenya. In this regard, law enforcement personnel seem to be the culprits. Despite many police raids in the fight against illicit drugs, Ngeera and Muia (2020) in a study entitled *Influence of substance abuse on service delivery by the Kenya police officers: A case study of Nairobi City County, Kenya* fund out that drug abuse among police rank had had a negative impact on the fight against drug abuse. Because it is the

police that is the face of the fight against drugs, when they are seen to be ineffective, then it is easy to conclude that Government is unable to respond effectively against illicit drugs in Kenya.

For Mombasa County, as in other parts of Kenya, the lack of rehabilitation facilities of drug abusers poses a danger to the users health, but more importantly a continuous threat to peace. Kahuthia-Gathu *et al* (2013) in a study of emerging drugs in Kenya noted that the other tragedy of increased use of illegal drugs was the lack of rehabilitation programs including vocational training. Drug users become a burden to themselves and society when they are unemployable, because they become criminals or get easily recruited into terrorist ideologies. Agade *et al* (2021) in an insightful research on the criminilisation of youth drug abuse and conflict raise pertinent issues around the perpetuation of a criminal image of youth in Mombasa, thereby contributing to their hostility to established authority. Youth are also victims of gang-related activities and therefore the practice of dismissing them wholesale as perpetrators of violence simply adds to conflict drivers in Mombasa as the youth begin adopting a "revenge" attitude towards society.

4. 5.2 Historical injustices

Colonialism and slavery are a history of historical injustices. Thompson (2001) argues that human history is replete with examples of injustices such as killings, torture, cheating, enslavement exploitation and dispossession, most of which remain unacknowledged and uncompensated. Because of the distortions, historical injustices are difficult to discuss due to different versions of history and the unanswered question as to whether all historical injustices should be compensated or only those that endure . The problem of historical injustice is also a moral one since the subject raises moral questions about history. Where the perpetrators of the historical injustice no longer

exist, such as the Tartars, it has been argued that the power of claimants is weak and it is perhaps better to leave bygones be bygones (Waldron, 2002). However, in many parts of the world, the legacy of historical injustices endures and deserves recognition and compensation. This is the issue with the current situation of Native Americans and Black Americans (Merjian, 2010)

A Kenya Government report produced by the Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA Working Paper No. 2012/02) defines historical injustices as

> those harms and wrongs committed by individuals, groups and institutions (including rulers and regime elite) against other individuals and groups who may be dead but whose descendants are alive. The descendants could be individuals or groups of all kinds deserving of recognition or acknowledgement for their suffering and should as such be compensated. (CRA, 2012:3).

The context of historical injustices in Kenya begins in precolonial times when Arab traders from Oman alienated land from indigenous peoples at the Coast, ushering in a long period of Arab imperialism and domination. During the colonial period, several foreign laws, such as the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915 on land ownership and the Native Trust Bill of 1926 restricting Africans to Native Reserves were further used to alienate land and raise inequalities in Kenya. Wambua *et al* (2021) notes that British settlers, with the support of local proxies, displaced communities from their native lands and annexed huge tracts in the productive White Highlands in the Rift Valley, central, and coastal regions.

At Kenya's independence in 1963, the people of the then Northern Frontier District (NFD), who were mostly of Somali origin felt that little had been done to remove the repressive policies of marginalisation designed by the colonial government. This led to the secessionist movement, leading to the *Shifta* war because of the injustices felt by the Somali people in the then Northern

Frontier District (NFD) (Mutisya, 2017). The problem of marginalisation was not addressed even under the Moi Government. For example, the policy of District Focus for Rural Development in the 1980s, which was meant to redirect resources to formerly economically neglected areas such as North Eastern Province (NEP) did not percolate among the people and therefore the sense of neglect continued. Under the Moi Government, state operatives stole public land, and oversaw further displacement of communities from their indigenous lands, especially in the productive regions in the Rift Valley, central, and coastal regions (Wambua *et al,* 2021). The return of multi-party politics did not address inequality in Kenya either as the NARC Government concentrated investments in areas favourable to them, and marginalised groups felt even more marginalised. The promulgation of the 2010 Constitution and formation of the County governance structure was supposed to address marginalisation, but it too has come with its challenges, ushering in unprecedented corruption and massive theft of public resources. Addressing historical injustices is, therefore, an unfinished business in Kenya.

The study sought to establish whether historical injustices were seen as a cause of conflict in Mombasa County. Out of 113 respondents, 17.7% (N=20) mentioned that historical injustices were a major cause of conflict in Mombasa County, as seen in table 4.4. Asked to explain this issue during focus group discussions and key informant interviews, the overall feeling was that injustices were not only historical but also contemporary, concerning issues such as nepotism, police brutality, lack of access to Government services and misplaced Government priorities regarding villager's welfare. In a focus group discussion with a women's group, the feeling was captured succinctly by the following quote from a respondent,

> when talking about historical injustices I am referring to sharing of power, land issues, sharing of resources and marginalisation when giving out jobs. Elected leaders also promote marginalisation and that causes conflict…in our community, rich kids secure jobs with the help of their parents and poor kids are easily left out. Issues to do with lands exist. Local people don't have title deeds while those from upcountry have title deeds. (FGD with Women's Group, Kisauni, November, 13 2021)

According to many villagers in Mombasa county, the Government is blamed for the perpetuation of conflict because of ignoring the problems that ordinary people face or applying the wrong solutions. An FGD session with a mixed group of men and women brought out the following opinion,

> the government is not aware of what people fight for, and if the government knows, it ignores it because, in Laikipia, people are fighting over boundaries… Government ignorance makes things get worse. Government's response is wrong. They use police to resolve conflicts but at times, that response is not always effective. Government should always look at the root course before responding to issues…. government must know what makes people fight and sort out these issues and people will live in peace. We have people who incite others to fight especially when elections period approaches. The government wants people to fight so that they can bring the police to fight people. (source: FGD with mixed village elders: March 17, 2022)

The feeling of injustice among the people is closely linked to that of police brutality in Mombasa County. Police reaction to suspected gang activities and drug dealers has been judged as harsh and often without benefit because it does not yield any desirable results. The police have invariably applied force to round up suspected gang members. According to a key informant, the raids often net innocent people who are then punished for crimes they did not commit. This issue has been one of the biggest problems in the peacebuilding agenda of the county.

A senior member of the Mombasa peacebuilding infrastructure opined as follows,

> The war of gangs is wrong because when the police come to arrest the gangs, they find only the victims who are then arrested and taken into custody after the gang members have run away. Profiling for amnesty was also done wrongly because most reformed youths are still considered criminals. To solve this issue, we brought the youth and insisted that the DCI and police take a back seat and we talk to the youth first before the police come. This way we ensured that youth who were ready to reform were not victimised by police. (KII with sub-county peacebuilding committee member, Likoni, August 31 2021)

The issue of extrajudicial killings by police is yet another matter that adds to the feeling of injustice among the public as indicated by our respondents. In November 2021, as data collection for this study was going on, a daily newspaper reported that police had carried out more extrajudicial killings in that year than any other year in Kenya. According to the report, there were 43 cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in 2021, in Kenya. Of the 43 killings, 17 were from Mombasa County. Quoting from a Human Rights NGO, which works in Mombasa county, the report further averred that complacency by security agencies when it came to investigating disappearances, led many to believe that police were involved in the same. Part of the blame the report added was on the poor training and equipping of police who are expected to perform their duties under difficult circumstances. As was indicated in one FGD session with the youth.

> Disappearance cases have been so rampant victims mostly being the youths, men and women and, those who disappear go missing forever or they are found either dead and that causes conflicts because people need to know what is happening. Another thing is historical injustices, land cases take too long before the cases are resolved. (KII with sub-county peacebuilding committee NGO, Kisauni Nov, 15 2021)

Obadha (2018) in a research paper titled *Assessment of International Human Rights Instruments and Their Application on Extra-Judicial Killings by the National Police Service in Kenya* found that the government of Kenya had undertaken various steps to address extra-judicial killings such as the domestication of international instruments which form part of the laws of Kenya and setting up various commissions which have been significant in the reforms of the National Police Service. However, these reforms fly in the face of continued killings and forced disappearances such as was witnessed in Mombasa in 2021.

4.5.3 Poverty

Poverty has been defined in many ways and described in such terms as "absolute poverty", "relative poverty",and "desperate poverty" . The World Bank defines poverty as a ‘pronounced deprivation in well-being”. Well-being is a subjective term that has no absolute measure. Narrow definitions of well-being are typically linked to commodities, and therefore poverty can be linked to monetary income and consumption. Rohwerder (2016) points out that the most commonly used global comparative poverty lines that are usually set by the World Bank is now about USD 3 a day. But yet again this is relative because there are countries where USD 3 is not seen as poverty. Narayan (2000) summarises poverty as the state of having no voice and no power. Citing a World Bank study on *World Development Report 2000/ 2001: Attacking Poverty,* the author argues that while poverty manifests in specific contexts, it is multidimensional and has important non-economic dimensions. Therefore, it is not enough to use the standard dollar-a-day measurement as is common in many publications.

There is evidence that connects poverty and conflict (Draman, 2003). Today the world is composed of 1 billion rich, 4 billion in countries rapidly developing and converging in living standards on the and 1 billion in states falling behind, and often falling apart. This bottom billion is trapped in several traps, among which, conflict is one, and is best predicted by poverty, lack of growth, dependence on misgoverned resource wealth, and a previous history of civil conflict or coups. Marks (2016) in a review of the literature on conflict and poverty argues that there are two levels in examining this issue. At the state level, poverty can lower resilience to conflict by weakening government institutions, stripping capacity for public goods provision, and limiting the projection of power and authority. Poverty also compounds vulnerability to insurgency especially if this is combined with high unemployment and inequality, and low levels of education and development. At the individual level, it is always the poor that suffer the most in conflict situations and that can ignite the vicious cycle of poverty and conflict.

Students of peacebuilding have argued that poverty is a major contributing factor to insecurity and instability, especially in the rural areas where communities depend on scarce land-based natural resources which are affected by climate change, population growth and even prevailing political climate (Muigua, 2021). However, urban poverty is just as serious and in the case of this study, Mombasa county, being largely urban has not faired any better. Shifa and Leibbrandt (2017) using the 2009 Kenyan population census data argue that, in comparison to other urban centers, Mombasa poverty is 44%, second only to Kisumu which stood at 46%. The authors also argue that intra-city poverty is significant where certain parts of the urban centers are poorer than others. In the case of Mombasa, the more affluent areas such as Nyali and the beaches masks significant

within-urban-center inequalities. This is a cause of conflict especially where poor people see their poverty in terms of other people's undue advantage over them.

This study sought to establish whether poverty was seen as a cause of conflict in Mombasa County. Out of 113 respondents, 16.8% (N=19) agreed with the statement that poverty was a cause of conflict in Mombasa County. The results are illustrated in table 4.4. The focus group and key informant interview data on this question were overwhelming as all groups pointed to poverty as a source of conflict in Mombasa County. The study raised this question during the focus group discussion and even in the key informant interviews. The following quote captures the feeling of the respondents on the question of poverty and conflict.

> lack of employment and poverty. when Government brought *kazi mtaani*, the crime rate went down because youths were engaged, now that *kazi mtaani* is no more they have gone back to their usual activities. The government should bring back *kazi mtaani* to engage the youths. Another thing is drugs. A lot of youths have gone into drugs. The only way to help them is by talking to them but it is hard because we have nothing to offer them as an alternative to drugs. The government should get rid of drugs. **(**FGD with Youth Group, Likoni, January 6 2022)

The idea of *Kazi mtaani* is discussed in some detail here concerning the question of lack of employment among youth, which as of now stands at 38.9% among young Kenyans of ages 15-34 years. This translates to 5,341,182 million out of the 13,777,600 who are eligible for employment (*Business Daily*, 2020). The research sought to find out from the respondents if they thought lack of employment was a source of conflict. Out of the 113 respondents, as seen in Fig. 4.4 15% (N=17) indicated the affirmative. As summarised in the prevenient quote from one respondent.

Much of the focus group discussion touched on three inter-related issues; lack of employment, youth idleness and the propensity for crime. Unemployment contributes to idleness among the youths who in turn engage in deviant behaviours causing conflict thus hindering peace efforts within the County. This assertion was supported by the FGD discussants who argued that:

Unemployment is a phenomenon which suggests inequality, especially among the youthful population Unemployment occurs when youth are not able to secure employment opportunities consistent with and which uses their levels of skill and education. Youth unemployment has been adduced as a factor for protracted conflicts following research suggesting that a proportion of violent extremists were relatively well educated but either unemployed or employed in fairly menial roles. At the same time, while the relationship between education, employment and violent extremism has been imputed, there is some limited evidence that militant groups recruit from the ranks of the unemployed (Abdalla, 2013).

Youth in Kenya are experiencing much higher unemployment rates than the rest of the Kenyan population and the problem is getting worse by the day. As a way of responding to this problem, the Government of Kenya came up with the idea of creating work for youth in their communities, under a program called *Kazi mtaani.* The Kenya National Hygiene Programme popularly known as the *Kazi mtaani* is a national initiative by the Government that was launched in April 2020 to cushion the most vulnerable but able-bodied citizens living in informal settlements from the effects and response strategies of the Covid-19 pandemic. The work entails cutting grass and clearing drainages but from the Government's perspective, this is part of giving youth some meaningful work and keeping them out of trouble, in other words, it is a peacebuilding intervention. The

programme, which started with a Ksh. 10 billion kitty, employed 283,210 youths in 900 informal settlements across all the counties and enabled thousands of youths to start small businesses. It targeted those above 18 years and below 35 years. In many ways, this is a social welfare program with a forward-looking view. In a country where youth unemployment is so high, *Kazi Mtaani* was a laudable move by the Government.

As a peacebuilding intervention, *Kazi Kwa Vijana* or *Kazi Mtaani* speaks to the question of the Government's ability to implement a youth employment program that can also avert conflict. This type of intervention has been examined by Tydas and Peksen (2012) who argue that welfare spending contributes to sustaining the peace because it reduces grievances by offsetting the effects of poverty and inequality in society. Initiatives such as *Kazi Mtaani* are virtuous in the sense that they are not seen as charity and so those in the program do not see themselves as getting handouts. It has a strong pacifying effect. A respondent summarised the value of the program as the following quote,

> *Kazi kwa Vijana* was very good. A lot of youths left maskani to work in *Kazi kwa Vijana* and in the process they got cash and you find that most of them concentrated with their families and some of them married and that kept them occupied other than being idle. (FGD with Youth Group, Likoni, January 6 2022)

However, this program, as with many Kenya Government initiatives has been a source of pain for youth and an opportunity for corrupt officials to enrich themselves at the expense of the youth. Anecdotal evidence from newspaper interviews with affected youth in Nairobi, Kiambu, Mombasa, Kisumu and Trans-Nzoia counties pointed to MPs, county administration officials, ward representatives and Nyumba Kumi heads colluding to employ their relatives and supporters

Not only was there nepotism but also exploitation of youth who in some instances were forced to share half their daily wages ranging from Sh450 to Sh600 with Ward Administrators (*People Daily*, Friday, July 17th, 2020). According to the Government, this program, which is supported by the World Bank gave employment to some 283,210 in phase one of the project. Against the number of unemployed youth in Kenya, which is estimated at 5,341,182 or 38.9 percent of the 13,777,600 young Kenyans, then this program is a drop in the ocean (*Business Daily*, Monday February 24 2020). The program can be concluded to have failed to manage the expectation of the majority of the youth and this can be a source of frustration and a threat to peace.

Khalil (2014) contends that governmental failure to provide basic services potentially creates a vacuum that extremist groups can fill to build support and legitimacy for themselves, at the expense of legitimate Governments. Examples of violent groups which have built substantial support in this way include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hamas, Hezbollah, Jemaah Islamiyah (Indonesia), the Gamaa Islamiyya (Egypt), and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). Violent groups who normally fill this void are able to use their new-found friendship with communities to fill their ranks with the support of the community because they are seen as caring. Tobiko *et al* (2021) reviewing the perception of youth unemployment in Kajiado, have argued that youths perceive their unemployment as a product of social and economic problems in society. Under such conditions, youth easily get swayed by ideologies that seem anti-establishment. Poverty is therefore a conflict driver.

4.5.4. Youth Radicalisation

Radicalisation has been blamed on many factors, with all of them acting either as "push" or "pull" incentives into radicalisation and violent extremism. The push factors are, for example, the feeling of group deprivation which can be read as injustice, inequality, marginalization, grievance, social exclusion, frustration, victimisation, and stigmatisation. The pull factors are psychological ones that can render an individual more susceptible to undertaking violent extremist behaviours, for example, the existence of well-organized violent extremist groups or places provide outlets for grievances and promise of money, adventure, freedom and spiritual comfort (Nanes and Lau, 2018). The reasons why people participate in violent extremism, remain a matter of contention because of the different views and interpretations of what drives radicalism or who a radical is. Vergani *et al* (2018) argue that radicalisation has been one of the most difficult subjects to understand because the line that defines an extremist or a radical from a moderate or legitimate opinion or behavior is never very clear. This is an important line to remember as one discusses the issue of radicalisation. Trip *et al* (2019) defined radicalisation in the following manner.

> Radicalisation is a process of developing extremist beliefs, emotions, and behaviours. The extremist beliefs are profound convictions that oppose the fundamental values of society, the laws of democracy and universal human rights by advocating the supremacy of a particular group (racial, religious, political, economic, social .) Trip *et al* (2019:2)

The extremist emotions and behaviours may be expressed both in non-violent pressure and coercion and in actions that deviate from the norm and show contempt for life, freedom, and human rights. The current terrorist threats in Kenya and Uganda have been attributed to unemployment among youth populations and other state failures such as the lack of investment in intelligence and

policing capabilities. In Kenya, radicalisation of youth and the requisite response to radicalisation and extremism has been studied by, among others; Odhiambo *et al* (2012); Odhiambo (2014); Papale (2021); Sahgai and Kimaio (2020); Chitembwe et al (2021) and Breidlid (2021).

The study sought to establish whether radicalisation contributes conflict in Mombasa County. The results are illustrated in figure 4.4. The Out of 113 respondents, 13.3% (N=15) indicated that radicalisation was a major cause of conflict in Mombasa County. Mombasa has been associated with radicalism perhaps because most of the people who were seen as radicals came from there. Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (2016) note that the majority of Kenya youths who have joined Al-Shabaab came from coastal counties of Kilifi, Mombasa and Kwale. Several sources confirm that radical clerics used their mosques as platforms for preaching radicalism. The data from the focus group discussion seemed to indicate that youth radicalisation was a state of mind rather than just the desire to join a *jihadist* group like al-Shabaab. Indeed, as argued by Quinn (2021), the rise of Salafi-inspired Islam with its strict interpretation of the religion pauses a danger as more youths fall to the risk of general lawlessness and the desire to reject anything from people who are not from the Coast.

In 2012, a Muslim cleric, Aboud Rogo Mohammed was accused of radicalising and recruiting Swahili-speaking Africans for carrying out violent militant activity in Somalia. Mr Mohammed was accused of being the "main ideological leader" of Kenya's al-Hijra group, also known as the Muslim Youth Centre, which was viewed as a close ally of al-Shabab. Rogo and other radicals came into the limelight when in 1990, the Kenya Government refused to register the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), leading to a series of violent riots in the coastal city of Mombasa. Shortly after, a radical wing of the IPK started to mobilise and radicalise members (*Daily Nation*, July 3, 2020).

Apart from the doctrine, it has been hypothesised that drug addiction and promises of riches was a push factor for radicalisation.

As Kenya moves towards the 2022 general elections there is already a feeling of déjà vu because politicians are already mobilising their constituents along the same old ethnic and religious lines. In December 2021, the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry Mombasa (KNCCI) chapter, which represents the business community on the Coast raised concerns over rising political temperatures and called for peaceful elections for the sake of the development of the County. The KNCCI noted that politicians had not relented in their campaigns since the 2017 general election, implying that the atavistic tone that marred the last general elections was still being used.

The fear and concern of women respondents on this matter are captured in the following quote from respondents in a Focus Group discussion,

> Politicians cause conflicts, they install tribalism to people and make members of the public aware of their tribal entities. …people supporting different political aspirants sometimes get into conflicts with each other. Politicians, they mislead us and our generations, and generations after us because they give false promises.(FGD with Women's Group, Changamwe, November 13, 2021)

As Njambi (2017) concludes, youth radicalisation at the Coast has increased and traditional methods of radicalising youth through teachings in mosques are complemented by other ways of radicalisation. It is important that these other methods of radicalisation be understood if there is going to be any sustainable peacebuilding. It is also important that the beliefs held by the youth

within the social, cultural, economic, and political context in the counties be understood. It is argued in this study that radicalisation is indeed an important factor in the peacebuilding agenda of Mombasa County because it constitutes threat to peace on many fronts. First, radicalisation sets youth in an inevitable path of conflict with the law because it does not simply mean the acquisition of extremist view, but it also encourages the general disobedience of the law, ranging from theft, robberies and personal assaults. Religious radicalisation which is the most common in Kenya also inculcates hatred of other religions to the extent that criminal activity by radicalised youth more frequently target those that they discern as belonging to other religions. In this study, reformed youth admitted to harbouring anti-Christian views which made them target the same with crimes such as spiking of drinks because alcohol was abhorrent to Islam.

4.5.6 Juvenile gangs

One of the most enduring problems in Mombasa has been the presence of juvenile gangs which are both criminal and radical. Like many other social phenomena, juvenile gangs are difficult to define because they come in different forms and for different purposes. Secondly, different jurisdictions may have their unique classification of juvenile gangs. How a jurisdiction defines a juvenile gang determines the policy direction that will be taken to address the situation. However, Moore and Cook (1998) define a youth gang as a group of youths or young adults who are willing to identify or classify as a 'gang.'" These could be motorcycle gangs, hate or ideology groups, prison gangs. These groups are self-formed and usually have: a gang name, recognizable symbols, recognizable leadership, a geographic territory, a regular meeting pattern, and collective actions to carry out illegal activities. Gangs usually have a safe haven and a recruitment pool.

Using the example of the United States, Howell (1999) argues that juvenile gang members commit serious and violent offences at a rate several times higher than nongang adolescents, including drug trafficking. In Latin America, showing concern over the problem of juvenile gangs, the Organization of American States (OAS), undertook a systematic study of the issue of gangs and their various violent and criminal manifestations. According to the OAS;

> Youth gangs represent a spontaneous effort by children and young people to create, where it does not exist, an urban space in society that is adapted to their needs, where they can exercise the rights that their families, government, and communities do not offer them. Arising out of extreme poverty, exclusion, and a lack of opportunities, gangs try to gain their rights and meet their needs by organizing themselves without supervision and developing their own rules, and by securing for themselves a territory and a set of symbols that gives meaning to their membership in the group. This endeavour to exercise their citizenship is, in many cases, a violation of their own and others' rights, and frequently generates violence and crime in a vicious circle that perpetuates their original exclusion. (OAS, 2007:5)

From the OAS study, juvenile gangs are likely to be urban, linked to adolescents and youth, with an average age of less than 18. Juvenile gangs arise from conditions of poverty and exclusion and are closely linked to a lack of opportunities provided by the government, the market, and the community. The OAS study found that juvenile gangs originate among children or adolescents who come from dysfunctional families and are looking for an identity, protection, sense of belonging, and power They are males and are linked increasingly to trafficking in drugs, arms, and persons, and other crimes related to organized crime OAS, 2007).

In Kenya, Cheruiyot and Wainaina (2020), found that Mombasa had witnessed a rapid growth in juvenile criminal gangs who are involved in criminal acts almost daily. Gang members were as

young as seven (7 years). These juveniles carry knives and other crude weapons and engaged in all manner of crimes such as extortion, petty thefts, bag snatching, and pickpocketing alongside drug abuse, including narcotics such as “bugizi" (the date-rape drug Rohypnol) to give them courage and confidence. As recently as September 2021, two of the gangs that have been involved in rampant violent crime; *Wakali Kwanza* and *Wakali Hao* were said to have made a comeback and were terrorizing residents of parts of Mombasa especially Kisauni, Likoni and Bamburi. A newspaper report indicated that a night raid by the gang left 9 people nursing machete (panga) wounds. The report also indicated that the gang members had a strong belief in witchcraft and supernatural powers (*Daily Nation*, Thursday, May 5, 2022).

A growing problem with juvenile gangs in Mombasa is their propensity to take on radical extremism as part of their modus operandi, and thus pose a serious threat to peacebuilding. Syokila (2020) in a study on the challenges of tackling violent radicalisation of youth in Mombasa County found that while the problem was real, especially in the marginalised areas of Majengo, Jomvu and Kisauni, there was no comprehensive policy framework for youth empowerment that went beyond peripheral job creation and entrepreneurship promotion to address root causes of youth alienation and disenchantment. The study concluded that youth needed to be made to feel useful. On the other hand, Chitembwe *et al* (2021) in a study on the nature and extent of youth radicalisation in Mombasa found that youth radicalisation into violent extremism and terrorism in Mombasa and Kwale was the result of perceived injustices based on history, religion, politics, economics, and heavy-handed criminal justice system.

In this study 3.5% (N=4) indicated that juvenile gangs were a source of conflict in Mombasa County. While the number is small, the problem of juvenile gangs in the county is real and

growing. In December 2016, the Ministry of Interior named and banned extremist gangs in Kenya; among them were quite a number based in the coastal area. In a crime mapping report by National Crime Research Centre in 2016, the following gangs were identified: Al-Shabaab, Mombasa Republican Council, Bagdad Boys, *Wakali Kwanza, Wakali Wao, Wakali Kabisa, Funga File, Waiyo, Wasafi, Mawayu, Kumi Bila, Boko Haram-Shoda,* 40 Brothers, KK, 45 #86Team, 9 Boys, Ten Town, Vietnam, *Kunku*, List *Chafu, Sokoni* Youth and Shymbo. These gangs have been known to rob, maim and kill. They are a threat to peacebuilding in Mombasa.

In this study, respondents felt that the juvenile gangs also were a hindrance to development as summarised in the verbatim.

> There are gangs that hinder peace (and) development in the County. These include *Roma*, *Sukari ya Warembo* among others. When *Roma* and *Sukari ya Warembo* are not on good terms, these groups are strategically at different places so no one from Roma will be allowed by *Sukari ya Warembo* to get to their territory and vice versa. What causes conflicts in this group is maybe a person from Roma went to *Sukari ya Warembo* territory and a phone was stolen from him so Roma group will join forces and attack *Sukari Ya warembo* to regain the stolen phone. We have had so many gang groups and politicians use those groups to fight for superiority. These groups get protection from politicians and powerful people in the society. (FGD with Youth, Changamwe, August 23 2021)

A daily newspaper, in an exclusive investigative piece uncovered new politically-inspired gangs that are directly funded by politicians in preparation for the 2022 elections. These are Gaza, *Wajukuu wa Bibi*, Buffalo, Young Thugs, *Akili za Usiku*, Kapenguria Six, Gater Family, Born to Kill, *Chafu* za Downs, *Viwanjeni* Boys*, Watalia, Piyo*, Congo by Force, Bad Squad, 88 Battalion. The report continues to observe that the youth are trained and helped to organise. In most instances, after arrest, the first person to be called is the local politician who will have these youth released.

In some parts of the county, say, Jomvu, the leading criminal grouping is 64 Gang while *Waiyo*, Bundesliga and *Bafana Bafana* control Majengo. Changamwe has three gangs; Spanish Sparter, 64 Gang and Vietnam, while Turdor is proliferated by the most powerful gang in Mombasa; *Wakali Kwanza*. The gangs controlling Buxton and Old Town include Young Turks, Temeke, Crazy Boys, Home Boys and Young Mula (*Daily Nation*, April 21, 2021).

The challenge in dealing with criminal gangs in Kenya has also to do with what the law can hold a person responsible for. The gangs in Mombasa county which have attracted members as young as 8 years have been known to cause serious crimes including murder. Under the law, however, the age of criminal responsibility, which is the minimum age that a child can be prosecuted and punished by law for an offence is not straightforward and is interpreted in 3 categories under Section 14 of the Penal Code. Under Section 14(1), persons under 8 years old are not criminally responsible for any act or omission. Between 8 years but under 12 years, the law, under section 14(2) requires proof of capacity. In other words, proof is needed to show that the child was aware that he ought not to commit the act or make the omission. Children are also protected under Section 14(3) and presumed incapable of having carnal knowledge. This provision is supposed to shield male children under the age of 12 years from criminal responsibility of carnal nature. But these children commit exactly these acts, and this introduces a complicated situation where aggrieved parties, knowing that criminals are protected by the law take the matters into their own hands (Ndegwa, 2014).

4.5.7 Clashing cultural and religious beliefs

The study sought to establish whether clashing cultural and religious beliefs were seen by the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committee as a cause of conflict in Mombasa County. Out of 113 respondents,4 (3.5%) indicated that clashing cultural and religious beliefs were a major cause of conflict in Mombasa County. Kamaara (2004) argues that at its worst, religion can be a source of social conflict as seen in Northern Ireland with its perpetual conflicts between protestants and Roman Catholics and Nigeria with conflicts between Muslims and Christians. As confirmed during an FGD by respondent in this study,

> Religion also cause conflict in the society. Muslims refer to Christians as kafir, Christians also say things about Muslims. For us Muslims, we chose madrasa for our kids, we also choose schools for our kids on claims that the owners of those schools we refuse our kids to attend are rich and unkind (FGD with Women Group, Nyali November 8 2021)

Africa has suffered several cases of religious conflicts, more so between adherents of Christianity and Islam. Religious conflicts have been a major source of civil strife in countries such as Sudan, Nigeria, the Central Africa Republic, including Kenya. Such scenarios cast darkness on the consistency of religious actors in peacebuilding and reconciliation among societies. But the success stories strongly show that if well tapped, religion remains a key player in holding societies together given that other highly esteemed structures such as state governments, intergovernmental organizations and reputable Non-Governmental have also fallen short of the task. It is therefore evident that religion can work both positively and negatively for peacebuilding including related tasks such as national cohesion and integration depending on the dynamics at a given time in a context. Religious communities have in various ways been involved in the mitigation of real and potential religious conflicts.

4.5.8 Gender-based violence

Rohwerder (2014), in a conflict analysis of Kenya, argues that gender-based violence (SGBV) is part of a long history of violence in Kenya. Citing Njeri & Ogola, (2014), the author posits that 45 per cent of women aged 15- 49 have experienced either physical or sexual violence; 47 per cent of married women have experienced emotional, physical or sexual violence; and the FGM prevalence rate is at 27 per cent in Kenya. The abuse of male adults and children is vastly under-reported and poorly understood and is on the increase. SGBV is more prevalent during elections when women are victimised either as part of the target communities in ethnic clashes and/or as survivors of opportunistic predation and criminality that is characteristic of antagonistic elections processes (Njuru, 2012).

The study sought to establish whether gender based-violence is a cause of conflict in Mombasa County. Out of 113 respondents,4 (3.5%) argued that gender based-violence is a cause of conflict in Mombasa County. The results are illustrated in table 4.4. When this issue was posed to the respondents, discussions focused on conflicts at the family level because of what many respondents saw as family dysfunction and parental neglect of their duties. One respondent summarized the issue in these terms;

> some families don't understand ways to up bring children from birth till they become of age. In the first seven years from birth, a child is supposed to be so close to both parents, from the age of eight to fourteen, a child is supposed to be taught discipline and what the community expects of him. He should be taught what is right to do and what is wrong to do, from the age of fifteen to twenty-one, a child should be friends with the parents till they marry… For me conflict is caused by lack of strong foundation (FGD interview with Village Elder, Nyali, November, 11 2021)

4.5.9 The *Wabara* Phenomenon as a Source of conflict

The issue of *Wabara* (people of the hinterland) and *Wapwani* (people of the coast) has historical roots in Kenya starting from the early days of the slave trade, Arab rule, colonialism under the British and the eventual "domination" of the people of the hinterland of affairs in the coast. This domination has been used by the political class to whip up the feeling of marginalisation for which the *wabara* have been blamed and has been a cause of conflict on the Coast for a long time. With Kenya's independence, and as more people moved to the coast to settle and work, land ownership and employment opportunities became a point of contention as the *wapwani* began seeing other people being considered over them. This feeling of marginalization has been a major source of conflict on the coast and has precipitated serious community clashes.

The study sought to evaluate whether the *wabara* phenomenon was seen as a source of conflict and challenge for sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County. The results are presented in figure 4.5. Out of 113 respondents, 3.5% (N=4) strongly disagreed with the question, 13 11.5% (N=13) disagreed, 6.2% (N=7) were undecided, 16 (14.2 %) agreed to the inquiry and 73 64.6% (N=73) strongly agreed that *wabara* phenomenon was a source of conflict, and posed a challenge for sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa. Cumulatively, 79.2% (N=89) saw the issue of *wabara* (outsiders) as a cause for conflict in Mombasa County.



Figure. 4.5 *Wabara* Phenomenon as a Source of Conflict

Source:Field Data,2021

The foregoing findings are confirmed by the response from one of the key informants who opined that,

> Locals and non-local feuds are a major challenge to peacebuilding initiatives in Mombasa County. The situation worsens during elections. The conflict between supporters of different politicians comes up at a time like this when we are nearing elections, and if people from outside support one candidate we people from here support the one from here and conflict arises. The Sub-county Peace Committees also step in and in most cases, they can resolve those kinds of disputes. Unfortunately, our politicians want to get credit out of such kind of conflict that pits locals versus non-locals who are labelled '*watu wa bara'(*non-residents) (KII, with ward administrator, Nyali April 14, 2022).

The unprecedented post-election violence in Kenya in 2007, and which gave birth to the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) also known as the Waki Commission concluded in the case of Mombasa that,

> Some ethnic groups have been classified as 'insiders' or indigenous communities, while other communities are routinely referred to as 'outsiders". These are the Kamba, Kikuyu, Luo and other upcountry people resident at the Coast" (Commissions of Inquiry - CIPEV Report – CIPEV-Waki report 2008).

Mombasa county, like other parts of Kenya, has experienced violent politically motivated conflicts with every general election since 1991 when multi-party politics was reintroduced. The Kenya Conflict Sensitivity Consortium report (2009) points to deep structural issues that have nourished coastal people's grievances over time, starting with land and political power. The indigenous communities perceive migrant communities especially the Luo, Kikuyu, Kamba and other upcountry people as outsiders. Sometimes this division has taken on a religious tone and the *wapwani* are seen as Muslims while the *wabara* are seen as non-Muslims.

It is instructive to note, however, that the *wabara* assertion cannot fully explain the causes of conflicts in Mombasa and other parts of the coastal region. For example, there have been incidences of conflicts in the region which involved communities considered native. Political competition provides a ripe environment to amplify the alleged marginalisation of the local people. Otherwise, if marginalisation was the main factor, then the conflict would be the order of the day. It would therefore be fair to conclude that, conflicts in Mombasa and the larger coastal region are

a complex phenomenon caused by a multiplicity of factors, but underwritten by politicised identity, known as the *wabara* versus *wapwani*.

4.6 Chapter Summary

Chapter four presented and discussed data on the policy framework under which the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees work. The chapter focused on the influence of the policy framework and its influence on the work of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa. The study found out that Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees enjoyed policy support of the National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (2015) both as a creation of that policy but also by way of direct supervision of the County administration which represents the Office of the President in Mombasa County. The policy is however restrictive for the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees because it does not support financing, remunerations and logistics for the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees work. In this regard, it can be argued as Ajulor (2018) concludes that peacebuilding policy implementation suffers from serious operational and management problems.

This study found out that the policy provides for other peacebuilding opportunities which compensate for the lack of state funding for Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees, including discretionary support from County Administration, cooperation and collaboration with Civil Society organisations which support peacebuilding projects in various parts of Mombasa County and bilateral support through the traditional peacebuilding partners of Kenya, such as UNPD, USAID and DANIDA. The study therefore concluded that the policy atmosphere was supportive of peacebuilding in Mombasa County, albeit with certain limitations that are correctible.

The study found out that the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees are composed of young people, the majority of whom, have high school education. The data also showed that there was fair gender balance with both genders almost equally represented in the peacebuilding committees. This finding is important because it pointed to increasing youth agency in peacebuilding, despite some literature arguing to the contrary (Cardozo *et al,* 2016) . In the case of Kenya, youth agency in peacebuilding was demonstrated by the Government's commitment to UN Resolution 2250 and the many youth groups that the study encountered in Mombasa doing peacebuilding. The study also found out that in keeping with the NSC recommendations, the formation of the Sub-county Peace Committees had both genders, youth and other community-based stakeholder. The study therefore concluded that the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa were compliant with the Government policy position on local peacebuilding entities.

The study also found out that peacebuilding challenges still remain in Mombasa County, based on old narratives such as land and other economic considerations, combined with new problems such youth radicalisation and illegal drug trafficking. The literature review demonstrated that Mombasa County was a transit point for international drug transit, an issue which has created a drug problem in the County. Rakodi *et al* (2000) point out this problem. Illegal drug trafficking is a well-established threat to peace and peacebuilding. The study therefore concludes that these credible threats to peace require commensurate peacebuilding strategies if Mombasa County is to realise any sustainable peacebuilding and this leads to the next chapter on strategies for peacebuilding.

CHAPTER FIVE

STRATEGIES OF SUB-COUNTY PEACEBUILDING COMMITTEES IN ADVANCING SUSTAINABLE PEACEBUILDING IN MOMBASA.

This chapter presents and discusses the findings on the strategies used by the Mombasa County peacebuilding infrastructure in fostering sustainable peacebuilding in the County. The chapter begins by exploring the issue of policy awareness and engagement because peacebuilding strategies are undertaken within a policy framework. This chapter ends with a summary of the main findings.

5.1 Peacebuilding Strategies Deployed by Mombasa Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees.

Peacebuilding strategies can be defined as those approaches that are applied to bring about the desired change in a conflict situation. Like the term peacebuilding itself, peacebuilding strategies can be applied at different levels; global, regional, national and sub-national and even at the village level. At each of these levels, the strategies will be different and will produce different results. Patterson *et al*, (2012) argue that in an immediate conflict resolution (or peacemaking) context, there might be a need for aggressive third-party interventions as opposed to times of relative calm when different strategies will be needed. This distinction is important in the case of Mombasa where cyclical violence associated with elections and gang violence have been witnessed, necessitating different strategies to build peace at different times.

Distinguished scholars of peacebuilding have tended to see peacebuilding strategies as applicable only in post-conflict situations (for example, Lambourne (2000);Tschigri (2004); Barnett *et al*, (2007), however, peacebuilding is not only a post-conflict intervention but also a pre-conflict undertaking which acts a preventive measure that prevents conflict in the first place. Pre-conflict peacebuilding has been argued by, among others, Abdullah (2010), Klein (2019) and Turan (2015). In this study, a distinction was made between peacebuilding during times of conflict and times of no conflict because, not all peacebuilding in Mombasa County is immediately post-conflict. This study was conducted during the Covid-19 epidemic and therefore the threat to peace was not based on violence from belligerence or criminality but reduced social and economic activities in Mombasa County.

5.2. Peacebuilding Strategies in Mombasa County During Times of Conflict

Öjendal et al (2021) argue that peacebuilding has been in a state of permanent reinvention and re-introduction because of the many failures it has had. This is coupled with the fact that conflicts have increased, rather than reduce since the adoption of peacebuilding as a concept by the UN in 1992. This means that peacebuilding has taken place even in contexts of conflicts, hence the need to constantly review what the initial objective was how it can be used to effectively reduce and eliminate violent conflicts. Data on the global trend of conflict point to increased rather than reduced conflict. Using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Cederman and Pengl (2019) note that from the 2000s, armed rebellions by non-state actors, and internal strife challenging established authority has been on the rise.

Mombasa County is conflict-prone due to the many socio-political problems. Some of the problems are historical and some are emergent. As has been noted in Chapter 4, the main reasons provided by the members of Mombasa Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees for conflict were; poverty, historical injustices, youth gang-related violence including illegal drug peddling and "*waBara*" hatred. The failure to address persistent problems in the county have fueled conflict as frustrations turn to hopelessness and despair. This study sought to find out what peacebuilding strategies were used by the peacebuilding committees during times of strife. The findings of the study are presented in figure 5.1. Per the results, the most applied strategy during times of were; community dialogue, 31.8% (N=35), followed by ad hoc public meetings, 26.6% (N=30), then online community sensitisation, 22% (N=25) and lastly peace *Barazas,* 19.5% (N=23).



Figure 5. 1 Strategies for maintaining peace during conflict in Mombasa County

Source:Field Data,2021

5.2.1 Community Dialogue

Community dialogue is a common feature in Africa and has been applied in many issues that impact society. Community dialogue can be defined as a forum that draws participants from different sections of a community to create the opportunity for exchanging information and perspectives, clarifying viewpoints, and developing solutions to issues of interest to the community. The main outcome of community dialogue is to find common ground and increase the constituency base and voices so that an issue can enjoy a broad consensus. Bercovitch (2009) argues that dialogue is one of the approaches that is mostly used and cuts across all other approaches to conflict resolution and transformation. It is a distinctive way of approaching issues,

especially where political, social and economic exchanges are habitually confrontational. Dialogues are not debating which tend to place people on opposite sides of issues and foster adversarial relations. In dialogue, people are supposed to speak openly and listen respectfully and attentively. Dialogue excludes attack and defense and avoids derogatory attributions based on assumptions about the motives, meanings, or character of others (UNDP, 2016). The dialogue facilitator must realise that the primary goal of a dialogue approach is not necessarily to reach an agreement but rather mutual understanding. For instance, it would be difficult to reach an agreement in a dialogue on value-based issues such as "for or against abortion; gay marriage; female genital mutilation; ordination of women to the priesthood in the Catholic Church, among others." In such situations, dialogue allows the parties to learn about one another's perspectives, without expecting them to compromise their values. In practice, dialogue is in an effective method for conflict management and peacebuilding, because of its flexibility and ability to manage expectations (Feller and Ryan, 2012).

One of the applications of dialogue has been the *Community Dialogue and Sustainable Peace (CDSP)* model advanced by UNPD. The CDSP model is a process of community-driven dialogue aimed at bridging the gap between deeply divided communities to start dialoguing (UNDP, 2016). The CDSP process involves a thorough analysis and understanding of the various issues, aspects, dimensions, levels, and causes of perceived or real tensions in the community. The CDSP model is a preventive approach to peacebuilding and therefore more appropriate for peacebuilding when there is an expectation that a situation may arise. The key components of the CDSP are; conflict mapping and analysis; dialogue facilitation; building a shared future through negotiation; assisting the community to negotiate a social contract that will bind members to peaceful conduct and finally

designing peace recovery programs in the community. CDSP has been used in several cases with an appreciable rate of success. Somalia provides a good example where external support to the peacebuilding process did not bear fruit until internal dialogue was given a push by local peace stakeholders (Barawani, 2017).

In this study, focus group discussions were held with community leaders on the peacebuilding strategies and most were quick to point to community dialogue;

> We have community dialogue, peer-peer, women to women dialogues, also we have parental dialogues, and also forums where we mainly focus on women who have been affected by violence, we go around school talk to the headteacher and get to know the challenges children face while in schools and give them recommendations. We also do one on one counselling to parents who feel they have too much concerning parental responsibility, we also have *Barazas*, we also do civic education, we also do awareness on equitable sharing of resources, and we also promote cohesion between police and youth through tournaments. We also take youth to do general clean up exercise at the police station. (FGD session with Women leaders, Nyali, December 9 2021)

Dialogue is a very important input into peacebuilding, and throughout the data collection exercise it became clear that Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees engage in dialogue to resolve many conflicts. The Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees when accorded the opportunity also make visits to schools and homes to talk peace. On many occasions, one-on-one sessions with victims of gender-based violence forms part of the peacebuilding routine of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. The idea of community dialogue also takes the form of public

relations between the police and the communities. Youth are often persuaded to go to police stations and do general cleaning and interact cordially with police.

5.2.2 Ad Hoc Peace Meetings

Respondents indicated that ad hoc peace meetings were also used during times of conflict. The Britannica dictionary describes Ad hoc as a word that originally came from the Latin language and means “for this" or "for this situation." Currently, the word is used to describe something that has been formed or used for a special and immediate purpose, without previous planning. Ad hoc peacebuilding meetings are those that take place without prior planning to address an immediate problem. Respondents did mention times when warring youths would be arrested by the police and immediately. An issue that was discussed at length was the fire-fighting role of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees.

A respondent added to the above sentiments by stating what it takes for the DPC to actually regain peace in a community.

> Mostly what they do is to negotiate with members of the community, especially when there are inter-communal conflicts. They set up meeting where they meet with the disputing group and do conflict resolution through negotiation and most of the time as security actors, we don’t move in because it works, they will talk with the disputants and give a report that they have resolved the issue and the community has resolved to live harmoniously. It is better than when we go as security because we go to enforce certain laws which at times is lose-win but with them they make sure it is a win-win situation (Interview with DCC Nyali Subcounty on 30th,Septemeber,2021).

5.2.3 Community Sensitisation by Social Media (WhatsApp Groups)

The world over, social media has become the dominant tool for communication, providing several platforms such as Twitter, WhatsApp, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat and LinkedIn. This has been made possible with the widespread availability and use of mobile smartphones through which audio-visual information can be transmitted. Smartphones can browse the Internet and run software programs like a computer. Smartphones use a touch screen to allow users to interact with them. There are thousands of smartphone applications including games, personal-use, and business-use programs. The rapid rise in the use of mobile telephones and internet-enabled gadgets has resulted in social media becoming an important locus of social and political transformation in Kenya. Odero (2013) in examining the role of social media in Kenya argued that the penetration and popularity of social media among the Kenyans highlighted its potential to be a great tool to foster democratic dialogue and freedom of expression. However, owing to the unrestricted nature of the internet and social media, it can be used to circulate misleading information by unscrupulous people to destabilise the peace. For example, Denskus (2019) exposes the problem of how Facebook has become a platform for sectarian violence in Sri Lanka, fueled by misinformation. Moreover, the power of the corporations behind these platforms, for example, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, or messaging applications, are unregulated.

In Kenya, the most visible use of social media platform for peacebuilding has been the *Uwiano* Platform which has been in operation since 2008. The *Uwiano* Platform for Peace was used as an early warning media strategy to prevent electoral violence around the 2010 constitutional referendum and the 2013 elections. *Uwiano* is a Swahili word meaning cohesion. *Uwiano's* partners include NSC, NCIC, PeaceNet (an umbrella organisation for civil society organisations

countrywide), UNDP, Partnerships for Peace and Security, UN Women, and the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. *Uwiano s*ucceeded because of the mobile phone. Today, *Uwiano* is a multi-media system including text, images, voice, and video used to track and report on the conflict. Through Uwiano Kenya @ 108 Kenyans can add their voice to peacebuilding efforts in Kenya. This platform integrates the use of SMS, Incident Reports and Media reports to help strengthen peace and conflict prevention efforts in Kenya. Uwiano has grown into what can be called a national electronic Baraza where conflict and peacebuilding issues can be discussed.

Among the strategies applied by the Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in their peacebuilding efforts is the use of social media techniques to reach out to the community. It was the third most applied technique mentioned by 22% of the respondents. During the focus group discussion, a respondent summarised the use of social media (WhatsApp) as follows as a good thing that could advance the cause of peacebuilding.

5.2.4 Peace *Barazas*

A *Baraza* by definition is a place where public meetings are held or a public meeting. The characteristics of a *Baraza* are that it is a participatory and democratic forum where different opinions can be shared and problems concerning the community are resolved. Once a decision is taken in a Baraza, it is usually taken as binding. On the other hand, *Barazas* have been used as forums for passing information from Government on issues to do with security, health and development. Kenya's *Barazas* are governed by the Public Participation Bill of 2018 which provides a general framework for effective citizen involvement on issues affecting them such as development, crime, health, and security. The Bill provides for public participation as a

requirement in any decisions that will affect them as individuals, communities or organisations. The advantage of public *Barazas* is the participatory nature of proceedings when shaping public policy at the local level (Mutegi and Muna, 2021).

By their very nature, *Barazas* are open and people talk freely about the issues they feel most strongly about. A newspaper report on such a meeting held in March 2018, raised several key issues on peacebuilding. Youth declared that they felt safer in youth gangs than with the police because police were not to be trusted. Some of them often collude with gangs to commit crimes, and then blame some other groups. "In a criminal gang, fellow members will protect you more than you will be protected by police,", one youth was quoted as saying. The residents told the security chiefs that few people are willing to give information about criminals to the police because the same officers later expose the informants.

> "You give an officer a tip on who is committing a crime in the area and the same criminal comes to your house threatening to kill you for speaking out," …I would rather stay quiet and suffer from the criminals ruling the estate than risk being killed for giving a police officer information,". The youth said it was for this reason that youth had joined the *Wakali Kwanza* and *Wakali Wao* youth gangs (*The Star Newspaper*, March 12 2018).

A similar meeting in 2020 discussed the same issues of youth gangs and the threat to peace.

Apart from peace *Barazas*, community sensitization, *ad hoc* peace meetings, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees gather intelligence, which is often used by the police to apprehend criminals in the communities. The role of intelligence gathering was considered of critical

importance because the police rely on such information to act against criminal elements of the society.

A KII respondent had this to say about this evolved role,

> Another thing that they do is that they (the peacebuilding committees) collect intelligence, they are able to follow up on boys who are used to stealing from others and give us information on them and where we can get them. They can work with the local police stations and the chiefs where we can have these people and go further to identify the people behind this. At times when you see some boys rioting, you will be surprised that somebody is behind this. Today as we speak I had a group of five boys who through their local Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have been able to come up with a self-help group doing peace and out of their efforts, we have identified some seventeen boys that we need to talk to so that they change from their ways. We believe once the seventeen or part of the seventeen have changed the locality they live in will have peace (Interview with a key informant, Kisauni January 21, 2022).

According to the NSC, The Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are supposed to play an active role in the National Conflict Early Warning System by enhancing conflict early warning and response. Kenya's post election violence of 2007/2008 put into serious question the conflict response system that was available to the Government. According to the The Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), also known as the *Waki* Commission, there was enough intelligence about where the violence could occur, but somehow the communication did not reach the people who could act. The death and destruction that was unleashed at this time was

unprecedented. It therefore became necessary to review and set up a National Conflict Early Warning System to handle any future problems such as this.

The NSC has charged the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees with the responsibility of ensuring that this system works at the Sub-county level. However, the intelligence gathering is not just for transmission to NSC, but local police, Chiefs, *Nyumba Kumi* personnel, NGO partners and any party to whom the information could be useful. The study was able to conclude that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees' role had evolved and to some extent had become a point of reference for the County administration and police assistants. Local NGOs who work in Youth empowerment programs refer to the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to referee the youth that they would like to recruit into their programs. Many youths have come into empowerment programs through DPC endorsement.

5.3. Peacebuilding Strategies in times of No Conflict

The study sought to assess whether strategies for maintaining peace during times of peace existed and whether they were in use. The results are presented in figure 5.2.



Fig 5.2 Peacebuilding Strategies During Times of No Conflict

Source: field data,2021

A cumulative 54% of the respondents (N=61) indicated that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees had peacebuilding strategies during times of no conflict, that is, during times when the situation seems to be clam and the need for emergency measures for peacebuilding absent.

22% of the respondents (N=25) mentioned Peace *Barazas*, 19.5% (N=22) mentioned community sensitisation, 17.7% (N=20) mentioned civic education, 18.5% (N=21) mentioned radio talks, roadshows and cultural event were mentioned by 4.5% (N=5) each and stakeholders' meetings by 13.3% (N=15). Peace *Barazas*, community sensitisation and stakeholders' meetings have been discussed in the foregoing section, therefore this section will discuss civic education, radio shows and cultural events as peacebuilding strategies.

5.3.1. Civic Education

According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007), “civic education” refers to all the processes that affect and attempts to shape people’s beliefs, commitments, capabilities, and actions as responsible members or prospective members of communities. Civic education need not be intentional or deliberate, it can be transmitted as values and norms. In Kenya, civic education has been had its challenges, and at times not taken kindly by Government. Bellucci *et al* (2007) in a study titled "Political" versus "Civic" Education in Colonial and Independent Kenya, argues that civic education was viewed skeptically by the elite who saw it as a way of igniting political awakening in an otherwise subservient population, while those who favoured it saw it as a way of enlightening the populace on political matters and improving their participation in matters of their governance. While there could be some truth in these views, it is also important to note that sometimes people are civically educated in ways that disempower them or impart harmful values and goals.

Peace education can be conceptualised in many ways depending on the prevailing socio-political and cultural context. Peace education as a method of peacebuilding can be implemented across

various stages of a conflict and utilised as prevention and post-conflict strategy (Zanoni, 2018). At the end of the day, civic education can either be a driver of conflict or a tool for transformation. Since the post-election violence of 2008, Kenya is now considered a conflict country and therefore peace education takes on a very significant meaning, more so as the country moves towards another general election in the year 2022, amidst divisive rhetoric by politicians. The 2008 PEV, is also a reminder that other factors such as extremist groups, the small arms trade and corruption amongst state security forces decrease stability in Kenya. Maiyo *et al* (2012) make a strong case for peace education in Kenya in a research paper by concluding that peace education was an essential component of economic and social development and can also support the cultivation of a culture for peace which then guarantee better living conditions of millions of people.

In this study, 17% of the respondents mentioned civic education as a peacebuilding strategy for the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa County. The civic education is carried out by the many partners that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have assembled in their peacebuilding agenda for the county. In 2020 the County Government of Mombasa elaborated its Public Participation Policy through a civic education plan pursuant to Article 184 (1) (c) of the Constitution of Kenya (2010). In the policy, civic education is defined as the provision of information and learning experiences to equip and empower citizens to participate in democratic processes. Civic education aims to promote the rights and responsibilities of individuals in their governance, and to that, a critical mass of citizens is endowed with knowledge and skills to understand their role in their involvement in the governance processes of their government (County Government of Mombasa, 2020:18).

5.3.2 Radio Peace Talks

With the liberalisation of broadcast laws in Kenya, Community and FM Radio stations have mushroomed in Kenya, expanding the reach of media and increasing citizen participation in current events. For a long time, community radio, which usually broadcast in local languages has been used to mobilise communities around issues that are important to them. On the other hand, FM radio stations that are commercially owned have also added to the reach and influence of radio, globally. Okiniy (2018) distinguishes between Community and FM radio stations in terms of ownership but both types of radio have been used to promote input and participation from listeners through call-in methodology. This feature has lent much credibility and appreciation from listeners. Because of size, budget and editorial policy, community radio stations are involved in civic education and raising awareness about people's rights, but their obligations are also characterised by the ownership of the people, with the implication that they can determine what kind of programming can take place in the station (Gustafsson, 2016)

The liberalisation has also introduced an element of risk of misinformation from these means of communication. Taro *et al* (2022) in a study of the regulatory policies of FM radio broadcasting argue that there is no regulation as to what can be broadcast through these stations therefore the risk of misinformation is very high. However, Githethwa *et al* (2018) in a review of radio for peacebuilding give an excellent example of the UMOJA (Unity) Radio for Peace initiative, a Kenyan Community Radio Project which brought together 40 Community Radio stations in the aftermath of the 2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya. The project is a partnership between GIZ Civil Peace Service and Kenya Community Media Network (KCOMNET). Among the key

training points for the journalists was Marshal Rosenberg's concept of Nonviolent-Communication (NVC), on countering hate speech.

In the case of Mombasa, Maweu (2021) provides a good example of how media have facilitated the work of religious leaders in peace talks include, NTV (a non-religious TV station owned by the Nation media Group), *Baraka* FM (Christian station), Radio Salaam (Muslim station), Radio *Rahma* (Muslim station), Pwani FM (non-religious station), Sheki FM (Christian station), IQRA TV (Muslim station) and KTN (non-Christian station). These media outlets have supported peace talks by continuously engaging the citizens of Mombasa County to live in harmony as a people.

5.3.3 Cultural Events

A cultural event can be described as a live performance that is devoted to the public exposition of a work of art, music or literature including exhibitions, concerts, plays and other theatrical performances. Performed by cultural groups, these events are designed for education, entertainment and enjoyment. In Mombasa, the *Manyatta* Youth Entertainment CBO is one such cultural group. Founded in 2008 the CBO aims to empower youths, women and vulnerable children to attain sustainable livelihoods. *Manyatta* Youth Entertainment CBO (MAYE) is a not-for-profit Youth-Led, Human Rights Community Based Organization Active in Mombasa, Kwale and Kilifi Counties. MAYE's mission is to provide disadvantaged youth with a viable platform on which they can openly address issues affecting them and their grassroots communities, such as the promotion of community resilience, social accountability and social economical-political justice, besides engaging creative, theatrical and innovative means to formulate sustainable solutions to challenges affecting society.

Manyatta's peacebuilding project themed *'Majirani Tulindane, Sisi Sote Tusiasi'* (Neighbours, Let's Take Care of Each Other, and Keep God's Will). The project mainly advocated for peace and patriotism during election times and countered the lure of MRC and Al-Shabaab. Manyatta has also reached out to youth-led initiatives in Mombasa such as *Jicho Pevu* Arts, Innocent Souls and *Vijana* for Change for peacebuilding capacitation. Events that involve youth do not always yield the expected results. Football tournaments which have become commonplace in terms of bringing youth together and "keeping them out of trouble" have also been recruiting grounds and havens for drug dealers. As one village elder said in an FGD;

> Our governor has built stadiums and pitches for youths to engage in football but you find that spectators, who are mostly youths, most of them due to lack of employment spectate while smoking bhang and chewing miraa. Youths are idle. When youths are idle, they can steal. The lack of funds to facilitate education, and forcing children to do things frustrates them. (FGD with Village elders, Changamwe, November, 13, 2021)

The foregoing response which was provided by a villager is reminiscent of the frustration that parents feel about youth and the lack of opportunity for them. Youth unemployment in Mombasa County, which includes underemployment is estimated at 40% (Chitembwe *et al* 2021). The *Kuza* Project, a youth empowerment initiative, defines unemployment to include people earning less than Ksh. 10,000 per month. By this definition, most Mombasa County youths are unemployed. In the attempt to keep youth busy, the Government of Kenya, through the Ministry of Sports, Culture and the Arts has put in place a policy of encouraging sports, especially among youth. This is because sport has important physical, health, economic and social benefits. In line with this policy, the County Government of Mombasa has created sports facilities as safe havens for young

people to nurture sports talent. Unfortunately, these spaces have been hard put to offer any of the two.

Mariga (2021) examined the role of Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) in peacebuilding in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya, and found out that the toxic influence of partisan and ethnicised politics were at the root of conflict in Kenya. The author concludes that sport has a key role in peacebuilding as long as it is used to encourage a sense of achievement and not encouraging the "winner-loser" framework. Unfortunately, the challenges of sports in Kenya has completely eliminated the potential of sport to be an emancipatory program for peacebuilding and youth development. Corruption has cost so many youths their future in sports and even encouraged doping which has put Kenya on the World Anti-doping Agency (WADA) watch list (Juma *et al* 2022*)* At the County level, corruption has derailed the sports development program with youth training in poor or non-existent stadia. In 2018, Kenya lost the opportunity to host the *2018 Africa Home Nations Championships by the Confederation of African Football* because of poor infrastructure. It is therefore not unusual that youth who are idle and who see no chance in sport can use it as an event for engaging in delinquent behaviour instead of maximising on the potential of sport.

5.3.4 The *Nyumba Kumi* (Ten Homes) Initiative and Peacebuilding

The link between the DPC and the *Nyumba Kumi* is the office of the sub-county police Chief and the sub-county commissioner who all work as a team. *Nyumba Kumi* Initiative is an innovation of policing generally known as "Neighborhood Watch" which uses the community to conduct crime watch. The program is based on the idea that citizens know their areas well enough to be able to

spot and call out any suspicious or unusual activities in their surroundings. The adoption of this participatory and collaborative approach by the Kenyan government is geared towards the reduction of crime and peaceful conflict resolution. Mwangangi *et al* (2020), in a study to assess the role of *Nyumba Kumi* argue that the initiative has helped in fighting crime. However, Ngigi (2018) examining *Nyumba Kumi* found that the lack of cooperation between locals and the police hindered the full potential of the initiative.

In Kenya, it has been argued that that it was the increase in terrorism from al-Shabaab and rising crime rates that created a sense of urgency for the need for a new policing framework (Kioko, 2017). The President of Kenya lobbied for the *Nyumba Kumi* idea as one that could redefine crime prevention in Kenya, and this is what led to the *Nyumba Kumi* initiative. It is instructive to note that *Nyumba Kumi* does not mean 10 homes, but it could mean a cluster in a residential court, a block of houses, a market centre, or a village. In Likoni sub-county the Likoni Development Program (LICODEP) began the Community Neighborhood Focus in 2008 to address the issue of instability in light of the constant terrorism threat. The undertaking utilised the *Nyumba Kumi* model. Since then, *Nyumba Kumi* seems to have gained the trust and confidence of the Mombasa peace infrastructure. During the focus group discussions, it was clear that *Nyumba Kumi* is seen as part of the peacebuilding agenda of Mombasa County.

One key informant reiterated the importance of *Nyumba Kumi* thus:

> The DPC will never go anywhere without the *Nyumba Kumi* because the Nyumba Kumi is the custodian of several households. In some cases, you may find someone who is a Nyumba Kumi and also a DPC member, which gives us an added advantage but where it does not apply the Nyumba Kumi supports the DCPs because whenever we have meetings the Nyumba Kumi knows they also work for us and it is us who have appointed the Nyumba Kumi. The Nyumba Kumi has been appointed by the chief who is an Ex officio member of the local DPC, they work very closely maybe in future the national steering committee has to come up with a policy on how they engage the two because these are two policies, there is Nyumba Kumi and there is community policing which is a police issue appointed by the OCS and we also work with them so you may find there is Nyumba Kumi and there is a chair of the community policing from that area and also there is DPC. Our task is to make sure they have the same objective which is to make sure there is peace within the community (KII with Sub-county administrator, Nyali, January 11, 2022)

While there is praise and appreciation of the *Nyumba Kumi* Initiative, some senior Government have expressed at least some reservations, if not outright skepticism. A daily newspaper carried a story of a police vetting session in 2015, in which a senior police officer said this about *Nyumba Kumi*

> in a society like Kenya, I don't know if it will work, maybe in rural areas where people know each other unlike in towns where people prefer privacy. It is not going to be easy to implement it. (Standard Newspapers, 2015).

In the same session, the Kenya Alliance of Residents Association (KARA) said the efforts to streamline the goals of *Nyumba Kumi* in the fight against crime would not succeed because the government had side-lined KARA in key security meetings. Behind this confusion has been the

mixed signals that the Government had been sending on improving the security sector by launching many initiatives, often in haste and with little consultation.

Munyao and Ng'ang'a (2017) in a study on the effectiveness of the *Nyumba Kumi* Initiative in Lungalunga, Kwale County found that *the Nyumba Kumi* strategy was indeed working successfully in Lungalunga sub-county however the government should allocate more financial resources to the initiative. The same conclusion had been reached by Muchangi (2016). A major issue that Kioko (2017) found was that there was too much duplication of the work of *Nyumba Kumi* and that of local peace committees that at the local level, they seem to be the same thing. In Likoni for example, this study found that there are members of the DPC who are also *Nyumba Kumi.* Despite this, *Nyumba Kumi* is playing a supportive role in the peacebuilding agenda of the county and is appreciated by many stakeholders across the board.

5.4. Peacebuilding Education

As indicated in the foregoing paragraph, the National Steering Committee (NSC) requires the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees that they conduct peace education as part of their peacebuilding responsibilities. In fact, this is the first responsibility that the NSC had delegated to the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. Peacebuilding education is a process of constructive exchange of ideas or dialogue towards a common goal. Like many social concepts, it has attracted several definitions, depending on the pedagogical philosophy that people hold during the point of discussions. While some authors see peacebuilding education as the natural conclusion of conflict, others see it as a necessary preventer of conflict. Parker (2013) defines peacebuilding education as the purposive consideration of conflict as a learning opportunity, in which issues are explicitly discussed in ways that can promote positive peace.

The study sought to establish whether Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees conduct peacebuilding education in Mombasa county. The results are contained in figure 5.3.



Figure 5. 3 Conduct of Regular Peacebuilding Education

Source: field data, (2021)

The study found out as follows: Out of 113 respondents, 11.5% (N=13) strongly disagreed with the inquiry, 15.0% (N=16) disagreed, 8.8% (N=10) were undecided, 28.3 % (N=32) agreed to the inquiry and 41(36.3 %) strongly agreed that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees had conducted regular peacebuilding education in Mombasa County. Cumulatively, 64% agreed with the statement that Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees held regular peacebuilding

education in the county. The regularity of the peacebuilding education was not defined because at any one time there is always a workshop or a seminar on peacebuilding going on in the County. Focus group discussions confirmed that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees do indeed carry out peacebuilding education.

Kangethe (2021) reports on behalf of Kenya's Ministry of Education Science and Technology that in 2014, the Government of Kenya elaborated its peace education policy which came against the backdrop of the 2008 post-election violence. The overall goal of the Peace Education Programme is to promote peaceful co-existence among members of the school community hence contributing to peace and national cohesion in the country. The programme also enhances the capacity of the education sector to promote peaceful coexistence through conflict-sensitive policies and programming. A national monitoring exercise conducted in 2010 revealed that peace education was not being effectively taught due to a lack of adequate capacity among teachers. In some of the schools, life skills education, which is one of the main carrier subjects, was not taught as it is not examined in national examinations. Peace education is also taught in other educational institutions in Kenya. Kenyan Quakers, (Friends Mission) a religious institution which runs schools in Western Kenya obtained Kenya Government authorisation to develop a peace education curriculum in 2009. The curriculum which bases its instruction on facilitating, and not telling focuses on building the capacity of the learner to work with others to acquire behavioural knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values that will enhance peaceful co-existence.

5.5 Collaborative efforts –working with other peace stakeholders in Mombasa County

The Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, cited in van Tongeren and van Empel (2007) argue that preventing conflict over time it too important to be left to one single institution. This acknowledgement of strength in unity underscores the need for collaboration in peacebuilding for better and sustainable results. Kenya's peacebuilding policy (GoK, 2015) was a product of joint effort and collaboration between the Government and a host of stakeholders, including views from communities, county and national level actors. The views that went into the policy document came from Government officials, academia, development partners, regional organisations, CSOs, the private sector and special interest groups. Collaborative efforts in peacebuilding are therefore not a new thing in Kenya. The study adopted the definition of collaboration to mean the joint effort between two or more people, in earnest to produce an output or to reach a common goal. Collaboration in peacebuilding ranges from creating a conducive environment for peacebuilding actors to work or doing joint assessments, programming and evaluation.

Kenya Government's collaboration with NGOs, CSOc and CBOs is well documented but has been judged as intermittent, peaking only in times of need such as 2008, 2013 and 2017 when the country faced conflict situations. These collaborative efforts have usually not been sustained during what Ernstorfer (2020) has called "regular times.", that is, when there is no conflict or the threat of any. Collaboration with Government has also been hampered by a lack of common vision on what peacebuilding should look like. Ernstorfer (2020) argues that "peacebuilding" terminology can also cause problems because of the divide between terminologies such as "justice" and "peace" and related political connotations and affiliations. Lastly, there is currently no broad

platform for sharing learning or for using shared learning, so there is no leveraging for joint action and ongoing information sharing.

Collaboration with Government is not always a smooth affair in peacebuilding. Barnes, cited in van Tongeren and van Empel (2007) argues that collaboration between the national government and CSOs can be complex, especially where the Government itself might be a party to the conflict. At times, efforts to address conflict will have structural, legal, institutional, social and resource implications. At such times there might be subtle or open competition for control and influence. Usually, the Government will carry the day but there have been times when NGOs have done so and then the question of the sustainability of the peacebuilding initiative becomes an area of discussion.

The study sought to assess the steps taken by to collaborate with peace stakeholders in Mombasa County. The results are illustrated in figure 5.4 .



Figure 5. 4 Collaboration with other peacebuilding Stakeholders

Source: Field Data,2021

As illustrated in figure 5.4, out of 113, 5.31% (N=6) strongly disagreed with the inquiry, 9.74% (N=11), disagreed, and 2.66% (N=3) were undecided. On the other hand, Additionally, 59.29% (N=67) agreed with the inquiry while 23.01% (N=26) strongly agreed with the question. A cumulative 82.3% (N=93) agreed with the question thereby confirming that indeed Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees do work with other partners.

The Terms of Reference (ToRs) for Kenya peacebuilding committees requires them to work in collaboration with others peace stakeholders in the peacebuilding agenda of the country. The first two responsibilities that the guidelines assign to the local peace committees are; 1) to network with other Peace Forums/Committees and organisations to enhance harmonious relationships and; 2) in consultation with Security and Intelligence Committees and other stakeholders to oversee the implementation of peace agreements and/or contracts. In essence, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are not seen as independent organs at the same level as the National Steering Committee (NSC) but as part of the team that works on peacebuilding wherever they are. In our case, it is Mombasa county. The study also sought to find out who the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were collaborating with and what the collaboration entailed. Table 5.1 shows the most mentioned collaborators with the DPC and what areas they collaborate in.

Table 5. 1. Entities that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborate with

	Collaboration partners	Nature of collaboration
1	Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI)	Human Rights
2	Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE)	Peacebuilding Conflict Mitigation
3	HAKI Africa	Peace and security
4	Nyumba Kumi	Monitoring of security threats
5	National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)	Election management Peace development
6	Chiefs	Dispute settlement
7	County Government of Mombasa	Coordination of security matters
8	JUHUDI	Peace Development

Source: Field Data, 2021

Many entities are working in peacebuilding in Mombasa County, ranging from NGOs, CSOs, Governmental and even international organisations, but the most mentioned are summarised in table 5.3. Further analysis of the data seemed to indicate that the bulk of the collaboration was in the areas that support the primary function of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. However, the study found that there are emergent areas of collaboration that, though only nuanced in the National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (2015), have formed significant areas of collaboration in the county peace agenda. These are; Human Rights and Elections Management. The study sought to establish where the weight of the collaboration lay, and the results are presented in figure 5.5. There are the areas where Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees draw their support from.



Figure 5. 5. Areas of collaboration

Source: field Data, 2021

As per the results in figure 5.5 , the respondents agreed that the largest area of collaboration with peacebuilding stakeholders was in: peacebuilding, 29.2% (N=32), followed by conflict mitigation, 18.6% (N=21), next was peace and security, 14,2% (N=16), followed by monitoring of security threats, 11.5% (N=13), then dispute settlement 9.7% (N=11). The last two areas of collaboration, human rights, 9.8% (N=11) and elections management, 7.0% (N=9) are not specified in the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees ToR but they are important because of the nature of the politic of Mombasa County. These last two issues are discussed in greater detail .

Some of the clearest collaborations that the DPC enjoy are with grassroots NGOs such as JUHUDI which spans many peace and security issues. As a respondent said;

> we have been working very closely with the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees and through the office of the county commissioner…they have a very big role to play because they are intermediaries between the community and the state organs, the security apparatus and when it comes to matters of conflicts and sometimes they even play the role which is supposed to be played by the area chief as a mediator or the leadership within the provision of administration, however, in their linkage they have a lot of mutual trust from the community because community perceive security organs to be of their threat on one angle and there is no good co-operation, however, through the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees they are there to mitigate that gap and make sure that the communities can see the security apparatus with a different eye. (KII with NGO representative, Kisauni, February 21 2021).

The study found out that the close collaboration and cooperation existing between the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees and the civil society in the County is because many members of the DPC came into the peacebuilding entities via NGOs in which they are members or somehow associated. Some of the NGOs have been officially coopted into the Sub-County Peacebuilding

Committees. At the same time, just one alliance such as the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) is a huge organisation that brings many faith-based organisations under one umbrella for peacebuilding. CICC is made up of; Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), Hindu Council of Kenya (HCK),The Catholic Church (KEC), Archdiocese of Mombasa, and Diocese of Malindi, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Organization of African Instituted Churches, the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya (EAK) and Africa Traditional Religions. By working with CICC, the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees will be partnering with almost all faith-based programs in the County.

5.5.1. Human Rights and Peacebuilding in Mombasa

The UN Office for Human Rights states that the promotion and protection of human rights provide the foundation for sustaining peace and sustainable development. This is because the international human rights framework which comprises the universal norms and practices is an agreed-upon instrument that most all countries agree upon and most recognise. Kofi Annan, cited in Krasniqi (2017) once said that there was a direct relationship between respect for human rights, sustainable peace and sustainable development. Lasting peace or sustainable peacebuilding, therefore, rests on the respect and championing of human rights to ensure that there is no chance of a lapsing into conflict. The International Peace Institute (IPI, 2017) citing UN Secretary-General argues that human rights violations and lack of accountability and prosecution for such violations are often drivers of conflict, implying therefore that human rights and sustainable peace are intrinsically linked. From Galtung's (1997) positive peace framework, human rights promote peaceful coexistence, tolerance and recognition thereby making societies more resilient. Positive peace represents the capacity of a society to meet the needs of its citizens, reduce the number of

grievances that arise, and resolve residual disagreements without the use of violence, however, this has not always been possible.

Kenya has been cited in several studies as a human rights offender, especially when it comes to the enforcement of Government directives. In this study, 9% of the respondents answered that part of the collaboration that the DPC is involved in concerns human rights. These responses came about from the discussions around how law enforcement has dealt with certain kinds of real or perceived threats to peace in Kenya and Mombasa County, in particular. This study adopts the United Nations definition of human rights, which are; the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to work and education. Regardless of the station in life, everyone is entitled to these rights, without prejudice. The denial of any of these rights by any act of commission or omission amounts to human rights abuse.

The advent of Covid-19 as a global pandemic has proven to be a health and security challenge. Global measures to curb the disease through enforcement have produced some of the most deliberate human rights abuses. Kenya has not been spared the ordeal. Human Rights Watch report for 2021 indicated that police enforcement of the nationwide dusk-to-dawn Government directive on Covi-19 was done through excessive and arbitrary force which led to deaths and injuries. As of September 22, 2021, the Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA) had received 93 complaints of police misconduct while enforcing the curfew, involving 20 deaths and 73 injuries from shootings, assaults, and inhuman treatment. Many cases of this nature were reported across Kenya. In September several human rights groups filed a class suit against the government on behalf of victims of police brutality, including Yassin Moyo (a 13-year-old boy who was shot dead

by police for just standing on the balcony of his home in Mathare), to seek compensation for deaths and injuries resulting from police abuses during the enforcement of COVID-19 measures. The petition also called on the government to implement laws intended to address human rights violations and protect victims. Human Rights Watch (2020) argues that the lack of accountability for serious human rights violations by security forces remains a major concern in Kenya and a blot on the Government's records in law enforcement. Police go unquestioned to these violations including extra-judicial killings and forced disappearances.

Mombasa has in the past come under the spotlight became of what has been termed human rights abuse by law enforcement agencies, when responding to threats to peace either from radicalised groups or declared terror groups like Al-Shabaab, Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), and other lesser-known threats emanating from narcotics. To put the matter of human rights in Mombasa in perspective it is instructive to note that youth gangs in the county have sunk strong roots and at times have unleashed terror in communities such as Likoni, Mvita and Kisauni with the same impunity. Gumba (2020) in a report for Institute for Security Studies argues that youth criminal gangs have set the stage for criminality and act as foot soldiers for drug peddlers. Senior Government officials state that three reasons drive the gangs: gang patrons and their paymasters; unscrupulous businessmen who buy valuables stolen from residents; and politicians who hire group members for personal protection. These people ensure that gang members are quickly released from police custody when they're arrested. In response to this problem, police have used force, including extra-judicial killings to combat youth criminality, terrorism and drug peddling.

The spectre of Al-Shabaab introduced a new chapter in the relationship between law enforcement in Mombasa and the community. Lind *et al* (2017) in an article titled *'Killing a mosquito with a hammer: Al-Shabaab violence and state security responses in Kenya*" argue that the kind of violence that was perpetrated by Al-Shabaab constitutes a security threat that might have a ripple effect across Kenya and the region. However, the response to Al-Shabaab, which did not seem to deter the group was seen as excessive, akin to killing a mosquito with a hammer. Rather than deter the group Al-Shabaab increased their attacks on Kenya and remains a threat to date. Lind *et al* argue that Operation *Linda Nchi* seemed to have increased Al-Shabaab's audacity and brutishness. According to the Armed Conflict Location Event Database (ACLED), Al-Shabaab attacks occurred between 16 October 2011 (the start of Operation Linda Nchi) and the end of 2015, claiming 839 deaths indicating the effectiveness of the organisation's strategy to exploit internal tensions in Kenya to promote the spread of violence.

The Kenya Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) which is the Government's entity for fighting terrorism has been lauded for providing a robust counterterrorism response by thwarting dozens of terrorist plots and arresting or killing dozens of terrorist suspects. However, ATPU has committed a wide array of human rights abuses that violate international, regional, and domestic law. Human Rights watchers; Open Society Justice Initiative and Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) document numerous cases of extrajudicial killings, beatings of terrorist suspects, arbitrary detention, renditions, and the disappearance of terrorism suspects. In a review of the Kenya Government's response to Al-Shabaab, Nderitu (2015) argues that the Government has been criticised by both Muslim communities and human rights groups, for profiling the Somali ethnic group for systematic discrimination. This issue has raised a huge dilemma for the

Government in terms of balancing human rights issues with the need to flush out terrorists from their hideouts, especially within the city suburbs.

Chapter Four of the Constitution of Kenya, the Bill of rights, Part 2 (a)- Rights and fundamental freedoms states that every accused person has the right to a fair trial, which includes the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. Under this Constitutional rule, Kenyan Courts have had to release people who are accused even of very serious crimes, and at time the same people commit more crimes when on bail. Members of the police force have at times carried out extra judicial punishment because of this issue. In 2013, the BBC reported an anonymous member of ATPU who admitted that the justice system was not favourable to the work of the police, and that is why they often opt to eliminate suspects instead of dealing with the same people when they are released on bail. This is more or less how three Muslim clerics, Sheikh Aboud Rogo, Sheikh Ibrahim Omar and Sheikh Abubakar Shariff, aka *Makaburi,* were killed between 2012 and 2014. Their cases have yet to be conclusively investigated and prosecuted. The Kenyan government had accused the clerics of recruiting youths from Masjid Musa mosque for Al-Shabaab. Youth in Mombasa have had close encounters with police in this regard as one respondent indicated in a focus group discussion when asked about the causes of continuous conflict in Mombasa county;

> Police go after reformed youth or those in the reformation process and treat them as criminals. Reformed youth should be equipped with skills and given employment other than killing them because we are killing potential youths and the act of killing them install a bad mentality to the young brothers of the killed youth and afterwards you find that these young brothers join Al-Shabaab and attack the government in a process of revenging their killed brothers. We need a better approach (FGD, with Youth, Kisauni August 26, 2021)

In some instances, in the enthusiasm of finding radicals, police have been known to enter mosques wearing their shoes and thereby earning the abhorrence of Muslims because it is considered a desecration of the mosque. In 1999, SUPKEM, the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims demanded an apology from the Police Commissioner following such an incident at Anas Bin Malik Mosque, Kwale County. It is instructive to note that this FGD session with the youth was the closet that young people came close to revealing why some of them are tempted to join extremist groups such as Al-Shabab (*Daily Nation,* 29 August 1999).

In a separate interview, some respondents seemed to confirm what other human rights groups have been reporting on unexplained disappearances. This phenomenon has pitted the Police against human rights organisations who have not been shy to accuse the police on this matter.

One respondent had this to say when the issue of causes of conflict was being discussed;

> disappearance cases have been so rampant victims mostly being the youths, men and women and, those who disappear go missing forever or they are found either dead and that causes conflicts because people need to know what is happening. how can someone just disappear like that? We have people now with traumas and mentally ill people because of these problems.(FGD with women group, Nyali, November 13 2021)

Forced disappearances are not new in Mombasa. Many young people have been picked by police never to be seen again. In December 2021, as the researcher was conducting field work, a weekly newspaper reported that in the Kenyan coastal town of Mombasa, three families whose sons went missing between July and October are among many families who could not account for their kin after similar disappearances, and had reason to suspect that police were involved because the boys

were picked by police from their homes. In 2021, at least 43 people were allegedly abducted by Kenyan security officers and their whereabouts could not be established. One of the abductees was said to be a role model who sensitised other youths in the county against extremism, radicalisation and alcoholism and drug abuse (*The East African, December,* 14 2021). As security forces intensify their pursuit of suspected terrorists, disappearances will continue. According to Haki Africa, a local human rights organisation, 63 people disappeared in 2021 compared to 18 in 2020.

On its part, the Mombasa peace infrastructure has walked the fine line between law enforcement on the one hand and distrusting communities who see them as just another wing of Government. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees sometimes go out of their way to do outreach programs to ensure that communities see them as friends and not foes.

As one respondent stated,

> There are several initiatives put in place by the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees which are monitored at various intervals. For instance, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees plan and organize strategic meetings for fostering peace in the county. Besides, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees engage in frequent consultative fora with other stakeholders. There are various platforms through which Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees engage with other stakeholders on matters of peacebuilding and conflict management. (FGD with Village Elders Changamwe September, 23 2021).

DPC meetings with communities range from village peace walks, community dialogue and home visits, especially when the DPC suspect that a household is harbouring a suspected felon.

5.6. Youth engagement in peacebuilding

The engagement of youth as partners in peacebuilding is not new in the history of conflict and peace management. Youth are at once the perpetrators of conflict and also the ambassadors of peace when given a chance. Del Felice and Wisler (2007) in a research paper on the potential of youth as peacebuilders argue that youth have been underestimated as positive agents of change and key actors in peacebuilding, both by policymakers and academics. The authors further posit that youth have unique power and potential to affect social change, given the opportunity. Irrespective of where they are, youth are indiscriminately affected by direct, cultural and structural forms of violence. Del Felice and Wisler (2007) raise an important point about youth and conflict, arguing that youth are fundamentally affected by this culture of violence transferred, and sometimes popularised, across national borders through print, media and information technology. Much of the radicalisation that the youth face today has been accessed through popular media, and yet this link has not been studied fully.

The unanimous adoption of UNSCR 2250 on Youth and Peace in 2015 was a rare event in which the United Nations Security Council acted in one accord to recognise the importance of youth in peace and security. Youths play a pivotal role in peacebuilding and yet, review after review seems to suggest that youth have always been put aside or as Ozerdem (2016) argues, they have been "othered" in peacebuilding discourse. By so doing one can argue that about 1.3 billion young people aged 15-24 in the areas where conflict mostly takes place are being denied the opportunity to contribute to peacebuilding and yet they form the age bracket that drives most conflicts. In this matter, they are seen as potentially dangerous 'subjects' and policy approaches often regard them as 'a problem', rather than part of the solution, and are constrained by narrow social constructs

(Ozerdem, 2016; Berents and Mollica, 2020). Yet as the Ozerdem argues, youth can and has been a positive force in peacebuilding. In the case of Africa, Maina (2012) in a report titled *Opportunity or Threat: The Engagement of Youth in African Societies Africa*, argues that the view of the "youth bulge" as a problem rather than an asset may damage the potential that youth have in peacebuilding as exemplified by the peacebuilding work done by youth in Liberia.

The contribution of Kenya's youth in peacebuilding was for a long time overshadowed by research that focused mostly on the role of young people as victims and perpetrators of violence. Youth have engaged in the arts and theatre to spread peacebuilding messages. For example, the Tegla Lorupe Foundation for Peace, Nakuru youth-led Maisha Initiative, the Kibera Hamlets, and Kibera Walls for Peace (KHKWP), the Manyatta Youth Resource Centre (MYRC) in Kisumu are all innovative youth-led peacebuilding programs. The MYRC community centre promotes sustainable empowerment projects among the youth through sports development, and music talent promotion, including homegrown solutions to local security challenges (Edith *et al,* 2019).

With the foregoing, the study sought to assess whether youth engagement was a strategy for the Mombasa County peacebuilding infrastructure and also determine the nature of this engagement. A summary of the data indicated that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees engage youth in three main areas; combating radicalisation; creating economic opportunities and responsible citizenship through civic education. In the area of tackling radicalisation, 85% (N=97) of the respondents indicated that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees engaged the youth. On economic opportunities, 82.3% (N=93) responded in the affirmative, while on responsible citizenship, 80.7% (N=92) replied that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees engaged with

youth in the area of responsible citizenship. All these areas are important in increasing youth agency and ensuring that peacebuilding gets strong roots in the county.

Table 5. 2 Youth engagement in maintaining peace in Mombasa County

	Tackling radicalisation		Creating economic opportunities		Responsible citizenship	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Strongly disagree	6	5.3	7	6.2	7	6.2
Disagree	10	8.8	13	11.5	15	13.3
Agree	81	71.7	85	75.2	81	71.7
Strongly agree	16	14.2	8	7.1	10	10
Total	113	100.0	113	100	113	100

Source: Field Data,2021

In Mombasa County, the *Search for Common Ground* Peacebuilding Program. *Search for Common Ground* is an international non-governmental organisation (NGO) working in peacebuilding globally. The organisation positions itself as a dedicated peacebuilding entity in the world and works in 31 countries across Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North America. In Kenya, the organisation's *Inuka* (stand up) Project, which is implemented in the coastal region of Kenya, has increased young people's involvement in peace and security processes. The project is designed to ensure that county governments in the coastal region create an enabling environment for young people to be actively engaged so they can influence important peacebuilding decisions. Ultimately, the project is premised on youth voices, agency, participation and leadership as the basis for sustainable peace. The project is implemented in collaboration with; Youth Bunge

Initiative (KYBI), Human Rights Agenda (HURIA), Humanity Action Knowledge Integrity in Africa (HAKI Africa) and Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI).

5.6.1. Tackling Youth radicalisation as a Peacebuilding Strategy

Chitembwe *et al* (2021) argue that youth radicalisation can be viewed through the demonstration of unconventional beliefs/attitudes and engagement in violent action by young people. The Government of Kenya defines radicalisation as a

> Measured and continuous process that exploits the psychological, politico-religious, and ideological conditioning of individuals to believe that they are part of a threatened or combative collective identity, to socialize them to violent extremism (National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, 2016: 5*).*

The stated objective of the Government is to shrink the number of potential recruits into violent extremism. Holmer (2013) citing several researchers on radicalisation and violent extremism argues that radicalisation is highly contextual but certain socio-psychological traits can be universally understood, foremost is the feeling of needing to belong and the quest for validation.

There is enough evidence that youth are being radicalised in Mombasa (Hellsten, 2016; Mwangi, 2017; Githigaro, 2018; Githigaro and Kabia, 2022). Chitembwe *et al* (2021) note that radicalisation in Mombasa and Kwale counties has been going on for over twenty years. What is new is the violent extremism that has caused great socio-economic difficulties to the people. This research uncovered some information during the focus group discussions and KII sessions. Radicalisation takes place either when youth is in the correctional system, as was revealed in a KII or the mosques as was discussed by youth in Kisauni who said that youth get radical ideas in mosques. On their part, the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have tackled this problem by

engaging the youth directly. One of the DPC members who was a respondent summarised the experience of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees as follows;

> Me as one of the DPC, I can say we have talked to youth in juvenile gangs and helped them reform and helped them get alternative ways to leave. We also do public awareness on peace. we are currently talking to the youth and women about the importance of voting (civic education**)** (KII with DPC member, Kisauni, September 24, 2021)

In another focus group discussion, the work of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were fully appreciated by village elders who have witnessed the destructive nature of radicalisation. A respondent had this to say

> They (the DPC) brought together MRC followers, talked to them, and guaranteed them safety. They poured out their issues, why they had joined that radical groups and why they want to involve themselves with other things. In the process, 80% withdrew from MRC membership. They have helped radicalized youths reform. Women in the DPC have played a great role in talking to their fellow women and telling them they should not always be dependent on their husbands and as a result, we have seen women engaging themselves with business (FGD with Village Elders, Changamwe, September 29, 2021)

Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are supported by the recently published Kenya National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NAP), to fight violent extremism. Subsequently, Mombasa County unveiled its Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MCAP-P/CVE) to guide the county's P/CVE efforts between 2017 and 2022. The MCAP-P/CVE outlines four strategic objectives: 1) to build community resilience toward violent extremism. 2) to promote human dignity, security, and access to justice for all. 3) to enhance county cohesion

and integration, especially between people of different faiths. 4) to promote networking and cooperation between state (national and county) and non-state actors. Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were fully engaged in the process of developing this county strategy.

5.6.2. Youth economic empowerment as a peacebuilding strategy

Economic empowerment has for a long time been used as a peacebuilding strategy. The idea of economic empowerment emanated from the need to respond to marginalisation which can be described as both a process and a condition, that prevents individuals or groups from full participation in social, economic and political life. According to a DFID people can be marginalised due to multiple factors; sexual orientation, gender, geography, ethnicity, religion, displacement, conflict or disability. Schiffer and Schatz (2008) argue that marginalisation happens when one is distanced from power and resources and denied self-determination in economic, political, and social settings. However, definitions of what is regarded as marginalised are highly dependent on the historical and socio-economical context of a society, and sometimes it might be a personal feeling to decide whether one is marginalised or not. Economic empowerment has been used as one of the responses to marginalisation and a peacebuilding strategy.

Poverty is both a consequence and a cause of being marginalisation and is manifested by the unemployment rates of young people in any society. Radicalisation usually takes advantage of marginalised and unemployed youth. The Youth unemployment rate in Mombasa was determined at 44% (ILO, 2017), but the advent of Covid-19 introduced a steep slowdown in economic activity, in part because of stringent lockdown measures ordered by Government. This action pushed unemployment up and drove more youth into vulnerabilities. Youth in Mombasa now face an even

greater challenge navigating a path to employment. The use of economic empowerment to counter extreme violence on the part of youth is not new. In Indonesia for example, where almost 60% of high school and university students admit to having a "radical" religious attitude, the Government has undertaken a wide range of programs through the central and local governments aimed at preventing youth violence and extremism (Asrori *et al,* 2018).

Bangura (2016) in an article about youth involvement in peacebuilding cites an interview with a young man in Sierra Leone who is quoted to have said: “What is peace? It means nothing because we cannot eat it. If there is no education, no job, no food on the table, peace means nothing. It is not the favourite word in our dictionary” (Bangura, 2016:39). This quote brings home the point about the dilemma of peacebuilding in a situation where marginalisation has led to violent conflict. Sierra Leone suffered a long brutal and unnecessary civil war because of the problem of bad governance that created extreme poverty and which led to internal conflict. A vast number of youths joined the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and resorted to acts of extreme violence that remain some of the worst in recent history. It has been argued that the scale of the war and the ability to mobilise such a large number of youths could only have been possible in situations where people are disaffected by their government as was the case of Sierra Leone. The RUF quickly became an army not of rebels a group spreading terror among innocent villagers. In situations where few opportunities are availed to young people, they will claim space by engaging in many anti-social acts and Sierra Leone serves as a good case in point.

The study sought to find out if Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees engaged in youth economic empowerment as part of their peacebuilding strategy. According to the respondents,

82.3% (N=93) answered in the affirmative. In Mombasa County, several youth empowerment projects led by Government and NGOs are focusing on youth for economic empowerment and countering radicalisation and extremism. The Kenya Youth Empowerment and Opportunities Project (KYEOP) funded projects are supporting youth-led enterprises from waste management to ICT and lifting many youths out of poverty, vulnerability and potential extremism. The Ministry of ICT, Innovation and Youth Affairs has launched the Kenya Shillings120 million *Future Bora* (Bright Future) under which innovative programs in environmental management will be funded. Another example is the Youth empowerment program initiative (YEPI) which works with youth aged 16-35 who are most at risk for unemployment, poverty and violent extremism in Mombasa.

Kisunza and Theuri (2014) in a study on the *Determinants of effective utilization of youth enterprise development fund: A case of Kisauni Constituency, Mombasa County in Kenya.* Argue that while such funds are available for youth, most youths do not have information on how to access the funds. Secondly, arduous application processes and lack of proper entrepreneurial skills reduces the potential for the funds to change the life of the youths. This approach has the potential of further marginalising the youth and pushing them towards radicalisation and violent extremism.

Working across partnerships, the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborate with youth-serving organisations on economic empowerment as part of their peacebuilding strategy. Youth economic empowerment in Mombasa county has taken on a deeper meaning because of the experience that the county has had with youth idleness. One youth empowerment organisation observed for example, that the high unemployment rates among youth not only deny the county

the benefit of the youth dividend but also places many youths at the disposal of extremist philosophy which is the precursor of violent extremism. What is more, the low educational achievement of youth in the county calls for a different approach to youth empowerment (African Youth Trust, 2021).

Several programs are ongoing to support youth empowerment. For example, under the Mombasa County Government Social Protection Strategy (2018-2022), the County is managing the Consolidated Revolving Fund, to create employment opportunities for young people and women through entrepreneurship training and the provision of affordable financial and business development support services. Similarly, the Government of Kenya's Youth Empowerment and Opportunities Project (KYEOP-), the Youth Empowerment Program Initiative (YEPI), the African Youth Trust- a partnership of several international NGOs (AYT), and the Kenya Youth Business Trust Pwani are all working on one aspect of youth empowerment or the other. According to Mombasa County Social Protection Strategy, the areas that have the potential for youth employment include agriculture and agri-processing, construction, tourism, micro trade and retail, fisheries, export processing zones and waste management and recycling.

One co-opted member of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees had this to say when asked how the DPC works in order to empower youth.

> I am from the youth office and in the youth office, we normally have several programs and functions that involve the youths. In our youth office, we have programs that will help them to build their economic muscles or financial muscles. We deal with youths, women and people living with disabilities. From the office, we mostly encourage them to be in registered groups because we offer business grants and loans from the National government. In business loans, we have *Uwezo* funds and Youth funds. When we bring them together, we train them on entrepreneurship financial management and in the process of teaching them because they are in groups we sensitize them on why it is important to be peaceful. (KII with a coopted member of DPC, Changamwe, September 24, 2021)

While economic empowerment as a peacebuilding strategy is a viable strategy, it has major implementation challenges, especially when radicalised youth are the beneficiaries. This is particularly so when youth who have been with Al-Shabaab are supposed to be reintegrated into society. The reintegration of Al-Shabaab returnees is an emotive issue which has been worsened by the lack of structures to ensure the proper involvement of host communities in the reintegration process of these returnees. Juma and Githigaro (2021) argue that Kenya is not unique in grappling with the reintegration of former combatants, however, Al-Shabaab returnees face unique socio-economic and psychological challenges, because of lack of opportunities and stigmatisation, on the one hand, and the fear of Al-Shabaab retaliation on the other.

Juma (2020) in a study of exiting terrorism and rehabilitation of former Al-Shabaab members found that the threat of the organisation still loomed big for former members even after leaving the organisation. In this study, Juma argues that the returnees faced an imminent threat from the

terrorist group having been labelled traitors while at the community level, they are treated with both suspicions by the security agencies and with envy by others who see them receiving economic support to start over as productive and responsible citizens. All this is happening amidst poor socio-psychological support for these young people.

A 2016 rehabilitation program for returnees in Kwale run by the IOM underlined some of the challenges. While almost 50 people completed the program, the program created dangerous rivalries between returnees who were selected to take part and those who were not. Those left out felt further marginalised as those selected are at times provided with motorbikes to become *boda-boda* (public transport operators using motorbikes) while the others look on under the same conditions that might have driven them to Al-Shabaab in the first place. There have been incidences of attacks on these rehabilitated youth by their colleagues with whom they had spent time in the terrorist camps. It would appear that the issue of Al-Shabaab is far from over, for Kenya. In March 2022, a single Al-Shabaab returnee was handed over to the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) by a Mandera court, to be transferred to Nairobi for de-radicalisation and reintegration at the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) into society. Despite a general amnesty declared in 2014, this was the first recorded voluntary surrender in Mandera (*Daily Nation,* March 2022)

5.6.3. Engaging Youth in Peacebuilding Through Civic Education

Civic education has been used as a peacebuilding strategy to inculcate good citizenship mannerisms on the part of the recipient. The rationale behind civic education, as Levin and Bishai (2010) argue, is that it provides a positive framework for collective civic identity, and therefore it can be a stabilizing factor in societies suffering from violent conflict or its aftermath. Crittenden

(2017) defines civic education as a process of influencing peoples beliefs action as responsible members of a society. The authors argue further that civic education, which is lifelong, is not always deliberate but can be transmitted by institutions in society. It is not limited to the educational system of a country and is provided by families, governments, religious institutions, and mass media. Given the wide range of civic education sources, the right education must be provided in case it is being used as a strategy for peacebuilding. Citing Sherrod *et al,* Crittenden and Levine (2018) argue that civic habits and values are relatively easy to influence and change while people are still young, hence the importance of well-designed civic education programs for peacebuilding.

Examples of civic education provided by or with the collaboration of Mombasa DPC are many. At the policy level, the Mombasa County Public Participation Policy (2020) has elaborated a civic education strategy which is aimed at making the public more aware of the devolution of Government and promoting the rights and responsibilities of individuals in their governance. It ensures that a critical mass of citizens is endowed with knowledge and skills to understand their role in their involvement in the governance processes of their government. By law, County Governments must undertake civic education in line with the principles of the devolved government in the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (County Governments Act, 2012, Part X). In addition, Section 100 (4) requires that county civic education programs involve the participation of registered non-state actors.

The study sought to find out if Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees engage youth in civic education as part of the peacebuilding strategy. 72.7% (N=92) answered in the affirmative.

Some examples of civic education programs running in Mombasa county in the collaboration with Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are; *Uongozi Bora* Community Initiative Project implemented by Kwacha Afrika; the African Youth Trust, AYT which conducts civic education and awareness targeting the youth around pertinent issues of governance and civic importance, and is supported by USAID through ACT Kenya, URAIA, *Amkeni Wakenya* (Wake Up Kenyans) the former Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs in Kenya and Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution.

In a focus group discussion, the issue of civic education was addressed and it seemed to have the support of the village representatives as well.

> Community members need to be educated because if people are not educated on the dangers of conflicts and the benefits of peace it is hard to get sustainable peace. We need to get to the grassroots and involve religious leaders, educate them, and use them to pass the information to their followers. *Boda* (public motorcycle riders) riders should be educated on how to avoid words that might cause conflicts.(FGD with villagers, Jomvu, September 21, 2021)

Even though the study was interested in civic education within the context of peacebuilding, it became clear that civic education is seen as a political exercise mostly provided around the time of elections. However, the final outcome is usually peace at the community level and therefore it can be argued the civic education supports peacebuilding. A good example of the same was provided by the peacebuilding partners of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees such as, the Likoni-based *Manyatta* Youth and Entertainment Society and JUHUDI organisations who even though they are primarily civic education organisations, have also greatly contributed to peacebuilding in their daily programs.

5.7. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaboration with Security and Law Enforcement Authorities for Peacebuilding.

The collaboration with security and law enforcement agencies in peacebuilding interventions is important in ensuring the sustainability of the peacebuilding interventions. Shinoda (2001) argues that the rule of law is key to coordinating peacebuilding activities because it denotes the respect for the fundamental rights of others, offering greater stability to the society as a whole. The rule of law dictates that all persons obey the constitutional procedures and solve conflicts per law. Sessional Paper No. 5 of 2014 on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, lays out the Government response to conflict which differs from one place of conflict to another, using different means and added the aspect of community policing (*Nyumba Kumi*) which is a partnership between security apparatus and the public (GoK, 2015). Peace and security are used almost synonymously in Kenya, hence the requirement that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees work with the security and intelligence committee and other stakeholders to oversee the implementation of peace agreements. Additionally, local peace committees are obligated to support initiatives that try to eradicate illegal firearms and promotion of safety and security as part of their ToR.

The study sought to assess whether Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborate with law enforcement authorities to conduct peacebuilding activities in Mombasa County. The results are illustrated in figure 5.6.



Figure 5. 6 Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaboration with law enforcement in Peacebuilding

Source: Field Data,2021

Out of 113, 3.54% (N=4) strongly disagreed with the inquiry, 19.47% (N=22), disagreed, 3.54% (N=4) were undecided, 53.9% (N=61) agreed to the inquiry and 22(19.47 %) strongly agreed that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborate with law enforcement authorities to conduct peacebuilding activities in Mombasa County. Cumulatively,73.5 % agreed to the inquiry that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborate with law enforcement authorities to conduct peacebuilding activities in Mombasa County.

The study then went further to find out which of the law enforcement agencies the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborated with the most and the result are presented in figure 5.7.



Figure 5. 7:Type of Law Enforcement Agencies that DPC Collaborate with

Source:Field Data,2021

From figure 5.7, it is apparent that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborate with many partners on the ground for peacebuilding. The most common collaboration is the *Nyumba Kumi* initiative because they are the first step toward law enforcement at the grassroots level. Of the respondents, 38% (N=43) responded that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborate with Nyumba *Kumi,* while police collaboration followed with 23.9% (N=27), and vigilante groups followed with 19.5% (N=22) and then County administration with 18.6% (N=21), in that order.

Collaboration with the County Administration is expected because Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees function under the auspices of the office of the County Commissioner (CC), who is the patron of all Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. In Mombasa, the six Deputy County Commissioners (DCC) act as the DPC supervisor at the sub-county level, assisted by Assistant County Commissioners, the chiefs, and other officers of Government at the ward and village level. The ACC is an important link between the DPC and the office of the County Commissioner because of the direct peacebuilding responsibilities.

On the law enforcement side, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborate with all police, starting with Officers Commanding Police Divisions (OCPD), Officers Commanding Police Stations and Police Posts (OCS), and other Intelligence officers on the ground. This collaboration is required of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees as per their ToR but also because practically the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are supposed to ride on the convening power of other government entities that have the power to do so. The collaboration with *Nyumba Kumi* is not only a new thing but one that is proving to be a unique way of approaching peacebuilding. This is because the initiative is evolving and therefore the experiences of *Nyumba Kumi* play into the peacebuilding agenda of the community. *Nyumba Kumi* encourages neighbours to constantly interact and share information about one another and monitor security threats and provide information to the local administration and security organs. By so doing, this participatory and collaborative approach is expected to reduce crime. The initiative has been criticised on many grounds.

Since its reintroduction in 2013, however, the initiative has been mired with conceptual and practical misunderstanding. Government officers have on numerous occasions attempted to correct the image of the initiative by saying that although a government initiative, *Nyumba Kumi* was not about the Government but about members of the community being vigilant in their locality (News Capital 2019). The problem with *Nyumba Kumi* as seen by stakeholders was the poor communication between the Government and community members on what the initiative is supposed to achieve. The poor communication has not been confined to the Government and the communities, but it is also apparent among community members. This is more apparent in cosmopolitan areas where community cohesion and communication are not the same as in rural communities. Andhoga and Mavole (2017) found in a study on *Nyumba Kumi* in Nakuru cosmopolitan areas that the initiative managed to create a partnership between the administration and communities in crime prevention, but did not build any sense of community among residents of these localities.

Diphoorn and van Stapele (2020) have argued that *the Nyumba Kumi* initiative which has a colonial history in Kenya is still seen as a state surveillance scheme conducted at the local level. It was seen as a state-sanctioned snitch system to help the colonial Government. Secondly, *Nyumba Kumi* has very uneven parameters of work and therefore no two security clusters work in similar ways. The authors further posit that where multi-ethnic communities live, such as in cosmopolitan areas, it is difficult to determine what constitutes "community" and so *Nyumba Kumi* is seen as a system for police informers rather than the community taking charge of their safety and security in their areas. Therefore, even though *Nyumba Kumi* is positioned as a partnership between police and community at times it is seen as a mechanism whereby the police can extract information and

assert control in communities within a state-centric approach. That said, *Nyumba Kumi* is positioned by Government as a peacebuilding strategy in the Sessional Paper No. 5 of 2014 on National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management and will form part of the peace agenda in the foreseeable future.

5.8. Sub-county Peacebuilding Committee assessment of their Peacebuilding Success

Peacebuilding success is a debatable subject for the simple reason that no one measure can be assigned to any peacebuilding intervention. That said, any efforts that lead to the successful reduction of violence (negative peace) or an improvement in people's livelihoods, such as new laws or better infrastructure (positive peace), whether measured by econometrics by other qualitative means can be deemed successful. At the global level, the US Institute for Peace (2007) documents its successful peacebuilding initiatives; from promoting the rule of law in Iraq and South Sudan, promoting reconciliation in Bosnia or reconciling former enemies in Kosovo, all this adds to peacebuilding successes stories. However, success and sustainability are two different issues and herein lies the challenge of peacebuilding at the global, regional, country and sub-national.

In the middle of all these peacebuilding successes, are to be found the local peace committees, which as Nganje (2020) argues, present the opportunities for peacebuilding but are, at the same time, challenged by the terrain in which they operate. The pioneering success of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) has been studied by, among others Sheikh (2010), Åkerdahl (2013), Hedditch (2016), Konde (2019) and Nganje (2020). Hedditch (2016), in a study on the contribution of the Wajir experience to the current debate on infrastructure for peace (I4P)

has argued that the narrative of success is dependent on whose perspective is on the table. As far as local level peacebuilding is concerned, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) has been judged as the benchmark of success.

As summarised by Menkhaus (2008),

> the WPDC was unquestionably instrumental in the remarkable turnaround of Wajir district from one of the most anarchic to one of the more stable border zones of Kenya; the WPDC is a model for similar experiments with peace committees throughout other troubled rural areas of Kenya, a policy shift that is now in the process of being enshrined in a national policy on conflict management and peacebuilding; crucial to the WPDC's success was the combined commitment of a top local government administrator and local civic leaders. The absence of either would likely have doomed the WPDC to failure. (Menkhaus, 2008:27),

The foregoing summary demonstrates the real issue with the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, which is the commitment that must be demonstrated by leaders if the DPC model is to succeed.

Citing the cases of Kenya, Colombia, the Philippines and Zimbabwe, Chivasa (2019) provides a critical summary of the experiences in these countries with local peacebuilding entities. The Wajir Peace and Development Committee, Zones of Peace in the Philippines and LPCs in Colombia are examples of fostering peacebuilding initiatives in situations where Government action has been either absent or very weak. However, when the Wajir Government leadership showed interest, the role and authority of the DPC changed. Chivasa (2019) however notes that the scale at which these entities operate may not be enough to trigger large scale peacebuilding, except where these entities receive Government recognition as was the case of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee.

The value of these local entities is perhaps strongest in their ability to increase the capacity of local people to participate in their peacebuilding in their ways which speaks to the sustainability of their work.

This study sought to find out how Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees thought of themselves, and the successes, or lack thereof, of their strategies in peacebuilding. The results are presented in Table 5.2. Out of 113, 5.3% (N=6) strongly disagreed with the inquiry, 36.3% (N=41) disagreed, 4.4% (N=5) were undecided, and 38.1% (N=43) agreed to the inquiry and 15.9 % (N=8) strongly agreed that DPC strategies were successful. Cumulatively, 46% (N=52) were unsatisfied with the peacebuilding strategies while 54% (N=61) thought that DPC strategies were successful. The results are presented in table 5.4

Table 5. 3. Whether strategies for peacebuilding have been successful

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly disagree	6	5.3	5.3	5.3
Disagree	41	36.3	36.3	41.6
Undecided	5	4.4	4.4	46.0
Agree	43	38.1	38.1	84.1
Strongly agree	18	15.9	15.9	
Total	113	100.0	100.0	1000

Source: field data, 2021

The responses are not surprising because of the way respondents defined success. In the focus group discussion and the KII, it was clear that while the older members of the Sub-County

Peacebuilding Committees saw more success in peacebuilding, the younger members were less inclined to say the same and were more interested in strategies that yielded immediate economic benefits and also those that could ensure that the authorities, especially the police and politicians did not threaten their peace. The County administration also saw the idea of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees as a successful strategy in the peacebuilding agenda of the communities in which they work. As one senior government respondent put it;

> they have door to door peace campaigns, which is of great help. Through door to door campaigns, they were able to bring those juvenile gangs back into society. We really thought that is a difficult job but to them, they managed. They went off one on one discussions with those juvenile gangs, which also helped very much and they are really accepted back into the society. (KII with Chief, Kisauni, September 14 2021)

A senior county administration official summarised the approach to the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in the following quote;

> They are locals, most of them are born and raised here, they know the core cause of certain problems, they don't do guesswork. There's another problem that we have been working with for a long time because it cannot be solved immediately, it is the gangster life and drugs and because most of these gangsters are their sons, daughters, and relatives they have been able to convince some of them to surrender. We have not succeeded because we are using a gun and the bullet, they are using soft power. The last time I checked we had over seven hundred gangsters who had abandoned crime, this has been done by the DPC Nyali, not the police. I would say their strategies are working because they are locally made and tailored and sustainable. They need a very little resources, we don't pay them it is voluntary. If we had a budget for them, we would run out of money. What we do is to support them with the authority of the government, sometimes I join just to stamp in the government's authority and I say this matter I have left to the DCP of this area to

> resolve and report back to me and people listen (KII with County Administrator, Nyali, September 14 2021)

DPC's work revolves around the concepts of reconciliation and negotiation when conducting peacebuilding activities. Reconciliation as a peacebuilding strategy is gaining traction even though it is a contested concept. Reconciliation is both a goal and a process and has at least four elements; it must be inclusive, allow for freedom of speech, enjoy political will and have a vision of what needs to happen at the end of the process.

Reconciliation is both a goal and a process. There are four key elements to a successful reconciliation: (i) an inclusive national dialogue; (ii) political will; (iii) security and freedom to speak and move; and (iv) a national vision of the nation's end state as defined by its citizens. Sanchez and Rognvik (2012) in a report on *Building Just Societies: Reconciliation in Transitional Settings*, argue that a general definition of reconciliation would suggest that it is about building or rebuilding relationships damaged by violence and coercion, among people and groups in society, and between the people and their Government. The authors argue further that because the concept has many approaches, the most appropriate way to look at reconciliation is to focus on the purpose of reconciliation and what is being rebuilt. At the theoretical level, reconciliation means restoration, which suggests a return to the status quo ante, but this is often not good for peacebuilding as it might fail to address the conditions that precipitated the conflict in the first place. However, reconciliation has been used by Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees as part of their strategies. One FGD respondent summarised it as follows;

> Yeah reconciliation which they use to bring people together, they identify the hotspot that we are able to respond to. We have youths that have reformed, we move with them and let them talk to the others in that way, we can

> change others. They use skits, songs to spread the message. (FGD with Youth Club members , Kisauni August 25, 2021)

A village representative from Nyali was also in agreement that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have good peacebuilding strategies

> in case there is a problem in the community, they (the DPC) listen to both sides of the story and facilitate coming up with a wise solution for reconciliation. The good thing with them, even if the perpetrator is someone they know, they don't favour them. They also walk and mobilize people and tell them to live in peace, especially during elections. They tell people that politics come and go but your neighbour remains your neighbour even after politics go (FGD with village representatives, Nyali, November 15 2021)

However, when the youth were asked to indicate whether in their view the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have been successful in their peacebuilding work, their concern was more on strategies that could yield immediate economic benefits and an end to the suffering of youth through police and politicians.

> the government should initiate *Kazi mtaani*: again, the government should stop oppressing the youths. The government should suspend lockdown for us to try and build our economy and another thing, leaders should avoid using youths in politics. Politicians use youths to cause chaos. Government should come up with a plan or a way to put an end to this issue of politicians using the youths (FGD interview with Youths in Mvita, September 22 2021)

Similarly, youth in Nyali sub-county had this to say about peacebuilding strategies;

> getting together in groups and discussing how to start projects. Employability projects. For a start, we need to have projects that do not require capital. There are so many ideas for those kinds of projects that we can come up with in a group. For example, we came up with an idea of we youths offering security in exchange for money. We decided to be security guards for tuk-tuk and motorbikes packed in one place.(FGD discussion with Youth in Nyali, August 24, 2021)

Analysis of the FGD and KII data reveals that certain keywords point to the strategies that have been employed by the youth. Key peacebuilding terms like "conflict resolution" was mentioned 72 times, "reconciliation" was mentioned 10 times, "negotiations" 8 "promotion of unity" 11, and peace forums 48 times. Other responsibilities of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees also require them to adopt strategies that facilitate peacebuilding. The terms of reference for the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees as spelt out by the NSC (2016) require the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to; promote peace education and a culture of peace and non-violence; facilitate training, community dialogue, sensitisation and awareness-raising on peace and nation-building; restore and transform relations among communities during post-conflict periods.

5.9. Chapter Summary

In fostering sustainable peacebuilding, Mombasa Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees have employed a mix of strategies that work for them in their context, ad these are what Haider (2009) calls community-based approaches to peacebuilding. The study found out that the Sub-County

Peacebuilding Committees used a mixture of community dialogue, ad-hoc peace meetings, community sensitisation through social media and peace *Barazas* as strategies for establishing and maintaining quick peace during times of conflict. Peace *Barazas* and ad-hoc peace meetings lend themselves easily to immediate peace results because they involve the larger community and are usually attended by both peacebuilding stakeholders and law enforcement. Therefore, if a conflict involves rival gangs, a Peace Baraza or an ad-hoc peace meeting is useful because the resolutions from such gatherings are binding. The same goes for community dialogue and community sensitisation. These quick wins mediations are however temporary and do not gain long-lasting peace. From the literature review, Tieku (2011) posits that mediation requires a deep knowledge of the issues at hand and the position of the belligerents in order for the mediator to succeed in bringing peace. The cyclical nature of conflict in the county would suggest that peace *Barazas* work only for a while before conflict flares up again. The study found out that the responsibility of early warning and intelligence gathering that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are supposed to carry out is being done, however, the logistics of getting the information as problematic due to lack of facilitation by the authorities.

In this area of peacebuilding during conflict times, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborate with the offices of the County and Sub-county Administration, Police and other law enforcement organs, the Chief, village elders, *Nyumba Kumi* and a host of Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who have funds for these kinds of activities. Of particular note are NGOs like Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC), Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), Justice, Humanity and Dignity Organisation (JUHUDI), and Manyatta Youth who are collaborating partners of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees.

For most of these strategies, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are usually not the direct implementer but their collaboration ensures that the activities go towards the county peacebuilding agenda. This study established that each DPC has a string of collaborating partners on the ground, drawn from a wide range of forums such as *Sauti Ya Wanawake (*a county-wide women's organisation in Kenya), the Red Cross (international NGO), Kadzandani Youth Group, Blue Bench, Simple Swaggers, Manyatta Youth, and village organisations such as Kaydee and Big Nation. This range of collaborators ensures that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees can draw from all voices and interests in the community to get support and buy-in for their peacebuilding agenda. For youth in particular, because of their role in the peace agenda of the county, approaches such as economic empowerment and tackling radicalisation through supportive reintegration of Al-Shabaab returnees has enabled the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to have a viable peacebuilding agenda.

Taken in totality, however, the peacebuilding strategies used by Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are mainly those of restoring the status quo and can therefore be argued to be achieving only negative peace. Except for a few activities of empowering youth through economic activities, the bulk of the approaches is meant to maintain the peace or securing pacific community co-existence. Like other local peacebuilding committees worldwide, Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are not in a position to enforce their decisions and that is usually done by the police and the *Nyumba Kumi* programme. The Kenya peacebuilding policy is geared towards the enforcement of peace and this is why law enforcement and public administration play such a big role in the work and agenda of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. As has already been seen in the literature, Nganje (2020) suggests the biggest

shortcoming of local peacebuilding is the lack of enforcement capability on the part of the committees. This means that they rely on other entities who may not have the same thinking as they have on peacebuilding. That said, the value of the peacebuilding work done by Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees cannot be underestimated. This has obviously been done under much stress and duress and challenges that need to be understood. Chapter six therefore tackles the areas of peacebuilding challenges and the opportunities that might enhance the work of Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa County.

CHAPTER SIX

CHALLENGES AND OPPORUNITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACEBUILDING IN MOMBASA COUNTY

This chapter presents analysis and discussion findings on the challenges and opportunities for Mombasa County Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in fostering sustainable peacebuilding in the County. The chapter presents data which describe challenges that are internal to the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees as well as those that are external or environmental in the context of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. Just as peacebuilding approaches can be context-specific, so too will be the challenges and opportunities. In a review of newly formed peacebuilding institutions in three Nigerian states. Van Beijnum (2013), concerning the UN Peacebuilding Fund, argues that in general, it is the lack of peacebuilding capacity across many countries that poses the biggest challenge to peacebuilding. This chapter breaks down factors that, together, amount to challenges for Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees and also delves into the opportunities that present themselves. A chapter summary is presented at the end.

6.1 Stakeholders' Recognition and Support to District Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa County

This analysis begins with the important issue of recognition and support for Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa County. To be recognised for something is to be acknowledged and identified with that particular issue and the agency that comes with it. It is only through recognition that entities such as local peacebuilding committees can successfully foster sustainable peacebuilding. This issue becomes even more critical because the majority of Kenyan

Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were formed through a Government directive, after the 2007/8 Post Elections Violence (PEV), in the hope that the institutionalisation of traditional and community-based peace structures would support a national peacebuilding agenda. This action was informed by the encouraging reports of the success of local peacebuilding entities, for example, the Wajir Peacebuilding and Development Committee) and national entities such as the Ghana National Peace Council (UNDP, 2010). Peacebuilding researchers have argued that local peacebuilding structures are valuable where the authority of the Government in keeping the peace is either weak or absent (Ndegwa, 2001; Odendaal & Olivier, 2008). Therefore, the recognition of local peacebuilding entities is dependent on the nature of the peace that is prevailing at the time of their formation more than their image as an entity dealing in peacebuilding.

Depending on how the local peace entity was formed, it might or might not enjoy the support of other local peacebuilding stakeholders. In the case of Nakuru, Åkerdahl (2013) argues that the committees seem to have managed to find their role quite well in the community, as there were no reports of duplicated activities or problems regarding their relationship with other state stakeholders in the county, and therefore supported by the other stakeholders. However, the potential for conflict between locally formed peace committees (usually informal) and those formed on the instruction of the Government (formal), exists which usually arises from role overlap or encroachment into other peacebuilding stakeholders' "territory".

To establish the extent to which DPC are supported, this study sought to investigate whether Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees felt that they were supported by all peacebuilding stakeholders in Mombasa County. The results are presented in figure 6.1



Figure 6. 1 : Support to Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees by all stakeholders in Mombasa County

Source: Field Data, 2021

Out of 113, 22.1% (N=25) strongly disagreed with the inquiry, 36.3% (N=41) disagreed, 9.7% (N=11) were undecided, 25.66% (N=29) agreed to the inquiry and 6.2 (N=7%) strongly agreed that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are supported by all stakeholders in Mombasa County. Cumulatively, 68.4% disagreed with the inquiry that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are supported by all stakeholders. The question was meant to gauge the acceptability of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees at the county level. The high percentage of responses to the negative was also noted in the FGDs and KIIs where respondents stated that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees had not publicised themselves to the public and explained what they were supposed to do. In the FDGs villagers indicated that they did not know the DPC and had had little interaction with them. As one community member said;

> I will be very honest. I only hear about DPC, how it came about and how it works I don't know. I just hear the word DPC. How they work or how they relate to us I don't know…The way I know about DPC, they try to sustain peace, they try and resolve conflicts, most of them are the village elders and mostly they solve family issues. They try and get to know what is happening in their area of jurisdiction…DPC need to build a friendship with people in the community because they are already at the ground level. Find ways to make people know them so that they can approach them. (FGD, with Villagers, Jomvu, September 22, 2021)

In another focus group discussion, a respondent said;

> From my own understanding, the village elders do everything and when everything is done and issues resolved, DPC come and claims that they are the ones who did everything. We as the village elders, we do everything, afterwards, the peace committee come and we are kept aside. (FGD, Changamwe villagers, November 13, 2021)

Other community members had this to say;

> they are not fully involved in peace management. Most of them are engaged in other activities which means they are like part-timers. You will only get them when they are available. Secondly, the community is not ready to cooperate with the peace committees. The local communities which are the main beneficiaries of peace are not ready to cooperate and they try to question how they work. (FGD, Changamwe villagers, November 13, 2021)

It became apparent that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, having no visibility, usually walk behind the Deputy County Commissioners (DCCs), the Chief or some well-grounded NGOs to team up and spread peacebuilding messages or even conduct community reconciliation. They routinely take advantage of *Barazas* to do this. For example, in January 2022, soon after the Government began relaxing the Covid-19 public safety and social distance rules Nyali sub-County

administration (DCC) convened a Baraza which was attended by Deputy County Commissioner Nyali, Assistant County Commissioner Nyali, and Freretown, DPC chairperson Sub-county Intelligence Officer, Reformed youths, Village elders, Nyumba Kumi representatives, and community members from Maweni and Kisumu Ndogo, and Kadzandani.

Chairs and tents used trough out the meeting were donated by the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC). Among the key messages passed in the Baraza were: 1) increased vigilance through *Nyumba Kumi*, 2) supporting youth to take advantage of *Kazi Mtaani* and reduction of drugs in the village, 3) the use of Government hotline 988 for reporting incidences to the police. The meeting ended with encouragement from reformed youths who encouraged their fellow youths to do away with crime, reform, and join their network where they could get more and better opportunities and support from well-wishers. This is a concrete example of how the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, riding on the convening power of the in which, peace and security, among other things, is usually discussed. It is through such meetings that Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees find space to discuss authorities and usually get their work done.

Those in public administration who have to deal with peacebuilding from an official standpoint saw a different role for Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees and support their work. As confirmed by a KII with one of the senior county administrators;

> They are very useful. If I was to give a percentage, I will give 100%. The usefulness of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees within this sub-county cannot be underrated. With Peacebuilding Committees, the work of the government in terms of conflict resolution becomes very easy. (KII with County Administrator, Nyali, September 14 2021)

In another KII it was made clear to the researcher that DPC is centrally complementary to the work of the Government, as the KII respondent said;

> As the DCC, I need some structures below me to reach out to people. One of the structures that help me reach out to the people is the DPC. DPC is anchored in the spirit of governance where we are talking of members of the public taking responsibility for their issues, and circumstances happening around them. It is in the spirit of building nationhood that we as Kenyans get to own things that are happening around us and feed them to the mainstream government structures. DPC have a specific function. To us, they are our peace monitors. They monitor threats to peace in the vicinities where they leave. If you look at how membership is drawn, it is representative cutting across different aspects of the community. They easily notice any threat to peace and communicate it as first as possible for the relevant government agencies to respond. To me, their main role is peace monitor (KII with County Administrator, Mvita September 14 2021)

While the appreciation and support for the DPC seem to be high at the Government level, this does not seem to be the case with ordinary villagers who may have benefitted from the work of the DPC without realising it.

The appreciation is summarised by one senior Government official;

> I am the beneficiary and they work for me and the Government, I must get out there and support them when I feel the community is despising them. I go there and say I am the one who has authorised these people (the DPC) to sort this issue and once they have sorted it, they report to me (KII with County Administrator, Changamwe, September 15 2021)

The support that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees enjoy is because of their formal nature which means that they are tied to and influenced by state institutions and processes. Some scholars see this as a poisoned chalice because Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are usually forced to assume a lesser role because of the overlap between their mandate and the functions of state structures (Nganje, 2020). Because of the strong coordination role that has been bestowed on Kenya's new County Administration, local peacebuilding entities have effectively become the business of the administration. This relationship has been seen by some students of peacebuilding as nothing more than state-building by another name. From the literature it was observed that this relationship is not always ideal for peace, especially when local peacebuilding entities can be abused by politicians (Chopra (2009). Some of the positions taken by local peacebuilding entities can sometimes contradict local administration and complicate rather than support local peacebuilding.

6.2. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees Lack of Financial and Other Resources for Peacebuilding Activities

Peacebuilding resourcing has been a subject for discussion with much of it leaning towards the need for continuous funding by all stakeholders starting from individual countries affected by conflict to donor countries who support peacebuilding. A SIPRI (2021) report notes that the current practice to peacebuilding financing is largely composed of donors separately funding individual peacebuilding actors, which results in fragmentation, underfunding, inadequate impact of peacebuilding effort and vulnerability to changes in donor behaviour. What is more, these funding models are not designed to translate policy commitments to local peacebuilding into action on the

ground. Most of the entities especially international NGOs though favoured because of fiduciary astuteness are not well-suited for local peacebuilding.

Secondly, as noted by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), peacebuilding funding is rarely accessible to local peacebuilders, including women and youth peacebuilders, who sometimes are forced to work within the funding parameters, and not their own priorities. The advent of Covid-19 has also impacted peacebuilding activities. Obi and Kabandula (2021), argue that while the predicted doom of Covid-19 in Africa has not yet occurred, the epidemic has given rise to instability at the community level and "shadow epidemics" such as gender-based violence because of the measures that many Governments took to curb the epidemic. There is growing consensus that Covid-19 might not turn into the apocalypse that was predicted but the strain on poor countries' economies will be much more than other well-heeled countries.

Funding for local peacebuilding can be viewed in two ways; the personal remuneration of members of the local peacebuilding committee for the work that they do, and the other is the financing of the work and programs of the local peacebuilding committee. The official position of the Government of Kenya is that local peacebuilding committees are instituted voluntarily on the understanding that members of the committee are volunteers who do not expect to earn any money for the work that they do. The study sought to evaluate whether Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees felt that they had sufficient financial resources to carry out peacebuilding activities. The results are illustrated in figure 6.2 .



Figure 6. 2:Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees financing

Source: Field Data, 2021

Out of 113, 31(27.4%) strongly disagreed with the inquiry 53(46.9%) disagreed,3 (2.7%) were undecided, 21(18.6%) agreed to the inquiry and 5 (4.42%) strongly agreed that LPCs have sufficient financial resources to carry out peacebuilding activities. Cumulatively, 74.3% disagreed with the inquiry that LPCs had sufficient financial resources to carry out peacebuilding activities in Mombasa County. From the data, it can be averred that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are not financed adequately for their work. As has already been illustrated, there a no earmarked funds Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, despite the encouragement for the establishment of peacebuilding entities or committees in all levels of administration in Kenya. That said, it is instructive to note that support for local level entities has been by way facilitation, specifically,

office space, transport and subsistence allowances and access to vehicles and internet (Githaiga, 2020).

Volunteerism has been adopted in many cases as a strategy because it generates social capital that is indispensable in peacebuilding, and it plays an important role in aiding the development of national civilian capacities, however, the expectation that members of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees can work for absolutely nothing has had major drawbacks on local level peacebuilding. Githaiga (2020) notes that the institutionalisation of peacebuilding committees introduced certain formal processes and costs to peacebuilding that now necessitates the funding of these entities. For example, peacebuilding committee members are supposed to provide early warning information to the authorities and this involves first travelling to verify the information and then calling the concerned authority with the information. This costs money which is not provided. Still, opinions differ on this matter. Some hold the opinion that remuneration leads to the culture of "sitting allowances" and the dependency on donors for what should be a community matter.

This policy of non-remuneration of DPC members was confirmed over and over again during this research with many Government officials affirming the position but admitting that the policy was at times, a hindrance to the work of the DPC.

This matter was explained by two senior Government officers in KIIs as follows;

> the spirit of the DPC was that when I nominate somebody from the locality, I nominate someone who is earning his living already, it is not like we are picking people for employment, we are reaching out to the community where you live…the only thing we do now, we can only provide incentives … When opportunities arise, we may consider their children, like *Kazi mtaani*, when partners come and they want to reach out to the community, they act as our gatekeepers we tell them we are linking you with this person assist …they can only build on some of these incentives and they should always appreciate (KII with County Administrator, Nyali, September 14 2021)

In a separate KII, it was recognised that the lack of any sort of compensation was counterproductive to peacebuilding because of the costs involved in the work. As a senior Government official said about non-remuneration;

> It is a bad thing because these people need airtime. Moving from point A to point B also costs some money. I know there is a time when there was funding from UNDP just after the Post-Election Violence (PEV) of 2007/2008. After that program the funding got dry and they have never been funded. If there was token funding to cover basics like airtime for communication. They also need loudspeakers when they have these meetings where they have to hire. It's a challenge but as the government, we keep promising that something will be done because that is what the national steering committee says will be done but volunteering has its own limits(KII with County Administrator, Kisauni September 14 2021)

A KII interview with a member of the DPC indicated that it was their relationship with NGOs and CBOs that often support their work. In this regard, the respondent had this to say;

> We have challenges because you realize the small facilitation you are given is not enough…what we do is that we work with friendly CBOs and NGOs that have objectives on matters of peace. These are the people who can hire a hotel somewhere. When we have the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees out in a hotel in a friendly environment, we feel appreciated and get something as we go home, maybe transport. (KII with DPC member, Kisauni, November 12 2021).

The experience in other countries regarding this matter has been different. Tandukar *et al* (2016), in the case of Nepal, found that through the Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation (MoPR), District Local Peace Committees (DLPC) are supported to the tune of 500,000 rupees ($ 630) to conduct programmes for conflict-affected people and administrative use. All three staff members of the DLPC are also financially supported by the MoPR. It is instructive to note however that Nepal, which came out of a war lasting 10 years Maoist-led war to overthrow a Monarchy has a different peacebuilding architecture than Kenya.

The study further sought to understand how members of the DPC understood their funding sources, by simple asking the respondents where they thought their funding support came from. The results on perception of sources of funding are displayed in figure 6.3.



Figure 6. 3:DPC Members' perception of sources of funding.

Source: field data, (2021)

Figure 6.3 shows the responses of the DPC members on how they saw funding for their activities were done. The overall picture that emerges is that most of the members of the Sub-county Peacebuilding Committees felt their funding sources were themselves, from donors, but very little from Government. 53.98% felt that Government never funded them at all. However, Government funding is available but how it is managed has been left to local administration and political leaders.

As one respondent confirmed during a KII,

> There should be a real investment in peace, by the way, there is money and the government has made it clear where the money to do such things can be obtained. CDF was left to do two things security and education. Here we get 120 million but the Member of Parliament doesn't want to get involved. That is where the money to fund Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees can be gotten from. If you go to Nairobi to ask the national government why they are not facilitating the DPC they will tell you, we put money *kwa mashinani* (in grass-roots), truly the money is there but if the area MP is not focused then you find his priority is elsewhere. I would not say the government has failed to allocate resources, I will say the person with the money refuses to accept that these people are important and he should take care of their small needs. (KII with Sub-county administrator, Kisauni, November 12 2021).

The question of donor funding is not as straightforward as the receipt and spending of funds. The 2008 PEV brought a new view of donor funding as was expressed by one respondent,

> That time was unique because we had just come from post-election violence and there was a lot of work to be done by the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees across the country. I don't like where foreigners take charge of our internal affairs it borders on failure. Security belongs to the government, where you let foreigners invest in your security systems and welfare issues it is a failure. We have NGOs who support the DPC here, like HAKI AFRIKA, Red Cross but I make sure they don't take over the work of the DPC. They request me if they can support the DPC in terms of funding, I allow but I don't let them take over the running of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. NGOs can easily do that (KII with Sub-county administrator, Kisauni, November 12 2021).

Community support for Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees has been an underlying theme in this study. Members of the DPC are drawn from the communities and work without pay, therefore

communities do fund Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in that sense. However, sometimes communities. Respondents also felt that communities do funds DPC activities. Per figure 6.3, out of 113, 31 the majority (69%) felt that communities either occasionally or always funded Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. Community funding is an important part of local peacebuilding because it demonstrates the ownership of the peacebuilding process. The feeling of those who have benefited from the work of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees was perhaps summarised by this FGD respondent who felt that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees need real tangible support;

> the government should recognise them, even if they will not be paid, they should at least be given a token of appreciation because they do a lot of work for the community. Their work exceeds those in the office. They need to be given something so that they can effectively respond to issues. These people risk their life, especially when walking at night to go and resolve issues. They are attacked and beaten because they don't have money to give out when attacked by thieves (FGD, Changamwe villagers, November 13, 2021)

The lack of financial and other resources is not confined to formal peacebuilding committees, but affects even informal peacebuilding entities. Mungai *et al* (2020) in a study of informal peacebuilding committees in Nairobi conclude that the lack of resources posed a serious challenge to the functionality of the informal peace committees in Nairobi County. The authors further argue that this lack of resources impeded the ability of the committees to respond to emergency issues thus losing confidence in the eyes of other peace stakeholders. Nganje (2020), on the other hand, notes that the reliance on external ffinancial, technical, institutional, or logistical support has not always been good for the local peacebuilding agenda. This overdependence can be paralysing as money issues such as "sitting allowances" overcome the spirit of volunteerism. On the other hand,

external help has been the reason local peacebuilding has taken place in some countries. Many studies seem to be supportive of the idea of external support for peacebuilding but the caution is to ensure that the external support does not overshadow local agency.

6.3 Internal Inefficiency and Environmental Challenges faced by Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees

Apart from financial challenges, local peacebuilding committees face many other challenges both from internal inconsistencies and external contradictions that impede their work. These challenges speak to the effectiveness of the DPC in supporting sustainable peacebuilding wherever they operate and Mombasa County Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are no exception. Mungai *et al* (2020) note in the case of peacebuilding committees in Nairobi County that the lack of ability to deal with politically motivated conflicts and lack of cooperation from other peacebuilding actors severely compromised the potential of these entities as effective peacebuilding mechanisms in Nairobi. These problems might emanate from the simple lack of networking ability of individual committee members to more fundamental issues of lack of a supportive atmosphere for the local peace committee's work.

UNDP (2010) recommends that the local peace committees acquire an in-depth understanding of the demands and dynamics of the peacebuilding processes and must have the skills to manage them. In some cases, local peacebuilding committees might have access to professional, skilled conflict transformation practitioners to train them but this is not consistent. In the case of South Africa, UNDP notes that local peacebuilding members do have access to professional facilitators who support members of the peacebuilding committees. Onyango (2010) also concluded in a

mapping exercise of local peacebuilding infrastructures in Kenya that the technical capacity of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to undertake peacebuilding activities depended largely on the number and quality of trained members of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees.

This study sought to find out what challenges, internal and external to Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees affected their efficiency in fostering peacebuilding in Mombasa County. The results are displayed in figure 6.4.



Figure 6. 4 :Internal Inefficiencies of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees

Source; field data (2021)

Out of the 113 responses on this subject, 34.5% (N=38) indicated that a lack of standard operating procedures caused internal inefficiency, while 29.2% (N=34) mentioned the lack of peacebuilding knowledge. 21.2% (N=24) mentioned the low morale of the members of the DPC while 15.0%

(N=17) mentioned the dearth of staff. Taken as a whole these issues that are internal to the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have been acknowledged by several peacebuilding stakeholders. The lack of standard operating procedures (SOPs) is one of the most frequently cited causes of challenges in the way many organisations carry out their work. The African Union (2009) in publishing their standard operating procedure for mediation (SoPs) argued that the SoPS was supposed to correct the ad hoc manner in which mediation was being carried out. By and large, the organisations with the greatest number of SoPs are the UN, EU, bilateral organisations and the Africa Union, and this may be because of the accountability standards that they are required to maintain both for themselves and their partners. The closest that could be termed as SoPs that this study found was the Terms of Reference (ToRs) that were developed by the National Steering Committee (NSC, 2016). Apart from the ToRs, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are also guided on how to develop their Constitution, how to constitute themselves into a representative organ and how to ensure inclusivity. On this point of standard operating procedures, Nganje (2020) notes that local peace committees draw their strength and legitimacy from the local culture and processes, which in some ways do not lend themselves very well to standard operating procedures.

The lack of peacebuilding knowledge was mentioned by 29.2% of the respondents as the next major challenge for peacebuilding entities in Mombasa County. Even though some respondents said that they had been trained (57%), further questioning of the respondents revealed that many felt that they did not have the requisite peacebuilding knowledge to do their work. The NSC requires that a member of a DPC be someone who has diverse knowledge in peacebuilding and conflict management, is willing to learn new ways of working, is committed to peace and is known for impartiality. Even though these requirements are on paper, most people who find themselves in these committees do not necessarily have any prior peacebuilding knowledge. In some in-depth

interviews, it was clear that partners of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees had noticed the lack of skills among DPC members. As one respondent said about the DPC;

> there is a lack of capacity but the little capacity they have, they have been using it very well because they have members from every corner of the sub-county. Two, they are well connected with the local people. We need training for them because they don't have skills like conflict scan mechanism and the least. Those are the training we want for the committee. (KII with DPC partner, Kisauni, September 15 2021)

Chivasa (2019) is critical of the fact that peacebuilding at the local level has largely been dominated by elites, especially national level political leaders and international stakeholders. Usually national level elites, who are more in touch with international donors, are more familiar with the requirements of donors and are able to secure funding for peacebuilding activities. They therefore dominate peacebuilding agendas because of the resources that they are able to attract. On the other hand, however, the low peacebuilding knowledge and skills of the members of the peacebuilding committees may be contributing to this problem. In a changing world where peacebuilding is challenged by complex threats that operate at different levels, the response against these from a peacebuilding perspective needs more expertise than just wisdom and goodwill. As a respondent noted members of the peacebuilding committees need proper skills to be able to influence the peace agenda of the communities in which they function.

The question of peacebuilding skills arose from the observation that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees don't seem to be influencing the peacebuilding agenda as much as they would like to.

> because in most cases, they do not have the skills, they have not been trained on those skills which one can undertake to understand what you are seeing on the surface is not what is beneath. That is where the biggest challenge is. I am a trained counsellor Sometimes whenever I talk to them I tell them what you are telling me that could not be the issue there is another issue beyond what you are seeing. I send them back to probe more and, in most cases, when they report back, they say that whatever I told them was true. (KII with DPC partner, Kisauni, September 15 2021)

In some instances, the respondents were able to identify where they thought the problem lay regarding the capacity building of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. A key informant had this to say;

> The National Steering Committee which is the body set up to train the DPC has trained some people, but not all of them have been trained. The chairs of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have been trained and they understand the work, the policies behind the DCPs and those that have not been trained, we have been engaging them, me, and my security committee, we usually meet them at their local levels. Whenever we go out for their *Barazas* we usually have a meeting with them where we try to explain to them the dos and don'ts because there are matters that they are not supposed to handle for example matters that should be handled by police only because of the legal issues concerned, we do engage them. I have not found any of the DPC in conflict with the law. If one conflicts with the law, I would say it is because they don't understand their role and their boundaries the OCS has never reported to me that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are doing the role of the police (KII with County Administrator, Nyali, September 14 2021)

The issue of low morale among the DPC members was mentioned by 21% of the respondents and merits further examination. Low morale can be described as the lack of enthusiasm, low confidence, or loyalty of an individual or group about a function, or tasks at hand. The sign of poor morale is a feeling of discouragement and dislike for the job. While the majority of the DPC members did not feel like they had low morale, in general, those who mentioned low morale felt that the lack of appreciation for the work done by the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees members contributed to their low morale. Secondly, many DPC members work under duress because at times they provide information that leads to the arrest of criminals. Under such circumstances, they are supposed to appear in court or at the police station, something they do at great personal risk.

A member of the DPC summarised their feeling as follows;

> DPC needs to be recognized in the community, we need facilitation and recognition because the work we do is hard as DPC, we need identification badges so that when we approach people with those badges and stamps people will give you their time. We need to work together with all categories of security enforcers, we need a refresher course because we were trained long ago. (KII with DPC member, Kisauni, November 12 2021).

6.4. Challenges of Visibility

A major issue that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have had to deal with is that of physical absence in their areas of operation. As is evident in figure 4.6 the invisibility of DPs is because there is no provision for the provision of office space or any accommodation to the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. As the supervising entity, it would appear that the

responsibility of facilitating accommodating Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees would fall under the National Steering Committee (NSC), however, their task in this regard is summarised in two action points; to harmonise operations of the Sub-County Peace Committees and, to identify and mobilise resources for peacebuilding and conflict management. This is why some village respondents were clear that they had no idea about the peacebuilding committees in their areas. The study also sought to establish other factors contributing to the poor performance of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. The result of this inquiry is presented in figure 6.5.



Figure 6. 5.Environmental Challenges facing Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees

Source; field data, 2021

Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees also face challenges from the surroundings and the peacebuilding environment in which they work. From the KIIs and FGDs, four thematic areas kept coming up as challenges that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees face in their quest of fostering sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa. These were summarised as; corruption (mentioned by 31.1% of respondents, N=35), competition from similar peacebuilding activities mentioned by 27.1% of respondents, N=31), political interference mentioned by 20.1% of respondents, N=23), and threats from criminals mentioned by 12.1 % of respondents, N=14). Nganje (2021) argues that the effectiveness of local peacebuilding committees depends on whether their efforts are seen as part of a broader peacebuilding agenda and are complementary to other efforts. The opposite impacts negatively upon their work.

The threat that corruption poses for peace is well-documented. Corruption misdirects resources, compound social inequities and undermines trust of Government and thus lowers the level of peace. Defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, Philip (2008), corruption has a symbiotic relationship with conflict whereby one reinforces the other. In post-conflict countries, corruption entrenches itself in the affairs of the community and infuses an atmosphere of impunity that is fueled by self-interest and complete disregard for the law. At the same time, peacebuilding may generate corruption by setting standards of conduct that have few adherents and lack adequate enforcement.

In this study, 32.1% of respondents opined that corruption posed a challenge for the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees work in peacebuilding. Most respondents pointed to the police and their frequent partial application of the law. In some instances, DPC members noted that their lives were

endangered because police often release known criminals or collude with the same to hide cases of criminality, or simply break the law by soliciting bribes, to the disadvantage of peacebuilding. Examples of police misconduct include police brutality, dishonesty, fraud, coercion, forcing of false confessions, abuse of authority, and sexual assault or the demand for sexual favors in exchange for leniency (Hope, 2018). Police misconduct, is illegalised under the Laws of Kenya, National Police Service Act No. 11A of 2011, the Public Officer Ethics Act No. 4 Of 2003 and the Police (Conduct) Regulations of 2004. In the case of Mombasa County, the researcher found out the following during an FGD,

> The OCS (officer commanding station) when allocated to the new areas they should call on board all security leaders, call them and discuss security. These OCS should not call the police and frustrate people by arresting them, and charging people for offences they did not commit. There is a need for us to have a good relationship with the police. The community should have a good relationship when interacting with the police (FGD with Village Elders, Jomvu, September 23, 2021)

Another respondent had this to say, upon which youths agreed in unison;

> police who go for patrol in the community, go for business other than patrol. They arrest children and ask them to call their parents to bail them out. They dictate the amount of money they want to release those children they have arrested. (FGD with reformed youth, Changamwe, August 23 2021)

Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees also face threats from politicians, many of whom do not like to deal with peacebuilding committees that they cannot control. This is not uncommon. Obradovic-Wochnik (2020) argues for example, that while local peacebuilding implies the shift away from internationally imposed top-down interventions, the space can also become an

exclusionary club where local voices are ignored and instead replaced by more powerful locals who can govern the conduct and participation of the less powerful locals. Where politicians see the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees as useful in advancing their political agenda, they usually insist on sitting in these committees or being represented. When they see a threat or fail to infiltrate membership of these committees, they often disrupt and even render the committees dysfunctional (Khabure, 2014).

It is instructive to note that political support, or what Travers (2015) calls political accompaniment is sometimes necessary for peacebuilding to succeed. However political support requires a balancing act between providing the support necessary to advance local peacebuilding initiatives and encouraging local peacebuilding committees to own the process. Therefore, political support or accompaniment is a question of value rather than the mere presence of politicians in a local peacebuilding committee. In this study, 20% of the respondents indicated that political interference and threats from politicians were a challenge for them as a Sub-county Peacebuilding Committee. A respondent had this to say;

> we suffer from threats from politicians, there are politicians who use gangs for political gains. The moment DPC tries to reform gang members Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees receives threats from politicians. The other one us the structure, they don't have a specific structure, the only structure I know is of the *Ngao* (County administration. (FGD with coopted members of the DPC, September 24 2021)

The sentiments against politicians did not seem to change across all the youth groups and other groups that were interviewed in this study. In other words, respondents saw only the dark side of politicians' involvement with Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees.

Following is a summary of what these groups of respondents had to say;

> Politicians cause conflicts. They install tribalism among people. Politicians mislead us and our generation by providing false promises. They play a greater role in displacing people by taking their lands. Youths are paid to cause violence by politicians. (FGD with coopted members of the DPC, September 24 2021)

The issue of youth manipulation and misuse by politicians has been widely discussed, for example by Botha (2014), Githigaro and Kabia (2022) and therefore youth manipulation into delinquency, including terrorism has been established. In this study, local NGOs that work with Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have also experienced this as one respondent said,

> Youths easily get used during the election period by politicians to cause violence. Political leaders cause youth groups to cause violence during election periods…politicians pay youth to cause violence. The government should come up with a plan to put an end to politicians who use Youths. (KII with DPC partner NGO, Likoni, August 28 2021)

The youth themselves have also know that they are sometimes manipulated. A respondent had this to say

> during elections, politicians incite people against the government for example if someone is educated and unemployed, politicians tell them that they should blame the government for not providing employment. University graduates cannot do informal kinds of jobs. They sit and wait for the government to give them a job. Those who performed poorly and did not get a chance to go to college, do all kinds of jobs. Those who are educated at long last will go and hire guns (FGD with members of a Youth Club, Kisauni, September 17, 2021)

Data analysis also revealed that members of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were concerned about the distortion of their work by similar peacebuilding activities in their area of jurisdiction. These activities have often been seen as competing with the work of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees because they are done by NGOs who are funded for short projects. 27.7% of the DPC members thought that this was the case. At any one time, several peacebuilding initiatives led by many organisations will be going on in many parts of the county. While this is welcome, the problem becomes a lack of coordination of peacebuilding activities into an articulate agenda. Some of these activities are led by organisations that seem to be competing for publicity rather than peacebuilding. The result is a disjointed and incoherent range of activities that is hard to monitor and account for. It has been observed that many DPC members sometimes move from one seminar to another in the same, ostensibly for training, but actually for the incentives that they usually get after attendance. Secondly, this state of affairs introduces an unhealthy competition for donor funding and therefore the emphasis shifts to meeting donor agendas and not local peacebuilding needs.

Githaiga (2016) in an unpublished PhD thesis entitled *Building Peace that Lasts; A study of State-led Peacebuilding in Kenya* argues that the involvement of the state in peacebuilding has resulted in improved coordination of peacebuilding activities across the country. However, this finding seems to apply more at the national level where the National Steering Committee (NSC) is coordinating with several Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees and other organs to implement a national peacebuilding agenda. At the ground level, lack of coordination seems to be the order of the day as piecemeal peacebuilding activities dominate the County. Githaiga also makes the point about the relegation of peacebuilding to be about meetings, seminars and planning sessions. These are normally done without coordination and participants find themselves often sitting in sessions with the same contents from one seminar to another.

A recurring theme in Mombasa County is the problem of criminality and the threat to peacebuilding. There is also a direct link between criminality and the narcotics trade, which therefore makes crime and criminals a very serious problem in the County. As has been demonstrated in Mombasa County, violence can also occur between and within criminalised groups, as they fight for control of criminal rent (Cornell and Jonsson, 2014). Mwachinalo (2019) provides a good background to criminality in Mombasa and how this phenomenon constitutes a threat to peacebuilding. In an occasional paper published by the International Peace Support Training Centre entitled: *Nexus between Organized Criminal Gangs and Terrorist Groups: Case of Mombasa County*, the author demonstrates the extent of criminality in the County and how this has impacted peace in the county. In this study, 12.1% of the respondents stated that their work as peacebuilders was affected by criminals who threaten the DPC members whenever they act against

them. Some of the respondents noted that threats and fear do impact negatively on the work of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. as a respondent indicated;

> most of them resign from DPC because of fear, they need to guaranteed their security, they should be given material such as pamphlets to distribute to people in peace meetings...” village elders are referred to as snitches by local youths who are in gangs (FGD with village elders, Jomvu, 15 Dec 2021)

The resurgence of criminal gangs seems to be closely associated with Kenya's electioneering period which has always been associated with high tensions, lack of security and even sponsored criminality. On March 19, 2022, a popular media outlet broadcasted a news report on the resurgence of political gangs and militias in the country ahead of the August 9 elections, this time with bigger membership. The gangs pose a significant threat to the country’s national security and public safety. Politicians have always been accused of taking advantage of the desperation of the youths to recruit them into these gangs, for their selfish agenda (Mkutu and Opondo, 2021). Even with these seemingly insurmountable problems and odds stacked against sustainable peacebuilding, there are opportunities that can support a sustainable peacebuilding agenda in Mombasa County.

6.5. Sustainable Peacebuilding Opportunities in Mombasa County

This section presents the opportunities for sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County through the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. Most studies on peacebuilding have traditionally focused on the didactic and operational challenges that local peacebuilding infrastructures face but often fall short in proposing concrete action for fostering sustainable peacebuilding. Öjendal *et al* (2017) note that opportunities for local peacebuilding have been made possible because of policy

development in many countries. These policies have elevated the notion of "local turn" into concrete action for peacebuilding. This chapter examines the opportunities for sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County based on the study questions and provides suggestions as the evidence provides. A chapter summary is presented at the end.

Formal peacebuilding entities in Mombasa County have benefitted from the development and adoption of the Sessional Paper No. 5 of 2014 on National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict management. In the document, the Government states that it will embark in an all-inclusive and participatory process of sustained peacebuilding through enhancing coordination and management of conflicts. The Government also undertakes to do this in the most participatory, culturally sensitive, inclusive, transparent and accountable manner. This policy document is further supported by a Standard Guidelines and Terms of Reference for Peace Structures in Kenya (GoK, 2016) which lays out the work of all peace structures in Kenya including County and sub-county committees also known as District Peace Committees (DPCs).

Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees seem to have embraced the responsibilities assigned to them, a fact that has been appreciated by the secondary respondents who benefit from the work of the DPC. Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have managed to infuse some sense of deliberate peacebuilding in the County, despite the challenges of finances and poor coordination. The study established that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees do have a central role in peacebuilding in Mombasa County.

A summary of KII respondents is provided as follows;

> My office works with the DPC in their peace endeavours throughout the sub-county. Whenever there is conflict within the community in the sub-county, the body that I give the assignment to is the DPC. We have DPC in the sub-county, the division and in every location, which makes work easier when there is conflict within the location because I know there are people there who can intervene before I go there …I would not imagine how it would be without them. It would mean I am all over doing peacebuilding, and conflict resolution and I will not have time to be in the office. (KII with Sub-county administrator, Mvita January 20, 2022)

The appreciation of the work of the DPC is acknowledged almost unanimously by senior Mombasa County administrators. However, the *Nyumba Kumi* initiative which has also been added into the County Peace and Security agenda is also equally appreciated. This study found that indeed there are members of the DPC who also double up as *Nyumba Kumi.* A KII respondent who is a senior county administrator had this to say about the DPC in his area and the collaboration,

> Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, and *Nyumba Kumi* are the people that will feed the chief with information. The chief will be a link to me as the boss who has the equipment as well as the tools and the DPC person at the grass root…they should be made stronger by giving them the needed support, for example when you call them for a meeting at least they should get something to survive on such as transport allowance. (KII with Policy Maker, Kisauni January 21,2022)

The foregoing KIIs brought out a key responsibility of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, which is to respond as expeditiously as possible to conflicts in the community.

Peacebuilding stakeholders in Mombasa however do reach out to Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees even when there is no visible conflict. the KII respondents indicated that DPC members are called upon to talk about peace in workshops, in schools, mosques and other places where members of the public gather. DPC members are also the official monitors of the National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System which has been put in place to support Kenya towards effective conflict prevention initiatives. Members of the DPC gather intelligence on the ground and are supposed to pass the information to relevant authorities.

Mombasa County Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees can play a catalytic role in advancing peacebuilding in Mombasa County, defined as the acceleration of an action to achieve the desired result speedily. Most of the situations that require the intervention of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are usually conflict situations that, if left to fester, could into major conflicts in Mombasa County. In some cases, the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are required to negotiate with police in the event of arrests of suspected youth gang members or violent disputes among neighbours. These actions are necessary but the essential catalytic role is to widen the partnerships on the ground and assigning roles that can be monitored and reported on. The researcher was unable to see any report submitted to the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees by peacebuilding organisations on the ground. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees rely on voluntary reporting which is sporadic.

Against select stated terms of reference (ToRs) of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, the study sought to summarise the confidence that the members of the Sub-County Peacebuilding

Committees had in their ability to foster sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County. The result is presented in table 6.1.

Table 6. 1 Ability of DPC to undertake duties as specified in their terms of reference

Duties	Response	Frequency N=113	Percent	Summary of risks and assumptions
Promote peace education and a culture of peace and non-violence	Yes	81	71	This is the major preoccupation of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. However, there is no community curriculum for peacebuilding and most of the education is dependent on the DPC member.
	No	32	29	
Mobilize resources for peacebuilding	Yes	58	51	Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees conduct resource mobilization in cash and kind. Most of the resources mobilised are in-kind and come by way of materials and equipment to hold meetings.
	No	55	49	
Early response to emerging conflict and early warning.	Yes	71	62.8	Members of the DPC are part of the Kenya Conflict Early Warning System but are not funded to gather and disseminate conflict information to the authorities.
	No	42	38	
Foster public participation and Ownership of peacebuilding processes.	Yes	77	68.1	Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees rely on other arms of government to convene public meetings such as *Barazas* to spread peacebuilding messages
	No	36	31.9	
Conduct community training for peacebuilding	Yes	76	67.3	Members of the DPC are expected to conduct community-level training for members of the public but do not have the tools
	No	37	32.7	
Apply traditional conflict resolution mechanisms	Yes	79	69.9	There is however little application of traditional mechanisms for peacebuilding in Mombasa County.
	No	34	30.1	

Source; filed data, 2022

6.5.1 Sustainable Peacebuilding Opportunity through Community Peace Education

The first duty in the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the District Peace Committees is to promote peace education, a culture of peace and non-violence peacebuilding. This is a broad responsibility with a very wide mandate, which encapsulates the whole idea of sustainable peacebuilding. The study sought to establish the extent to which DPC members felt that they were up to this task, and out of the 113, 71% (N=81) responded in the affirmative, while 29% (N=32). This means that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees feel that they are capable of promoting peace education. The rationale behind peace education is that it will promote the knowledge attitude and skills necessary for peaceful resolution of conflict to be the method of choice for members of society. Nonviolence on the other hand is manifested through values such as respect for human rights, freedom and trust. Unlike conflict resolution, peace education is a proactive preventive method of inculcating values of nonviolence, tolerance, equality, respect for differences, and social justice (Corkalo, 2022).

The current practice of peace education is heavily reliant on NGO partners such as the Justice, Humanity, and Dignity Center (JUHUDI), Kenya Community Support Center (KECOSCE), and the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) and an occasional international conference such as the 2009 International Conference on "Education for Peace" organised by Kenyan Ministry of Education and the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA). Secondly, a review of several NGO reports seems to point to a bias towards civic education in which issues such as human rights, land rights, Gender-Based Violence and Youth empowerment dominate. The Peacebuilding Infrastructure in Mombasa could develop a community peace education curriculum that could be used as part of the civic education program, especially in the condition of poor literacy. The County Government of Mombasa has elaborated a Civic Education program

under its Public Participation Policy (2020) which is a county-wide vehicle that can carry a community peace education program at no extra cost. Opportunity also exists for Peace Education through the formal education sector, under the Education Sector Peace Education Policy (GoK, 2014).

To this end partnering with community-based radio could be useful in broadcasting peace education without requiring members of the community to gather in a particular place for educational purposes. Mombasa has at least 15 licensed Frequency Modulation (FM) radio stations. FM radio stations offer stronger, more clear signals and are therefore ideal for educational programs. Support for education was also supported by villagers who summarised their feelings thus;

> community members need to be educated because if people ate not educated on the dangers of conflicts and benefits of peace it is hard to get sustainable peace. We need to get to the grassroots and involve religious leaders, educate them, and use them to pass the information to their followers. Boda riders should be educated on how to avoid words that might cause conflicts. FGD with village elders, Jomvu; November, 2021)

DPC members drawn from NGOs that have training funds have supported peace training as exemplified by the excerpt from a KII,

> when I am training teachers, I train them to train children to solve problems within them so that when I have an issue, we can talk out amongst ourselves as pupils…because we are developing a generation that will be able to solve a problem when they mature other than fighting because fighting is not a solution. That one we do at a school level. Secondly, what we are doing with parents is guiding them on parenting because parents need to be present in their children's life. Parents are there when children are young later in life parents leave these children to make decisions but these children make wrong decisions. To have sustainable peace from my perspective parenting is a key area. To add, social protection programs for the youth who don't feel belonging somewhere. They need to feel belonging somewhere and when they drop out of school, they need to go somewhere we have TVET, they need to be directed that way as a way of assisting them to get trained. Government shout chip in because if they are left hanging, they cause chaos. (KII with NGO partner of the DPC, Changamwe, September 15 2021)

6.5.2 Sustainable Peacebuilding Opportunity through Networking and Partnership Building

Sustainable peacebuilding also entails networking with other partners and stakeholders. According to the ToR, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are required to network with other forums to enhance harmonious relationships. When asked to indicate whether they, as members of the DPC were able to do this, out of 113, 62% (N=71) replied that they could, while 38% (N=42) were of the contrary opinion. Probed about what this meant it became clear that not all networking will result in a harmonious relationship but a major result that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees anticipated with this is the sharing of resources and responsibilities. Ekomo-Soignet, cited in a report by Connolly and Powers (2018) titled *Local Networks for Peace: Lessons from*

Community-Led Peacebuilding presents two arguments for networking; the first is that networks are usually different in aim and approach, size, membership, geographic reach, and organisational structure, and secondly, there is certainly some financial, political, resilience and organisational benefit from networking. However, managing networks which may have diverse opinions, expectations, and capacities can be challenging, time-consuming and sometimes inconsequential in terms of sustainable peacebuilding. Nevertheless, networking is a popular method of peacebuilding and has been adopted by many stakeholders.

Several peacebuilding networks exist in Mombasa. For example, the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) is a network of several faith-based organisations, including the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), Hindu Council of Kenya (HCK), The Catholic Church (KEC), Archdiocese of Mombasa, Malindi Catholic Diocese, The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), The Evangelical Alliance of Kenya (EAK), The Organization of African Instituted Churches (OAIC) and the Africa Traditional Religions. CICC has a long-standing partnership with the Mombasa peacebuilding infrastructure with which it has implemented several peacebuilding projects. For example, for Nyali DPC alone, CICC has done the following: capacity building on peace interventions, training on mediation and cohesion, conducted *maskani* visits (youth hangouts for counselling), funded peace *Barazas* (65 of these in Nyali sub-county alone), provided audio-visual and events equipment (tent and chairs), and a 1-year supply of Wi-Fi (Personal Communication with Nyali DPC Chairperson, 2022).

Networks can increase the reach of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees and expand the peacebuilding agenda both within Mombasa communities and to individual members. Networking

also provides the possibility of a faster response to any conflict situation. In the event of a particular constituency needing special attention such as youth, a youth organisation that is a member of the peacebuilding network. Mombasa DPC can develop a networking strategy based on the type of conflict being confronted and ensure that there is a member that is capable of responding to that particular problem. Kirimi cited in Connolly and Powers (2018) report titled *Local Networks for Peace: Lessons from Community-Led Peacebuilding* argues in the case of PeaceNet Kenya the network provides an opportunity for both horizontal and vertical coordination that is most ideal for peacebuilding. This is of particular import because other aspects of peacebuilding such as gender-based violence, environmental conservation and human rights and historical injustices are also addressed within the network. As one KII stated,

> the coast civil society network …brings together all the CSOs across the coastal region and I also formed a network the Mombasa team. Within the network, I divided it into thematic areas. The one I am having today is a thematic area which deals with issues on land and natural resources. Here we are talking about historical injustices, land issues and so on and we have divided it into two weeks so the first week we have people dealing with land. Then we have a thematic area that deals with issues of governance, we have another thematic area that deals with matters of health, and we have a thematic area that deals with matters of youth. When you come to Mombasa you will find a network by the name of Civil Society Reference Group working for security and human rights which brings together all those themes. (KII with DPC partner, December 18 2021)

6.5.3. Sustainable Peacebuilding Opportunity through Early Response and Early Warning to Conflict

The National Steering Committee (NSC) places the responsibility for early response and early warning and reporting squarely on the shoulders of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. The study sought to find out whether Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were confident to undertake this responsibility, and 63% (N=71) replied in the affirmative, while the other 34% (N=42) had a contrary view. This answer points to Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees' confidence in this responsibility. According to the World Bank, early warning is a process that alerts and promotes an understanding of the nature and impacts of violent conflict (Defontaine, 2019). The early warning involves the regular collection and analysis of data on conflicts, by systematically monitoring and reporting conflict indicators. Early warning and early response work better when the reporter and the responder are linked. This is normally not the case because responding to a situation of conflict may require a wide range of actors spread over a wide area.

The practice in Mombasa County Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees is to report incidences of conflict upon verification. The DPC member normally visits the areas or areas of conflict, verifies the incident and then reports to the relevant authority on the nature of the problem, and what they think the action should be. This is necessary because at times the law enforcement is needed to quell a situation and therefore a verified incident is needed in case of potential arrests or any other forceful action.

As a KII indicated in an interview during this study;

> To us (the DPC) they are our peace monitors. They monitor peace threats in the vicinities where they live. They easily notice any threats to peace, they report back for government agencies response...they also assist us on early warning, they can tell you that in these places, if you look at market days and you don't have so many people know that something is happening for example migration. They are able to tell us there is voter migration from this place to that place because of hatred between this tribe and that tribe in a way you know what to expect. If it is about politics or ethnic hatred, they are there and they will tell you. (KII with Policy Maker, Kisauni, January 21 2022)

While Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are at the front line of early conflict data collection, they do not do this routinely. This system of working is emblematic of the lack of resources that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees face in doing their work. The advantage of early warning is to be found in the regular collection and analysis of conflict data and not sporadic and incident-specific data, which might not show a pattern of conflict. The potential for Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in this area is to be enabled to collect and analyse routine data in the county.

In this regard, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees can collaborate with institutions that collect data routinely such as Universities, Healthcare Providers (in case of GBV), and law enforcement (in case of youth delinquency or any violation of the law). By working with these institutions, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees can be in a position to better advise the authorities on the nature, size and severity of potential conflict. No attempt has been made by any of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to engage the cooperation of these institutions to access data that has

already been collected to advise the County administration on conflict trends. There is an opportunity here that could be exploited for the benefit of the County's peacebuilding agenda.

6.5.4 Sustainable Peacebuilding Opportunity through Public/Community Participation and Ownership

In 2020, the United Nations published a report titled *United Nations Community Engagement Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace* (2020), in which it called for meaningful engagement of local populations and communities in their peacebuilding process to ensure sustainability. Community participation can be described as the strategic process of directly involving local populations in all aspects of decision-making and implementation. In the context of peacebuilding and sustaining peace, community engagement is generally done through partnerships with a broad range of local civil society actors as intermediaries who work in the sphere of peacebuilding (UN, 2020). The study put this question to the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in order the gauge their confidence in carrying out the responsibility. Out of 113, 68% (N=77) indicate the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are capable of doing this, while the other 32% (N=36) indicated the contrary. This answer pointed to the idea that peacebuilding has been conducted by the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees through public participation. The NSC requires the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to foster public participation and ownership of peacebuilding processes.

Community engagement or public participation has become a favourite topic and is at the heart of successful peacebuilding. To promote meaningful inclusion through broader partnerships, the

Secretary-General's report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/72/707-S/2018/43) called for strengthened and systematized engagement with civil society, including women and youth groups and local communities at large. Reflecting on the UN's engagement with civil society, the Secretary-General report pointed to interventions such as; building capacity, sharing good practices, producing practical tools, fostering a conducive environment for robust civil society, and active engagement in analysis, planning, and programming and monitoring and evaluation. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have several opportunities for community/public engagement and participation in peacebuilding such as; *Barazas*, peace meetings, reconciliation meetings and sessions with affected people, and advocacy meetings with law enforcement. A KII respondents had this to say;

> DPC members are drawn from different sectors within the community…we expect if somebody is an *imam,* when preaching in the mosque he will have one aspect of telling people the importance of peace. Teachers use parent meetings to talk about peace. Pastors also preach peace; businessmen also preach peace in board meetings. He will take time to remind other businessmen of the importance of keeping the peace. (soured; KII with Policymaker, 21 January 2022)

At the ward and village level, the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees also engage with law enforcement as was indicated by a respondent.

> Another strategy is wherever we have a public *Barazas* also we give local committees chance to speak to the people. This has been working out and also involves them where there are these conflicts, we make them be part and parcel of the team helping us to arbitrate. So far, it is really working out well… they have door to door peace campaigns, which is of great help. Through door to door campaigns, they were able to bring those juvenile gangs back into society. Though that is a difficult job but to them, they manage. (FGD with a chief; November 11, 2021)

In some instances, the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have been instrumental in diffusing major threats to peace, for which village elders are grateful. During fieldwork, the study found that villagers are still struggling with issues . FGD response corroborates the situation:

> They brought together MRC (Mombasa Republican Council) followers, talked to them, and guaranteed them safety. They poured out their issues, why they had joined that radical group and why they want to involve themselves with other things. In the process, 80% withdrew from MRC membership. They have helped radicalized youths reform. Women in the DPC have played a great role in talking to their fellow women and telling them they should not always be dependent on their husbands and as a result, we have seen women engaging themselves with business. (FGD with village elders, Likoni, Nov 11 2021)

From members of the DPC, there was also an appreciation of the work being done and the results being seen by the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees.

A DPC respondent had the following observation,

> we do community dialogue, peer-peer, women to women dialogues, also we have parental dialogues, and forums where we mainly focus on the women who have been affected by violence, we also go around school talk to the headteacher and get to know the challenges children face while in schools and give them recommendations. We also do one on one counselling to parents who feel they have too much concerning parental responsibility, we also have *Barazas*, we also do civic education, we also do awareness on equitable sharing of resources, and we also promote cohesion between police and youth through tournaments. We also take youth to do general clean up exercises at the police station. (FGD with DPC member, Nov, 2021)

Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have taken advantage of such gatherings to talk about peace, resolve gang-related conflicts and reconcile communities. However, the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have no means of convening these meetings on their own because they have neither the financial nor the logistical capacity for this. In this regard, the responsibility of "fostering public participation" becomes a matter of working through other partners and state organs that have the means. Since the gatherings are usually organised for other issues other than peacebuilding, the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are given little time to talk about peace and this curtails the potential benefit of such gatherings for peacebuilding. A major disadvantage of public gatherings is that they involve all and sundry and therefore peacebuilding messages might be passed on to unconcerned people. The numbers in a public gathering can be deceptive. Therefore, to foster public participation, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees can maximise participatory approaches to peacebuilding and engage meaningfully with concerned groups directly. By dividing the "public" into concerned constituencies, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees will be able to engage with these groups and ensure peacebuilding has a better chance of taking root in the communities.

6.5.5 Sustainable Peacebuilding Opportunity through Application of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms (Village Elders as a resource)

Kenya's peacebuilding and conflict management policy recognises the role of traditional conflict management mechanisms as important in sustainable peacebuilding. The policy states in part that to strengthen traditional conflict prevention and mitigation mechanisms, the Government will mobilise communities to embrace these mechanisms relevant to their context (NSC, 2015). It is for this reason that Government has encouraged Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to apply

these methods whenever possible. This is not new. Indeed, as Muigua (2017) argues, African communities had their conflict resolution mechanisms before the advent of colonialism, and mechanisms such as negotiation, reconciliation, and mediation were used in those days to build peace. These mechanisms have also been studied by Ajayi and Buhari (2014) in the case of Nigeria; Waindim (2018) in the case of Cameroon, and Mburugu (2016) in the case of the famous Njuri-Ncheke of the a-Meru in Kenya.

Most of the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in Kenya have been implemented in the North-eastern parts of Kenya but the system exists in nearly all Kenyan communities. Haider (2020) in reviewing conflict in Northern Kenya notes that traditional elders under the Council of Elders (CoE) mechanism have played a big role in implementing traditional mechanisms for peacebuilding. This role is however being challenged by the preference for formal settlement of disputes through the use of the modern legal system. That said, the relevance of traditional mechanisms in peacebuilding may still be to act as the entry point for other actors to conduct peacebuilding. The case of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee in which traditional leadership gave way for the formation of a formal peacebuilding committee is an example.

The peacebuilding and conflict management policy encourages Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to apply traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution as part of peacebuilding. The study sought to find out the degree of confidence that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees had in applying these mechanisms for peacebuilding and the result is presented in table 7.1. Out of the 133 respondents, 69.9% (N=71) indicated that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were capable of such a task, while 31% (N=42) indicated the contrary. The idea of *Wazee Wa Kijiji*

(village elders) is critical when traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution and peacebuilding are being discussed. *Wazee Wa Kijiji* in many instances are the custodians of respected traditions which if adhered to could lead to sustainable peace. Despite obvious biases, male domination and sometimes inconsistency with the law, the *Wazee Wa Kijiji* structure is still important especially when combined with new village-level policing systems such as *Nyumba Kumi*. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees can maximise the potential of the *Wazee Wa Kijiji* to expand the peacebuilding agenda and ensure that they are incorporated into peacebuilding missions in Mombasa County.

6.5.6 Sustainable Peacebuilding Opportunity through facilitation (the Honest Broker role)

Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are also entrusted with the responsibility of facilitating training, community dialogue, sensitization and awareness-raising and other activities that support peacebuilding. The process of facilitating is important perhaps because the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are not supposed to do the work but are required to build the partnerships and interests that are best suited to do the work. This is the honest broker role that in essence summarises the work of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. The "honest broker" role cannot be underestimated as it has been able to play a fundamental role in peacebuilding (van Beijnum (2016).

The study sought to find out how members of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees felt about this role and when the question was put to them, out of 113 respondents, 64.6% (N=73) saw

their role in brokering and facilitation while 35.4% (N=40) were of a different opinion. The majority of DPC can therefore be said to have confidence in their role as honest brokers in the Mombasa peacebuilding agenda, however, this has not been as easy as it sounds. The role of an honest broker is not always appreciated. Peace brokers often get accused of siding with one party against the other in a conflict. Apandi *et al* (2018) argue in the case of Malaysia's role in brokering peace in the Philippines that the former has been accused of siding with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, even though the evidence speaks differently.

Focus group discussions with partners of the DPC members confirmed this role as one said;

> in case there is a problem in the community, they listen to both sides of the story and facilitate coming up with a wise solution. The good thing with them, even if the perpetrator is someone they know, they don't favour them. They also walk and mobilize people and tell them to live in peace, especially during elections. They tell people that politics come and go but your neighbour remains your neighbour even after politics go. (FGD with partners of DPC, Kisauni, August 24, 2021)

The honest broker role in Kenya has been documented by Abdi (2015) with the example of the *Al-Fatah* clan elders from Wajir County, who were able to mediate peace among all the 3 major clans in Wajir County in 1993. This was done at the height of one of the deadliest periods of inter-clan fighting in what was the then North Eastern Province. The peace was secured in a madrasa called Al-Fatah in Wajir town, hence the name Al-Fatah clan elders. Since this occasion, the Al-Fatah Council of Elders has been called to help mediate conflicts in Mandera, Garissa and Isiolo counties. But even in Wajir, mediators have been criticised for overreliance on traditional methods of mediation that might not be consistent with the law and the constitution of Kenya. The traditional system of payment of “blood money” or (diya) in case of murder is not consistent with Kenyan

Penal Code. Austin and Wennmann (2017) have also argued that the business community in Kenya has the potential of playing the "honest broker" role, as long as it can overcome some business-related obstacles

The role of the honest broker must also include expanding the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees partnership base and interests that will amplify the peacebuilding agenda. Partnerships building will also address two other responsibilities entrusted to Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees which are: 1) to mobilise resources for the implementation of programmes and activities, and 2) to network with other peace forums to enhance harmonious relationships.

Cohen (2013) argues that peacebuilding and conflict resolution interventions often require partnerships between locals and outsiders, based on sound trust and professionalism because peacebuilders have to work across partnerships and networks. Mombasa County boasts some well-known peacebuilding networks such as Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE), Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) Trust, Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (KMYA), Faith to Action Network (FAN), National Council of Christian Churches (NCCK), PeaceNet Kenya, all of whom can form strong partners of Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. For this to happen, however, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have to delineate clearly, the contribution expected from each and the accountability expected from each.

6.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter concentrated on exploring the challenges and opportunities that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees face in their quest to foster sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County. The overall conclusion is that Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees face operational challenges which render their work difficult. The study established that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees enjoy full support of policy arms of Government but the same support is not readily available at the community level. This is partly because Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are unknown and partly because communities usually have no resources with which to support entities such as Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, except through goodwill. Some respondents claimed that they were hearing of the DPC for the first time during the interviews. This situation may have arisen from the fact that most of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were formed by Government directives and little was done to involve communities in their formation. Studies have been done on the matter of local peace committee (LPC) formation and the conclusion is that where communities are involved in the formation of the LPC, there is usually more acceptance, support and role clarity.

Much of the operational challenges for the DPC come from the lack of funding with which to conduct their activities. Nearly all respondents, from village elders to the youth and even Government officials decried the lack of funding for the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees as a major drawback for peacebuilding in Mombasa County. Neither do the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees receive personal emoluments nor do they receive operational funds from the Government, which is the entity that formed them in the first place. The official position of the Government is that peacebuilding at this level is a normal function in which the first

beneficiaries are the locals and therefore cannot be a matter of payment. This is true however, studies from Nepal for example, have shown that where local peace committees are supported financially, they tend to be more efficient in their peacebuilding work. Other studies have argued that institutionalisation, having come with certain costs has made Kenyan Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees ineffective. Peacebuilding has now become a series of endless meetings and workshops because these are the fundable parts of peacebuilding.

The study also established there are internal and environmental challenges that continue to impact negatively on the peacebuilding work of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. The lack of standard operating procedures was mentioned by the majority of the DPC members as a problem. This speaks not only to the problem of applying ad-hoc methods for peacebuilding but also the lack of proper preparation of the members of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees for the rigours of modern-day formal peacebuilding. The study also found that DPC members' training is not systematised and has been mainly done through NGOs, whose agendas are not always synchronized with DPC needs. The majority of DPC members also pointed to issues of corruption and interference by politicians as a major problem in peacebuilding. The literature in both these areas is still nascent but the link between corruption has been established by several studies. The same can be said of political interference which is a big factor in determining the direction of peacebuilding in many African countries.

Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees also face the problem of criminality which impacts negatively on their work peacebuilding. The link between the two can be debated but violent criminals have been known to threaten and harm those who act against them. Criminal

gangs see Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees as part of the "snitches" or people who report them to the authorities and are, therefore "enemies". Much as criminal youths are sometimes saved by members of the DPC, the relationship is not on friendly terms. Looking at the discussions in this chapter one may argue that the work and position of Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are far from ideal. How they are facilitated needs to be reviewed with the view to ensuring that they work smoothly, with some visibility and the ability to fund at least some of their activities.

The study established that Mombasa County Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have peacebuilding opportunities that are not only spelled out in the ToRs provided by the NSC, but also those that they can create or take advantage of in the County. The ToRs have at least six activities that can support sustainable peacebuilding and these are; Community Peace Education, Networking and Partnerships Building, Conflict Earl Warning reporting, Community Participation and Public Ownership, Village Elders engagement, and Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees Honest Broker role. These opportunities are also supported by the County and Sub-county administration all the way down to the village elders. Peacebuilding opportunities are also buttressed by the vast number of peacebuilding partnerships in the Civil Society, faith-based entities, international donors and other well-wishers who feel obligated to create a peaceful County. Therefore, peacebuilding opportunities both in the normative roles and through other channels. Youth agency was also seen as an opportunity but this has to be harnessed in a proper way. The next chapter presents the study summary and discusses the conclusions and recommendations for further research.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter concludes this study by providing the conclusions and recommendations as per the data and findings. The conclusions are presented based on specific objectives and the research questions that were used to collect data on the challenges and opportunities for sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County.

The general objective of the study was to investigate the challenges and opportunities for sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County, with a focus on the formal peacebuilding infrastructure. The formal peacebuilding infrastructure is made up of six District Peace Committees, one for each of the six sub-counties; that is, Mvita, Kisauni, Nyali, Jomvu, Changamwe and Likoni.

7.1 Summary of Findings

The first objective of this study was to examine the policy framework for fostering sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County. The study found out that Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees enjoy policy support in the sense that they were formed following Government's pronouncement and a policy to promote peace through local peacebuilding infrastructures. County administration officials were then given the responsibility of supporting the formation of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. Most of the day-to-day supervision of the DPC is done by the Sub-county commissioner, and therefore, the effectiveness of the DPC is dependent on the effort that the County administration out in the DPC. As already seen in the literature, Leonardsson and

Rudd (2015) have argued for the implementation of peacebuilding at the sub-national level, in the belief that the best peacebuilding potential is to be found at the local level, where conflicts also occur. This in concurrence with Lederach who also posits that the best place to place peace is in the people and their culture. However, this optimistic view of local peacebuilding needs policy support that recognises and encourages local agency and the power of the people to own their own peace.

All the Sub-county administrators who were interviewed were appreciative of the work of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, but were quick to point out that they could do more if they were facilitated financially. The study also established that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are expected to mobilise funds and other resources from peacebuilding stakeholders and well-wishers to do their work. Government policy is that financial support cannot be provided, except on rare occasions such as facilitation to attend meetings out of Mombasa County. This policy introduced a peculiar problem for the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, which while being viewed as part of the national peacebuilding agenda, have to look to non-Governmental entities for support to do something that is so important for the nation. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees at have to match their programs to those of the supporting NGO and this does not always work to the advantage of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. Financial support to local peacebuilding entities has been argued by several authors cited in the literature review, for example, Call (2015) in the case of the UNPBC, and Nganje (2021) in the case of local peacebuilding entities in Africa.

The study also found out that the National Steering Committee which is the coordinator of all peacebuilding programs in the country had elaborated clear terms of reference for the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, however, some aspects of the ToRs is difficult for the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to handle primarily because there are other Government agencies better equipped to handle the matter. For example, in for illegal arms, the Police and Army are better placed for searching and confiscating such items. The ToRs contain responsibilities that require resources which the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees simply do not have and cannot raise. For example, to mount a comprehensive public peace education is an elaborate undertaking that require huge amounts of money, time and effort (Mbogo and Ndiritu, 2016). Therefore, the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are constrained in carrying out their key responsibilities, as per the ToR.

The issue of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees composition or membership has been studied by, among others Akerdahl (2013), Nganje (2021) and even internationally by Ahmad *et al* (2013), all of whom are cited in the literature review. The key message from these studies is that the kind of members of the peacebuilding entity determines how it is viewed in the locality and this ultimately determines how successful the committee will be. The study found out that in keeping with the recommendations of the National steering committee (NSC), Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have both genders represented as members. The study also established that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees members are significantly young including a group of youth called "reformed youth. These youths are former gang members, drug traffickers and some Al-Shabaab returnees. It is actually the interest of these youths in peacebuilding that has greatly increased the size and impact of Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in the

County. The study also found that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees members are mostly self-employed. This situation raised the question of how much time the DPC members were able to devote to the responsibility of peacebuilding.

The study found out that members of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees understood their role as peacebuilders even though further probing on this matter revealed that DPC member training was haphazard, unsystematic and dependent on occasional workshops run by NGOs. This phenomenon has led to a culture of frequent workshop attendance whereby DPC members go to numerous training programs which do not add to comprehensive competence building in peacebuilding. A follow-up question regarding the peacebuilding knowledge revealed that DPC members felt that this was one of the major challenges that they faced as Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees.

Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were found to operate from a point of basic knowledge of what the sources of conflict in Mombasa County are. Asked this question, DPC members mentioned illicit drug peddling, historical injustices, poverty, youth radicalisation and criminality, and the perceived domination of "outsiders" (wabara phenomenon) as the top causes of conflict in Mombasa. However, this knowledge seems to have been based on the lived experience of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees rather than a specific study on this matter.

The second specific objective was to evaluate the strategies applied by the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in peacebuilding in Mombasa County. The study found out that the most common strategies or approaches for peacebuilding that Sub-County Peacebuilding

Committees used were; individual and community dialogue; community mobilisation through theatre and dance (including cultural festivals); peace *Barazas*, community walks; youth engagement and ad hoc meetings. Much of the peacebuilding work depended on what threat to peace was foremost at the time of response. Among the strategies most mentioned Peace *Barazas* seemed most preferred perhaps because of the number of people who attend and the fact that Baraza resolutions are usually binding and enforceable. The study established that there was a heavy reliance on *Barazas* for peacebuilding. For example, whenever there was a breakout of gang fighting, the solution of which required a public resolution and the support of law enforcement for implementation, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees would liaise with security agencies to hold a peace baraza. This would then be funded by a collaborating partner. Elfversson (2016) has pointed to the usefulness of Barazas as peacebuilding venues. The study therefore concluded that the work of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees does not fall neatly into the preventive diplomacy, mediation and early warning continuum but a mixture of all three depending on whether the peacebuilding activity was routine or necessitated by an eruption of a conflict.

The involvement of youth in peacebuilding has gained a lot of interest. Youth involvement has been studies by, among others, African Union (2020), Higgins *et al* (2016), Bangura (2016) all of whom have been cited in this study. This study found out that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have engaged the youth as a key partner in nearly all their peacebuilding efforts. Youth engagement was mentioned in Peace *Barazas*, Community Walks, and Community Peace Education through theatre and dance. Many youths have also been engaged in counselling other youth primarily because of their potential to convince their peers with their own life experiences. Youth were seen as a good ally in the County peacebuilding agenda because of their enthusiasm,

reach and knowledge of where trouble spots would be. The study also established that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees collaborated with a wide range of other stakeholders including; Government agencies (such as NSC), NGOs, and both local and international and religious organisations. The study found out that social media has been used as one of the peacebuilding tools employed by the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. The use of short message services (SMS) and WhatsApp has greatly increased the capacity of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to communicate. Yet this effective and cheap means of communication is hampered by the non-funding of committee members' communication needs.

The third specific objective was to evaluate the challenges faced by Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees and the opportunities for sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County. In this regard, it is to be noted, as Chuma and Ojielo (2012) argue, that the pursuit of peace cannot be divorced from understanding the root causes of conflict, and in the case of Mombasa County, these are deep structural causes that have a long history. The study found out that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees face many challenges in trying to build the peace amid conflict drivers that are structural in nature. Lack of financial resources has stifled their potential and weakened the peacebuilding agenda of the County. Githaiga (2020) and Nganje (2021) both point to the danger of institutionalisation which seems to have reduced the agency of these peacebuilding entities. The study therefore concludes that the full potential of these peacebuilding entities can only be reached if their agency in considered alongside serious attempts to address the root causes of conflict in Mombasa County.

The study also found out that there was poor coordination of peacebuilding activities on the ground, implying that there was duplication of effort and even unhealthy competition for attention and resources. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees also have no standard operating procedure (SOPs), with the implication that DPC operations are applied in an ad hoc manner and no standards for which Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees can be held accountable. The study further established that peacebuilding committees faced challenges such as threats from politicians and criminals whenever they took action that these groups did not like. Perhaps most telling was the finding that members felt they did not have adequate peacebuilding knowledge. This problem seriously reduced the impact that the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees could wield on the County peacebuilding agenda.

Further, within the third specific objective, the study explored the potential and opportunity for sustainable peacebuilding. The study out found that DPC terms of reference (ToRs) as established by the National Steering Committee have elements of sustainable peacebuilding if followed. Key peacebuilding activities such as Public Peace Education, support for Early Warning capability of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, Partnerships Building and increasing the capacity of DPC to act as Honest Brokers have the potential of fostering sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa. These strategies are not expensive to mount and have proven to be effective in other countries and can work well for the Mombasa peacebuilding infrastructure. Van Tongeren (2013) had argued for the potential of local peacebuilding committees in enhancing local peace but this can only be done if these entities get the right kind of support.

7.2. Conclusions

The overall conclusion of this study that the diminished agency of Mombasa peacebuilding infrastructure is caused by a combination of a weak policy regime and the application of ineffective peacebuilding strategies, further complicated by continued social unrest and discontent in the County. Policy support without the requisite resources for peacebuilding may be counterproductive in the long run as it creates the impression among the populace that peace was not a serious matter. Yet, peace policy development globally has gradually moved towards the recognition of investing in peace and funding peacebuilding infrastructures to ensure the sustainability of peacebuilding activities. Kenya's ambitious and comprehensive peacebuilding policy argues that for peacebuilding to work at the sub-county level, there must be dedication and commitment. This dedication and commitment can only work if it is backed by resources commensurate to the peacebuilding needs of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. Peacebuilding responsibility without capacity to execute is an exercise in futility. The notion that the Government security apparatus could somehow deliver sustainable peace is misleading. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are central to sustainable peacebuilding and must be treated as such in the future if the model is to be used as a peacebuilding approach in future.

Given the very visible hand of Government in the peacebuilding agenda, this study concludes that peacebuilding in Mombasa County is still very much a Government affair with a little input from the locals by way of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. The manner in which Government controls the appointment into the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, seems to oppose the idea of "local peace by local people". Linking Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to *Nyumba Kumi* and the law enforcement apparatus reflects the continued link between

peacebuilding and security matters in Kenya. Government seems to be the final arbiter of peace and it will define what is peace and what is not. In this situation, security matters always tend to overtake peacebuilding and the result is negative peace. Peaceful co-existence is then mistaken for peace while the real problems that precipitate conflict are "swept under the carpet", so to speak. On this matter, it can be concluded that for Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to be effective, they must be provided with the opportunity to embark on genuine peacebuilding rather than being tied to the security process thus losing the opportunity to build and sustain the peace.

This study also concludes that, contrary to what was expected, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are becoming more youthful and equitably representative of both genders. This is what was found in Mombasa when age and gender were reviewed. This composition has serious implications for peacebuilding because peacebuilding literature is replete with examples of the marginalisation of women and young people. The new-look Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have implications on how peacebuilding will be conducted in future. Peacebuilding in future will have to have the same sense of urgency with which young people see their agency in this matter. Secondly, more gender-sensitive approaches and tools will need to be developed to support peacebuilding activities at the community level. Global experience in this matter revolves around policy development that recognises that men and women are affected differently by conflict and therefore peacebuilding solutions must be along the same lines and cannot be a one-size-fits-all affair. There is evidence to show that where women are fully involved in peacebuilding, the chances of success are much higher. Peacebuilding strategies that are strongly anti-gender-based violence and biases, and more sensitive to solutions that do not impinge on gender rights will certainly change the effectiveness of peacebuilding.

When interrogating the competency of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, the study concluded that the members of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees were not competent to undertake modern-day peacebuilding activities because of inadequate training. This matter speaks to the question of fit-for-purpose, because the level of preparedness of the local peacebuilding committee determines the direction of peacebuilding in a particular place. NSC has the mandate to ensure that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are fully trained and fit for purpose. Secondly, the terms of reference as recommended by the Government, through the NSC are designed for Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees that are well-grounded in modern methods of conflict analysis, management and peacebuilding. Discussions with DPC members revealed that the training, that is being done intermittently does not prepare them for such demanding tasks. The conclusion is that the training is neither adequate nor systematic enough to ensure that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have the requisite competence for sustainable peacebuilding.

In reviewing the strategies available for the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, the study concludes that most peacebuilding strategies can be termed as "soft" approaches that mostly address the symptoms, rather than the root causes of conflict in Mombasa County. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees apply public based activities such as community dialogues of different kinds, be they peace *Barazas* or community dialogue. Where possible, Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have supported youth to start some businesses as a way of addressing criminality and promoting responsible living. The conclusion is that these strategies are necessary but not sufficient approaches for sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa County. The key drivers of conflict in the county can be addressed only partially by the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. To ensure that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees can foster sustainable

peacebuilding, their strategies need to gradually shift towards those that address the underlying causes of conflict in Mombasa County. This study also observed that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have opportunities for fostering sustainable peacebuilding through public peace education and acting as the honest broker among other peacebuilding stakeholders. It can be concluded therefore that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have the potential for fostering sustainable peacebuilding in Mombasa county but their role and tools of trade need to be reviewed and streamlined to match their capacity.

The study established that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have both internal and external challenges. Those that are internal to the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, for example, lack of sufficient peacebuilding knowledge or lack of SOPs can be resolved by systematic training or the development of tools to guide the process of peacebuilding. The challenges that are external to the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are the more problematic ones, the most critical ones being the lack of resources. The position of the Government is that local peace cannot be financed since local people are the first beneficiaries of peace and therefore cannot be paid for their peace. However, this position is not only inconsistent with international practice, it also leaves communities with the feeling of inadequate Government accompaniment in their peacebuilding journeys. It can be concluded that policy support for DPC is not matched by the necessary financial investment for Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to foster sustainable peacebuilding.

This thesis is original both in conceptualisation and in presentation of data because it has collected original information that had not been sought or interrogated by other studies before it. It may be considered a pioneer study which has opened the way for other studies to delve further into

peacebuilding scholarship. Mombasa County still poses a major peacebuilding challenge because of old and emergent threats to peace which need to be understood and responded to effectively.

7.3. Recommendations

Policy support for any undertaking by Government is very important because it usually signals the direction of resource allocation and areas of priority. The policy also delineates duties and responsibilities and draws the accountability lines. Nothing could be more important for Kenya and Mombasa County as a policy that does all the three issues. Mombasa County stands at crossroads of peacebuilding, having so much to offer Kenya, economically and culturally, and yet, potentially the most volatile County given the geographical and historical experience of the County. A sustainably peaceful Mombasa augurs well for Kenya as a whole and therefore peacebuilding in the County must be given the attention and the seriousness it deserves.

Based on the study findings, the study recommends that the idea of peacebuilding through local peacebuilding structures such as Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees be a priority in Kenya's peacebuilding discourse with some modifications in the formation and functioning of Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. The most important according to the study findings is that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees should be provided with enough resources to enable them to organise and manage their peacebuilding activities without having to depend on County Administration or donors and other partners. Who pays the piper calls the tune, and therefore the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are normally forced to comply with NGOs and Donors whose agenda and timing of activities do not always tally with theirs, just because of funding.

At the same time, the terms of reference (ToRs) of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees should be reviewed to include only the responsibilities that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees can undertake meaningfully. Regarding youth, the study recommends that that the responsibilities and composition of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees should be reviewed to reflect Youth Agency in both activities and membership. A major issue that came out of the study was the unpreparedness of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to undertake peacebuilding activities. The study recommends that Government should consider a basic pre-service program at the level of "Certificate in Peacebuilding" which should be a requirement for all Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees. This could be done in collaboration with a leading academic institution in peacebuilding.

The positioning of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees in the community is very important because it will determine their acceptability. The Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees should be de-linked from the county security processes and positioned as the "Honest Brokers for Peacebuilding", whose primary responsibility will be to harness all available resources in their locality to bear on their peacebuilding agenda. This position will help This will ensure that peacebuilding has greater community support to enhance its sustainability. Educate the public about peacebuilding and the role that Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are expected to play in this agenda.

In order for the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees to formulate effective peacebuilding strategies, they should be supported to conduct community-based baselines surveys in order to align peacebuilding strategies to community conflict dynamics. This will reduce the mismatch

between their actions and community peacebuilding needs. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees should be supported to take advantage of modern means of communications and the reach of social media for peacebuilding, by ensuring their connectivity and use of mobile telephony. At the same time, more attention should be given to developing specific youth engagement strategies that reflect the urgency and potential agency of youth in peacebuilding in Mombasa county. A youth-focused peacebuilding agenda needs to address all aspects of youth social, economic, cultural and political agency.

While Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are engaging the community in peacebuilding, the authorities must take steps to create an atmosphere that is conducive to sustainable peacebuilding. The study found that threats to Mombasa County peace are many. Importantly the authorities should ensure that coordination of peacebuilding activities and programs is done to avoid duplication of effort, competition and waste of resources in peacebuilding. The authorities should encourage cross-border peacebuilding initiatives because of the location of the county, vis a vis the other counties in the Coastal region and proximity to other Countries and the Indian Ocean. This proximity has the potential to internationalising local threats to peace and increases Kenya's vulnerability to terrorism and drug trafficking

7.4. Suggestions for Further research

The results of this study have shown a clear gap between the rhetoric as contained in the Kenya National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (2015) and the action on the ground concerning peacebuilding in Mombasa County. While it must be acknowledged that policy is often a latecomer in many public affairs, peace is such a critical element of the Country's development

and survival that any aspect of peacebuilding cannot be left to chance. The gap in the knowledge of how Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees manage to foster sustainable peacebuilding vis a vis the mandate that they have been given is still wide. Mombasa Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees are formal structures set up by the Government and can be considered nascent therefore little is known about them. This research set out to study the policy, strategies and opportunities for sustainable peacebuilding that the local peacebuilding structure in Mombasa County may have. Recommendations for further research are provided in the same thematic areas.

For policy, further research is needed to understand whether and how policy stewardship works for sustainable peacebuilding. This research could not ascertain how Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have applied the provisions of the Kenya National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (2015), nor if they had developed any of their own. The understanding of policy stewardship in the management of peacebuilding activities will go a long way in shaping how peacebuilding policies should be crafted. There are different stakeholders in the County peacebuilding agenda but little is known about their take on policy and how they see their role in it. More studies are warranted in this area.

In terms of peacebuilding strategies, the study established a bias towards the more public-oriented approaches, but with no clear direction as to how these could or should influence the peacebuilding process. The peace *Barazas* are usually used as special purpose vehicles to pass other messages from Government. The question remains; how effective are they and can they be a tool in sustainable peacebuilding? Further research is necessary for this area. Moreover, a cost-benefit analysis of these strategies is necessary to inform policy. *Barazas* have been held in Kenya since

colonial times for administrative purposes but in terms of peacebuilding, this is new and needs to be understood.

The advent social media and the so-called “social influencers” is new and yet proving to be a powerful indicator of social dynamics. Never before has there been a category of people known as social influencers in Kenya's public discourse, and yet the now seem to be setting the public agenda. Social media has now emerged as a tool in peacebuilding. Research is necessary as to the degree of its influence and whether as a peacebuilding tool it can be reliable. This is a critical point because of the proclivity of youth to turn to social media for much of their information. It is instructive to note that even terrorist groups have used social media to spread their propaganda and influence society. Research is necessary for this aspect of modern life and how it can be harnessed for sustainable peacebuilding.

Challenges to peace and peacebuilding in Mombasa are being witnessed very regularly by all stakeholders. Some are based on the old scripts of historical injustices and youth criminality but there are emerging and nascent threats such as the silent epidemics of gender-based violence, the new Covid-19 threat, the challenges of devolution and the problem of allocation of resources to peacebuilding. And then there is critical issues regarding the set-up of the Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees, their roles and functions, and their readiness to undertake peacebuilding. Research is necessary to fully understand the confluence points of these old and emerging issues that come together, to negatively impact the peace and influence peacebuilding in Kenya. Sub-County Peacebuilding Committees have the potential to contribute to peacebuilding in Kenya, but only if they are fully supported and adequately prepared to do so.

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APPENDICIES

Appendix 1. 1 Consent Form

Dear Sir/Madam

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study.

I am a student at Masinde Muliro University of Science Technology (MMUS), pursuing Doctoral studies on peacebuilding. My topic of study is: ***Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Peacebuilding in Kenya. An Analysis of Local Peacebuilding Committees in Mombasa County.*** Peace is an integral part of our national development agenda. The findings of this study will be instrumental in helping policymakers, practitioners, other peace stakeholders in our country to respond better in our national peacebuilding agenda. I am kindly requesting to provide truthfully the information that will help achieve this objective. The information you provide shall be used strictly for this study and confidentiality shall be maintained.

Please note that your participation in this research is voluntary and you shall derive no financial benefit from it. You may skip any questions that you are uncomfortable with or withdraw your participation at any time that you chose.

Thank you in advance.

I have read and understood the contents of this note and hereby agree to participate in the research

Signature_____ Date_____

Appendix 1. 2: Local Peace Committee Questionnaire (County and Sub-county)

The following questions are to be administered to each member of the Local Peace Committee. The questions are meant to solicit your own perceptions and opinions and therefore there are no wrong answers. You will be requested to provide your answer on a sliding scale from 1-5. Choosing 1 will mean that you strongly disagree with the statement, while 5 will indicate that you strongly agree. You may also choose 2, 3, or 4 depending on how you feel. At the end of each question, you will be provided with space to add any information that you may wish to add.

Shukran!

1. Name of my LPC _____
2. My gender is: male ☐ female ☐ not stated ☐
   (chose one)
3. My age is_____(please provide answer in complete years)
4. My LPC was established in _____ and I have been a member for _____years
5. This LPC is registered in the County. Yes ☐
   No ☐

   If Yes, please indicate which authority that issued your certificate of registration_____
6. I am a member of this LPC as (please tick one)
   elected member ☐ selected member ☐

   If you were selected, please indicate by whom_____

   If you were elected, please indicate by whom_____
7. My membership in this Local Peace Committee can be described as:

NGO representative ☐ government representative ☐

youth representative ☐ women representative ☐

Special interest group representative ☐ community representative ☐

donor representative ☐ volunteer member ☐

Other (please specify)_____

8. I fully understand the role of my LPC

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

The role of my LPC is to:

a) _____
b) _____
c) _____
d) _____
e) _____

9. I have been trained in my role as a member of this LPC

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please indicate the topics you have been trained in (for example negotiation skills, conflict theory, peacebuilding.)

I. _____
II. _____
III. _____
IV. _____

10. I know the difference between conflict resolution, conflict management, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

1	2	3	4	5

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please elaborate_____

_____

_____

11. My LPC is fully aware of the Kenyan National Policy on Peace-Building and Conflict Management prepared by the Office of the President in 2011.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please elaborate_____
_____
_____
_____

12. I am aware of other peacebuilding policies and documents in Kenya

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please name them

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____
iv. _____
v. _____

13. My LPC is supported by all stakeholders in this county

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please elaborate_____
_____
_____

14. My LPC has a work plan that it adheres to in doing its peace work in this County

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please elaborate_____
_____
_____

15. My LPC meets: every day ☐
weekly ☐
monthly ☐
quarterly (every three months) ☐
only when needed ☐

Please provide any more details you might have on your meetings_____

_____
_____

16. My LPC has a structure that facilitates our work (for example, recognised Chairperson, secretary, office bearers etc.,

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please describe the structure of your LPC

_____
_____
_____
_____

17. The office bearers of my LPC are changed regularly through a credible process

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please indicate how this is done

18. My LPC has taken steps to include the voices of all the peace stakeholders in this sub-county

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please provide examples _____

_____

19. Please provide details of members of the LPC in the table below

Constituency	How many	Position held
Women		
Men		
Youth		
Differently able persons		
Private sector		
Religious organisations		
Sub-county security agencies (SCIC)		
Others (please name them		

20. My LPC is able to keep records of our discussions and deliberations for future follow-up

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please tell us how this is done _____

_____

_____

21. My LPC has Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for conducting peacebuilding activities

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please give examples

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____
iv. _____

22. My LPC has enough financial resources to carry out peacebuilding activities in our area of operation

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please explain your answer_____

_____

_____

23. My LPC is financed as follows:

Source of funds		Always	Occasionally	Never	Provide explanations if any
1	Government				
2	County Government				
3	Donor				
4	Community				
5	Members of the LPC				
6	Other				

24. My LPC is able to resolve all conflicts in our County/sub-county

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please explain your answer_____

_____

_____

24 My LPC has undertaken a conflict analysis and fully understands the causes of conflict in the County/sub-county

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please elaborate when this was done/with whom?_____

_____

_____

25 Our analysis shows that the following are the main causes of conflict in our County/sub-County

i. _____
ii. _____

iii._____

i. _____

26 Crime poses a challenge for sustainable peacebuilding in my county/sub-county

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please provide some examples

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____
iv. _____

27 My LPC has the ability to do the following

Issue	Yes	No	Please provide examples
Respond to Emerging conflict in our county/sub-county			
Address underlying causes of conflict in our county/sub-county			
Foster Participation and Ownership of peacebuilding processes in our county/sub-county			
Manage the peacebuilding processes in our county/sub-county			
Mobilise resources for peacebuilding activities in the county			
Conduct Community training for peacebuilding in our county/sub-county			
Conduct Policy advocacy in our county/sub-county			
Assess the contribution of each member of the committee			
Apply traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in our county/sub-county			

28 My LPC is aware of other peacebuilding efforts in this county/sub-county

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please name them

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____
iv. _____
v. _____

29 My LPC works with other partners in promoting peace in this County

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please name your partners and how you collaborate with them

ii. Partner_____
Nature of collaboration_____
iii. Partner_____
Nature of collaboration_____
iv. Partner_____

Nature of collaboration _____

v. Partner_____

vi. Nature of collaboration _____

vii. Partner_____

Nature of collaboration _____

(use additional paper if needed)

30 My LPC conducts regular peacebuilding education in this county/sub-county

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please provide examples

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____
iv. _____

31 My LPC collaborates with law enforcement authorities (e.g. police, county administration) to conduct peacebuilding activities in this county/sub-county

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please give examples

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____

32 The authority of my LPC has been challenged in this County/sub-county

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please provide examples of the challenges that your DPC has experienced

_____
_____
_____

33 My LPC has used the National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (2011) in conducting peacebuilding activities in this county/sub-county

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please give examples

i._____
ii_____
iii_____
vi._____
v._____

34 The National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (2010) provides adequate guidance to LPCs on how to conduct peacebuilding activities at the County/sub-County level

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please give examples

i._____

ii_____

iii_____

vi._____

v._____

35 My LPC has plans for addressing these problems in our County/sub-County

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please provide examples of your plans

i. _____

ii. _____

iii. _____

iv. _____

v. _____

36 The work of my LPC is affected by the following problems

Issue	Yes	No	Please give examples
Lack of staff			
Lack of financial & other resources			
Non-payment of Peace committee members			
Competition from other peacebuilding projects			
Political interference			
High turnover of committee members			

Lack of knowledge on then part of committee members			
Lack of community support			
Lack of office space/ equipment and supplies			
Corruption			

Please add any other problems/issues that do not appear above

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____
iv. _____
v. _____

37 My LPC has developed its own peacebuilding policy

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please elaborate _____

_____

38 My LPC has been able bring durable peace in the County/sub-County

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please give examples_____
_____
_____
_____

39 My LPC uses the following strategies to maintain peace during times of NO conflict

i._____
ii_____
iii_____
vi._____
v._____

40 My LPC uses the following strategies to build peace during times OF CONFLICT

i._____
ii_____
iii_____
vi._____
v._____

41 Our strategies for peacebuilding have been successful

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please examples

i._____
ii_____
iii_____
vi._____
v._____

42 My LPC has collaborated with neighbouring counties to conduct/sub-counties peacebuilding (e.g. Kilifi, Kwale)

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please provide examples of cross-border peace initiatives

_____
_____
_____
_____

43 My LPC has used traditional conflict resolution and peacebuilding mechanisms to secure the peace (for example village elders, Kaya, traditional prayers)

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please give some examples

i. _____
ii. _____

iii. _____

iv _____

v._____

44 My LPC has addressed the problem of youth radicalisation in this county/sub-county

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please provide examples

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____
iv. _____

45 My LPC is able to create economic opportunities for youth and other marginalized groups

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please provide examples

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____
iv. _____
v. _____

46 My LPC has used the following strategies for engaging youth in responsible livelihood/good citizenship

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____
iv. _____
v. _____

47 My LPC has addressed the problem of lawlessness in this sub-county

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please give examples

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____
iv. _____
v. _____

48 My LPC has addressed the problem of gender-based violence in this county/sub-county

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please provide examples

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____
iv. _____
v. _____

49 My LPC has addressed the problem of violence against people who are originally not from this community

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please provide examples

v. _____
vi. _____
vii. _____
viii. _____
ix. _____
x. _____

50 My LPC has collaborated with security apparatus in this sub-county to promote public safety

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please elaborate

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____
iv. _____
v. _____

51 My LPC has a role in the future of peacebuilding in this county/sub-county

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please tell us why you think so

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____
iv. _____
v. _____

52 In my view, the following problems are the main obstacles for peacebuilding in my sub-county

i. _____
ii. _____
iii. _____
iv. _____
v. _____

53 My County/sub-County has become more peaceful since the formation of my LPC

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree

Please elaborate

_____

_____

_____

_____

54 My County/sub-County can be more peaceful if the following things were done

i. _____

ii. _____

iii. _____

iv _____

55 I have the following additional information/suggestions to provide.

Appendix 1. 3:**Observation Checklist**

	Issue observed	yes	no	Comments
Meeting Preparation				
1	LPC members received communication of the meeting in good time			
2	LPC members received meeting agenda and minutes of last meeting in time			
3	Meeting venue was conducive for conducting business (seating, space, audio/visuals)			
Actual meeting				
4	Meeting started on time			
5	Chairperson called meeting to order and explained the purpose of the meeting			
6	Adoption of agenda allowed for inclusion of LPC members concerns and needs			
7	Deliberations conducted in a manner to bring about useful/doable resolutions			
8	Chairperson summarised all deliberations to ensure that actionable points were captured			
9	Chair assigned follow up tasks to members of the LPC			

Follow up				
10	Plans for follow up and feedback seem adequate for county peace agenda			
11	Follow-up mechanism adequate to ensure that decisions are implemented			
LPC Infrastructure				
12	LPC has own office and operational space			
13	LPC has own personnel necessary for conducting business			
14	LPC has own equipment and supplies			

Appendix 1. 4: FOCUS GROUP GUIDE

FGD for Households and Residents of Wards/Youths Groups/Special Interest Groups

Participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the study at any time without giving reasons, and without prejudice or any adverse consequences. The information you give will only be used for research purposes and will be aggregated with other responses and only the overall or average information will be used. Your identity and individual answers will be kept totally confidential. Should you wish to discuss this further please feel free to contact me. The questions are meant to solicit your perceptions and opinions so there are no wrong answers. For ease of analysis, we shall record this session

Please sign this consent to signify your acceptance. Thank you!

1. What are the most common conflicts in this ward, and how do they occur?
2. How does your LPC respond to these conflicts ?
3. Please describe to me your LPC?
4. How do you work/relate to the LPC? (probe how many people, how often do they meet to conduct business?)
5. What strategies does this LPCs use for conflict resolutions and peacebuilding?
6. How do you rate these strategies?
7. How would you describe the impact of your LPCs in promoting sustainable peacebuilding? (probe)
8. What challenges have you seen your LPC going through when doing peacebuilding?
9. What would you like to see them do to ensure lasting peace in this community?
10. How does your community support the LPC?
11. How do you relate to your neighbours/people from other communities in this ward?
12. How does your LPC work with other organizations working on peace in your community?
13. How do you assess their collaboration?
14. Do you have any other information on the peace work in your sub-county?

Thank you.

Appendix 1. 5 **Key Informant Interview Guide**

To be administered to:

1. Government officials at national level
2. Government officials at county/sub-county level
3. NGOs/CBOs in Mombasa County

Introduction

Thank you for taking time to talk to me about peacebuilding in Kenya. As you are aware, Kenya's new conflict management and peace building policy places great emphasis on local peace building committees. I would like to hear your views on these committees.

Please note that participation in this interview is voluntary. Your opinions will not be divulged to someone else. Please sign this consent to signify your acceptance.

1. Tell how are you connected to County Peace Committees/ Local Peace Committees?
2. What is your opinion on County Peace Committees/ Local Peace Committees?
3. Tell me about the structure of County Peace Committees/ Local Peace Committees and how this facilitates their work
4. What would you say are the strategies used by County Peace Committees/ Local Peace Committees?
5. How would you rate the LPCs on the following issues?
    a. Responding to Emerging conflict
    b. Strategies used in peacebuilding
    c. Addressing underlying causes of conflict
    d. Fostering Participation and Ownership of peacebuilding processes at the local level
    e. Managing the peacebuilding processes
    f. Capacity development for peacebuilding
    g. Engaging with Peace Policy
    h. Advocating for peace
    i. Application of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms
    j. Managing resources for peacebuilding

    (probe why for each issue)

6. What do you think are some of the challenges affecting the work of County Peace Committees/ Local Peace Committees?
7. Do you think there is enough investment going into peacebuilding in Kenya?

   Probe, why, what resource are provided?

8. Please talk to me about government interventions in conflict-affected Counties
9. Are peace activities being sustained for long enough to make a real difference to durable peace?
10. How do you see the role of international organizations in the achievement of peace in Kenya?
11. What kind of support should County Peace Committees/ Local Peace Committees? expect from National Government?
12. What kind of support should County Peace Committees/ Local Peace Committees? expect from County Governments?
13. What can you tell me about Mombasa County LPCs in relation to what we have discussed?

Thank you for your time

Appendix 1. 6 Approval letter by DPS (**MMUST)**

MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MMUST)

Tel: 056-30870
Fax: 056-30153
E-mail: directordps@mmust.ac.ke
Website: www.mmust.ac.ke

P.O Box 190
Kakamega – 50100
Kenya

Directorate of Postgraduate Studies

Ref: MMU/COR: 509099

4th June, 2021

Dan Odhiambo Odallo,
CPC/H/04-53335/2018,
P.O. Box 190-50100,
KAKAMEGA.

Dear Mr. Odallo,

RE: APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL

I am pleased to inform you that the Directorate of Postgraduate Studies has considered and approved your Ph.D. proposal entitled ***"Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Peacebuilding in Kenya:An Analysis of Local Peace Committees in Mombasa County, Kenya"*** and appointed the following as supervisors:

1. Prof. Pontian Godfrey Okoth - SDMHA, MMUST
2. Prof. Edmond Were - Kissi University

You are required to submit through your supervisor(s) progress reports every three months to the Director of Postgraduate Studies. Such reports should be copied to the following: Chairman, School of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Graduate Studies Committee; Department of Peace and Conflict Studies & Departmental Graduate Studies Committee. Kindly adhere to research ethics consideration in conducting research.

It is the policy and regulations of the University that you observe a deadline of three years from the date of registration to complete your Ph.D. thesis. Do not hesitate to consult this office in case of any problem encountered in the course of your work.

We wish you the best in your research and hope the study will make original contribution to knowledge.

Yours Sincerely,

Dr. Consolata Ngala
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

INFINIX
AI CAMERA

Appendix 1. 7:**NACOSTI RESEARCH LISENCE**

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

NACOSTI

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: **981325**

Date of Issue: **21/June/2021**

RESEARCH LICENSE

This is to Certify that Mr.. Dan Odhiambo Odallo of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, has been licensed to conduct research in Mombasa on the topic: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACEBUILDING IN KENYA: AN ANALYSIS OF LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES IN MOMBASA COUNTY,KENYA for the period ending : 21/June/2022.

License No: **NACOSTI/P/21/11281**

981325

Applicant Identification Number

Director General
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Verification QR Code

NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document, Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.

Appendix 1.8 Research Authorization from County Government of Mombasa

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,
P.O. BOX 90424-80100,
MOMBASA.

Tel. 0715 040444/0780 040445

Email: cc.mombasa@interior.go.ke
When Replying please quote:

Ref. no. **MCC/ADM.25 VOL.III/ (124)** **20th August, 2021**

All Deputy County Commissioners,
MOMBASA COUNTY MOMBASA

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION – DAN ODHIAMBO ODALLO
PERMIT NO. NACOSTI/P/21/11281

This is to authorize the above named student from Masinde Muliro University, to conduct a research on ***"Challenges and opportunities for sustainable peacebuilding in Kenya: an analysis of local peace committees in Mombasa County, Kenya"*** for the period ending **21st June, 2022.**

Any assistance accorded to him will be highly appreciated.

G. B. KITIYO, MBS
COUNTY COMMISSIONER
MOMBASA COUNTY

C.C.

County Director of Education
MOMBASA

Appendix 1. 9: **Research Authorization from Mombasa County Director of Education**

REPUBLIC OF KENYA
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
STATE DEPARTMENT OF EARLY LEARNING & BASIC EDUCATION

Telegrams: "SCHOOLING",
Mombasa
Telephone: Mombasa 2315327 / 2230052

COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION,
MOMBASA COUNTY,
P. O. BOX 90204-80100
MOMBASA

Ref.No.MC/ED/GEN/23

20th August, 2021

To Whom It May Concern

RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION
DAN ODHIAMBO ODALLO-PERMIT NO.NACOSTI/P/21/11281

This is to authorize the above student from Masinde Mulilo University to conduct a research on ***"Challenges and opportunities for sustainable peace building in Kenya: An Analysis of local peace Committees in Mombasa County"*** for the period ending 21st June,2022.

Any assistance accorded to him will be highly appreciated.

COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION
P. O. BOX 90204 - 80100
MOMBASA

Peter M. Magiri
COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION
MOMBASA