

**DYNAMICS OF EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY REGIONAL FORCE'S
INTERVENTION IN THE MANAGEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF CONGO'S INTRACTABLE INTRA-STATE CONFLICT**

Manana Robert Santos

**A Research Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of the
Award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies of
Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology**

November, 2024

DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work prepared with no other than the indicated sources and support and has not been presented elsewhere for a degree or any other award.

Signature..... Date.....

Manana Robert Santos

CPC/H/01-70370/2021

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned certify that they have read and hereby approve for acceptance of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology this thesis entitled “**Dynamics of East African Community Regional Force’s Intervention in the Management of Democratic Republic of Congo’s Intractable Intra-State Conflict.**”

Signature..... Date.....

Prof. Frank K. Matanga

Department of Peace and Conflict Studies

Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology- Kenya

Signature..... Date.....

Prof. Dr. Edmond M. Were

Department of Political Science and Peace Studies

Kisii University –Kenya

DEDICATION

To my wife Caroline and Children whose prayers always surrounded me until I become what I am now. They were always with me through the journey of struggle and the moment of success especially while I was away in Eastern Congo for data collection. To my entire family and friends, your encouragement and continued support made me achieve my dream.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the guidance and the help of several individuals who in one way or another contributed and extended their valuable assistance in the preparation and completion. First, I take this chance to thank my God the Almighty for his love and blessings He has been showering on me. I would like to thank my supervisors Prof. Frank K. Matanga and Prof. Dr. Edmond M. Were who motivated me to demand excellence from myself and not to be so shocked on the occasions that I may actually achieve it. I express my appreciation and thanks to their curiosity, patience, understanding and encouragement. Their advice, comments and guidance to my thesis enabled me to develop an appreciation for research.

My sincere appreciation goes to my research assistants Lt. Col. Aquinas Nyakundi, Major Diana Naker and Sgt Franciscar Mali who made sure that data was collected on time. I cannot forget Eng. Chrispus Wathimba for coming in handy and sponsored my trip from here in Kenya to study area and back. A big thank you goes to Eng. David Ojwang, Mr Gilbert Kaijuka and crew for welcoming and hosting me in Kigali-Rwanda and Eng. Jude Tibanyendera and crew for hosting me in Kampala -Uganda during my research tour your, sacrifice was not in vain.

To my employer, thank you for permitting to study and clearing me to travel to Goma- DRC for field work. To my friend Austere, Malivika Voice of America reporter and crew, thank you for walking with me in the valleys of Goma during my field work.

Lastly, I thank my late mum, Doris. It is her care, support, and encouragement that fuelled my intellectual curiosity and my love for learning. She is also the one who made me know that it did not matter what I “did” in the past as long as I “did my best in the present”. It is because of her, that I developed the imagination to dream, the self-confidence to pursue my dreams, and the tenacity to achieve them. Rest in peace Mum.

COPYRIGHT

All rights are reserved. No part of this thesis may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the author or Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology on that behalf.

ABSTRACT

The protracted new generation warfare in the Eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the intervention by the EAC Regional Force (EACRF) are indicative of the need for a comprehensive security strategy and the vitality of regional efforts. Intra-state conflicts in eastern DRC have been protracted since its independence in 1960. The conflicts have varied from political, ethnic to resource use and control. They have rendered the Eastern part of the country ungovernable and contributed to a huge influx of refugees into neighboring countries as well as millions of internally displaced persons. In addition, the conflict has embraced regional states as active fomenters. Furthermore, the eastern DRC has attracted international and regional conflict resolution actors who have for all practical purposes been unsuccessful. This study investigated the dynamics of EACRF intervention in the management of DRC's intractable intra-state conflict. The specific objectives included an examination of EAC regional force role, structure and objective in the management of DRC's intractable intra-state conflict, assessment of the root causes, types and extent of DRC intractable intra-state conflict and evaluation of the challenges and opportunities of DRC's conflict management by EACRF. The study was buttressed by conflict transformation, power and neo functionalism theories to explain the interplay of its variables. The target population was 297 from which a sample of 177 was derived. Sampling techniques included census, simple random, snowballing and purposive sampling. Primary data were collected using an interview guide and questionnaire. Secondary data were obtained from a review of published materials on the DRC Conflict. The qualitative data were analyzed thematically while quantitative data were analyzed by the use of descriptive statistics including frequencies, percentages and means. This study addressed an academic gap related to pursuit of a multidimensional strategy in conflict resolution as well as policy gaps related to intervention strategies at state and inter-state levels in the study area. Findings of the study indicated that EACRF major role is military coordination 85(56.66%), 40(25.66%) rapid deployment of troops, Capacity to respond in Crisis 25(16.66%). however, military coordination challenges occur as a result of intervening state interests in the DRC conflict, therefore, deployment of these troops in DRC is seen as a ploy to undermine conflict management efforts. About 89 (59.33%) of the respondents believed that cross border armed groups are a major cause of the war; 38(25.33%) indicate that resource competition. On EACRF challenges 101 (67.33%) of the respondents agreed to lack resources while 33 (22. %) agree to inadequate manpower and 16 (10.6%) agree to slow enforcement to quell the conflict in DRC. The study recommends expanded role and structure for EACRF. Besides the military and political wing, there is need to include local police and civilian's role to effectively and comprehensively manage the conflict. This means the one-year period of deployment was inadequate to realize peace in DRC. Further, the study recommends Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda to manage internal conflict within their borders since Eastern Region of DRC is a haven for rebel groups that emerge from these states. From the study, the overall conclusion is that the EACRF intervention, is yet to achieve sustainable peace and security in relation to the management of DRC's intractable intra-state conflict. Therefore, the intractable intra-state conflict will remain growing at unprecedented rate.

TABLE OF CONTENT

DECLARATION	ii
CERTIFICATION	ii
DEDICATION.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iv
COPYRIGHT	v
ABSTRACT	vi
TABLE OF CONTENT.....	vii
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xiii
LIST OF PLATES	xiv
LIST OF TABLES.....	xv
LIST OF APPENDICES	xvii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.....	xviii
OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY CONCEPTS	xx
CHAPTER ONE.....	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background to the Study	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	12
1.3 Objectives of the Study	13
1.3.1 General Objective	13
1.3.2 Specific Objectives.....	14
1.4 Research Questions.....	14
1.5 Justification of the Study.....	14
1.5.1 Academic Justification	14

1.5.2 Policy Justification.....	16
1.5.3 Philosophical Justification.....	16
1.6 Scope of the Study.....	18
1.7 Chapter Summary.....	19
CHAPTER TWO.....	19
LITERATURE REVIEW	19
2.1 International Intergovernmental Organizations, Regional Organizations and Conflict Management.....	20
2.1.1 Role, Structure and Objectives of Regional Forces in Management of Europe and The Organization of the American States Intractable Intra-State Conflict	36
2.1.2 Role, structure and Objectives of Regional Forces in Management of African Region Intractable Intra-state conflict.....	47
2.1.3 The birth of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).....	50
2.1.4 Institutional and Structural Capacity of Regional Mechanisms in Conflict Management.....	73
2.1.4.1 Institutional Capacity of the SADC in Conflict Management.....	74
2.1.4.2 The ECOWAS Institutional Capacity	75
2.1.5 Role, Structure and Objectives of East African Regional Forces in Management of East African Region Intractable Intra-State conflict.....	78
2.2 Root Causes, Types and Extent of European and Middle East Regions Intractable Intra-State Conflict	84
2.2.1 Root Causes, Types and Extent of African Region Intractable Intra-State Conflict	90
2.2.1.1 Root Causes, Types and Extent of Malian Intervention by the ECOWAS Intractable Intra-State Conflict.....	102
2.2.1.2 SADC and the Intervention in the DRC	103
2.3.1.3 Root Causes, Types and Extent of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia	106

2.2.1.4	Origins, Characteristics, and Scope of SADC Intervention in the Intractable Intra-State Conflict in Lesotho	110
2.2.1.5	Root Causes, Types and Extent of DRCs Intractable Intra-State Conflict.....	112
2.3	Dynamics and Challenges in the Management of European, ASEAN and OAS Regional Organizations Intractable Intra-State conflict.....	127
2.3.1	Dynamics and Challenges in Management of European Union (EU) Regional Bloc in the Kosovan Crisis Intra-State Conflict.....	147
2.3.2	Dynamics and Challenges of Regional Intervention in Southeast Asia (The ASEAN Way of resolving regional conflict).....	153
2.3.3	Dynamics and Challenges in Management of Africa Intractable Intra-State Conflict	154
2.3.3.1	Dynamics and Challenges of Regional Intervention by African Union (AU) Intervention in Burundi	156
2.3.3.2	Conflict Management in the Southern Africa Sub-Region	158
2.3.3.3	The Policy Framework of the SADC Brigade	158
2.3.3.4	Dynamics and Challenges in management of Southern African Development (SADC) in the Lesotho Intractable Intra-State Conflict	160
2.3.3.5	Intractable Intra-State Conflict Management in the West African region (The ECOWAS).....	161
2.3.3.6	Dynamics and Challenges in Management of ECOWAS Intervention in the Liberia's Intractable Intra-State Conflict.....	165
2.3.3.7	The Malian Conflict	169
2.3.4	Dynamics and Challenges in Management of East African Community Bloc Intractable Intra-State Conflict.....	171
2.3.4.1	Constraints on Regional Organizations Conflict Management	181
2.3.4.2	Dynamics and Challenges for UN Peacekeeping Operation in the Congolese State: Regional Security Complex in the Great Lake Region and its Challenges.....	183
2.3.4.3	Capability Challenges at the AU That Directly Affect the EACRF. ...	185

2.3.4.4 Responsibility to Protect.....	186
2.4 Empirical Review	188
2.4.1 The Role, Structure, and Objectives of EACRF in the Management of DRC’s Intractable Conflict.....	188
2.4.2 Root Causes, Types, and Extent of DRC’s Intractable Intra-State Conflict	191
2.4.3 The dynamics and challenges in management of DRCs intractable intra-state conflict by EACRF	193
2.5 Conceptual Framework.....	195
2.5.1 Conflict Transformation Theory.....	195
2.5.2 Power Theory.....	197
2.5.3 Neo-Functionalism Theory.....	200
2.5.4 Conceptual Framework Model	204
2.6 Chapter Summary	204
CHAPTER THREE.....	206
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	206
3.1 Research Design	206
3.2 Study Area.....	208
3.3 Sample Size and Sampling Techniques	210
3.5 Data Collection.....	212
3.5. 1 Questionnaire Surveys.....	212
3.5.2 Key Informant Interview Guides	212
3.5.3. Focus Group Discussion Guide	213
3.6 Data Collection Procedure	213
3.7 Validity and Reliability of Research Instruments	214
3.8 Data Analysis	216
3.10 Ethical Considerations	217
3.11 Chapter Summary	218

CHAPTER FOUR	219
ROLES, STRUCTURES AND OBJECTIVES OF EACRF IN MANAGEMENT OF DRC’s INTRACTABLE INTRA-STATE CONFLICT.....	219
4.1 Introduction	219
4.2 Response Rate	219
4.3 Background Information.....	219
4.3.1 Distribution of Respondents by Gender.....	220
4.3.2 Distribution of Respondents by Age Brackets	220
4.4 EACRF Role, Structure and Objectives in DRC Intractable Intra-State Conflict.....	222
4.4.1 Military Coordination.....	225
4.4.2 Objectives of Rapid Respond in Crisis	232
4.4.3 Role of EACRF Affiliated Structures in DRC Intrastate Conflict	234
4.5 Chapter Summary	239
CHAPTER FIVE.....	240
ROOT CAUSES, TYPES AND EXTENT OF DRC INTACTABLE INTRA-STATE CONFLICT.....	240
5.1 Regional Root Causes in DRC Intrastate Conflict	240
5.1.1 Nature, Types and Extent of Trans-Border Militia Conflicts, History of Militia in DRC.....	242
5.1.2 Resource Extraction, Cross Border Trade Contribution to DRC Conflict... ..	246
5.2 State Governance Weakness, State Exclusion and Marginalization as Root Causes, Types in relations in DRC Internal Conflict.....	257
5.2.1 Institutional Governance Weakness in EAC States	262
5.2.2 DRC Colonial History, Weak Governance Systems and Marginalization Contribution to DRC Conflict.....	265
5.2.3 Transnational Ethnic Groupings, Ethnic Exclusion and Armed Groups	269
5.3 Chapter Summary	272

CHAPTER SIX.....	273
DYNAMICS AND CHALLENGES IN MANAGEMENT OF DRC's INTRACTABLE INTRA-STATE CONFLICT BY EACRF.....	273
6.1 EACRF Intervention Dynamics and Challenges.....	273
6.1.2 Relations between the Central Government and Sub-National Communities Challenge	275
6.1.3 Regional Dynamics and its Complexity.....	277
6.1.4 Humanitarian Operation Challenges.....	280
6.1.5 Preventive Deployment Challenges.....	291
6.2 EACRF Coordination Challenge.....	293
6.2.1 Peace Building and Peace Keeping Challenges.....	295
6.2.2 EACRF Preventive Diplomacy Strategy Challenge	296
6.2.3 Special Envoys.....	297
6.2.4 Panel of the Wise and Special Representative.....	299
6.3 EACRF Structural Challenges.....	302
6.3.1 Resource Capacity Challenges	303
6.3.2 Slow Enforcement and Military Difficulties	306
6.4 Chapter Summary	309
 CHAPTER SEVEN	 311
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	311
7.1 Summary of Findings.....	311
7.2 Conclusions	315
7.3 Recommendations.....	317
7.4 Suggestions for Further Research.....	318
 REFERENCES.....	 319

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Model Showing the Relationship Between Variables.....	204
Figure 4.1: EACRF Partners	226
Figure 4.3: EACRF Intervention Personnel.....	235
Figure 5.1: Regional and Intra-State Conflict Root Causes.....	241
Figure 5.2: Regional Root Causes and internal Conflict in DRC	262
Figure 6.1: Humanitarian Challenges in DRC Internal Conflict.....	282
Figure 6.2: Preventive Diplomacy.....	297
Figure 6.3: Structural Capacity Challenges	303

LIST OF PLATES

Plate 4. 1: Plate Showing the Researcher at EACRAF HQ - DRC	224
Plate 5. 1: Plate Showing the Researcher in Goma-DRC	264
Plate 5. 2: Plate Showing the Researcher in North-Kivu.....	268
Plate 6. 1: Plate Showing the Researcher in Kigali, Rwanda	278
Plate 6. 2: Plate Showing the Researcher with IDPS in Kibati- 10kms from Goma.	284
Plate 6. 3: Plate Showing the Researcher in Sky Blue T-Shirt (on the left) during an FGD with Refugees in Nyakabande Transit Center - Kisoro Western Uganda.....	284
Plate 6. 4: Plate Showing the Researcher with Refugees in Kigali -Rwanda	286
Plate 6. 5: Showing the Researcher in Blue T-shirt at Department of Refugee in Uganda in Kyangwali.....	290
Plate 6. 6: Plate Showing the Researcher in Blue T-shirt with the Refugees in Uganda in Kyangwali refugee Camp	290
Plate 6. 7: Plate Showing the Researcher with the spokesperson- Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) Wazalendo.....	306

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Table Showing Summary of Research Design Adopted the Study and the Measurable Variables	208
Table 3. 2: Target Population.....	210
Table 3.3: Sample Size Determination Techniques	211
Table 4.1: Questionnaire Response Rate	219
Table 4.2: Distribution of Respondents by Gender.....	220
Table 4.3: Age of Respondents	221
Table 6.1: Table Showing EACRF intervention Challenges	280
Table 6.2: Table Showing EACRF Partners	293

LIST OF PLATES

- Plate 4.1: Plate Showing the Researcher at EACRAF HQ - DRCError! **Bookmark not defined.**
- Plate 5.1: Plate Showing the Researcher in Goma-DRCError! **Bookmark not defined.**
- Plate 5.2: Plate Showing the Researcher in North-KivuError! **Bookmark not defined.**
- Plate 6.1: Plate Showing the Researcher in Kigali, RwandaError! **Bookmark not defined.**
- Plate 6.2: Plate Showing the Researcher with IDPS in Kibati- 10kms from Goma
..... **Error! Bookmark not defined.**
- Plate 6.3: Plate Showing the Researcher in Sky Blue T-Shirt (on the left) during an
FGD with Refugees in Nyakabande Transit Center - Kisoro Western
Uganda..... **Error! Bookmark not defined.**
- Plate 6.4: Plate Showing the Researcher with Refugees in Kigali -Rwanda..... **Error!
Bookmark not defined.**
- Plate 6.5: Plate Showing the Researcher in Blue T-shirt at Department of Refugee in
Uganda in Kyangwali **Error! Bookmark not defined.**
- Plate 6.5.1: Plate Showing the Researcher in Blue T-shirt with the Refugees in
Uganda in Kyangwali refugees camp292
- Plate 6.6: Plate Showing the Researcher with the spokesperson- Alliance of Patriots
for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) WazalendoError! **Bookmark
not defined.**

LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: Introduction Letter	319
APPENDIX II : QUESTIONNAIRE For EACRF Ground Personnel.....	332
APPENDIX III: Key Informant Interview Guide	338
APPENDIX IV: Focus Group Discussion Guide.....	339
APPENDIX V: MMUST Approval of Proposal.....	340
APPENDIX VI: NACOSTI Research Permit.....	341
APPENDIX VII: Field Work Schedule of Activities.....	342
APPENDIX VIII: Researcher’s Official Request to Collected Data in the Republic of Rwanda.....	344
APPENDIX IX: Researcher’s Official Request to Collect Data in DRC.....	345
APPENDIX X: Researcher’s Official Request to Collect Data in the Republic of Uganda.....	346
APPENDIX XI: Clearance by NPS-K for Researcher to travel to the Republic of Rwanda for Data Collection	347
APPENDIX XII: Letter of Support by the High Commission of Uganda	348
APPENDIX XIII: Researcher’s International Travel Document.....	349
APPENDIX XIV: Map of East Africa	350

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADP:	People's Democratic Alliance (<i>Alliance Démocratique du Peuple</i>)
AFDL:	<i>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques de Libération</i> (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo)
AFRICOM:	Africa Command
AUMBI:	African Union Mission in Burundi
APCLS:	<i>Alliance des Patriotes pour un-Congo Libre et Souverain</i> (Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo)
ASEAN:	Association of Southeast Asia Nations
ASF:	African Standby Force
AU:	African Union
CEPGL:	<i>Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs</i> (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries)
CIAT:	<i>Comité International d'Accompagnement de la Transition</i>
CNDP:	<i>Conseil National pour la Décence du Peuple</i> (National Council for the Defense of the People)
CNRD:	<i>Conseil National de Résistance pour la Démocratie</i>
DP:	Democratic Party
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo
DDR:	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion
EACRF:	East African Community Regional Force
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
EU:	European Union
FAR:	<i>Forces Armées Rwandaises</i> (Rwandese Armed Forces)
FARDC:	<i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i> (DRC Armed Forces)
FDC:	<i>Forces de Défense du Congo</i> (Forces for the Defense of Congo)
FDD:	<i>Forces de Défense de la Démocratie</i> (Forces for the Defense of Democracy)
FDLR:	<i>Front Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda</i> (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda)
FNI:	<i>Front des Nationalistes et Integrationnistes</i> (Nationalist and Integrationist Front)
FNL:	<i>Forces Nationales de Libération</i> (National Forces for Liberation)
FOLC:	<i>Forces Œcuméniques pour la Libération du Congo</i> (Ecumenic Forces for the Liberation of Congo)
FRPI:	<i>Forces de Resistance Patriotique en Ituri</i> (Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri)
GW:	Global Witness
HRW:	Human Right Watch
ICC:	International Criminal Court
ICG:	International Crisis group
ICGLR:	International Conference for Great Lakes Region
ICJ:	International Court of Justice
IGAD:	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
INGO:	International Non-Governmental Organization
LRA:	Lord Resistance army

M23:	March 23 Movement
MLC:	<i>Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo</i> (Movement for the Liberation of Congo)
MNC:	<i>Mouvement National Congolais</i> (Congoese national Movement)
MNCs:	Multinational Organizations
MONUC:	<i>Mission des Nations Unies au Congo</i> (UN Mission in Congo)
MONUSCO:	<i>Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation du Congo</i> (UN Mission for the Stabilization of Congo)
MPLA:	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MPR:	<i>Mouvement Populaire pour la Révolution</i> (Popular Movement of Revolution)
MRLZ:	<i>Mouvement Révolutionnaire pour la Libération du Zaïre</i> (Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Congo)
MRND:	<i>Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement</i> (National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development)
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU:	Organization of African Unity
ONU:	<i>Organisation des Nations Unies</i> (United Nations Organization)
OTP:	Office of the Prosecutor
PARECO:	<i>Patriote Résistants Congolais</i> (Coalition of Congoese Patriotic Resistance)
PM:	Prime Minister
PNP:	<i>Parti National du Peuple</i> (People's National Party)
PRP:	<i>Parti pour la Révolution Populaire</i> (People's Revolution Party)
PSA:	<i>Parti Solidaire Africain</i> (African Party for Solidarity)
RCD:	<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</i> (Congoese Rally for Democracy)
RCD-ML:	<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie- Mouvement de Libération</i> (RCD- Liberation Movement)
SADC:	Southern African Development Community
SPLA:	Sudanese People Liberation Army
UN:	United Nations
UNITA:	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
UPC:	<i>Union des Patriotes Congolais</i> (Congoese Patriots Union)
USA:	United States of America
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WB:	World Bank

OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

Complex humanitarian emergency: This is a consequence of egregious human rights violations in the DRC, which have caused the collapse of the public assistance delivery system.

Conflict: A situation in the DRC involving at least two identifiable factions pursuing incompatible objectives in deliberate opposition to one another.

Contingent: This is a combat force that a specific nation has contributed.

Durable peace: This form of peace enables the government to carry out its routine operations while also permitting citizens to resume their regular routines.

Dynamics: Challenges and opportunities of EACRF intervention that influence conflict management in eastern DRC

Failed states: These are states whose governments are incapable of providing fundamental public services, such as social security, and are therefore unable to uphold their citizens' constitutional rights.

Follow-on forces: These forces are tasked with providing reinforcements to the soldiers that were initially deployed, particularly in situations where the burden of the mission is overwhelming.

Intra-state conflicts: The persistent armed conflict in the region of Eastern DRC

Intractable Conflict: The intense, deadlocked, resistant to de-escalation or resolution. Tend to persist over time, with alternating periods of greater and lesser intensity

Interoperability: The capability of armies from various nations to collaborate effectively during a joint operation or mission.

Intervention dilemma: Circumstances in which the commanding officers must simultaneously defend the civilians, ensure the safety of their own forces, and destroy the insurgents while carrying out the mission.

Mandate: The military has designated tasks that the forces in the host country are expected to complete.

Military intervention: Force projection or deployment beyond national boundaries by a nation-state with the objective of averting or resolving pervasive and severe transgressions against the fundamental human rights of non-committees, without the consent of the nation whose territory the force is employed.

Mission scenarios: Operating principles by which the EACRF is expected to function.

Missions: Military missions that are designed to neutralize the opposing forces, thereby bringing an end to the hostilities.

Peace support operations: These are military operations conducted in a region where violent armed conflicts are raging. Its purpose is to compel armed organizations to abide by a ceasefire agreement.

Sub-Region: Denoting the nations of Eastern Africa

Support Arm: Refers to combatants equipped with long-range weaponry, such as an artillery brigade.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Since the Cold War ended, the ability of international and regional organizations to control conflicts has hinged on their access to economic, diplomatic, and military resources, as well as their determination to use these tools strategically. This triad of resources, determination, and strategy continues to be an essential element with regard to the organization as a whole. The inadequate progress and engagement of numerous regional and international organizations (IO) in conflict regulation can be attributed to a dearth of determination and strategic planning, as opposed to a mere scarcity of resources. Furthermore, NATO serves as a potential example of how the effective management of conflicts requires a synergy of resources, determination, and strategy. Although the outcome of Afghanistan remained uncertain, NATO has unequivocally achieved success in six of the seven operations it has conducted since the end of the Cold War: Libya, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and two anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. The significance of internal consensus and leadership in facilitating the efficient allocation of resources is further exemplified by the achievements of NATO (Moe & Geis, 2020). They directed their attention towards the aspect of mutual interest in conjunction with the potential for effective interventionism by forces within the region. An important omission of the present research, however, is the examination of competing interests and the profound impact this has on the conflict.

It is worth noting that traditional peacekeeping or observation and interposition operations were the prevailing form of action during the Cold War. These operations

involved the deployment of observers to monitor the situation and establish a buffer zone between the conflicting factions once a cease-fire has been reached. This category includes two of the United Nations' earliest missions, namely the ones in Suez (UNEF) and Kashmir (UNMOGIP), which were established in 1949 and 1956, respectively (ACLED, 2022). Despite the continued significance of this form of operation in the post-Cold War era, international or regional missions are becoming progressively more complex. The much broader objectives of these stability operations, peace support, and peace building initiatives reflect a growing recognition of the necessity for a comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction. As an illustration, several missions of the European Union are dedicated to security sector reform, with a particular focus on enhancing the capabilities of police forces and border guards (as is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Georgia). Another objective is the promotion of a rule of law-oriented culture and institutions (Kosovo, Georgia).

In its objective of establishing a new state, the United Nations mission in East Timor was arguably the most ambitious of these new-type operations; it facilitated East Timor's transformation from an Indonesian-occupied territory to a fully recognized member of the international community of sovereign states. Furthermore, additional responsibilities have been incorporated into instances of international intervention that maintain conventional peacekeeping components. As shown by the EU mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the AU mission in Darfur, peace-building missions almost always include humanitarian operations, particularly aiding refugees and internally displaced persons, organizing and observing elections, and building institutional capacity (Amar, 2012; Mawdsley, 2012).

The prospective success of the NATO operation in Afghanistan is contingent upon several critical factors: the accessibility of material resources, the level of political determination exhibited by the Allies, and the presence of the necessary instruments to support collaborative military endeavors. Coordination within and beyond the alliance, on the other hand, is considered problematic. Nevertheless, the primary obstacle concerning the Alliance's endeavor in Afghanistan concerns the complexity of formulating a well-defined strategy for ISAF. Iván (2022) points out that as the nation-building mission has grown more complex, NATO's role has become more nebulous and international, as "the NATO operation is seen as complementary to an ambitious nation-building effort guided by the UN." Furthermore, the Alliance's security coordination with the EU remains hampered by a political crisis involving Cyprus, a non-NATO member state, and Turkey, which is not a member state of NATO. This indicates that partner states' multi-membership in regional organizations is a deficiency when it comes to Europe's effort to unite regional forces behind a unified front. Similarly, the DRC's status as a partner state to SADC and EAC contributes to the conflict's dynamics.

Increasing internal displacement-related activities are also observed in other regions, including the Americas, within the Organization of American States (OAS), the political institution that governs the entire hemisphere. Resolutions of the OAS General Assembly have recognized the presence of internal displacement in the area and emphasized the necessity of implementing assistance programs and safeguarding the human rights of displaced populations. By prioritizing the protection of democracy, it has additionally contributed to the mitigation of the risk of significant population displacement in the Americas. The OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, composed of seven independent legal experts, has officially endorsed

the Guiding Principles. It employs these principles as a foundation for assessing and monitoring conditions of internal displacement during its missions to various countries. Furthermore, governments in Latin America, particularly in Colombia, where there are more than 1.4 million internally displaced persons, are recognizing the value of the Guiding Principles when devising programs and policies regarding internal displacement. As is evident from this discourse, the majority of interventions in regions afflicted by armed conflict are aimed at mitigating humanitarian crises rather than engaging in direct combat, as is the situation in the Americas. Particularly in regards to achieving enduring solutions to the conflict in the DRC, such a strategy might prove ineffective.

Conversely, Iván (2022) contends that internationalization dynamics were discernible in additional contexts, including the Turkey-Iranian conflict (southeast), during which the Turkish Army conducted multiple military campaigns against Kurdish forces situated in northern Iraq. Turkey maintained a prominent position in the conflict unfolding in the adjacent country of Syria. Iran's sustained engagement in the armed conflict in Syria and its significant role in shaping the dynamics of the armed conflict in Iraq can be attributed to its influence over multiple Shia militias. Tehran's increasing engagement in Yemen can be attributed to its close closeness to the Houthis, its interest in the country due to the power struggle with Saudi Arabia, and the ongoing negotiations regarding its nuclear program. A significant role was held by the United Arab Emirates and Riyadh in the international coalition involved in the armed conflict in Yemen. Riyadh maintained this leadership position. Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have been "proxy wars" for a number of years, during which time regional and international disputes have been manifestly reflected in the conflict's dynamics.

An additional conflict that garnered attention for its internationalization dynamics in 2021 occurred in Ethiopia (Tigray). This conflict was precipitated by Eritrea's support for the Ethiopian government, which led to the fighting spreading to the border region between Ethiopia and Sudan. There, Sudanese militias engaged in clashes with the armies of Ethiopia and Sudan. Significant events transpired in northern Mozambique, where a multitude of international actors were engaged in support of the counterinsurgency operations of the Mozambican security forces. Some of these actors, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Rwanda, and Portugal, as well as the United States and the European Union, contributed military and/or police contingents. Others provided training units (Iván, 2022). The probability of proxy conflicts arising from the conflicting interests of partner states engaged in intervention is suggested by this study.

Africa's territorial configuration has undergone significant transformations since the conclusion of the Cold War, contributing to a broader global reorganization (Chaturvedi and Painter, 2007). Undoubtedly, the African continent has been undergoing perpetual socio-spatial transformations ever since the era of colonialism. In addition to the ramifications of migration, climate change, and the global pursuit of natural materials, violent conflict continues to be a significant catalyst for these transformations (Hentz, 2014). Examining the domain of African peace and security with a spatial perspective not only engages with the principles of traditional political science, but also contributes to the discourse surrounding the emergence of 'new regionalism' in the 1990s. This discourse has contributed to the progress of the discipline by challenging fundamental tenets of the "old regionalism," specifically the (neo-)functionalist perspective on European integration. It argued that since the end of the Cold War, new, frequently expansive forms of regionalism have emerged in the

Global South (Hettne, 1999). Concurrently, an emerging field of research known as "comparative regionalism" is spearheading a third iteration of studies on regionalism (Soderbaum, 2016a).

The primary mechanisms through which the AU Commission enforces conflict prevention and mediation in Africa consist of statutory entities, including the Panel of the Wise, Special Envoys, and High Representatives of the AUC Chairperson. Since its establishment in 2007, the Panel of the Wise has consisted of five members; four panels have been appointed in succession (Gomes Porto & Ngandu, 2015). Subsidiary organizations consisting of the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FemWise-Africa) and the Pan-African Network of the Wise (Pan Wise) were formed in 2013 and 2017, respectively. These organizations are still in the planning stages, but they will eventually become fully functional networks that include many non-state actors, including faith-based groups, NGOs, community groups, councils of elders, ombudsmen, pastoralist mediators, and education and research groups. The Panel of the Wise has played a pivotal role in elevating significant subjects such as transitional justice, women in conflict, and electoral violence to the agenda of the Union.

Peen (2012) examines the African Union through the lens of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB). The study concludes that despite being the inaugural mission of the organization, it significantly advanced the post-conflict transition in Burundi and thus proved to be a triumph. He explains that AMIB's achievements were attributable, in part, to its establishment and maintenance of liaison between local parties and, in part, to its close coordination with external partners such as the EU and the United Nations. His contribution also underscores the significance of internal

coordination among the institutions and members of the organization, as well as the criticality of the role performed by the mission's leading nation, South Africa. Notwithstanding the AU's inadequate financial resources and nascent institutional infrastructure, the mission was sustained through the political determination of its member states, which also contributed to the stabilization of the security situation in the country. The preceding study underscores the importance of a leading nation in any intervention involving internal conflict. Nevertheless, it neglects to identify vulnerabilities in situations involving power rivalry among associate states, which is the subject of the present investigation.

At the outset, violent conflict in Africa during the 1990s was described as "new wars," distinguished by factors such as an increased prevalence of intra-state conflicts centered on ethnic identities and civilian casualties, in contrast to the proxy conflicts of the Cold War. Violent conflicts increased during the 2000s, primarily as a result of unconstitutional government changes, including coups d'état, contested presidential third-term debates, and electoral violence (AUC Chairperson, 2010). As a result, there has been a dramatic increase in violent conflict in the last ten years. This is largely due to the rise of radical insurgencies like Ansar Dine, MUJAO, Boko Haram, Ansar Bait Al-Maqdis, Islamic State Provinces (Sinai, Libya, and Tunisia), al-Shabaab, the Lord's Resistance, and numerous others. According to the African Union, these acts of violence are referred to as "violent extremism and terrorism" (AU PSC, 2014a; AUC Chairperson 2014). According to the AUC Chairperson (2014), there are a number of characteristics that define trans-regional conflict zones in Africa. These include terrorist attacks on African interests, attacks on Western and other foreign interests, the use of African territories as safe havens, the fact that Africa is a breeding ground for terrorists and a source of funding and recruitment, and the fact that Africa is a

transit point for terrorists and donors involved in other illegal activities. Research like this sheds light on a plethora of causes for continental internal turmoil; as a result, any solution needs to pinpoint the exact nature of the conflict, which is why this study is focused on that area.

There have been attempts to get the African nations together and create a regional platform for them to talk things out for decades. In 1963, the principal goal of the Organization for African Union (OAU) was to promote unity and collaboration among African states for the benefit of the African people. The organization's charter (OAU, 2014) made reference to the idea of peaceful conflict resolution. Following its 2002 dissolution, the African Union (AU) took over; its goals were largely unchanged from its predecessor, but its commitment to peaceful conflict resolution remained unchanged. The AU's charter and organization are more precisely defined than the OAU's, according to Jerome (2016), when it comes to a regional approach to dispute resolution.

Two initiatives that aim to put the idea of maintaining peace and security on the African continent into action are the Peace and Security Council and the African Standby Force (ASF). In an effort to end the fighting in the African Great Lakes Region, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) is hard at work mediating peace talks. Because it founded the Force International Brigade in the DRC, the organization played a critical role in bringing about a peace agreement in the country (The Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2008).

Development, Security, and Peace are distinct yet interdependent concepts that are frequently in a state of flux. One of the most fundamental definitions of peace is the lack of structural violence. In contrast, security can be defined as the condition in

which social, political, economic, and environmental hazards are absent. The interplay between security and peace ultimately leads to progress (Okoth, Matanga, & Onkware, 2018). The DRC has been engulfed in conflict for an extended period of time, which has had an adverse impact on its development. This, in turn, has laid the groundwork for protracted conflict in certain regions of the country. According to Matanga et al. (2018), the notion of peace transcends structural violence by a significant margin.

Most African regional and sub-regional organizations, however, are primarily concerned with economic matters; examples include ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD. As the Deputy Assistant Administrator of USAID in Africa, Franklin Moore opined that while economic growth and development are crucial, they do not satisfy the region's more pressing requirement for peace and security. Additionally, he noted that the efficacy of economic regional organizations in Africa lies in their ability to effectively address intra-state disputes, as opposed to the more prevalent inter-state conflicts in the area (The Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2008).

However, as previously mentioned, conflicts in Africa are a combination of interstate and intrastate disputes, as evidenced by the participation of numerous intrastate militant groups and neighboring states in the civil wars in the DRC. By leveraging economic disconnectedness, these groups can significantly aid nations in limiting their participation in civil wars, allowing them to exert more control over militant groups within their borders. An example of an economic organization that attempted to intervene in the DRC conflict was SADC, which appointed mediators. Additionally, SADC members assisted the DRC in enduring the 1998 intervention by Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi (Cawthra, 2010). More recently, Tanzania, South

Africa, and Malawi assisted the Congolese army in expelling M23 from North Kivu Province via the Intervention Brigade and under the auspices of the United Nations (Jerome, 2016).

The conflict in Congo is multifaceted and nuanced. It has vestiges of the personal rule manifested in the King Leopold personal leadership style and the consequent Belgian colonial rule. The dawn of independence in 1960s pushed the country into the Cold War dynamics based on the competition over high impact natural resources including uranium. The competition was actualized in the country through rival proxy political groups that morphed into militias with the capability to challenge central state power. Since the overthrow Mobutu Sese Seko, the Country has experienced intractable conflicts between rival militias that are also enjoy the backing of neighboring states with a view to controlling the valuable mineral and timber resources.

Since the 1990s, the conflict has largely been characterized by deterministic motivations of the armed minority Kinyarwanda-speaking Banyamulenge ethnic group that is allegedly backed by Rwanda. In addition, the eastern part of the DRC is fraught with rebel groups that have cross-border ambitions and whose operations have contributed to regional instability that has attracted international, sub-regional and unilateral state interventions. The humanitarian dimensions of the conflict have been dire and in the course of time have contributed to regional instability and insecurity.

The heads of state of the EAC member states issued a call for an urgent cessation of hostilities in the eastern DRC and made the decision to proceed with the joint force. General Robert Kibochi, the chair of the EAC's military staff and chief of defense forces of Kenya, delivered a preliminary concept of operations during the meeting. This document outlined the objectives and standards of engagement of the joint force,

as well as the resources that would be provided to its commander. The proposed battle plan specifies that between 6,500 and 12,000 soldiers are to be assembled in the eastern DRC with the mission of "containment, eradication, and defeat of negative forces." The combat force, under the leadership of a Kenyan commander and with its headquarters in Goma, the capital and commercial center of North Kivu, would be tasked with conducting operations in four provinces of Congo: Haut-Uélé, Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu. Its mandate would be renewable every six months and would be subject to a strategic review conducted by the involved parties every two months. Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, and South Sudan have all agreed to contribute military personnel to support the Congolese forces in combat (Bischoff, Aning, & Acharya, 2016).

Although the joint force is a novel endeavor, the majority of its units would be re-deployments of personnel already stationed in the DRC within the last few months; each contributor would be tasked with a unique objective. Joint force Ugandan soldiers are tasked with providing support to their fellow soldiers in the conflict against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a coalition of Ugandan rebels in which the largest faction has declared its allegiance to the Islamic State in the regions of North Kivu and Ituri. To begin with, armed interventions in the area have a poor track record of long-lasting success, and the involvement of nations with economic and strategic interests in the region could further complicate an already perilous situation (Nelleke, 2022). As previously stated, a number of the DRC's neighbors have intentionally and repeatedly undermined the region's eastward stability through the support of proxy combatants and the exploitation of its vast natural resources. Some nations, such as Uganda and Burundi, may continue to pursue their own objectives despite being under the command of a joint force. Analysts express concern that the

Kenyan force commander stationed in remote eastern regions will have limited supervision authority from the Goma headquarters. As an illustration, the Burundian contingent that embarked on its journey into the DRC on August 15th has been subordinate to Congolese authority instead of Kenyan command. It appears that their primary focus is on advancing Burundian interests in the region of South Kivu (Nelleke, 2022).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a fluid conflict zone that has experienced protracted conflict since its independence in 1960 (Marks 2011, Shepherd 2018, Parker 2024). The fluidity has influenced the failure of subsequent interventions that have largely followed the conventional script of conflict management animated by coercive intervention strategies. According to the Centre for Preventive Action (2024) six million deaths have been recorded since 1996. The severity of the conflict has seen almost 400,000 people in internally displacement camps in the first two months of 2024 (OCHA, 2024). The conflict has involved numerous internal and external actors whose convergence has only but fueled further conflict in the region (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2017). The conflict manifests the basic attributes of New Warfare that have taken root in the Post-Cold war era. The New Warfare in the region has for all practical purposes exceeded the intervention capacities of the state, multilateral as well as unilateral security actors.

The United Nations' intervention missions since the 1960s and the 1990s unilateral state interventions in the post-Mobutu dispensation have to all practical purposes been incapable of reigning in the intermittent conflicts. Any lull in the fighting is just a prelude to future escalation in the conflict. Since 1998, however, the eastern region of

the DRC has attracted dedicated regional military intervention by SADC countries focused on a mixture of coercive engagement as well as mediation. This has to a certain extent involved the Coalition of the Willing (CoW) within the regional body and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). It is apparent that the security problematic of the region is such a complex web that requires a new approach from the erstwhile conventional coercive strategies and arrangements. This is justified by the changing nature of warfare in terms of tools, alliances and methods. The Eastern African Community Regional (EACRF) has been one of the latest entrants in this theatre of war.

This study analyses the dynamics of the emerging region-centric intervention in New Warfare in eastern DRC with a specific focus on EACRF. Though a regionally sanctioned intervention mechanism, the EACRF also comprises partner states that portray vested interest traits in terms of cultural affinity, informal resource exploitation propensities, and pursuit for resident non-state combatants. Manana et.al (2024) In this context, this study examines the capabilities and mechanisms of the EACRF in the intervention in the DRC. It further analyses the EACRF structure and composition, the physical and relational capabilities, and the contribution of conflict of interest among the EAC partner states in the management of New Warfare in eastern DRC.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 General Objective

The general objective of the study was to investigate the dynamics of EAC Regional Force's intervention in the management of Democratic Republic of Congo's intractable intra-state conflict

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The study purposed to achieve the following specific objectives:

- i. Examine the role, structure and objectives of EACRF in management of DRCs intractable conflict
- ii. Assess the root causes, types and extent of DRCs intractable intra-state conflict
- iii. Evaluate the dynamics and challenges in management of DRCs intractable intra-state conflict by EACRF

1.4 Research Questions

- i. What roles, structures and objectives of EACRF relate to the management of DRCs intractable intra-state conflict?
- ii. To what extent do root causes and types contribute to DRCs intractable intra-state conflict?
- iii. What are the dynamics and challenges in management of DRCs intractable intra-state conflicts?

1.5 Justification of the Study

1.5.1 Academic Justification

Research on intra and interstate conflicts has largely focused on rebel groups and governments engaging in power struggles. An investigation by Nelleke (2022) reveals, for instance, that the government and pro-government militias in the eastern part of the DRC are engaged in combat with M23. He contends that an EAC joint force has a number of benefits over ongoing bilateral interventions. The inclusion of

the DRC in the multilateral force structure may potentially mitigate the perceptions of the Congolese people that external actors are intervening in the nation for the purpose of advancing specific foreign interests. However, the EAC faces substantial dangers when participating in a combat mission. To begin with, armed interventions in the region have a poor track record of long-lasting success, and the involvement of nations with economic and strategic interests in the area could potentially worsen the situation. As previously mentioned, a number of the DRC's neighbors have willfully and repeatedly contributed to the region's instability in the east through their support of proxy combatants and exploitation of its vast natural resources. Certain nations, such as Uganda and Burundi, may persist in pursuing their individual objectives despite being under the joint command of their forces (Nelleke, 2022). Nonetheless, this study neglects to illuminate the intricate dynamics that emerge in armed conflicts, which are heavily skewed toward regionalized interests and, at times, global interests. As demonstrated, prior research has primarily examined mechanisms rather than highlighting the intricate nature of conflict dynamics that complicate the involvement of regional intervening forces.

According to a study by Mwinyi, M. , Okoth, P. and Maloba, E. (2022) the EAC was preoccupied with resource disputes, specifically fishery rights on Lake Victoria. He recognizes the significance of cross-border conflict resolution structures at the regional level. However, his study fails to adequately address routine political and security concerns that pose a risk to the independence of member nations.

The examination of intra-state conflict has not been extensively explored in the EAC within the framework of regionalization and especially involving state partners with vested interests. As such, non-hegemonic regionalization, an emergent phenomenon

in conflict management that has evaded incisive analysis, is the subject of this study. The prevailing body of literature has predominantly examined regional hegemons as the principal actors in intervention processes across different conflict arenas on the continent. The EACRF mechanisms bring a fresh perspective to conflict management by highlighting the need of collaboration and fair involvement.

1.5.2 Policy Justification

The determination and course of action regarding conflict management policy formulation have historically been the domain of influential nations on the global stage. The United States, being a global power, exerts influence over the characteristics of interventions in diverse theaters of war and conflict. This has been delegated to the regional hegemons at the regional level. Nigeria has emerged as the preeminent ECOWAS member state in West Africa, while South Africa has dominated the SADC region. As opposed to this, however, power struggles among EAC partner states did not factor into the formulation of intervention policies in the eastern DRC. Therefore, this research proposes a paradigm shift in the approach to managing regional conflicts in the absence of such conflicts. Cooperation, consensus-building, and formative consultations are emphasized in the execution of regional mandates during conflicts.

1.5.3 Philosophical Justification

The methodology employed in this investigation was interpretivism as its philosophical foundation. The origins of this approach can be traced back to the Chicago School of thought, which was established in the early 20th century and was spearheaded by Max Weber, Erving Goffman, Martin Bulner, and others (Alharahsheh & Pius, 2020). It primarily entails a comprehensive analysis of the research elements, thereby introducing human interests into the investigation. Social

perceptions, including language, shared meanings, and consciousness, are hypothesized to be the foundation of any potential path to realities. Furthermore, the study employs qualitative approaches to gather data in order to encompass a broader spectrum of perspectives regarding the subject matter (Chowdhury, 2014). By employing this methodology, the researcher was able to decipher the perspectives of individuals in order to determine the intricacies of the East African Regional Forces' intervention in the DRC's intra-state conflict management. Through the utilization of various data acquisition methods, the researcher was capable of conducting a comprehensive analysis of the research subject. This contributed to the accomplishment of the study's objectives.

The study's results are expected to provide significant insights into the domain of intra-state conflicts as they pertain to regionalism as a whole, as well as enhance our comprehension of the interplay between peace and conflict. For example, Gatling's theory of peace posits that peace is defined as the condition in which violence ceases to exist. Thus, Galtung's theory is a theory concerning peace and violence in the same sense. Therefore, Galtung's theory of peace is predicated on his definition of violence. According to him, violence is the disparity that exists between potential and actuality, or what might have been and what is. He explains his theory, which emphasizes structures over agents, as an attempt to distance himself from the actor-centric perspective that permeates much of Western social science. His theory of violence, for instance, accounts for the military–industrial complex, but provides little insight into the decisions that individuals make within these processes; for instance, can an unemployed immigrant be considered an agent of violence if he enlists in the military due to the lack of viable alternative career opportunities? However, in the same way

that structures exert an impact on agents, agents also have the ability to alter structures.

Therefore, it is necessary to attempt to position individuals in relation to the processes and movements that both shape them and are in turn shaped by them. Consequently, this study emphasizes that, from a philosophical standpoint, the involvement of actors in the DRC conflict is crucial, considering the regionalized nature of the conflict. The examination of intra-state conflicts, in particular, has not garnered significant scholarly interest in the EAC. This gray area continues to require further investigation with regards to the rationalization of such conflicts. This research holds significance for scholars and students interested in investigating the transformation of conflicts and associated concepts. Its findings will serve as a valuable literary resource and contribute to the foundational principles of Johan Galtung's theory of peace. Academics will additionally gain from the expansion of knowledge frontiers with regard to the methodologies utilized, the examination of theoretical foundations, and the development of practical remedies for the repercussions of intrastate regionalized conflict.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a fluid conflict zone that has experienced protracted conflict since its independence in 1960. There has been attempted intervention in new warfare by international and regional bodies like MONUSCO, SADC and many others. The study was limited to EACRF, an East African Community regional security mechanism that was specifically created to promote conflict resolution in the DRC. The study aimed to critically analyse EACRF intervention in the New Warfare dynamics in Democratic Republic of Congo which

traces the intervention way back in 2012 that has not yield peace thus deployment of EACRF in 2022. This period is characterized by the emergence and intensification of the March 23 Movement (M23) – a rebel group that seeks to advance the interests of the Congolese Tutsi ethnic group within the DRC military and political system. The data was collected from the month of August to December 2023

1.7 Chapter Summary

The chapter highlights new regionalism in post-Cold War era in Africa where states are member s of several regional blocs. This has complicated relations in conflict situations where competing interests reduce ability to resolve intra-state conflict on the continent. As such, this gives space for external intervention with diverse interest making the conflict complex. As it were, ASF at EAC level is yet to be operational and, in its place, the EACRF emerged as an alternative. The involvement of the EACRF in DRC conflict where other multiple players have set foot adds more twists and turns to the conflict. the subsequent overleaf contains the literature review chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter critically analyzed relevant secondary sources that have addressed organizational capacity in terms of resources, operations, structure and technics of conflict management. Also, intervention mechanisms such as peace enforcement, peace keeping, diplomacy, dialogue, peace building are discussed. Lastly, the dynamics to the conflict due to competing interest and weakness of the DRC state were explored. The conceptual framework which guides the study is also presented and discussed in this chapter. The chapter ends with a summary

2.1 International Intergovernmental Organizations, Regional Organizations and Conflict Management

According to classical theories of state structure, states typically have populated territories, sovereign authorities, and functional governments that keep domestic anarchy and state collapse at bay (Bull, 1984; Waltz, 1979). In contrast, traditional international relations depict the international system as chaotic. Centrifugal forces of violent ethno nationalism related to normative issues like human rights and democratization have emerged in the post-Cold War era, prompting reactions from the international system, including peacekeeping missions.

These interventions demonstrate a departure from the principle of non-intervention and the rigorous observance of the doctrine of state sovereignty. The escalating magnitude and breadth of violent confrontations that result in interventions in civil wars sanctioned by the United Nations (UN) and the Great Powers (G-7), highlight the vulnerability of institutionalized principles, doctrines, and practices to modification, violation, or alteration in reaction to systemic imbalance. These modifications are implemented as a result of the heightened emphasis on state and international safeguarding of human rights, a concept that garnered more attention following 1945. Moreover, such conceptual developments that manifest as novel

approaches that disrupt established modes of operation may stem from internal factors alone (e.g., the demand for democratization that incites violent civil strife) or from external factors and evolving policy perspectives (e.g., the conditionality of democratization in relation to the International Monetary Fund). Key actors engage in interventions, whether coercive or non-coercive, to achieve the dual objectives of "homogenization" and "socialization" of international society.

The turbulence and conclusion of the Cold War sparked a shift in both international practice and conception with regard to intervention in safeguarding human rights. State sovereignty is confronted with both internal and external obstacles, such as ethno-political and other types of threats associated with the state, as well as civil unrest that can grow into widespread misery and genocide. Currently, the Great Powers have extended their peacekeeping efforts to include involvement in civil wars, under the auspices of the United Nations. The end of ideological rivalry among major countries has promoted unity in the pursuit of improved worldwide cooperation and structural stability, helped by the United Nations and other international institutions. Developing states are consequently subjected to heightened levels of international social control by the United Nations Security Council and other global powers. According to Robinson (1996) and Aguelli & Murphy (1988), the Gramscian ideology places considerable importance on the notion of social control, which functions at two separate levels: the political realm and civil society. When states like Yugoslavia, Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, and others have lost social control due to political society, a powerful and influential Security Council and a prosperous North use peacekeeping interventions to prevent the complete breakdown of the state and maintain their dominant positions in cooperation.

According to Horowitz (1985), ethno nationalism can be described as a force that is influential, all-encompassing, fervent, and widespread (Levinson, 1993), presenting an internal obstacle to the state. Within many nations with limited resources, the ongoing struggle for power and resources has prompted ethnic groups to employ coalition-building and pressure politics as strategies to gain political and economic dominance. Long-lasting and difficult conflicts have a significant impact on the stability of the nation-state. While dispute resolution efforts may sometimes lead to formal agreements, they rarely cultivate long-lasting peace and harmony. As a result of the prolonged, intense, and extensive nature of these violent battles, several regimes have experienced failure while others have approached a perilous stage of collapse. The aforementioned consequences stem primarily from the profound, essential, and comprehensive aspects of ethnic cohesion, which are associated with the perceived significant consequences in civil conflicts, specifically, the preservation of a particular group, the subordination of one ethnic group by another, or the subordination of one group by another.

Ethnopolitical variables and fundamental sentiments exert a significant influence on violent conflicts within multiethnic communities, surpassing mere rivalry for political and economic domination. These factors give rise to powerful manifestations of xenophobic and ethnocentric hate. Consequently, resolving such conflicts becomes especially illogical. Consequently, due to the internal difficulties presented by these contrasting ethnic differences, the United Nations (together with other international organizations) have interfered to safeguard the structure of the state system. In most instances, international organizations and prominent state players encounter the state, which often becomes a participant in the conflict or possesses a strong interest in the victory of one group over another. In order to effectively carry out their humanitarian

and rescue duties, external peacekeeping intervention troops have been obligated to participate in peace enforcement endeavors, which may involve engaging in battle with either the state or rebels.

The precedent of utilizing amassed physical might to sustain the global system, often at the expense of national sovereignty, has been created through collaboration among the United Nations Security Council, the Great Powers, and regional organizations. Since the early 1990s, there has been a growing belief in the effectiveness of force authorized by the Security Council, leading to the adoption of this method by other governments and regional organizations. In 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, deliberately aimed to enhance the Security Council's jurisdiction in order to effectively uphold peace.

In *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali (1992) put up a proposition supporting the endorsement of the utilization of force. The employment of the United Nations as a symbolic representation to execute military interventions, even in instances of civil wars, can be understood as a reaction to severe infringements upon human rights within internal armed conflicts, such as those observed in former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Liberia, and Somalia. These conflicts have garnered significant attention from the media and public scrutiny. Public outrage often leads to political pressure, prompting Great Powers and the United Nations to intervene and address human rights breaches committed by both state and non-state entities.

A novel trend in the dynamics of North-South relations has surfaced subsequent to the conclusion of the Cold War: the rationalization of involvement in domestic matters as a countermeasure to the principle of non-intervention, in light of the rising prevalence of violent disputes within states. Although the concept of non-intervention is firmly

supported by Article 2.7 of the United Nations Charter, it is increasingly recognized that violent disputes within states can be classified as "a threat to international peace and security" according to the definition provided in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The utilization of force by the United Nations Security Council is substantiated by this rationale. Hence, while assessing the presence of a potential danger to or breach of global peace, the Security Council has often employed an expansive jurisdiction, thereby potentially undermining the autonomy of the nation-state. The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs has been modified to allow for humanitarian action by the United Nations and major powers in crises that are primarily domestic in nature (Harris, 1991). Resolution 688 was officially approved on April 5, 1991, to address Iraq's suppression of Kurdish civilians during the March 1991 Kurdish insurrection. This rebellion began after Iraq's defeat by the Gulf War alliance. Iraq regarded the Resolution in question as a clear and illegal encroachment into the domestic matters of the nation, in addition to a violation of Article 2 of the Charter. Resolution 688 was the first resolution adopted by the Security Council to establish that a state's violation of the human rights of its inhabitants posed a threat to global peace and security. Pol Pot of Cambodia and Idi Amin of Uganda's atrocities did not elicit an equivalent degree of determination, response, or utilization of military might from the United states or the most influential states.

Resolutions 757 and 713 were passed on 30 May and 25 September 1991, respectively, in response to the murderous and internecine nature of the Yugoslavian conflict. These resolutions imposed an embargo on the whole region and comprehensive economic penalties on Serbia and Montenegro, respectively. According to the United Nations (1995), these resolutions elevated the domestic

conflict in Yugoslavia to the level of an international crisis. By 1992, external forces had militarily intervened in the civil strife.

State failure or near-state collapse, which is defined as the complete absence of state sovereignty, has prompted United Nations or Great Power intervention in developing countries since the end of the Cold War. In instances such as Somalia, where the complete absence of legitimate state authority did not give rise to concerns regarding domestic jurisdiction and state sovereignty, there were no significant issues. Furthermore, prior to this, instances of intervention in domestic crises involving Iraq, the Kurds, and the former Yugoslavia established a precedent for such actions. Therefore, upon the initial implementation of the compulsory arms embargo under Chapter VII (Resolution 733), the Security Council member states exhibited minimal divergence of opinion regarding the non-intervention principle. A "unique and exceptional circumstance" can be the trigger for an intervention by the UN or a great power in a developing country. For example, in 1993, the Security Council determined that the situation in Haiti presented a threat to worldwide peace and security. Simultaneously, on 16 June 1993, a trade restriction was enforced on trade with Haiti under Resolution 841. The unique circumstances in Haiti emerged as a result of several factors. Firstly, a coup d'état occurred on January 24, 2001, leading to the exile of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's legitimate government. Secondly, the prevailing atmosphere was marked by fear, persecution, and economic instability, which posed a potential threat of generating a substantial number of refugees for neighboring countries. Thirdly, the legitimate government of Haiti requested a trade embargo from the United Nations. Lastly, the Organization of American States (OAS) imposed an embargo. The initiation of Resolution 841 was prompted by a coup d'état, indicating a notable change in the Security Council's stance on meddling in internal

affairs. The Council had not previously engaged in direct intervention in the process of reinstating an overthrown regime in a sovereign state subsequent to a coup d'état. This matter was considered to be entirely internal in nature. Although the President of the Security Council expressed that the Resolution should not be seen as a precedent-setting measure, it nevertheless represented a deviation from the established protocol of the Security Council.

The intervention in Sierra Leone in February 1998 by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group, often known as ECOMOG, aimed to remove the military junta that had deposed a democratically elected government in May 1997. The decision to intervene was influenced by the historical precedent established during the Cold War, which involved intervening to avoid extensive human rights violations and reinstate democratic governance. The majority of ECOMOG's forces were of Nigerian soldiers. In an endeavor to restore the deposed regime, ECOMOG, with the full support of the United Nations Security Council and the Organization of African Unity, intervened. In essence, there is a growing inclination among external entities to engage with issues pertaining to internal instability, significant acts of violence, and the safeguarding of democratic principles. There is a growing recognition that these concerns extend beyond the realm of internal sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. ECOMOG forces were deployed in Liberia between 1990 and 1997 with the aim of resolving the ethnic conflict and destruction between the Krahn/Mandingo and Gio/Mano ethnic groups (Magyar & Conteh-Morgan, 1998).

Following the Gulf War, the primary objectives of coerced intervention were mostly focused on addressing humanitarian issues. Nevertheless, as time has progressed,

these aims have expanded to include evolving military needs inside the corresponding battles. The increasing severity of emerging conflict scenarios has led to the development of innovative solutions that have substantial implications for the autonomy of nations. Nevertheless, following the conclusion of the Cold War, the Security Council's authorization for states to utilize force was predominantly enacted with the aim of achieving humanitarian goals. Civilians residing within the territorial boundaries of a singular state are often the primary focus of armed wars, as opposed to sovereign states. Resolution 770, issued on August 13, pertaining to the Bosnian conflict, articulated that the utilization of force was intended to "enable the provision of humanitarian aid" in order to guarantee the provision of essential humanitarian necessities to the populace (United Nations, 1992). Similarly, the consideration of humanitarian needs was a significant aspect in the formulation of Resolution 794 (3 December 1992) pertaining to Somalia, Resolution 929 (22 June 1994) involving Rwanda, and Resolution 940 (31 July 1994) concerning Haiti, all of which were officially accepted by the United Nations. The intervention of the United Nations in Haiti in 1992 was necessitated by the intensifying refugee problem and the worsening humanitarian conditions, despite early hesitancy from the United States. President Bill Clinton promptly called for the military leadership in Haiti to surrender their authority, highlighting his firm stance that "our national interests are impacted when extreme violence occurs near our coastlines."

Moreover, it is incumbent upon us to initiate action (Clinton, 1993). Since the Korean War, the majority of military actions authorized by the Security Council to employ force have been carried out and controlled by Great Powers, with a special emphasis on American forces. Some critics argue that the authorization granted by the Security Council has primarily served as a means to uphold institutions that serve the national

interests of major powers. However, the use of force approved by the Security Council is not effective without the political leadership of the Great Powers and the active participation of their powerful military forces. Intervention, despite its inherent contradiction with the notion of state sovereignty, functions as a means to protect the state and mitigate severe human rights transgressions and genocidal acts.

Nevertheless, within the realm of peacekeeping, the political turbulence that followed the Cold War, which materialized in civil unrest and diverse manifestations of ethno-political violence, has not led to a consensus on concepts and implementation, but rather to an abundance of recommendations for the successful execution of peacekeeping operations. One could say that as a consequence, although the scope of peacekeeping has expanded, the approaches taken to implement it differ significantly between regions and entities.

At the micro level, socioeconomic and political structures have been shaped by the propensity of groups of people (ethnic, religious, and regional) to ensure their security through self-help (Horowitz, 1994; Gurr, 1993). The outcome entails a progressive erosion of the state's integrity and a disruption of the process of national integration. The state and its sub-entities are unable to confront and resolve significant problems of collective political violence due to the concept of self-help. The desired results are humanitarian intervention or peacekeeping to put an end to ethnic violence, reunite states in disintegration, or provide sustenance to refugees and malnutrition victims. People consequently come to the conclusion that the United Nations and industrialized nations bear the responsibility of averting catastrophic violence, widespread anguish, and the unmanageable escalation of conflicts. Put simply, the concept of state sovereignty serves as the foundation for socio-economic and political

engagements within the international system. However, it is simultaneously jeopardized by concerns regarding security, the escalation of world order complications stemming from interethnic conflicts, and various manifestations of political violence. In the post-Cold War era, the empirical statehood of developing nations is more precarious than ever before (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982).

Transnationalizing issues such as refugeeism, the escalation of actual and potential conflict situations, civil wars and their spillover effects, and the like, appear to be undermining the effectiveness of conventional peacekeeping approaches and necessitating the adoption of novel and potentially dubious peacekeeping endeavors. Three potential outcomes emerge as particularly noteworthy among the far-reaching ramifications of threats to global stability: (1) the confluence of centrifugal forces of nationalism and ethnicity may compel the disintegration of numerous nation states' legitimacy, authority, and cohesion; (2) the differentiation between matters pertaining to civil and international conflicts may become progressively blurred; and (3) the integrity of traditional peacekeeping approaches may be further compromised.

It is not unexpected that subsequent to the termination of the Cold War, the United Nations has engaged in around twice the quantity of peacekeeping operations compared to its preceding four decades of authority. The expansion of peacekeeping efforts is demonstrated by the Security Council's adoption of peacekeeping resolutions, the United Nations' active involvement in preventive diplomacy, and the increasing involvement of regional and sub-regional organizations in operational peacekeeping. Concurrently with the widespread expansion of peacekeeping operations, there seems to be a shift in both the concept and execution of peacekeeping as a flexible skill. The development of this skill has evolved from

preventive diplomacy, which involves the use of military forces to prevent conflicts from escalating, to peacemaking, which involves proactive intervention to encourage warring parties to resolve their differences, to peace enforcement, which involves the enforcement of peace. During the post-Cold War era, instances have arisen when the severity of famine, killing, or malnutrition has been deemed significant enough to warrant the promotion of peace enforcement. Prominent examples encompass Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone (where ECOMOG invaded), Bosnia, and various other countries.

Conflict management encompasses a range of activities aimed at promoting the goals of preventing, mitigating, and resolving conflicts. Cox and Jacobson (1971) provide a conceptualization of a spectrum of conflict management activities, wherein the difference in the degree of effort required and the practical implementation of each activity determine its characteristics. Regional organizations at the lower end of the continuum set norms on several subjects, some of which can enhance the peace and security of the region. The Western Hemisphere has witnessed the establishment of a strong democratic norm, which has been made possible via the efforts of the Organization of American States (OAS) (Dexter 2002).

This norm indirectly promotes peaceful conflict resolution by deterring changes in regimes that go beyond the constitution, which can lead to instability in the region. It also encourages democratic states to choose peaceful methods to resolve disputes instead of resorting to armed combat (Russett, 1994). Regional organizations implement normative resolutions or publish declarations that directly address specific risks to regional order. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) released a proclamation in 1992, urging for the peaceful resolution of problems

related to the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) issued a proclamation on terrorism following the Madrid train explosions in 2004, as documented by Crocker (2008). The purpose of these measures is to promote the shared interests of the members of an area, and hence, their immediate consequences may not be expected. Conversely, other normative activities seek to accelerate changes in conduct across member states. To provide an example, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed resolutions denouncing the military uprising that took place in Ecuador in 2000 and pushing for the restoration of the president who was elected by democratic means (Cooper & Legler, 2001).

Regional organizations participate in a wide range of diplomatic activities with the objective of fostering peace and security as they advance along a continuum that represents increased dedication and operational engagements. The fundamental assumption that underlies diplomatic attempts, such as mediation, is that conflicts can solely be effectively addressed and resolved through internal means by the relevant parties. Diplomatic endeavors have the potential to promote the resolution of conflicts through diverse methods, including the reconciliation of conflicting parties who may not have otherwise pursued negotiations.

The regional organization's ability to mediate between conflicting factions is facilitated by the presence of political pressure, as well as the possibility for legitimacy and prestige. Furthermore, it is worth noting that regional organizations and their representatives have the potential to actively engage in the bargaining process. According to Hopmann (1996), individuals has the capacity to clarify the positions of the parties concerned, redefine the issues under consideration, facilitate talks, apply pressure on each side to make concessions, and provide alternative offers.

Regional organizations have the potential to offer economic or political support as additional incentives to encourage the parties involved in reaching a consensus. Furthermore, it is worth noting that regional organizations or their constituents have the option to provide their services as guarantors for peace agreements or conflict management accords, thus ensuring their ongoing participation in the implementation process.

In order for regional organizations to cultivate collaboration and set standards, a number of prerequisites must be satisfied. One can be regarded as a response to enduring conflicts and crises. In direct response to the globalized civil war in Bosnia, the European Union (EU) expeditiously deployed a peace mission led by Lord Carrington, the former secretary-general of NATO.

The negotiations of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) had a considerable impact on the 1999 Lusaka Accords, which aimed to resolve the violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (previously known as Zaire) (Zartman, 2007). Regional organizations have the capacity to set norms pertaining to weapons and promote cooperation in arms control as a means of addressing enduring threats to peace and security. The Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) initiative is an example of an unsuccessful attempt to implement arms control in the Middle East. In an attempt to develop shared standards and laws, specific regions have redirected their attention from traditional security concerns to emerging security subjects. Latin American groups exhibit a high level of engagement in addressing various difficulties, including human security issues, drug trafficking, and terrorism.

On the other hand, regional organizations are involved in many activities that fall under the category of peacekeeping. Conventional peacekeeping entails the provision

of light military equipment for the purpose of addressing regional security concerns or ongoing conflicts (Diehl 2008). Peacekeeping may involve humanitarian assistance, post-conflict reconstruction, cease-fire monitoring, and verification of armament control, among other responsibilities. The 1990 ECOWAS Monitoring Group deployment in Liberia is an excellent illustration of the peacekeeping responsibilities of a regional international organization. Additionally, ethnically divided states may benefit from the support of regional organizations for democratic institutions and conflict resolution. Enforcement strategies encompass the most coercive alternatives, necessitating the most substantial political and resource investments. By convention, the term "enforcement" denotes extensive military campaigns that aim to safeguard those who have been subjected to aggression and reinstate tranquility and security through the repugnance of the aggressors. Additionally, the purpose of enforcement could be to compel a specific resolution to a given dispute (Lepgold & Weiss, 1998).

Deterrence is the foundation of this strategy, which is collective military action. States must execute the threatened military action and restore peace and security to the region if deterrence fails. Recent NATO actions against the former Yugoslavia in Kosovo are illustrative of this. Roughly speaking, enforcement actions can be divided into two categories. forcibly changing the status quo. The second category is commonly known as collective defense. Although this also encompasses military action or deterrence against an aggressor, it is frequently attributed to conventional military alliances rather than to organizations of the international government. The prototypical example is the initial role of the NATO alliance in Europe, which was met with skepticism by the inhabitants of that region regarding what they perceive as external intervention. Thus, regional (Arab, African, etc.) resolutions to regional conflicts are frequently advocated prior to the intervention of international forces.

Equally significant, while disputants might be more receptive to the actions of a regional organization, substantial organizations and others in the conflicting states might perceive them as more legitimate. Regional actions possess a significant advantage over global organizations such as United Nations missions to the extent that they are capable of generating more support.

Additionally, regional initiatives might be more effective than United Nations initiatives at fostering conflict resolution. The latter has a tendency to offer band-aid solutions to security issues in the face of crises, with minimal diplomatic follow-up. Prior to conflict resolution, the United Nations has frequently assisted in cease-fire negotiations and/or deployed noncombatant forces; however, it has seldom facilitated a final peace agreement after those peacekeepers have been stationed. As a result, both the international community and the main characters may be dissuaded from engaging in additional diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflicts or, if negotiations do transpire, from attaining a settlement (Diehl, 2008). While the United Nations has attempted to prevent the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives by delaying the deployment of peacekeepers and peace-building efforts until a settlement is reached, such a settlement may never materialize or become finalized too late.

The underlying conflict may be of greater concern to regional organizations due to the significantly greater ramifications it has on the states situated in the area. In addition, they might establish a stronger connection between the passage of resolutions and the deployment of peacekeeping forces and a settlement mechanism, such as elections, or negotiations, which serve as potential alternatives. Regional organizations have the potential to not only advance conflict management but also facilitate the ultimate resolution of conflicts in this manner.

One potential benefit of regional conflict management initiatives is their potential to garner greater support from interested third party states. These states are more likely to engage in the discussion and grant authorization for any proposed course of action, in contrast to a United Nations forum where their participation may be limited. Interested third parties are those with substantial economic and security interests in the conflict or those that share a border with the affected area. Thus, the third-party state is more likely to support the operation and has a greater opportunity to modify it in accordance with its views. Furthermore, it reduces the likelihood of interference against the organization's endeavors.

The conflict management activities of regional organizations are hindered not only by authority and mandate, but also by a dearth of necessary resources. The term "resources" pertains to the financial, political, and occasionally military and logistical capabilities required to execute a course of action. Such capabilities are not intrinsic to organizations; rather, they must be procured from members in order to facilitate operational activities. Conversely, conflict management efforts might be limited to diplomatic and normative endeavors that necessitate minimal material investments.

Certain humanitarian assistance, collective security, peacekeeping, and security operations necessitate substantial financial investments to cover the costs of supplies and personnel. Several regional organizations, including SADC, are comprised of less developed states that are incapable of constructing or sustaining such operations. There has been a growing trend among these organizations to seek assistance (including financial, logistical, and training resources) from prominent states in the international system, the United Nations, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in order to execute missions. While this has partially alleviated the challenges faced,

its impact has been limited. As global actors subcontract tasks they are averse to perform to regional organizations and others, this may become more prevalent in the future (Weiss 1997). Merely possessing financial resources does not ensure that a regional organization will operate effectively. Political capital is another requirement for the organization and its members to exert influence over regional affairs.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), comprising six oil-rich Arab states, undoubtedly possesses the financial means to finance virtually any operation. However, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, its members are politically and militarily weak and lack the ability to significantly influence Middle Eastern policy (Miller 2008). The third factor that differentiates effective regional organizations from their less effective counterparts globally is the possession of military resources. Undoubtedly, NATO possesses the personnel, logistics, and military expertise necessary to execute a vast array of operations beyond the immediate European theater. Other regional organizations rely on military personnel of their member states that are frequently inadequately equipped and weakly trained, which results in a dearth of long-range force projection capabilities.

2.1.1 Role, Structure and Objectives of Regional Forces in Management of Europe and The Organization of the American States Intractable Intra-State Conflict

Scholars have examined the manner in which regional organizations handle intrastate conflict in the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, complications arise concerning the definitions, significance, and application of the term "conflict" in relation to its prevention, management, and resolution. The instruments and policies utilized for conflict regulation, that is, the approaches taken to address conflicts, vary

considerably between regions and International Organizations (Stefan & Oya, 2012). This presents a further challenge.

The then Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson (1999-2003), emphasized capabilities as the only means to ensure the security of future alliances similar to NATO. The capabilities discourse is subdivided into the capacities to act, fund, cooperate, and coordinate within the framework of the EU. Initially, a sequence of European Council meetings have deliberated on the capabilities to act, with particular attention given to matters concerning personnel and infrastructure. The Helsinki Headline Goal, for example, pertains to the establishment of suitable capabilities. As of 2001, when the Capability Improvement Conferences were held in Brussels, the leaders of the European Union were certain they had substantially improved their military and civil capabilities. Consideration should be given to the developments, including the Berlin Plus agreement, in the context of a longer-term strategy to close the gap created by capabilities constraints.

The Berlin Plus is an amalgamation of various agreements signed between the European Union and NATO, which were negotiated during the 1999 Washington Summit and were previously implemented through a Framework Agreement. Additionally, NATO and the EU have a number of consultation agreements in which the EU provides its resources and capabilities. Moreover, in March 2003, NATO and the EU entered into an Agreement on Security and Information, which facilitates the implementation of shared security standards for the management of critical data and the exchange of classified information. It has been suggested that the EU's reliance on NATO impedes its ability to effectively execute its conflict management mechanisms. However, it also offers specific benefits: EU members are NATO members, and as

such, they frequently confront similar security challenges such as regional conflicts, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Consequently, bolstering EU capabilities increases their capacity to conduct crisis management operations independently of one another, which is advantageous for both parties. Simultaneously, there is concern that the NATO's diminishing influence could potentially compromise the capabilities of the EU and increase their susceptibility. Significant advancements have been made by the European Union (EU) in the establishment of critical conflict management mechanisms ever since its intervention in the Kosovo Crisis. Several institutions involved in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is overseen by the European Council, are inextricably linked to EU crisis management operations. Notably, the EU Military Staff, the Political and Security Policy Committee (PSPC), and the EU Military Committee are all permanently enshrined in the Treaty of Nice. Undoubtedly, this institutional framework has demonstrated remarkable strength, efficacy, and efficiency. The EU possesses sufficient funding capabilities, both in the immediate and extended periods. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these funds, as exemplified during the Balkan Wars, has been limited by the intricate framework upon which they function. Additionally, the European Union (EU) has enhanced its capacity for short-term funding through the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), an entity entrusted with the duty of promptly and flexibly responding to emergency crises and imperative situations.

The concept comprises six facets of crisis management within the European Union: evaluation of potential responses to the crisis, prevention of conflicts in countries exhibiting indications of instability, management of critical crises, reconciliation and reconstruction following conflicts, and efforts to combat terrorism. Article 6 of the

Framework authorizes member states, in conjunction with non-state actors and regional and international organizations that possess the requisite expertise and capabilities, to assume responsibility for the aforementioned situations. It is mandatory that this transition occur within a period of six months.

Coordination and cooperation capabilities are evident in two aspects: first, they exist horizontally and involve the three pillars; second, they exist vertically and connect the European Union, its interconnected institutional structures, and its member states. Since 1999, and particularly in accordance with the Treaty of Nice, internal cooperation and coordination capabilities have been bolstered by a more secure institutional infrastructure designated for crisis management. An illustrative instance is the Political Committee, which supplanted the Political and Security Committee and assumed numerous responsibilities of the former. Coordination and cooperation with NATO are crucial on an external level, and despite the European Union's reliance on NATO's resources, these efforts have been fruitful. Furthermore, the bloc has adopted a multilateral strategy and is aware of the organization's expertise in preventing conflicts and managing crises. Permanent procedural coordination, for instance, has been established within the Berlin Plus agreement; with regard to the European Union's collaboration with third parties, clear coordination procedures have been established, including the formation of Committees of contributing countries to provide third parties with appropriate roles in crisis management.

The internal aspect of conflict management organizations consists of three sets of pertinent factors, namely the capabilities that the organization must possess in order to effectively regulate conflicts. This consists of the capacity to coordinate, fund, act, and cooperate. Political will significantly influences the capacity to take action with

regard to conflict management. The participation of state leaders in a conflict as mediators and administrators requires their consent. Typically, political will is determined by state values and interests, the nature of the conflict (whether it is localized or extensive), and the perceived probability of success for any intervention. The presumed likelihood of success is determined by evaluating the extent to which current capacities to fund, coordinate, and act are commensurate with the anticipated difficulties that a particular intervention is likely to confront. Critical capabilities are contingent on the degree to which an organization's capacity to pursue conflict regulation is facilitated or impeded by the availability of personnel and hardware (or lack thereof), as well as the availability of policy instruments to support intentions with tangible actions, including the use of military force when necessary (Stefan & Oya, 2012).

The provision of financial resources to maintain conflict regulation initiatives is vital to their achievement. In this regard, conflict management organizations typically encounter formidable obstacles, such as a dearth of financial resources or a reluctance on the part of member states to allocate funds to the organization or for a specific objective (Stefan & Oya, 2012). An additional potential issue pertains to the expediency with which funds can be obtained and the financial sustainability of operations. The capabilities of cooperation and coordination have two dimensions. Internal coordination is necessary between the various institutions of an organization and among them and its member nations.

This necessitates that an examination of "success factors" in this regard take into account the interest structures of pertinent actors and the opportunities they possess to pursue these interests independently or in collaboration with organizational partners.

The efficacy of internal cooperation and coordination is additionally influenced by the degree to which the organization functions as a relatively independent actor (that is., is not dependent on member states) and the complexity of organizational structures. Coordination and cooperation with other regional and international organizations, individual nations, and non-governmental organizations are frequently required on the external level for two reasons. From one perspective, these partnerships have the potential to assist an organization in addressing specific capability deficiencies, such as those pertaining to financial resources, military hardware, and so forth. Conversely, international efforts that are effectively coordinated have a greater capacity to influence positively conflict regulation policies.

Multilateral endeavors involving multiple regional and/or international organizations (IOs) can be advantageous in certain circumstances when it comes to bolstering the legitimacy of a specific conflict regulation effort among local actors. An illustration of this can be seen in the manner in which EU collaboration with NATO (for example., within the Berlin Plus framework) compensates for the Union's military capabilities shortfall, whereas EU–AU collaboration (for instance., the African Peacebuilding Facility) can bridge the AU's frequent funding imbalance. Consequently, this necessitates an examination of the extent to which specific regional and IO entities have established mechanisms and processes to facilitate coordination and collaboration with external entities, as well as the practical efficacy of such systems and procedures (Stefan & Oya, 2012). Coordination being of the utmost importance for the success of interventions, the study fails to emphasize dependency gaps, particularly among regional forces like the EAC, where complex interests may contribute to the overall failure of the interventionist mission—a concern of the present study.

Peen Rodt & Wolff (2012) have conducted an analysis of the European Union's conflict regulation initiatives in Macedonia, deriving insights from the international arena. Peen Rodt and Wolff observe that the EU underwent a "learning process" after its initial failure in the Balkans; this process was instrumental in averting a protracted civil conflict in Macedonia in 2001. This success is primarily ascribed in their study to the EU's establishment of an institutional framework and other essential resources, including personnel, equipment, and financing, which enable the organization to support its diplomatic endeavors with credible threats of force when required. Additionally, the study by Peen Rodt and Wolff warns against overgeneralizations and highlights the EU's effective implementation of its conditionality policy towards nations that offer credible assurances of closer ties and, potentially, accession to the EU. In contrast to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Mindanao and the Organization of the Atomic States in Haiti, the European Union possessed a stable, member-state-adherent set of interests that largely coincided with those of the most influential local political actors. In conclusion, the EU and other IOs in Macedonia engaged in effective multilateral cooperation, as Peen Rodt and Wolff observed, which contributed to the ground's progress. A unified array of actors appears to be the determining factor in the success of regional interventions; as previously stated, coordination and the presence of shared interests are crucial.

The research emphasizes the Organization of American States' (OAS) engagement in Haiti and reaches the conclusion that although it accomplished certain accomplishments in carrying out its mandate, notably with regard to its Electoral Technical Assistance Program and collaboration with other IOs like the United Nations and CARICOM, it failed to capitalize on crucial prospects to employ its most potent diplomatic instruments in support of democracy in Haiti. An example of this is

the lack of sanctions imposed by the OAS in an effort to compel President Aristide to negotiate with the opposition. As a result, their contribution aptly exemplifies the difficulty a regional organization faces when attempting to conduct peacekeeping operations using only diplomatic instruments. Moreover, this research emphasizes the dearth of political determination among OAS members, the difficulties posed by destitution in Haiti, and the OAS's inability to maintain a sustained presence in the conflict. According to the findings of this study, internal factors can be detrimental to intervention efforts; therefore, a multifaceted approach is crucial, which is the subject of the present investigation.

Conflict management is an umbrella term for a variety of activities that are all intended to advance the objectives of conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution. A spectrum of conflict management activities can be conceptualized, wherein the degree of effort needed and the practical implementation of the activity determine its variation (Cox & Jacobson, 1971). Regional organizations establish standards on a multitude of topics, some of which have the potential to foster peace and security in the area, situated at the lower end of the continuum (Enuka & Nwagbo, 2016). An instance of a robust democratic norm can be observed in the Western Hemisphere, which has been facilitated by the Organization of American States (OAS) (Dexter 2002). This principle not only serves as a deterrent against extraconstitutional regime changes, which may contribute to instability in the region, but it also indirectly fosters peaceful conflict management by encouraging democratic states to adopt peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms rather than engage in armed conflict with one another (Russett 1994).

NATO, on the other hand, serves as a timeless example of how effective conflict regulation requires a synergy of resources, political determination, and strategic planning. Although the outcome of NATO's mission in Afghanistan fell short of initial expectations, the organization has unequivocally achieved success in six of the seven operations it has conducted since the end of the Cold War: Libya, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and two anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. Additionally, the achievements of NATO illustrate the significance of leadership and internal consensus in facilitating the efficient deployment of resources. Nevertheless, this becomes apparent when examining the European Union's initiatives in the Balkans (and, also, its activities in Africa), the African Union's engagement in Burundi, and the United Nations' stance in East Timor. Conversely, the OAS's reluctance to engage in military intervention in Kyrgyzstan and its primarily auxiliary role in Haiti might be attributed to the absence of shared interests and strong national leadership.

The enduring effectiveness of an organization's conflict regulation is heavily dependent on its long-term sustainability, especially in terms of tangible and positive effects. Despite the lack of success in the European Union's endeavors in the Western Balkans during the first half of the 1990s, the organization managed to sustain its presence in the region, enhance its understanding of the complex conflict dynamics in the area, and develop and implement a comprehensive long-term strategy that integrated policies aimed at managing the conflict. Since 1995, the Union's role to conflict regulation in the region has been significantly enhanced. Just as the extended involvement of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Mindanao yielded outcomes, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OAS) formulated and executed

more efficacious conflict regulation policies in Haiti throughout its endeavors in the region.

The multilateral nature of various successful international and regional conflict regulation projects, as exemplified by the cases analyzed in this analysis, highlights the importance of effective external cooperation. This phenomenon is linked to considerations pertaining to resources, specifically the synergistic nature of the contributions that different partners can offer. This is clearly demonstrated by the collaboration between the European Union (EU) and NATO in the Western Balkans, the EU and the African Union (AU) (and United Nations) across Africa, and the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) in the context of Haiti. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the implementation of multilateral conflict regulation contributes to the overall credibility of the practice and individual actions. This phenomenon facilitates the cultivation of a societal framework that recognizes and executes regional and international security as a collective obligation of nation-states. This is achieved by employing suitable regional groups, such as International groups (IOs) (Soderbaum, 2016a).

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation countries exhibit conflicting national interests in the Mindanao dispute, particularly between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Libya, where a lack of shared political determination is apparent. Furthermore, akin to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OAS), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has a deficiency in the fundamental resources and capacities necessary for the proficient management of disputes. For instance, although the OIC managed to bring together the parties for negotiations to some extent, it lacked the necessary monitoring system to guarantee the end of hostilities. Through the pursuit

of a "impracticable autonomy arrangement," the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) inadvertently played a role in the protraction of the conflict.

According to Peen (2012), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is considered to be the least-researched among the organizations mentioned in this context. The analysis conducted by the author examines the fundamental justifications for the organization's choice to address the security problem in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 using diplomatic methods rather than resorting to military actions. By engaging in such actions, it has the ability to facilitate the emergence of a humanitarian crisis, notwithstanding its designated duty of overseeing regional security. This paper enumerates a range of global, regional, state, and local variables that influenced the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's choice to refrain from intervening in the riots. These factors were accompanied by the organization's overall political reluctance to meddle in domestic matters and its limited expertise in this area. At the regional level, notable considerations included the controversy surrounding Russia's activities in Georgia in 2008 and the apprehension regarding heightened Russian assertiveness in Central Asia. Furthermore, it has been noted that the lack of intervention may have been impacted by the contrasting political goals of other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

This concept posits that the structural capacities of regional organizations are undermined by the apathy or self-interest of associate states in regional conflicts. Nevertheless, regional dominant governments wield more significant control over the scope and direction of involvement. Resource limitations are found to have a greater impact on structural inequalities when partner nations are obligated to uphold armed forces in other regions.

2.1.2 Role, structure and Objectives of Regional Forces in Management of African Region Intractable Intra-state conflict

The effectiveness of continental, regional, and international organizations in promoting global security and peace after the conclusion of the Second World War was widely acknowledged. The inception of the League of Nations in 1919 and the United Nations (UN) in 1945 have established the foundation for the management of conflicts between states, a crucial element in the maintenance of peace and security. During this period, the act of intervening in internal issues within states was intricately linked to the principles of non-interference and sovereignty. However, there was a notable change in the situation following the Cold War: the sudden breakdown of the Eastern Bloc, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the rapid rise of globalization forces.

According to Ali (2014), Fukuyama and other scholars argued that the end of the Cold War marked the decline of socialism and the rise of political liberalism, which promoted the peaceful cohabitation of nations. However, this brief period of joy was short-lived, as the New World order experienced the rise of an unparalleled form of warfare known as intrastate conflict. Significantly, Africa was the location of the majority of these disputes within individual states. Furthermore, these battles not only resulted in significant human losses, extensive infrastructure destruction, and the displacement of populations, but also had profound impacts on social and political aspects. Regional and international institutions have intervened in order to mitigate the adverse effects of these conflicts. Unfortunately, their efforts were inadequate in addressing the growing escalation of violence. The United Nations and the African Union's inability to effectively avert the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, Somalia in the 1990s, and Darfur from 1990 to 2003 serves as illustrative instances of their

shortcomings. Consequently, it became crucial to build a new institution with the capacity to effectively tackle the newly arising security and peace concerns. In accordance with the ratification of the Constitutive Act, this event occurred subsequent to the establishment of the African Union.

The aforementioned phenomenon emerged as a result of the breakdown of the Cold War and the subsequent establishment of a novel global and geopolitical framework. According to Williams (2011), the presence of competent technical management capabilities for peacekeeping operations and sanctions regimes is not the sole requirement for armed conflict management. Political, bureaucratic, and infrastructure factors are also essential.

The political dimension plays a crucial role in effectively managing conflicts. However, the African Union's conflict management has been influenced by several factors, such as the widespread agreement on the possible and unexpected results of AU peace operations, unity within the Peace and Security Council (PSC), continuous political backing for the AU's peacekeeping and enforcement equipment, and genuine collaboration from the host country. With respect to bureaucratic constraints, it is expected that the effective operation of the African Union (AU) relies on competent governance and bureaucratic structures, both in Addis Ababa and at the grassroots level, in order to establish a strategic vision and uphold the objectives of senior leadership. However, the African Union faces obstacles due to shortcomings in its institutions and human resources, which hinder its ability to carry out advanced peace operations.

The AU Commission has identified several obstacles in its internal assessments, which encompass inadequate information technology, bureaucratic inefficiencies, a

damaged reputation, limited financial resources, and a scarcity of motivated and skilled personnel. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is currently confronted with limitations in resources, and the field of peacekeeping has seen institutional challenges related to activities such as operations, deployment, planning, and withdrawal. The AU's headquarters have significantly limited planning and force generation capabilities compared to other international organizations that aim to carry out similar activities. Furthermore, the African Union (AU) has faced constraints arising from its military capabilities. When it comes to acquiring the necessary military personnel and resources for sophisticated peace operations, it constantly fails to meet its full potential.

Regarding military manpower, the African Union (AU) demonstrates a significant lack of specialists who possess the requisite experience. To address this gap, the group has sought external aid in the form of logistical, financial, and personnel support. The involvement of citizens is undeniably essential in multifaceted peace operations. However, the African Union (AU) is currently facing a shortage of essential professionals in security institutions and the rule of law, including police officers, justice officials, and correctional personnel. Additionally, there is a need for expert training programs to enhance domestic skills in these areas. The African Union (AU) is confronted with a substantial obstacle concerning the shortage of civilians, principally stemming from its evident inadequacy in mediation capacities. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the African continent has been presented with the opportunity to reorganize its peace and security systems. This has been evident in the transformation of the OAU into the AU. The field of peace and security has been significantly strengthened by the establishment of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the active engagement of the African Union (AU) and sub-

regional organizations in addressing the various peace and security challenges that have emerged in the continent in recent decades.

2.1.3 The birth of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

The inception of APSA is closely linked to two interconnected events: firstly, the conclusion of the Cold War, and secondly, the advent of a new global order that resulted in the continent relinquishing its geostrategic pearl and was entrusted with the task of resolving the repercussions of the Cold War. The second factor was the dynamism of conflicts, which roused Africa to devise strategies to address the emerging security challenges. Thabo Mbeki coined the phrase "Architecture of Cold War" to describe the profound political ramifications that Africa experienced with the end of the Cold War. This resulted in the continent being reduced to a geostrategic arena and a staging area for a superpower display of strength.

The War facilitated a multitude of intrastate disputes in Africa while providing protection to autocratic and corrupt regimes in order to advance the strategic objectives of the superpowers. Undoubtedly, the conflict hindered the continent's capacity to determine its socioeconomic and political fate. In the realm of conflicts, the period following the Cold War witnessed the emergence of a fresh surge of disputes that presented distinct challenges to global peace and security, including those within Africa. It was characterized by the rise of novel actors and anxieties arising from threats other than interstate aggressions. The newly discovered sources comprised, among other things, the proliferation of conventional small ammunition, ethnic strife, domestic actors menacing civilian populations, and egregious human rights violations. Furthermore, the majority of these conflicts have transpired

internally among nation-states and have been initiated by non-state entities in the majority of instances.

2.1.4. The Structural Components of the African Peace and Security Architecture

It executes decisions pertaining to peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, peace prevention, and peacemaking in a timely and prudent manner through the use of an operational framework. It is supported by two fundamental elements: policy and normative components. The first is based on redefining sovereignty and committing to an interventionist peace and security regime; it accepts African answers to African problems and is rooted in two legal frameworks. The first principle encountered an initial challenge in the form of the principle of non-interference. The aforementioned premise was eliminated upon the passage of the Constitutive Act, as it was formally included into Article 4. According to Article 4, the African Union (AU) is bestowed with the authority to intervene in highly grave circumstances, encompassing acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

The aforementioned action represented a significant shift away from the non-interference position towards an interventionist approach within the domain of dispute resolution. The regime governed by the African Union (AU) is based on a novel security paradigm that prioritizes human security over a state-centric perspective. The transition is further supported by the African Union's Solemn Declaration on the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). The strategy explicitly states a transition from the traditional security framework to a non-military notion that encompasses human rights, governance, and human security, and is shaped by the present global context.

2.1.5. The Institutional Dimensions of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and Their Operations

PSC Protocol Article 2 delineates the formation of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). This agreement outlines the various components of the APSA, including the AU Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace Fund. Regional procedures for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts are also integrated into APSA. The PSC serves as the primary governing entity and operates as a unified security and early warning system to enhance the effectiveness and timeliness of crisis responses across the continent. The composition of the group comprises fifteen individuals, with ten members serving two-year terms and the remaining five members serving three-year terms. The choices made by the entity are often backed by consensus. However, in situations where consensus is not achieved, a minimum of two-thirds of the votes are considered. Regarding its implementation, it might be argued that the PSC has effectively exercised its authorized jurisdiction. This is due to the facilitation of numerous mediation efforts and peace support operations. Its high-level meetings have effectively tackled a multitude of concerns, including but not limited to the violent conflicts in Darfur, Sudan, Burundi, and Somalia; it has resolutely responded to unconstitutional government transitions and electoral violence. As an illustration, it has supported the restoration of civilian governance in Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, and Madagascar subsequent to military coups. It has also attempted to address concerns such as armed conflict, terrorism, and the protection of civilians over time. Nevertheless, the PSC has faced allegations of being a reactionary establishment due to its prioritization of conflict management and resolution over peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, and conflict prevention. The PSC's

agenda has been beset by sporadic outbreaks of crises and violent conflicts ever since its inception. The establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) was outlined in Article 12 of the PSC Protocol.

The primary duty of this entity is to collect, assess, and predict potential risks that may pose a threat to the stability and security of the continent. The primary objective of this initiative is to furnish the AU Commission with essential data and analysis pertaining to potential challenges to peace. This will enable the Commission to effectively raise awareness of these issues to the PSC and its conflict prevention entities. The ASF component is utilized in scenarios where conflicts are either imminent or have already occurred, and efforts to establish peace have been failed, or when Article 13 of the Protocol describes situations of extreme severity. Essentially, its main objective is to support the PSC in preventing and managing conflicts by preventing escalation, strengthening peace processes, enforcing resolutions, promoting peace-building efforts, advocating for humanitarian action, and managing disasters. The effectiveness of this component's mandate in addressing the security concerns and conflict dynamics now afflicting the continent is noteworthy.

Peen's (2012) study focuses on the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) inside the African Union. The study's findings indicate that despite being the organization's initial objective, AMIB made a substantial contribution to enhancing the security of the post-conflict transition in Burundi, thereby achieving a notable level of success. The author elucidates that the accomplishments of AMIB can be attributed, to some extent, to its construction and sustenance of communication channels among local

stakeholders, as well as its effective collaboration with external entities such as the European Union and the United Nations.

The author's contribution further emphasizes the importance of internal coordination among the organization's structures and members, as well as the crucial role played by South Africa, the leading nation of the mission. Despite the African Union's limited financial resources and early development of institutional infrastructure, the organization's objective was upheld by the political resolve of its member nations, which also played a role in stabilizing the security situation of the country. The significance of a prominent nation in handling internal issues is emphasized in the Penn study. However, it fails to acknowledge the vulnerabilities that arise in situations involving power rivalry among partner nations, which is the focus of the current investigation.

It is worth mentioning that the effectiveness of conflict regulation initiatives carried out by regional or international organizations is heavily reliant on the availability of diplomatic, economic, and military instruments, as well as the determination and resources to employ them strategically in a particular conflict scenario. This triad of resources, determination, and strategy is critical to the organization as a whole. The limited effectiveness of and engagement in conflict regulation by numerous regional and international organizations (IOs), including some of those discussed here, can be attributed to a dearth of determination and strategy, as opposed to a simple lack of resources.

The African Union (AU) is actively pursuing an ambitious agenda in the realm of peace and security. The adoption of a Solemn Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU) in May 2013 marked the 50th anniversary of

the establishment of the AU and its precursor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in 1963. The proclamation includes a pledge to prevent the transmission of conflict burdens to subsequent generations of Africans and to bring an end to all armed conflicts in Africa by the year 2020 (AU Assembly 2013, 5).

This policy is located within a complex African Peace and Security Architecture, as demonstrated by the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA, cf. OAU 2000; African Union 2002). It operates to varying degrees. The unequal and largely completed process of integration and harmonization between the Union and the eight officially recognized Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Mediation and Resolution (RMs) has been observed, as stated by Nathan et al. (2015). The Union heavily depends on its international partners to carry out peace and security initiatives, as well as to construct its own peace support operations (PSOs), such as those carried out in Somalia, from a financial perspective. The Union is currently engaged in proactive measures to address various forms of violent conflicts throughout the continent, aiming to accomplish the objective of "Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020" (Khadiagala, 2015; AU Assembly, 2018). This analysis underscores the apparent inadequacy in the financial and technological capacities of the African Union (AU) to adequately resolve internal conflicts inside the African continent.

In the last ten years, the African Union has become the primary authority in determining the management of security in Africa. Nevertheless, as a global institution, it also functions as a hybridized platform for conflicts about the power of member nations and the legitimacy of continental politics in connection with the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Markets (RECs/RMs) and international

institutions. The entities encompassed in this category consist of former colonial powers, emergent actors such as China, and strategic partners such as the United Nations/European Union. The paradoxical entanglements often exert a significant influence on the organizational politics and impact of different types of African security agencies (Moe & Geis, 2020).

The territorial landscape of Africa has seen substantial transformations subsequent to the culmination of the Cold War. The aforementioned alterations serve as indications of a more extensive worldwide restructuring, as demonstrated by the research conducted by Chaturvedi and Painter (2007). Academic researchers, including Mbembe (2002), Engel and Nugent (2009), and Engel, Boeckler, and Müller-Mahn (2018), have noted that Africa is currently experiencing a phenomenon known as respacing. The African continent is currently experiencing substantial socio-spatial changes that are similar in scale to those observed during the colonial era in the late 19th century. Hentz (2014) contends that violent conflict is a crucial factor in driving the alterations caused by climate change, migration, and the worldwide search of raw materials. Analyzing the realm of African peace and security via a geographical lens not only conforms to established principles in political science, but also adds to the ongoing academic debate surrounding the emergence of the notion of 'new regionalism' in the 1990s. The ongoing debate has advanced the area by questioning the underlying assumptions of the traditional concept of regionalism, particularly the (neo-)functionalist perspective on European integration. Hettne (1999) argued that following the Cold War, new forms of regionalism have emerged in the Global South, often known for their extensive scope. Simultaneously, there is a burgeoning body of scholarship called 'comparative regionalism' that is rapidly gaining prominence (Söderbaum, 2016).

Conversely, regional organizations also participate in diverse missions that fall under the category of peacekeeping. According to Diehl (2008), the concept of "traditional peacekeeping" refers to the deployment of military forces with limited weaponry to handle regional security issues or respond to ongoing hostilities. Peacekeeping involves various tasks, including overseeing cease-fires, delivering humanitarian assistance, assisting in post-conflict reconstruction, and ensuring compliance with arms control regulations. The deployment of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group into Liberia in 1990 exemplifies the peacekeeping duties carried out by a regional international organization. Regional organizations possess the capacity to expedite the resolution of conflicts and promote the establishment of democratic institutions inside ethnically divided states. Enforcement can be characterized as a highly forceful set of decisions, requiring substantial political and financial allocation. Traditionally, enforcement has been characterized as a thorough military operation with the objective of protecting the victims of violent acts and restoring peace and security through the defeat of the assailants. Leggold and Weiss (1998) argue that enforcement might be deliberately employed to ensure the implementation of a particular outcome in a conflict.

However, despite making assertions about 'regions', most contributions fail to incorporate the perspectives of Hurrell (2007) and other scholars, who argue that regions are not inherently determined but rather socially constructed, just like any other geographical arrangement. In general, the field is marked by ontological uncertainty over the nature of space and the resulting methodological implications. Therefore, the majority of contributions to the debates on 'new regionalism' and 'comparative regionalism' are still limited by the rigid constraints of methodological

nationalism (Levine & Nagar, 2016). Nevertheless, certain scholars are adopting a spatial turn perspective while approaching the field.

The notions of 'fringe regionalism', 'inter-regionalism', and 'trans-regionalism' have been extensively studied and supported by empirical evidence. These concepts often go beyond the boundaries of individual states (Mattheis & Litsegård, 2018; Mattheis, Raineri, & Russo 2019; Middell 2019). The term of 'old regionalism' has been subject to criticism by scholars who have expressed concerns regarding its Eurocentric worldview (Acharya, 2014; Söderbaum, 2016b; Engel, 2018). The aforementioned perspective frequently leads to an unconscious juxtaposition of African integration endeavors with a 'European' paradigm, which is perceived as a generally applicable 'optimal approach'. To date, the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have not been extensively examined through the lens of spatial and post-colonial theory, with only a limited number of exceptions (Döring, 2018; Döring & Herpolsheimer, 2018). These findings suggest that regionalism in Africa is ineffective and may hinder its capacity to efficiently handle internal conflicts. Hence, the formation of alliances with foreign entities is not fundamentally optional.

This article examines the correlation between "spatial orders" and "spatial formats" by drawing upon the conceptual debate conducted at the Collaborative Research Centre 1199 in Leipzig on the topic of "Processes of Spatialization under the Global Condition" (Marung & Middell, 2019). Space organization concepts, or past experiences with it, are understood within specific spatial frames. These are political endeavors carried out by concrete collective bodies, conveyed through specific spatial meanings, such as "regionalism," "empire," and "state," among others. The intersubjective communication processes serve as the signifiers of these spatial

formats (Engel, 2018). In their fundamental state, spatial forms lack materiality and do not meet the criteria to be classified as "social space." Conversely, these patterns are recurrent occurrences that actors see and select based on their perceived significance at a particular juncture, as they correspond to their distinct political needs. In this context, spatial formats serve as templates, models, or standards. Spatial formats can assist the institutionalization of spatial practices and ultimately establish a tangible spatial order, which is a contingent and relational arrangement of "things" in physical space. This achievement is often achieved through negotiation and contestation.

The process of combining several spatial forms to create a spatial order is a tangible and creative dialectical process. In addition, the organization of space is determined by categorizing observable spatial configurations as "accepted," "valid," "relevant," or "important" (Engel 2018). The process of organizing physical space is primarily a cognitive activity that necessitates the interpretation of language and the negotiation of social interactions within what was formerly known as "social space" (Soja, 1989). Through the act of arranging or indicating space, individuals not only assign significance to an object but also make it perceptible.

The utilization of spatial formats enables the intersubjective communication of concepts that would otherwise be confined to metaphorical existence. Effectively resonating with these indications necessitates entrepreneurs who possess a sense of significance and a related audience. Moreover, it requires the utilization of tools, platforms, and communication tactics, such as verbal expression, symbolic representation, and physical actions (e.g., by organizing Public Service Organizations, coordinating regionally interconnected mediation). The stabilization of spatial formats

is achieved by the use of efficient spatial arrangements. Ultimately, spatial hierarchies based on material quality arise as a result of power imbalances. Hence, by analyzing the concrete behaviors of actors motivated by their own interests, it becomes feasible to unravel the phenomenon of "socially constructing" regions by introducing a dialectical interaction between spatial arrangements and forms. The capacity to observe and analyze space unveils a previously obscured phenomenon within the domain of peace and security, namely the establishment of regions. The African Union might be considered a diverse spatial entrepreneur, similar to international organizations such as the European Union, the United Nations, or bilateral actors like France or the United States. The various armed factions can be seen as spatial entrepreneurs within certain limitations. The term "African Union" refers to the combination of the member nations of the African Union (AU) and the AU Assembly, as well as the AU Commission, which includes all of its organs and sub-actors.

The junta's actions, which provoked internal conflict within Mali, were condemned by Mali's main international supporters, including the ECOWAS regional bloc, the African Union, the European Union, France, and the United States. The insurrection was unanimously denounced by the United Nations Security Council, which, in response to obstructions from Russia and China, abstained from enacting harsh measures. The ECOWAS and AU have suspended Mali's membership. As a reaction, the World Bank halted disbursements to the country. The military actions between France and Mali were briefly suspended on June 3, with a subsequent restart of activities taking place one month thereafter. ECOWAS imposed the initial sanctions on September 16, which sparked intense protests in opposition to the move.

On November 7, ECOWAS slapped further penalties on 149 state officials in response to President Goïta's announcement that the February 2022 election date would not be met. The punishments included the freezing of assets and the imposition of travel bans, with the exception of Goïta, in order to preserve communication connections. On November 15, the European Union announced the imposition of measures against individuals or entities that impede the progress of the transition in Mali. The coordination of intervention actions denotes a collaborative effort wherein all parties involved exhibited shared interests.

During the intervening period, there was a significant schism between the Mali and French governments due to the military coup, the junta's rejection of the election date, and the widespread anti-French protests that transpired across the nation. On 10 June, President Emmanuel Macron of France officially announced the termination of Operation Barkhane in the Sahel region, maintaining its current configuration. The European Takuba task force will replace this activity.

During his address at the G5 Sahel conference on July 9, President Macron provided further details regarding the restructuring of the French military presence in the Sahel region. He announced the planned closure of three installations located in northern Mali by early 2022, along with a proposed reduction of the personnel count by 50%. According to ACLED (2022), the Secretary-General of the United Nations made a formal request on July 15, 2022, for the Security Council to increase the authorized MINUSMA force by an additional 2,069 personnel. According to press sources, the Mali administration has announced an agreement with Russia to deploy Russian military in the nation, including a minimum of 1,000 soldiers from the Russian private security business Wagner Group, amidst tense relations with France and European

partners. Nevertheless, both the governments of Russia and Mali refuted this claim. On December 23, sixteen European countries and Canada expressed their condemnation of the alleged deployment of mercenaries from the Wagner Group in Mali. The French government, specifically, said that their presence would be "incompatible" with the ongoing operations of France.

The European Union implemented sanctions on the Wagner Group on December 13, based on suspicions of its involvement in severe human rights transgressions, including as torture and extrajudicial execution, across various nations. A multitude of demonstrations were orchestrated nationwide to express solidarity with the agreement with Russia (ACLED, 2022).

In the 1990s, violent conflicts in Africa were initially referred to as "new wars." These conflicts were characterized by a higher occurrence of conflicts within states that revolved on ethnic identities and resulted in civilian losses. This was in contrast to the proxy battles that took place during the Cold War. The 2000s were marked by a notable increase in instances of violent conflicts, primarily stemming from unlawful governmental transformations assisted by coups d'état, disputed presidential third-term debates, and election violence (AUC Chairperson, 2010).

The past decade has witnessed a notable increase in instances of violent conflict, primarily ascribed to the rise of radical insurgencies such as Al-Mourabitoun and al-Qaida in the Maghreb region, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, Boko Haram, Ansar Bait Al-Maqdis in Egypt, and the purported Islamic State Provinces in Somalia, Libya, and Tunisia. Some examples of extremist groups in the Horn of Africa are al-Shabaab, the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, and Ansar Dine in North Africa. The declaration of "violent extremism and terrorism" has been made by the African Union (AU PSC,

2014a; AUC Chairperson ,2014). According to the AUC chairperson (2014), the transregional conflict zones in Africa are characterized by the following: acts of terrorism targeting African interests, acts of terrorism targeting Western and other foreign interests, the presence of safe havens in African territories, the recruitment and funding of terrorists in Africa, and the utilization of Africa as a transit point for terrorists and funds associated with other illicit activities. The research described above provide insights into several causes that contribute to internal conflict on the continent.

Therefore, any intervention should aim to investigate the conflict situation in these specific aspects, which is the main subject of this study. Furthermore, the territories of Western Sahara, Abyei, Libya, and South Sudan are currently embroiled in a persistent state of violence. The African Union (AU) is now engaged in Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Darfur and Somalia. However, in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, the AU has outsourced the coordination of PSOs previously overseen by the AU to the United Nations. AU Assembly 2016, 2018 has shown an increasing awareness of "non-traditional security topics" like as Ebola, El Niño effects, and illicit financial flows.

Given the prevailing circumstances, the African Union, with the AU Commission functioning as its central political entity and administrative body, is aggressively executing a variety of peace and security measures (Karbo & Murithi 2018). The aforementioned activities align with the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, which was created by the African Union in 2002. The APSA Roadmap (African Union 2016) provides a thorough summary of the policy possibilities for implementation from 2016 to 2020.

The following section will present a succinct summary of the comprehensive range of African Union (AU) reactions to violent conflict across four categories that exhibit some degree of overlap. The Union aims to restore the sovereignty of member states that it has lost by implementing the following strategies: (1) creating networks for conflict prevention and mediation, (2) coordinating multi-actor security processes in the Horn of Africa and Sahelo-Saharan region, and (4) forming strategic partnerships with the European Union and the United Nations. According to Felio (2007), the primary aim of these interventions is to reinstate the sovereignty that has been relinquished among the member states of the African Union. This is achieved through the adoption of diverse networked regionalisms, with multi-regionalism being the favored geographical framework.

The African Union, like many other actors in the Global South dealing with the intricacies of modern globalization processes, emphasized the crucial role of regions in development. According to Hurrell (2007) and Engel (2018), the primary justification for African Union peace and security operations is in the establishment of regions that possess resilience, capability, and effectiveness. The research put forth relevant ideas; nevertheless, they fail to acknowledge the impact of involvement in various sub-regions, which leads to fragmented endeavors and subsequently contributes to the intricacy of the conflict. The current work seeks to address this gap in knowledge.

The regulation of peace and security activities between the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Ministries (RECs/RMs) and the African Union is primarily governed by a Memorandum of Understanding established in 2008 (African Union, 2008). The five meta-regions defined by the African Union (AU), which are also part

of the Arabian Sea (ASF), are separate from the eight officially recognized Regional Economic Communities/Regions of Man (RECs/RMs): North, Central, West, East, and South. Furthermore, there are several other RECs that now exist. Throughout the year 2001, there has been a gradual and recurring labor divide between the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Ministries (RECs/RMs). The ideas of subsidiarity, complementarity, and comparative advantage, while often lacking clarity in their precise application, serve as the fundamental basis of this concept.

The advancements in this collaborative effort are particularly evident in the areas of early warning and conflict prevention, as well as mediation (Fisher *et al.*, 2010; Nathan *et al.*, 2015). The efforts of ECOWAS in Côte d'Ivoire in 2011 and Gambia in 2017, as well as SADC in Lesotho in 2014, serve as notable examples of conflict interventions (Witt & Schnabel, 2020). Hence, a crucial element of the African Union's efforts to promote peace and security is the deliberate enhancement of the authority of regional organizations across the continent. The relationship between ECOWAS and the AU is not without difficulties and divergent interests, as demonstrated by the findings of Doring (2018). The term 'region' can be seen as a "sovereignty regime" (Agnew, 2005), and the African Union's support for regionalism as a practice that enhances sovereignty (Soderbaum, 2004) within this framework.

On the other hand, there are notable variations among the eight formally acknowledged Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in terms of their implementation of the African Peace and Security Agenda (APSA) and the establishment of peace and security measures. Regional standby brigades play a crucial role in the framework of ECOWAS and the EAC. While the ASF is now

operational, the EAC has a relatively poor history of promoting peace and security, as noted by Elowson and Lins de Albuquerque (2016), in comparison to ECOWAS (Tejpar & Lins de Albuquerque, 2015).

According to Tejpar and Lins de Albuquerque (2015), ECOWAS has not demonstrated any significant influence in the Lake Chad Basin region in relation to Boko Haram. Until recently, there was a lack of political resolve among IGAD member states to collaborate on peace and security issues in their region (Elowson and Lins de Albuquerque, 2016). The South African Development Community (SADC), which comprises a coalition of ruling liberation organizations, exhibits a complex structure for peace and security. Nevertheless, in practical application, it has exhibited a perceptive inclination to tackle political conflicts inside the area, as evidenced by its handling of Zimbabwe (while also addressing the circumstances in Lesotho, Madagascar, and Swaziland). The deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in 2012, under the leadership of South Africa, as a component of the United Nations peacekeeping mission MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), successfully quelled and eradicated the M23 insurgency (Lins de Albuquerque & Hull Wiklund, 2015).

The Economic Community of Arab States (ECCAS), consisting of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad, and Central African Republic (CAR), along with other states plagued by war, has the necessary political determination and institutional capability to adequately tackle peace and security issues (Ingerstad & Tham, 2015). The operationalization of the North African Regional Capability (NARC) and intervention in conflicts such as Libya or against the Islamic State by the AMU and

CEN-SAD has been hindered by several factors, including inadequate governance and a lack of political determination (Lins de Albuquerque, 2015).

Hence, the endeavor to construct resilient, flexible, and proficient regions remains challenging, as the Union's strategies for sovereignty must continually address the multifaceted issues of the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Models (RECs/RMs) and their constituent states (Spandler, 2020). The previous conversation highlights shortcomings in the capabilities and operations of specific sub-regional blocs in Africa's armed forces. Furthermore, the present study highlights the significance of selectiveness and competing interests in their activities.

The central proposition posited that the regional brigades of the African Standby Force (ASF) may function as a potent mechanism for handling instances of violent conflicts. However, the full implementation and utilization of the ASF have not yet taken place as a result of many factors (De Coning, Gelot, & Karlsrud 2016; Onditi & Okoth, 2017; Doring, 2018; Karbo & Virk, 2018). The African Union has consequently enhanced its extant military intervention capabilities, specifically the Rapid Deployment Capacity and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). In reaction to the expansion of radical Islamic groups in Algeria and the growing hostage-taking industry in the Sahara, the United States extended its 'war on terror' to Africa during the early 2000s (Pérouse de Montclos, 2016). The formation of several bilateral and regional partnerships between the United States and member states of the African Union has ensued.

Originally a local disagreement, this escalated into a Sahelo-Saharan conflict that affected multiple regions after Libya broke apart in March 2011 due to NATO intervention, the removal of Gaddafi, and the reintegration of armed Tuareg groups that

had previously supported the Libyan government back to Mali. In late 2011, they established the Mouvement National de Liberation de l'Azawad (MNLA) and, in January 2012, launched a "rebellion" in cooperation with extremist Jihadists. On April 6, 2012, the autonomous entity of Azawad in northern Mali was officially declared.

In response, the African Union and ECOWAS formulated a military strategy, which eventually came to fruition. In response to the insurgency, France strategically implemented 'Operation Serval', which proved to be an effective means of repulsion (Whitehouse & Strazzari, 2015). The support for this was voiced by the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali, February 2013) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which began in April 2013 (Albrecht & Cold-Ravnkilde, 2020). In June 2013, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was subsequently allocated to MINUSMA. In the subsequent year, France commenced "Operation Barkhane" (often referred to as the G5 mission or Joint Force) to provide assistance to Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad (Doring & Herpolsheimer, 2018).

A group of African Union member states in the Sahelo-Saharan area have taken steps to address the issue of "terrorism and violent extremism" in the midst of various actions. In March 2013, the Peace Support Operations (PSOs) commenced the Nouakchott process with the objective of facilitating the coordination of responses to several challenges, including violent conflicts, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, transnational organized crime, and the African Union Peace Security Council (AU PSC) (Lacher, 2013; Lacher, 2012). In December 2014, a gathering was held with political leaders from eleven African governments with the purpose of coordinating intelligence and security responses throughout their designated "region"

(African Union, 2014). The coordination of this initiative was undertaken by the African Union Commission, in accordance with "The African Union Strategy for the Sahel Region" (AU PSC, 2014b). Over the past five years, the Chairperson of the African Union Council (AUC) and the president of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in collaboration with the Special Representative for West Africa to the United Nations Secretary-General (formerly ECOWAS president Mohammed Ibn Chambas of Ghana), have actively cultivated strong networks among nations that share a common interest.

According to Doring (2018), the practical implementation of this phenomenon has led to the emergence of a novel kind of regionalism that surpasses the existing Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS, NARC, and ECCAS. Similarly, the African Union has dealt with the conflicts in the Horn of Africa, which initially involved maritime piracy and militias in Somalia, but later focused on the Islamic Courts Union and, later, the al-Shabaab militia, resulting in consequences that affected neighboring countries (Solomon, 2015). The African Union establishes the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007, so ensuring its continued engagement in Somalia. The Djibouti process, initiated in May 2008, was jointly led by the African Union and the United Nations. It received support from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, together with Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia, are actively involved in the Djibouti process by providing troops and police help. This format surpasses the limitations of the ASF and REC by bringing together nations from EAC, ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC. In both the Nouakchott and Djibouti processes, the spatial arrangement might be characterized as "regionalism of the willing and the able."

To enhance its "sovereignty," the African Union is forging strategic partnerships with the European Union and the United Nations (Hentz, Soderbaum, & Tavares, 2009). The relationship between the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) is marked by complementarity and subsidiarity, as well as the AU's dependence on the UN's ability to engage in peacekeeping operations (Wondemagegnehu, 2018). Nevertheless, the relationship between the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) is a unique manifestation of interregionalism (De Lombaerde, Soderbaum, & Wunderlich, 2015). The African Union has developed a comprehensive network of institutional links since the mid-2000s, leading to improved policy coordination and capacity-building at the African Union Council (AUC).

Since 2006, there have been yearly consultations between the AU PSC and the UN Security Council. Furthermore, a collaborative working group has been established with the specific purpose of conflict prevention. Additionally, biennial operational level meetings, commonly referred to as desk-to-desk meetings, are carried out. In 2009, the African Union established a permanent presence to the United Nations in New York. Subsequently, in the subsequent year, a Joint Task Force on Peace and Security was formed. In 2010, the United Nations established a presence within the African Union. In addition, the collaboration has been regularly revised since 2014 by implementing Joint UN-AU Frameworks for an Enhanced collaboration in Peace and Security (UN/AU, 2017). Moreover, it is evident that the United Nations has a vital role in the peace and security agenda of the African Union. This is due to its provision of financial resources and support for peacekeeping operations throughout the continent. Currently, there are around eight such missions in operation, with an

estimated annual expenditure of \$6 billion (Tardy & Wyss, 2014; Brosig, 2015; Koops *et al.*, 2015).

The African Union (AU) and European Union (EU) established their alliance during a summit held in Cairo, Egypt, in April 2000. Following that, there have been regular assemblies, with the most recent occurring in Abidjan, *Côte d'Ivoire* in 2017. This interregionalism is based on the 2007 Joint Africa-Europe Strategy (JAES) and a Plan of Action that was approved during the second summit of the African Union and European Union in Lisbon, Portugal (Farrell, 2013; Baert, Scaramagli, & Soderbaum 2014; Pirozzi & Litsegrd, 2018).

According to the current road map, the following are the areas of cooperation that are considered to be of the utmost importance: human development, sustainable and inclusive development, growth and continental integration, peace and security, democracy, good governance, and human rights; and foreign affairs. Frequent interactions between the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) encompass many gatherings, such as political and security committees, ministerial summits, commissions (college-to-college), the AU Military Staff Committee, the EU Military Committee, and the two crisis management committees known as the Joint Africa-EU Expert Groups. The European Union (EU) is involved in four cases of police or military intervention in the extended Sahel zone, in addition to the development aid provided by the European Development Fund (EDF). Supporting the fight against jihadists and separatists, EUTM Mali has been operational since 2013, EUCAP Sahel Mali assists the local police, and EUBAM Libya is responsible for safeguarding the borders of this nation. EUCAP Sahel Niger (2012) is also involved in this fight.

The EU-African Peace Facility (APF) has played a crucial role in providing substantial financial assistance for the execution of the APSA. Since its establishment in 2003, the AU and the RECs have received a total allocation of €2.7 billion (European Commission, 2018). The maintenance or expansion of flexibility inside the African Union is contingent upon the presence of both coalitions, as they constitute the fundamental elements of the Union's sovereignty policy. However, it should be noted that the bilateral relations between the two countries are not without intricate tensions. There are varying perspectives regarding the reform of the United Nations Security Council, particularly in relation to the future of veto rights and the matter of African representation. The African Union also spoke out against NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011 and France's intervention in Mali in 2013. They also said they did not like how the P3 (France, the UK, and the US) kept getting involved in African affairs without consulting the continent first. Furthermore, the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) have contrasting perspectives on matters such as the "refugee crisis" that occurred in 2015 and the ongoing discussion in 2016 concerning the future funding of AMISOM.

Therefore, the African Union upholds its commitment to a number of fundamental principles in its strategic alliances: endorsement of African ownership and prioritization; adaptable and inventive application of the subsidiarity principle; adherence to the principle of comparative advantage; and a division of labor facilitated by complementary approaches (AUC Chairperson, 2012). Nevertheless, notwithstanding these requests, the African Union's strategic alliances with the United States persist in advancing. Due to its constrained financial resources, the African Union was driven to develop these alliances. According to Bischoff, Aning, and

Acharya (2016) and Brown (2012), the Union's capacity to wield influence extends beyond continental boundaries to encompass international spheres.

2.1.4 Institutional and Structural Capacity of Regional Mechanisms in Conflict Management

Minyori (2018) asserts that regionalization in peace operations is not a relatively new phenomenon. Regional organizations are charged with the responsibility of resolving regional issues and implementing enforcement measures under the jurisdiction of the Security Council, as stipulated in Article 52 and 53 of the United Nations Charter. The rationale for this position is grounded in the actors' expertise regarding the pertinent matters, as well as their sociocultural and historical affiliation with one another and the parties engaged in the conflict. Critics of collective security contend that the interdependence among its participants has resulted in a diminished principle of impartiality, hence posing challenges to the effectiveness of regional peace operations. The successful regional collectivization of security is impeded by various hurdles, including negative perceptions of regional power, limitations on resource capacity, absence of authoritative legitimacy, and institutional weaknesses within the United Nations and the African Union (AU). Regional economic communities and processes in Africa have exerted greater influence in influencing the security situation in their individual regions, owing to their comprehension of the dynamic character of conflict.

According to the subsidiarity rule, the United Nations has the authority to authorize the African Union (AU) to implement actions with the objective of ensuring peace and security throughout the African continent. However, it should be noted that the African Union (AU) has the power to authorize Regional Economic Communities (RECs) or Regional Mechanisms to intervene in disputes that take place within their

respective regions. However, despite the implementation of the subsidiarity concept, various regions on the continent have attained varying levels of success in terms of collective security. Regional mechanisms are being increasingly focused on strengthening their ability to intervene in disputes that directly affect them.

Regional groups exhibit varying degrees of integration in peace and security activities. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has exhibited a higher level of proficiency in conflict management when compared to the Northern Africa region. Regional mechanisms play a vital role in conflict management since regional disputes often have a spillover effect that can potentially impact neighboring countries. Several regional organizations have established peace and security frameworks, in which they participate in cooperative endeavors with the African Union (AU) to tackle matters related to collective regional security. The individuals possess the autonomy to utilize all the systems provided by the APSA in order to guarantee security within their own domains. (Minyori, 2018)

2.1.4.1 Institutional Capacity of the SADC in Conflict Management

The entity under consideration is a regional economic community located in Southern Africa, committed to promoting sustainable socioeconomic development through integration, efficient governance, and the construction of long-lasting peace and security. The establishment of the organization can be attributed to the period spanning the 1960s and 1970s, wherein the recently liberated African states engaged in political, diplomatic, and military cooperation as the Frontline States. The primary aim of their endeavor was to foster unity in opposition to the apartheid regime and advocate for the formation of a continental organization. However, the formation of

the economic community took place in 1992. Following this, there has been a gradual transition towards conforming to the objectives of the OAU/AU.

The responsibility of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the promotion of peace and security is confined to the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation and the Mutual Defense Pact. This statement highlights the establishment of the SADC as a highly structured entity committed to the promotion of peace and security. Since its establishment, SADC has actively engaged in numerous peace operations, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Comoros, and Madagascar. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) demonstrated its engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in accordance with the stipulations delineated in Article 4 (j) of the African Union Constitutive Act. The selection of a military strategy over diplomacy was motivated by the unique nature of the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Despite facing criticism, the SADC has successfully played a commendable role in managing conflicts in Southern Africa.

2.1.4.2 The ECOWAS Institutional Capacity

The initiation was motivated by the aim of promoting economic development in the West African countries. However, in the past few decades, there has been a significant focus on the promotion of peace and security, acknowledging the interconnectedness between security and economic advancement. In order to address conflict prevention and management, the bloc adopted the Protocol Relating to the Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999) and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001). Both of these pillars provide stability to the ECOWAS Conflict and Prevention Framework. AFISMA, the

Africa-led international mission to Mali, involved the bloc's recent military intervention. Furthermore, the organization has employed non-military strategies, specifically mediation and sanctions, in order to make a meaningful contribution to its objective.

The limited involvement of the military in Mali was mostly attributed to inadequate logistical support and the United Nations' decision to delay the authorization of the operation. In addition, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has faced an institutional crisis due to Nigeria's dominant tendencies. In October 2014, the resurrection of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, with the objective of tackling the Boko Haram insurgency, was seen as an effort to exclude the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nevertheless, this action ultimately exposed weaknesses in the utilization of armed troops. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is equipped with a sophisticated early warning system that effectively predicts and disseminates information to the organization with the aim of mitigating potential risks (Minyori, 2018). However, the effective execution of steps to reduce the impact has been impeded by inadequate logistical and communication capabilities. Currently, there is a lack of a clearly defined logistical system within the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). Nevertheless, continuous efforts are being undertaken to tackle this matter, which has the potential to provide advantageous outcomes.

The East Sudan Force (ESF) is additionally encumbered by its dependence on Nigerian troops, who have taken on the duty of supplying more than 50% of the forces to the bloc. The bloc's efforts to achieve collective security have been impeded by a linguistic barrier, namely between the Francophone and Anglophone states. In

comparison to the latter's expeditious reaction to emergencies, the former demonstrates a tendency to postpone taking action until obtaining authorization from Paris. ECOWAS possesses a robust preparedness committee to develop a linkage with the APSA. The organization of the operational concept and deployment is structured within the context of the quick development capabilities of the African Standby Force (ASF). The regional Task Force plays a crucial role in facilitating quick deployment capabilities. In the meanwhile, military personnel and other resources, such as civilians and law enforcement personnel, continue to be stationed within their respective nations, awaiting their eventual deployment. However, the reserve force of the bloc has various limitations in its capacities, including a scarcity of well-trained civilians and law enforcement officers, logistical complexities, and a deficiency in deployable communication technology. The bloc has exhibited a proactive stance in promoting peace, alongside its other regional Standby forces within the African Union, despite its noteworthy accomplishments in mediation and diplomatic efforts related to security management.

The remarkable accomplishments of ECOMOG in both Liberia and Sierra Leone provide evidence to support this claim. Furthermore, the absence of a prevailing authority like Nigeria has bolstered endeavors to tackle obstinate individuals and fortify the democratic framework. This observation highlights the significant correlation between democratic governance in the West African region and the conflict prevention framework. This study reveals that ECOWAS has prioritized diplomatic interactions over forceful involvement, as the ESF is now constrained by a deficiency in many capacities that constitute the force (Minyori, 2018).

The findings of this study indicate that regional military operations in intra-state conflicts have produced varied outcomes due to inadequacies in their structural capacities. Systemic factors refer to a range of elements that include foreign interests, ethnic fragmentation across borders, and insufficient governance systems. Although the AU has implemented policies to encourage participation, the region's difficulties primarily arise from insufficient governance in certain partner states. This particular segment of the research focuses on the analysis of resource scarcity, with a specific emphasis on the involvement of foreign entities in conflicts within states.

2.1.5 Role, Structure and Objectives of East African Regional Forces in Management of East African Region Intractable Intra-State conflict

The area serves as a multifaceted testament to the administration of collective security. It is composed of nations affiliated with various regional institutions, whose jurisdictions frequently overlap, and which are embroiled in a grave hegemonic competition concerning regional security and peace. The nature and classification of conflicts in this area complicate the administration of security collectively. These consist of one-sided violence against civilians and interstate, intrastate, and non-state conflicts, among others. The area frequently experiences humanitarian crises, natural calamities, widespread poverty, and malnutrition, while concurrently contending with an unparalleled influx of refugees and a substantial population of internally displaced individuals.

The region's interstate relations are characterized by animosity, mistrust, and confrontations, which exacerbate the security situation. In 2006, the East African Community (EAC) officially approved its Regional Strategy for Peace and Security, specifically addressing issues related to peace and security. Furthermore, a subsequent establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Defense was

undertaken to regulate the contacts among the defense forces in the region. Two further essential documents are the Protocol on an Early Warning and Response Mechanism and the Regional Framework for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution. The conflict of interest arising from overlapping jurisdictions in different regional organizations hinders the maintenance of peace and security in the area due to divergent allegiances. Duplicity ensues in this regard, which has repercussions for the EACRF, the regional contingency force. Therefore, the resolution of conflicts in this area has predominantly relied on diplomatic methods, which have proven to be ineffective thus far.

The EACRF is comprised of states that are not members of any regional bloc and are members of various blocs, including IGAD, SADC, and others. However, the functioning of the EACRF has been impeded by the hegemonic rivalry between Ethiopia and Kenya, both of which have staked claims on the location of the regional headquarters. Hence, the management of security within and between the members of the region is contingent upon the benevolence of its constituents (Minyori, 2018). Notwithstanding these obstacles, the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) has undertaken a number of initiatives to ensure regional security collectively, including fact-finding missions in South Sudan and Somalia, and most recently, the deployment of soldiers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In agreement, the seven East African Community (EAC) member states would station a regional force in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Under EAC auspices, a Burundian contingent entered the DRC for the first time on August 15, 2022. In late March, the DRC became a member of the EAC, a regional economic bloc. On the occasion of the DRC's accession, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi

requested assistance from his counterparts in addressing the dozens of armed groups that have been engaged in years of conflict with the authorities in the eastern DRC. The seven leaders of the bloc subsequently reached an accord to form a regional troops-comprising joint force in an effort to quell the violence. In April, they initiated initial negotiations facilitated by Kenya in Nairobi, involving leaders of armed groups in Congo (Nelleke, 2022).

The EAC has collaborated with ECOWAS, IGAD, and AU, all of which operate early warning systems of different types and levels, to develop its own Early Warning System (EWM), which is regarded as a critical cornerstone in the prevention of conflicts and crises. Additionally, the EAC established the Nyerere Centre for Peace Research in Tanzania with the purpose of furnishing the EAC with well-informed policy alternatives, training, and research in the domain of peace and security. Its primary objective is to advance peace and security as fundamental prerequisites for regional integration and development (Brown, 2012).

An similar source of funding for the EAC and IGAD is a partnership fund through which partners finance particular initiatives. However, the organization receives daily operating funds from its member states. Lack of resources and adequate personnel, sluggish enforcement of agreements reached at EAC meetings at the national level, and the community's lack of authority over national troops make it difficult for the EAC to act on military security matters within member states. Furthermore, Tanzania appears to hold a cautious stance with respect to the proposed political federation of East African nations. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the security operations of the EAC, which are encompassed within the more comprehensive concept of security,

supplement those of other security mechanisms such as the EACRF, which may primarily engage in military endeavors (Brown, 2012).

The eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is currently seeing an unprecedented surge in armed group violence, which includes attacks on people and refugee facilities. In July, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees documented a displacement of more than 160,000 individuals due to the ongoing conflict between the Congolese army and the March 23 Movement (M23), an armed faction that was ultimately vanquished by Congolese and United Nations forces in 2013. The hostilities transpired inside the jurisdiction of North Kivu province. The repositioning of government and UN soldiers to regions where the M23 is most active has created a security vacuum in Ituri province and parts of North Kivu. Furthermore, attacks on non-combatants in these areas have been intensified by other armed groups (Brown, 2012).

The EAC chiefs of state issued a call for an immediate ceasefire in the eastern DRC on 20 June and made the decision to proceed with the joint force. General Robert Kibochi, the chair of the EAC's military staff and chief of defense forces of Kenya, delivered a preliminary concept of operations during the meeting. This document outlined the objectives and standards of engagement of the joint force, as well as the resources that would be provided to its commander. The proposed battle plan specifies that between 6,500 and 12,000 soldiers are to be assembled in the eastern DRC with the mission of "containment, eradication, and defeat of negative forces." Under the guidance of a Kenyan commander and with its main office situated in Goma, the capital and commercial center of North Kivu, the combat force would be deployed in four provinces of Congo: Haut-Uélé, Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu.

Its mandate would be renewable every six months, and the parties involved would conduct a strategic review every two months. Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, and South Sudan have all agreed to contribute military personnel to support the Congolese forces in combat (Bischoff, Aning, & Acharya, 2016).

Although a novel endeavor, the units comprising the joint force would primarily supplement soldiers that were already stationed in the DRC; each participant would be assigned a unique objective. Joint force Ugandan soldiers are tasked with providing support to their fellow soldiers in the conflict against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a coalition of Ugandan rebels in which the largest faction has declared its allegiance to the Islamic State in the regions of North Kivu and Ituri. The Kenyan military would pursue additional insurgents in North Kivu, an area where Kenyan personnel were already stationed as part of the United Nations force (although their missions were distinct). Tanzanian and Burundian forces are expected to conduct operations in South Kivu, thereby solidifying the Burundian army's presence in the region where it has been engaged in combat with the RED-Tabara militia since December 20 with the tacit sanction of the DRC... In conclusion, a limited number of South Sudanese soldiers would be allocated to engage the remnants of the Lord Resistance's Army in the region of Haut-Uélé (Bischoff, Aning, & Acharya, 2016).

East African nations have been concerned for years about the insecurity in the eastern DRC, but previous discussions regarding the deployment of a regional force to intervene had never materialized. It remained uncertain, notwithstanding Burundi's deployment on August 15, when, if ever, the neighboring countries of the DRC would deploy troops into the region. Although the plan mandated that each nation pay for its own soldiers, certain governments encountered financial difficulties in meeting the

expenses. The EAC would seek additional funding from regional and international organizations, including the African Union (AU) and the United Nations, according to a senior Kenyan official who spoke to Crisis Group; however, securing external funding proved difficult. UN support for additional personnel on Congolese soil is improbable, considering the organization's current costly peacekeeping mission in the country consists of 16,000 personnel.

The AU is unable to sustainably provide funding. The European Union (EU) could potentially provide financial assistance to the EAC or the troop-contributing countries through the European Peace Facility (Brown, 2012). For reasons previously discussed by Crisis Group, the European Union has limited willingness to finance personnel stipends. However, it is willing to allocate funds for equipment, logistics, communications, and transportation (Nelleke, 2022). The organizational capacity deficiency of the EACRF to intervene in Eastern DRC is identified as a limitation of the current study.

The proposed plan contains significant voids and potential snags in addition to financial constraints. An aspect that necessitates further elucidation is the manner in which EAC forces, who will be stationed in close proximity to UN troops, will collaborate with the latter. The mission plan of the EAC merely states that the two forces must "cooperate"; no implementation details are provided. In addition, it is possible that President-elect William Ruto of Kenya would be less inclined to mobilize a regional force compared to Uhuru Kenyatta, his predecessor, who was reportedly more concerned with protecting Kenya's economic interests in the eastern DRC, according to some analysts. Ruto, who was an ardent supporter of Congolese President Tshisekedi but seems to have a closer relationship with Ugandan President

Yoweri Museveni than with Tshisekedi, may also reconsider engaging in a costly and perilous operation (Nelleke, 2022).

It is evident from the preceding discourse that regionalism in Africa is characterized by fragmentation and a significant reliance on external major powers to provide capacity building in various domains of intervention, including intra-state conflicts such as the one in the DRC. The EAC, similar to numerous other sub-regional African organizations, generally exhibits a deficiency in the necessary capacities and capabilities to address multi-cause conflicts, in contrast to their Western counterparts. This section cites scholars who assert that resource scarcity is a significant barrier to regional military intervention. The present study has identified a deficiency in the coordination among EAC partner states, which contributes to their inability to effectively manage multi-casual conflicts.

2.2 Root Causes, Types and Extent of European and Middle East Regions Intractable Intra-State Conflict

Enuka and Nwagbo (2016) argue that regional organizations are impacted by situational limits when faced with external threats to regional peace and the involvement of regional powers, even though these organizations have proven their ability to handle conflicts. The constant topic in the analysis conducted by Bryon (1984) is the inability of regional groups to effectively unify against their most important members. Authorization for regional operations in conflicts directly involving global or regional powers is highly unlikely to be given. The organization faces challenges in executing operations in states that are opposed or not actively supported due to a lack of critical resources and political influence.

A state possessing substantial regional influence has the capacity to endure coercion in order to endorse a particular course of action. In circumstances when such support

is not obligatory, the dominant power has the ability to covertly or openly undermine the mission via means of intermediary players. This circumstance inevitably limits strong regional responses to conflicts that occur among or within smaller nations. The matter of grappling with a dominant power is notably prominent in the Western Hemisphere. The Organization of American States (OAS) has encountered challenges in implementing effective operational measures due to the absence of support from the United States. Although the United Nations may face difficulties in securing cooperation from the United States, as exemplified in the Panama case, the likelihood of such cooperation is quite low when considering the Organization of American States (OAS). The current power configurations indicate that other locations may experience a lower number of challenges. Any regional system in Asia would have difficulties in regulating the actions of the Chinese or Japanese. In the southern region of Africa, it is observed that certain sub-regional and regional institutions may not possess the necessary ability to enforce cessation of any violations committed by South Africa. The United Nations, in particular, holds the capacity to restrict the actions of a regional authority. The United Nations has the requisite resources and political leverage to apply pressure on states to adhere to its peacekeeping endeavors, especially in situations where certain states may not cooperate. One notable limitation of regional initiatives is in their inability to effectively curtail the influence of regional hegemons.

According to Iván (2022), additional examples of circumstances where internationalization caused changes include the conflicts conducted in southeast Turkey between the Turkish Army and Kurdish forces in northern Iraq. In addition, Turkey has a dominant position in the conflict in neighboring Syria. Iran's sustained engagement in the armed conflict in Syria and its significant role in shaping the

dynamics of the armed conflict in Iraq can be attributed to its influence over multiple Shia militias. Tehran's increasing engagement in Yemen can be attributed to its close closeness to the Houthis, its interest in the country due to the power struggle with Saudi Arabia, and the ongoing negotiations regarding its nuclear program. A significant role was held by the United Arab Emirates and Riyadh in the international coalition involved in the armed conflict in Yemen. Riyadh has consistently upheld its position of leadership.

The potential effectiveness of the NATO operation in Afghanistan relies on many crucial factors: the availability of financial resources, the degree of political resolve demonstrated by the Allies, and the existence of the requisite tools to facilitate cooperative military efforts. However, the issue of coordination both within and beyond the alliance is regarded as troublesome. However, the main challenge regarding the Alliance's efforts in Afghanistan revolves upon the intricacy of developing a clearly defined strategy for ISAF. According to Iván (2022), the NATO operation is perceived as a supplementary endeavor to a comprehensive nation-building initiative led by the United Nations. With the increasing complexity of the nation-building mission, the role of NATO has become more unclear and multifaceted. Moreover, the Alliance's ability to coordinate security efforts with the EU is hindered by a political situation involving Cyprus, a non-NATO member state, and Turkey, which is not a NATO member state.

The European region, on the opposite end of the spectrum, is abundant with a multitude of security-related institutions. These roles and memberships have complimentary functions that overlap. NATO, a longstanding and major organization, has traditionally been entrusted with the responsibility of collective defense and

security. The missions of the organization have experienced alterations subsequent to the conclusion of the Cold War, and subsequently, it has assumed the role of a peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Afghanistan. The European Union has effectively enhanced its security-related jurisdiction through a series of diplomatic endeavors and the implementation of a cohesive defense policy. The institution for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an institution involved in the supervision of elections and the resolution of ethnic conflicts, serves as a supplementary entity to NATO and the European Union (Eneka & Nwagbo, 2016).

The substantial presence of foreign forces and mercenaries in Libya, coupled with the nation's persistent failure to adhere to the 2011 arms embargo (which was deemed "completely ineffective" by a panel of United Nations experts in March), presents a considerable obstacle to attaining a sustainable transformation in the conflict dynamics within the region. The ceasefire agreement, which was ratified in October 2020, included a provision for a complete withdrawal from all areas of Libyan territory (land, sea, and air) within a three-month timeframe. However, numerous foreign forces, such as Turkish forces and mercenaries from Russia, Syria, Chad, and Sudan, continued to maintain their presence within the country. Throughout the year, the United Nations consistently underscored the imperative nature of terminating foreign intervention. During the second Conference on Libya held in Berlin in June, the Secretary-General of the United Nations called upon all parties involved in the conflict, both internal and external, to achieve a consensus on a withdrawal strategy that encompasses a defined timeline (Iván, 2022). For several years, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have been characterized as "proxy wars," wherein the dynamics of the battle have clearly mirrored regional and international issues.

The presence of intra-regional rivalries among the constituents of a region serves as an indicator of the challenges it faces. These rivalries have the potential to not only generate complex conflicts that are challenging to handle, but they can also hinder the ability of regional groups to participate in collective action. According to Diehl (2000), these rivalries seem to serve as the foundation for regional conflicts and other significant risks to global security. These conflicts, commonly known as long-lasting rivalries, present the most significant threat to global peace. The examination of Asia and Europe through a comparative lens reveals the significant impact of rivalry on regional conflict management endeavors.

The ASEAN+3 states, which include 10 Southeast Asian members together with China, Japan, and South Korea, are engaged in over twenty rivalries. These states demonstrate several patterns that are relevant to conflict management in the region. The origins of several rivalries may be traced back to a common external foe, namely North Korea. Upon conducting a more thorough analysis, it becomes apparent that although China, Japan, and South Korea share certain similar interests with regards to North Korea, their positions and priorities diverge significantly in relation to this nation. Additionally, it is worth noting that there are rivalries between each of these three republics and the remaining two. Hence, although there may be some possibility of collaboration in the field of foreign policy, there is undeniably no substantial basis for regional cooperation centered on North Korea. According to Foot (1995), the lack of a common external opponent has traditionally hindered the progress of security cooperation in Asia. Furthermore, according to Diehl (2000), eleven of the rivals had a higher probability of engaging in fight with each other rather than with an external adversary. This finding is connected to the initial point. The notable aspects of the

group lie in the rivalries observed among the three main economic powers, namely China, Japan, and South Korea.

According to Diehl (2008), China and Japan, who are considered the primary states in the coalition, are involved in eleven rivalries, one of which involves a competition between them. Nevertheless, there exist other interconnected rivalries, with the most prominent being the conflict between China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei about the Spratly Islands. The ASEAN+3 members will be unable to achieve complete cooperation on regional security matters until the conflicts between major powers and, to a lesser extent, the disagreement over the Spratly Islands are resolved.

The extent to which regional organizations can engage in conflict management is mostly influenced by the political authority and endorsement granted to them by their voters. Certain regions lack a comprehensive security institution. The lack of a regional body tasked with conflict management in north Asia is exemplified by Hemmer and Katzenstein's (2002) research. The institutional capacity in different regions of Asia is quite weak. In the context of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), collaboration is primarily focused on issues related to the economy and society. Hence, due to its inherent characteristics, it lacks the ability to significantly impact the Indo-Pakistan conflict, and even if it does, it can only do so through a functionalist perspective on peace (Diehl 2008). Other regional organizations, such as ASEAN, face comparable constraints in terms of their jurisdiction to undertake security measures.

ASEAN's actions have primarily been limited to normative pronouncements. Despite recent efforts to explain its decision-making procedures, ASEAN has reaffirmed its stance of non-interference in the internal affairs of members and has not committed to

the use of military force. There is considerable variance observed in the missions and level of institutionalization of regional organizations across different regions.

2.2.1 Root Causes, Types and Extent of African Region Intractable Intra-State Conflict

Regarding ethnic conflicts and feeble states, regional organizations are constrained and unable to effectively manage conflicts. Africa has been plagued by these issues (Diehl, 2008). Ethnic conflicts and feeble states pose substantial challenges for regional conflict management due to the substantial negative externalities associated with such disputes. Throughout history, the resolution of internal conflicts was predominantly the responsibility of the state and not subject to regional organization. This exemplified a rigid perspective on sovereignty. On the basis of sovereignty concerns, numerous African Union members have opposed any military intervention in Darfur, Sudan (Euka & Nwagbo, 2016).

Simultaneously, feeble states and ethnic conflicts have increased the likelihood of intervention by neighboring states operating independently of regional organizations. The Congo conflict exemplified direct intervention in a civil war in its most egregious form. Several neighboring states deployed troops to the region to support and oppose diverse Congolese factions (Zartman, 2007). As a consequence, attaining consensus on course of action for a regional organization became virtually unattainable (Euka & Nwagbo, 2016).

Territorial disputes—often involving states contending for control over a parcel of land that is contiguous to both parties geographically—present an additional peril to regional security and tranquility. Controversial matters of particular peril are those pertaining to territories that are esteemed for their intangible attributes as opposed to tangible qualities. Specifically, territorial disputes concerning resource or defense

concerns present less difficulty in reaching compromise positions than those concerning religious, ethnic, or historical claims to a territory (Hensel, 2002). Africa continues to endure the repercussions of the Berlin Conference of 1885, during which its colonial borders were established without regard for historical demarcation or the ethnic composition of the territories' inhabitants. However, this has been mitigated to some extent by the agreement reached at the time of independence among African leaders that military force would not be used to alter state borders. While the majority of border disputes have been resolved, particularly in Europe, numerous others continue to be difficult for regional organizations in Africa and Asia to resolve (Enuka & Nwagbo, 2016).

Ethiopia (Tigray) exemplified the dynamics of internationalization in Africa in 2021, subsequent to Eritrea's ally in the Ethiopian government and the escalation of hostilities to the border region separating Ethiopia and Sudan, where Sudanese militias engaged in combat with Ethiopian military forces. Mozambique (north) was another noteworthy location where numerous international actors were active. Some of these actors, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Rwanda, and Portugal, as well as the United States and the European Union, provided training units or military and/or police contingents to assist the Mozambican security forces in their counterinsurgency efforts (Iván, 2022). As is the case in the DRC, this study suggests that proxy conflicts are probable as a result of the competing interests of partner states engaged in intervention.

Trans-regional conflicts that have arisen on the African continent due to repeated interventions, such as those observed in the extended Horn of Africa and the Sahelo-Saharan area, serve as indicators of dynamism. The determination is shaped by

limitations in available space and pragmatic factors, alongside the conviction that these two occurrences will effectively demonstrate the whole spectrum of space-related activities undertaken by the AU/REC (Engel, 2019). The Sahelo-Saharan region spans from northern Libya to the Lake Chad Basin in the south, and from western Mauretania to eastern Chad, traversing a rugged topography. The Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) is composed of eight member states that collectively represent the Horn of Africa region. These states are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda. According to Solomon (2015), violent conflict emerges as a result of various complex elements in both cases. These factors include prolonged periods of inadequate governance, lasting impacts of colonialism, ongoing politics of exclusion, and the occurrence of spill-over effects within a volatile location. The transregional nature of conflicts has emerged due to the recurrent interventions by neighboring countries and external actors (Aning, 2014; Engel, 2019). The transregional conflicts have resulted in significant changes to spatial regimes, as evidenced by the works of Doring (2018), Hüsken & Klute (2015), Charbonneau (2017) in the context of Mali, and Rosato (2016) in the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa.

The processes described above have led to the development of conflicting and overlapping forms of governance and the delivery of public goods, such as security and healthcare, by both governmental and non-governmental actors. This encompasses instances of violent insurgencies, such as militias, religious fanatics, or extreme Islamists, as well as individuals from both African and non-African backgrounds (De Waal, 2015). Notable examples include the United Nations and French intervention troops in the G5 countries.

In essence, the transregional conflicts observed in Africa provide empirical support for the notion that sovereignty is not intrinsically situated inside geographical boundaries or exclusively structured by nation-states. In addition to fragile governments in the Sahelo-Saharan and Horn of Africa areas, different players beyond the state, such as United Nations peacekeepers and other intervention forces, also exercise forms of sovereignty (African Development Bank, 2014).

Violent dialectics of de-territorialization and re-territorialization are prevalent in various global regions, such as the Sahelo-Saharan region, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, the Gulf of Guinea in Africa, Syria and Iraq in the Middle East, and the Red Sea conflict complex at the crossroads of both regions. In this context, state actors endeavor to regain control over individuals, ideas, and territory in response to the actions of other competing social actors (such as Regional conflict formations, also known as regional conflict complexes, can be described as assemblages of transnational conflicts that cultivate interdependent linkages within a specific geographical area, leading to prolonged and enduring conflicts.

This analytical classification should not be considered as distinct from conflicts between states and conflicts inside states that include several parties. The phenomenon under consideration cannot be simplified to instances where one conflict "spills over" into another, nor to scenarios where multiple fundamentally autonomous civil conflicts coexist inside a given region. In contrast, the emergence of regional conflicts is frequently characterized by interrelated and foundational processes and networks that transpire inside a specific geographical area. Transborder social networks, illegal trade and trafficking, exploitation of natural resources, militarization

and arms transfers, and transborder armed groups are among the processes and networks that are encompassed within this context (Iván, 2022).

Regional conflicts have emerged as a result of prolonged societal conflicts, interstate wars, and civil wars throughout Africa, surpassing national borders. The international community has put up regional alternatives in response to the situation (Onditi & Ben-Nun, Gilad & Were, Edmond & Nyadera, 2021). Furthermore, it is said that African nations often depend on improvised procedures to tackle the task of improving the effectiveness of their responses to peace and security challenges. However, this particular methodology has faced several structural limitations. As a result, the comprehensive framework has restructured the traditional "RSC" into a more efficient compilation of "resources." The present study aims to identify a hasty approach to conflict settlement in the African context and proposes a comprehensive plan for attaining sustainable solutions. Despite the limitation of this research in focusing just on the origins of disputes related to resources, there exist other noteworthy underlying issues that the current study aims to investigate.

Although the fundamental attributes of regional conflict complexes have been discussed previously, precisely identifying the most significant connections between these eight dynamics and the occurrence and continuation of large-scale violence at the regional level is a more challenging endeavor. In other words, which causal arguments provide the most comprehensive explanation for the emergence of regional conflicts? In order to provide a comprehensive policy response and address this inquiry effectively, it is crucial to acknowledge that states invariably serve as the foundation for prosperous regional peacebuilding. Consequently, the issue is predominantly articulated in relation to the initial point mentioned earlier: the

institutional deficiencies of one or more nations. When examined through a macrohistorical lens, the fundamental concern is a state-building process that resorts to various forms of predation against the civilian populace in the absence of reciprocity.

Moreover, the manner in which states are integrated into the global system also influences them, indicating that it is necessary to consider developments at the international and national levels in order to comprehend them thoroughly. In the long run, it may be crucial to investigate novel approaches for establishing secure and sustainable external environments for fragile states (Iván, 2022).

Regional organizations have obstacles in their conflict management efforts due to both a lack of power and mission, as well as a scarcity of essential resources. The concept of "resources" encompasses the financial, political, and even military and logistical capacities necessary for the implementation of a certain decision or course of action. Organizations do not possess these qualities naturally; instead, they need to acquire them from individuals to enable operational activity. On the other hand, conflict management pursuits may be constrained to diplomatic and normative initiatives that require modest financial resources. Significant financial investments are required to pay the expenses of goods and manpower for specific humanitarian assistance, collective security, peacekeeping, and security operations. Multiple regional organizations, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), consist of underdeveloped states that lack the capacity to establish or maintain such activities.

An increasing inclination has been observed among these entities to solicit support, encompassing financial, logistical, and training resources, from influential

governments within the global framework, the United Nations, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with the aim of carrying out missions. Although this has largely mitigated the difficulties encountered, its influence has been restricted. In the future, it is likely that global players will increasingly outsource activities they are unwilling to execute to regional organizations and other entities (Weiss, 1997). The mere possession of financial resources does not guarantee the proper operation of a regional organization.

The organization and its members must possess political capital in order to effectively exercise influence over regional affairs. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which consists of six Arab governments abundant in oil resources, undeniably have the necessary financial capacity to support a wide range of operations. Nevertheless, apart from Saudi Arabia, the constituent nations of this alliance exhibit political and military vulnerability, hence limiting their capacity to exert substantial influence over Middle Eastern policy (Miller, 2008). The existence of military resources is identified as the third characteristic that distinguishes effective regional organizations from their less effective equivalents on a global scale. Without a question, NATO possesses the requisite manpower, supplies, and military skill to effectively carry out a wide range of operations that extend beyond the immediate European theater. Other regional organizations depend on military forces from their member states who often lack proper equipment and training, resulting in limited ability to project force over large distances.

In the context of regional conflict complexes, peacemaking efforts can be observed through four various approaches: comprehensive, tactical, strategic, or networked. An all-encompassing strategy would require the simultaneous execution of numerous

peace accords that engage regional allies. Nevertheless, this strategy may also entail the potential danger of disregarding vital factors, such as the transfer of weapons, which require international engagement and the continuation of regional conflicts. In addition, a tactical plan would seek to impact the immediate cost-benefit calculations of combatants in a manner that is specific to the location, with the goal of fostering peaceful conflict settlement. Nevertheless, this would typically only be efficacious as a provisional remedy. Moreover, an effective strategy would prioritize the examination of the distinct economic and political networks that play a pivotal role in perpetuating the regional conflict complex, such as the trade of coltan originating from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nevertheless, a significant proportion of companies have not yet acquired the capability to perceive and implement this particular form of intervention. In the end, it may be possible to create a network of individuals dedicated to promoting peace in a specific region, similar to the networks that support wars. However, this is now a theoretical effort without a formal organization.

The dynamics of internal conflicts are characterized by various factors, encompassing the exploitation and commercialization of natural resources by insurgent factions, the pursuit of war-related profits by entities such as arms traders, organized criminal networks, and corporate mercenary enterprises, and the adoption of economic strategies by civilian populations, such as engaging in cross-border trade involving a diverse range of commodities. However, gaining a comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms underlying the transborder conflict economy is often a complex and challenging endeavor.

The arms trade illustrates this intricacy: the downfall of a nation (as seen in Albania) can lead to the sale of weapons in the region, while the establishment of more stability can result in both an increase in arms (as war profiteers take advantage of weapon buy-back schemes) and a decrease in arms (as seen in Sierra Leone), which worsens conflict in neighboring countries. Likewise, the relationship between politics and economics is not always clear-cut, as strong political connections can strengthen emerging economic networks, while significant economic advantages might strengthen fragile political coalitions. The unknown aspects of transborder war economies encompass several social elements, such as jobs that require legal travel and commerce with war-affected nations, familial links that extend across national borders, and the role of diasporas in financing conflicts.

While acknowledging the potential substitution of politically driven violence with economically motivated violence in cases when state military capabilities are severely constrained, the individual asserted that the primary driving force behind the rebels' actions is their need for self-preservation in the face of "extermination." Furthermore, a narrow focus solely on the alleged economic motivations of insurgent groups fails to consider numerous other relevant factors within interconnected conflicts. These factors encompass governance and compliance with legal structures, external regulatory frameworks, the demand for "conflict goods" among consumers in developed nations, coping mechanisms employed by civilian populations, and the participation of neighboring states. In specific countries, like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where trans-border war economies have unquestionably played a role in the development of a regional conflict, the use of rebel violence for economic purposes only sheds light on a part of a much more complex story.

This narrative also incorporates the economic sustenance of civilians through the extraction and trafficking of natural resources, like as coltan, as well as the armed forces of regional states, such Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Rwanda, which seem to be driven by commercial interests. The effective mitigation of the adverse effects of transborder war economies has proven to be a significant challenge due to a lack of comprehensive comprehension, unintended consequences arising from state-centric sanctions regimes, inadequate supervision of the private sector across international boundaries, and conflicts of interest among intervening states and organizations (International Crisis Group, 2020).

Regarding the rationales behind the interventions of Angola and Namibia in the DRC, Koyame and Clark concur with Turner. However, they hold a different opinion than Nest regarding the interventions of Zimbabwe in the DRC. Zimbabwe, they contend, appears to be primarily motivated by economic considerations. Representing its motivations, Zimbabwe cannot even use the pretext of security concerns, as it shares no frontier with the DRC through which rebels could infiltrate its territory. Furthermore, Zimbabwe's intervention lacks any ideological rationale or justification. However, the country manages to amplify the appearance of 'counter-intervention' by leveraging the international norm against unwelcome intervention (2003).

Concerning whether these three nations acted with or without the SADC mandate, a number of academics have questioned the legitimacy of the military intervention conducted by the three SADC member states. As a novel mechanism for preserving and bolstering regional peace and security, Mbuende (2001) stresses the significance of the OPDS's established status. The resolution of the situation in the DRC is mirrored in the SADC's collective reaction. With respect to this matter, Mbuende

(2001) contends that the intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was predicated, among other things, on the 1995 Cape Town, South Africa meeting of the Inter-State and Security Committee, wherein SADC nations ratified a resolution urging collective action against military coups and other unconstitutional endeavors to overthrow governments. The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee met in Harare on August 18, 1998, in response to a request for assistance from the administration of President Laurent Kabila. SADC and SADC Allied Armed Forces responded successfully to this request.

Scholars who investigate war economies exhibit a striking absence of concurrence; consequently, policymakers who address war economies grapple with a significant lack of consensus. Consider the management of "conflict goods" in the context of peacebuilding; is cooperation or interdiction the more effective strategy? Sanctions are typically applied uniformly to a single state, disregarding the regional ramifications of resource extraction and armaments transfers, except in rare instances where such measures are deemed appropriate. Even though the international community's role in promoting peace and war in this region is still in its infancy, two of these West African conflicts stand out for their intervention by the United Nations: Contrary to Sierra Leone, where UNAMSIL is presently the largest peace operation in the world (International Crisis Group, 2020), Liberia signifies the inaugural deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force, UNAMIL, in conjunction with an established regional force, ECOMOG.

The conflict in Liberia from 1989 to 1997 was characterized by Warlord Charles Taylor's efforts to gain the support of his domestic adversaries, the division of support among different factions, the involvement of ECOMOG at the sub-regional level, and

the allocation of international financial resources for peace operations, which one panelist referred to as a "poor man's war." The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) initiated its operations in 1999 as a successor insurgency to the presidency acquired by Taylor in 1997. Following this, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone continued its abhorrent military campaign by engaging in the illegal commerce of diamonds. The neighboring countries, including Taylor, extended support to different groups within the RUF and ultimately dispatched a peacekeeping contingent. According to the International Crisis Group (2020), the United Nations took on the responsibility for the peace operation in 2000 subsequent to the withdrawal of ECOMOG forces.

Regarding Guinea-Bissau, the internal peace negotiations were conducted with dishonesty, the deployment of 700 peacekeepers at the sub-regional level was inadequate, and significant non-West African parties largely refrained from taking action. The persistent conflict in Cote d'Ivoire can be partially ascribed to the nation's economic decline, as seen by its \$14 billion external debt as of 1999, as well as the significant regional disparities between the northern and southern regions of the country. The involvement by Cote d'Ivoire in Liberia has led to retaliatory actions at the sub-regional level, resulting in the deployment of peacekeepers by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In the global arena, France has deployed a contingent of 4,000 military personnel to reinforce the regime's stance, whereas the United States has conveyed its endorsement.

Gaining insights from the West African experience can provide valuable knowledge regarding the ongoing wars in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, as well as prospective tactics for efficiently handling future complex regional conflicts. Governments' endorsement

of insurgencies in neighboring states can give rise to recurring patterns of retaliation and persistent regional instability. Sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS necessitate adequate military capacities to intervene in conflicts that demand peace enforcement operations. Regional hegemons, such as Nigeria, have been observed to contribute to conflict in various cases, as exemplified by Sierra Leone and Liberia. The presence of good governance is a crucial element in preventing conflicts.

2.2.1.1 Root Causes, Types and Extent of Malian Intervention by the ECOWAS Intractable Intra-State Conflict

Olsson (2015) noted that the crisis that transpired in Mali in 2012 was driven by the pursuit of stability, encompassing national, regional, and international dimensions. The concern for security was escalated to the point where it was equated with terrorism. The aforementioned was illustrated through the Abuja Summit of 2012, which formulated an intervention strategy and whose concluding communiqué underscored the escalating security crisis and the critical nature of promptly dismantling the transnational criminal and terrorist network that threatens global peace and security. As a result of the unfolding security situation in Mali, neighboring nations tightened their grasp out of concern for the potential spillover effects of infiltration and destabilization.

The United States and other Western powers promptly classified the Malian crisis as an endeavor to combat terrorism. In general, the struggle against terrorism was implemented as an intervention strategy during the Malian crisis. ECOWAS perceived the crisis as an impetus for establishing stability in the region and a perilous shoreline for the stability of Africa as a whole. In essence, the Malian crisis was classified as a security and terrorism crisis with the potential to propagate throughout the region and pose a threat to global stability as a whole. This exacerbated the

position of a region that was already precarious. Additionally, it has been contended that the crisis was emphasized by neighboring nations as a test of their commitment to nationalism and statehood. The postcolonial borders were deemed ineffectual and criticized for contributing to the exacerbation of the Malian crisis in this regard.

According to Olsson (2015), the intervention by ECOWAS in the Malian crisis can be interpreted as an exhibition of political power and underscores the organization's resolute commitment to maintaining its strength despite encountering challenges and inadequate international backing. In the past, the primary concern of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was its reluctance to expand its scope and establish itself as a significant international force. Nonetheless, this position was modified in response to the Malian crisis, when the organization intervened to restore order. The then-president of Chad, Mr. Debby, recognized the influence of political considerations in order to bolster his position through the deployment of troops during the ECOWAS intervention; therefore, it was exceedingly difficult for Western donors to question his alarming trajectory regarding human rights and governance. Once more, it is believed that Nigeria, the economic powerhouse of the region and a regional hegemon, had a principal interest within ECOWAS. Nigeria's deployment of soldiers in Mali, notwithstanding the domestic threats engendered by the Boko Haram insurgency, is perceived as an exhibition of their regional prowess and capability.

2.2.1.2 SADC and the Intervention in the DRC

The initiation of a civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) had far-reaching consequences for the stability and security of the Great Lakes region, Eastern Africa, and Southern Africa. Additionally, it served as a catalyst for the intervention of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the

Congolese conflict. Kigali and Bujumbura both supported Laurent Kabila of the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) during the 1996 rebellion, which was a successful attempt to remove the despotic Mobutu from power.

The formed alliance between Kabila, Kigali, and Rwanda came into effect when Rwanda initiated support for two rebel factions in the DRC, a move that was in direct opposition to the former. After failing to disavow his erstwhile allies, Kabila sought military intervention from the SADC. The SADC intervention was thus directed by Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. The situation evolved from what was initially expected to be a straightforward military triumph in favor of the SADC forces to one that was intricate, requiring a substantial deployment and ongoing confrontation. The SADC decision was rationalized on the grounds of the imperative to rectify the dire humanitarian situation that had developed as a result of the conflict.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is undeniably endowed with vast resources, particularly in the form of valuable minerals, gold, and copper, as well as enormous reserves of coltan and diamonds. The majority of scholarly works devoted to the DRC conflict emphasize the significance of economic interests as powerful incentives for foreign intervention. The prospective economic opportunities presented by the available resources constitute the most likely basis for intervention. From a strategic-led interest perspective, one could argue that Harare's intervention was driven by the perception that the Zimbabwean authorities and military elites benefited from "take-what-you-want" exploitation.

In terms of strategic interest, Angola's intervention was motivated by the following objectives: halting supply routes, safeguarding government oil enterprises that were

crucial to the economy and war, and, above all else, preserving a regime that would be subservient to Angolan interests. In order to achieve Namibia's government's ambitious goal of diverting water from Congo to the north of Namibia via Angola, Nujoma's intervention was necessary to secure this plan. As determined by the panel of experts subsequently convened by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Zimbabwe's intervention was motivated by its policy of indirectly financing the conflict through direct payments to Congolese companies that had contracted with Zimbabwe. Second, Zimbabwe had previously entered into a profitable contract with them and wished to retain them. The report indicates that the Angolan government had a significant stake in obtaining contracts via Sonagol, a state-owned oil company. Moreover, both Kigali and Kampala were accused of engaging in a profit-driven war, which impeded their efforts to develop lasting resolutions to the Congolese conflict.

The SADC intervention, similar to the ECOWAS intervention in Mali, can be analyzed from a geostrategic perspective. Initially, Namibia designated the situation as a security concern due to its impact on the Caprivi region. The Caprivi separatists were additionally impacted by the Angolan civil war, which exacerbated the situation. The situation was identical with regard to Angola's geostrategic proximity to the DRC. Both countries share a border that contains enormous hydrocarbon deposits. Moreover, this proven to be crucial for both Angola and the DRC during the war. An additional concern was the potential for a contagion effect, which was further intensified by the troop deployments of Uganda and Rwanda, specifically in the Bas-Congo region, which bordered Angola. Angolan security concerns also intensified as apprehension grew that Jonas Savimbi, just as he had done during the Mobutu regime, might use the country as a launching pad to initiate an opposition campaign against Luanda's government. Such an endeavor would destabilize the peace and security

situation in Angola. As a result, Angola's intervention in the DRC conflict was perceived as a partial war against the UNITA, an organization that the SADC has since designated a terrorist organization for its hostilities against the regime in Luanda.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo exemplifies the interdependence of regional, national, and individual concerns. Under the auspices of the SADC, the intervening nations stimulated personal interests. For example, there were those who interpreted Mugabe's choice to intervene on Zimbabwe's behalf as an attempt to challenge South Africa's ecopolitical hegemony in Southern Africa and outmaneuver his South African counterpart, Nelson Mandela, as the political leader of Southern Africa.

The influx of Western assistance directed at Kampala and Kigali grew into an increasing personal concern for Mugabe. Mugabe perceived these occurrences not only as an act of territorial expansion and imperialism, but also as a betrayal of his esteemed position as a frontrunner in regional politics. Furthermore, one could contend that Harare's intervention was motivated by Mugabe's necessity to terminate a substantial contingent of unpaid and unemployed soldiers, whose presence was progressively undermining the stability of Mugabe's power structure.

2.3.1.3 Root Causes, Types and Extent of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia

Intractable Intra-State Conflict

The intervention in Liberia by ECOWAS was the second military operation of a regional organization on the African continent. According to Tavares (2011), the intervention was perceived as a means to advance national interests by means of collective action. Nigeria orchestrated the intervention and made a substantial contribution to its implementation through logistical and military assistance. From a

practical standpoint, the conflict served as a model for utilizing regional agencies to advance national interests. The government of Abuja was concerned that the conflict's cascading effect might have ignited an insurgency throughout the region. An example of this can be seen in the humiliating defeat suffered by the Liberian army at the hands of civilian insurgents. This event severely harmed the political standing of the military throughout the entire region. In his addresses to his military commanders, then-Nigerian president Ibrahim Babangida emphasized this point.

The apprehension was exacerbated by the swift progression of the rebels in Sierra Leone, which were spearheaded by Charles Taylor, and the ineffectual reaction of the armed forces of both nations. As perceived by Abuja, the collapse of Sierra Leone and Liberia was equivalent to the collapse of the entire region. Furthermore, the deteriorating humanitarian situation and the general safety of Nigerians residing in Liberia were subjects of profound concern to it. The situation was significantly worsened by Taylor's heinous conflict, which resulted in the deaths of a minimum of one thousand Nigerians within the compound of the Nigerian embassy (Tavares, 2011). It was unavoidable that Nigeria, in addition to other ECOWAS nations, would be eager to intervene in an effort to stop the violence. An additional researcher suggested that Abuja's intervention was motivated by its desire to preserve its hegemonic status in the region. As a result, this designated hegemonic function undermines the ability of ECOWAS to intervene in the Liberian conflict. Although the ECOWAS attempted to uphold the principles of liberal institutionalism, it was unsuccessful in surmounting uncertainties or improving objectives and procedures.

The intervention decision was marginally influenced by the support that Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso extended to the insurgents that ECOWAS was engaged in combat

with. For example, the former furnished an optimal environment for the Taylor's forces to commence their offensive, whereas the latter supplied Taylor's camp with hundreds of soldiers. As a result, the ECOWAS objective of maintaining regional stability was compromised. The intervention was therefore motivated by self-interest. Academics with a keen interest in analyzing Nigeria's actions frequently hypothesized that the country intended to strengthen its standing as a champion of democracy and human rights. For example, ECOMOG was employed as a negotiating instrument during the authoritarian rule of General Abacha to counter threats posed by international sanctions. This was achieved through the tacit threat of Nigerian forces withdrawing from Sierra Leone and Liberia (Tavares, 2011). Therefore, the intervention emerged as the sole viable course of action for Abacha's regime to redirect global attention away from Nigeria's worsening socioeconomic and human rights conditions.

Moreover, in a nation such as Nigeria, where the military exercises immense power and sway, Liberia's military intervention was regarded as a feasible strategy to remove the military from the country while providing sufficient financial aid to sustain its operations. An additional indication of the intervention was Abuja's support for domestic dynamics, particularly since it had substantial economic and commercial interests in the region that the Liberian civil war undoubtedly threatened. Within this framework, Abuja harbored a strong desire to cultivate ECOWAS into a formidable free trade zone and, ultimately, a regional economic bloc in order to achieve the sustainable and long-lasting economic integration outlined in the African Economic Community (AEC) Treaty of Abuja (1990). Nigeria stood to benefit from the trade expansion within a resurgent ECOWAS, contingent upon the maintenance of political stability in the area.

Conversely, there are those who argue that Ghana was the driving force behind the intervention, intending to execute an operation in Monrovia in order to extricate the stranded refugees from the Ghanaian embassy there. In addition to humanitarian considerations, Accra was troubled by the presence of Ghanaian dissidents in Taylor's camp, who had been posing an external threat to the regime. It is apparent that Ghana and Nigeria pursue intervening policies driven by divergent interests. In regard to Senegal, the United States compelled the country to intervene because Senegal did not wish to become directly embroiled in the conflict and desired for the mission to be branded solely as a Nigerian expedition. Gambia's intervention was motivated by its strong conviction that certain rebels implicated in the unsuccessful rebellion of 1991 had aligned themselves with Taylor's faction. In addition to national considerations, the intervention also encompasses regional dimensions.

This is further supported by the regionalization of conflicts and the dominant global politics, of which West Africa continues to serve as an uncontested model. A regional concern was swiftly materializing concerning the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Liberia. This demonstrates that Nigeria effectively played the ECOWAS card of military intervention in an effort to prevent the humanitarian catastrophe and restore regional peace and security. It is worth noting that the internal dynamics of the conflict in each country were significantly impacted by the regional dimensions of the conflict. Furthermore, in light of their tenuous democratic systems and unequivocal legitimacy, the endeavors of the ECOWAS leaders, conducted under the guise of collective security, were specifically designed to solidify their regimes and eradicate guerilla tactics.

Ultimately, political decisions were influenced and molded by personal ties and ambitions as well as intertwined national and regional factors in light of the African conflicts. Samuel Doe, who had personally urged then-Nigerian president Ibrahim Babangida to intervene in the Liberia conflict, was a personal companion of Babangida. Contrarily, Doe was never pardoned by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the president of Ivory Coast at the time, for directing the execution of Benedict Tolbert, his predecessor, whose foster daughter Daisy Delafosse was wedded to his son Adolphus. Sierra Leone contemplated intervention due to the personal friendship between Ibrahim Babangida and President Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone has been the recipient of economic aid from Bangladesh, and the former's assistance to Doe was perceived as a form of reciprocation (Tavares, 2011).

2.2.1.4 Origins, Characteristics, and Scope of SADC Intervention in the Intractable Intra-State Conflict in Lesotho

In September 1998, in an effort to prevent a military rebellion by mutinous soldiers of the Royal Lesotho Defense Force (RLDF), South Africa launched a military incursion. The operation was conducted as a component of the SADC Combined Task Force, with South Africa and Botswana providing military and logistical coordination, respectively, to a lesser degree. "Operation Bolease" illustrates how the outcome of internal strife in Lesotho influenced the response, which was determined by the failure of negotiations between the nation's political factions and the mutinous forces. South Africa rendered multiple rulings regarding the legitimacy of the intervention. These rulings stated that the operation was conducted under the guise of the SADC, that it originated from the SADC's refusal to tolerate unconstitutional government changes, and that it was stipulated in the 1994 agreement whereby South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana would ensure stability in Lesotho (Tavares, 2011).

Following a sequence of negotiations during which SADC forces threatened military

intervention, the democratically elected government was reinstated to authority. Multiple academic discussions regarding this occurrence concluded that the intervention violated the SADC Treaty and was therefore ineligible to be classified as a SADC mission.

In this regard, SADC's intervention lacked legitimacy due to the absence of ratification of pertinent proposals for an unconstitutional change in government at any SADC summit throughout this period. The South Africa operation has been subject to criticism due to its purported aim of consolidating the power of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), which was in power at the time. The sole significant statement made by the SADC regarding the situation was its apprehension over the ongoing civil unrest and loss of life in the aftermath of the recent Lesotho elections. Furthermore, it lauded South Africa's mediation endeavors, which resulted in the formation of the SADC Committee of Experts to investigate the allegations of electoral fraud (Olsson, 2015). In addition to the aforementioned, further strategic interests emerged. Primarily, South Africa was engulfed in a state of ambiguity surrounding the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), a water transfer endeavor of significant magnitude. The objective of the project was to generate hydroelectric power for Lesotho and supply water to the Central South African region, which was home to the majority of the country's industrial and mining operations, in exchange for a source of revenue for Lesotho. Numerous researchers conclude that this contributed to the conclusion that the intervention was instigated by South Africa's desire to protect Gauteng's water supply. This elucidates the rationale behind the South African forces' incursion into the Katse Dam and subsequent confrontation with the Liberian military. Furthermore, there was apprehension regarding the potential

escalation and subsequent spillover effects into South Africa, particularly with regard to the 1999 general election that South Africa was attempting to impede.

Additional sources have posited that South Africa was growing increasingly apprehensive regarding the escalation of illicit narcotics and small arms trafficking across international borders. Furthermore, in Southern Africa, South Africa operated as the sole superpower, and Lesotho's intervention served to maintain the status quo. Such a vision, which is unwavering in its dedication to preserving regional peace and security, is only attainable through hegemonic leadership, which entails the deployment of troops and the augmentation of resources to bolster this ideal. Conversely, Botswana took action to avert a descent into political anarchy in Lesotho. Gaborone was also aware that the massive influx of refugees and subsequent residual effect would generate unwarranted unrest (Tavares, 2011).

2.2.1.5 Root Causes, Types and Extent of DRCs Intractable Intra-State Conflict

The nation possesses an extensive array of natural resources, encompassing timber, water, minerals, energy, and forestry. In addition to copper and cobalt, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a major producer of petroleum, diamonds, coltan (columbite-tantalite), and silver. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is responsible for 55 percent of global cobalt production (including 45 percent of global reserves), 21 percent of industrial diamonds, and 12 percent of tantalum, according to the most recent estimates (USGS, 2014). Mineral processing and mining constituted a significant proportion of overall domestic output (11.5 percent in 2012); this industry has been the primary catalyst for the recent surge in growth. Although minerals and hydrocarbons receive considerable attention, alternative sources hold equal significance.

One such asset is the substantial endowment of expansive water reserves, which functions as a critical resource for transportation and hydroelectric power generation. The nation possesses the capacity to produce electricity sufficient to supply the entirety of the Great Lakes region and further afield. This serves as a potential catalyst and pillar for fostering regional integration, while also facilitating economic diversification in both the nation and the surrounding area and generating development.

In addition to abundant rainfall throughout the territory, the eastern and northern regions of the DRC are endowed with volcanic soils, which contribute to the country's fertile terrain. Agriculture, when accompanied by sufficient investments in technological innovation and infrastructure development and executed as a component of a unified national industrialization and growth strategy, has the capacity to serve as a catalyst for industrialization while concurrently ensuring food security.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) owns the most number of adjacent countries on the continent, totaling nine. Hence, the consequential impact of political stability and economic development in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) extends beyond the Great Lakes region, encompassing several other geographical areas. The advantageous geographical location of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) enables the facilitation of trade and the establishment of the country as a central hub for economic integration within the subregion. These advantages are of considerable importance. However, it is undeniable that being in close proximity to a large number of individuals has its disadvantages.

The nation's susceptibility to adverse externalities arising from the instability of its neighboring countries is a notable disadvantage. Undoubtedly, the utilization of the

nation as a staging place by insurgent forces originating from Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi persists in contemporary times (Kisangani, 2012). This phenomenon has a detrimental impact on the diplomatic ties between the nation and its neighboring governments, leading to a state of instability inside the nation. Without a doubt, the presence of these negative externalities has had a substantial impact on the initiation, outcomes, and prolonged duration of the current conflicts in eastern Congo.

To fully understand the causes of the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), develop effective strategies to reduce them, and assist in the process of rebuilding after the conflict, it is crucial to adopt a regional approach that takes into account the interests of neighboring countries. The administration in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has had considerable difficulties in efficiently addressing its institutional and operational issues due to its limited presence and geographical distance from the local population. Rwandan and Ugandan separatists, who are collaborating with their governments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, lack a strong basis in their respective countries. Consequently, they seek refuge behind permeable borders in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with the intention of initiating assaults and interacting with susceptible populations. Two examples of insurgent organizations are the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Allied Democratic Force (ADF). The ADF, an insurgent organization based in Uganda, has been inactive within the country since 2007 and currently maintains its headquarters in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The primary goal of the organization is to emancipate Uganda from what it perceives as an endeavor to establish supremacy by Rwandan Tutsis.

The FDLR, a Hutu rebel movement, is a group of Rwandan insurgents that actively opposes the Tutsis and is one of the few remaining factions in the DRC (De Heredia, 2017). Moreover, there was a significant increase in the number of refugees originating from Rwanda. The establishment of armed factions by Hutu genocidaires, in collaboration with the Mobutu, was subsequently replicated by Tutsis and other opportunistic organizations with the aid of Rwanda (2019). Neighbors, especially Rwanda, use this pretense as a justification to intervene in the conflict. The meddling ultimately led to the occurrence of the Congo wars. The establishment of Mai-Mai militias and subsequent violent clashes were significantly influenced by the meddling of Rwanda (De Heredia, 2017).

The Mai-Mai militias were established with the intention of engaging in acts of resistance. However, some individuals started to follow alternative hobbies as time progressed. The enduring ethnic conflict between the Hutus and the Tutsis continues to be observed in contemporary times. Furthermore, the battle is believed to promote Rwanda's illegal coltan extraction purposes, which accounts for its suspected involvement despite its denial. Furthermore, the Congo Wars led to the exposure of soldiers from neighboring nations to the riches in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Through the establishment and examination of global networks, these military personnel effectively fanned and exploited the conflict.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is confronted with a substantial threat due to the internal disputes and rivalries that exist among Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. These governments have engaged in proxy battles by deploying militias in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In contrast to Rwanda, the FDLR maintains diplomatic relations with Burundi and Uganda (International Crisis Group, 2020).

Rwanda has been linked to offering support to insurgent groups, such as the ADF, which are in opposition to Museveni's Uganda and are currently engaged in operations in South Kivu against Burundi (French, 2009). President Tshisekedi aims to address this situation using diplomatic methods, specifically by implementing a quadripartite agreement for reconciliation among Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda.

Were (2016) posits that the prioritization of partner nations' interests may supersede the collective regional objectives. According to Ungaya, Okoth, & Were (2019), the utilization of communal ecological systems, such as the Serengeti Mara, for individual gain has eroded the efficacy of East African Community (EAC) tourism rules that were originally intended to protect the interests of states. Were (2016) restates the same points regarding the management of Lake Victoria as a "regional common" that is expected to adhere to the international rules of transboundary natural resource administration. Nevertheless, the ongoing exploitation of shared resources has been driven by external demand-driven national interests and power asymmetry among riparian states, beyond regional and international conventions. Nevertheless, these studies focus on the sharing of resources across borders in the East African Community (EAC) region, rather than the violence within the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The insurrection known as M-23, which took place in April 2012, was a tumultuous mutiny inside the FARDC that led to confrontations in the region of North Kivu. The uprising was organized by former members of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) who had amalgamated with the FARDC. The Congo National Democratic Party (CNDP), established in 2006 by Laurent Nkunda, garnered backing from Rwanda and Uganda. In April 2013, a total of 66 M-23 units were vanquished,

and those who managed to escape were separated into two factions and sought refuge in Uganda and Rwanda. They reentered the fight after returning to eastern DRC two years before the 2018 election. The return of the ex-M-23 mutineers, who often interact with Ugandan military leaders and operate freely in Kampala, intensified the tensions between Rwanda and Uganda due to Rwanda's belief that Uganda was employing them. This statement reflects the geographical context of the competition and the possibility of a proxy conflict that emerged after the 2018 elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The obligation of facilitating the election was acquired by Presidency Tshisekedi from his predecessor, Kabila, who had done so under political coercion and with the intention of preventing any potential disruptions (International Crisis Group, 2020).

Rwanda's engagement in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which it considers a strategically significant region closely connected to its own security, has been a subject of intense disagreement for an extended period of time. Moreover, the region has valuable gold and other minerals that hold significant importance for various stakeholders in Rwanda. Over the course of several years, the country has interfered in Congolese politics and provided assistance to a sequence of uprisings, resulting in significant hardships for a considerable number of Congolese civilians. Rwanda and Uganda provided assistance to the Tutsi-led M23, who spearheaded the most recent notable uprising in Congo, around ten years ago. Kigali provided the insurgents with ample financial resources and ammunition, enabling them to capture certain areas in the eastern region. This included a temporary control over Goma before it was ultimately vanquished by Congolese and United Nations forces. Rwanda's participation in any future external intervention could provoke a significant

and potentially violent reaction from the population, who have painful memories of those times.

The level of enmity between Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame has experienced a considerable escalation since November 2021, when the former granted Uganda clearance to deploy soldiers in North Kivu and Ituri. The involvement in Uganda was explained by President Museveni as crucial for the eradication of the ADF, an organization that he connects to the occurrence of a series of suicide bombs in Kampala, the capital city of Uganda. In the subsequent month, Tshisekedi authorized Burundian forces to clandestinely penetrate South Kivu with the purpose of countering RED-Tabara, a Tutsi-led rebel group that opposes the Hutu-controlled government in Burundi. Kagame's potential irritation with these initiatives may stem from his apprehension of the potential loss of access to and influence within the region. Rwanda repeatedly asserts that it regards the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a remnant of the Hutu militia responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide, as the biggest internal threat in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In February, Kagame made a declaration in a confrontational address, expressing his readiness to deploy military forces across the border in order to confront the FDLR, regardless of Tshisekedi's agreement (Nelleke, 2022).

The reemergence of the M23 has further intensified the already tense dynamic between Kagame and Tshisekedi. After the militia's defeat in 2013, one faction withdrew to Uganda, while another faction chose to reside in Rwanda. In 2017, Sultani Makenga, the military commander of the M23, facilitated the return of approximately two hundred combatants from Uganda to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The aforementioned gang, which had experienced a period of limited

activity since November 2021, has recently escalated its attacks on the Congolese military, leading to the displacement of numerous residents. From the outset, Tshisekedi has maintained the conviction that Kagame is once again offering aid to the M23.

During deliberations over the regional force, he has consistently advocated for the exclusion of Rwanda. Following the EAC discussion on force deployment, he asserted that he successfully obtained Rwanda's withdrawal due to its backing of the terrorist group M23. The suggested battle strategy of the EAC seems to seek a middle ground by having Rwandan forces stationed in reserve near the Congolese border. Furthermore, it has been stated that Rwandan forces will provide support to the regional contingent in the collection of intelligence. According to Nelleke (2022), Crisis Group received information from a regional military expert indicating that Rwanda is anticipated to furnish liaison officers to the sectoral headquarters of the force.

The armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), like most African militaries, were heavily politicized and involved in civil wars. They were subjected to autocratic governance and regulations, which were partly influenced by the colonial legacy and subsequent dictatorships. These regimes exploited the armed forces to achieve political objectives. At different junctures, the military would depose its own administrations on seemingly valid justifications. The conflict is a combined result of various factors, including geography, politics, economy, military, internal affairs, and ethnicity. These factors, along with external interference, create a situation where all parties take advantage of the opportunity to plunder the country's plentiful natural resources. Nzongola-Ntalaja concisely asserts that external interests have consistently

exerted dominance over the political terrain in Congo during its 116-year history since gaining independence. The country's strategic geographical position and abundant natural resources have made it an appealing destination for imperial aspirations, mercenaries, and various forms of plunder (Nelleke, 2022).

A multitude of foreign parties, including both state and non-state entities, have made efforts to offer assistance; yet, their contributions have resulted in disastrous outcomes. Peace remains elusive due to deeply rooted mistrust. Consequently, regardless of whether leaders emerge by force or manipulated elections, they face the same challenges. According to Zartman (1995), in a system that has experienced collapse, the presence of numerous actors and diverse ideas leads to a shift in loyalty towards individual rulers rather than the nation as a whole. This could potentially elucidate the reason behind the deficiency of essential patriotism among numerous local residents and lawmakers, hindering their ability to reconstruct their nation. Mills cautions against the notion that outsiders possess a greater affection for the nation than its residents. Consequently, in instances of system failure, a considerable proportion of Congolese individuals tend to resort to their tribal history, thereby fostering an excessive sense of pride that hinders their endorsement of a leader whom they do not acknowledge as their own. Usually, these interactions lead to a clear conflict that is easy to define but extremely difficult to resolve (Mills, 2014).

An analysis of the recent history of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) demonstrates that specific individuals or groups emerge and disappear depending on the situation. This observation lends credence to the hypothesis that the international community has interfered in the Democratic Republic of Congo's issue just when the situation reached a state of critical urgency. There seems to be a disturbing connection

between the meddling of the "international community" and the worsening living conditions of the local population. According to Colette Braeckman, the underlying factors and potential remedies for the prolonged duration of Africa's "first world war" remain hidden beyond the confines of the Congo. Refer to Mills (2014).

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced significant activity and rapid restoration efforts aimed at repairing the military and preventing a return to chaos. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the largest of its kind, despite its limited deployment. It is present in nearly all regions of the DRC, with particular emphasis on the Eastern Region. The investigation of the involvement of other countries in the Great Lakes Region is an additional noteworthy storyline. The arbitrary division of lands during the colonial era, which neglected to sufficiently account for the pre-existing nationalities and populations that were included into the newly established colonial states, has been widely acknowledged by numerous experts as a primary factor contributing to the conflicts. Inherent divides inside these states led to intrastate wars, characterized by concerns like as irredentism, power rivalries, the pursuit of identity, and fragmented allegiances.

The participation of private enterprises and China in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) signifies a supplementary advancement that warrants scrutiny with regards to its ramifications for the security landscape within the nation. There is no doubt that their influence extends beyond solely business factors. Can these be incorporated into the endeavor to support the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), considering the universal recognition that help is necessary from all perspectives? The UNSC in 2013. Amidst the distinctive dynamics between the Democratic Republic of

the Congo and its neighboring nations, it is imperative to bear in mind that enduring tensions between the Congolese and Uganda, Burundi, and neighboring countries Rwanda have not fully abated, thereby leaving a lasting impact. Rwanda and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) have faced persistent allegations of providing assistance to the M23 militia and inadequate measures to counter the FDLR, which consists of Hutu forces that escaped Rwanda following the defeat of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, currently under the leadership of President Paul Kagame in 1994. The final result of the SADC Meeting of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGL) and its determination to implement a compulsory disarmament of the FDLR remains uncertain. Although the FDLR, like other militia organizations (except the M23), have offered an offer to surrender, they are indistinguishable from the broader population. Are the SADC TCCs adequately equipped to address the potential humanitarian consequences? Refer to Mills (2014).

The battles during the early independence period were greatly influenced by the deep ideological differences among the key political players. Disagreements primarily emerged with regards to the concept of self-determination. A group, led by Patrice Lumumba, argued for the comprehensive ideological separation of the nation from its previous occupiers and the Western world as a whole. Opponents shown a greater degree of empathy in their efforts to uphold strong ties with Western nations. Lumumba espoused the principle of fairness in any form of cooperation with Western nations, but his opponents, led by Moise Tshombe, favored preserving economic connections with Belgium, which they characterized as a "community with Belgium" (Kisangani, 2012).

On the second front of hostility, proponents of socialism, led by Lumumba, engaged in a confrontation with proponents of capitalism, led by Tshombe. The primary catalyst for the Eastern uprising of 1964-66 was ideological hostility. The pro-Lumumba coalition, led by prominent individuals like Laurent Kabila, played a pivotal role in the 1996 anti-Mobutu revolt (Kisangani, 2012). The occurrence of ideological disagreements following the attainment of independence resulted in a condition of political disorder and acted as the main catalyst for the death of Lumumba and the subsequent appointment of pro-Western Mobutu to positions of authority. The aforementioned series of events resulted in a significant transformation in the destiny of the nation, cultivated hostility among different regions and ethnic communities, and led to prolonged periods of autocratic, dictatorial, and kleptocratic governance.

According to Kisangani (2014) and Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002), the Loi Fondamentale played a crucial role in shaping the constitutional direction of the nation following its achievement of independence. This transitional constitution implemented a parliamentary democracy system and bestowed substantial authority upon the provinces. There were still significant questions over the central authority's ability to regulate provincial administrations. Provincial leaders strategically employed these ambiguities to advance their individual political agendas.

During the independence era, political leaders had significant differences in their views on the structure of the state, particularly regarding whether the nation should be organized as a unitary state or a federal system. Lumumba pushed for the establishment of a centralized and unitary state as a means to symbolize authentic national autonomy. In contrast, Tshombe, Kasavubu, & Kalonji (2012) put up a

proposition in favor of granting provincial autonomy in relation to the central government (Kisangani, 2014). The separatist movements that were widespread during the 1960s and 1970s had such antecedents. Ethnicity continues to play a crucial role in modern disputes, just as it did in the initial years of independence. The ethnic dominance of the majority of political parties played a pivotal role during the period of independence. Lumumba's MNC prioritized national unity over ethnic affinity, as seen by the works of Kisangani (2012), Lemarchand (1964), Young (1965), and Young and Turner (1985). Alternative political parties were established based on ethnic affiliations and explicitly championed the interests of particular ethnic communities in response to the perceived "ethnic threat posed by foreigners."

An organization known as CONAKAT, which was founded on October 4, 1958, was assigned the special responsibility of protecting the interests of "authentic Katangans" (Lulua and Baluba originating from Katanga) against "strangers" (Lulua and Baluba, who were recruited by the UMHK to work in the mines) from Kasai and Kivu. The urban mining workers, driven by the desire for job stability, played a role in fostering xenophobic views. Furthermore, the political elites, led by Tshombe, contributed to the exacerbation of xenophobia through the pursuit of their individual political goals. The ethnic animosities played a crucial role in shaping the Kasai secession crisis of 1960–1962 (Kisangani, 2012; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002).

The ethnic orientation of the political process arose due to the intentional suppression of a dynamic middle class by the colonial system. This suppression hindered democratic expression through civil society and established ethnic kinship as the primary basis for political competition. The inclusion of ethnic rhetoric in the political

landscape of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was not a result of inherent hostilities among ethnic factions, as often argued in some examinations of African politics. In contrast, like other African countries, ethnicity became politicized as a result of the combination of the colonial administration's tactic of dividing and ruling, and the exploitation of this situation by national elites who sought quick ways to gain political support.

Following the genocide and the subsequent victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) during the 1996-97 conflict, a significant influx of Rwanda Hutu refugees, exceeding one million in number, occurred in Eastern Congo in June 1994. The significant increase in the number of Hutu individuals caused a disturbance in the delicate balance among ethnic groupings in the region, intensifying the marginalization of the Banyamulenge, who were part of the Rwandan Tutsi ethnic group (Kisangani, 2012). Mobutu strategically exploited the crisis to consolidate his authority domestically by instigating ethnic hostilities, specifically targeting Kirinyaga-speaking individuals who were stigmatized as "foreigners" and accused of supporting foreign governments, notably Rwanda. On April 28, 1995, a resolution was adopted by the parliament, rendering the nationalities of all Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge as Congolese null and void.

In October 1996, the South Kivu administration opted to evict Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, as per a parliamentary resolution of the same title. In October 1996, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques de la Libération (AFDL), under the leadership of Laurent Kabila, initiated a rebellion during a moment of significant upheaval. The AFDL consisted of constituents from the Banyamulenge and other ethnic communities that had historically expressed opposition to Mobutu's authority, with

particular emphasis on the Mai Mai. The regime led by Mobutu saw significant weakening, hence creating a favorable environment for Kabila's rise to power. Nevertheless, his collapse was equally swift, resulting from his treachery against his followers, namely in Rwanda and Uganda. A rebellion against Kabila occurred within a year, leading to the outbreak of the second Congo War in August 1998. According to Pruiet (2009), the involvement of Angolan, Namibian, and Zimbabwean forces in preserving Kabila's power resulted in the transformation of the conflict into a genuine "African war." Despite the killing of Kabila in January 2001 and the subsequent coronation of his son, the wars endured. Presently, the nation is confronted with substantial humanitarian issues and structural instability, particularly in the eastern region.

From the previous conversation, it can be inferred that the history of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since gaining independence has been characterized by wars and conflicts that exhibit fundamental similarities with the economy and society. The persistent nature of the disputes suggests that these factors have not been sufficiently resolved; the efforts made by the Mobutu dictatorship to suppress dissent and promote political restructuring were ultimately unsuccessful. The deterioration of the economic and political system created a conducive environment for the rise of the rebellions that finally led to the overthrow of the administration in 1997. Internal disputes unquestionably give rise to a plethora of interconnected issues that are initiated by the people concerned. When partnered states pursue opposing objectives, feeble states may face difficulty in efficiently resolving such conflicts. The varied interests of the East African Community (EAC) partner nations in the internal conflict of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) provide challenges for the overall intervention endeavor.

2.3 Dynamics and Challenges in the Management of European, ASEAN and OAS Regional Organizations Intractable Intra-State conflict

Some American analysts formulated prophecies that envisioned a placid and equitable global era characterized by the absence of ideological battles, which occurred simultaneously with the formation of the United Nations and the victory of liberal democracy over communism, representing a significant milestone in history. However, the concept of hope was significantly weakened due to the occurrence of multiple conflicts in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa. The ineffectiveness of the United Nations' (UN) global endeavor to address conflicts prompted a thorough reassessment of the strategy, resulting in the emergence of regional coordinated initiatives as a viable alternative. Regionalism is a well-established concept in international politics, as evidenced by the United Nations Charter's endorsement of conflict resolution through regional institutions (Ngendahimana, 2023).

Regionalism has gained importance due to the rise of organizations such as the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in developing conflict resolution strategies and promoting peace in their own regions. These entities existed before the Cold War began. Following the conclusion of the Second World War, these entities developed, albeit with a primary emphasis on regional security rather than global peace. Their development was significantly influenced by the opposing ideologies that defined the Cold War era. Notably, the end of the Cold War brought about a new viewpoint on resolving conflicts because of the changing dynamics of the war and the objectives of regional organizations formed within this framework. Consequently, the regional organizations that remained after the Cold War made necessary adaptations to their structures and functions in order to align with the fundamental changes occurring within the global security system.

According to Ngendahimana (2023), the importance of regional organizations as influential actors in peacebuilding and conflict management has been increased. As these organizations advance in their commitment and operational involvement, they engage in a wide range of diplomatic efforts to advance peace and security. The fundamental assumption that underlies diplomatic attempts, such as mediation, is that conflicts can solely be effectively addressed and resolved through internal means by the relevant parties. Diplomatic endeavors have the potential to promote the resolution of conflicts through diverse methods, including the reconciliation of conflicting parties who may not have otherwise pursued negotiations.

According to Enuka & Nwagbo (2016), the regional organization is able to reconcile competing factions due to the presence of political pressure, as well as the possibility for legitimacy and prestige. Furthermore, it is worth noting that regional organizations and their representatives have the potential to actively engage in the bargaining process. According to Hopmann (1996), individuals has the capacity to clarify the positions of the parties concerned, redefine the issues under consideration, facilitate talks, apply pressure on each side to make concessions, and provide alternative offers. Regional organizations have the potential to offer economic or political support as additional incentives to encourage the parties involved in reaching a consensus. Furthermore, it is worth noting that regional organizations or their constituents have the option to provide their services as guarantors for peace agreements or conflict management accords, thus ensuring their ongoing participation in the implementation process. In order for regional organizations to cultivate collaboration and set standards, a number of prerequisites must be satisfied. One can be regarded as a response to enduring conflicts and crises. The European Union (EU) played a role in

the worldwide civil war in Bosnia by sending a peace mission led by former NATO secretary general Lord Carrington (Eneka & Nwagbo, 2016).

During the duration of the Cold War, the predominant strategy employed was conventional peacekeeping or observation and interposition operations. The aforementioned operations encompassed the utilization of observers to oversee the circumstances and build a protective area between the opposing sides following their mutual consent to a cessation of hostilities. The United Nations established two of its early missions, namely Kashmir (UNMOGIP) and Suez (UNEF), in 1949 and 1956, respectively (Purushothaman, 2021).

Notwithstanding the enduring importance of this mode of operation in the era following the Cold War, international or regional missions are increasingly acquiring greater intricacy. With the increasing acknowledgment of the necessity for a comprehensive strategy in post-conflict rehabilitation, the stability operations, peace support, and peace building stated before have far broader objectives. To provide an example, a number of European Union missions are specifically devoted to the reformation of the security sector, with a specific emphasis on bolstering the capacities of police forces and border guards. This is evident in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Georgia. Another goal is to foster a culture and institutions that prioritize the rule of law (Kosovo, Georgia).

The United Nations mission in East Timor can be considered as one of the most ambitious new-type operations due to its aim of establishing a new state. This mission played a crucial role in facilitating the transformation of East Timor from an Indonesian-occupied territory to a fully recognized member of the international community of sovereign states. Moreover, there has been an integration of

supplementary obligations into cases of global involvement that uphold traditional peacekeeping elements. Humanitarian operations, specifically those targeting internally displaced persons and refugees, along with election organization and observation, and institutional capacity-building, have become essential components of peace-building missions, as exemplified by the EU mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the AU mission in Darfur.

Most of the missions described above are related to the field of conflict resolution and management. However, there are also measures that are put in place with the aim of preventing such incidents rather than reacting to violent breakouts. The preventative deployment mission undertaken by the United Nations in Macedonia and its successors serves as a noteworthy example of similar missions in a broader context. Furthermore, the effectiveness of such missions is underscored in this context. From an analytical standpoint, it is beneficial to embrace a more holistic approach to prevention by integrating strategies applied during and after the violent and post-violent phases of a dispute, with the aim of preventing other instances of violence. This methodology allows for the assessment of any external intervention designed to prevent the reoccurrence, escalation, spread, or escalation of violent conflict within its suitable context.

From this perspective, the implementation of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina starting in 1992 was ineffective in halting the escalation of the ethnic war or achieving a resolution to it. Nevertheless, their persistent existence following the Dayton Accord undeniably served as a successful strategy in preventing the resurgence of violence (up to this point), yet it did not help to the ultimate resolution of the dispute. Similarly, the United Nations Mission in Cyprus failed to prevent

military conflicts between India and Pakistan in Kashmir on three distinct occasions (Purushothaman, 2021). The author posits that throughout its involvement in conflict prevention, management, and settlement endeavors, the international community possesses resources beyond the mere act of deploying military forces to conflict areas in order to achieve favorable outcomes. There exists a wide array of alternative options available to individuals, and their adoption is significantly more widespread and involves a significantly greater group of people. The presence of many actors and instruments requires the establishment of specific classifications for external interventions.

In contrast, the rise of new supporters occurred at the same time as an increased level of worry among the global community and Western benefactors, particularly for states that are unstable and plagued by conflict. In the early 1990s, the United Nations witnessed a notable expansion in its capacity and inclination to enhance its peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, and peace-building initiatives. This was primarily driven by the conclusion of the Cold War and a notable upsurge in instances of violent civil conflicts. According to Doyle (2001), member states expressed their support for a significant broadening of collective involvement. Simultaneously, the global community acknowledged the interconnectedness and reciprocal reinforcement of development and security. The United Nations Development Programme (2000) recognized poverty, inequality, and disease as the primary causes of violent conflict, civil war, and state failure. The prevailing narrative on the global dissemination of "the virus of disorder" was reinforced by the 9/11 attacks and the US-led worldwide campaign against terrorism (Turner & Pugh, 2006), which specifically focused on vulnerable and conflict-ridden nations.

Western donors employed many ideas, sometimes referred to as the liberal peacebuilding model, to organize operations in states that were both weak and plagued by violence. The aforementioned concepts underscored the importance of democratic systems of governance and market-based economies as essential conditions for achieving enduring stability and facilitating peaceful resolution of conflicts. Hence, liberal peacebuilding interventions placed emphasis on the augmentation of participatory political processes, the establishment of the rule of law, the advancement of market mechanisms and the private sector, and the cultivation of accountable and transparent governance institutions, alongside reforms in the security sector. According to the United Nations/World Bank (2018), there was a significant rise of nearly 140 percent in official development aid provided to fragile and conflict-affected governments from 2000 to 2015. Nevertheless, despite the allocation of substantial financial resources, the results of initiatives have yielded predominantly inconclusive findings (OECD, 2020; World Bank, 2020).

The initiatives aimed at "fixing" these nations have faced criticism due to their ineffectiveness and conceptual ambiguity. There have been allegations that these policies exhibit a tendency to prioritize the institutional interests of donor organizations at the expense of aid recipients, consequently perpetuating global power rankings. Moreover, they have faced criticism for neglecting the input, viewpoints, knowledge, and responsibility of local individuals. Hence, these strategies have often resulted in interventions that were unsuitable for the circumstances, inconsequential, and lacking in legitimacy.

According to Luckham (2017), Woodward (2017), and Firchow (2018), critics have contended that these interventions often intensified the existing tensions and

vulnerability of the state they were intended to tackle. According to Paris (2004), the process of political and economic liberalization is necessarily characterized by turbulence. Fragile societies that have just emerged from a civil conflict have heightened risks of social unrest and the possibility for unstable peace to be shattered. The implementation of interventions, originally intended to address conflicts, can potentially worsen the situation when the interests of the parties involved prioritize their own objectives over the broader mission.

On the other hand, critics of the liberal peace-building paradigm argue that these efforts were based on assumptions about the complexities of political and economic change, which were influenced by Western experiences, without sufficiently considering the potential differences in these dynamics across various regions (Commission on State Fragility, Growth, and Development, 2018). Furthermore, emerging benefactors express disapproval towards the liberal peace-building paradigm and the portrayal of aggressive governments as vulnerable.

Therefore, there is a growing body of scholarship that examines the increasing involvement of new donors in the delivery of development and humanitarian aid. There has been a lack of comprehensive research comparing the conceptualizations of peace-building and reconstruction interventions in conflict-affected states by different new donors. However, there is a growing body of literature on interventions by individual new donors (de Carvalho & de Coning, 2013; Paczyska, 2019; Ghimire, 2020).

The findings of these research indicate that there exists a notable disparity in the conceptualization of peace-building and reconstruction between new donors and Western donors. However, the study indicates that these conceptualizations are

always evolving and subject to change, as has been the situation in the DRC for many years.

The occurrence of internal displacement in the Americas and the necessity to adopt assistance and human rights protection efforts for displaced communities have been acknowledged by resolutions of the Organization of American States General Assembly. The prioritization of democratic defense has played a significant role in mitigating the likelihood of widespread displacement in the Americas (De Coning and Pradash, 2016; Call & de Coning, 2017). The seven-member OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has officially endorsed the Guiding Principles. Throughout its international journeys, the commission utilizes these principles to evaluate and oversee the circumstances surrounding internal displacement. Moreover, it is worth noting that governments in Latin America, particularly in Colombia, where the number of internally displaced individuals exceeds 1.4 million, are increasingly acknowledging the significance of the Guiding Principles in formulating initiatives and strategies pertaining to internal displacement.

Furthermore, the Inter-American Commission has appointed a Special Rapporteur to address the urgent circumstances faced by internally displaced individuals in many nations across the hemisphere. This post represents the first and unique institutional role created at the regional level, with the explicit objective of tackling the problem of internal displacement. There have been previous endeavors to put a more uniform focus on the matter within the Western hemisphere.

The establishment of conflict prevention mechanisms in Europe by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) aims to mitigate the tensions that contribute to forced migration. The central Asian countries of the former Soviet

Union are also included in its jurisdiction, extending beyond Europe. In contrast to its equivalents in Africa or the Americas, the OSCE apparatus employs a strategy of maintaining a sustained presence of field staff over an extended period of time. This approach aims to mitigate domestic tensions and foster positive communication and reconciliation. Therefore, personnel from the OSCE are actively involved in the protection and well-being of internally displaced individuals. OSCE field personnel in Tajikistan, for example, oversaw the human rights and security of internally displaced individuals who were returning to their original territories. They promptly reported any cases of harassment and unauthorized occupancy of property to the relevant authorities.

Hundreds of OSCE staff workers in Bosnia and Herzegovina were responsible for overseeing several human rights criteria, such as freedom of movement, the capacity of displaced persons to retrieve their property or get compensation, as stipulated in the Dayton accords. In 1997, a European "multinational protection force" was deployed in Albania under the auspices of the OSCE. The primary objective of this force was to assist in the establishment of a secure environment and facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to displaced individuals and other affected parties.

The OSCE operates based on the idea of consensus, however it maintains the power to intervene independently in instances of overt, severe, and unaddressed violations of human rights commitments. The judgment made in 1992 represents the first occurrence in which a regional or international institution has provided a justification for overriding the authority of individual states, based on principles of human rights and humanitarian norms. The OSCE allows governments to engage in nonconsensual decision-making processes, such as initiating bilateral dialogues and good offices

missions with a violating government, addressing the issue through multilateral means, or, in the most severe cases, undertaking mandatory missions with the support of at least a minimum number of states.

During its September 2000 conference, the OSCE extended an invitation to the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons to deliver the opening address. Moreover, the organization has expressed its support for the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and is actively disseminating them. Moreover, with the aim of fostering compliance with their provisions, the organization has commenced the organization of seminars focused on the Principles. In May 2000, a seminar will be held in Tbilisi, Georgia, in collaboration between the OSCE, the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement, and the Norwegian Refugee Council. The forthcoming event aims to bring together government officials and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in order to engage in a comprehensive deliberation regarding effective strategies for tackling the problem of internal displacement.

The new donors, in contrast to their Western counterparts, presented themselves as viable alternatives to the liberal peace-building model, despite significant differences in their strategies for working with states impacted by conflict. The liberal peace-building paradigm was commonly perceived as too intrusive in the internal political matters of recipient states and excessively focused on imposing political frameworks that were deemed unsuitable for the contextual circumstances. India and Turkey argued that the establishment and maintenance of enduring peace necessitated the presence of inclusive political institutions that were rooted in indigenous traditions and local origins. Aneja (2019) and Tank (2019) argued that the liberal peace-building

approach was inadequate in this aspect since it imposed political frameworks that were developed by other sources.

China and Brazil, along with other nations, have voiced their opposition to liberal peace-building tactics, citing concerns about their perceived ineffectiveness in addressing the root causes of conflict and promoting long-lasting stability. They held the belief that attaining enduring peace required tackling poverty and fostering economic advancement. Unlike Western donors, new donors have embraced a non-hierarchical approach to these interactions, abstaining from using the term "fragile state," and prioritizing South-South cooperation and unity, non-interference, and non-conditional assistance. New benefactors prioritized providing assistance that aligned with the needs and desires of recipient governments, rather than implementing externally developed programs and policies, by presenting their involvement as a commitment to refrain from meddling in the internal affairs of conflict-affected nations and upholding their sovereignty. However, it has been claimed that these rhetorical framings serve to hide the complex motives underlying the distribution of aid and the dynamic practices of developing donors. In addition to superficial appearances, the commitment of recent donors to non-interference has regularly exhibited a certain degree of fragility.

This tension is seen in the distinct manners in which new donors have historically engaged with surrounding states compared to those located at a greater distance. The magnitude of these pressures has escalated in correlation with the expansion of fresh donor investments and, in the instance of specific new donors, their burgeoning worldwide ambitions. The changes described above have led to demands for a

reevaluation of their stance on non-interference and an increased dedication to peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and conflict mediation.

The long-lasting ramifications of external interventions, colonialism, and the domination of hegemonic power have been notably substantial. Hence, to avoid the appearance of hierarchical systems, new donors form cooperative and collaborative partnerships with states impacted by conflict. The personal experiences of violent internal wars have had a tremendous impact on their commitment to state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. To illustrate, contemplate the subsequent instances: The historical events include apartheid in South Africa, a military struggle in Chechnya instigated by Russia, violent conflicts in Kashmir and Gujarat for India, and a prolonged dispute between Turkey and its Kurdish community that has lasted for several decades. China has recently repressed the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong and marginalized the Uyghur Muslim minority. A significant proportion of these entities are located in regions where adjacent states are grappling with instances of violent instability. Russia has expressed concerns regarding the Caucasus and Central Asia regions. India, on the other hand, has harbored apprehensions regarding the potential escalation of violence resulting from civil wars in Afghanistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. South Africa has encountered spillover effects stemming from political crises in Zimbabwe. Lastly, Turkey's apprehensions regarding its own and regional stability have been intensified by the ongoing conflict in Syria.

A significant portion of the population expresses apprehension regarding the potential exploitation of policies such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to rationalize intervention in their domestic matters, infringement upon their sovereignty, or even

the promotion of regime alteration. The concerns were heightened by the fact that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was enforced in Libya but not in Syria (Li, 2019). Consequently, these encounters have an impact on the way in which new donors interact with other nations impacted by conflict, particularly their doubt towards interventionist strategies that underpin the liberal peace-building framework.

The encounters of new donors with internal violent conflict and foreign dominance have exerted a considerable influence on their perspective of security and progress. Throughout history, a notable fraction of recent benefactors have placed emphasis on fostering economic ties with nations impacted by hostilities, all the while striving to avert political interferences. They avoid using the term "fragile state" because they believe it represents an externally imposed criterion for the appearance of a legal state. Additionally, it is argued by scholars that the fragility frame shifts the perception of poverty from a developmental obstacle to a matter of security. This perspective assigns the responsibility for global peace and security to countries in the Global South, rather than the countries in the Global North, which have traditionally been the primary sources of violence (Paczyska, 2016, 2019).

Hence, a significant proportion of the assistance they offer comprises of the enhancement of infrastructure, establishment of trade agreements, and direct investments. The authors suggest that poverty and economic underdevelopment are the primary determinants of instability and war, asserting that the achievement of enduring peace is unachievable in the absence of sustainable development. Their critique of the liberal peace-building model is primarily rooted in their understanding of the relationship between development and conflict. The argument put up is that this particular paradigm has shown to be insufficient in effectively addressing the issue of

sustainable development. Although numerous countries have sent peacekeeping forces for United States operations, they have shown less willingness to engage in more comprehensive peacebuilding efforts, as they view them as excessively encroaching onto the domestic affairs of states harmed by violence. Nevertheless, as will be shown in the following section, these policies of non-interference and limited backing for extensive peace-building missions have shown more adaptability than what this language suggests.

India has always considered South Asia as a place where it has sought to become involved in conflicts with its neighboring countries, particularly in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. According to Aneja (2019), India's adherence to the ideals of sovereign equality and noninterference in the area has exhibited a high degree of selectivity. In essence, India demonstrates a willingness to exert political influence and engage in the domestic affairs of other countries, perhaps resorting to military intervention, in instances where its security interests are jeopardized within the immediate vicinity. The deployment of armed forces by India to East Pakistan in 1971 was a direct response to the Bangladesh Liberation War, which was triggered by the increasing atrocities perpetrated by the Pakistan army against the Bengali population. According to Bass (2015), the rationale for this course of action was supported by the premise of humanitarian intervention.

In compliance with the conditions of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, India deployed the Indian Peace Keeping Force to intervene in the Sri Lankan civil strife between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government in 1987. Although the Indian soldiers had peacekeeping goals, they actively engaged in a military conflict with the LTTE until they ended their involvement in 1990. In an

attempt to prevent a coup attempt, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi deployed a contingent of 1,600 troops to the Maldives in 1988. India has deviated from the ideals of non-intervention through the implementation of non-military initiatives. In the year 2015, India demonstrated its inclination towards observing Nepal's revision of its recently passed constitution, with the aim of addressing the persistent civil unrest within the country.

New Delhi asserts that several components of the text were a risk to the country's persistent instability. In instances where diplomatic endeavors proved ineffective, India opted to implement an economic blockade on Nepal as a means to exert pressure on the nation to revise its constitution. Concurrently, amidst the intensification of regional power dynamics between India and China, India has sporadically deviated from the rules of non-intervention. This was seen in its allocation of military resources to the Sri Lankan government during the period of the civil conflict from 2009 to 2011.

The interdependence between the security and economic advancement of India is closely tied to the establishment of stable and harmonious states within the area. In recent times, the United Progressive Alliance (2004-2011) and the Bharatiya Janata Party, led by Narendra Modi, have emphasized these principles by prioritizing communities in their programs. Given these factors and preferences, the provision of aid to Afghanistan has placed emphasis on the amalgamation of economic development and security as the most effective approach to impede the spread of extremist beliefs within the region and build a state of stability inside the nation.

India's policies were completely different from its approach towards conflict-affected governments in Africa. India's approach focused on ensuring export markets and

access to raw materials, and was based on the notion of South-South cooperation (Paczyska, 2019). In the aforementioned physically remote areas, there has been a growing inclination to lessen adherence to non-intervention norms, which has coincided with India's investments in states plagued by conflicts. This article will further on this matter in the subsequent part.

Similarly, it is possible to observe the same underlying dynamics in Turkey's policies with governments in Eastern Europe that are plagued by violence. After being elected to power by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2003, Turkey has decided to abandon its earlier support for the liberal peace-building paradigm. Instead, Ankara adopted a strategy of approaching its interactions with conflict-affected governments from the perspective of humanitarian diplomacy based on Islamic principles. The strategy in question has been presented as a viable alternative to the perceived ineffectiveness of Western interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Humanitarian diplomacy places emphasis on providing assistance to indigenous institutions that possess the capacity to effectively rule and foster sustainable economic growth, rather than focusing on the reconstruction of governments afflicted by violent conflicts in the donor state's likeness.

Turkey has employed a strategic approach in its engagement with Somalia, which involves providing support for the enhancement of local government institutions, fostering economic development, and assisting the repair of state infrastructure. These efforts have been undertaken alongside efforts to facilitate peace and reconciliation processes. Contrarily, Turkey's commitment to this approach and principles of non-intervention was subject to scrutiny subsequent to the Arab upheavals that transpired in 2011. As Ankara's apprehension regarding the potential ramifications of the

upheavals on the Kurdish autonomy movement and its perception of a security danger arising from the escalation of protests in neighboring Syria into a civil war, this concern became more pronounced. Turkey deviated from its pledge of non-intervention and non-interference and publicly extended support to armed Sunni forces involved in the resistance against the Bashar al-Assad regime, in light of the security concerns it faced in its close neighborhood (Tank, 2019).

Qatar, like Turkey, saw a change in viewpoint during the Arab upheavals, transitioning from conflict mediation to interventionism. More precisely, it commenced offering explicit aid to rebels in Libya and Syria. During the later period, a total of \$3 billion was allocated to opposition troops from 2011 to 2014. According to Barakat and Milton (2019), the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and President Mohamed Morsi received financial support during his tenure as president.

Moreover, Russia has implemented a unique strategy towards its surrounding nations in contrast to more isolated areas of the globe. Throughout history, Russia has considered the Caucasus and Central Asia to be its dominant areas. The nation places considerable importance on the preservation of stability through the provision of development aid and the implementation of proactive measures to address and mitigate violence. Russia views cross-border conflicts as a direct threat to its security. Russia aims to reunite former Soviet countries and reduce the influence of other world powers through security and economic connections. Consequently, development assistance is seen as a strategy to "preserve overall geopolitical influence in the region" (Sergeev *et al.*, 2013). Moreover, it is noteworthy that Russia has engaged in a collaborative air defense system arrangement in the Caucasus and Central Asia, alongside its participation in the Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade

Area (CISFTA). Furthermore, a lease deal was signed with Tajikistan for the 201st Motorized Rifle Division military installation, which would remain in effect until 2042. According to Zürcher (2019), Moscow successfully applied pressure on Kyrgyzstan in 2014, compelling them to halt their activities at the US Manas Air Force installation. Moreover, in instances where Moscow identified a potential risk to its strategic interests in the vicinity, it exhibited a willingness to engage in military intervention without hesitation. The deployment of Moscow's 14th Army occurred in response to the intensification of the separatist war in Moldova in 1992. In 2008, Russia extended assistance to the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which were involved in the separatist movement in Georgia. In reaction to the resumption of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the province of Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia took the initiative to invade the Crimean region of Ukraine in 2014 and subsequently sent peacekeepers to the same territory in 2020.

The 2014 concept statement underscores the correlation between Russian development assistance and its national objectives, with a special focus on the near abroad. As per the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2014), the contention posits that an assertive and focused approach in the realm of international development aid, which aligns with the country's national interests, plays a role in fostering the stabilization of the socioeconomic and political conditions in partner nations. Furthermore, it aids in the eradication of current and potential sources of tension and conflict, particularly in the neighboring regions of the Russian Federation.

In contrast, the contemporary involvement of Russia in Latin America has predominantly revolved around diplomatic initiatives, business interactions, and the exportation of weaponry. In this context, the entity has made efforts to form

partnerships with countries that express interest in developing institutions that are not under the dominance of the United States. In addition, it has offered support to the Maduro government in Venezuela and has established a strong alliance with Brazil through the BRICS group (Gurganus, 2018; Herbst & Marczak, 2019). Similarly, the interactions between Moscow and African nations are driven by unique interests. Despite being the largest supplier of weapons to the continent, Moscow has redirected its attention from ensuring Russia's security to promoting economic ties, such as investments and trade, and establishing political alliances. This shift occurred following its expulsion from the G-8 in 2014 and the imposition of Western sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine, particularly in relation to the former. However, because to its growing international aspirations and the increasing rivalry from other developing benefactors, Russia has embraced a more aggressive strategy in its engagements with conflict-ridden nations in Africa.

The government in the Central African Republic has received active support from Russian diplomats and the Wagner Group, a Russian security organization. Additionally, they have contributed to the facilitation of negotiations aimed at establishing ceasefire agreements with rebel factions (Lewis, 2020). The Russian government has been gradually adopting a strategy that integrates security collaboration with electoral support for countries facing political instability, including Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Mozambique. The objective of this method is to ensure the acquisition of mineral resources and diplomatic support in international forums such as the United Nations (Stronski, 2019).

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has three main advantages in conflict management: a membership that includes Russia in the Eastern

region and the United States in the Western region, a thorough comprehension of security, and a diverse range of field missions throughout Europe. Therefore, it is expected that the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) will play a crucial role in resolving several conflicts in the Caspian region, including Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in Eastern Europe, as demonstrated by Georgia. However, it is important to emphasize that there is a significant exception in Chechnya, where the OSCE has withdrawn at the request of Russia. Furthermore, the OSCE has developed a wide range of conflict prevention tools, such as setting benchmarks for minority and human rights, overseeing electoral processes, and establishing early warning systems through on-site missions. While the OSCE remains capable of playing a substantial role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, it does have specific constraints in the context of peace operations. Firstly, it refrains from deploying armed forces, hence it usually functions in tandem with a political resolution. Additionally, the OSCE frequently encounters budgetary limitations in relation to restoration efforts, which frequently surpass its operational capabilities (Stronski, 2019).

The European Union (EU) established institutional capacity for conflict management in 1999, as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The operational capabilities of the European Union are distinguished by various essential elements, including peacekeeping, law enforcement, adherence to the rule of law, civilian governance, and cooperation. The organization is presently making strides in its pursuit of attaining its goal of deploying a total of 60,000 peacekeepers, 5,000 law enforcement officers, and a maximum of 300 justice workers. The European Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia, including a contingent of 500 law enforcement personnel, functions as a substitute for the International Police Task Force (IPTF) established by

the United Nations. Furthermore, Macedonia is now hosting a 350-troop deployment referred to as "Concordia," which serves as a substitute for a NATO peacekeeping operation. The European Union (EU) has sent peacekeepers as part of its initial out-of-area deployment to support the United Nations' (UN) operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), following the summit held in May.

In the context of peace operations, it is plausible that North American and European institutions may exhibit certain comparative advantages in comparison to the United Nations. One potential approach to promoting peacebuilding involves utilizing the possibility of eventual integration into the European Union as a motivating factor for adherence to a peace process. Furthermore, regional organizations can achieve greater efficiency as a result of their ability to quickly deploy resources, access superior information, improve interoperability, and ensure long-term viability. Furthermore, specific regional organizations like the OSCE and EU have the ability to broaden and enhance their intervention endeavors, leading to a more all-encompassing strategy and enhanced human security. Finally, in the context of NATO, the regional security alliance exhibits a considerably higher capability than the United Nations in terms of its ability to participate in peace enforcement operations when needed.

2.3.1 Dynamics and Challenges in Management of European Union (EU) Regional Bloc in the Kosovan Crisis Intra-State Conflict

Changes occurred in the European security architecture following the end of the Cold War. Conflict security through deterrence or the prospect of mutual annihilation in the event of a military rivalry between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) received little attention. Conversely, the conventional security paradigm underwent a transformation in response to the rise and intensification of

internal political crises. It came as no surprise that the antiquated security framework, which had been devised to avert war between the two blocs, proved inadequate in containing the emerging surge of strife, particularly the ethnic strife within the Communist camp's successor states.

This development instigated the European Union (EU) to not only strengthen the economic integration of Europe but also redefine and delineate its security architecture. Following this period of institutional uncertainty, the disintegration of Yugoslavia presented an immediate challenge to the European Union and other international organizations concerned with European security. The ineffectiveness of the traditional security institutions of the European Union to address the Yugoslavia crisis became evident. In its initial reaction to the Yugoslav crisis, the European Union prioritized containment and the consolidation of statehood. The economic influence of the European Community was utilized to mediate a ceasefire through the provision of aid to parties that complied and the threat of withdrawal to peace disruptors. In an effort to prevent the conflict from escalating beyond Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, the European Community (EC) maintained its containment strategy. Regrettably, this approach failed to prevent the conflict from subsequently spreading to Bosnia.

The EC retaliated with severe economic sanctions, including the cessation of financial assistance to the region, in addition to a number of peace missions. Nevertheless, in December 1991, it was compelled to abandon its containment strategy due to the escalating humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and the blatant rejection of the bloc's efforts. In doing so, it declared its preparedness to acknowledge the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, mediate the resolution of border disputes amicably, and guarantee

governmental authority over their respective territories. In 1992, a comprehensive military conflict had already broken out in Bosnia. It is important to mention that while the Community had previously acknowledged Bosnia's independence, it declined the Bosnian president's request to provide peacekeeping forces. Conversely, the Serbian delegation denied yet another peaceful negotiation facilitated by the European Community and the United Nations.

As a retaliatory measure, the EC imposed additional economic sanctions, including arms embargoes, on both Serbia and Montenegro. In response to the EC's intensive pressure, the United Nations dispatched a protection force to Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia in an effort to quell Thea's armed aggression and facilitate humanitarian operations. The use of force by the Forces was authorized in self-defense. The 1995 Srebrenica Genocide, which further demonstrated the ineffectiveness of European-led conflict management initiatives, put an end to the mission. The United States significantly marginalized the European Commission, instead deploying the Contact Group of Five in an effort to achieve consensus. The Dayton Peace Agreement, nevertheless, was achieved as a result of the intervention carried out by NATO. Regrettably, the accord proved ineffective in resolving the ethnic strife in the former Yugoslavia, where violent clashes between ethnic Serbs and Albanians in the province of Kosovo persisted from 1998 to 1999. The consequences of the EC's incapacity to assert its authority during this crisis were evident in the form of a NATO intervention commanded by the United States.

The Kosovo crisis highlights a number of limitations that the EU faced. Primarily, the organization struggled with its incapability to furnish security, hard, and soft power. It was incapable of overcoming Yugoslavia's complex problem due to its infancy of

Common Foreign and Security Policy and its lack of military strength and strategy to counter its threats. Furthermore, the European Union encountered an inability to reconcile the contrasting perspectives of its constituents, who not only held opposing views on the appropriate course of action but also on the most effective approach to achieving it. The resultant indecision and inconsistency of the bloc exposed it as an ineffective international actor in the management of conflict. Based on this assessment, academics conclude that diplomatic efforts to prevent conflicts are the most frequently employed strategy for managing intrastate conflicts. A coordination deficit in the implementation of these intervention mechanisms is noteworthy, given that numerous actors appear to be engaged in the majority of conflicts. Nevertheless, peace building as a mechanism is underutilized; therefore, it merits greater consideration.

As stated by Reilly (2002), the region, be it the northern Asia-Pacific or the southern part, is beset by a keen strategic awareness of the international security threat. Almost all security concerns in the North, for example, are filtered through the prism of the superpower rivalry between the United States and China. As a result, the security analyst is preoccupied with interstate competition in the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and the Taiwan Strait. Nevertheless, this stands in contrast to the Southeast Asian and South Pacific regions, which have been the epicenter of numerous intrastate conflicts characterized, among other things, by secessionist movements and civil skirmishes that have threatened the political stability of their respective nations and the neighboring countries. Initially, these conflicts often materialize in various forms, encompassing communal, linguistic, religious, and ethnic components. The aforementioned conflicts that have transpired in Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines, and Papua New Guinea illustrate this point. Historically, eco-political concerns such

as control over natural resources, social relations dynamics, increased group inequalities, and tensions exacerbated when traditional power structures are confronted by the forces of modernization, urbanization, and change have been mobilized through the utilization of ethnic animosities. Multiple factors contribute to the enduring intrastate conflicts, one of which is the weakness-induced incapability of certain states to counter regional, religious, and ethnic insurgencies.

According to Reilly (2002), the persistence of traditional approaches in the face of modern state structures, the artificial nature of some states, and the prominence of ethnicity all contribute to the challenges associated with employing conventional methods as effective instruments for resolving conflicts. This predicament is indicative of broader regional issues, most notably the so-called "arc of instability," which spans East Timor, Melanesia, and Indonesia.

The Asia-Pacific region has been engulfed in a quagmire of ethnic conflicts of a pernicious nature that defy conventional methods of resolution. Furthermore, their primary objective of promoting interstate stability renders them immune to the conventional approaches to international security that are ingrained in international law, diplomacy, and intergovernmental organizations. In the same way, these conflicts have grown considerably more complex, particularly when considering the effectiveness of conventional solutions such as preventive diplomacy, early warning systems, and international intervention. In the past, regional security and internal conflicts were considered distinct concerns. The "internationalness" of the majority of internal conflicts, however, prevents the delineation of these two aspects in the Asia-Pacific region. This is largely attributable to the "artificialness" of the state borders and the polarizing effects of globalization on the region's state borders.

The connectivity between the West Papuan insurgents and the neighboring state of Papua New Guinea, as well as between the fundamentalist Islamic movements operating in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, to name a few, are manifestations of these ties. Reilly's article, on the other hand, is predominately concerned with internal strife, particularly self-determination and secessionist disputes that have enveloped Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, as well as their origins, causes, and broader implications for international peace and security. His lack of understanding regarding the distinctive regionalization of conflicts in these areas and, by extension, the potential regional initiatives aimed at achieving conflict stability, was evident.

It is difficult to ignore the exponential growth of regionalism in the realm of international politics, given that virtually every regional organization has actively engaged in security and defense initiatives through defense alliances, with the intention of promoting technological advancements and economic growth (Soomro, Behan & Siddiqui, 2019). Furthermore, these organizations have endeavored to address regional conflicts, a trend that has been exacerbated by the United Nations' (UN) incapability to promptly intervene in internal affairs. State-formation conflicts and revolutionary conflicts are frequent manifestations of intrastate conflicts in South East Asia. When secessionist movements strive to establish their own territory, thereby fostering communal identities, the former is fermented. Language, religion, culture, as well as political and economic interests comprise these identities. The case involving the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Philippines serves as evidence for this. In Indonesia, Acehnese, West Papuan, and Timorese, additional linguistic groups have fought for their rights. Diverse approaches have been taken by the administrations of these troubled regions in an effort to resolve these conflicts. To

address the Acehese crisis, the Indonesian government implemented suppression and national integration initiatives (Soomro *et al.*, 2019).

2.3.2 Dynamics and Challenges of Regional Intervention in Southeast Asia (The ASEAN Way of resolving regional conflict)

A number of conflict management mechanisms have been implemented by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to address the persistent intrastate conflicts that plague the region. Recognized as the "ASEAN Way" framework for resolving disputes, the organization has embraced diplomatic principles based on a shared sense of values and interests.

The organization has positioned itself as a "cooperative security regime" in which disagreements are resolved in accordance with predetermined consensus standards and protocols. The "New Way" of conflict resolution is firmly grounded in the tenets of non-intervention in member states' internal affairs, peaceful dispute resolution, and the abstention from the application of force. While the aforementioned are fundamental tenets of regional security agreements, the ASEAN WAY is regarded as a resilient approach to resolving conflicts at the regional level due to its reliance on dialogue and the implementation of an agreement to disagree. In contrast, opinions regarding the viability of the ASEAN Way principles, particularly non-interference, have been divided. While some contend that it has facilitated the bloc's conflict management, others attribute responsibility to the perceived interference of regional organizations in internal matters. An exemplary illustration of this contention is readily apparent in the complicit involvement of ASEAN in the Cambodia-Vietnam war. The alliance has also derived some advantages from the non-use of force, particularly in terms of communication, pressure, diplomacy, and concessions. However, the ASEAN Way has encountered numerous obstacles, most notably in the

aftermath of the Cold War, which has forced it to retreat somewhat in its approach to conflict management and thus presents a formidable challenge.

2.3.3 Dynamics and Challenges in Management of Africa Intractable Intra-State Conflict

The AU has exhibited a resolute readiness to address the peace and security dilemmas that have afflicted the continent. Nevertheless, a significant portion of this has been devoted to scenarios in which discord has arisen. The AU's engagement in peace support and peace enforcement operations serves as empirical proof of this. The AU has conducted similar operations in Somalia (2007), Burundi (2003), Darfur (2004), and the Central African Republic (CAR) (2013) since 2003. The efficacy of sanctions in instances of unconstitutional government change and assistance to mediation processes are additional indications of the AU's command over conflict resolution and management.

To name a few nations that have been placed under suspension as a result of unconstitutional government transitions are Burkina Faso, Togo, Egypt, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger. In addition, the continental bloc has undertaken peacemaking and mediation initiatives. Mali, Somalia, and Darfur, Sudan-South Sudan, are among these nations. Notably, these processes have taken on a variety of forms, including high-level panels for Sudan and Egypt, ad hoc panels for the Ivorian crisis and Libya, chief mediators of the Union, or special representatives of the AU Commission for the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Comoros, and Mali. Nevertheless, these interventions have faced criticism due to their emergency approach and the scarcity of initiatives aimed at preventing conflicts.

The AU Commission in Africa employs many statutory institutions, such as the Panel of the Wise, Special Envoys, and High Representatives of the AUC Chairperson, as

its major instruments for conflict prevention and mediation. According to Gomes Porto and Ngandu (2015), the Panel of the Wise has been comprised of five members from its inception in 2007. Subsequently, four panels have been appointed consecutively. Forming in 2013 and 2017, respectively, were subsidiary groups known as the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FemWise-Africa) and the Pan-African Network of the Wise (Pan Wise). These organizations are still in the planning stages, but they will eventually become fully functional networks that include many non-state actors, including faith-based groups, NGOs, community groups, councils of elders, ombudsmen, pastoralist mediators, and education and research groups. The Wise Panel has been instrumental in bringing important topics, including transitional justice, women in conflict, and electoral violence, to the forefront of the Union's agenda.

In contrast, the Special Envoys and High Representatives of the AUC Chairperson operate as a slightly less organized and unified group (African Union 2018); in reality, their involvement in the Union's activities is only superficial. Initially, the Chairperson appointed special envoys to handle problems within each member state of the African Union. In 2008, Thabo Mbeki, the former president of South Africa, was appointed as the Chairperson of the High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan (AUHIP). Furthermore, in 2009, Ibrahima Fall, who had previously held the position of Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs at the United Nations Secretariat, was designated as the Special Envoy to Guinea. However, considering the changing nature of violent conflict throughout the continent, appointments have increasingly become more comprehensive.

In 2012, Pierre Buyoya, the ex-president of Burundi, was designated as the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel. Boubacar G. Diarra, a Mali native, was appointed as the Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region in the same year. Bineta Diop, the founder of Femmes Africa Solidarité and a Senegalese native, was appointed as the Special Representative for Women, Children and Armed Conflicts in 2013. While the African Union still hires special envoys for specific countries, these appointments indicate that the organization is becoming more aware of the wide-ranging nature of violent conflict across the continent and the need to engage stakeholders beyond member states and regional economic communities (Stronski, 2019).

2.3.3.1 Dynamics and Challenges of Regional Intervention by African Union (AU) Intervention in Burundi

The AU's intervention can be characterized as an evaluation of the organization's proficiency in handling interstate conflicts. Burundi has experienced recurrent political instability since the pre-colonial era, with the 1993 conflict, which was instigated by the assassination of then-elected president Ndadaye Melchior, being the most recent. The ensuing aftermath was nationwide vengeance against Tutsis, which provoked Hutu retaliation from Tutsi-dominated armed forces. Around 300,000 civilians were killed and an additional 1.3 million were displaced internally or rendered exiles as a result of the conflict. The AU intervened in Burundi in response to its deteriorating state of affairs by amplifying African solutions to African problems. The AU should have intervened in this conflict in light of the Burundian government's unconstitutional transition. As a result, the conflict elevated the standards that were gaining traction on a global and regional scale. The former demonstrated the position of the AU in denouncing the unconstitutional change in

government, whereas the latter presented a difficulty in determining the Responsibility to Protect.

The African Union Intervention in Burundi (AMIB) has garnered commendation for its successful implementation of an armistice and deployment of peacekeepers to oversee the situation. The OAU intervened politically in an effort to terminate the conflict in 1993. Furthermore, in the midst of these frenetic negotiations, it successfully organized a coalition government. The dispute persisted until the OAU was reconfigured as the AU. Despite the inception of regional initiatives that culminated in the Arusha Agreement in 2000, the conflict persisted.

As a consequence, regional leaders reassessed their decision to transfer the burden to the continental organization. In an effort to revive the Arusha Agreement, the African Union dispatched Ambassador Mamadou Bah, its Special Representative in Burundi, with the responsibility of monitoring the ceasefire negotiations and the establishment of a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission and an International Judicial Commission of Inquiry. Later in 2002, at Arusha, a ceasefire was established between the principal combatants as a result of the AU's initiative. Undoubtedly, this cessation of hostilities played a pivotal role in the peace process of Burundi. In order to ensure the complete execution of the ceasefire, the African Union was obligated to dispatch the AMIB to oversee the verification and monitoring process, as well as to form a joint liaison team comprised of all signatory states to the African Mission. The political and diplomatic endeavors led by the AU persisted subsequent to the United Nations Peace Keeping Operation in Burundi (ONUB) assuming control of the region.

2.3.3.2 Conflict Management in the Southern Africa Sub-Region

The sub region has been confronted with several challenges that jeopardize its peace and security, including armed rebellions initiated by external actors, territorial disputes, ethnic armed conflicts, and civil wars. Without a doubt, it is necessary to have a highly skilled military force that can be quickly deployed during times of emergency in order to effectively address these threats (Baker & Maeresera, 2009). To ensure timely and efficient intervention, it is imperative for sub-regional responses to instabilities to encompass coordinated political and military endeavors.

In light of the prevailing conditions, the SADC Standby Brigade of the Southern African Development Authority has rekindled its ambitions for a triumphant military intervention in alignment with Article 13 of the Protocol that established the Peace and Security Commission of the African Union. In the event of severe circumstances or upon the request of a member state aiming to reinstate peace and security, this clause grants authorization for military intervention. Before the SADC BRIG is fully implemented and after SADC member states sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Baker & Maeresera (2009) stated that political and operational challenges will greatly affect the effectiveness of the institution.

2.3.3.3 The Policy Framework of the SADC Brigade

The Protocol on Peace and Security Council was established in accordance with Article 5.2 of the Africa's Constitutive Act. Its purpose is to expedite responses to crises on the continent by establishing collective security and early warning procedures. The formation of an African Standby Force (ASF) including five brigades in each of the five regions of Africa is mandated by Article 13 of the PSC Protocol, which imposes an obligation on the AU Commission. Consequently, the SADC Interstate, Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) established a team of military

strategists. The culmination of this endeavor occurred in May 2002 when the Planning Element (PLANEM) was established in Gaborone. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was established to streamline the establishment of the reserve brigade. The conceptual framework of the SADC BRIG is designed to provide personnel who have been pledged to the brigade to stay in their home countries until they are assigned again, as per the specified response time.

The deployment is planned to take place either under the auspices of the African Union (AU) or the United Nations (UN). In spite of the praiseworthy efforts made by Southern African nations, Baker & Maeresera (2009) contend that the absence of common national interests and values among member states poses obstacles to the establishment of trust, institutional cohesion, unified policies, and a synchronized approach to addressing crises. This can be attributed to the member states' unwillingness to surrender their sovereignty to a security system that has a legally binding mandate, as well as their resistance to granting regional bodies the power to make security decisions. Previously, the SADC was entangled in such divisions, particularly between the militaristic and pacific sides. For instance, the early decisions made by SADC to interfere in both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Lesotho caused a significant disagreement among member states about policy, which further undermines the effectiveness of the SADC BRIG.

The region is comprised of fourteen members, all of which are Southern African Development Authority (SADC) members. Multiple economic, political, and historical considerations contributed to the formation of the intricate web of security that currently plagues the region. According to historical discourse, the majority of the region's economies entered the capitalistic economic order as peripheries under the

guidance of South Africa, which was asymmetrically linked to the economy of Southern Africa. Politically, the region united in opposition to the authority of the white minority; this can be attributed to their concerted efforts to establish a regional mechanism. This has been reinforced even more by membership in a single regional economic bloc. Due to their interdependence and the clear distinction between "weak" and "divided" nations, they are all components of the same regional security complex. As a consequence of this interdependence, strife within any of the member states is prone to propagate to the neighboring nations.

SADC was initially formed to coordinate the assistance of the international community in the struggle against discriminatory rule. The primary objective of the bloc was to eradicate the economic reliance of its member states on South Africa. Additionally, it functioned as a political instrument and a supplementary measure to the economic sanctions imposed by the international community against the racist regime of South Africa. During the Cold War era, the United States of America and the Soviet Union were superpowers whose rivalry influenced the majority of conflicts in the region. This phenomenon progressively ceased to exist after the abrupt end of the Cold War.

2.3.3.4 Dynamics and Challenges in management of Southern African Development (SADC) in the Lesotho Intractable Intra-State Conflict

An internal struggle ensued in 1994 among the competing factions of the Lesotho army. Throughout history, the nation has been beset by a number of political instability issues and the intervention of military juntas in politics. This has caused concern among neighboring countries, particularly South Africa, which was hosting its inaugural democratic elections at the time, due to the apprehension that a spillover could occur. As a result, the Southern states convened an urgent emergency meeting

in an effort to defuse the escalating tensions in Lesotho. The meeting concluded with the democratically elected Basuto Congress Party (BCP) receiving unanimous support. Also drafted was a proposition to deploy a military contingent in the event that the situation did not return to normal.

The 1998 general elections were concluded, but the opposition party later renounced the results, accusing the governing party of electoral fraud and rigging. As a reaction, the SADC instituted an inquiry commission that failed to uncover any indications of electoral malfeasance. However, the opposition rejected the findings of the Commission and instead demanded military assistance to orchestrate a coup. The SADC military contingent, under the leadership of South Africa, intervened on September 22, 1998, in the aftermath of the attempted coup. In conjunction with the Botswana Defense Force, the force formed the South Africa Defense Forces (SADF). The result was the restoration of order in Lesotho. The Lesotho crisis serves as a classic illustration of how member states can disproportionately benefit from the implementation of regional mechanisms that prevent the escalation of conflicts and achieve success. Once more, the expeditious triumph of the SADC in Lesotho was facilitated by a number of factors, including the country's excessive reliance on South Africa, which rendered it vulnerable to the influence of influential nations such as South Africa.

2.3.3.5 Intractable Intra-State Conflict Management in the West African region (The ECOWAS)

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which was founded in 1975, was intended to foster economic development, cooperation, and trade among its member states. Nevertheless, it was unavoidable that the organization would undertake this responsibility in response to persistent insecurity challenges that were

already prominent in the region, including but not limited to the unsuccessful military coup attempt to overthrow Benin's government in 1977; border disputes among its members, particularly between Togo and Ghana regarding the Volta region; and territorial disputes between Mali and Burkina Faso that escalated into a military confrontation in 1985, to name a few. These discouraging occurrences not only hindered the economic integration efforts of ECOWAS but also initiated significant discussion regarding the necessity of promoting peaceful coexistence in the region. Subsequently, in 1981, the West African bloc ratified the Mutual Assistance on Defense and the Protocol of Non-Aggression, both of which were crucial. The primary objective of the former initiative was to tackle interstate conflicts and promote peaceful methods of resolving disputes. In contrast, the latter urged member states to unite their defense strategies in response to any external aggression supported by external influence. In general, the purpose of these legal instruments was to contribute to the improvement of political stability in the area.

The genesis of the ECOWAS conflict regional mechanism can be attributed to the shortcomings of previous protocols in addressing the emergence of intricate security challenges, particularly in the context of Sierra Leone and Liberia, which subsequently affected neighboring nations. In May 1990, in an effort to stabilize the situation in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the ECOWAS leaders established the ECOWAS Monitoring and Observation Group (ECOMOG) as a result of the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) that was established in response to this crisis.

The ECOWAS leaders were compelled to reconsider a "new security strategy" as a result of the legality of ECOMOG's intervention and the obstacles it came across. In response to comparable incidents that were observed in Guinea-Bissau during the

1990s, the bloc ratified the Peacekeeping and Security in Lome, Togo 1999 Protocol Establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. It was the inaugural institutional framework to include the Executive Secretariat, the Defense and Security Commission, the Authority of Heads of State and Government, and the Mediation and Security Council. Moreover, ECOMOG was notably integrated into this institutional framework.

The sole purpose of ECOWAS conflict management is to address political crises that occur within the territories of its member states through the utilization of ECOMOG as the regional intervention instrument. In the 1990s, when ECOWAS initially deployed ECOMOG forces in Liberia to thwart Charles Taylor's attempt to overthrow the government of Samuel Doe, intervention took on an unusual quality. The nature of ECOMOG's intervention varies from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, contingent upon the prevailing circumstances. An exemplary instance can be found in the crises that beset Sierra Leone and Liberia, in which ECOMOG deployed a peacekeeping contingent to safeguard the civilian and military populations. Nevertheless, due to the enduring nature of the violence and its transformation in both nations, ECOMOG was compelled to transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement activities.

The ECOWAS conflict prevention framework drew inspiration from the challenges encountered during the implementation of the preventive component of the 1999 mechanism, particularly the delayed reaction to the crisis. The primary objective of this framework was to prevent the escalation of tensions, halt the emergence of conflict, and facilitate a productive transformation of the dispute. Its primary objective was to avert the escalation of conflicts. To achieve this, a number of components were utilized, including but not restricted to the identification of conflict

triggers. This new framework, according to Osagie *et al.*, (2017), can be considered a proactive alternative to the ECOMOG. Put simply, the motivation for intervention should be oriented toward prevention rather than waiting for a conflict to escalate, escalate violently, and erupt before it occurs. The ramifications would involve the designation of military intervention as a last resort. A number of elements support the framework, such as Political Governance, Early Warning, Preventive Diplomacy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, Peace Education, and Democracy.

The Early Warning Component is of the utmost importance to ECOWAS members due to its explicit purpose of forecasting impending conflicts and enabling intervention strategies to avert the crisis. In rekindling the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), this laudable goal was accomplished. According to Osagie *et al.*, (2017), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has effectively evolved from an economic integration instrument to an eco-political bloc, carrying out security stabilization, peacebuilding, and conflict management in the sub-region, among other responsibilities.

Controversies persist, however, regarding whether the bloc has fulfilled its responsibility in terms of conflict management. On the basis of the bloc's previous responses, particularly those facilitated by ECOMOG, one could argue that it has prevented a number of crises in the sub-region to some degree. In contrast, the organization has subsequently encountered formidable obstacles stemming from inadequately implemented institutional frameworks. However, the bloc has demonstrated a comparatively exceptional track record in crisis management, particularly with regard to the utilization of ECOMOG, as opposed to conflict prevention. It has also achieved notable accomplishments in the realms of

peacemaking and mediation. It has successfully orchestrated the implementation of multiple ceasefires via diplomatic means and ensured adherence by deploying peacekeeping forces.

2.3.3.6 Dynamics and Challenges in Management of ECOWAS Intervention in the Liberia's Intractable Intra-State Conflict

The conflict in Liberia can be ascribed to a multitude of factors encompassing political, social, economic, religious, and religious aspects. Concurrent with the end of the Cold conflict in the early 1990s and the outbreak of a civil conflict in Liberia from 1989 to 1997, the former emerged. It was generally acknowledged that this was the initial intrastate conflict in Africa. It was fought between dissident militias and other splinter organizations and former president Samuel Doe. The asymmetrical conflict in Liberia commenced in December 1989 when an offensive was launched from Ivory Coast by a faction of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) headed by Charles Taylor, a former official of the Doe regime. Leveraging the Ivory Coast as his initial target, the NPFL expeditiously penetrates into the territories of Liberia.

This sentiment was reinforced by the repressive measures implemented during Doe's administration, which the majority of Liberians had grown weary of and desired to alter. The circumstances facilitated the recruitment of combatants, acquisition of vital intelligence, and establishment of secure havens for the NPFL militias during their frequent encounters with the Liberian defense forces. Nevertheless, in a disproportionate fashion, NPFL fighters committed numerous war crimes and egregious human rights violations, including rape, torture, beatings, and murder, despite the support of the civilians. The NPFL achieved similar military triumphs in the neighboring counties of Lofa, Bong, Rivercess, and Grand Bassa as it did in

Nimba. Subsequently, the NPFL effectively seized additional territories. Early in March 1990, the NPFL controlled approximately ninety percent of Liberia's territory.

Dissension surprisingly ensued as the NPFL continued to record decisive military victories against the Doe's forces. This can be primarily attributed to the realization that certain high-ranking commanders under Taylor did not intend for the war to end with the installation of a democratic regime, which was a repressive one. Conversely, the objective was to appoint Charles Taylor to the presidency of the Republic of Liberia. Taylor's proclivity for exploiting the funds generated from the sale of Liberia's natural resources in territories controlled by his militia for personal gain infuriated certain lieutenants, who regarded the conflict as an opportunity to emancipate the populace of Liberia. Taylor's tendency to issue lethal orders for the execution of well-liked militia members whom he perceived as potential threats to his omnipotence constituted a further concern.

As an illustration, Taylor issued a warrant for the executions of Cooper Teah and Edmond Johnson, two exceedingly well-liked militia commanders. Taylor's extravagant way of life during the conflict served to further persuade his skeptic commanders that the purpose of the war was to elevate Taylor's reputation. Amid the internal struggle for power within the NPFL, one of its highest-ranking commanders, Prince Johnson, defected and established the opposition Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL).

The deterioration of the Liberian State commenced in November 1985, subsequent to an unsuccessful coup endeavor targeting the Doe regime. The revolt transpired in opposition to the tampering with the national elections in Liberia that took place in October 1985. According to all credible assessments, Jackson Doe and the Liberian

Action Party emerged victorious in the presidential election against Doe and his National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL). Nevertheless, President Doe extended his control by manipulating the electoral results through the use of the advantage of tenure. Concurrent with the terror campaign initiated by Doe, this ultimately led to the state's demise and prompted protests across the nation. The citizenry was massively mobilized in opposition to the state and its illegitimate regime by civil society organizations, opposition political parties, and opponents of the regime, including the student and labor movements, among others. The resistance was further invigorated by the government's failure to consistently remunerate government employees and deliver vital services to the populace.

Nonetheless, under Taylor's leadership, Liberia's transition from conflict to peace was unsuccessful. In 2001, the nation was confronted with yet another chasm of civil strife. Charles Taylor and the rebel militias, headed by the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, which opposed his rule, were engaged in conflict in 2001. Taylor advocated for territorial dominance and devised a strategy that primarily focused on unarmed civilians, subjecting them to routine acts of sexual assault, rape, torture, and murder. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which deployed troops to Liberia in 2003, instigated the regional response. Furthermore, Olusegun Obasanjo, the former president of Nigeria, spearheaded diplomatic initiatives on behalf of the African Union (AU). Following nearly a decade and a half of conflict, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNAMIL) assumed responsibility for reinstating the precarious ceasefire from 2003 to 2005.

Prior to the intervention of ECOWAS in the Liberian conflict, religious leaders initially endeavored to reconcile the warring factions through appeals, but their efforts

were in vain for years. The religious faction proceeded with the development of an armistice strategy that ultimately resulted in a peace conference. This plan was regrettably approved by Doe's regime but rejected by Taylor's faction. ECOWAS subsequently resolved to intervene in the conflict in response to the religious leaders' ignored appeal. This decision was influenced by the escalating chaos and devastation in Liberia, where civilians were being mercilessly murdered; furthermore, several ECOWAS member states were stranded in the country due to the conflict. It is believed that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) exercised its right to humanitarian intervention in response to the unprecedented human rights violations.

As a result of the OAU and UN failing to act, ECOWAS recognized that it was forced to intervene in order to prevent the crisis. As a result, in May 1990, a Standing Mediation Committee was formed in Banjul with the purpose of mediating disputes that arose between member states. A military delegation convened in Freetown, Sierra Leone in July of the aforementioned year to deliberate on the potential formation of a peacekeeping force in Liberia. The initial Standing Mediation Committee, convened in Banjul, reached the decision to form ECOMOG, which would consist of soldiers from the SMC nations as well as countries such as Guinea and Sierra Leone. As a result, a peace plan was formulated, which stipulated the formation of an interim government, an ECOWAS peacekeeping force, and an instantaneous cessation of hostilities. In 1990, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), an ECOWAS peacekeeping force, was deployed to Liberia, in defiance of the opposition from Taylor's faction.

As a consequence, the ECOWAS accepted the intricate responsibility of mediating conflicts within the region. In an effort to execute the preliminary peace strategies, ECOWAS gathered an All-Liberia Peace Conference in Banjul in 1990 with the purpose of forming a transitional government. Aside from Taylor's faction, every party was represented at the conference. The resolutions reached encompassed several matters, including the amendment of the 1984 Constitution, elections for the interim government, and equal representation of political parties in the cabinet and other public agencies.

With the exception of a demand for the presidency of the interim government, which was once more rejected by the Conference delegates, Taylor's faction rejected every proposal. The nation was subsequently divided in half, with Taylor's faction controlling 90% of the territory and the interim government overseeing the remaining 10%. The impasse left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with limited alternatives but to commence negotiations with the conflicting factions. The Liberian genocide came to an end with the signing of several armistices, including the Bamako Accord, a formal ceasefire between the contending parties. In an effort to conclude the ceasefire implementation modalities, another conference was held in Lome, Togo in 1991. However, this agreement was subsequently withdrawn by Mr. Charles Taylor. Additional Accords that were designated were the Yamoussoukro and the Monrovia. The stalemate in the Liberian conflict brought to light a deficiency in trust regarding the ECOWAS conflict mechanisms, in particular the standing mediation committee (Essuman, 2009).

2.3.3.7 The Malian Conflict

The origins of the Malian conflict can be traced back to twenty years of military rule that commenced immediately after the 1968 military rebellion, succeeded by a

sluggish transition to democracy in 1992. Furthermore, the ethno-political demands that evolved into separatist factions, particularly in the northern region of the country, can also be identified as a contributing factor to the conflict (Oluwadare, 2014). The year 2012 marked a turning point with the emergence of armed Islamist extremists who subsequently enrolled in the rebellion. The Tuaregs, enraged by the Bamako government's continued marginalization, resorted to the uprising that lasted until the 1990s. The Malian army was besieged from the northern region of the country in January 2012 by the Tuareg group, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and other Islamic extremist organizations. The offensive resulted in the capture of two-thirds of the country, including the strategically significant towns of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. Nevertheless, the Malian army's ability to quell this volatile uprising was compromised when Captain Amadou Sanogo orchestrated a military coup in March 2012.

Following the March rebellion, ECOWAS promptly implemented its preventive diplomacy strategy by designating Blaise Compaore, the president of Burkina Faso at the time, as its principal mediator. Furthermore, the bloc disclosed its intentions to mobilize a standby force of 3,000 individuals in the event that the insurgents declined to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict. As a result of the ECOWAS endeavor, Amadou Traore, the president of Mali, was compelled to resign and was temporarily succeeded by Dioncounda Traore. Commencing in June 2012, deliberations were commenced to facilitate the implementation of a stabilization force, with a particular focus on Northern Mali, in an effort to restore the authority of the state.

A motion was presented to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seeking authorization for the implementation of an ECOWAS stabilization force, which is

endowed with the authority to enforce peace as specified in Chapter VII of the UN Constitution. The objectives of the enforcement mission were to reestablish statehood in Northern Mali, regain the elusive territorial integrity, and fortify the border security. An improved operational concept was reached, which aimed to harmonize the strategy of the Mali army with that of the sub-regional force known as the "African-led International Support Mission in Mali" (AFISMA).

The Malian crisis exemplifies the political motivations that underpin the continent's peacekeeping missions. It demonstrated how external powers employ United Nations sanctions missions to advance and solidify narrow-minded interests in Africa. The conflict serves to further illuminate the perceptions of the international community regarding African peacekeepers, who continue to be regarded with lesser significance by Western peacekeepers. The AFISMA was predominantly perceived as a strategic maneuver to deploy African forces to Mali as sacrificial animals for slaughter. There has been discourse suggesting that although humanitarian intervention was on the line, both French and African nations had strategic interests in the Malian crisis, particularly economic interests in the uranium sector (Oluwadare, 2014).

2.3.4 Dynamics and Challenges in Management of East African Community Bloc Intractable Intra-State Conflict

The East African Standby Force (ESF), formerly referred to as the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), was founded with the mission of facilitating prompt deployment for preventive deployment, peace enforcement, intervention, and stability operations. Subsequent to the African Union Summit (AU) that was convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, it was founded. In this context, the progression has been from the formation of EASBRICOM, the coordinating mechanisms of EASBRIG, the planning element (PLANELM), to the establishment of a secretariat, which has since

housed the peace operations department. Amid these unfolding events, member states of the region became preoccupied with bolstering their capabilities in preparation for deployment on the EACRF duty manifest.

The EACRF was initially conceived as a multidimensional entity comprising operational police, civilian, and military components. However, its progress has been hindered by the lack of a unified regional community capable of integrating all nations that have contributed to its capabilities. Nevertheless, following a field exercise in Adama, Ethiopia, in September 2015, it was deemed entirely operational. It initiated a resource mobilization plan in 2014 to ensure it had sufficient funds and logistical support to effectively deploy in response to regional crises. Private philanthropic organizations and the international donor community were to be engaged in the appeal. Consequently, it has been striving for a trajectory of financial and logistical autonomy, notwithstanding the fact that the ASF finances the peacekeeping and security operations conducted by the regional contingency forces. According to Minyori (2018).

When external intervention is necessary to quell the M23 and other insurgencies in the eastern DRC, the establishment of an EAC joint force presents specific benefits in comparison to the current bilateral interventions. The inclusion of the DRC within the multilateral force structure could potentially mitigate Congolese perceptions that foreign intervention in the country is motivated by specific foreign interests. There are, however, substantial dangers associated with the EAC pursuing a combat mission. To begin with, armed interventions in the region have a poor track record of long-lasting success. Furthermore, the involvement of nations with economic and strategic interests in the area could potentially worsen an already perilous situation.

As previously stated, a number of the DRC's neighbors have intentionally and repeatedly undermined the region's eastward stability through the support of proxy combatants and the exploitation of its vast natural resources. Some nations, such as Uganda and Burundi, may continue to pursue their own objectives despite being under the command of a joint force. Analysts express concern that the Kenyan force commander stationed in remote eastern regions will have limited supervision authority from the Goma headquarters. As an illustration, the Burundian contingent that embarked on its journey into the DRC on August 15th has been subordinate to Congolese authority instead of Kenyan command. It appears that their primary focus is on advancing Burundian interests in the region of South Kivu (Nelleke, 2022).

Secondly, the armed violence may once more disproportionately affect civilians. When under military pressure, armed groups in the DRC have frequently become more brutal toward villagers. An example of this can be seen in early 2020, when the Congolese offensive against the ADF in North Kivu precipitated an increase in civilian maltreatment. Moreover, in its history, the EAC has not conducted any peacekeeping or enforcement operations, nor has it attempted to establish safeguards to ensure the safety of the civilian population. This generates significant apprehension regarding possible human rights transgressions committed by the military personnel.

Notwithstanding these hazards, the deployment of Burundi's troops suggests that the EAC nations are inclined to advance. How can hazards be most effectively mitigated to ensure the mission's success? If the EAC decides to proceed with full deployment, coordination with MONUSCO, the United Nations peacekeeping force, will be essential for maximizing the likelihood of success for both parties. UN mission chief Keita, speaking to the media following her June Security Council address, insisted

that the duties and responsibilities of each force be precisely defined. Although the mandate of MONUSCO is to safeguard civilians, the East African force will concentrate its efforts on eliminating insurgents. In light of the fact that security forces frequently encounter difficulties differentiating suspected insurgents from local inhabitants, close coordination between the regional force and MONUSCO becomes particularly critical so as not to impede the organization's endeavors to safeguard civilians. Furthermore, robust protections will be required to dissuade the possibility of grave violations against civilians.

Further Regional forces in Africa, such as the G5 Sahel, have undertaken trials that involve the utilization of specialized cells to monitor and record personnel conduct during operations. These trials primarily concentrate on military maneuvers that have an influence on civilian populations. The EAC should contemplate adopting similar mechanisms. According to reports, the EAC is also competing for the endorsement of the AU Peace and Security Council to ensure political protection for the force. The endorsement should require the force's commitment to adhere to the human rights due diligence regulations of the African Union (AU), which encompass measures aimed at protecting civilians during peace operations. If the AU approves the EAC, it is crucial to closely monitor the human rights situation. In addition, the AU should provide the EAC with technical advice on the most effective methods for protecting civilians during operations of this kind. Moreover, given the disastrous history of previous military efforts in reestablishing peace in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), it is recommended that Tshisekedi simultaneously initiates conversations with armed factions. Among the multitude of militias operating in the eastern region, a few eighteen organizations participated in the hastily convened and unproductive inaugural round of negotiations held in Nairobi during the month of April. There was

a notable absence of several highly violent organizations, and the deliberations also omitted entities deemed foreign, such as the ADF and FDLR.

The second round of conversation, which the Congolese government has been diligently preparing for through engagement with communities affected by violence and communication with over fifty armed groups, has not yet been scheduled. The neighboring countries of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) should persist in supporting Tshisekedi in this matter and express their opinions on the upcoming round of discussions about a framework, timing, and the involvement of armed groups. While it may be unlikely to include every group, it would be advantageous to have a more intentional approach in determining which groups should be included and for what specific reason before proceeding to the next phase. The EAC's decision on 22 July to appoint Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta as facilitator may help revive the peace talks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite Kenyatta's opposition to William Ruto, who was later declared the winner of the Kenyan election (Nelleke, 2022). Furthermore, it is imperative for EAC states to promptly establish the specific role that the regional force would play in implementing President Tshisekedi's proposed demobilization strategy. The national policy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was launched in April of the current year, seeks to facilitate the reintegration of former combatants into their respective communities. This approach differs from earlier demobilization attempts, which focused on integrating them into the army. The task of executing the task is delegated to provincial coordinators, rather than the authorities located in Kinshasa. Offering armed groups an option and a motivation to leave the jungle is expected to be crucial for a sustainable solution, despite the fact that the project has not yet commenced in a serious manner.

There exists a theoretical connection between the demobilization drive and the diplomatic and military aspects of Nairobi. The suggested operational framework entails the provision of assistance by the joint force to Tshisekedi in his efforts to demobilize. The concept that armed groups are required to either demobilize through the Nairobi political pathway or become targets of the regional force seems to be an anticipated outcome. However, the concept lacks specific details regarding the operational aspects of this scenario. Prior to and during the upcoming round of negotiations in Nairobi, it is imperative for the DRC and its stakeholders to carefully evaluate the integration of the many components of this initiative.

In light of the deteriorating security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), member nations of the East African Community (EAC) may reassess their strategies for attaining their stated objectives. Organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), inasmuch as they offer help, should maintain a state of alertness with regards to field reports and be prepared to curtail their aid in the case of intervention failure. The UN Security Council should exercise caution in appearing to support the operation, at least until it can have a proven track record that supports its positive impact. For almost thirty years, there have been recurring episodes of armed violence targeting people in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). While the concept of addressing this issue is praiseworthy, efforts to address it must exhibit practicality in order to justify additional examination and support (Nelleke, 2022).

The protracted conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is marked by the presence of numerous armed organizations, comprising both Congolese and foreign rebels. Additionally, neighboring nations have consistently intervened, ostensibly in their pursuit of the rebels (Stearns, 2012; Arieff, 2014). The

region has served as the origin of a multitude of armed factions, with over twenty of them emerging during the past twenty years. The Kivus, a region that has been recognized as the primary source of instability in the South-West Landlocked Region (SGLR), remains a major challenge to achieving security in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its surrounding nations (Banda, 2012; Stearns, 2012).

Over the past few decades, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), previously referred to as the Rwandan rebel forces, have exploited eastern Congo as a secure haven and carried out multiple assaults on people in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Ugandan insurgents, including the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU) and the Lord Resistance Army (LRA), were setting up bases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and carrying out brutal attacks on people. In addition, both the Burundian insurgent organization and the National Liberation Forces (FNL) were involved in activities within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Dagne, 2011; Stearns, 2012). The persistent activities of these foreign insurgency elements in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) persistently undermine regional stability.

The rebels in question are regarded as a significant threat to the national security of the governments of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Consequently, there has been a recurring pattern of direct or indirect intervention by the involved parties in the Congolese conflicts, ostensibly justified by the objective of chasing these rebel organizations. Throughout the Congolese wars, these states have played crucial roles and consistently contribute to the recurring patterns of instability and warfare in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A complex network of regional and

international parties has been involved in the Congolese conflicts due to their convoluted character (Stearns, 2012; Reyntjens, 2009; Cammaert, 2013). The conflict has extended beyond the confines of individual nations and currently covers the nations within the Southeast Gulf Cooperation Region (SGLR), a region characterized by a significant historical interdependence rooted in ethnic and colonial dynamics (Ewald, 2004). The conflict is deeply experienced and closely connected to the political and security matters of the SGLR states, in accordance with the concepts of Buzan's Security Complex.

Consequently, the countries in the region exemplify Buzan's Security Complex, as the security of these states has always been interconnected. Moreover, following the tenets of the Security Complex thesis, the SGLR states have traditionally exhibited a greater degree of hostility than harmony, hence complicating endeavors to achieve peace in the DRC. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its neighboring nations, Rwanda and Uganda, have maintained a deep-rooted hostility, even though Uganda is smaller in size (Arieff, 2014; Cammaert, 2013). Rwanda and Uganda continued to provide assistance to rebel groups as intermediaries and have been actively involved in the Congolese hostilities. The perpetuation of conflict cycles between the SGLR and the DRC can be attributed to the presence of mutual hatred. The presence of destabilization and antagonism among regional states poses a major hindrance to the success of MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Regional states have national security challenges due to the ongoing dangers provided by insurgent groups operating within the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Furthermore, there is a convergence of ethnicities along the boundary. As a result, the interests of various stakeholders in the Congolese wars are very intricate and

significant (Stearns, 2012; Reyntjens, 2009). Therefore, the aforementioned findings offer compelling evidence indicating that the regional security complex has played a significant role in the escalation and persistence of conflict cycles in both the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the relatively smaller Great Lakes Region. These challenges remain important to the achievement of MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Regional powers have a vested interest in exploiting and pillaging the Congolese natural wealth, which they may achieve through covert support to rebel factions or direct armed warfare, in addition to security concerns.

In February 2013, a framework for regional peace, security, and collaboration was formed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to address the conflict's important regional component, which goes beyond its boundaries alone. This resolution was approved with the aim of fostering neighborly trust and addressing the underlying causes of conflicts in the Congo. The framework facilitated by the United governments was adopted by eleven African governments. According to the established framework, it is recommended that political actors at the national level take the lead in implementing this comprehensive strategy, with the support of regional authorities (Cammaert, 2013).

The UN Security Council (UNSC) formally announced the deployment of the intervention brigade inside the MONUSCO on 28 March 2013, in adherence to the agreement reached at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in July 2012. Engaging in offensive operations against rebel groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a new and assertive strategy employed by United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKOs) since their establishment (Arieff, 2014; MONUSCO, 2014). The United Nations has highlighted

the regional nature of the Brigade and has urged regional political leaders to engage in further communication and demonstrate a shared dedication to resolving the ongoing cycle of instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This instability poses a threat to both their border and regional security.

Following the military victory of the intervention brigade against the M23 rebel group in 2013, there has been a notable improvement in the diplomatic ties between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighboring countries, Uganda and Rwanda. This development has led to certain progress in the endeavor to address persistent conflicts. Nevertheless, the level of confidence between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its neighboring countries remains fragile (MONUSCO, 2014). According to Reyntjens (2009), the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains plagued by persistent and recurring patterns of conflict. To ensure the successful restoration of peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), it is imperative for MONUSCO to address the regional security complex and disrupt the pattern of intervention in the war by neighboring states. MONUSCO lacks the authority to participate in hostilities against the militants.

The Chapter VII mandate imposes limitations on the utilization of force, limiting its application to the safeguarding of civilians who face immediate and imminent physical damage. MONUSCO has limited control over external regional actors in terms of stopping the supply and equipment delivery to rebel groups (Cammaert, 2013). Failure to address the financial, weaponry, and resource-based lifelines of rebel groups, both Congolese and foreign, who are financially and materially self-sufficient due to their control of mining regions, would require the severance of their financial, weaponry, and resource-based lifelines, as well as the resolution of the regional

security complex. The jurisdiction and capacities of MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) do not extend to the destruction of rebel organizations and the severance of their communication channels.

The type of intervention mechanisms is clearly determined by the interests of foreign parties, as mentioned in the previous section. According to Matanga (2018), the United Nations provides a definition of integration of peace and peace building models as a comprehensive set of measures aimed at enhancing national and conflict management capabilities, diminishing the probability of future hostilities, and laying the foundation for sustainable development and peace. Peacebuilding is crucial for effective conflict management in nations devastated by war. However, scattered efforts have consistently resulted in variable outcomes, as has been the case in the DRC for most of the past few decades. Currently, the primary focus of the EACRF's engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) revolves around peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, the participation of specific partner states in the wars for their own agendas may hinder regional initiatives.

2.3.4.1 Constraints on Regional Organizations Conflict Management

A more precise assessment of the conflict management capabilities of regional organizations can be achieved by taking into account their comparative advantage vis-à-vis international organizations (Chuka & Samuel, 2016). Despite their apparent enthusiasm and commitment to resolving regional conflicts, these groups still face situational constraints when faced with external threats to regional peace and the involvement of regional powers. The analysis often highlights the lack of cohesion among regional organizations in their efforts to counter their regional hegemons. Consequently, these organizations face significant challenges when it comes to

granting authorization for operations involving regional or global powers. Notably, these organizations typically face a dearth of essential resources and political clout to challenge these prevailing authorities.

The United States, as the dominant power, lives in the Western Hemisphere, where this unique issue continues to exist. One illustrative instance is to the Organization of American States (OAS)'s incapacity to effectively execute regional operations in the lack of endorsement from the United States. A similar scenario may be witnessed in the Asian region as a result of the existence of regional hegemons such as China and India. A comparable trend may be identified within the South African environment, namely in the southern region of the continent. The enduring presence of ethnic conflicts and fragile regimes throughout Africa gives rise to more constraints and incapacitations. The presence of these conflicts adds an extra layer of intricacy as a result of the significant externalities they produce. Historically, regional organizations have faced limitations in their ability to interfere in internal conflicts that extend beyond their own areas. The AU's hesitance to intervene in Darfur was demonstrated by its justification based on sovereignty. The primary determinant of the level of influence that regional organizations can play in conflict administration is the authority and mandate granted to them by their component members.

Chuka & Samuel (2016) have seen the increasing prevalence of regional organizations' engagement in conflict management, particularly in the context of international conflicts that encompass regional elements. The absence of engagement by international organizations like the United Nations (UN) in most conflicts has given regional bodies the authority to tackle neglected situations. However, the article focused on the skills and effectiveness of regional organizations in managing

conflicts, as well as the challenges they face in this area. However, the response offered by these organizations had a tendency towards overgeneralization, displaying limited consideration for the structural barriers that impede their capacity to effectively execute their mandate.

2.3.4.2 Dynamics and Challenges for UN Peacekeeping Operation in the Congolese State: Regional Security Complex in the Great Lake Region and its Challenges

The Great Lake Region (GLR) is comprised of seven countries located in the rift valley inside east and central Africa. These countries include Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda. On the other hand, the smaller Great Lake Region (SGLR) encompasses Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (Kivus). The central focus of the conversation revolves around the regional security complex and its potential hindrance to the establishment of UNPKO in the Congolese state. The concept of a "security complex" provides valuable insights into the complex dynamics of conflict inside the South China Sea and its surrounding regions. States within the SGLR are limited to a specific geographic zone and retain close proximity to each other, in accordance with the primary principle of the Security Complex.

The attainment of national security in these nations is intricately interconnected and cannot be accomplished in a vacuum. In view of the geopolitical dynamics, regional security complex, and pattern of state relations of the Congolese nations, it is necessary to evaluate the Congolese conflicts and impediments that hamper the efficacy of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).

The protracted conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is marked by the presence of numerous armed organizations, comprising both

Congolese and foreign rebels. Additionally, neighboring nations have consistently intervened, ostensibly in their pursuit of the rebels (Stearns, 2012; Arieff, 2014). The region has served as the origin of a multitude of armed factions, with over twenty of them emerging during the past twenty years. The Kivus, a region that has been recognized as the primary source of instability in the South-West Landlocked Region (SGLR), remains a major challenge to achieving security in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its surrounding nations (Banda, 2012; Stearns, 2012).

Over the past few decades, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), previously referred to as the Rwandan rebel forces, have exploited eastern Congo as a secure haven and carried out multiple assaults on people in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Ugandan insurgents, including the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU) and the Lord Resistance Army (LRA), were setting up bases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and carrying out brutal attacks on people. In addition, both the Burundian insurgent organization and the National Liberation Forces (FNL) were involved in activities within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Dagne, 2011; Stearns, 2012). The persistent activities of these foreign insurgency elements in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) persistently undermine regional stability.

The rebels in question are regarded as a significant threat to the national security of the governments of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Consequently, there has been a recurring pattern of direct or indirect intervention by the involved parties in the Congolese conflicts, ostensibly justified by the objective of chasing these rebel organizations. Throughout the Congolese wars, these states have played crucial roles

and consistently contribute to the recurring patterns of instability and warfare in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Congolese conflicts have experienced a notable escalation in complexity as a result of the participation of multiple interconnected regional and international players (Stearns, 2012). The conflict has extended beyond the confines of individual nations and currently covers the nations within the Southeast Gulf Cooperation Region (SGLR), a region characterized by a significant historical interdependence rooted in ethnic and colonial dynamics (Ewald, 2004). The conflict is deeply experienced and closely connected to the political and security matters of the SGLR states, in accordance with the concepts of Buzan's Security Complex. Consequently, the countries in the region exemplify Buzan's Security Complex, as the security of these states has always been interconnected.

2.3.4.3 Capability Challenges at the AU That Directly Affect the EACRF.

The efficient management of armed conflict necessitates a range of capabilities that extend beyond the technical resources commonly associated with peacekeeping operations and sanctions regimes. Moreover, it includes substantial political, administrative, and infrastructural elements. The discrepancies and lack of coherence in donor support can be largely attributed to a lack of clarity in assumptions, as demonstrated by Bachman (2012). Although all assumptions have the potential to be legitimate and no single assumption has complete authority over the others, each donor has the freedom to choose and select from the ASF components that best correspond with their national preferences or practices.

An illustration of this can be seen in the significant investments made by the United States and France in tactical military formation. Conversely, the French prioritize operational and tactical military formation, while Germany, Canada, and Italy

concentrate on police training. These investments are primarily directed towards nations or organizations that align with their immediate interests and preferences.

ASF faces a hardship due to the lack of financial, intellectual, and political ownership by its major members, who are also the recipients (Festus, 2008). The relationship exhibits a lack of clarity and, in its most severe form, represents a wasteful allocation of political influence, financial assets, and human resources. The absence of resolution of these concerns at the African Union (AU) level would suggest that the African Solidarity Fund (ASF) is a project that incorporates external influences, hence rendering it inappropriate to be categorized as a "African solution to African problems." This might potentially lead to an amplification of the influence on the regional security systems that provide its basis.

2.3.4.4 Responsibility to Protect

Onford (2009) emphasizes that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) strives to put a stop to serious and systematic breaches of human rights. The proposition entails authorizing non-consensual actions against a nation-state or its leaders on the grounds that such actions are necessary for humanitarian or protective objectives. In the past, safeguarding civilians who were being subjected to grievous human rights violations posed a significant challenge for intervening forces.

Nevertheless, larger nations ought not to engage in self-serving aggression against weaker ones. In accordance with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, the EACRF ought to be capable of fulfilling its mandate. Each state bore the principal obligation of safeguarding its own populace against atrocities such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The international community is additionally obligated to employ diplomatic, humanitarian, and other nonviolent

methods in support of population protection, as stated in Chapter VI of the Charter (Massingham, 2009). The international community may intervene when domestic authorities patently fail to protect their populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and when peaceful methods are insufficient. The obligation comprises three components: the obligation to preempt, the obligation to respond, and the obligation to reconstruct. Post-conflict reconstruction should be feasible for the intervening force under the aforementioned conditions (Onford, 2009). It is imperative that the peacebuilding process be executed with utmost diligence in order to restore stability to the nation. Military intervention for humanitarian objectives is an essential component—albeit a measure of last resort—of the obligation to respond.

The R2P is founded upon the principle that non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states is the most effective means of preserving international order. Nevertheless, this principle is called into question by the fact that it acknowledges that perpetually upholding sovereignty entails the potential for complicity in humanitarian catastrophes (Massingham, 2009). In other words, the R2P espouses a conception of sovereignty that prioritizes the ability to ensure protection over territorial dominance. According to Onford (2009), the principle serves to enhance human security as opposed to regime protection. Therefore, it is possible to impede despotic leaders who are perpetrating acts of terrorism against their subjects by invoking this principle. According to Weiss (2004), the R2P expands upon the three criteria of a sovereign state outlined in the Peace of Westphalia Treaty—territory, authority, and population—by adding a fourth component, namely respect for human rights.

With the proper authorization and good intentions, the force is capable of intervening to prevent additional human distress in the affected nation. Ensuring a reasonable probability of success is imperative to prevent the force from squandering both financial and human resources. In addition, any failed intervention by the EACRF could result in a loss of credibility. In the past, interventions have been executed in accordance with this principle. NATO initiated an intervention in Libya in 2011 with the objective of averting additional civilian casualties. It is imperative to recognize that the expression "responsibility to protect" establishes anticipations. The phrase should be avoided, according to Massingham (2009), especially by humanitarian organizations that lack the means or authority to provide actual protection.

The contemporary global order is predicated on the notion that independent nations possess the prerogative of non-intervention, which means they are entitled to be free from unwarranted external intervention in their domestic matters (Weil, 2001: 80). Subsequent humanitarian interventions, however, have repeatedly challenged the concept of sovereign immunity in 1991 in the name of safeguarding civilians. This human security perspective on the use of force, which is based on the notion that the foundation of a just and secure world lies in the rights of individuals rather than states, has been articulated in the notion that states are obligated to safeguard civilians within their territory.

2.4 Empirical Review

2.4.1 The Role, Structure, and Objectives of EACRF in the Management of DRC's Intractable Conflict

In their study titled "Navigating the Transition Tightrope" Kamais et al. (2023) examined the national security threats experienced by Kenya in the wake of the withdrawal of its Defence Forces from African Union Mission in Somalia

(AMISOM). This study is important in order to understand the role of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) in the management of intractable conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The DRC setting is then drawn parallel to pre Peace Support Operations, where troop withdrawals can perpetuate instability in the region. Their report finds that in turn, weak local security forces paired with insufficient funding to support transitions, damage national security in ways that work hand in hand with the EACRF's aim to stabilize conflict affected areas in the DRC.

The study recommends taking proactive measures to avoid threats through strengthening border security, socio-economic development which is concomitant with the EACRF being an organization facilitating protection of civilians and support local governance. Finally, the research concluded that a coordinated regional approach to conflict management is essential to the effectiveness of the EACRF as a mediator in so many complex security problems in the DRC.

The African Union Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) has been one of the African Union's rallying contributors to peace and security, stabilizing the country and fighting the Al-Shabaab insurgency. According to Cilliers (2018), the mission is successful via a wide-ranging comprehensive strategy employing military operations, political dialogue and the building of local security force capacity. At times AMISOM has been hampered by coordination issues and lack of resources. This implies that the EACRF should connect its peace initiatives to DRCs politics and context. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has advocated for mediation by regional entities of internal conflicts such as the case of South Sudan. Unlike these military campaigns, Donais and Solomon (2022) show that IGAD made these peace

agreements fall short of active hostilities levels, but more steady. This perspective, however, focuses mainly on how IGAD harnesses regional clout to function as an important tool in its arsenal. This is particularly for the EACRF, given its efforts to present a united face of East African states in response to the presence of Congo in the region.

Through EUFOR in Bosnia, intervention by the European Union provides an example of a comprehensive approach towards resolution of conflict. The EUFOR mandate included institutional reforms and rule of law initiatives alongside military support, and as Brandt et al. (2022) attest, these initiatives were crucial in peace consolidation. The multi-dimensional approach is a model for the EACRF that suggests that this sort of integration of development efforts with military operations is necessary in the DRC context. Kosovo is a case study of NATO's successful military engagement. Allan (2020) highlights how NATO's operations not only stopped ethnic cleansing but also set an environment for peace to begin by providing a secure environment for civil missions. This explains why the success has been enjoyed by NATO through the clear objectives and good command structure and because the EACRF must have well-defined operational goals and work closely with the international partners allowing the control of DRC conflict.

The involvement of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Yemen illuminates some of the more complex aspects of regional military and diplomatic interventions. As noted by Hoetjes (2021), GCC countries' initial unity in reply to the Houthi insurgency ultimately split, stifling their military campaign against it. This experience illustrates some of the obstacles that the EACRF is confronted with to secure

consensus among member states on how to effectively tackle the complex conflict dynamics in the DRC.

The Organization of American States (OAS) has been important to Colombia's peacebuilding efforts through monitoring ceasefire agreements and providing support for disarmament programs. The long term engagement of the OAS and local expertise have also made a major contribution to the sustainability of the peace process (Lee, 2013). This points to the lesson positing that when it comes to managing the DRC conflict, regional bodies can be effective peacebuilders as long as they maintain commitment and continue to mobilize grassroots organizations.

2.4.2 Root Causes, Types, and Extent of DRC's Intractable Intra-State Conflict

Mineral wealth is deeply rooted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) conflict. It fuels warlordism, militia groups, and systemic corruption. Mawejje and McSharry (2021) draw attention to the fact that the competition for control over lucrative goods, such as coltan, diamonds, and gold, feed violence among different armed groups. Competition over these resources intensifies local grievances and sustains cycles of conflict, according to their study. This conflict pattern is also repeated in the DRC as was in the case during Sierra Leone's civil war, where 'blood' diamonds were vital for sustaining violence (Mawejje and McSharry 2021).

Secondly, conflict has persisted in the DRC largely due to ethnic divisions within the country. Historical animosities are intensified by colonial legacies and discriminatory policies, as alluded by Moe and Geis (2020). These appear to perpetuate localized violence in the Kivu provinces. The ethnic tensions often turn up in land dispute, and contestation for political representation. Unresolved ethnic grievances and exclusionary politics can produce long-term, protracted intra state conflicts according

to Gligorov (2019) as comparative analysis with such conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia suggests. A critical factor in prolonging the conflict in the DRC is its weak governance structures. The Centre for Preventive Action (2024) found that the state's limited capacity to provide security and essential services has allowed armed groups to fill a power vacuum. The study shows that the fragmentation of authority in the country is enabled by the absence of an effective central government, which allows militias to operate with impunity. This has been seen in similar cases in Somalia and Afghanistan, where weak state institutions bring about protracted internal conflicts (Moe & Geis, 2020).

The DRC's conflict has also been sustained by the involvement of neighboring countries. Mulindwa (2020) explores intervention by regional actors, particularly Rwanda and Uganda, who engage directly and support the proxy militias in furtherance of strategic interests. Such complicated peace processes make it doubly challenging to resolve conflict, as it now introduces another set of conflict drivers to the equation. This is analogous to Syria and Libya, where the external meddling of regional powers has made the conflicts all the more intractable (Pollat, 2022).

The country's protracted conflict is closely connected with widespread poverty and unemployment forcing young men into armed groups. Ngendahimana (2023) also observes how socio-economic deprivation combined with illegal mining and looting promises make it seem appealing to participate in violence. Similar to Darfur context, Sudan's economic dimension reflects other impoverished regions where poverty and marginalization resulted in armed rebellions (Donais & Solomon, 2022).

Ultimately, sexual violence as a tactic in the DRC conflict has devastating impacts on communities. According to Parker (2024), sexual violence not only terrorizes populations, it also disrupts social structures. The study finds that such violence compounds the humanitarian crisis and perpetuates retaliatory cycles. It is not an isolated case in the DRC and is similar to other cases such as Bosnias of the 1990s and Myanmar's Rohingya crisis (Bhaumik, 2017).

2.4.3 The dynamics and challenges in management of DRCs intractable intra-state conflict by EACRF

Despite its efforts to manage the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) faces serious coordination difficulties. This is typical of multinational operations like the NATO led International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan illustrates. According to Berni and Hochuli (2024), it was difficult for ISAF to coordinate its different military units of diverse countries with different military doctrines and rule of engagement. The situation is similar to the EACRF's dilemma: diverse East African countries need to get their military approaches, strategies and objectives to fall in line for a unified response. Preventing operational fragmentation is necessary to prevent ineffective peacekeeping based on effective coordination.

However, peacekeeping operations in large, resource constrained environments such as the DRC suffer logistical challenges that limit effective conflict management. Like with Myhill (2011), Makdisi (2014) discusses logistical and financial constraints similar to those encountered by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Regardless of the scenario, poor infrastructure and rough terrain make troop deployment, resupply, and mobility difficult. Therefore, like UNIFIL, the EACRF must address these logistical challenges to keep its force as capable as

possible in responding to shifting conflict dynamics in an economical manner over wide areas.

The DRC conflict is characterized in the EACRF along with many other armed groups due to the involvement of diverse groups with a multitude of motivations. The local sectarian militias' dynamics with which Parry and Vogel (2023) noted, made the operations of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) very complicated to govern. For foreign interventions in Iraq, they had to choose between military actions and local peace building interventions that respond to certain grievances. Like UNAMI, EACRF has no choice but to adapt its strategies to contextualize with the local locations of DRC where issues can blow up into larger fights without mediation and community engagements.

The participation of other countries is important for success, especially in peace missions. For instance, the contributing states to the European Union Force (EUFOR) mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina let them down with existing levels of political will (Palm, 2017). One should not predict stability regarding national interest and political changes that can disrupt mission cohesion and undermine the effectiveness of the mission in tackling the DRC conflict. The mission's ability to enforce peace agreements and stabilize conflict zones may be hampered by lack of unified political backing.

The task for EACRF entails safeguarding civilians in a conflict instance replete with entrenched human rights abuses. In Gaza Strip, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East (UNRWA) also faced a similar problem. According to Tayeh (2022), peacekeepers had to deal with the additional problem of ensuring civilian safety within a context of active hostilities, comprising

the weigh between humanitarian protection and military objectives. Efforts undertaken by EACRF within DRC must continue to prevent such atrocities committed by state as well as non state actors to the civilian protection and foster trust in the people, and sustain the legitimacy of EACRF.

To operate efficiently, a balance between military action and political reconciliation is needed. Raik et al. (2024) suggest that the involvement of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Ukraine is exemplary. The OSCE has used its military in monitoring so as to complement the diplomatic push to end the conflict politically in Ukraine. Like the EACRF's strategy in East Africa, it has to tackle the root cause of the conflict, namely political exclusion and economic marginalization, and have to be expanded beyond the disarmament to include the political engagement of all stakeholders towards the building of long term stability.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

This research is informed by three theoretical frameworks, specifically the conflict transformation theory, power theory and New functionalism theory in order to examine the involvement of the EACRF in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

2.5.1 Conflict Transformation Theory

According to Lederach (1995b), a prominent advocate of the conflict transformation concept, this theoretical notion "arose from the need for a suitable language to describe the endeavor of peacemaking," with references to Curle (1990), Kriesberg (1989), and Rupesinghe (1994). This furnishes a crucial theoretical framework that directs the investigation in order to assess the role of EACRF in the Congo conflict

resolution process spanning the years 1998 to 2023 and to derive insights from this endeavor. Additionally, the theory will facilitate an examination of the involvement of additional regional actors in this conflict. Internal conflicts and the multidimensional nature of protracted social conflicts are emphasized in the theory. A multisectoral approach is suggested as a solution to the intricate nature of numerous ongoing and emergent conflicts.

The theory comprises various elements, such as the pre-negotiation stage, comprehension of underlying causes, process ownership, identification of all actors and facilitators, establishment of a practical timeline, effort sustainability, evaluation of success and failure, strategic constituencies, the involvement of external peacemakers, and the involvement of local peacemakers (1995).

The researcher focused on the eleven conflict resolution elements that were mentioned. In relation to process ownership, the researcher shall assess the degree of ownership exhibited by different political parties or groups in Congo during the peace process. Failure and success will be evaluated in light of empirical data. The research assessed the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of EACRF's participation by analyzing existing literature and qualitative empirical data that the investigator will gather.

The strengths of this theory is that it goes beyond conflict management and identifies root causes of the conflict where party interests, needs of different stakeholders are known. In this case, underlying issues are resolved so that the conflict does not keep on recurring in future. Nevertheless, this theory disregards the significance of power or statecraft in the process of conflict transformation. In numerous respects, the element of power is crucial when political will to resolve conflict exists. Following this, the theory of power addresses this weakness. In the DRC case, state power

largely is critical in enabling cooperation and pulling together resources necessary in resolving the conflict.

2.5.2 Power Theory

Waltz (1979) and Morgenthau (1967) are two proponents of power theory. In a broad sense, power can be defined as the capacity to exert influence over others, even when they resist. This enables a potent state 'A' to compel state 'B' to comply with its demands and to prevent state 'B' from retaliating against her. The classical power theory posits that in pursuit of their own interests, nations invariably strive to optimize their power.

This results in an environment of unrestricted competition, which can occasionally escalate into armed conflict. In essence, power theory offers an epistemological framework for understanding the dynamics of inter-state relations that are characterized by the application or threat of force. The ability to exert control over external affairs permits a nation-state to pursue its objectives through any means required. The pursuit of power, according to classical realists, is the result of a confluence of factors: the rational and self-interested nature of human nature; and historical circumstances that have established international anarchy as the prevailing state of affairs among nations. Human nature is constrained in society by the law and its enforcement by the government; since there is no "world government," the authority of other nations is the only way to restrain nations. Realists, one of the schools of thought that espouse the power theory, employ power as a methodological instrument to scrutinize the realm of international politics. As a consequence of the superior nation's ability to subdue the inferior, every state's objective is to attain, maintain, or augment its power.

In addition, power theory asserts that the likelihood of conflict between a dominant and a weaker state is extremely remote. The challenger state would be rendered powerless to counteract the discontent of the dominant state due to its inability to do so. Although states pursue diverse objectives, they must possess the capability to accomplish those objectives regardless of the means by which they pursue them. However, the means and purposes of achieving a balance between the objectives of states are exceedingly uncommon. However, this does not preclude the possibility that power is primarily concerned with what a nation is capable of accomplishing and what it can hinder another nation from accomplishing. Despite the increasing prominence of irregular warfare and terrorism, the fundamental nature of conflicting interests and wills in the international arena continues to endure. Furthermore, it posits that since the sovereign state occupies a central position within the state system, power is the primary and most fundamental prerequisite for any state to maintain its independence. Consequently, it follows that regardless of the magnitude of a state's power, it must possess a sufficient quantity to repel potential threats in order to maintain its independence. A multitude of strategies are implemented to achieve independence, including the mobilization of sufficient power and the construction of alliances among states with shared interests in order to repel aggression.

Within the realm of power politics analysis, four distinct factors are recognized as remaining constant: In order for a demonstration of power to be tangible, it is necessary for there to be a divergence of opinions or concerns regarding values or interests between two or more states, or among groups of states. State A fundamentally perceives state B as acting in opposition to state A's interests. A display of power may result from the protection of interests under such conditions. Compliance-power is established upon a state's capability to compel other states to

comply with its own interests. The less powerful state would be compelled to concur with the demands of the more powerful state if it could employ superior force.

The potential for grievous deprivations to result from invoking sanctions suggests that a weak state would incur a greater cost by failing to comply with the demands of a more powerful state, as opposed to complying. State B, which is threatened, considers the sanction threat of state A, which is superior, to be credible and tangible. Violent divergences can lead to the use of force; the invocation of force signifies an inability to achieve desired outcomes through the prospect of retribution. Nonetheless, force may not be sufficient to ensure the achievement of these goals.

In addition to intangible assets, power can be assessed through the possession of tangible capabilities or assets. The quantification of the tangible assets can be achieved in an objective manner. For instance, population, economy, army size, and so forth. Although such quantification may lack precise measurements, it may be difficult to determine whether state 'A' is more formidable than state 'B', notwithstanding the potential for quantification.

Power encompasses additional intangible aspects that are similarly challenging to quantify or assess. These intangible assets might be valuable for evaluating power at the level of non-military assessment of power determinants. Power can also take on a relational nature. Two states have relational power when there are acceptable indices or standards for measuring power. Nigeria's military might be considered more formidable than Togo's, according to economic indicators compiled by international organizations. Moreover, Nigeria's economy is more robust. A similar argument can be made regarding the comparison between Nigeria and the United States of America,

in which Nigeria is portrayed as a weak nation. As a consequence of this, power is considered to be relational.

Power may be perceived to a considerable extent through a psychological lens. Because a nation's strength may be substantially influenced by how other nations perceive it, this is the case. An essential method for investigating this possibility is through the exhibition of power that nations customarily demonstrate at each available occasion. They contribute to the promotion of peace in regions prone to conflict through the deployment of military contingents. At times, the very essence of these activities consists of influencing others' perceptions regarding their military prowess.

The strength of the theory is that power is a resource in fostering cooperation among states even in regional organization. Without power it is difficult to make things happen and that's why diplomacy and panel of the wise are part of statecraft elements in getting parties to negotiate. However, the theory's deficiency lies in its failure to acknowledge the constraint of state power and the criticality of sub-regional cooperation in resolving complex conflicts, such as the one in the DRC Congo. Power is a deterrent when applied with selfish interests since competition and state rivalry undermines cooperation. This the case with DRC conflict where Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda have continued advancing their interest thus undermining the collective effort of EACRF. The following section presents Neo-functionalism, a theoretical framework that emphasizes the significance of collaboration.

2.5.3 Neo-Functionalism Theory

American scholars, in the mid-1950s, initiated the development of neo-functionalism with the intention of theorizing the emerging modes of regional cooperation that

emerged in the aftermath of World War II. This approach places greater emphasis on the process as opposed to the final outcomes. This approach includes terms such as "spill-over," "spill-back," and so forth. Prominent proponents of neo-functional theory consist of Ernest B. Haas and J.S. Nye. According to Haas, the entirety of politics entails allegiances, anticipations, and political engagements with a novel center whose institutions request or exercise authority over an extant national state.

As an ultimate result of this political integration process, a novel political community emerges, superimposing itself upon the pre-existing ones. Haas (1964) elaborated on the dynamic among political actors, stating that once the integration process has commenced, member states are willing to cede some autonomy by delegating certain responsibilities to the supranational level.

The theory posits that the concept of integration in one domain may serve as a catalyst for integration in another, thereby instigating a domino effect by virtue of its practicality in specific domains. Explanation of this is sufficiently provided by the spill-over effect. Furthermore, this theory is noteworthy for its ability to influence the elite to embrace the concept, which will result in them assuming a pivotal role in disseminating the idea to the general populace and, more significantly, in fostering an expansion of integration. Through the gradual implementation of policies that reorient allegiance to a new center, neo-functionalism facilitates the formation of supranational regional organizations; furthermore, the feedback loop between the newly formed center and society will be strengthened, whereas the one between the state and society will be weakened.

This demonstrates that two types of spill-over exist: a. Functional spill-over: Functional spill-over occurs when integration occurs in specific policy domains,

inspiring or initiating the development of a new policy in unrelated domains. b. Political spill-over refers to the establishment of supranational organizations voluntarily in order to provide specific advantageous outcomes. This theory is pertinent because it acknowledges the significance of supranational structures in addressing intrastate conflicts such as the one in the DRC. According to this hypothesis, the EACRF is a regional force capable of establishing peace in the DRC under specific conditions.

Linkages may be established during the spill-over process due to external influences and competition among political elites vying for attention in the newly formed center. However, it is alarming to consider that if caution is not exercised, a backfire effect known as "spill-back" may occur.

While the majority of integration theories are considered normative, neo-functionalism distinguishes itself by primarily employing empirical data to elucidate and depict the integration process. Under this theory, integration-promoting strategies were also examined, and the significance of actors functioning as agents of socialisation was emphasized, given their critical function in facilitating interactions between states and groups within each state. This also constitutes a critique of a theory that is considered excessively elitist. Furthermore, the neo-functionalist's presumption regarding the potential for a shift in focus and allegiance towards a novel center, which typically results in the establishment of a fresh political community, is purportedly flawed.

The strength of the theory is that it pulls resources of a region to effectively handle issues such as perennial conflicts. Since the theory focuses on common interests of the states involved it promotes cooperation and builds structures on which to achieve the

objectives. Further, spillover effects can be realized when cooperation permeate into other areas such as security, environment among others. The weakness of this theory is the assumption that states willingly donate their power to a regional entity like EAC. Hegemonic tendencies, power rivalry continue to play out even in regional institutions. This can be seen in EACRF where Rwanda, Uganda have continued interfering in DRC internal affairs by supporting armed groups. Further, the spillover effects sometimes do not take place as states maintain identity and continue to pursue national interests within regional organization which undermines collective resolve. This the state of affairs in DRC conflict where state interests have contributed to the conflict making it difficult to get a lasting resolution. This weakness is covered by conflict transformation theory when common interest brings in cooperation however difficult.

2.5.4 Conceptual Framework Model




Figure 2.1: Conceptual Model Showing the Relationship Between Variables

Source: Researcher, 2023

2.6 Chapter Summary

According to the literature review, specific roles and structures are necessary for regional forces to intervene effectively in intrastate conflicts. As an illustration, NATO's achievements in Iraq and other conflicts can be attributed to its tremendous operational, technical, and resource capabilities. Furthermore, while NATO's binding

interests as a regional force have been effective in the past, the competing interests of partner states continue to be the greatest obstacle to resolving intrastate conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Intra-state conflicts have occurred on the African continent, including in Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and the DRC. To contain intrastate conflicts, the ASF and sub-regional Standby Force were conceptualized in terms of organization. Nevertheless, sub-regional sets have become completely operational, and these spaces have been occupied by amorphous units such as EACRF. In the DRC, where a multitude of other blocs and actors are also active, EACRF has established a presence. The subsequent overleaf contains the methodology chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The chapter provides the operational framework within which data were collected and analyzed. It further looks at research design, study area, target population, the sample size and the ethical consideration.

3.1 Research Design

In order to attain and ensure the valid research results, the study adopted two research designs- descriptive survey and historical longitudinal research designs. These two were triangulated to achieve valid research results. Historical research design was used to collect, verify as well as synthesize past evidence with regards to intervention in the Management of Democratic Republic of Congo's Intractable Intra-State Conflict. Specifically, the historical longitudinal research design was adopted for this study. The design was used to gather primary data from EACRF personnel, local authorities, and affected populations. It also used documentary evidence, official records as well as reports among other historical sources of data to interrogate the research problem. This design was particular used in the second specific objective of the study.

On the descriptive design, the descriptive survey design was employed. As a design for this study, it was used to gather quantitative and qualitative data from the target population of the study especially those attached with EACRF. The design also enabled the researcher to use statistical techniques to identify distribution and patterns with regards to the research question under study. In combination, the study triangulated the two designs to in an effort to achieve valid research results. In particular, a convergent parallel mixed method research descriptive design was used. As a method, it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and

qualitative data in a single study or series of studies. Its central premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches, in combination, provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone (Demir & Pismek, 2018). The research process can be symbolized as qualitative and quantitative (QUAL+QUAN). A convergent parallel design entails that the researcher concurrently conducts the quantitative and qualitative elements in the same phase of the research process, weighs the methods equally, analyzes the two components independently, and interprets the results together (Creswell & Pablo-Clark, 2011). The research design; collects and analyzes both quantitative and qualitative data; mixes two forms of data in different ways and gives priority to both forms of data. In addition, it increases validity of research results and helps to best understand and develop a more complete understanding of the research problem by obtaining different but complementary data. The purpose of this form of research design is that both qualitative and quantitative research, in combination, provide a better understanding of a research problem or issue than either research approach alone.

It is important to point out that, the three specific objectives of the current study to a large extent met the minimum threshold required the adoption of a convergent parallel mixed method design. The design utilized mixed methods under both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The design was suitable for this study since it involved measurement of variables about the Dynamics of East African Community Regional Force's Intervention in the Management of Democratic Republic of Congo's Intractable Intra-State Conflict. The primary aim of this study was to examine the endeavors of sub-regional mechanisms in Eastern Africa concerning matters of peace and security, as well as the obstacles they encountered in their endeavor to harmonize their efforts. Such coordination is critical for the successful implementation of a

regional collective security strategy. These are summarized in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Table Showing Summary of Research Design Adopted the Study and the Measurable Variables

Objective	Research Design(s)	Measurable variables
Examine the Role, Structure, and Objectives of EACRF in Management of DRC's Intractable Conflict	Descriptive Survey Historical longitudinal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EACRF alignment of goals with local community needs • Clarity of EACRF strategic goals in the conflicts • Frequency of engagement of EACRF with community members • Perception of EACRF operational efficiency
Assess the Root Causes, Types, and Extent of DRC's Intractable Intra-State Conflict	Historical longitudinal Descriptive survey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Historical, political, socio-economic factors • Type, intensity and geographical spread of conflicts • Impact indicators such as displacements, human right abuses
Evaluate the Dynamics and Challenges in Management of DRC's Intractable Intra-State Conflict by EACRF	Descriptive survey Historical longitudinal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changes in EACRF strategies • Inter-agency coordination/Rivalry • Logistical, operational, political environment and security challenges

Source: Researcher (2023)

3.2 Study Area

The study was conducted in DRC - Goma region of eastern DRC, which is home to military barracks. Stabilizing the situation in order to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance was the EACRF's mandate. It establishes secure passageways for the non-combatants comprising the force. Internal displacement, enlistment and conscription of child soldiers, murder, attacks on civilians, rape, sexual slavery, mutilation, and forcible population transfers have all resulted from the conflict in eastern DR Congo, particularly in the Ituri region and the provinces of North and South Kivu. This also encompasses human rights concerns, as the Democratic Republic of the Congo is plagued by grave violence, including summary executions,

abductions, and killings of noncombatants, including civilians, that are predominantly carried out by the M23 and the Kamuina Nsapu militia, especially in the Kasai provinces. Despite the implementation of several interventions, these atrocities persist, thus demanding an inquiry into the Congolese intrastate conflict. The selection of this research site is motivated by the fact that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has endured protracted conflicts with regional repercussions since its independence, distinguishing it from other intrastate conflicts observed in the region. Figure 3.1 depicts a map of the DRC and its neighboring countries.




Figure 3.1: Map of the DRC
Source: MMUST GIS Expert (2023)

3.3 Target Population

The focus of this research was on the following individuals: the EAC Director of Coordinating Mechanism (1), chiefs of staff committee members (7) from all seven EAC member states, military attachés (7) in the Goma Region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 235 ground personnel of the EACRF, 13 local administrative officers. Additionally, the study targeted 10 community based organizations (CBOs), 8 IDP self-help groups, 13 refugee self-help groups and 3 head of militia groups. The target population is detailed in Table 3.2 that follows.

Table 3. 2: Target Population

Category	Sample Frame
EACRF Director of Coordinating Mechanism (KII)	1
EACRF, Chiefs of Defense Committee (KII)	7
EACRF ground personnel in Goma	235
Local population in Goma (Community based organizations)	10
Local authority in Goma (Chiefs and their assistants)	13
IDPs self-help groups (Goma camp)	8
Congolese Refugee groups in Nyamagabe in Rwanda, Kyangwali in Uganda , NBI in Kenya	13
Military Attaché, High Commission in the EAC member countries	7
Heads of Rebel/militia groups	3
Total	297

Source: Researcher, 2023

3.3 Sample Size and Sampling Techniques

This study relied heavily on qualitative sampling methods, such as snowball and purposive sampling. The sampling techniques that have been mentioned are suitable for this study due to the modest size of the sample. A sample is a representative subset of a population. A sample size refers to a limited subset of a statistical population that is examined in order to obtain insights about the entire population

(Webster, 1985). Furthermore, according to Best & Khan (2001), a sample size ranging from 10% to 30% of the population is deemed sufficient for a comprehensive or detailed study. Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009) contend that a ten percent to thirty percent acceptable margin is for descriptive research, but that a larger sample size is preferable. Table 3.3 provides summaries of the sample and profiles of the respondents.

Table 3.3: Sample Size Determination Techniques

Category	Sample Frame	Sampling Technique	Sample Size
EACRF Director of Coordinating Mechanism (KII)	1	Purposive	1
EACRF, Chiefs of Defense Committee (KII)	7	Purposive (Best and Khan (2001) 30 – 50%	4
EACRF ground personnel (Questionnaire survey)	235	Simple Radom (Krejcie & Morgan) Table 1979 Confidence level of 95% and margin of error 5%.	152
Local population in Goma (Community based organizations) (FGD)	10	Purposive (Best and Khan (2001) 30 – 50%	4
Local authority in Goma (Chiefs and their assistants) (KII)	13	Purposive (Best and Khan (2001) 30 – 50%	6
IDPs (Goma camp) (FGD)	8	Purposive (Best and Khan (2001) 30 – 50%	2
Congolese refugees groups in Nyamagabe in Rwanada, Kyangwali in Uganda , NBI in Kenya (FGD)	13	Purposive (Best and Khan (2001) 30 – 50%	4
Military Attaché, High Commission in EAC member Countries (KII)	7	Purposive (Best and Khan (2001) 30 – 50%	3
Heads of Rebel/militia groups (KII)	3	Purposive (Best and Khan (2001) 30 – 50%	1
Total	297		177

Source: Researcher, 2023

The study sample therefore comprised EAC Director of Coordinating Mechanism (1), EAC Chiefs of Defense Committee (4), EACRAF ground personnel (152),

Community based organizations in Goma representing the community (4), Local authority in Goma including Chiefs and their assistants (6), IDPs Self-help groups in Goma camp (2), Refugees self-help groups in Nyamagabe in Rwanda, Kyangwali in Uganda, Nairobi in Kenya (4), Military Attachés at the High Commission (3) and 1 rebel head of a militia group. The sample size for this study was 177 respondents.

3.5 Data Collection

The researcher gathered both primary and secondary data with the goal of answering the study questions. Primary data was obtained through the administration of questionnaires and interview schedules. Secondary data was obtained by reviewing relevant literature pertaining to the EAC regional force. Journals, books, and other scholarly publications were consulted in order to obtain secondary data.

3.5.1 Questionnaire Surveys

The data utilized in this study was gathered via means of individually administered questionnaires in order to obtain the requisite information. Vigilance and regulation were implemented to guarantee the return of every questionnaire that was distributed to the participants. A total of 152 questionnaires were disseminated to the EACRF ground personnel in Goma. Participants were invited to complete the questionnaire online via Google Forms or through a drop-and-pick-later system. There was a combination of open-ended and closed-ended questions, with some closed-ended inquiries requiring respondents to select the appropriate options (Appendix II).

3.5.2 Key Informant Interview Guides

The interview schedule was regarded as a primary instrument utilized in the process of gathering data. Interviews were conducted in person by the researcher with personnel affiliated with chiefs of defense/in charge-7. The interview schedule comprised pre-established inquiries that were employed by the researcher to elicit

information from the participants. Preceding the interviews, the researcher scheduled appointments with the participants so that they might have sufficient time to sufficiently prepare. Each interview session lasted approximately twenty minutes, and the data gathered was documented in the form of notes to ensure the integrity of the reports (Appendix III).

3.5.3. Focus Group Discussion Guide

The participants of the concentrated group discussion were those impacted by the intrastate conflict in the DRC. This methodology was employed to investigate diverse facets of war's repercussions, including displacement, loss of life, property, and family. The parties were assigned specific topics for discussion. Participants in this initiative comprised exiles and internally displaced persons from Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda. A total of 10 Focused Group Discussion groups were assembled targeting the community based organizations, IDP and refugee groups. Each FGD comprised of 7-12 participants. The participants were convened in order to partake in a structured dialogue regarding the specified subjects. Each cohort received one to two hours of the researcher's time. The researcher presided over the taped discussions, which were transcribed subsequent to being recorded with the participants' consent (Appendix V).

3.6 Data Collection Procedure

The questionnaire was individually administered to all the selected respondents by the researcher. The questionnaires were designed in such a way that the identical questions were presented to all respondents in the same manner, with the same wording and sequence. Due to the difficulty of questionnaire administration, the researcher assembled a team of five research assistants to assist in the face-to-face interview-based administration of the questionnaire to the EACRF executors. To ensure a substantial rate of response, the survey was distributed to the executors by

the team during business hours. Personal visits and phone calls and emails were utilized as a follow-up.

3.7 Validity and Reliability of Research Instruments

This section presents the methodology used to validate and confirm the reliability of data collection instruments.

3.7.1 Validity of Research Instruments

Validity is the degree to which results obtained from analysis of data actually represents the phenomenon under study (Best & Khan, 1993). It is the accuracy and meaningfulness of inferences, which are based on the research results. Validity refers to the agreement between the value of a measurement and its true value. According to Mugenda (2008), the validity of a research is concerned with the extent to which that data measures what it is supposed to measure.

To test the validity of the research instruments, the questionnaire was presented to other researchers, peers and the research Supervisors at MMUST for cross checking and to assess the reliance of the content. Precisely, reliability entailed a critical evaluation of the items in terms of content and construct validity. Content validity sought to test whether the test covered a representative sample of the domain to be measured in the study. Construct validity on the other hand sought to establish how well this study would measure up to its claims. It sought to ensure that this study would only measure aspects related to Dynamics of East African Community Regional Force's Intervention in the Management of Democratic Republic of Congo's Intractable Intra-State Conflict.

Content Validity Index (CVI) was used to calculate the statistical proof of all the research tools. The following formula was used for questionnaires and interview

schedules.

$$CVI = \frac{n}{N} = CVI = \frac{18.5}{20} = 0.92$$

Where;

n = the number of items declared valid

N = total number of items

A CVI above 0.7 according to Polit *et al.*, (2001), then the instrument is regarded to be valid.

3.7.2 Reliability of Research Instruments

Reliability refers to the consistency of a measure while the extent to which results derived from the analysis of the data accurately represent the phenomenon is referred to as validity. To ensure reliability of data collection instruments, professionals from the department of peace and conflict were involved. The supervisors also checked the tools and advised accordingly, making sure that the instruments could sufficiently answer the research questions. Thus, the tools were reliable.

The questionnaire was subjected to a split half reliability test. The full questionnaire was subjected to subject matter experts at the DoD of defense headquarters in Nairobi. 10-30% of the questionnaires were subjected for a pilot study. This population category was purposively picked from the unit in charge of the EACRF deployment and therefore had knowledge of the issue under study. To demonstrate reliability, the questionnaire items were split into two and administered to 15 respondents at the DoD. The first and second half each had 10 questionnaire items that were subjected to the test. The first half comprised questions 1-10 while the second half comprised questions 11-20.

The researcher used the Pearson's correlation coefficient to determine the score of the

two halves as indicated in the equation.

$$\text{Reliability} = \frac{2 \times \tau}{1 + \tau} \quad \text{Substitute} \quad \tau \text{ with } = 0.7$$

$$\text{Reliability} = \frac{2 \times 0.7}{1 + 0.7} = \frac{1.4}{1.7} = 0.82$$

To estimate the reliability of the full questionnaire, the Spearman-Brown formula was applied, yielding an adjusted reliability coefficient of approximately 0.82. This high reliability coefficient suggests that the questionnaire possessed good internal consistency, affirming that the items measure the intended construct consistently across the sample.

3.8 Data Analysis

The questionnaires underwent a preliminary coding and editing process prior to the initiation of any analysis. Qualitative and quantitative data were utilized in order to maintain objectivity. Analyses of quantitative data were conducted utilizing descriptive statistics, including percentages and frequencies. Version 28 of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was utilized to conduct the analysis. The findings were visually represented through the use of tables, pie charts, photographs, and graphs. Qualitative data were analyzed through content analysis, which involved an examination of aspects of the information gathered through open-ended queries, interviews, and observation. Baulcomb (2003) asserts that content analysis achieves valid and replicable inferences regarding the context of data through the use of a set of categorizations. The information was presented in various graphical and pie chart formats, tables, narratives, and verbatim.

3.9 Limitations and Delimitation

There were various constraints that hindered the achievement of the study's aim and

research objectives. A subset of participants conveyed ambiguity concerning the research's objectives under certain conditions, citing the sensitivity of the subject matter concerning internal armed conflict as a potential source of inaccurate information that could compromise the precision of the data collected. The researcher successfully circumvented this restriction by assuring the participants that the research was strictly academic, that their information would be handled with utmost confidentiality, that their identities would remain anonymous, and that the study would be verified using existing secondary data. Furthermore, secondary data were incorporated as a supplement to the primary data.

3.10 Ethical Considerations

Creswell (2013) emphasizes the significance of proactively identifying and addressing ethical concerns that may arise throughout a research investigation, as well as integrating sound research practices. As defined by Donald and Theresa (2013), ethics consists of standards that regulate human behavior and exert a substantial influence on the well-being of individuals. Norms and standards of conduct that govern moral decision-making regarding our conduct and interactions with others constitute ethics. Ensuring that research activities do not cause injury or adverse effects to individuals is the fundamental objective of research ethics (Cooper & Schindler, 2003). Prior to commencing data collection, the researcher obtained a research permit from NACOSTI and a letter of authorization to conduct research from Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology.

In accordance with the principle of voluntary assent, the researcher enabled participants to engage in the research of their own accord. The researcher took precautions to avoid violating non-disclosure agreements, breaching the

confidentiality of respondents, misrepresenting results, or deceiving individuals while conducting this study. Following data collection, the researcher conducted a thorough analysis and presented the findings without any manipulation of the results.

3.11 Chapter Summary

This chapter elaborated on the sampling techniques and study area, as well as the study population and sample, providing specifics on how the study sample was acquired. Thoroughly described have been the research instruments, including the procedures that must be followed to administer them. Instrument validation and reliability, the data collection procedure, data analysis, and instrument piloting have all been addressed. The subsequent overleaf contains the roles, structures and objectives of EACRF in management of DRC'S intractable intra-state conflict chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

ROLES, STRUCTURES AND OBJECTIVES OF EACRF IN MANAGEMENT OF DRC'S INTRACTABLE INTRA-STATE CONFLICT

4.1 Introduction

The objective of this research was to examine the intricacies of EAC Regional Forces' interventions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's difficult intrastate conflict management. The investigation was predicated upon the subsequent research aims: Analyze the roles, structures, and objectives of the EACRF in the management of intrastate conflicts in the DRC; determine the origins, nature, and scope of intrastate conflicts in the DRC; and assess the obstacles that the EACRF faces in managing intrastate conflicts in the DRC.

4.2 Response Rate

A total of 152 questionnaires were sent to the EACRF ground personnel. The return rate for the questionnaires was 150. This constituted a response rate of 98.5%. According to Saleh and Bista (2017), it is deemed suitable to conduct data analysis with a response rate exceeding 75%. The subsequent table 4.1 presents the response rate.

Table 4.1: Questionnaire Response Rate

Category	Administered	Returned	Response rate
Questionnaires	152	150	98.5%

Source: Field Data, 2023

4.3 Background Information

The study intended to establish general information on the respondents, such as their

gender, years of experience, highest educational level, and ethnic groups i.e Hutu, (Nyaruchuru) Tusti (Nyamasisi) Wanande, Wahunde and others to share the impact on intractable intra-state conflict . The study findings were as follows:

4.3.1 Distribution of Respondents by Gender

The study sought to establish the distribution of respondents by gender. These findings are shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Distribution of Respondents by Gender

Male	125	83.3
Female	25	16.7
Total	150	100.0

Source: Field Data, 2023

According to the study's results regarding the gender of the participants, 125 (83.3%) were identified as male, whereas 25 (16.7%) identified as female. This demonstrates that data were collected from participants of both sexes, and that their perspectives were duly considered in the research. This suggests that males constitute the plurality of respondents in the EACRF. The results of this investigation corroborate the findings of Armande (2023), which demonstrated that males predominate in regional affairs and conflict resolution within the East African community. The gender distribution that has been observed presents a challenge to the prevailing masculine bias in the region with regard to regional affairs, conflict resolution, and management.

4.3.2 Distribution of Respondents by Age Brackets

The study sought to determine the distribution of respondents by the age bracket and the results were as presented in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Age of Respondents

Age Bracket	Frequency	Percent
Less than 25 years	20	13.33
25-35 years	85	56.7
36-45 years	40	26.7
46-55 years	5	3.33
Total	150	100

Source: Field Data, 2023

Based on the study findings, the age distribution of the respondents was as follows: 20 (13.33%) were less than 25 years, 85 (56.7%) were between the ages of 25-35, 40 (26.7%) were between the ages of 36-45 while 5 (3.33%) were between the ages of 46-55. This indicates that data were successfully collected from all age groups that were included in the study. It suggests that middle-aged men and women who are actively engaged in combat occupy the majority of positions in the EARCF. Furthermore, this discovery provided further support for the conclusions drawn by Twesigye (2013), which indicated that individuals in this particular age group are exceptionally susceptible to direct and indirect conflicts. Furthermore, the results of this investigation align with a study conducted by Armande (2023), which demonstrated that middle-aged men and women played a significant role in conflict resolution and management in East Africa. These individuals continue to be crucial in involving a wide range of stakeholders and their participation in conflict management efforts was substantial. Moreover, their extensive professional expertise, diverse backgrounds, and extensive networks render them crucial participants in the regional endeavors.

4.4 EACRF Role, Structure and Objectives in DRC Intractable Intra-State Conflict

The EACRF is a group of different countries that were sent to the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in November 2022 to help bring peace and security back to that area of the country. In accordance with the goals outlined in Articles 124 and 125 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC and the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security, the Regional Force, which is an East African Community Force, is comprised of soldiers from the Republics of Burundi, South Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya. The Federation of Congo, Republic of Rwanda, and United Republic of Tanzania are all members of the EAC Treaty-based force headquarters in GOMA (2003). The mandate of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) is as follows:

The EACRF was tasked with three primary roles or objectives: firstly, to assist the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in maintaining law and order; secondly, to support the FARDC in their efforts to eliminate armed group elements from the Eastern DRC; and thirdly, to assist the DRC in collaborating with humanitarian agencies to sustain humanitarian aid to populations impacted by the activities of armed group elements, including Internal. Since its operation came to an end, the force has accomplished a number of goals, such as: fully deploying EACRF troops in the Joint Operation Area; collaborating with FARDC on joint planning and operation execution; exchanging intelligence and coordinating with MONUSCO and FARDC; protecting civilians in the Joint Operation Area (JOA) and dominance patrols; facilitating the return of humanitarian agencies to provide aid to the local population; facilitating Joint Bureau verification missions in the EACRF JOA; and providing humanitarian assistance, such as maternal health, casualty evacuation, and medical cars (EAC, 2023).

The EAC Heads of State authorized the deployment of the EACRF during their 22nd Ordinary Summit, which took place in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 2022. As a consequence of the protracted conflict in Eastern DRC, which has displaced millions of individuals and precipitated a humanitarian crisis, this decision was reached. In North Kivu's Masisi, Nyiragongo, and Rutshuru territories, the EACRF has been assisting the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) in the enforcement of peace agreements, protection of civilians, and promotion of the political process. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers of Defense and Security, and the Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff are the three structural organs of the Eastern Africa Regional Force (EAC news, 2022). The Ad-Hoc Verification Mechanism (AVM)-logistics, the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJECT-strategy), and the East African Community Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (EAC-MVM)-operations are all parts of the military track structure found at the Force Headquarters in Goma, Eastern DRC. The subsequent Plate 4.1 denotes the location of the East Africa Community Regional Force's headquarters in the DRC.



Plate 4. 1: Plate Showing the Researcher at EACRAF HQ - DRC

Source: Field Data, 2023

The researcher requested the EACRF ground personnel ascertain the roles and objectives of the EACRF in managing the intra-state conflict in the DRC. The total count of participants was 150. The return of two questionnaires was absent. The findings are summarized in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5: EACRF Roles and Objectives

EACRF Roles		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Percent
Valid	Military coordination	85	56.66.	56.66	56.66
	Capacity to respond in crisis	25	16.66	16.66	16.16
	Rapid deployment of troops	40	26.66	26.66	26.66
	Total	150	100	100	100.0

Source: Field data, 2023

The major role of ECRAF as shown in Table 4.5 responded as follows; military coordination 85 (56.66%), 40 (26.66%) Rapid deployment of troops, Capacity to respond in Crisis 25 (16.66%).

4.4.1 Military Coordination

Coordinating EAC military operations and airlifting personnel to associate states afflicted by conflict, such as the DRC, is the primary responsibility, as shown in Table 4.5. Nevertheless, the coordination function is hindered by the presence of established intervention parties in the DRC Congo Conflict, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.

As illustrated in Figure 4.1 92 (61.33%) of respondents thought that the Congolese army is the most powerful participant in the conflict, with 42 (28%) agreeing that the rebel outfit M23 is a prominent player. UN troops also plays a role with 12 (8%) agreeing to it. Although 4(2.66%) stated that DRC is a SADC partner state, its participation is not readily apparent.




Figure 4.1: EACRF Partners

Source: Field Data, 2023

According to Table 4.5, the primary responsibility is to organize the EAC military and transport them to partner states that are prone to conflicts, such the DRC. This coordination function is, nevertheless, confounded by the existence of intervention groups in the DRC Congo. The results corroborate those of Ngendahima (2023), who classified the Congolese government and army as internal protagonists in the Congolese conflict in his analysis. He noted that the colonial system, post-independence political unrest, and Mobutu dictatorship are the origins of the DRC's problems. The history of the DRC is marked by a catalogue of oppression, and the government of the DRC has never failed to adequately represent or protect its people. In contrast, it has frequently functioned as a catalyst for individual affluence and unrestricted authority. Notwithstanding the Congolese army's prominent involvement in the Congolese conflict, the government fails to provide assurances regarding the safety and security of its populace. According to Ngendahimana (2023), the eastern Congo will continue to be a battleground with innocent civilians paying a terrible

price as long as the Congolese government is unable to govern the country, provide basic services, or adequately safeguard its people. This is because various armed groups in the region benefit from the illegal trade of natural resources and intricate regional alliances.

In addition to the EAC regional peacekeeping force, various military organizations are engaged in the conflict albeit with distinct functions. The primary objective of the Congolese Army is to eradicate the M23 militia in order to reestablish dominion over the Eastern Congo region. The purpose of the United Nations forces is humanitarian and peacekeeping. In such a scenario, the EACRF joint force's units would primarily consist of reinforcements for soldiers that have been deployed to the DRC within the past few months; each contributor would be assigned a unique mission. In North Kivu and Ituri, for instance, Ugandan soldiers who are members of the EACRF joint force are tasked with assisting their compatriots in combat against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan rebel coalition whose largest faction has sworn allegiance to the Islamic State.

This indicates that Uganda is actively seeking a dissident group and may not place a high priority on the restoration of peace in the DRC. The potential for divergent interests among numerous military factions in Congo restricts the ability to effectively address the internal conflict. The function of rebel groups and militias that traverse EAC borders is a related point, as posited by a member of the chief of defense committee:

The Kinsasha government and the EAC Partner states have experienced an increase in mistrust following the intervention of the East Africa Regional Community Force (EARCF) in the DRC conflict. This mistrust stems from the Kinsasha government's allegation that certain Partner states are engaging in coordination with M23 and FDLR rebel groups. As a result, the mandate of this regional organization in its efforts to combat Congolese armed groups has been jeopardized. (Interview held with a member of chiefs of defense

committee, Kenya, 7th September, 2023 in Nairobi).

Another respondent reinforced the peculiarity of several actors in the DRC conflict by asserting the following;

The DRC war is a longstanding issue in Africa. Indeed, this struggle may be traced back to the merciless governance of the Belgians. During the initial Congolese war, we observed the involvement of foreign entities, including major powers at the time, as well as other actors such as the United Nations. Nevertheless, notwithstanding these answers, I believe their primary intentions were to exploit the undiscovered resources of the Congo. Following the conclusion of the Cold War, the African continent found itself in a state of isolation. During this period, we observed the increasing influence of regional organizations as they actively participated in reshaping and realigning the regional security framework. The Second and subsequent Congolese conflicts have garnered heightened attention from regional organizations such as the Southern African Development Association (SADC) and, more recently, the East African Community (EAC) partner states, facilitated by the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF). These organizations, in my view, prioritize their own strategic interests, particularly economic interests, rather than focusing on stabilizing the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). (Interview with military attaché, 7th, August, 2023).

This dialogue exposes a profound mistrust in the peacekeeping mission, as the host state is equivocal regarding joint military operations, particularly those originating from the EAC region. This result supports the contentions made by Bischoff, Aning, and Acharya (2016) that the role of joint force coordination is diminished by a significant number of participants. Kenyan troops, for instance, pursue additional insurgents in North Kivu, where the nation already has personnel stationed with the United Nations force (although the two contingents will have separate objectives). Conversely, operations by Tanzanian and Burundian forces in South Kivu effectively formalize the Burundian army's presence in the region, where it has been engaged in combat with the RED-Tabara militia. A small South Sudanese contingent is tasked with combating the remnants of the Lord Resistance's Army in Haut-Uélé. However, the results of these studies contradict the claim made by Bischoff, Aning, and

Acharya (2016) that partner states coordinate effectively. To begin with, the partner states deployed their forces every two months as a result of resource constraints. Furthermore, the results suggest that EACRF forces are stationed in Congo for reasons unrelated to the restoration of peace in the country.

Despite the fact that East African nations have been concerned for years about the insecurity in the eastern DRC, previous deliberations regarding the deployment of a regional force to intervene have never materialized. Despite Burundi's deployment on August 15, the timing, if any, of the DRC's neighboring country's troop ingress into the region remains uncertain. While the strategy mandates that every nation provide financial support for its own military personnel, certain administrations might encounter difficulties in meeting the associated expenses (Nelleke, 2022). This study contradicts his assertions because EACRF was not initially deployed to enforce peace in the DRC; rather, resource limitations may have ultimately halted the mission.

The EAC coordinator posited in an interview that the organization might pursue supplementary financial support from regional and international entities, such as the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU). But obtaining external funding will be extremely difficult. The proposed plan contains significant voids and potential snags in addition to financial constraints. An aspect that necessitates further elucidation is the manner in which EAC forces, who will be stationed in close proximity to UN troops, will collaborate with the latter. The EAC's mission plan provides no explicit details regarding the manner in which the two forces are to "cooperate" (Nelleke, 2022).

This, he expounded in the following manner;

Given the increasing regionalization of many contemporary conflicts, particularly in Africa, it is crucial to acknowledge the expanding

influence of regional organizations. The Great Lakes region has been beset by ceaseless internal strife for a considerable period of time, which has had a tremendously detrimental impact on the surrounding area. As a consequence, the East African region has experienced ongoing domestic unrest in the DRC and perceived the conflict as a threat. Its decision to intervene in the conflict was influenced by this. Nevertheless, the endeavors intervention has encountered financial deficiencies in addition to logistical limitations. Due to the international community's preoccupation with other crises that are currently unfolding in other regions, it is uncertain whether we will be able to secure external funding. Additionally, we are cognizant of the ongoing peace support initiatives in the DRC, such as MONUSCO; this presents us with yet another coordination challenge, but we remain resolute in our determination to surmount this obstacle throughout our operation. (Interview with a EAC Coordinator, held on 8th August, 2023).

The area gathered between 6,500 and 12,000 soldiers for the deployment, which was authorized to "contain, defeat, and eradicate negative forces" in the eastern DRC for a period of six months, renewable, and subject to a bimonthly strategic review by the involved parties. Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, and South Sudan all contributed personnel to engage in combat alongside Congolese forces (Bischoff, Aning, & Acharya 2016).

Nonetheless, this research uncovered numerical military voids, which undermines the very purpose of the Joint Area of Operation, which is to cover a vast region with numerous long-range patrols. Nevertheless, the command structure, extending from the Force Headquarters to the contingents, is effective and efficient. An EAC coordination military officer expressed regret in an interview that the participation of numerous military organizations has resulted in power asymmetry among certain member states, consequently diminishing the effectiveness of the force. The presence of numerous military opposition groups in Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda hinders EACRF efforts in the DRC. He provided the following explanation:

The primary objectives of our force's deployment in the war-ravaged region are to prevent the conflict from escalating further and to

establish a lasting peace. In accordance with the security mechanisms that have granted legitimacy to this operation, every partner state is duty-bound to provide military personnel in support of our endeavor. As a result, they have responded to this appeal. Nonetheless, the ongoing Congolese conflict has been marked by the participation of numerous militia factions, some of which have established ties with the partner states. The ongoing existence of these militia groups has significantly hindered our ability to carry out this laudable operation efficiently, as the balance of power in terms of capabilities remains elusive. (Interview, EAC Military coordinating officer, 7th August, 2023).

The various strategies employed by distinct divisions appear to be operating against the regional force's objectives. It is unclear whether this is the result of ineffective coordination or a strategy. FARDC and the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) are conducting a joint offensive operation in the northern regions (northern North-Kivu and Ituri) to trace the ADF-NALU rebel group. Boundary-strong, the Burundian army is currently stationed in the southwestern region of the province of North Kivu, where it is impeding the M23's progress. It appears that Kenya has adopted a more diplomatic stance. Angola is poised to deploy a military contingent to the area subsequent to the ceasefire it mediated between the Congolese army and the M23 insurgents failing to materialize. The manner in which MONUSCO operations can be practically applied to other forces is still unknown.

It is evident from this discourse that the very structures of the EACRF betray its immediate duties and objectives in relation to joint missions, as divergent state interests of some EAC states have negative repercussions on the EACRF mission. It is possible to classify the efforts of Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda to combat militia groups operating within their borders as a conflict of interest. Limited coordination and the presence of numerous military factions further jeopardize the EACRF's goal of restoring peace in the DRC. Additionally, duty multiplication, as a portion of their forces are integrated into the United Nations peace mission in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo. It is apparent that the primary focus of the EACRF's mandate has been peacekeeping rather than peace enforcement.

4.4.2 Objectives of Rapid Respond in Crisis

The primary goal of the East African Regional Force is to be more easily deployed to complex peace and security operations than other regions, especially when contrasted with the African Standby Force (Minyori, 2018). EACRF is more structured and organized. For example, the personnel listed on the Civil Roll are present, despite being domiciled in their respective home countries. Additionally, the police component is easily accessible for the ASF. This pertains to the structure of the military component. Similar to other regions, the EACRF depends significantly on military leadership to ensure efficient deployment and planning. This is due to the secluded environment of the compounds, which facilitates the mobilization of sufficient personnel during force generation.

The extent to which the availability of personnel and hardware (or lack thereof) facilitates or impedes an organization's capacity to engage in conflict regulation, and the degree to which policy instruments are accessible to support intentions with tangible actions, including the use of military force when required, are critical determinants of structural capabilities to act decisively (Stefan & Oya, 2012). In an interview, a member of chiefs of defense committee argued:

Without a doubt, one of the most robust security mechanism frameworks governs the operations of our community force: the East African Standby force. However, the implementation and improvement of these frameworks have yet to occur. In relation to the capability of deployment, we continue to contend with the immediacy of responding to crises in the region, which has been hampered by financial and logistical constraints and has consequently rendered ineffective our intervention in the DRC. In particular, the strategic capability of swift airlift has impeded the forces' intervention in the DRC, rendering it ineffective. (Interview held on 11th October, 2023 in Goma DRC, Rwandan Cohort).

Political will plays a crucial role in determining the capacity to take action with regard to conflict management. The participation of state leaders in a conflict as mediators and administrators requires their consent. Typically, this political determination is dependent on the values and interests of the state, the nature of the conflict (whether it is localized or extensive), and the perceived probability of success for any intervention. The assumed probability of success is determined by evaluating the extent to which current capacities to fund, coordinate, and act are commensurate with the difficulties that a particular intervention is expected to confront.

Additionally, the ability to finance and maintain conflict regulation initiatives is critical to their success. IOs and regional organizations alike encounter substantial challenges in this domain, whether it be a dearth of financial resources or a reluctance on the part of member states to allocate funds to a specific organization or objective. The speed with which funds can be made available and the duration of financially sustainable operations, after they have been initiated, are additional potential issues. Cooperation and coordination capabilities have two facets: coordination is necessary both internally and between the various institutions of an organization and its member nations. This necessitates that an examination of "success factors" in this regard take into account the interest structures of pertinent actors and the opportunities they possess to independently or in collaboration with organizational partners achieve these interests. The efficacy of internal cooperation and coordination is additionally influenced by the degree to which the organization functions as a relatively independent actor (i.e., is not dependent on member states) and the complexity of organizational structures. EAC coordination military officer said:

The effectiveness of military deployments by contributing states during times of crisis is unquestionably contingent on their political will. It is worth noting that while the EACRF frameworks mandate members to promptly address crises, the member-states maintain distinct military

structures that lack coherence with one another and possess varying structural capabilities. The structures for military intervention are ineffective as a result of a disjointed and untimely military response, which fails to avert the escalation of a conflict into a full-scale war. Regional and international security mechanisms should cooperate in any way possible to bolster the structural capacity of forces in order to mitigate this difficulty. (Interview held on 13th October, 2023 in Goma DRC, Rwandan Cohort).

Coordination of military forces from partner states is the EACRF's primary responsibility in order to facilitate swift deployment in conflict zones such as the DRC. The degree of coordination has been compromised by unreliable military infrastructures, which result in inconsistent deployment schedules among the EAC member states. In addition, the presence of other military organizations complicates the EACRF's coordination function. In the subsequent subsection, the function of additional collaborators in intrastate conflicts in the DRC is identified and discussed. The complexity of the DRC conflict is attributable to a multitude of factors influenced by competing interests. The power theory postulates that power is a key element that contributes to conflicting interest as seen with EAC states in dealing with DRC conflict. As discussed here, Uganda, Rwanda have other interest far from restoring peace and security in DRC. However, power as an element is also important with regard to conflict resolution when interest of parties converge. In this case, interest of EAC states is peace and security of DRC.

4.4.3 Role of EACRF Affiliated Structures in DRC Intrastate Conflict

The researcher aimed to comprehend the function of EACRF affiliate structures and the manner in which they contribute to the EACRF's objectives in the DRC conflict. The researcher requested that the EAC Director of Coordinating Mechanism and Military Attaches, as well as the EACRF logistical, operational, and strategy teams, ascertain the functions performed by EACRF affiliate structures in the administration of intrastate conflict in the DRC. The total count of participants was 150. The return

of two questionnaires was absent. The results are summarized in Figure 4.2.




Figure 4.3: EACRF Intervention Personnel

Source: Field Data, 2023

One hundred and fifty respondents (100%) supported the deployment of emergency personnel in the war-torn DRC. Police and justice personnel were not accepted by any of the respondents as part of the EACRF conflict management process. During times of crisis, emergency forces are mobilized; nevertheless, the implementation of the EAC regional peacekeeping force has been sluggish.

Due to the inherent characteristics of its structure, the EACRF has been constrained to its primary responsibilities of peacekeeping and conflict prevention in the DRC's internal affairs. It was disclosed that regional forces have accomplished little in recent months with regard to peace building and enforcement. During a recent interview, a member of the chiefs of defense committee addressed:

Our mandate, as prescribed by the political faction of the region, is limited in scope and is founded upon specific objectives. In this regard, EACRF activities are limited to member state collaboration and joint exercises. Therefore, in order to restore peace, the treaty requires joint forces to collaborate with local law enforcement and civilians. It fails to account for the critical role that justice personnel play in the

peacebuilding process. (Interview held with a chiefs of defense committee member, 14th October, 2023 in Goma, DRC, Uganda Cohort).

The statement alludes to a more comprehensive intervention framework that extends beyond the mere deployment of emergency troops. This is consistent with Article 13.1.1 of the Protocol of Africa Standby Force, which stipulates that the ASF shall be comprised of multidisciplinary contingents on standby in their respective countries of origin, consisting of civilian, police, and military personnel, prepared for immediate deployment. Hence, EACRF constitutes a multifaceted entity comprising elements from the military, security, and civilian sectors. This indicates that certain portions of the EAC charter on the EACRF structure are deactivated or mute. A military officer in charge of EAC coordination argued in an interview:

Among the many factors that have contributed to the politicization of ethnicities and the ongoing exploitation of resources is the Congolese conflict. This provides a strong correlation between the DRC's resources and its development. Conflict in the eastern DRC is intricate and at times time-consuming, necessitating the participation of all parties involved. For the disarmament of armed groups, the political process must continue to advance at an accelerated rate. Additionally, it is imperative that the intervening actors exhibit a genuine commitment to bringing an end to the conflict, rather than engaging in further illicit activities that I am unable to divulge but which are circulating in local and international media outlets on account of their sensitive nature. (Interview held with a EAC coordination military officer 4th November, 2023 in Nairobi, Kenya).

This statement provides further support for the inclusion of civilians and law enforcement in the EACRF intervention structure. The joint force intervention may not produce significant results if certain crucial elements are omitted, as evidenced by the following findings. However, the defunct EACRF utilized this framework to delineate the responsibilities of each segment. In 2011, the EACRF Standby Roster acknowledged the registration of 176 civilian personnel, in addition to the training of 635 police officers. At the defunct EACRF 2012 Exercise Njiwa, which focused on

capacity building for institutions upholding the rule of law, more than a hundred police and civilian participants participated. In addition to the force's multidimensional nature, EACRF acknowledges and endeavors to partially execute UNSC resolution 1325 concerning gender mainstreaming. 209 out of 635 trained police officers were female in 2011.

EACRF has accomplished a remarkable feat in terms of training its personnel both collectively and individually, both within EACRF structures and in member nations. The culmination of these training programs has been the successful EACRF in order to standardize doctrine and training in accordance with the United Nations' requirement for doctrine and training for multidimensional forces, COM collaborates with regional training institutions such as the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC). However, in the case of the EACRF, this standardization also accounts for African realities. In order to ensure the effectiveness of collaborative peace support operations, three regional centers of excellence for peacekeeping training in Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda provide forces contributing from member countries with common joint pre-deployment training.

EAC has collaborated with ECOWAS, IGAD, and AU, all of which operate early warning systems of varying varieties and levels, to develop its own Early Warning System (EWM), which is regarded as a cornerstone of crisis and conflict prevention. Furthermore, the EAC established the Nyerere Centre for Peace Research in Tanzania with the purpose of furnishing the EAC with well-informed policy alternatives, training, and research in the domain of peace and security. Its primary objective is to advance peace and security as fundamental prerequisites for regional integration and development. It is estimated that over a hundred armed organizations are active in the eastern region of the DRC. Notwithstanding the existence of over 16,000

peacekeepers from the United Nations, these factions persist in instilling fear among populations and exerting authority over porously governed regions. Moreover, a considerable number of these armed factions maintain affiliations with firmly established terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab, thereby enabling them to function from a firmly established base equipped with ample resources (International Crisis Group, 2020).

An indicator of potential sites for the emergence of a new insurgency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is historical progression: commanders exploit networks of former combatants and reestablish connections with traffickers, arms dealers, and miners, which enables armed factions to proliferate. The persistence of violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is fueled by trans-border militarized networks and partnerships with terrorist organizations, in addition to regional dynamics (International Crisis Group, 2020). Contrary to the findings of this study regarding the involvement of terrorist groups in the conflict, the insurgent groups' ethnic ties determine their regional character.

Further exacerbating the problem of extensive violence inflicted by armed factions in the eastern DRC is the propensity of the Great Lakes region nations, notably Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, to actively facilitate and support armed groups in the DRC with the intention of instigating proxy conflicts against one another. Concurrently, President Félix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is contemplating inviting these nations into the country to combat factions that they oppose. If invited into the DRC, these three nations, whose animosity is intensifying, might increase their support for allied militias while focusing on adversaries. A new proxy conflict has the potential to destabilize the DRC even further and even spark a regional security crisis.

4.5 Chapter Summary

According to the findings presented in this chapter, EACRF was established as a regional organization tasked with resolving internal conflicts in the area. The organ is composed of military teams specializing in logistics, operations, and strategy, as well as heads of state and chiefs of defense staff, who comprise both the political and military branches. On the other hand, resistance from locals and politicians in the DRC Congo has significantly impeded military coordination duties and emergency deployment. These individuals perceive such missions as a means to escalate the ongoing internal conflict. It was observed that EACRF has not yet fully incorporated the participation of locals. Additionally, the force's deployment is restricted to a duration of six months, with the possibility of renewal. As conflicting responsibilities emerge, the involvement of other actors, including SADC troops and UN troops, among others, complicates the EACRF's objectives as outlined in the EAC Treaty. In the intrastate conflict in the DRC, state interests that pursue divergent goals impede EACRF objectives significantly. The Subsequent Overleaf Contains the Root Causes, Types and Extent of DRC Intractable Intra-State Conflict Chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

ROOT CAUSES, TYPES AND EXTENT OF DRC INTACTABLE INTRA-STATE CONFLICT

This chapter assesses the origins, varieties, and scope of intrastate conflicts in the DRC. The chapter discusses, interprets, and presents regional fundamental causes that influence the DRC conflict to what extent. Additionally, the discourse encompasses internal state institutional frailty, ethnic exclusion, colonial influences, and the DRC. Additionally, regional and internal dynamics of the DRC in relation to military competition, failings of state leadership, and state interests are examined.

5.1 Regional Root Causes in DRC Intrastate Conflict

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has encountered a series of conflicts since the 1960s, which have significantly impacted its challenging process of transitioning from colonization to indigenous governance. According to Kisangani (2012), the conflicts that arose during the initial stages of independence were primarily attributed to internal debates within the political elite on various aspects of the state's structure, particularly the decision between federalism and a centralized state.

The era was characterized by intense hostilities based on regional and ethnic divisions. The instability inside the nascent nation was further intensified due to the colonial powers' reluctance to relinquish control over the milk cow, as well as the geopolitical motivations of Western powers who strategically utilized the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a strategic base to counteract the spread of communism across Africa.

Hence, the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have consistently

been influenced by both internal and external factors. The current disputes in the country are largely a revival of earlier wars. This observation suggests that the underlying structural factors contributing to the conflicts have not been sufficiently resolved. Hence, even ostensible instances of tranquility, such as during the Mobutu government in certain regions of the 1970s and 1980s, were not attained via effective peacemaking, but rather through the suppression of widespread dissatisfaction.

The researcher sought input from the EAC Director of Coordinating Mechanism and the EACRF logistical, operational, and strategy teams in order to ascertain the nature and extent to which regional factors contribute to the DRC conflict, as well as the causes and types of interstate conflicts in the region. The sample size consisted of 150 participants. Failure to return two questionnaires was seen. Figure 5.1 summarizes the results.




Figure 5.1: Regional and Intra-State Conflict Root Causes

Source: Field Data, 2023

According to Figure 5.1, 89(59.33%) respondents believe that there are root causes, such as cross border armed groups, contributing to the war. Additionally, 38(25.33%) respondents indicate that resource competition is a root cause that has hampered the management of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Another contributing factor is the trans-border weaponry trade, accounting for 16(10.33% of the causes, while illegal trafficking and trade account for 5(3.33%)

5.1.1 Nature, Types and Extent of Trans-Border Militia Conflicts, History of Militia in DRC

The results suggest that the effective management of intra-state conflict may pose challenges in situations when militia groups engage in cross-border operations, hence facilitating the illicit trade of firearms. The situation is exacerbated by the presence of ethnically linked groups that traverse national boundaries, as they often exhibit loyalty towards these militia factions. As a result, regional conflicts are caused by things like weak institutions in one or more states, competition over regional security, a parallel and transnational informal economy, cross-border social networks, illegal trade and trafficking, the exploitation of natural resources, the building of militaries and the transfer of arms, and cross-border armed groups.

There exists a distinct correlation between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its neighboring countries in terms of ongoing hostilities between the Congolese and neighboring nations of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, which continue to be disputed at the present time. According to the interview, Rwanda has faced recurring allegations of providing support to the M23 militia, whereas the Congolese have been accused of neglecting their responsibilities towards the FDLR (the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda). The FDLR is believed to be a remnant of the genocidal

Hutu forces that fled Rwanda after the triumph of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, led by President Paul Kagame in 1994.

The rebel factions appear to find refuge in their own nations, so complicating efforts to alleviate the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Decisions have been taken in several forums, including as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGL) / SADC Meeting, to compulsorily disarm the FDLR. The FDG unveiled that the militia organization had extended an offer to surrender; nonetheless, their lack of distinctiveness from the community poses challenges in achieving complete dismemberment.

The present study aligns with Nelke's (2022) assertion that Rwanda has maintained a contentious presence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), viewing the region as a vital flank closely associated with its own safety. Nevertheless, the findings contradict the claim that Rwanda accuses the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) of exacerbating the war due to its government's inability to effectively address rebel groups in the eastern region. The region is moreover a reservoir of gold and other minerals that are much sought after by many Rwandan stakeholders. For years, the country has interfered in Congolese affairs and supported consecutive uprisings, some of which caused significant hardship to the Congolese population. A decade ago, Rwanda, together with Uganda, provided support to the Tutsi-led M23, which spearheaded the most recent significant uprising in Congo. Kigali supplied the insurgents with sufficient funds and weaponry to seize some regions in the eastern portion of the country. The group temporarily seized Goma before being repelled by UN and Congolese forces. During an FDG, a respondent from the IDP expressed frustration:

The DRC's civilians bear distressing recollections of the periods when Rwanda's involvement in a novel external intervention threatened to

incite a substantial, if not violent, backlash. Ethnic relations influence Rwanda's involvement in the internal conflict of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the M23 are Tutsi rebels, and the political leadership in Kigali is interested in the enormous resources of the DRC. (Interview held on 13th October, 2023 in Goma IDP camp, DRC, Goma)

The aforementioned attitudes are indicative of the escalating tensions between Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame, which have intensified since November 2021, subsequent to Tshisekedi's authorization for Uganda to deploy military forces to North Kivu and Ituri. However, the intervention of Uganda in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) can be attributed to the ADF, a rebel group that is believed to be accountable for a series of suicide attacks in the capital city of Kampala, Uganda. Burundi also opposes the Hutu-dominated government by supporting a Tutsi-led rebel force. Kagame has shown dissatisfaction with these efforts, since he is likely concerned about the potential loss of power and access to the region. Rwanda has consistently maintained its perception of a potential danger originating from within the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), mostly emanating from the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), which is a relic of the Hutu militia that was accountable for the Rwandan massacre of 1994.

This observation contradicts Nellke's (2022) claim that the resurgence of the M23 has exacerbated tensions between Tshisekedi and Kagame, as the Hutus, who sought refuge from the Rwandan genocide, have transformed into rebel factions operating in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Following the militia's incapacitation in 2013, one faction sought refuge in Uganda, while another group established themselves in Rwanda. In an interview with a rebel head, it was noted that they operate across EAC borders.

In 2017, Sultani Makenga, the military head of the M23, commanded approximately 200 combatants who returned to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from Uganda (Interview with M23 rebel group spokesperson, held in October, 13th 2023)

The group has recently intensified its assaults on the Congolese army, resulting in the displacement of several civilians from the fighting. Tshisekedi has held the belief since the beginning that Kagame is once again providing assistance to the M23. Consequently, he has consistently advocated for the exclusion of Rwanda in negotiations pertaining to the regional army. During an interview, a military officer claimed that the president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) requested and successfully avoided Rwanda's involvement in the deployment of the East African Community (EAC) regional forces due to its backing of the terrorist organization M23.

The coordination issue arises from the vested interests of EAC members, which encompass several factors such as resource allocation, Rwanda's regional hegemonic inclinations, and the presence of ethnic networked armed groups throughout the EAC states. Trans-regional conflicts highlight the fact that sovereignty is not solely based on territorial boundaries or organized on a state-by-state basis. Instead, it is also influenced by the presence of weak nations within the EAC bloc.

The current state has experienced a decline in its sovereignty status, particularly in instances where governance mechanisms exhibit weaknesses, as shown in certain African nations. This allows for the involvement of different entities, like as militia groups, UN peacekeepers, and other intervening forces like EACRF and SADC forces, to exercise different forms of sovereignty.

The EACRF has a lengthy history of military competition, specifically between Uganda and Rwanda. The two East African Community (EAC) governments have been deeply involved in the Congolese conflict for an extended period. Rwanda and Uganda have held differing opinions regarding the most effective strategy for the war. According to a report by the International Crisis Group (2022), Rwanda first tried to remove Kabila alone using force. Upon Uganda's involvement in the war, Museveni endeavored to establish his authority by promoting a political strategy centered on the empowerment of the Congolese population. The disparities between the rebel RCD movement caused it to disintegrate, as individual leaders embraced the stances of their backers.

Based on this conversation, it is evident that the presence of EAC regional forces contributes to the issue affecting the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This is because certain states provide support to militia groups or allow these groups to originate and operate within their borders. Consequently, the deployment of these troops in DRC is perceived as a strategy to undermine efforts to manage the conflict. The EACRF encounters coordination issues due to its self-serving goals, which further hinder their objective of disarming M23 and other armed organizations in Eastern Congo and reinstating peace in the DRC.

5.1.2 Resource Extraction, Cross Border Trade Contribution to DRC Conflict

The abundance of natural resources, or more precisely, the reliance on resources, has been identified as a significant determinant and defining feature of the DRC's conflicts. Thus, one could contend that the nation has been subjected to the most severe manifestation of the 'abyssmal' resource curse': not only has it witnessed the decline of non-resource sectors, but its natural resources have also served as catalysts, perpetuators, and foundations for conflicts (Laudati 2013). One could contend that the

Democratic Republic of the Congo exemplifies the economics of resource-driven conflicts as described in the textbook (Collier & Hoeffler, 2012).

Firstly, the presence of natural resources in a nation may increase the likelihood of conflicts by fostering violent secessionist movements. Natural resources may be distributed unequally within nations, just as they are not uniformly distributed across nations. Furthermore, populations residing in regions endowed with resources might have an innate propensity to assert exclusive rights to those resources. Nevertheless, the mere abundance and uneven distribution of natural resources throughout a nation do not guarantee the occurrence of conflicts. Despite the fact that oil production in Canada and the United States is concentrated in a few regions, these nations have yet to experience any conflicts related to oil. In a similar fashion, Botswana has a substantial economic footprint and a lengthy history of political stability despite its abundant natural resources.

In the instance of the DRC, the connection between natural resources and conflict is made possible by five factors. One primary concern is the inequitable allocation of revenue generated from natural resources, which infuriates regions endowed with such resources. Therefore, these areas perceive the central government as a means to exploit their resources without providing any discernible advantages to the communities. Ethnicity constitutes the second significant characteristic of the DRC, serving as a catalyst for conflict mobilization, particularly within secessionist movements. The significant concentration of ethnic groups across regions suggests that the allocation of natural resources across regions is, in reality, an allocation of resources among ethnic groups.

Therefore, through their promotion of ethnic self-determination and protection of

ethnic interests against "foreigners," entrepreneurs in ethnic politics incite and sustain grievances against the centralized state (Kisangani, 2012). As an instrument of political mobilization, xenophobia is utilized by those who wish to strengthen their hold on power. The third factor that lends credibility to the assertions of secession is the considerable worth of the minerals. The escalation of copper and cobalt prices during the 1970s served as an attractive incentive for the Democratic Republic of the Congo to pursue secession. In the same way that the discovery of highly valued commodities, such as coltan, and rising commodity prices during a period of global economic expansion fueled resource nationalism in resource-rich regions, particularly the Eastern provinces, Katanga, and Kasai regions (Kisangani, 2012). The fourth factor pertains to the state's weakness, which renders it ineffectual of suppressing secessionist rebellions and maintaining a robust security apparatus to counter the rebellion. Furthermore, a feeble state that fails to deliver essential public services, such as security, alienates its citizens and loses their loyalty. In conclusion, the confluence of a feeble government and an overabundance of natural resources furnishes external actors with opportunities to exploit the void of power and acquire natural resources. Subsequently, insecurity ensues and persists due to the involvement of diverse actors who vie for dominion over natural resources while simultaneously supporting domestic disputes.

A second pathway through which natural resources and conflicts are linked is through the financing of hostilities. According to Soysa, engaging in conflict is an expensive undertaking that will not take place if its investors do not anticipate a return (De Soysa, 2012). Armed conflicts cannot be instigated solely by grievances, as "challenging the state requires substantial funding and a relatively large number of

volunteers" (De Soysa, 2012). However, financial motivation alone is insufficient to establish a causal link between natural resources and conflicts. Two additional factors contribute to the feasibility of the resource-conflict nexus in the DRC. Once more, the first is the power vacuum caused by the feeble central government. The second concern pertains to the inequitable allocation of revenue generated from the extraction of natural resources. When a robust centralized state is present, natural resources have the potential to facilitate the establishment of robust security systems, effective governance, and efficient income redistribution. These factors collectively would diminish the motivations and viability for secessionist rebellion.

Government accountability erosion constitutes the third pathway through which natural resources and conflicts are intertwined (Collier & Hoeffler, 2012). A surplus of natural resources relieves the government of the obligation to generate substantial tax revenues. Good governance is a prerequisite for efficient taxation; taxation cannot exist without representation. Moreover, taxation serves as a mechanism to ensure that elected officials are held answerable to the public. The central government employs rent-based revenue generation in lieu of politically burdensome taxation as a means of financing public affairs, owing to its substantial endowment of natural resources.

As time passes, however, the dynamics of internal conflicts are defined by a number of factors, including the extraction and sale of natural resources by rebel groups, war profiteering by actors such as arms merchants, organized crime syndicates, and corporate mercenary firms, and economic coping mechanisms among civilian populations, such as cross-border trade in a vast array of goods. Nevertheless, comprehending the inner workings of the transborder conflict economy is not always a straightforward or intuitive undertaking. This complexity is exemplified in the arms

trade: regional exportation of weaponry may result from state collapse, whereas an increase in stability may cause both an influx of arms (as war profiteers take advantage of weapon buy-back schemes) and an outflow of arms (which exacerbates conflict in neighboring states). Similarly, the correlation between politics and economics is not invariably straightforward, given that robust political connections can bolster nascent economic networks, whereas substantial economic benefits may fortify precarious political alliances.

Although the DRC is rich in natural resources, their distribution throughout its regions is uneven. As an illustration, Katanga is responsible for generating 70 percent of the nation's copper and cobalt output. According to sources cited in Ndikumana and Kisangani (2005), the province contributed to 20 percent of government expenditures and produced 75 percent of the nation's output at the time of independence. In a similar fashion, the "diamond state" Kasa region contains extensive reserves of industrial and gem-quality diamonds. The eastern provinces, particularly the Kivus, possess substantial gold, coltan, and tin reserves. During the initial stages of independence, the leaders of these regions expressed support for secession on account of their dissatisfaction with the central government's resource management. They believed that their regions were providing minimal benefits in return for subsidizing the central government's expenditures (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). Consequently, the initial open secession war occurred in Katanga from 1960 to 1963, and was subsequently the site of the Shaba I war in 1977 and the Shaba II war in 1978. The eastern rebellion of 1964-66 and the Kasa secession war of 1960-62 must be comprehended within this framework.

Moreover, an exclusive emphasis on the purported economic incentives of rebel factions disregards a myriad of other pertinent aspects within interrelated conflicts, including but not limited to governance and adherence to legal systems, external regulatory frameworks, the desire for "conflict goods" among developed nation-consumers, coping strategies employed by civilian populations, and the involvement of neighboring states. For instance, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where it is evident that transborder war economies have contributed to the formation of a regional conflict, rebel violence for economic gain merely illuminates a portion of a much more intricate narrative that also includes the following: the economic subsistence of civilians through the extraction and trade of natural resources (e.g., coltan); and the armed forces of regional states (e.g., Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) seemingly motivated by commercial gain. The development and execution of efficacious approaches to alleviate the detrimental impacts of transborder war economies have been notably challenging on account of inadequate understanding, unintended repercussions of state-centric sanctions regimes, insufficient transnational oversight of the private sector, and conflicts of interest among intervening states and organizations.

The results suggest that in addition to the rivalry, the conflict purportedly advances Rwanda's illicit coltan extraction interests; thus, Rwanda intervened, despite its denials. Additionally, soldiers from neighboring nations were exposed to the resources in eastern DRC as a result of the Congo Wars. By constructing and investigating transnational networks, these soldiers fueled and leveraged the conflict. Consequently, the internal strife in the DRC originates from her immense resources, from which participants gain the most during times of conflict.

The EAC region is a prime illustration of how internal conflicts of interest can impede an organization's members. Prominent instances encompass the fact that every member state has provided support to its own militia or warlord factions during the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, thereby prolonging an otherwise apparent civil war. Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda have faced allegations of this while simultaneously claiming to combat the emergence of militia groups within their borders.

The inability of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian member states to implement good governance codes of conduct via a peer review process is manifest. Moreover, due to the inherently state-centric nature of organizations like the EAC, civil society organizations have little opportunity to participate in regional peacebuilding initiatives. Consequently, the subsequent chapter delves into the particular interventions implemented by EACRF in order to address the internal conflict in the DRC. Mutisi (2016) bases his analysis of the SADC intervention in the DRC on an understanding of the interdependence of African nations and the interconnectedness of African nations. In addition to military intervention, mediation, and support for peace processes, the SADC engaged in international advocacy as part of its response. The objectives of the coalition were to safeguard the ailing statehood of the Congo, ensure the safety of civilians, and establish a lasting peace. Nevertheless, the author noted that the SADC's inability to achieve an expeditious moist victory could be ascribed to the intricate operational environment in which it functioned. Furthermore, the involvement of numerous actors and participants disrupted the peace process, necessitating SADC to navigate these complexities with strategic diplomacy. Additionally, he notes that the SADC's intervention in the Congolese conflict demonstrates the increasing significance of regional organizations in ensuring

regional peace and security.

Miskel & Morton (2003) conducted a study that acknowledged the challenge of contextualizing foreign troop intervention in the DRC conflict. However, they hypothesized that official deployment of Ugandan and Rwandan troops occurred in the region in 1998. Rwanda's actions were directed at dismantling the militia based in the DRC, which was engaging in cross-border incursions and posed a threat of instability throughout the region. The authors argue that the states would have garnered minimal international censure if they had limited their military activities to those that bolstered border security. Nevertheless, it became evident that Rwanda and Uganda were driven by a broader objective. For example, they discerned that a weak Kabila's government would provide them with an opportunity to exploit the DRC's extensive natural resources and rejected his independent foreign policies. The two individuals resolved to destabilize Kabila's government in the DRC by actively supporting two main anti-Kabila factions in order to accomplish their goals. Four additional African nations, namely Namibia, Angola, Chad, and Zimbabwe, joined shortly thereafter, transforming the DRC into a regional conflict.

Gbaya (2015), in his scholarly dissertation examining South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC, noted that the country's intervention in the DRC conflict was motivated by a desire to resolve the conflict from its own particular standpoint. However, the intricate nature of the DRC conflict posed a formidable obstacle to this objective. The assertion that South Africa's transition from a non-military to a military strategy was motivated by economic interests in the geostrategic nation does not provide a substantial justification for intervention. Despite the escalation of South

Africa's involvement in the DRC, its intervention signifies the country's liberal ambition for a continent that is both prosperous and stable. Given the precarious situation of increased foreign direct investments in the DRC caused by the conflict, South Africa was compelled to intervene in order to safeguard these investments. Many would argue that Johannesburg had little interest in Kinshasa during the first war, in contrast to its intervention in the Second Congolese War, which was primarily motivated by the desire of South African corporations to gain greater access to the vast resources of the DRC. In a similar fashion, South Africa's participation in peacekeeping operations in the DRC could be interpreted as a means to advance its economic interests, which include mining operations and enormous contracts from the Inga Dam, while also serving as a response to the continental objective of resolving conflicts as a foundation for socioeconomic development, democracy, and good governance.

Olsson (2015) devoted his dissertation to the examination of self-interest and altruism as driving forces behind regional action. According to his research, the realist hypothesis significantly impacted the interventions of ECOWAS and SADC in Mali and the DRC, respectively. In regard to the SADC intervention in the DRC, the primary motivations for intervention shifted towards the national interests of the participating countries. There is substantial evidence from economic and geostrategic indicators that political leaders were preoccupied with establishing their powers as crucial actors in the international community and the larger community. It was discovered that the intervention by both blocs was motivated by the potential contagion effect resulting from the tight-knit ethnic ties, porous borders, and economic interdependence.

Twesigye (2013) conducted an analysis of foreign intervention and enduring conflicts

in the province of North Kivu, with a specific emphasis on regional actors. His analysis revealed that the involvement of the DRC's neighbors, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, in the conflict is primarily motivated by their own strategic interests and is detrimental to the DRC's stability. The DRC has been of security concern to Burundi. The Hutu militia groups, including Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) and National Liberation Forces (NLF), which have been using the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as a launching platform to destabilize Burundi, posed a threat to the minority Tutsi government of Bujumbura. Additionally, some authors have cited economic factors as justifications for the backing of opposition groups in the DRC. Similar to Rwanda and Uganda, Bujumbura has frequently faced allegations of natural resource exploitation in the DRC. For example, in regions governed by the Hutu insurgents, a significant proportion of consumer products are exported and subsequently resold at increased prices.

Uganda is widely recognized for its substantial involvement in both the initial and subsequent Congolese conflicts, having provided support to Tutsi factions in the region as they fought militant Hutus originating from Rwanda. Kampala was at first an ardent supporter of the Kabila regime; this flirtation persisted for a period of time prior to Kampala's alliance with Uganda to overthrow the Kabila regime. Nevertheless, due to their distinct strategic objectives in the nation, the dispute between Rwanda and Uganda concerning land control resulted in the division of the Liberation Movement of Democratic Forces (RCD). The aforementioned division and persistent hostilities significantly influenced the politico-military terrain of Congo, as each faction sought to establish dominance over distinct regions and continued to contend for the country's vast and underutilized natural resources. The DRC was

consequently partitioned into regions governed by distinct rebel factions.

However, the United Nations Panel of Experts Report of 2005 has implicated both Kampala and Kigali as the primary actors in the illicit exploitation of natural resources and the ongoing conflict within the nation. Hutus who have migrated from Rwanda to Congo are suspected of being responsible for the country's instability. The civil conflicts that afflicted North Kivu in the early 1990s, for instance, were primarily interpreted as a dispute between the Hutus and Tutsis. Likewise, Rwanda has faced allegations of direct involvement in the Second Congolese War on account of its provision of support to the insurgent forces. A UN report on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo specifically noted that Kigali had extended assistance to the M23 faction. Therefore, Rwanda's involvement in the DRC encompasses not only an ethnic but also an economic dimension. Notwithstanding the abundance of natural resources in Rwanda, the country has amassed enormous profits through the importation and sale of valuable minerals such as tantalum and tungsten bearing Rwandan labels. Consequently, the profitable enterprise of contraband serves to not only offset Kigali's trade deficit but also sustains its backing of Tutsi rebel factions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This is supported by the fact that Tutsis have been defeated by both Hutu and DRC armies, rendering them destitute for assistance from Kigali. They assist Kigali in obtaining its proportionate share of the mineral resources of the DRC in exchange.

It is apparent from this discourse that the DRC conflict is multifaceted, owing to the participation of transnational militia organizations that enjoy backing from EAC member states. This has resulted from the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda failing to coordinate their efforts to combat these militia groups. Additionally, the

pursuit of natural resources in the DRC exacerbates and complicates the conflict. The intervention environment in which the EACRF operates in regards to the administration of the conflict in the DRC is as described.

5.2 State Governance Weakness, State Exclusion and Marginalization as Root Causes, Types in relations in DRC Internal Conflict.

The centralized Congo has been weak since the mid-1970s, which has made the country prone to political instability. The recent conflicts in North-Kivu and South-Kivu cannot be seen as isolated events. They should be understood within their historical context (Kisangani, 2012; Lemarchand, 2009; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). In the specific case of the conflicts in Eastern Congo, one important factor is the set of nationality laws that have explicitly aimed at not only excluding people of Rwandan descent from the political process, but also denying them the right to a permanent homeland (Kisangani, 2012). The issue of Congolese nationality originates from the decree of 27 December 1892 signed by King Leopold II according to which “an individual acquires the Congolese nationality by birth on the territory of the state of Congolese parents, by naturalization, by presumption of the law, and by option”; and “is Congolese, a child born on the Congolese soil of the state of legally unknown parents or without known nationality” (RDC, 2004). In brief, King Leopold II gave more weight to the doctrine of *jus soli*, place of birth, than that of *jus sanguinis*, blood doctrine or ancestry. The annexation of the Congo Free State to Belgium in 1908 did not change this law.

The researcher further interrogated inter-state weakness and DRC internal governance issues with regard to management of intrastate conflicts. To find out EACRF the nature of dynamics in management of DRC civil war, the researcher asked EAC Director of Coordinating Mechanism Olsson (2015) conducted a dissertation that examined the reasons for regional action, specifically focusing on self-interest and

altruism. The researcher observed that the intervention decisions of ECOWAS and SADC in Mali and DRC, respectively, were significantly impacted by the realist postulation. The intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was primarily driven by the national interests of the participating countries.

The economic and geo-strategic indicators provide compelling evidence, indicating that political leaders were primarily focused on demonstrating their influence as key participants in both the local community and the global arena. The action by both blocs was prompted by the probable spillover impact resulting from the entangled ethnic connections, porous borders, and economic interdependence.

The study conducted by Twesigye (2013) investigated the dynamics of foreign involvement and enduring conflicts in North Kivu province, with a specific emphasis on regional actors. His investigation uncovered that the participation of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, the surrounding nations of the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the conflict is primarily motivated by their own strategic objectives, which are detrimental to the stability of the DRC. Burundi has exhibited a security interest in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Bujumbura, a government predominantly composed of Tutsis, perceived a threat from Hutu militia organizations such as Forces fir the Defense of Democracy (FDD) and National Liberation Forces (NLF). These groups have been used the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a strategic base to undermine the stability of Burundi. The support of rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been attributed by several authors to economic factors.

Similar to Rwanda and Uganda, Bujumbura has faced recurrent accusations of

abusing the natural riches in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In regions under the jurisdiction of the Hutu rebels, a significant proportion of consumer items are exported from the country and thereafter sold at elevated prices.

Uganda is widely recognized for its substantial involvement in both the initial and subsequent Congolese conflicts, as it provided support to the Tutsi factions in Congo in their struggle against the Hutus militants who had moved from Rwanda. At the outset, Kampala exhibited unwavering support for the government led by Kabila, a temporary partnership that persisted until Kampala aligned itself with Uganda in contesting Kabila's dictatorship. Nevertheless, because to the divergent strategic objectives of Uganda and Rwanda, the territorial dispute between the two nations resulted in the fragmentation of the Liberation Movement of the Democratic Forces (RCD). The division and ongoing conflicts had a significant influence on the political and military environment of Congo, as each faction sought to establish dominance over various regions of the country and engaged in ongoing battles over the abundant and untapped natural riches. As a result, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was partitioned into distinct regions under the leadership of various insurgent factions. However, the UN Panel of Experts Report of 2005 has implicated both Kampala and Kigali as the primary actors responsible for the illicit exploitation of natural resources and the ongoing strife within the nation. The Hutus, who have relocated from Rwanda to Congo, are regarded to be the primary cause of the country's destabilization. The civil conflicts that afflicted North Kivu in the early 1990s were mostly perceived as a clash between the Hutus and Tutsi ethnic groups. In a similar vein, Rwanda has faced allegations of active involvement in the Second Congolese war through its provision of support to the rebel forces. Specifically, a United Nations assessment on the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) revealed that Kigali had been offering

assistance to the M23 organization. Therefore, Rwanda's involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) encompasses both ethnic and economic aspects. Rwanda, despite its abundant natural resources, has generated substantial profits through the illicit trade of important minerals such as Tantalum and Tungsten, which are subsequently sold under Rwanda's official labels. Hence, the profitable illicit trade not only offsets Kigali's trade shortfall but also serves as the driving force behind its ongoing backing of the Tutsi insurgent factions in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

This assertion is based on the observation that the centralized Congo has exhibited a state of weakness since the mid-1970s, rendering the nation susceptible to political instability. The disputes that have occurred in North-Kivu and South-Kivu need not be regarded as separate occurrences. According to Kisangani (2012), Lemarchand (2009), and Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002), it is imperative to comprehend these concepts within their respective historical frameworks. The conflicts in Eastern Congo are influenced by a significant aspect, namely the nationality laws that have been specifically designed to exclude individuals of Rwandan heritage from participating in the political process and to deny them the right to a permanent homeland (Kisangani, 2012). The origins of Congolese nationality can be traced back to the decree of 27 December 1892, which was signed by King Leopold II.

This decree stipulated that an individual obtains Congolese nationality through various means, including birth on the territory of the state with Congolese parents, naturalization, presumption of the law, and option. Additionally, the decree stated that a child born on Congolese soil of the state with legally unknown parents or without known nationality is considered Congolese (RDC, 2004). In summary, King Leopold

II placed greater emphasis on the theory of *jus soli*, which pertains to the place of birth, as opposed to the doctrine of *jus sanguinis*, which pertains to blood doctrine or ancestry. The statute remained unaltered following the annexation of the Congo Free State to Belgium in 1908.

The researcher conducted a more in-depth examination of inter-state weaknesses and internal governance concerns inside the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in relation to the management of intrastate conflicts. In order to understand the dynamics of managing the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the researcher requested the EAC Director of Coordinating Mechanism and Military attaches, as well as the EACRF ground team to identify the internal weaknesses of partner states, scenarios of state exclusion, and ethnicity as the underlying causes of the DRC conflict. The sample size consisted of 150 participants. Failure to return two questionnaires was seen. Figure 5.2 presents a summary of the data.

It is clear from this conversation that the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is intricate due to the participation of transnational militia groups that receive backing from EAC states. The lack of effective coordination among Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in addressing these armed groups has resulted in this situation. Moreover, the acquisition of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) exacerbates and intensifies the conflict. EACRF is currently facing a challenging intervention environment in managing the violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).




Figure 5.2: Regional Root Causes and internal Conflict in DRC

Source: Field Data, 2023

Respondents 91(60.66%) acknowledged that institutional weaknesses in EAC states contribute to prolonged conflicts in DRC. Additionally, 43(28.66%) respondents stated that regional security competition, namely power rivalry, affects the management of DRC conflict. According to 8(5.33%), the informal economy and 8(5.33%) trans-border social networks are additional factors that contribute to the complexity of internal conflict in the DRC.

5.2.1 Institutional Governance Weakness in EAC States

These findings indicate that successive administrations in the DRC have been plagued by operational and institutional crises, especially in the eastern region of the nation. In the eastern region of the DRC, where a power vacuum exists and which is abhorrent to nature, rebel organizations such as M23 arise to contest the legitimacy of the government. In addition, the Rwandan and Ugandan militants engaged in conflict with their respective governments across the DRC's borders lack a solid foundation in

their home countries; consequently, they utilize the porous borders of the DRC as safe havens from which to launch attacks and engage in interactions with vulnerable communities. This discovery is consistent with De Heredia's (2017) contention that the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Allied Democratic Force (ADF) are instances of such insurgents that operate arbitrarily along the eastern border. ADF is a Ugandan insurgent organization that has been inactive in Uganda since 2007 and is presently headquartered in the eastern DRC. The organization's objective is to liberate Uganda from what it considers to be an attempt at dominance by Rwandan Tutsis. FDLR is an oppositional Hutu rebel organization and one of the few remaining Rwandan rebel factions active in the DRC. Its members are Tutsis.

As a result, internal institutional weaknesses in Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC have complicated the DRC's Eastern region conflict management. The three nations are incapable of coordinating further in an effort to eradicate rebel groups operating along the permeable borders of the east. Militant organizations have a well-documented history and a culture of retaliation against the governments of their home countries, which have long held each other responsible for the militias' presence within their territories. A contention was put forth during an interview that disarmament, demobilization, and community reintegration constitute the means by which peace building is pursued. The military officer further contended that regional conflicts can occasionally impede interventions as a result of power rivalries among certain member states, which in turn diminish the effectiveness of the military force. The following plate is evident that the researcher was indeed in Goma for field study.



Plate 5. 1: Plate Showing the Researcher in Goma-DRC
Source: Field Data, 2023

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, the April 2012 M-23 rebellion, a violent insurrection within the FARDC, precipitated violent confrontations in North Kivu. Former National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) members who had merged with the FARDC organized the rebellion. Another insurgent organization founded in 2006 by Laurent Nkunda was the CNDP. It had the support of Uganda and Rwanda. During an interview, a military officer expressed the following view:

Le M-23 a été vaincu en avril 2013 et ceux qui n'ont été ni capturés ni tués ont été divisés en deux et ont fui vers le Rwanda et l'Ouganda. Plus tard, ils sont retournés dans l'est de la RDC et se sont réintégrés dans le conflit environ deux ans avant les élections de 2018. Leur retour a ajouté à la tension entre le Rwanda et l'Ouganda parce que le

Rwanda pensait que l'Ouganda utilisait les anciens mutins du M-23 qui rencontrent régulièrement des responsables militaires ougandais et opèrent librement à Kampala (Entretien avec un membre du comité du chef de la défense, 12th October, 2023 in Goma, DRC, Burundi Cohort)

In April 2013, M-23 was vanquished, and those who were not apprehended or murdered were divided into two factions and sought refuge in Rwanda and Uganda. Subsequently, they reentered the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and reengaged in the conflict approximately two years prior to the 2018 election. Rwanda perceived Uganda's utilization of the ex-M-23 mutineers, who frequently interact with Ugandan military leaders and operate autonomously in Kampala, as a contributing factor to the escalating animosity between Rwanda and Uganda. (Interview held with a chief of defense committee member, 12th October, 2023 in Goma, DRC, Burundi Cohort)

The expression encapsulates the geographical backdrop of the competition and the potential for proxy warfare in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The political repercussions of the DRC elections and the division within the party are internal factors that have resulted in the emergence of factions. These divisions then evolve into rebel groups that oppose the incumbent government, but with regional backing, as previously indicated. This finding aligns with the argument made by the International Crisis Group (2020) that President Tshisekedi assumed leadership of a democratically weakened nation that succumbed to political pressures in order to secure elections. However, the results do not implicate marginalization within the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a fundamental factor contributing to the violence, as mentioned in the subsequent sub-sections.

5.2.2 DRC Colonial History, Weak Governance Systems and Marginalization Contribution to DRC Conflict

As exemplified by the Congolese elections and the dictatorial tendencies in these nations, institutional state frailty refers to a lack of adherence to the rule of law, a shoddy electoral process, and justice. These circumstances lend support to the notions

of nepotism, corruption, and ethnic exclusion in the DRC State's resource distribution. The results corroborate those of Ngendahima (2023), who classified the Congolese government and army as internal protagonists in the Congolese conflict in his analysis. He noted that the colonial system, post-independence political unrest, and Mobutu dictatorship are the origins of the DRC's problems. The history of the DRC is marked by a catalogue of oppression, and the government of the DRC has never failed to adequately represent or protect its people.

In contrast, it has frequently functioned as a catalyst for individual affluence and unrestricted authority. Notwithstanding the Congolese army's prominent involvement in the Congolese conflict, the government fails to provide assurances regarding the safety and security of its populace. Ngendahimana (2023) further argues that eastern Congo will continue to be a battleground and innocent civilians will continue to bear a tragically high price so long as the Congolese government is unable to control its territory, provide basic services, or effectively protect its people, and so long as diverse armed groups can profit from illicit trade in natural resources and complex regional alliances.

Furthermore, this discovery supports the claim made by De Heredia (2017) that a substantial influx of refugees originated from Rwanda. Hutu genocidaires, in alliance with the Mobutu, established armed factions, which were subsequently emulated by Tutsis and other opportunistic groups with Rwandan assistance (2019). This is a pretext given by the neighbor, specifically Rwanda, to intervene in the conflict. Ultimately, the interference precipitated the Congo conflicts. For example, interference from Rwanda was a major factor in the formation of Mai-Mai militias and subsequent violent conflicts (De Heredia (2017)). Some Mai-Mai militias were

organized for resistance purposes. Others, nevertheless, began to pursue alternative interests over time. To this day, the ethnic rivalry between the Hutus and the Tutsi has persisted.

Dilemmas of ideology, resource allocation, and ethnic identity all contributed to the fragmentation of politics after independence. As a consequence, while some individuals supported the central government, others did not. Armed factions and economically motivated informal networks emerged as a means of aiding or opposing the central government's objectives, and were subsequently utilized to sustain acts of violence (Ntung, 2019).

The Katanga and South Kasai conflicts of secession (1960–65), as well as the Congo conflicts (1996–97 and 1998–2003), shared these characteristics. This fragmentation and its repercussions are substantial contributors to the weak legitimacy that all central administrations of the DRC have endured, since no factions have ever been completely in agreement. The extensive reliance on foreign intervention for security, financial, and humanitarian assistance from the United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO), the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPF) can be attributed to the fragmentation, which has also contributed to the conflict's current protracted duration and further weakened the state's capacity (Smith, 2). Furthermore, state-led repression was pervasive from the 1960s until 2019, when Joseph Kabila voluntarily ceded power. This is supported by the responses to criticisms, dissent, and opposition over the years. The following Plate indicates the researcher in North-Kivu for field study.



Plate 5. 2: Plate Showing the Researcher in North-Kivu
Source: Field Data, 2023

In spite of the persistent existence of economically motivated informal networks and political fragmentation, President Tshisekedi refrains from resorting to state-sponsored repression in order to quell dissent. Fragmentation and networks, by virtue of their socio-economic and socio-political ramifications, facilitated the formation, resurgence, and endorsement of armed factions (Misser, 2020).

The origins of the conflicts in the DRC can be traced back to the colonial era and the occupation by King Leopold II. The Belgian regimes established a precedent for unbridled individual authority, exploitation of public funds for personal gain, severe

suppression of political opposition, and ethnic and regional divisions within society (Kisangani, 2012; Lemarchand, 1964; Young, 1965; Young & Turner, 1985). The DRC underwent a challenging and precarious period following independence, in part due to this tragic past, during which rebellions and secessionist conflicts erupted beginning in 1960 (Kisangani, 2012). Understanding the conflicts in modern-day DRC and formulating viable strategies for their resolution and peace consolidation requires a firm grasp of the wars that raged during the 1960s and 1970s.

5.2.3 Transnational Ethnic Groupings, Ethnic Exclusion and Armed Groups

Hence, the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is multifaceted, encompassing various factors such as the enduring impacts of colonialism, prolonged periods of inadequate governance within the nations of the East African Community (EAC), persistent ethnic exclusionary politics, and the resulting spill-over effects within a volatile locality (Solomon, 2015). The internal conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has witnessed recurrent interventions from neighboring countries in Congo, such as the Sudan Development Assistance Committee (SDAC) and the East African Community (EAC) partner states. Additionally, external forces have played a role in transforming initially localized conflicts into transregional ones. This transformation has resulted in the emergence of competing and overlapping forms of governance, as well as the provision of public goods, including health and security, by both state and non-state actors. These actors include violent insurgencies such as warlords, militias, and religious extremists or radical Islamists (International Crisis Group, 2020).

The competition between Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, together with their internal conflicts, poses a significant danger to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

These nations have employed militias operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to engage in proxy conflicts with one another. According to the International Crisis Group (2020), the FDLR is associated with Uganda and Burundi in opposition to Rwanda. Rwanda is associated with providing assistance to rebel groups in South Kivu who are fighting against Burundi, as well as helping rebels such as the ADF who are against Museveni's Uganda. President Tshisekedi aims to diplomatically address this dynamic through the establishment of a quadrilateral agreement involving Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, with the objective of fostering reconciliation.

The results suggest that, similar to other African militaries, the DRC army is heavily influenced by politics and involved in civil conflicts. The DRC armed forces are controlled by autocratic leaders and regulations, which can be attributed, at least in part, to the colonial heritage and subsequent dictatorships that frequently exploited them as merciless political instruments. The military has cultivated a tendency to overthrow its own governing bodies. The conflict can be understood as a complex manifestation of various factors, including internal political, economic, military, geographical, and ethnic elements. These factors, when combined with external meddling, create a dynamic interplay that allows all parties involved to exploit the abundant natural resources of the country. The present findings are in contrast to the findings of Nellke (2022), which suggest that the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is driven by rebel groups originating from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. This dispute is mostly driven by internal factors and is influenced by the absence of the state, which requires effective resolution.

Numerous international players, both state and non-state, have endeavored to provide assistance; yet, their endeavors have ultimately resulted in unfortunate developments in the narrative. The persistent lack of trust hinders the achievement of peace, to the extent that all leaders who emerge, whether through violence or manipulated elections, encounter identical obstacles. According to Zartman (1995), the theory of Conflict Transformation posits that in a collapsed system, the presence of numerous actors and diverse ideologies leads to a change in loyalty towards individual rulers rather than the nation. This may elucidate the reason behind the lack of patriotic sentiment among politicians and local residents in their efforts to reconstruct their nation. The violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) arises from the exclusion of specific ethnic groups in the allocation of resources, necessitating the implementation of peacebuilding processes to address these concerns.

This aligns with Mills' (2014) claim that foreigners should not be perceived as having a greater affection for the country than the natives themselves. Consequently, when the system fails, numerous Congolese individuals frequently resort to their tribal heritage, leading them to feel excessively proud to support any leader they perceive as not belonging to their own community. These dynamics often give rise to a dispute that is easily characterized but poses significant challenges in terms of resolution. Therefore, the participation of the EACRF in the internal conflict of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) might be characterized as facing coordination issues due to the significant involvement of the EACRF organ and the political dynamics within it. Conflict transformation theory indicates that the way out of a conflict is to look at root causes of a conflict. As discussed in this chapter, primary root causes of DRC Congo seem to be internal since exclusion of some ethnic groups has birthed militia groups

and unending war in Eastern Congo. To resolve these conflicts therefore, there is need for inclusive process where all stakeholders participate towards resolving the conflict.

5.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter examined the origins, varieties, and scope of intrastate conflict in the DRC. It was reported that the complexity of the DRC conflict stems from underlying causes emanating from both the DRC and its partner states. In general, the EAC region has been plagued by weaknesses in state governance that have fostered transnational militia organizations. The borders of Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda are havens for militias that have emerged as a result of marginalization and governance deficiencies within these nations. A similar history of poor governance, assassinations, and economic exclusion of certain ethnic groups, particularly along the eastern border, can be found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. the subsequent overleaf contains the dynamics and challenges in management of DRC'S intractable intra-state conflict by EACRF Chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

DYNAMICS AND CHALLENGES IN MANAGEMENT OF DRC'S INTRACTABLE INTRA-STATE CONFLICT BY EACRF

This chapter evaluates the obstacles encountered by EACR in its administration of the DRC conflict. Difficulties associated with early warning systems, coordination, peace support, preventive diplomacy, and peace building are introduced, interpreted, and discussed in this chapter. It emphasizes on preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping programs, and conflict prevention. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the deficiencies of these intervention mechanisms.

6.1 EACRF Intervention Dynamics and Challenges

In general, the obstacles associated with establishing a solid foundation for sustainable economic and social development and resolving conflicts in the DRC are formidable. However, by leveraging its strategic location and vast resource endowment, the DRC also possesses enormous potential to become a driver of integration and expansion in the Great Lakes region and beyond. The opportunity for the resolution of the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to generate a significant peace dividend not only for the Congolese people but also for the entire Great Lakes region exists to the extent that adequate financial commitments can be mobilized and strong political will can be maintained (Kisangani, 2012).

Conflicts and instability have persisted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo despite persistent national, regional, and international efforts to negotiate peace and an end to hostilities. Significant peace accords have been established, such as the

January 2008 accord between the DRC government and rebel groups, the six-country ceasefire agreement signed in July 1999 in Lusaka, and the peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda in July 2002, which called for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops and the disarmament of Rwandan Hutu militias in Eastern DRC. The ceasefires facilitated the restoration of tranquility and readiness for a systematic transition to the post-conflict period, which encompassed the electoral processes of 2006 and 2011. However, insecurity persists, particularly in the Eastern region. An IDP stated in an interview:

The lack of progress towards establishing peace through ceasefires and peace agreements suggests that underlying issues remain unresolved, contributing to inter-group animosities, skepticism towards the government by communities and people, and strained relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighboring countries. (Interview held on 13th October 2023 in Goma IDP camp, DRC, Goma)

This statement highlights longstanding challenges in the DRC that can be traced back to the colonial period. Specifically, the colonial administration instituted a framework wherein the exploitation of national resources for the personal gain of the rulers was sanctioned by the state. This practice persisted from the reign of King Leopold II through the Belgian colonial administration and onwards to the regimes that followed independence (Kisangani, 2012; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). In the independent DRC, indiscriminate resource exploitation has persisted, posing formidable obstacles to peace interventions by an equal number of regional organizations. The most significant obstacle has been the relationship between central and subnational administrations, as will be elaborated below.\

6.1.2 Relations between the Central Government and Sub-National Communities Challenge

The history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been characterized by disagreements that revolved around the choice between federalism and a centralized state, which are the difficulties associated with the latter. Since 1966, the nation has been governed de facto as a centralized and unitary state (Kisangani, 2012; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). An important obstacle posed by a centralized government is the lack of veto power. A veto participant, as defined by Tsebelis (2002), is an individual or collective actor whose consent is required to effectuate a modification in the prevailing political order. As an illustration, federalism grants veto authority to provincial entities in relation to the federal government.

Parliament was a unicameral body during the Mobutu regime, with members elected or nominated from within the sole political party. No institutional veto actor was formidable enough to contest President Mobutu. Laurent Kabila imposed a regime by decree and suspended the transitional parliament upon assuming the presidency in 1997. While the 2006 Constitution establishes several institutional veto actors, including an independent judiciary and the National Assembly, their efficacy is restricted. Moreover, restrictions on press freedom impede the formation of non-partisan veto actors, of which the media constitutes a significant component.

A further difficulty posed by a centralized system in the DRC is the resource concentration at the epicenter of decision-making. Since the mid-1960s, the proportion of financial resources allocated to the provinces has been relatively insignificant in comparison to the resources allocated to the capital metropolis. According to a study by Kisangani (2012), the president's office reportedly utilized an average of 20% of the national budget annually from 1966 to 2010. In contrast, the

provinces received less than 10% of the national budget.

Moreover, traditional authorities who participated in state-building during the colonial period and could have contributed to the establishment of a robust state in the postcolonial era were weakened by the centralized state in the DRC. The central government was compelled to depend on foreign aid as its ability to collect taxes was significantly undermined as a result of the weakening of those traditional authorities. Moreover, the act of depriving traditional authorities of their responsibility as guardians of land weakened them as an institution capable of mediating land-related disputes amicably.

In conclusion, over time, the capacity of the centralized state to supply public commodities including roads, education, and health has diminished. The DRC had more than 145,000 kilometers of operational routes in 1959. At the end of 2013, the operational road network spanned less than 31,000 kilometers, with the majority of it situated in southern Katanga, Kinshasa, and Lower Congo (RDC, 2012). The DRC had the most advanced medical and health infrastructure in tropical Africa between 1958 and 1959 (European Community, 1959). After a span of fifty years, the infrastructure has significantly deteriorated. The denial of public infrastructure and social services undermines the centralized state's legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. Furthermore, it fosters an atmosphere that is favorable for the organization of resistance forces against the central government, potentially culminating in violent insurrections at the regional scale.

As this discussion has demonstrated, the lack of political will to confront the nature of

government that is suitable for the Congolese people has impeded peace efforts in the DRC. As discussed here, military interventions as a one-time event might not be sufficient to resolve the Congo conflict. Moreover, as will be elaborated upon subsequently, the regionalization of the conflict has presented an even more formidable obstacle.

6.1.3 Regional Dynamics and its Complexity

Rwanda and Uganda, as previously mentioned, maintain their involvement in the Congolese conflicts and support rebel groups as proxies. Such mutual animosity is what sustains the conflict cycles in the SGLR and the DRC. Destabilization and animosity among regional states is one of the most significant obstacles to the EACRF's success in the DRC. As one refugee put it:

Regional states are confronted with national security concerns stemming from the persistent threats posed by the insurgent groups that operate within the DRC. Additionally, there is ethnic overlap along the border. Interview held on 13th October, 2023 in Goma IDP camp, DRC, Goma)

This indicates that these nations have extremely complex and substantial interests in the Congolese conflicts. Hence, these findings provide strong evidence that the regional security complex has been responsible for the escalation and perpetuation of conflict cycles in the DRC as well as the Great Lakes Region, which was formerly lesser in size. These continue to be significant obstacles for EACRF peace efforts in the DRC. In addition to considerations of security, regional states possess vested interests in the exploitation and pillaging of the Congolese mineral resources, which they may do through clandestine assistance to rebel factions or overt military conflict. The researcher is depicted on the subsequent plate in Kigali, Rwanda, one of the EAC states impacted by the DRC conflict.

Hence, the resolution of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) necessitates a comprehensive approach that extends beyond its national boundaries, given the significant regional aspect. In February 2013, a Regional Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework was officially accepted. The adoption aimed to tackle the root causes of Congolese disputes and promote mutual confidence among neighboring countries. The framework, which was signed by eleven African governments, was mediated by the United governments. In alignment with the established framework, it is imperative that this overarching plan is propelled by domestic political players, bolstered by the backing of regional powers. According to Cammaert (2013).



Plate 6. 1: Plate Showing the Researcher in Kigali, Rwanda
Source: Field Data, 2023

Hence, the resolution of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) necessitates a comprehensive approach that extends beyond its national boundaries, given the significant regional aspect. In February 2013, a Regional Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework was officially accepted. The adoption aimed to tackle the root causes of Congolese disputes and promote mutual confidence among neighboring countries. The framework, which was signed by eleven African governments, was mediated by the United Nations. In alignment with the established framework, it is imperative that this overarching plan is propelled by domestic political players, bolstered by the backing of regional powers. According to Cammaert (2013),

Rwanda played a crucial role in the military defeat of the M23 rebel group by the intervention brigade. Additionally, there has been a notable improvement in the relationship between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the intervention brigade, indicating some progress in handling recurring conflicts since 2013. Nevertheless, the level of confidence between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its neighboring countries remains delicate (MONUSCO, 2014). The conflict and bloodshed in the east continue to be cyclical, and the Congolese state is still in a condition of collapse (Reyntjens, 2009). Regional blocs such as MONUSCO have made unsuccessful attempts to reinstate peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), mostly because to their reliance on disrupting the pattern of neighboring state involvement in the conflict and addressing the intricate security dynamics within the area. MONUSCO lacks the authority to engage in combat against the rebels.

A researcher wanted to know what problems EACRF had when trying to help handle the conflict between states in the DRC, so he asked EACRF's ground teams to find

those problems. The sample size consisted of 150 participants. Failure to return two questionnaires was seen. Table 6.1 is summary of findings:

Table 6.1: Table Showing EACRF intervention Challenges

Intervention Challenges		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Humanitarian operations	47	31.33	31.33	31.33
	Preventive Deployment	84	56.00	56.00	56.00
	Acceptability operations	0	00.0	00.0	00.0
	Peace building	6	4.00	4.00	4.00
	Peace keeping	13	8.66	8.66	8.66

Source: Field Data, 2023

A majority of respondents 84 (56.00%) agree with the challenge of preventative deployment, while 13(8.66) respondents agree with peacekeeping. 47 (31.33%) respondents agree with humanitarian activities, while only 6(4.00%) agree with peace building issues. This implies that the regional force is primarily concerned with the implementation of preventive measures in order to mitigate the escalation of an already ongoing violent conflict. The regional peacekeeping force should offer technical guidance on effective strategies for safeguarding civilians during such operations.

6.1.4 Humanitarian Operation Challenges

The results presented in Table 6.1 suggest that the EACRF does not prioritize the humanitarian function as a primary mandate within its mission. This observation highlights the challenge of justifying preventative military action from a humanitarian perspective, considering the possibility for significant harm resulting from such operations. However, it is important to note that delaying such action often leads to substantial loss of life during times of crisis. How can humanitarian groups prevent being perceived as participants in the conflict when military and relief workers engage

with one other? The primary determinant of both success and failure in all instances was the interplay between military strategy, humanitarian objectives, and the exigencies of the prevailing circumstances. Alignment of strategy, objectives, and demands significantly increased the likelihood of success compared to situations where one or more components were incongruent (Massingham, 2009). If intervening governments possess a comprehensive understanding of the challenges they face and demonstrate the political determination to sacrifice the lives of soldiers in order to rescue unfamiliar individuals, they wield significant influence over the result of a humanitarian intervention.

As the sub-region's conflict intervention force, the EACRF is responsible for executing any intervention missions assigned to it by the AU PSC. The force is expected to faithfully execute its mission, thereby resolving the war in that specific region. The multifaceted force has the capacity to transition from peace enforcement to peacekeeping in order to contribute to the post-conflict reconstruction efforts of the nation that has been impacted. This force can thus be utilized in various conflict scenarios as specified by the deployments of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ASF) and any other functions as ordered by the Philippine Security Council (PSC) or the Assembly.

In order to investigate the challenges faced by the EACRF in safeguarding the victims of the internal conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the region, the researcher consulted with the EAC Director of Coordinating Mechanism and Military attaches, as well as the logistical, operational, and strategy teams of the EACRF. The objective was to identify the specific groups affected by the DRC conflict and determine who could potentially benefit from the intervention of the EACRF. The sample size consisted of 150 participants. Two questionnaires were not received.

Figure 6.1 is summary of findings.

A majority of respondents 81 (54 %) reported that the internal conflict in the DRC has led to the displacement of internally displaced persons (IDPs), while 51 respondents (34 %) agreed that the conflict has resulted in refugees. 12 (8%) concurred with the existence of undocumented immigrants. The primary consequence of the internal conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the creation of internally displaced persons (IDPs), who are then dispersed among member states of the East African Community (EAC).




Figure 6.1: Humanitarian Challenges in DRC Internal Conflict

Source: Field Data, 2023

The Eastern Africa region has experienced some of the most protracted and violent domestic conflicts in the world, including the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The war in the region has resulted in fatalities, a significant increase in refugees, and the emergence of IDPS. These consequences have had a widespread impact on the region's efforts to establish stability and prosperity, as

evidenced by the work of EACRF. In the context of Eastern Africa, disputes have frequently transcended national boundaries, particularly in relation to sensitive matters such as refugees and environmental problems. These issues cannot be effectively addressed just from a state-centric standpoint.

Promoting peace and security, as well as establishing systems to facilitate the repatriation and reintegration of refugees, returnees, displaced persons, and demobilized military, are crucial aspects for the region. The matter concerning refugees in the region is multifaceted. The Tutsi refugees and their descendants have not relinquished their Rwandan identity or their entitlement to repatriation to Rwanda. The marginalization of the Tutsi population from public spheres and their systematic extermination throughout periods of political strife precipitated a rebellion in September 1990, which was ultimately suppressed albeit with significant loss of life. The massacre and subsequent mass displacement of the Rwandan population in 1994 can be attributed to the incursion of Tutsi refugees from Uganda, who had been historically marginalized from political influence.

The East African Community (EAC) organized a sub-regional summit in Mwanza, Tanzania on October 17, 1990, marking the first instance of such an event. Neighboring countries Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Zaire initiated multiple peace conferences. Each of these countries had a significant population of Rwandan refugees, prompting them to actively advocate for a ceasefire and facilitate political resolution. Plate 6.2 displays IDPs



Plate 6. 2: Plate Showing the Researcher with IDPS in Kibati- 10kms from Goma
Source: Field Data, 2023



Plate 6. 3: Plate Showing the Researcher in Sky Blue T-Shirt (on the left) during an FGD with Refugees in Nyakabande Transit Center - Kisoro Western Uganda
Source: Field Data, 2023

A refugee challenge has been imposed on the EAC bloc as a result of the turmoil in the DRC. UNICEF has issued a warning today that a significant number of children who are escaping the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

are facing severe danger in densely populated and unhygienic camps for internally displaced people (IDPs). The escalating magnitude of the crisis, characterized by the daily influx of new internally displaced persons (IDPs), has resulted in increasingly limited humanitarian access due to the worsening security conditions in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The conflict in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has escalated since October 20, 2022, resulting in the displacement of numerous individuals from the Rutshuru region in the North Kivu province. These individuals have primarily been relocated to Kanyaruchinya and Kibati, located north of the city of Goma, as well as to the Lubero area. During a series of Focused Group Discussions, the displaced and refugee participants expressed their deep concern on the distressing humanitarian circumstances they have endured subsequent to the resurgence of the violence.

Ntamuntu waje kudukiza, nuko twumva twenyine, tubabaye, kandi tutishoboye. Twagejejweho ko imiryango mpuzamahanga yihariye ibaho hagamijwe guteza imbere uburenganzira n'umutekano by'abantu bimuwe; ariko, ntibaradufasha. Ibyokurya bike twahawe nabeza neza ntibihagije; hari igihe nshobora kubaho ntabeshaho kandi ibintu birababaje ... Byongeye kandi, turi abantu kandi dukwiye gufatwa nkabo. (FGDs, abimuwe, 12 Ukwakira, 2023).

No one has come to save us, so we feel alone, upset, and helpless. It has been brought to our attention that specific international organizations exist to promote the rights and safety of displaced individuals; however, they have yet to assist us. The meager provisions bestowed upon us by well-wishers are insufficient; there are times when I can survive without sustenance and the conditions are deplorable...Additionally, we are human beings and ought to be treated as such. (FGDs, IDPs, 12th October, 2023).

Almost a similar concern was also raised by some refugees during another focused group discussion;

Toyebaki te que tolingaki kozala na situation oyo ya mawa. Matata oyo euti kozongisama sika epusaki biso mosika na bankoko na biso, bamosusu kati na biso babungisaki balingami na bango, basusu babungisaki biloko na bango. Ngai moko, nabungisaki bana na ngai

mibale mpe mwasi na ngai ntango batomboki bakotaki na ndako na biso, batumbaki ndako na biso mpe babomaki libota na ngai. Nasengelaki kokima mbangu mpo na kobikisa bomoi na ngai mpo nazalaki na nzela mosusu te. Sikawa, nazali na eloko moko te etikali, nazali na elikya te mpe nazali na ntembe soki nakozonga lisusu na mboka na ngai. Nakanisaki koya ya Force régionale africaine orientale elingaki e changer situation, na terrain, makambo ezali ndenge mosusu...mpe tozali vraiment ko souffrir ya solo (FGDs, refugees, 8th, August, 2023).

We were not anticipating finding ourselves in this pitiful circumstance. We were estranged from our ancestral lands as a result of the recently rekindled conflict; some of us lost cherished ones, while others lost their possessions. My wife and I, along with our two children, perished when the insurgents attacked and torched our residence and murdered my family. Running for my life was necessary because I had no other option. At this moment, I am destitute, despondent, and unsure of whether I will be able to return to my native country. Despite my expectation that the arrival of the East African Regional Force would alter the circumstances, the situation has notably deteriorated on the ground, and we are undoubtedly in great suffering. (FGDs, refugees, 8th, August, 2023).



Plate 6. 4: Plate Showing the Researcher with Refugees in Kigali -Rwanda
Source: Field Data, 2023

Plate 6.4 illustrates the refugee crisis within the EAC. Uganda accommodates refugee groups originating from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a country afflicted by a protracted civil war that commenced in 1998 subsequent to a rebellion led by Laurent Kabila, backed by rebels from Rwanda and Uganda, against the long-ruling dictator Joseph Mobutu. The ceasefire for this conflict was formally declared in July 2003. An estimated 3.5 million people perished during this period (either directly due to the fighting or as a consequence of starvation and disease), and an additional 3.6 million were displaced.

Despite the fact that the conflict was initially fought along ethnic lines, economic interests are also evident, given the DRC's abundance of natural resources, including gold, diamonds, timber, and coltan. However, in spite of the peace agreement, numerous regions continue to be occupied by rebel forces, rendering the situation extremely precarious. Although the situation seemed to stabilize following 2003, there were two significant influxes of Congolese into Uganda: in 2005/06, they were primarily directed towards Kyaka II (Kyenjojo district, Western Region); and in 2008, they were concentrated in Nakivale and Kyangwali (Isingiro and Hoima districts, both Western Region).

Notwithstanding the refugee/IDP predicament, the recent intervention by the EACRF has sparked apprehension regarding the potential escalation of human rights violations by the regional force. Prior research has established the detrimental effects that congested theaters may have on civilian protection, including unclear attribution and accountability for violations and divergent interpretations of civilian protection obligations. Despite the fact that civilian safety in eastern Congo remains a significant concern, the United Nations continues to be the benchmark for international actors in regards to POC. In contrast to MONUSCO forces, the EAC force lacks a protection

mandate, and the degree to which it will prioritize the mitigation of harm to civilians during its operations and planning remains uncertain. However, a military officer proposed:

EACRF should establish secure corridors for humanitarian agencies to traverse in order to reach the vulnerable population, thereby facilitating humanitarian intervention (Interview, held in Rwanda, 9th October 2023, Rwanda Cohort).

However, the contentious aspect of humanitarian intervention is that whoever is intervening does so in violation of the sovereignty of the targeted state, despite doing so on humanitarian grounds. Consequently, transgressions against civilians have the potential to erode the legitimacy of the force, an already precarious position considering the historical record of foreign forces committing excesses in the Congo. Rwanda has been denied permission to deploy troops as part of the regional force by Kinshasa. Numerous neighboring countries have benefited from the political economy of conflict in the Congo, and other contributing nations have a history of providing support to armed groups in the region.

This can also be accomplished by fostering dialogue among insurgent groups affiliated with the Congolese government and by actively engaging with communities impacted by violence. These results support the claim made by Nelleke (2022) that repeated episodes of armed violence have beset the civilized population in the eastern DRC for the past thirty years. Nelleke's (2022) research, on the other hand, does not document civilian participation in the conflict in the form of support for rebel organizations considered liberators. Although endeavors to tackle their predicament are praiseworthy on paper, they must demonstrate feasibility in implementation before they can warrant further consideration and backing. Thus, despite enduring the brunt of conflicts, civilians are not incorporated into peace processes according to EACRF.

A member of the committee of the chief of defense argued in an interview that:

The main goal of the EAC in deploying the EACRF is to intervene in intrastate violence in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Supervise the systematic disengagement of M23 and other Armed Groups, while establishing the requisite circumstances for the execution of Political Processes, all the while ensuring the protection of the populace. (Interview held with a chiefs of defense committee member, 14th October, 2023 in Goma, DRC, Burundi Cohort).

This was further reinforced by another key respondent who emphasized on the key operations of the EACRF by stating the following;

Our mission is clear: to keep the violence from spreading further while also providing peace and security. Regarding this, we will continue to combat the rebels until we achieve big victory. In as much as civilian protectionist entrenched in our mandate, I believe our focus right now is to face off the rebels, and others will follow. (Interview, military attaché, 7th November, 2023).

The humanitarian dimension of the conflict does not appear to be a priority for EACRF, according to this statement. Regardless of the fact that there is evidence to suggest that armed groups in the DRC have responded to military pressure by being even more cruel toward locals. This lends credence to the claims made by Nelleke (2022) that a rise in civilian atrocities occurred in early 2020 as a result of the Congolese onslaught against the ADF in North Kivu. The EAC regional force clearly does not do anything to safeguard the civilian population. This makes one very worried about the possibility of human rights abuses committed by the military forces. Rwanda vehemently refutes these allegations. The accompanying plate shows the researcher interacting with refugees at the Kywangali refugee camp and the refugee department in the Hoima district.



Plate 6. 5: Showing the Researcher in Blue T-shirt at Department of Refugee in Uganda in Kyangwali
Source: Field Data, 2023



Plate 6. 6: Plate Showing the Researcher in Blue T-shirt with the Refugees in Uganda in Kyangwali refugee Camp
Source: Field Data, 2023

The EACRF's function in the management of the refugee crisis and internally

displaced persons (IDPs) in the DRC remains ambiguous. According to an interview with the FDG, neither refugees nor IDPs are cognizant of the humanitarian function of the EACRF. The integration of humanitarianism and peacekeeping/enforcement is an essential aspect to consider in any mission of this nature. Plate 6.5 presents an image of the researcher accompanied by a group of IDPs in the Goma region of the DRC.

IDPs, who represent civilians adversely affected by the conflict, must participate in a broader peace building initiative. The EACRF, which is no longer in existence but was once among the standby forces, established a special day for peace in the region where stakeholders gathered to discuss and evaluate the effectiveness of the EACRF's field training and command post exercises. As envisioned in the EAC treaty, civilian participation in the peace process emphasized a holistic approach. However, the EACRF's recent interventions in the DRC internal conflict are piecemeal and lack the capacity to bring about enduring peace.

It is evident from this discussion that, in light of its previous experiences, EACRF may exacerbate the refugee crisis in the region. Due to the fact that the force disregards IDPs and refugees, civilians consider its intervention to be hazardous to their safety and, worse, a violation of human rights. It is critical that the EACRF serve as an organization for the protection of civilians, with potential expansion to include the repatriation of refugees to the DRC. This would constitute a significant stride towards the transformation of the conflict in the Congo in the near future.

6.1.5 Preventive Deployment Challenges

The primary intervention mechanism of the EACRF is the support and preventive deployment of political peace initiatives. The scope of these intervention mechanisms is insufficient to address other facets of the conflict, including human rights justice and the transformation of the situation to prevent its recurrence.

Since M23, the primary target of the intervention, has seized control of additional territories in the eastern region, including some where east African troops were stationed, the so-called deployment has produced little fruit. A FDG participant lamented:

The East African Community regional force has received criticism from many quarters than just the DRC government. Many members of the community have vented their discontent regarding the inefficacy of the force. This has occasionally resulted in violent outbursts and uprisings against the force. (Interview held on 12th October 2023 in Goma refugee Camp, DRC).

The declaration also highlights the prevailing lack of confidence in foreign forces, considering the historical instances of military and economic interference by the neighboring country of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The utilization of the Democratic Republic of Congo's natural resources by actors within the region has been extensively recorded. In addition, certain members of the East African Community Regional Force, such as Burundi and Uganda, have unlawfully seized control of regions within the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). There is a significant level of frustration with the ongoing insecurity that has persisted after years of intervention, which includes almost 25 years of UN peacekeeping in the nation. However, the prevalence of violence persists, resulting in the displacement of almost six million individuals in the eastern region.

The primary objective of the east African force's military presence was to serve as a supplementary component to the political process, which also encompassed the leadership of the regional bloc. However, the political process has come to a halt due to increasing tension between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. The allegations of Rwanda's backing of M23 continue to be a significant source of disagreement between the two nations.

The EAC regional force employs various conflict prevention tactics, including the prompt deployment of a moderate military force, which includes police and civilian people, into a conflict zone. In an interview, a military official contended that the justification for this approach is that taking proactive measures, such as conflict resolution, diplomacy, and timely deployments, is far more economical. Based on this conversation, it is evident that EACRF operations are impulsive actions designed for immediate deployment in emergency situations. The organization has not yet adopted the concept of peace building, which involves conducting thorough investigations into the underlying causes of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in order to find long-lasting solutions. Despite being included in the EAC Treaty; the civilians are not included in the conflict management strategy for EACRF. Nevertheless, a crucial element of the organization is the political faction engaged in proactive diplomacy alongside military operations.

6.2 EACRF Coordination Challenge

The researcher requested EACRF ground teams, to identify other entities involved in managing the intrastate conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The sample size consisted of 150 participants. Failure to return two questionnaires was seen. The findings are summarized in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Table Showing EACRF Partners

EACRF Partners		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	EU	0	0.00	0.00	0.00
	UN	114	76.00	76.00	76.00
	SADC	11	7.33	7.33	7.33
	AU	23	15.26	15.26	15.26
	IGAD	2	1.33	1.33	1.33

	Total	150	100.0	100.0
--	-------	-----	-------	-------

Source: Field Data, 2023

According to Table 6.2, 114 respondents, accounting for (76%) of the total, expressed agreement that the UN forces were the primary partner to the EACRF forces. Out of the replies, 23 individuals (15.26%) expressed agreement with AU, 11 (7.33%) respondent expressed agreement with SADC whereas 2 individual (1.33 %) agreed that IGAD forces collaborate with EACRF forces. Externally, it is crucial to coordinate and cooperate with other regional and international organizations, individual states, and non-governmental organizations for two main reasons. On one side, these collaborations have the potential to address specific deficiencies in an organization's capabilities, such as limited financial resources or military equipment.

In contrast, the efficacy of conflict control policies is enhanced by the implementation of well-coordinated international endeavors. Occasionally, collaborative endeavors combining multiple regional and/or international organizations might be beneficial in enhancing the credibility of a certain conflict regulation initiative among local participants. The East African Community Regional Fund (EACRF) receives financial support from several regional and international organizations, such as the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN).

Nevertheless, during the discussion, a military commander expressed the viewpoint that securing external funds would pose significant challenges. The probability of receiving additional UN assistance on Congolese territory is low, considering the existing costly peacekeeping mission of 16,000 UN personnel in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Moreover, the AU lacks the financial means to offer continuous funding. The European Union (EU) could potentially provide funds

through the European Peace Facility, which could help either the East African Community (EAC) directly or the nations who contribute troops. This study aligns with the assertions made by Nelleke (2022) that the European Union (EU) exhibits limited willingness to allocate cash towards troop stipends, as previously examined by Crisis Group. However, the EU has the potential to allocate monies towards several objectives, including equipment procurement, logistics, communication, and transportation.

Based on this conversation, the intervention of EACRF is restricted to peacekeeping, and the enforcement of peacekeeping measures is illusory due to the intricate nature of the conflict. Furthermore, there exists a vulnerability in the safeguarding of human rights. Consequently, the regional soldiers prioritize peacekeeping efforts.

6.2.1 Peace Building and Peace Keeping Challenges

The extent of the force's authority has thus been a source of dispute between the government of the Congo and the East African Community. The regional force was tasked with supervising the withdrawal of armed groups, including M23, from eastern DRC, as per the regional bloc. A military commander asserted that the region in question is home to an estimated one hundred and twenty armed organizations. In addition, the force was tasked with ensuring compliance with the ceasefire negotiated in December 2022. Nevertheless, despite the Congolese government's desire for a more assertive stance, the regional force has declined to participate in offensive operations; thus, EACRF does not face any difficulty in enforcing peace. The force's primary objectives are peacekeeping and facilitating negotiations (Neklle, 2022).

The DRC government has recently made the decision to not extend the mandate of the East African Community Regional Force beyond its current expiration date of December 8, 2023. The force has been accused by President Felix Tshisekedi of not only inefficiency but also collusion with insurgents. However, the more probable motive behind the force's withdrawal is Tshisekedi's disappointment with the force's reluctance to employ proactive force against M23. Adopting this strategy would require the military to collaborate with government forces in order to conduct offensive operations aimed at neutralizing non-state factions (Neklle, 2022). In contrast to the findings presented here, which contradict Neklie (2022), the force employs a greater emphasis on conflict prevention strategies as opposed to the offensive tactics described.

It can be inferred from this discourse that EACRF places significant reliance on external partners in order to gain influence over its operations. The regional force lacks the financial resources and military hardware necessary to significantly influence the internal conflict in the DRC. This could potentially result in their overall responsibility being limited to peacekeeping, given the presence of structural deficiencies as elaborated in this subsection. The subsequent subsection delves into the extent of their authority as a regional force in the EAC region with respect to the management of internal conflicts, in light of the given scenario.

6.2.2 EACRF Preventive Diplomacy Strategy Challenge

The researcher aimed to comprehend the obstacles posed by EACRF preventive mechanisms. The researcher inquired about EACRF by requesting the EAC Director of Coordinating Mechanism and Military Attaches, as well as EACRF logistical, operational, and strategy teams, to devise preventive response strategies for intrastate

conflict management in the DRC. 150 individuals responded to the survey. The return of two questionnaires was absent. The results are summarized in Figure 6.2.




Figure 6.2: Preventive Diplomacy

Source: Field Data, 2023

A majority of respondents 124 (82.66%) agreed to deploy special envoys, while 12 respondents (8%) agreed to have a panel of wise and elevated representatives. While 2 (1.33) respondents agreed with special rapporteur. On 20 June, Uhuru Kenyatta, the former president of Kenya and Kenya's peace envoy, organized a peace conference called the Nairobi Process, which brought together leaders from the East African Community (EAC). They agreed to send a regional military to eastern DRC in order to assist in the fight against the armed factions. Kenya is currently in the forefront of diplomatic and military endeavors under the leadership of Kenyatta.

6.2.3 Special Envoys

According to Figure 6.3, 124 respondents, which accounts for 82.66% of the total, agreed to have special envoys involved. Moreover, the results suggest that the implementation of Conflict Early Warning Systems (COMWARN) plays a crucial role in the prevention of conflicts through the practice of preventive diplomacy. Nevertheless, there is a deficiency in the involvement of Civil Society Organizations and Private Sector Organizations at regional levels in the EACRF, which hinders the improvement of good governance and the potential for implementing multi-track diplomacy.

The CEWS provides early warning information to the Chairperson of the Commission, allowing the PSC to take preventive measures. Additionally, the Panel of the Wise can be deployed to support the PSC's activities and also serves as an advisory and peace-making entity. The community has employed a political dimension in conjunction with military operations. There are several individuals involved in preventative diplomacy within the ranks of EACRF. The peace process managed by Nairobi suggests that Uhuru Kenyatta, the former president of Kenya, is serving as a facilitator for the peace negotiations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This aligns with the demobilization initiative associated with the diplomatic and military pathways in Nairobi, which are integral components of the peacebuilding plan in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This aligns with the joint force's actions to assist Tshisekedi in his demobilization endeavors. There seems to be a prevailing anticipation that armed factions are compelled to either engage in demobilization via the Nairobi political pathway or face the prospect of being targeted by the regional military.

Tshisekedi's demobilization activities are closely connected to the diplomatic aspect within the EACRF ranks. The endeavors revolve around armed factions making a

commitment to demobilization via the Nairobi political pathway, or alternatively, being susceptible to targeting by the regional force. During an interview, a military commander mentioned that the EAC conflict prevention tools encompass Institutionalism criteria for Election monitoring and Early warning procedures. However, there is uncertainty on the applicability of these instruments in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Since its establishment, the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) has successfully negotiated an agreement with the rebels to get access to regions under their control. Additionally, the EACRF has actively advocated for a continuous and meaningful conversation between itself, the rebels, and the government. Under the guidance of the African Union (AU)-designated mediator between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, Angolan President João Lourenço, the rebels have made a commitment to withdraw from certain areas and will be replaced by the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF).

6.2.4 Panel of the Wise and Special Representative

The implementation of the EACRF has solidified the dual approach of seeking a political resolution with military interventions. The problem can only be resolved through a synergistic approach involving both armed troops and a well-functioning political process. The involvement of the regional body in the political discussion will facilitate a strong interconnection and integration between the two processes. The alignment and mutual reinforcement of military intervention and the political process would be maintained. The situation is better comprehended by leaders in East Africa. By possessing the requisite political determination, they would possess the knowledge of the most effective methods of exerting influence and would be able to confront

stubborn adversaries who impede the progress.

An additional advantageous aspect of the EAC plan is the integration of military and diplomatic measures. The Luanda Process, initiated in July, plays a crucial role in fostering political discourse and compromise. Angola serves as a mediator between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. The military aspect of the EAC process enhances current endeavors to stabilize the region and establish a proficient and efficient FARDC capable of safeguarding its borders. The Nairobi process witnessed the participation of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government delegation, headed by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, H.E Jean-Pierre Bemba. Bemba actively engaged in the virtual forum and provided valuable insights during the deliberations. The speaker provided reassurance to the audience regarding the government's dedication to both the Luanda and Nairobi Peace Processes. Prof. Serge Tshibangu, the President's Special envoy, Hon. Mbusa Nyamwisi, the Minister of State for Regional Integration, and Gen. Ndima Kongba, the North Kivu Governor, expressed their agreement with his views. MONUSCO representatives, under the leadership of Ms. Bintou Keita, reaffirmed their dedication to achieving enduring peace in the conflict-ridden Region (EAC, 2022).

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) was attended by several organizations, including the East African Community (EAC), African Union (A.U.), observers from several international organizations, and select members of the diplomatic Corps. The presence of Major General Alphaxard Kiugu, the Commander of the East African Community Regional Force, Major General Benoît Chavant, the Commander of the MUNUSCO Army Force, and Colonel Timoteo Neves from the

Ad hoc Verification Mechanism were also observed. Subsequently, the Facilitator, along with Ms. Bintou Keita, the head of MONUSCO, Hon. Mbusa Nyamwisi, and other stakeholders involved in addressing Gender-Based Violence, convened a virtual meeting with a cohort of female leaders who expressed their apprehensions regarding the predicament of women and children in the IDP camps.

The individuals made a formal request to the Facilitator to promptly address these concerns and mobilize supporters who are capable of engaging in initiatives aimed at empowering women within the camps. The EAC (2022) identified the absence of economic empowerment as a contributing factor that rendered women and children susceptible within the camps. H.E Kenyatta, in his role as the Facilitator of the EAC-led Nairobi Peace Process, noted the concerns raised by the women and provided them with reassurance of his support. Additionally, he implored the women to unite and establish systems through which they can actively contribute to the pursuit of peace. The Facilitator expressed gratitude towards the organizations that are closely collaborating with women and children, emphasizing the importance of their unwavering commitment to safeguarding and providing for their needs.

According to Were & Okoth (2023), this form of diplomacy can be characterized as the universalization of European theoretical and conceptual foundations, which have traditionally proven to be inadequate in elucidating and addressing the majority of global social, political, and ecological issues. The authors additionally contend that the current social and technological changes have placed significant strain on the conventional professional responsibilities of diplomats and diplomacy. This is due to the emergence of various hubs of diplomatic activity, which has subsequently led to

revisions in its conceptual framework. This diplomacy fails to include crucial groups of those impacted by the DRC war, such as grassroots leaders who operate across borders, commonly referred to as the track three type.

These findings support the recommendations of Were and Okoth (2023) that incorporating African heritage into diplomatic thought is crucial for diversifying its character in response to the fast evolving current world order. The report advocates for the inclusion of grassroots leaders and communities in order to properly handle this issue. However, the findings of this study diverge about the modes of diplomatic involvement that appear to have limited results in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Based on the aforementioned analysis, it is evident that military involvement by the EACRF is considered a final option, since preventive diplomacy and early warning systems are utilized to mitigate confrontations. While there are preventive strategies available, there is a lack of peace enforcement, which highlights the problems faced by the EACRF in responding to these issues.

6.3 EACRF Structural Challenges

The researcher sought the opinion EACRF's ground teams in order to ascertain the structural obstacles that the EACRF has encountered while attempting to manage the civil war in the DRC. The sample size consisted of 150 participants. Failure to return two questionnaires was seen.




Figure 6.3: Structural Capacity Challenges

Source: Field Data, 2023

The summary of findings is presented in Figure 6.3. According to Figure 6.3, 101 respondents (67.33%) believe that the forces in the DRC lack resources, while 33 (22 %) agree that there is insufficient manpower and 16 (10.6%) think that enforcement is delayed in order to resolve the conflict.

6.3.1 Resource Capacity Challenges

The insufficiency of resources can be attributed to the excessive reliance of the East African Community (EAC) on partnership funds provided by international organizations. The organization, meanwhile, obtains financial resources for its day-to-day operations from the member states. The East African Community (EAC) encounters several obstacles, such as insufficient resources and personnel, sluggish implementation of agreements reached during EAC meetings at the national level, and the challenge of addressing military security issues within member states due to the absence of authority over national troops.

The paucity of resources is evident in the inability to cover numerous

places, as confirmed by a logistics military officer response. Essential resources are required to sustain troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with minimal reliance on outside assistance. Despite the provision of donor aid, inadequate coordination undermines the overall effectiveness of the operation. Interview held with an In-charge at EAC ministry, 8th December, 2023 in Nairobi, Kenya).

Similarly, another key informant reinforced this statement by asserting that;

In essence, logistical and financial aspects are required for a successful operation. The primary issue with the majority of international institutions is from the member state's incapacity to adequately fund them. Therefore, due to deficiencies in financial and logistical resources, any multidimensional operation such as the East African Community Regional Force is considered to be unsuccessful or perform below expectations. In order for these ambitious missions to achieve success, it is imperative that the member states demonstrate a willingness to allocate their available resources. This initiative is expected to significantly enhance morale and foster cooperation among military personnel and other pertinent stakeholders. (Interview with military attaché held on 8th, December, 2023).

The military attaché and the in-charge at the Ministry of Defense (EAC) have both disclosed that the forces' ability to adhere to deadlines has been constrained by resource scarcity. It is regrettable that military operations in the DRC were cut short by a lack of resources and logistical complications stemming from the inability to maintain a presence in the country. This is true, given that EACRF operations were halted six months prior to a reasonable level of conflict management. Nonetheless, the EAC deployment agreement imposed a six-month limit on the soldiers, with the possibility of a renewal.

A similar source of funding for the EAC and IGAD is a partnership fund through which partners finance particular initiatives. However, the organization receives daily operating funds from its member states. Lack of resources and sufficient personnel are two of the main problems confronting the EAC. Another issue is the difficulty for the EAC to take action on military security issues within member states due to the lack of authority the community has over national troops. Finally, the national level enforcement of agreements made at EAC meetings is slow. By relying on the

goodwill of partner nations to deploy troops for peacekeeping missions, EACRF was in effect dependent. Therefore, the fundamental difficulty with its mandate remains the sovereignty of the states. A member of the committee of chiefs of defense argued in an interview:

The EACRF mandate is extensive, raising concerns regarding the force's capacity to effectively carry out its duties, as well as the financial viability of each country's personnel contributions. It is improbable that the UN will provide any further financial assistance. Furthermore, there exist concerns pertaining to the comprehensibility of the EACRF mandate in relation to that of MONUSCO, and if these issues are adequately grasped. (Interview held with a chiefs of defense committee member, 9th October, 2023 in Goma, DRC, Rwanda Cohort).

The EAC peacekeeping force, commonly referred to as such, is a multifaceted entity that engages in collaborations with various military and militia groups. Due to its membership in both the EAC and SDAC blocs, it is probable that multiple military organizations will participate in the peace effort in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). During the process of reducing operations, the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) continued to face a concerning rise in armed group violence, which included a surge in assaults on people and camps for the displaced. During a Focus Group Discussion (FGD), a refugee provided an account of the military confrontations that occurred in North Kivu province between the Congolese army and the March 23 Movement (M23), resulting in a significant displacement of individuals. This study supports the claims made by Brown (2012) that the transfer of government and UN forces to regions with high M23 activity has resulted in a lack of security in Ituri province and certain sections of North Kivu. Additionally, other armed factions have escalated their assaults on non-combatants in these regions. Plate 6.6 indicates the researcher with Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) Wazalendo militia group:



Plate 6. 7: Plate Showing the Researcher with the spokesperson- Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS) Wazalendo
Source: Field data, 2023

6.3.2 Slow Enforcement and Military Difficulties

The EACRF operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo encountered opposition in Congo, resulting in a delayed implementation. As previously stated, the military division of EACRF receives directives from the political division. A political resolution was reached to fully deploy the troops, but, there were strong indications of

dissatisfaction in Congo. While the authorities of the East African Community (EAC), whose member nations are providing troops to the regional force, maintain their focus on non-military measures, the Congolese expressed their opposition to the inclusion of the South Sudanese army in the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF). In December, a contingent of 750 battalions from the People's Defence Forces of South Sudan was sent, positioning it as the fourth nation to engage in military deployment, following Uganda, Kenya, and Burundi (EAC, 2023).

During an FGD with refugees, one of them opined that:

The news of the East African Regional Force intervention in the DRC was received with mixed reactions across the country. Some of us anticipated for a quick deployment to avert the worsening humanitarian conditions and to stop the bloodshed. However, despite such swift pronouncement over the deployment, we waited for quite a long time before the forces could arrive. Indeed, the response was slow and this in turn triggered objections and suspicion toward the regional force (FGD with Refugees).

This was surmised during an interview with the EAC Coordinator who revealed the following;

After the endorsement of the deployment by the partner states there was slim of hope among the Congolese that help was on the way. Unfortunately, such hopes were dashed since it took some time for the partner states decision to be affected. I think this is due to the internal capabilities that vary across the regional countries. Additionally, the operation was further mud with a lot bureaucracies and mistrusts, thus contributing to the slow deployment and response to the DRC conflict. Moving forward, I think the East African Standby Force should be well equipped financially and logistically to overcome unnecessary challenge like slow deployment. Again, I think the partners states should embark on harmonizing their structural capacities to overcome such hurdles that have been witnessed during the Congolese intervention (Interview, military coordinator, 8th November, 2023).

The Nairobi process, which was spearheaded by Kenyatta, encountered widespread skepticism and outright opposition from a significant segment of the political, civil society, and public sphere. The public, in particular, was extremely apprehensive

about the inclusion of Rwandan forces in the contingent. Kinshasa had previously expressed opposition to the deployment of Rwandan military to the third Conclave in Nairobi. The 10-year-old civil society organization and citizen's movement Lucha (Struggle for Change), based in North Kivu, promptly responded on June 20 by writing to President Félix Tshisekedi its opposition to the deployment, stating that it could create an operational challenge in a region occupied by over a hundred local and foreign armed groups, the Congolese army, United Nations peacekeepers, and the Ugandan army (EAC news, 2022).

Recently, the Goma police have been occupied with quelling demonstrations that opposed the EACRF's purported "passivity" towards rebels who are suspected of committing acts of violence. There is widespread concern in the DRC that the divergent circumstances that Uganda, Burundi, and possibly Rwanda, where rebel groups are sheltering in Congo, may encounter further complicate an already precarious situation in eastern DR Congo.

General Robert Kibochi, Chief of Defence Forces of Kenya, presided over the Committee of East African Community Chiefs of Defence Forces, which established the military circuit. In order to facilitate the operationalization of the regional force and its numerous operational arms, he presented a Concept of Operations, Status of Forces Agreement, Rules of Engagement, and additional legal and technical regulations (EAC News, 2023).

This revelation was further reinforced in the following manner by a key informant who pointed out that;

The Congolese suspicion with foreign intervention is not a new thing. Such suspicion dates back to the Congolese war in the wake of the 1960s and the Second Congolese War in the late 1990s onwards.

Notably, such suspicion has also been entrenched in the peacemaking efforts, especially the temporary ceasefires that managed with little success to extinguish the persistent crisis. It is not a surprise that the Nairobi-Process has also suffered the suspicious which will eventually hinder its success in the intervention (Interview, military attaché, 8th November, 2023).

From this discussion, EACRF has suffered challenges of slow deployment of troops as a result of mistrust, lack of adequate resources and conflicting interests in DRC mission among partner states. Its capacity to respond is merely for peacekeeping mission and actual military combat is still a pipe dream. This scenario of power rivalry affirms tenets of power theory where state interests may undermine regional efforts. The challenges experienced by EACRF are mainly due to interests of partner states in DRC conflict. Rwanda, Uganda intervene in DRC with intent to neutralize rebel groups originally from their borders.

6.4 Chapter Summary

The findings in this chapter indicate that EACRF challenges undermine its objective to restore peace and security in DRC. Emergency troop deployment is a last resort and majorly to restore peace through peace keeping processes. Therefore, peace enforcement is not the mainstay of EACRF as results have indicated in other studies. Humanitarian intervention is a key pillar in EACRF mandate but no much of it in DRC Congo where Rwandan and Ugandan troops activities are deemed to worsen humanitarian situation. EACRF preventive diplomacy is dominated by states men, special envoys who utilize early warning systems to prevent conflicts from escalation. In a nut shell, EACRF is more of a political organ in management of internal conflict like DRCs' which again does not guarantee much needed success. It is deemed that military deployment is preventive in nature and thus does not border on peace building and peace enforcement as such. The gap in relation to mechanisms is that peace building is not part of EACRF role to completely manage the DRC conflict.

From the findings, the Eastern DRC region has had re-occurrence of violence which can only be solved by looking into underlying root causes which can only be unearthed by way of peace building and not emergency deployment of EAC troops in six months' period. The Subsequent Overleaf Contains the Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation Chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview, draws conclusions, and offers recommendations derived from the study's findings, while also proposing potential avenues for further research. The task is executed in accordance with the three distinct objectives.

7.1 Summary of Findings

The EAC Treaty on emergency deployment for a duration of six months, which applies to the DRC conflict, explicitly delineates the function, objective, and structure of the EACRF. A political wing is responsible for diplomatic engagements, while a military wing is tasked with enforcement. Its responsibilities include preventive diplomacy and military action coordination with the aim of restoring peace and security in affected nations such as the DRC.

As a consequence, the coordination issue arises from the vested interests of EAC states, which encompass resources, Rwanda's regional hegemonic ambitions, and ethnic networked militia organizations throughout the EAC. Therefore, it becomes evident from trans regional conflicts that sovereignty is not inherently territorial or organized solely at the state level; rather, it is contingent upon the inclusion of fragile states within the EAC bloc. Additionally, divergent state interests among some EAC states undermine the EACRF mission. It is possible to classify the efforts of Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda to combat militia groups operating within their borders as a conflict of interest.

The results pertaining to particular objective 2 suggest that a discernible correlation exists between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its neighboring countries, Uganda, and Burundi, in regard to the persistently disputed simmering tensions between the Congolese and these nations. The DRC conflict is exacerbated by factors that have plagued EAC partner states, including inadequate governance structures and marginalization, which has led to the formation of militia groups within the borders of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Due to governance deficiencies, these states are unable to eradicate these groups; as a result, they traverse the eastern border of the DRC. It has come to light that Rwanda has been subject to recurring allegations of providing support to the M23 militia, whereas the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which are primarily Hutu remnants of the genocidal forces that fled Rwanda after the Rwandan Patriotic Front led by President Paul Kagame in 1994, is not a concern, have been acknowledged. The rebel factions appear to be seeking refuge in their respective nations, which complicates efforts to alleviate the DCR conflict. Numerous forums, including the SADC Meeting and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGL), have reached decisions to disarm the FDLR by force. It was disclosed in an FDG that the militia group had made a surrender offer; however, their indistinguishability from the general populace poses a challenge in completely dismantling them.

Moreover, economic coping mechanisms among civilian populations, such as cross-border trade in a vast array of goods, and war profiteering by actors such as arms merchants, organized crime syndicates, and corporate mercenary firms, as well as the extraction and sale of natural resources by rebel groups, are factors that define the dynamism of internal conflicts. Nevertheless, comprehending the inner workings of the transborder conflict economy is not always a straightforward or intuitive

undertaking. This complexity is exemplified in the arms trade: regional exportation of weaponry may result from state collapse, whereas an increase in stability may cause both an influx of arms (as war profiteers take advantage of weapon buy-back schemes) and an outflow of arms (which exacerbates conflict in neighboring states).

Additionally, internal issues of provenance in the DRC have exacerbated the conflict. Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has been the epicenter of institutional and operational crises that have beset successive administrations. In the eastern region of the DRC, where a power vacuum exists and which is abhorrent to nature, rebel organizations such as M23 arise to contest the legitimacy of the government. In addition, the Rwandan and Ugandan militants engaged in conflict with their respective governments across the DRC's borders lack a solid foundation in their home countries; consequently, they utilize the porous borders of the DRC as safe havens from which to launch attacks and engage in interactions with vulnerable communities.

Internal factors such as political repercussions from the DRC elections and party division contributed to the emergence of factions. As stated, these factions eventually transform into insurgent organizations that oppose the incumbent government with regional support. The etiology of violent conflicts is multifaceted, encompassing factors such as prolonged periods of poor governance within EAC states, the enduring politics of ethnic exclusion, and spill-over effects within a volatile neighbourhood (Solomon, 2015). The internal conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been the subject of numerous interventions by neighboring countries (SDAC and EAC partner states), as well as external forces. These interventions have converted initially relatively localized conflicts into transregional ones, resulting in the

emergence of overlapping and competing forms of governance in certain regions of the DRC, including the Eastern area from which M23 operates.

The results pertaining to specific objective 3 suggest that the EACRF encounters obstacles that impede its capacity to function efficiently. Additionally, a lack of resources and a duplication of duties threaten the EACRF mission, as a portion of their forces are integrated into the United Nations peace mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is apparent that the primary focus of the EACRF's mandate has been peacekeeping rather than peace enforcement. The EACRF's function in the management of the refugee crisis and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the DRC remains ambiguous. According to an interview with the FDG, neither refugees nor IDPs are cognizant of the humanitarian function of the EACRF.

The results suggest that the EAC regional keeping force significantly depends on the structures of external partners in order to exert influence over its operations. The regional force lacks the financial resources and military hardware necessary to significantly influence the internal conflict in the DRC. Lack of resources and adequate personnel, sluggish enforcement of agreements reached at EAC meetings at the national level, and the community's lack of authority over national troops make it difficult for the EAC to act on military security matters within member states. By relying on the goodwill of partner nations to deploy troops for peacekeeping missions, EACRF was in effect dependent. Thus, state sovereignty continues to be the primary detriment to its mandate. The new-functionalism theory recognizes importance of regional organization in mitigating such challenges. State level organization are not in best position to resolve DRC conflict since it is regional in nature. The formation of EACRF was to function as such and have capacity to overcome these challenges.

7.2 Conclusions

This study concludes that management of the intractable conflict in eastern DRC is contingent on synchronizing the internal DRC political dynamics with the regional interests especially of her immediate neighbors. The populist call for the exclusion of the interests of her neighbors provides a temporal solution that disregards the complexity of the conflict web. In the context of regionalism EACRF is the most suitable intervention mechanism and guarantee for sustainable peace in eastern DRC. This is further demonstrated in the findings and conclusions immanent in the specific research questions and objectives.

The first objective investigated the structures, duties, and objectives of EAC regional peacekeeping forces in the DRC with regard to the management of intrastate conflicts. The conclusion of the study is that the EACRF's efforts to restore peace and security in the DRC have been hampered by inadequate personnel deployment structures. This could potentially result in their overall responsibility being limited to peacekeeping due to the presence of structural capacity deficits. The EAC peacekeeping force is a multifaceted organization that, in a sense, works in tandem with various militia and military entities present in the region. Moreover, discordant national interests among certain EAC states negatively impact the mission of the EACRF. It is possible to classify the efforts of Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda to combat militia groups operating within their borders as a conflict of interest. Additionally, a lack of resources and a duplication of duties threaten the EACRF mission, as a portion of their forces are integrated into the United Nations peace mission in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo. Clearly, the EACRF's mandate focuses more on peacekeeping than on peace enforcement.

The second objective assessed root causes, types of war and extend of conflict in the DRC. The study's findings indicate that the DRC conflict is multifaceted due to the participation of transnational militia groups that enjoy backing from EAC member states. This has resulted from the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda failing to coordinate their efforts to combat these militia groups. Due to the fact that some states in the DRC provide support to militant groups, the deployment of EAC regional forces in the country is regarded as an attempt to undermine conflict management initiatives. Coordination difficulties once more directly impede the EACRF's mission to disarm M23 and other armed groups in Eastern Congo and restore peace to the DRC, despite the organization's immense interests.

The third objective examined challenges EACRF encounters conflict management in the DRC. The conclusion of the study is that the EACRF faced obstacles spanning from coordination issues to divergent partner-state interests in terms of resources. The intervention mechanisms of the EACRF are insufficiently comprehensive to address human rights concerns or the transformation of the conflict to prevent its recurrence. The extent to which preventive measures are available, the extent to which EACRF enforces peace appears to be minimal. The organization has yet to adopt the concept of peace building, which entails conducting an in-depth investigation into the underlying causes of the conflict in the DRC in order to develop sustainable solutions. Although civilians are a signatory to the EAC Treaty, they are not incorporated into EACRF's conflict management strategy.

From the study, the overall conclusion is that the EACRF interventions, is yet to achieve sustainable peace and security in relation to the management of DRC's intractable intra-state conflict due to systemic internal and external factors in the conflict. Therefore, the intractable intra-state conflict will remain growing at unprecedented rate.

7.3 Recommendations

The study proposes an expanded role, defined Command and control structure as per the objectives of EACRF, in accordance with the first specific objective. These objectives include increasing investments in conflict prevention and transformation as means to establish enduring peace and security in the DRC conflict. Additionally, joint structured troop deployment is required.

The second objective of the study is to advise Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda on how to effectively manage internal conflicts within their borders, given that rebel groups that originate from these nations frequent the Eastern Region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is necessary to strengthen good governance in the aforementioned states, including the DRC, in order to quell ethnic unrest that fuels internal and regional conflicts in the EAC.

According to the third objective, resource scarcity is the primary obstacle for the EACRF in the DRC conflict. There exists a necessity for increased military hardware resources and extended intervention timeline. Additionally, the force should prioritize peacebuilding efforts over hasty deployments that might not yield significant results.

In order to address conflict and the new warfare Africa. Regions should adopt a regional centric approach instead of state centric approach and define the core problem, analyze the causes and effects.

7.4 Suggestions for Further Research

The initial objective investigated the structure, function, and goals of the EAC regional peacekeeping force in the DRC with regard to the administration of intrastate conflicts. As a consequence, the research was restricted to the structural responsibilities, structures, and objectives of the EACRF. As a result, the study suggests further research into the impact of interventions by other military organizations on the management of internal conflict in the DRC.

The second objective evaluated the origins, natures, and scope of intrastate conflict in the DRC. This restricted the research to domestic conflicts within nations and the resurgence of militia organizations that operate beyond the borders of the East African Community (EAC), as well as their influence on internal conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This study proposes further research into the correlation between the immense resources of the Congo and regionalized conflict.

The third objective examined the administration of intrastate conflicts in the DRC as it pertains to EAC regional peacekeeping forces. By confining the study to challenges faced by the EACRF, alternative external intervention organizations like the United Nations were omitted. Thus, the study suggests conducting research on the impact of international organizations such as the United Nations on the DRC conflict.

REFERENCES

- Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2017). The Role of External Actors in the DRC Crisis. <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/role-external-actors-drc-congo-crisis-sadc-au-icglr-un-eu/>.
- African Union (2016). *African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016–2020*. Addis Ababa: African Union.
- African Union. (2018). “Special Envoys of the Chairperson of the Commission.” <https://au.int/en/cpauc/envoys>. Indicate date of access and how it is formatted.
- Agnew, John. (1994). “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory.” *Review of International Political Economy* 1 (1): 53–80.
- Agnew, John. (2017). “The Tragedy of the Nation-state.” *Territory, Politics, Governance* 5 (4): 347–350.
- Albrecht, Peter, and Signe Cold-Ravnkilde. 2020. “National Interests as Friction: Peacekeeping in Somalia and Mali.” *Journal of Intervention and State building* 14 (2): 204–220. doi: 10.1080/17502977.2020.1719789.
- Alden, C., and Zheng, Y. (2019). “China: international developmentalism and global security,” in *The New Politics of Aid: Emerging Donors and Conflict-Affected States*, A. Paczyńska (ed). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 25–52.
- Allan, D. (2020). *The Minsk conundrum: Western policy and Russia’s war in Eastern Ukraine*. Chatham House. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/minsk-conundrum-western-policy-and-russias-war-eastern-ukraine>
- Allen, John. (2016). *Topologies of Power. Beyond Territory and Networks*. Abingdon, OX: Routledge. Aning,
- Amar, P. (2012). *Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industries*. London: Routledge.
- Aneja, U. (2019). “India: between principles and pragmatism,” in *The New Politics of Aid: Emerging Donors and Conflict-Affected States*, ed A. Paczyńska (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 53–70.
- Armande, M. (2023). *East Africa Community and Conflict Resolution in North Kivu Province, Eastern Democratic Republic Of Congo* (Doctoral dissertation, Kampala International University).
- AU Assembly. (2016). “Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa.” Assembly/AU/2 (XXVI), 26th Ordinary Session of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 29.
- AU Assembly. (2018). “Decision on the Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa.” Assembly/AU/Dec. 695 (XXXI), 31st Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, Nouakchott, Mauretania, July 1–2.
- AU Assembly.(2013). *50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration*. Addis Ababa: African Union.

- AU PSC. (2014a). “Communiqué Adopted at the 455th PSC Meeting Held at the Level of AU Heads of State and Government on the prevention and combating of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa.” PSC/AHG/COMM (CDLV), Nairobi, Kenya, September 2.
- AU PSC. (2014b). “The African Union Strategy for the Sahel Region.” Adopted at the 449th PSC Meeting, PSC/PR/3 (CDXLIX), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, August 11.
- AU PSC. 2017. “Communiqué Adopted at the 682nd PSC Meeting on Maritime Security.” PSC/PR/ COMM (DCLXXXII), Addis Ababa, April 25.
- AUC Chairperson. 2010. “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Prevention of Unconstitutional Changes of Government and Strengthening the Capacities of the African Union to Manage such Situations.” Assembly/AU/4 (XIV), 14th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 31 to February 2.
- AUC Chairperson. 2012. “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security.” Towards Greater Political Coherence, Tabled at the 307th PSC meeting, PSC/PR/2 (CCCVII), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 9.
- AUC Chairperson. 2014. “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa Tabled to the 455th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council.” PSC/AHG/ 2 (CDLV), Nairobi, Kenya, September 2.
- Augelli, Erico & Craig Murphy. 1988. *America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World, A Gramscian Analysis*, London: Pinter.
- Autesserre, S. (2021). *The Frontlines of Peace: An Insider's Guide to Changing the World*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Balasubramanian, P. (2020). China's Approach to Mediating Middle Eastern Conflicts. *The Diplomat*. Available online at: <https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/chinas-approach-to-mediating-middle-eastern-conflicts> (accessed January 5, 2021).
- Baulcomb, J.S. (2003) Management of Change through Force Field Analysis. *Journal of Nursing Management*, 11, 275-280. <https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2834.2003.00401.x>.
- Barakat, S., and Milton, S. (2019). “Qatar: conflict mediation and regional objectives,” in *The New Politics of Aid: Emerging Donors and Conflict-Affected States*, ed A. Paczyńska (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 141–160.
- Bass, G. J. (2015). The Indian way of humanitarian intervention. *Yale J. Int. Law* 40, 228–294. Available online at: <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol40/iss2/2> (accessed March 12, 2021).
- Bdirizak .M.Warfa 2021. What now for the Somali Region in Ethiopia? World peace foundation Bischoff, Paul-Henri, Kwesi Aning, and Amitav Acharya, eds. 2016. *Africa in Global International Relations. Emerging Approaches to Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge.

- Bennett, L. (1991). *International organizations: Principles and issues*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Berni, M., & Hochuli, A. C. (2024). ISAF and European military transformation: German, Swedish, and French counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 2003–2014. *Comparative Strategy*, 43(2), 61–86. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2024.2317229>
- Bischoff, Aning, and Acharya, (2016). *Africa in global International Relations: emerging approaches to theory and practice*. London and New York.
- Bodetti, A. (2019). How China Came to Dominate South Sudan Oil. *The Diplomat*. Available online at: <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/how-china-came-to-dominate-south-sudans-oil/> (accessed January 5, 2021).
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1992. *An Agenda for Peace*. New York: United Nations.
- Bhaumik, S. (2017). Why do China, India back Myanmar over the Rohingya crisis? *South China Morning Post*.
- Brandt, C., Kithumbu, O., Kuliumbwa, E., & Marchais, G. (2022). The multiple faces of ‘conscientisation’: Exploring links between structural inequalities, education, and violence. *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14767724.2021.2017860>
- Bräutigam, D. (2020). A critical look at Chinese “Debt-Trap Diplomacy”: the rise of a meme. *Area Dev. Policy* 5, 1–14. doi: 10.1080/23792949.2019.1689828
- Brosig, Malte. 2015. *Cooperative Peacekeeping in Africa. Exploring Regime Complexity*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Brown, William. 2012. “A Question of Agency: Africa in International Politics.” *Third World Quarterly* 33 (10): 1889–1908.
- Bryon, J. (1984). *Regional security in Latin America and Africa: The OAS and OAU in light of contemporary security issues*. PSIS Occasional Papers 1/84, Geneva: Graduate School of International Studies.
- Bull, Hedley, ed. 1984. *Intervention in World Politics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press
- C.R. Kothari (2009) *Research Methodology Methods and Techniques second revised edition*: New Age Publications.
- Call, C. T., and Abdenur, A. E. (2017). *Brazil's Approach to Peacebuilding. Geopolitics and Global Issue Paper 5*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- Call, C. T., and de Coning, C. (2017). *Rising Powers and Peacebuilding: Breaking the Mold?* London: Palgrave Macmillan. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-60621-7 CrossRef Full Text | Google Scholar.
- Centre for Preventive Action. (2024). Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *Global Conflict Tracker*. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo> (Accessed 2 June 2024).
- Chakrabarty, M. (2020). Will China Create Another Debt Crisis? New Delhi, India: Observer Research Foundation. Available online at: <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/will-china-create-another-african-debt-crisis/> (accessed March 12, 2021).
- Chandy, L. (2012). *New in Town: A Look at the Role of Emerging Donors in an Evolving Aid System*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

- Charbonneau, Bruno. 2017. "Intervention in Mali: Building Peace between Peacekeeping and Counterterrorism." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 35 (4): 415–431.
- Charter of OAU (2014), Available from http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_1963_0.pdf [Last accessed January 18, 2014].
- Chaturvedi, Sanjay, and Joe Painter. 2007. "Whose World, Whose Order? Spatiality, Geopolitics and the Limits of the World Order Concept." *Cooperation and Conflict* 42 (2): 375–395.
- Chatzky, A., and McBride, J. (2020). *China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative*. Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations. Available online at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative> (accessed January 3, 2021).
- Chaziza, M. (2018). *China's Approach to Mediation in the Middle East: Between Conflict Resolution and Conflict Management*. Washington, DC: Middle East Institute. Available online at: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-approach-mediation-middle-east-between-conflict-resolution-and-conflict> (accessed December 22, 2020).
- Cilliers, J. (2018). Violence in Africa: Trends, drivers and prospects to 2023. *ISS Africa Report*, 2018(12), 1-40. <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/ar-12.pdf>
- Commission on State Fragility, Growth, and Development. (2018). *Escaping the Fragility Trap*. London: International Growth Centre. Available online at: https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Escaping-the-fragility-trap_Oct-2020.pdf (accessed March 11, 2021).
- Cooper, A. & Legler, T. (2001). The OAS democratic solidarity paradigm: Questions of collective and national leadership. *Latin American Politics and Society*, Volume 43, pp.103-126.
- Cooper, D. R., & Schindler, P. S. (2003). *Business research methods*. 8th ed. Boston, Mass., McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
- Cox, R. & Jacobson, H. (1971). *The anatomy of influence*. New Heaven: Yale University Press.
- Cox, Robert W. 1981. *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Crocker, C. (2008). *Leashing the dogs of war: Conflict management in a divided world*. Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- De Carvalho, B., and de Coning, C. (2013). *Rising Powers and the Future of Peacebuilding*. NOREF Report. Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.
- De Coning, C., and Pradash, C. (2016). *Peace Capacities Network Synthesis Report: Rising Powers and Peace Operations*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs.
- De Coning, Cedric, LinnéaGelot, and John Karlsrud, eds. 2016. *The Future of African Peace Operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram*. London: Zed Books.

- De Lombaerde, Phillipe, Fredrik Söderbaum, and Jens-Uwe Wunderlich. 2015. "Interregionalism." In *The SAGE Handbook of European Foreign Policy*, edited by Knud Erik Jorgensen, AasneKallandAarstad, Edith Drieskens, Katie Laatikainen, and Ben Tonra, 2 vols., 750–761. London: SAGE.
- De Soysa, I. (2012). The capitalist civil peace: Some theory and empirical evidence. In P. Lujala and S. A. Rustad (Eds.), *High-Value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding* (pp. 437-459). London: Routledge.
- De Waal, Alex. 2015. *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa. Money, War and the Business of Power*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Deane-Peter Baker & Sadiki Maeresera (2009) SADCBRIG intervention.
- Diehl, P. (2008). Regional organizations and conflict management in the post- cold war era. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol.12, No. 2, pp.191- 202.
- Donais, T., & Solomon, A. (2022). Protection through peace-building in South Sudan. *African Security Review*, 31(1), 51-65. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2021.1968916>
- Doyle, M. W. (2001). "War making and peace making: the United Nations' post-cold war record," in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenge of Managing International Conflict*, ed C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, and P. Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press), 529–560.
- Elowson, Camila, and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque. 2016. *Challenges to Peace and Security in Eastern Africa: The Role of IGAD, EAC and EACRF*. Stockholm: FOI Swedish Research Agency.
- Emmanuel Kwesi. 2014. "Transnational Security Threats and Challenges to Peacekeeping in Mali." *Conflict Trends* 2: 11–17.
- Engel, Ulf, ed. 2019. "Africa's Transregional Conflicts." *Comparativ Special Issue* 28 (6): 7–108. Engel, Ulf, Marc Boeckler, and Detlef Müller-Mahn, eds. 2018. *Spatial Practices: Territory, Border and Infrastructure in Africa*. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers.
- European Commission. 2018. *African Peace Facility. Annual Report 2017*. Luxembourg: European Union.
- Farrell, Mary. 2013. "African Regionalism: External Influences and Continental Shaping Forces." In *The European Union in Africa. Incoherent Policies, Asymmetrical Partnership, Declining Relevance?* edited by Maurizio Carbone, 98–118. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Firchow, P. (2018). *Reclaiming Everyday Peace: Local Voices in Measurement and Evaluation After War*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/9781108236.
- Foot, R. (1995). *Pacific Asia: The Development of Regional Dialogue*. In Louise Fawcett (ed.) *Regionalism in world politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gbaya, D. M. (2015). *South Africa's Foreign Policy Toward the DRC: From Non-intervention to Intervention 1998-2013* (Doctoral dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Humanities, International Relations).
- Ghimire, S. (2020). *The Politics of Peacebuilding: Emerging Actors in Security*

Sector Reform in Conflict-Affected States. London: Routledge.

- Gligorov, V. (2019). Yugoslavia and development: Benefits and costs. *Yuhistorija*. http://www.yuhistorija.com/economy_txt01.html
- Godfrey Cotty Ungaya, Professor Pontian Godfrey Okoth, Professor Edmond Were (2019); Importance of Supranational Structures towards Transboundary Ecotourism Development: Case of Serengeti-Mara; *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications (IJSRP)* 9(5) (ISSN: 2250-3153), DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.29322/IJSRP.9.05.2019.p8977>.
- Gomes P, Cand Kapinga N. (2015). *The African Union's Panel of the Wise. A Concise History*. Durban: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Conflicts.
- Gowan, R. (2020). *China's Pragmatic Approach to UN Peacekeeping*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Available online at: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-pragmatic-approach-to-un-peacekeeping/> (accessed December 22, 2020).
- Gurganus, J. (2018). *Russia: Playing a Geopolitical Game in Latin America*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available online at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/03/russia-playing-geopolitical-game-in-latin-america-pub-76228> (accessed December 22, 2020).
- Harris, D.J. 1991. *Cases and Materials on International Law*. London: Sweet & Maxwell.
- Hemmer, C. & Katzenstein, P. (2002). Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism. *International Organization*, 56: 575-607.
- Hensell, P. (2002). Recognizing and responding to trends in armed conflict. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Volume 19, pp.27-52.
- Hentz, J., ed. (2014). *Routledge Handbook of African Security*. London: Routledge.
- Herbst, J. E., and Marczak, J. (2019). *Russian Intervention in Venezuela: What's at Stake?* Washington, DC: Atlantic Council. Available online at: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/russias-intervention-in-venezuela-whats-at-stake/> (accessed March 12, 2021).
- Herpolsheimer, J. (2019). "Transregional Conflicts and the Re-spatialization of Regions 'at Sea': The Yaoundé Process in the Gulf of Guinea." *Comparativ* 28 (6): 69–89.
- Hoetjes, G. (2021). The Gulf Cooperation Council and the failure of peacebuilding in Yemen. *The International Spectator*, 56(4), 151–166. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2021.1987034>
- Hopmann, T. (1996). *The negotiation process and the resolution of international conflicts*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 1994. "Ethnic and Nationalist Conflict." In Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds., *World Security: Challenges for a New Security*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Hurrell, A. (2007). "One World? Many Worlds? The Place of Regions in the Study of International Society." *International Affairs* 83 (1): 127–146.

- Hüsken, T. and Georg K. (2015). "Political Orders in the Making: Emerging Forms of Political Organization from Libya to Northern Mali." *African Security* 8 (4): 320–337.
- James F. Miskel & Richard J. Norton (2003) The intervention in the democratic republic of Congo, *Civil Wars*, 6:4, 1-13, DOI: 10.1080/13698240308402552.
- Jerome, N. (2016). *Managing Endemic Conflicts: Analysis of Regional Mechanisms For Response to DRC Conflict*
- Kabia, J. (2009). *Humanitarian Intervention and conflict resolution in West Africa: From ECOMOG to ECOMIL*. England: Ashgate.
- Kamais, C. E., Okoth, P. G., & Kimokoti, S. N. (2024). Navigating the transition tightrope: Challenges posed by African Union Mission in Somalia transition on Kenya's national security. *African Journal of Empirical Research*, 5(2), 371–387. <https://doi.org/10.51867/ajernet.5.2.32>
- Karbo, T. and Kudrat V. (2018). *The Palgrave Handbook of Peacebuilding in Africa*. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Khadiagala, M. (2015). *Silencing the Guns: Strengthening Governance to Prevent, Manage, and Resolve Conflicts in Africa*. New York, NY: International Peace Institute.
- Kisangani, E. (2012). *Civil Wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1960-2010*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Koops, A., Thierry T., Norrie M., and Paul D. (2015). *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lacher, W. (2012). *Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment
- Laudati, A. (2013). Beyond minerals: broadening 'economies of violence' in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. *Review of African Political Economy*, 40 (135), 35-50.
- Lee, B. (2013). *The Organization of American States*. *Council on Foreign Relations*. <http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-american-states/p27945#p3>
- Lepgold, J. & Weiss, T. (eds) (1998). *Collective conflict management and changing world politics*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Levine, H., and Dawn N., (2016). *Region-Building in Africa. Political and Economic Challenges*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Levison, David. 1993. "Ethnic Conflict and Refugees," *Refugees*. Geneva: UNHCR.
- Lewis, G. (2020). *Russia as Peacebuilder? Russia's Coercive Mediation Strategy*. Garmisch-Partenkirchen: The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Available online at: <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/russia-peacebuilder-russias-coercive-mediation-strategy-0> (accessed March 12, 2021).
- Ligawa, W. (2015). Why the assurance of Eastern African Standby Force (EACRF) on regional peace and security remains uncertain. *Journal of Global Peace and Conflict*, 3(2), 1-21.

- Lins de Albuquerque, A., and Cecilia H. (2015). Challenges to Peace and Security in Southern Africa: The Role of SADC. Stockholm: FOI Swedish Research Agency.
- Luckham, R. (2017). Whose violence, whose security? can violence reduction and security work for poor, excluded and vulnerable people? *Peacebuilding* 5, 99–117. doi: 10.1080/21647259.2016.1277009.
- Makdisi, K. (2014). Reconsidering the struggle over UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 43(2), 24–41. <https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2014.43.2.24>
- Marks, J. (2011). Crisis in the Congo. *Contingency Planning Memorandum* No. 11. https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2011/05/CPA_contingencymemo_11.pdf. (Accessed 2 June 2024).
- Marung, S., and Matthias M., (2019). Spatial Formats Under the Global Conditions. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg.
- Matanga, Frank Khachina, “*Conceptualizing Peace, Security, and Development: A Critical Discourse*”. Professorial Inaugural Lecture presented to MMUST and the Kenyan Public on 22nd February, 2018, MCU, Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, Kakamega, Kenya.
- Matlhakoane, B. G. (2021). South Africa and regional stability: Lessons from Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2013.
- Mattheis, F., and Andréas Li., (2018). Interregionalism Across the Atlantic Space. Cham: Springer.
- Mattheis, F., Luca R., and Alessandra R., (2019).. Fringe Regionalism When Peripheries Become Regions. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mawdsley, E. (2012). From Recipients to Donors: Emerging Powers and the Changing Development Landscape. London: Zed Books. doi: 10.5040/9781350220270.
- Mawejje, J., & McSharry, P. (2021). The economic cost of conflict: Evidence from South Sudan. *Review of Development Economics*, 25(4), 1969-1990. <https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12792>
- Middell, M., (2019). The Routledge Handbook of Transregional Studies. London: Routledge.
- Minyori, J. M. (2018). The Role of African Standby Force in Securing Africa: Case Study East Africa Standby Force (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).
- Misser, F. (2020). Rivers of Arms, Democratic Republic of Congo: Arms Flow. Africa in Fact 52.
- Moe, L., and Anna G. (2020). “*Hybridity and Friction in Organizational Politics: New Perspectives on the African Security Regime Complex.*” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*.
- MONUSCO. (2014). Statement of SRSG Martin Kobler to the Security Council: Building on the momentum.
- Namangale, C. (2015). Dynamics of Conflict Management in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *Prism*, 5(2), 72-83.

- Mpangala, G. P. (2004). *Conflict Resolution and Peace building in Africa as a Process: Case Studies of Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo*. University of Dar es salaam.
- Mulindwa, P. (2020). Interstate border conflicts and their effects on region-building and integration of the East African Community. *African Journal of Governance and Development*, 9(2), 599–618.
- Nathan, L., Robert K., Claude M., Michelle N., and Yahia Z. (2015). *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). 2014 Assessment Study. Final Report*. Addis Ababa: African Union.
- Ngendahimana J. (2023). *Managing endemic conflicts: Analysis of Regional Mechanism for response to DRC conflict*.
- Nibishaka, E. (2011). *Natural Resources and Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): The Failure of Post-Conflict Reconstruction Strategies*. Southern Africa: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.
- Ntung, A. (2019). *Dynamics of Local Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Challenges Ahead for President Félix Tshisekedi Tshilombo*. Fletcher F. World Aff., 43(2), 131.
- Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (2002). *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History*. London: Zedbooks.
- OCHA (2024). *Democratic Republic of Congo: Internal Displaced Persons and returnees*. <https://reliefweb.int/organization/ocha>. (Accessed 2 June 2024).
- OECD (2020). *States of Fragility 2020*. Paris: OECD Publishing. doi: 10.1787/ba7c22e7-en
- Okoth, P. G., Matanga, F.K. & Onkware, K., Eds (2018). *Peace, Security and Development in 21st Century Africa: Theory and Practice*. Nairobi: Finesse Publishing Ltd. Print. Pp v + 761 pages.
- Olsson, M. (2015). *Self-Interest and Altruism as motivations of regional action? A study of African Regional Organisations and the interventions in Mali and the DRC* (Master's thesis).
- Onditi, Francis & Ben-Nun, Gilad & Were, Edmond & Nyadera, Israel. (2021). *Reimagining Security Communities: Systems Thinking Approach for Africa*. 10.1007/978-3-030-70869-6.
- Onditi, Francis, and Pontian Godfrey Okoth. 2017. “*Politics of African Peace Support Operation Architecture: What Next Post-2015 African Standby Force?*” *African Studies* 76 (4): 597–620.
- Orwa, N. (2019) *Co-Management Strategy in Mitigating Fisheries Conflicts in Homa Bay County, Kenya*.
- Paczyńska, A. (2016). “Emerging and traditional donors and conflict-affected states: the new politics of reconstruction, in *Changing Landscape of Assistance to Conflict-Affected States: Emerging and Traditional Donors and Opportunities for Collaboration*, ed A. Paczyńska (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center), 1–13.
- Paczyńska, A. (2019). *The New Politics of Aid: Emerging Donors and Conflict-Affected States*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

- Paczyńska, A. (2020). Russia in Africa: Is Great Power Competition Returning to the Continent? German Development Institute Policy Brief 15. Bonn: German Development Institute.
- Palm, T. (2017). The changing character of EUFOR Althea: Power politics or learning? *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 30(1), 67–86. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2016.1256947>
- Parker, I. (2024). Congo Crisis. *ODUMUNC 2024 Crisis Brief Crisis Two*. <https://ww1.odu.edu/content/dam/odu/offices/mun/docs/crisis-two-congo.pdf>. (Accessed 2 June 2024).
- Parry, J., & Vogel, B. (2023). An illusion of empowerment? A twenty-year review of United Nations reports on localization in Iraq. *International Peacekeeping*, 30(5), 611–641. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2023.2265293>
- Patrick, S. (2011). *Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199751501.001.0001.
- Polat, F. (2022). From brotherhood of the revolution to the struggle for power: Analysis of the Libyan Civil War in the context of the security dilemma. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 51(1), 57–72.
- Prunier, G. (2004). Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan, and the Congo. *African Affairs*, 103 (412), 359-383.
- Prunier, G. (2009). *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Purushothaman, C. (2021). *Emerging Powers, Development Cooperation and South-South Relations*. London: Palgrave MacMillan. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-51537-9.
- Raik, K., Blockmans, S., Osypchuk, A., & Suslov, A. (2024). EU policy towards Ukraine: Entering geopolitical competition over European order. *The International Spectator*, 59(1), 39–58. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2023.2296576>
- Robinson, William I. 1996. *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rosato, V. (2016). “Hybrid Orders’ between Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Case of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.” *African Security* 9 (2): 110–135.
- Saleh, A. and Bista, K. (2017) Examining Factors Impacting Online Survey Response Rates in Educational Research: Perceptions of Graduate Students. *Journal of MultiDisciplinary Evaluation*, 13, 63-74.
- Söderbaum, Frederik. 2016a. “Old, New and Comparative Regionalism. The History and Scholarly Development of the Field.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism*, edited by Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, 16–37. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Söderbaum, Fredrik. 2016b. *Rethinking Regionalism*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Solomon, H. (2015). *Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Saunders M., Lewis P and Thornhill, A (2009). *Research Methods for Business Students*. 4th ed. Pearson Education Publishers. USA.

- Shepherd, B. (2018). Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Democratic Republic of Congo (M23) Case Study. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c190ffde5274a466da21704/DR_Case_study.pdf. (Accessed 2 June 2024.).
- Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory (2nd ed.). Sage Publications, Inc.
- Spandler, Kilian. 2020. “UNAMID and the Legitimation of Global-regional Peacekeeping Cooperation.” *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 14 (2): 187–203. doi:10.1080/17502977.2020.1725729.
- Stefan Wolff & Oya Dursun-Özkanca (2012). *Regional and International Conflict Regulation: Diplomatic, Economic and Military Interventions*.
- Stronski, P. (2019). *Late to the Party: Russia's Return to Africa*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available online at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/16/late-to-party-russia-s-return-to-africa-pub-80056> (accessed December 15, 2019).
- Suhrke, A. (2007). Reconstruction as modernization: the ‘*post-conflict*’ project in *Afghanistan*. *Third World Quarterly* 28, 1291–1308. doi: 10.1080/01436590701547053.
- Tank, P. (2019). “Turkey: new humanitarianism and geostrategic ambitions,” in *The New Politics of Aid: Emerging Donors and Conflict-Affected States*, ed A. Paczyńska (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 121–140.
- Tardy, Thierry, and Marco Wyss, eds. 2014. *Peacekeeping in Africa. The Evolving Security Architecture*. London: Routledge.
- Tavares, R. (2011). The participation of SADC and ECOWAS in military operations: the weight of national interests in decision-making. *African Studies Review*, 54(2), 145-176.
- Tayeh, N. (2022). Refugee camps in Gaza: Between upgrading and uricide. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 51(3), 3–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0377919X.2022.2091386>
- Tejpar, Johan, and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque. 2015. *Challenges to Peace and Security in West Africa: The Role of ECOWAS*. Stockholm: FOI Swedish Research Agency.
- The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2008). *Contributions to Economic Integration and Conflict Management*, Washington DC
- Turner, M., and Pugh, M. (2006). Toward a new agenda for transforming war economies. *Conflict Security Dev.* 6, 471–9. doi: 10.1080/14678800600933647.
- Twagirayezu, A. (2021). *Understanding the African union conflict prevention mechanisms constraints: “the case of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo”* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Rwanda).
- Twesigye Victor, V. (2013). *Foreign intervention and persistent conflict in North Kivu Province, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo*.
- UN/AU. 2017. *Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security*. New York, NY: United Nations and African Union, April 19.

- United Nations (2016). Summary of Troop Contributing Country By Ranking Police, UN Military Experts on Mission and Troops. Available online at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/nov16_2.pdf (accessed January 6, 2021).
- United Nations (2020). Amid COVID-19 Pandemic, Coordinated, Conflict-Sensitive Responses Crucial to Sustaining Peace, Secretary-General Tells Security Council. Available online at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14275.doc.htm> (accessed January 5, 2021).
- United Nations Development United Programme (2000). Millennium Development Goals. Available online at: http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/mdg_goals.htm (accessed December 22, 2020).
- United Nations/World Bank (2018). Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict; Main Messages and Emerging Policy Directions. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- UNRISD. 1995. States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalization. Geneva: UNRISD.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
- Were, E.M., Okoth, P.G. (2023). Visibilizing African Heritage in Diplomatic Thought and Practice. In: Onditi, F., McLarren, K., Ben-Nun, G., Stivachtis, Y.A., Okoth, P. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Diplomatic Thought and Practice in the Digital Age. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28214-0_2.
- Whitehouse, Bruce, and Francesco Strazzari. 2015. "Introduction: Rethinking Challenges to State Sovereignty in Mali and Northwest Africa." African Security 8 (4): 213–226.
- Wondemagegnehu, Dawit Yohannes. 2018. The African Union-United Nations Inter-Organizational Cooperation for Peace: Unravelling an Emerging Partnership. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag.
- Woodward, S. L. (2017). The Ideology of Failed States: Why Intervention Fails. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/9781316816936.
- World Bank (2020). World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Young, C. and Turner, T. (1985). The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Zürcher, C. (2019). "Russia: development aid and security interests," in The New Politics of Aid: Emerging Donors and Conflict-Affected States, ed A. Paczyńska (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers), 105–120.

APPENDIX I: **Introduction Letter**

Masinde Muliro University,
The Respondent, EACRFCOM,
P. O. BOX
GOMA- DRC

Dear Respondent,

RE: Request for voluntary participation in research

I, the researcher, Mr. Manana Robert Santos is a student at Masinde Muliro University pursuing PhD of Arts degree in Peace and Conflict Studies. I'm interested in carrying out a study of **Dynamics of East African Community Regional Force's Intervention in the Management of Democratic Republic of Congo's Intractable Intra-State Conflict**. Your response will be of great value to the research findings.

I am contacting you to request for voluntary participation in my research. The questionnaire is estimated to take 15 minutes to complete. Any information you give will be treated with a lot of confidence. Thank you very much for your attention, consideration as you sign your informed consent to participate in this research study.

APPENDIX II : QUESTIONNAIRE For EACRF Ground Personnel
Part A : Demographic Information

1. Gender: Male { } Female { }
2. Your age bracket (tick whichever appropriate)
- 18-24 yrs. { }
- 25-30 yrs. { }
- 31-34 yrs. { }
- 35-40 yrs. { }
- 41-44 yrs. { }
- 45-50 yrs. { }
- Over 51 yrs. { }

3. Your Rank

4. What is your highest level of education?

Certificate	
Diploma	
Higher national diploma	
Bachelors	
Masters	
PhD	

5. For how long have you served in the force?

Less than 2 yrs.	
2-5 yrs.	
6-10 yrs.	
11 yrs. and more	

Objective 1: Roles, Structure and Objectives of EACRF (tick appropriately)

1. Which of the following are EACRF strategic partners in DRC intervention?

AU EU UN SADC IGAD

Does the following define EACRF roles in DRC C

Coordinating and harmonizing with partner states,

rapid deployment of troops

capacity to immediately respond to crisis

3. What is the timelines for EACRF intervention in DRC?

2 months, 4 months 6 months 1 year

4. Does the intervention in DRC capture the following objectives?

- Early Warning Mechanisms
- Policy interventions
- Training programs
- Actor Mapping

5. What is the range of troops in numbers in EACRF in DRC?

- 2000
- 3000
- 4000
- 6000
- 8000

6. EACRF coordinating role involves the following groups in DRC?

- Congolese Army
- M23
- UN troops
- SADC troops

7. What is contained in EACRF agreement on DRC intervention?

- Objectives of the intervention mission
- Rules of engagement
- Operation areas
- Scope of intervention
- Or any other -state briefly-----

8. Do you think some EAC partner states engage with any of these rebel/Terror groups in DRC intervention?

- Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
- Lord Resistance Army
- M23
- ISIS

9.a) Does the force offer relatively sufficient training for its personnel?

- Yes
- No

b.If no, how should it be improved?

.....
.....
.....

c. How do military gaps affect the effectiveness of the force in a theatre of war?

10 a. In your opinion, is the force capable of handling any relatively large-scale hostilities?

- Yes
- No

b. If no, why? _____

11. (i) Does the force have infrastructural capacity to execute the mission scenario six?

(iii)If no, why? _____

12. What would you say of the command-and-control structure of the force?

13. What are your regional security threat perceptions?

15. Are there possibilities of networked societies across the region in the following aspects?

- Regionalized militia group
- Regional support for arms sales
- Cross border ethnic societies
- Or any other -state briefly-----

Objective 2: Root Causes, types and Extent of DRC conflict

1. Do you think there are overlapping forms of governance in EAC region that contribute to DRC conflict? Yes/no

If yes, explain how this has led to competing interests among partner states in EAC

2. Which of the following institutional weakness make the DRC conflict so dynamic?

- Institutional weakness of one or more states in EAC,
- Regional security competition,
- parallel and transnational informal economy,
- Trans border social networks
- Or any other -state briefly-----

3. Do the following factors contribute to DRC complex conflict within EAC?

- Resource exploitation competition,
- Trans border arms groups,
- Trans-border arms trade,
- Illegal trafficking and trade
- Or any other -state briefly-----
-

4)How will you describe EACRF strategy to intervene in DRC?

- Comprehensive
- Tactical
- Strategic
- Networked
- Or any other -state briefly-----

5) Do you think the following regional aspects brought by intra-state conflicts?

- Transnational economies
- arms sale/ban
- DPs/refugees
- Or any other -state briefly-----

6. EACRF encounters the types of coordination dynamics in their intervention in DRC?

- Intra coordination,
- Extra-coordination

- Repeated interventions,
- Transnational EAC conflicts
 - Or any other -state briefly-----
 -

7. What was the general objective of EAC in deploying EACRF in intervening intra-State conflict in Eastern DRC?

.....

8. Who do you consider the main primary actors in the DRC conflict.....

.....

9. How have the primary actors' actions influenced the intensity or duration of the DRC conflict.....

.....

Objective 3: Dynamics and Challenges

1. Which of the following terms can you use to describe EACRF intervention in DRC?

- Humanitarian operations
- Peace support
- Acceptability operations
- peace building
- preventive deployment

2. Which of the following conflict prevention mechanism does EAC employ?

- Easy local tension
- Encourage dialogue
- Reconciliation
- Monitors safety and human rights in DRC

3. Do the following part of EAC conflict preventive challenges?

- Institutionalism standards for HRs
- Election monitoring
- Early warning mechanisms

4. Do you think any of the following form part of EAC challenge DRC operation capacity?

- Peacekeeping
- Policy

- Rule of law
- Coordination of operations

5. Does EAC utilize the following in their intervention in DRC?

- Panel of the wise
- special envoys
- special rapporteur
- high representative of the EAC

Or any other -state briefly-----

6. Is there a link between conflict and development in DRC conflict?

- Yes
- No

If yes, is there need for EAC to extent her intervention to peace building?

How.....

7. What are the dynamcis and challenges does EACRF face in DRC intervention?

- Lack of resources
- lack of adequate personnel
- slow enforcement
- difficult to act militarily

Or any other -state briefly-----

APPENDIX III: Key Informant Interview Guide

1. Does the force have adequate airlift/strategic capability?
2. If not, how does the lack of the airlift capacity affect the force's operations?
3. How does the force raise its funds and other needed resources to maintain troops in DRC?
4. Is the donor aid from EACRF's partner friends coordinated?
5. If there is no coordination of the aid or resources how should the issue be approached?
6. How does the force handle the problem of lack of resources from the member states?
7. Is there competition for lead role amongst the member states?
8. If so, how does the EACRF handle this crisis?
9. The EAC is known for its volatility, how is the force handling the conflicts within this region?
10. Are there incidences where regional conflicts affect the intervention?
11. Does the power between some member states affect the efficiency of the force?
12. How does internal conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda affect efforts by EACRF in DRC?
13. What is really the cause of the conflict and the core problem in DRC?
14. What do you recommend? Are you seeing any ceasefire in the near future?

APPENDIX IV: Focus Group Discussion Guide

1. Why a you here?
2. What do you think is the root cause of you being here?
3. In your opinion, do you think ECRAF has brought peace in Eastern DRC?
4. What is your wish? And what do you think should be done to put an end to the conflict?

APPENDIX V: MMUST Approval of Proposal



MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MMUST)

Tel: 056-30870
Fax: 056-30153
E-mail: director@dps@mmust.ac.ke
Website: www.mmust.ac.ke

P.O Box 190
Kakamega – 50100
Kenya

Directorate of Postgraduate Studies

Ref: MMU/COR: 509099

21st August 2023

Manana Robert Santos
CPC/H/01-70370/2021
P.O. Box 190-50100
KAKAMEGA

Dear Mr. Manana

RE: APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL

I am pleased to inform you that the Directorate of Postgraduate Studies has considered and approved your PhD proposal entitled: *“Dynamics of East African Community Regional Forces’ Intervention in the Management of Intra-State Conflict in The Democratic Republic of Congo”* and appointed the following as supervisors:

1. Prof. Frank Matanga - MMUST
2. Prof. Edmon Were - KISII UNIVERSITY

You are required to submit through your supervisor(s) progress reports every three months to the Directorate of Postgraduate Studies. Such reports should be copied to the following: Chairman, School of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Graduate Studies Committee and Chairman, Department of Peace and Conflicts Studies. Kindly adhere to research ethics consideration in conducting research.

It is the policy and regulations of the University that you observe a deadline of two years from the date of registration to complete your PhD thesis. Do not hesitate to consult this office in case of any problem encountered in the course of your work.


We wish you the best in your research and hope the study will make original contribution to knowledge.


Yours Sincerely,

Date:
Signature:

Prof. Stephen O. Odebero, PhD, FIEEP
DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES


APPENDIX VI: NACOSTI Research Permit


REPUBLIC OF KENYA


NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: **112070** Date of Issue: **25/August/2023**


RESEARCH LICENSE




This is to Certify that Mr. Robert Sntos Manana of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, has been licensed to conduct research as per the provision of the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 (Rev.2014) in Nairobi on the topic: **DYNAMICS OF EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY REGIONAL FORCES' INTERVENTION IN THE MANAGEMENT OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO for the period ending : 25/August/2024.**

License No: **NACOSTI/P/23/29013**

112070
Applicant Identification Number


Director General
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION

Verification QR Code



NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document,
Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.

See overleaf for conditions

APPENDIX VII: Field Work Schedule of Activities

Santos Manana PhD Research schedule.			
ROUTING (NAIROBI KENYA - KIGALI RWANDA -- KIGALI - GOMA DRC - GOMA DRC - KISORO UGANDA- KAMPALA -HOIMA-KAMPALA- NAIROBI			
DATE	DAY	TRIP	ACTIVITY
08-Oct	Sunday	Nairobi -Kigali	Depart Nairobi for Kigali with Early or Mid-Morning Flight
08-Oct	Sunday	Kigali	Arrive Kigali, check in the hotel and hold Few Interviews
09-Oct	Monday	Kigali	Hold Interviews and Visit Genocide Memory Centre
10-Oct	Tuesday	Kigali-	Depart Early Morning to Southern Rwanda, visit Kigame refugee camp, hold interviews and travel back and rest
11-Oct	Wednesd ay	Kigali-Goma DRC	Hold interview in Kabuga-Kigali and depart to Goma DRC before mid-day, via Muzanze - Rubavu. Contact interview in Rubavu refuge transit center, cross the border at Gisenyi, check in at Linda hotel in Goma and hold interview
12-Oct	Thursday	Goma DRC	Hold interviews with VOA, Aljazira journalist and Wazalendo armed group spokesperson in Linda hotel and their after have a detour in Goma.
13-Oct	Friday	Goma DRC	Visit Kanyaruchina IDP camp hold interview with IPDs, Kibumba M23 base hold interview with M23 spokesperson, have a detour, assess effect of Volcano and back to Goma and hold further interviews
14-Oct	Saturday	Goma DRC- Kisoro UG	Depart in the morning to Cyanika/Kisoro visit Nyakabande transit center hold interview and then proceed to Bunagana for further interviews
15-Oct	Sunday	Cyanika/Kisoro- KPL	Depart very early to Kampala via Kabale-

			Ntungamo - Mbarara - Masaka. Arrive very late in the evening, check in the hotel
16-Oct	Monday	Kampala	Rest morning hrs, mid-afternoon hold interviews with UPDF Brig.General
17-Oct	Tuesday	Kampala- Hoima	Depart very early to Hoima hold interviews at Kyangwali refugee camp and travel back to Kampala and rest
18-Oct	Wednesd ay	Kampala	Hold further interviews with senior Military officials.
19-Oct	Thursday	Kampala- Nairobi	Hold further interviews, depart for Nairobi late in the evening and rest.

APPENDIX VIII: Researcher's Official Request to Collected Data in the Republic of Rwanda

Robert Santos Manana
P. O. BOX 11062-00100
NAIROBI
Email: sirsantos@rocketmail.com
Tel.0723953006

Rwandan Embassy
Gigiri, Limuru Road
P.O. BOX 30619-00100
NAIROBI

Date: 29/08/2023

Dear Sir/Madam

RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT ACADEMIC RESEARCH

I am the above named student of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology currently pursuing Doctorate Degree of Philosophy (PHD) in Peace and conflict studies.

In light of the above subject matter, I am requesting your good office for permission to conduct my research studies in your country dubbed "**Dynamics of East African Community Regional Force Intervention in the Management of Intra-State Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo**". My target group during research studies would be state officers, military attache, Embassy staff, visit some refugee camps and Rwandan genocide site.

I undertake to adhere to research ethics, standards and confidentiality.

Attached are copies of letter of approval and research license for ease of reference.

With those few remarks I hope my request will meet your sincere consideration.



Yours sincerely
Santos Manana

APPENDIX IX: Researcher's Official Request to Collect Data in DRC

Robert Santos Manana
P.O. BOX 11062-00100
NAIROBI
Email: sirsantos@rocketmail.com
Tel.0723953006

Embassy Of The Democratic Republic of Congo
Twiga Lane, Muthaiga Off Karura Avenue
P.O. BOX 48106-00100
NAIROBI

Date: 29/08/2023

Dear Sir/Madam

RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT ACADEMIC RESEARCH

I am the above named student of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology currently pursuing Doctorate Degree of Philosophy (PHD) in Peace and conflict studies.

In light of the above subject matter, I am requesting your good office for permission to conduct my research studies in your country dubbed "**Dynamics of East African Community Regional Force Intervention in the Management of Intra-State Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (in Goma)**". My target group during research studies would be state officers, military attache, Embassy staff and general public.

I undertake to adhere to research ethics, standards and confidentiality.

Attached are copies of letter of approval and research license for ease of reference.

With those few remarks I hope my request will meet your sincere consideration.



Yours sincerely

Santos Manana

APPENDIX X: Researcher's Official Request to Collect Data in the Republic of Uganda

Robert Santos Manana
P.O. BOX 11062-00100
NAIROBI
Email: sirsantos@rocketmail.com
Tel.0723953006

Uganda High Commission
Riverside Paddock, off Riverside Drive
P.O. BOX 60853-00100
NAIROBI

Date: 29/08/2023

Dear Sir/Madam

RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT ACADEMIC RESEARCH

I am the above named student of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology currently pursuing Doctorate Degree of Philosophy (PHD) in Peace and conflict studies.

In light of the above subject matter, I am requesting your good office for permission to conduct my research studies in your country dubbed "**Dynamics of East African Community Regional Force Intervention in the Management of Intra-State Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo**". My target group during research studies would be state officers, military attache, Embassy staff and visit some refugee camps.

I undertake to adhere to research ethics, standards and confidentiality.

Attached are copies of letter of approval and research license for ease of reference.

With those few remarks I hope my request will meet your sincere consideration.



Yours sincerely
Santos Manana

APPENDIX XI: Clearance by NPS-K for Researcher to travel to the Republic of Rwanda for Data Collection



CONFIDENTIAL



**OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE
NAIROBI - KENYA**

Telegraphic Address: "IG, NPS"
Telephone: Nairobi
When replying please quote

Jogoo House "A"
P O Box 44249-00100
NAIROBI

Ref. No. NPS/IG/SEC/6/11/2 VOL.CXIII (28)

12th September, 2023

The Director,
Directorate of Criminal Investigations,
P.O. Box 30036,
NAIROBI.

REQUEST FOR TRAVEL CLEARANCE TO RWANDA


NO. 235269 CI SANTOS MANANA

Reference is made to your letter Ref. DCI/SEC/6/11/2/VOL.XXI/268 dated **7th September, 2023** on the above subject.

Travel clearance is hereby granted to the above named officer to travel to Rwanda to conduct an academic research study dubbed "Dynamics of East African Community Regional Force Intervention in the Management of Intra-State Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo" from **8th October to 18th October, 2023.**

The officer is scheduled to travel on **8th October**, and travel back on **18th October, 2023.**

All travel and accommodation expenses will be met **privately.**


MATHEW KUTOH
For: INSPECTOR GENERAL
NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX XII: Letter of Support by the High Commission of Uganda



**HIGH COMMISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
NAIROBI**

**RECOMMENDATION LETTER FOR ROBERT SANTOS MANANA
A PHD STUDENT**

31st August 2023

I refer to the above named student and recommend him to whom it may concern.

The academic research dubbed "*Dynamics of East African Community Regional Force Intervention in the Management of Intra-state conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo*" will benefit us in the region to have more informed view entirely.

I am confident that he will adhere to your organizational working ethics, standards and confidentiality because of his background and our usual engagements while executing joint security challenges.

Any assistance rendered to him will be highly appreciated.

JOHN N. NDUGUTSE
POLICE ATTACHE



APPENDIX XIII: Researcher's International Travel Document



APPENDIX XIV: Map of East Africa

