THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES AND INTRACTABLE ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY, KENYA

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A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Conferment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work prepared with no other than the indicated sources and support, and has not been presented elsewhere for a degree or any other award.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this PhD thesis to my Late Father Julius Juma Aono and my beloved Mother

Jane Atieno Ombewa for their sacrifices, unconditional love and for believing in me.

They built a foundation on which my pursuit for knowledge was built.

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ABSTRACT

Violent conflicts in multi-ethnic societies remain a major problem in the world today. One important hypothesis concerning the causes of violent conflict focuses on the presence of major horizontal inequalities. This argument is based on the notion that when cultural differences coincide with economic and political among among groups, can cause deep resentment that may lead to violent struggles. Uasin Gishu County has been the epicentre of violent conflicts in post-colonial Kenya with ethnic communities in the area living in fear of violence especially during political seasons. Beyond the superficial differences between the ethnicities in Uasin Gishu County, there are deep-rooted horizontal inequalities which have not received the attention they deserve in explaining the intractable conflicts, hence the current study. The overall objective of the study was to critically interrogate the contribution of horizontal inequalities towards intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County in Post-Colonial Kenya. The specific objectives were to: Examine the nature of horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County in Post-Colonial Kenya, Analyse the nexus between horizontal inequalities and intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County in Post-Colonial Kenya. Assess the challenges and Opportunities in managing horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County in Post-Colonial Kenya.The study was anchored on a conceptual framework underpinned by three theories namely: Relative deprivation theory, primordialism Ethnic Conflict theory and Conflict Transformation theory.The study was conducted in Uasin Gishu County. The study targeted the following categories of the study population in Uasin Gishu County; Household heads, County Secretary, County Commisioner, CDF officials, Chiefs, Religious leaders, civil society organizations, local political leaders (MCAs), security personnel (senior Police officers) and opinion leaders. The total sample size for the study was 457. The study employed both probability and non-probability sampling techniques. The study adopted primary and secondary methods of data collection. Primary data was collected through Questionnaires, interviews and FGDs. Quantitative data was analysed using SPSS version 25 software to obtain descriptive statistics particularly frequencies and percentages as well as inferential statistics including Pearson's Product Moment Correlation Coefficient (PPMCC). Qualitative data was analyzed using thematic techniques to support quantitative data. Quantitative data was presented using tables, graphs, and charts while qualitative data was presented inform of narrative reports and verbatim quotations. The findings revealed that horizontal inequalities were manifested socially, politically, economically and culturally. Regarding economic inequalities, the findings revealed that was there was a statistically significant bivariate association between asset ownership and ethnic conflicts (r=.143[**], p= 0.005) and ownership of land and ethnic conflicts (r= 126[*], p= 0.015). In reference to political horizontal inequalities, the findings indicated that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Ethnic Patronage and ethnic conflicts (r= 265[**], p= .000.) and in reference to cultural status inequalities there was a statistically significant bivariate association betweenh with ethnic conflicts (r=.136[**], p=.009). The overall conclusion of the study is that horizontal inequalities have played a significant role towards intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County in Post-colonial Kenya.

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OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

Conflict- This refers to tension, disputes, skirmishes, clashes, or violence that arise primarily from differences in ethnic identity, competition over limited resources such as land and/or economic opportunities within Uasin Gishu County. These conflicts are manifested through disputes related to the political governance and administration, social issues and dynamics such as disputes over cultural practices, gender-related tensions, or issues related to social services, education, and healthcare privision as well as economic disparities, including disparities in income, business opportunities, employment, and access to financial resources within Uasin Gishu Couty.

Cultural Status Inequalities: In this study, Cultural status Inequalities Refers to disparities in the recognition of cultures of ethnic groups within Uasin Gishu County. These inequalities are characterized by variations in the perceived value, prestige, and influence associated with specific cultures or ethnic identities. The cultural status inequalities are manifested through stereotypes, biases, and prejudices based on cultural or ethnic identities which have the potential to influence economic disparities, access to political power, representation, and decision-making.

Economic Horizontal Inequalities: Economic horizontal inequalities pertain to disparities in wealth, income, and access to economic opportunities among ethnic groups in Uasin Gishu County. These include variations in land ownership, employment opportunities, access to credit and financial services, and income levels among different communities.

Ethnic Conflict: This refers to disputes, clashes, or violence that arise primarily from differences in ethnic identity, where members of different ethnic groups within Uasin Gishu County such as Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Kisii; Luo, Luhya, Kamba, Teso, Maasai, Turkana, Meru, Mijikenda, Somali among others are involved in confrontations, hostilities, or struggles over resources, representation, or historical grievances.

Ethnic Group: In this study ethnic group refers to the following culturally defined groups living in Uasin Gishu County; Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Kisii; Luo, Luhya, Kamba, Teso, Maasai, Turkana, Meru, Mijikenda, Somali among others.

Ethnic- In this study ethnic refers to culturally defined groups or groups of people sharing common and distinctive language, norms, and cultural orientation or background in Uasin Gishu County. These groups include the Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luo, Kisii, Luhya, Kamba among others.

Horizontal Inequalities: This refers to disparities in social, economic, and political opportunities, resources, and outcomes among different ethnic groups such as the Kalenjin, Luo. Kikuyu, Luhya, and Kamba among other groups residing within Uasin Gishu County.

Inequality: refers to disparities, differences, or imbalances in various aspects of life, including but not limited to social, economic, political, and cultural dimensions, among different ethnic groups living within the bounds of Uasin Gishu County.

Intractable Conflicts: Refers to conflicts or disputes within Uasin Gishu County that exhibit characteristics of being persistent, resistant to resolution, and difficult to manage or overcome. Intractable conflicts involve deeply rooted issues, complex

dynamics, and a history of failed attempts to find a comprehensive solution and multiple parties.

Intractable Ethnic Conflicts: This refers to long-lasting, deeply entrenched, and difficult-to-resolve conflicts that are primarily driven by ethnic or communal divisions within Uasin Gishu County. These conflicts are characterized by persistent violence, intergroup tensions, and a history of failed resolution attempts

Intractable: This refers to conflicts or disputes within Uasin Gishu County that exhibit characteristics of being persistent, resistant to resolution, and challenging to manage or overcome. Intractable conflicts often involve deeply rooted issues, complex dynamics, and a history of failed attempts to find a comprehensive solution

Multi-Ethnic: This refers to the presence of a diverse range of ethnic groups or communities residing within the geographic boundaries of Uasin Gishu County. This is characterized by ethnic diversity, Cultural plurality, linguistic variation as well as interaction and co-existence among ethnic groups such as the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Kisii; Luo, Luhya, Kamba, Teso, Maasai, Turkana, Meru, Mijikenda, Somali among others.

Political Horizontal Inequalities: This refer to disparities in access to and participation in political processes and decision-making within Uasin Gishu County. These inequalities are manifested in the County through differences in representation at various levels of government, including county and national representation; and

variations in access to political positions, appointments, and leadership roles which give some ethnic groups greater access to political power than others.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAC-Cronbach Alpha Coefficient

CIPEV-Commission of Enquiry into the Post-Election Violence

CBO-Community Based Organization

CDF-Constituency Development Fund

CGA-County Governments Act

CJPC-Catholic Justice and Peace Commission

CSO-Civil Society Organization

CUFMC-Constitunecy Uwezo Fund Management Committee

DCs-District Commissioners

DDC -District Development Committee

DFRD-District Focus for Rural Development

DPS-Directorate of Postgraduate Studies

FBO-Faith Based Organization

FGD-Focus Group Discussions

GDP-Gross Domestic Product

HEI-Horizontal Education Inequality

HI- Horizontal Inequality

ICC-International Criminal Court

KAMATUSA-Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu bloc

KANU-Kenya African National Union

KNBS-Kenya National Bureau of Statistics

KPHC -Kenya Population and Housing Census

LBCs-Land-buying companies

MCA- Member of County Assembly

NACOSTI-National Commission for Science and Technology

NCCK-National Council of Churches of Kenya

NCIC-National Cohesion and Integration Commission

NGO-Non-Governmental Organization

ODM-Orange Democratic Movement

PCs –Provincial Commissioners

PNU-Party of National Unity

PPMCC-Pearson's Product Moment Correlation Coefficient

PSs-Permanent Secretaries

QUAL-Qualitative Approaches

QUAN-Quantitative Approaches

SDG-Sustainable Development Goals

SFT-Settlement Fund Trustees

SPSS-Statistical Packages for Social Sciences

UDA-United Democratic Alliance

UNDP-United Nations Development Programme

UNEP- United Nations Environmental Programme

UN-United Nations

UN-United Nations

USAID-United States AID

TJRC- Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the current research and discusses the following important aspects of the study: Background to the study, statement of the problem, research objectives, Research questions, academic, policy and philosophical Justifications of the study and finally the scope of the the study.

1.1 Background to the Study

Violent conflicts in multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries remains a major problem in the world today. Such conflicts have been experienced in many parts of the world with regions like the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, the Basque region of Spain and Northern Ireland being among areas affected in Europe (Stewart & Brown, 2007). Other countries that have been affected massively by such conflicts include various African countries including Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan and Nigeria just to mention a few, Fiji and Indonesia are not left out of on the list of countries that have been reeling from numerous bitter, deadly conflicts have been fought along ethnic or religious lines (Collier, 2003).

In addition to the deaths and injuries that result on and off the battlefield, violent organized conflict is also a major cause of underdevelopment and poverty. It reduces economic growth and investment, worsens social service provision and leads to weaker human indicators compared to non-conflict countries (Stewart *et.al,* 2001). To make matters worse, the incidence of such violent conflict is highest among the poorest countries of the world. Consequently, those concerned with promoting development and reducing poverty must make prevention of these conflicts a priority.

Fortunately, there is plentiful evidence to show that violent conflict in multi-ethnic societies is not an unavoidable ramification of ethnic difference, an outcome of age-old ethnic hatreds as is popularly suggested, nor of an unavoidable clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1993). Violent conflict within multi-ethnic countries is not inevitable in fact, most multi-ethnic societies are peaceful (Fearon & Laitin, 1996). The critical question, then, is why does ethnic or religious conflict break out in some circumstances and not in others? One important hypothesis concerning the causes of violent conflict focuses on the presence of major horizontal inequalities or inequalities among culturally defined groups. This argument is based on the notion that when cultural differences coincide with economic and political differences between groups, this can cause deep resentment that may lead to intractable violent struggles (Stewart & Brown, 2007). If it is correct, it presents important implications, for development policy generally as well as for policy in conflict-affected countries.

According to Stewart (2007) there has been a major link between Horizontal inequalities (HIs) and countries that have faced conflicts in various parts of the world. Each country, has, however, confronted serious HIs differently. Horizontal inequalities (HIs) have four categorizations; Economic HIs, Social HIs, Political HIs, and Cultural HIs. Economic HIs include inequalities in access to and ownership of assets-financial, human, natural resource-based and social. In addition, they comprise inequalities in income levels and employment opportunities, which depend on such assets and the general conditions of the economy. Social HIs include inequalities in access to a range of services, such as education, health care and housing, as well as in educational and health status. Political HIs include inequalities in the distribution of political opportunities and power among

groups, including control over the presidency, the cabinet, parliamentary assemblies, the bureaucracy, local and regional governments, the army and the police. They also encompass inequalities in people's capabilities to participate politically and to express their needs. Cultural status HIs include disparities in the recognition and standing of different groups languages, customs, norms and practices.

In the 21st century, a large section of the world population is living in urban settings with a projection that more people will keep moving areas. According to the United Nations Department of Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2020) the proportion of the population residing in urban areas, which is highest in high-income countries, is projected to grow from 77 per cent in 2000 to 84 per cent in 2030. Middle-income countries, which started off at lower levels of urbanization, experienced more rapid urbanization during recent decades. In middle-income countries, the share of the urban population is projected to increase from 42 per cent in 2000 to 59 per cent in 2030. In low-income countries, the share of the population living in urban areas is projected to grow from 26 per cent in 2000 to 38 per cent in 2030. Africa and Asia are experiencing faster urbanization than other regions.

The movement of more people to urban areas means increased ethnic diversity within urban areas and thus the creation of more culturally defined groups. The possibility of one group dominating specific urban areas could easily create competition with minority or migrant ethnic groups and thus in the long run lead to incidences of ethnic conflicts, for example in conflict-prone cities, the machinery of government may be controlled by one ethnic group and used to discriminate against competing and threatening groups. This could easily lead to horizontal inequalities that in the long term may lead to conflicts. A

disturbing number of cities across the world are susceptible to intense inter-communal conflict and violence reflecting ethnic or nationalist fractures (Bollens, 2003). Cities such as Jerusalem, Belfast, Johannesburg, Nicosia, Montreal, Algiers, Sarajevo, New Delhi, Beirut, Karachi and Brussels are urban arenas penetrable by deep intergroup conflict associated with ethnic or political differences.

Across Africa, several incidences of ethnic conflicts have been recorded with horizontal inequalities being at the centre of these conflicts. McCoy (2008) attributed the roots of the Malian conflict to a combination of ethnic fighting between the black population of the south and the paler northern population coupled with northern economic grievances. He added that, the systematic neglect, discrimination and exploitation of the northern provinces created the Tuareg grievances against the government. Horizontal inequalities between the Northern and Southern populations were the root cause of the Malian conflict.These combination of economic and political horizontal inequalities led to a bloody conflict in Mali between the years 1991 to 1996. The conflict ended after overthrowing of the government of Moussa Traoré in March 1991 and his replacement with Konaré who was democratically elected in 1992.

Onwuzuruigbo (2011) further opines that in West Africa, violent conflicts stemming from Horizontal Inequalities have been experienced between the Aguleri and Umuleri communities in the Anambra State of Nigeria. Protracted land struggles and perceived historical inequalities in access to social, economic and political resources have promoted a collective feeling of difference between the two groups, and this has erupted in spasmodic bloody conflict. The conflicts experienced between the two communities in

1995 and 1999 claimed lives of several people from both communities and these two communities continue to live in tension and fear of ethnic violence at any given time.

According to McCoy (2008) the genocide in Rwanda was the result of deep and systemic horizontal inequalities within the political, economic and military sectors of society. The inequalities were suffered by both 'identities' and resulted in widespread violence against both Hutu and Tutsi. These inequalities and the thirst for power, coupled with systemic social and economic insecurity, bred extremism which resulted in one of the most efficient and most deadly violent outbreaks of the modern era.

Kenya has long had significant socio-economic HIs between ethnic groups and regions, mainly of colonial and geographic origin, which have continued over the 45 years since independence (Stewart, 2010). Ethnic conflicts in Kenya have been experienced since the pre-colonialism era and have continued to be experienced in the post-colonial Kenya (Oyugi, 2002). The recurrence of ethnic conflicts in the post-colonial Kenya has been characterized by varying and inherent social, economic, cultural patterns and governance systems (Onyango *et al*, 2011). Ethnic conflicts in Kenya have been exacerbated by injustice, corruption and ethnicization of politics that have led to social and economic marginalization of communities, economic inequalities, rise in poverty levels and inequitable distribution of resources (UNEP, 2007).

The ethnic conflicts have been experienced in many parts of Kenya have majorly been witnessed in towns such as Kisumu, Nakuru, Nairobi Eldoret, and Mombasa. According the NCIC report that was released before the 2022 general election in Kenya, six counties were considered high risk for Electoral related violence, these Counties, Nairobi,

Kisumu, Uasin Gishu, Kericho, Nakuru and Mombasa(NCIC, 2022). This is an indicator that these conflicts have not only been ethnic in nature but also urban in nature. Rural areas in Kenya are dominated by people from same ethnic group with towns bringing together different ethnicities thus creating a picture of culturally defined groups living within one area. In this regard, ethnic conflict in Kenya are urban in nature.

Ethnic conflicts in Kenya are mainly attributed to political incitement, land problems, ethnic polarizations, demonstration and consequent clashes and riots which a common characteristic of every political campaign season (Peters, 2009). Dercon and Raxona (2010), indicate that weak institutions in Kenya are to blame for the incidences of ethnic conflicts in Kenya. The weaknesses in institutions are attributed to the failure of the government to honour its social contract with the people which has led to the increased agitation both at individual and group levels and thus created a ripe environment for conflicts.

Uasin Gishu County which is an urban county has a multi-ethnic population. The county is ethnically diverse with the majority being Kalenjin (mostly Nandi) and others being Kikuyu, Luhya, Kisii, among others Luo. The County was at the epicenter of a series of violent confrontations and incidents that came in the wake of 2007 general elections. Election related violence is endemic to the area ever since the introduction of multi-party politics back in 1991 (den Broeck, 2009). In 2007, the most affected areas in Uasin Gishu were Kiambaa, Munyaka, Langas, Yamumbi, Burnt Forest, Eldoret Town, Cheptiret and Turbo.

The Kalenjin (Nandi) is the most dorminant ethnic group in the region with other communities largely the Kikuyu living in the settlement schemes being the second largest community. Kalenjin ethnic identity is the indefinite outcome of interplay between cultural, political and economic processes. Kalenjin antipathies towards the Kikuyu community have their roots in issues over land, land acquisition, land usage and resource generation that come from colonial and post-colonial land policies and are highlighted, (re)created and reaffirmed in times of heightened political competition(Kahura, 2019).

Despite its political significance, violence in the North Rift is rich in traditional connotations. During the post-election violence of 2007/2008 Kalenjin militias in Uasin Gishu county were ascribed the features and duties of traditional warriors. Whilst performing their raids they reportedly sung traditional Nandi war songs (den Broeck, 2009). Elders are believed to have blessed their warriors at the advent of a violent confrontation and in their discourses they expressed profound feelings of communal belonging and responsibility. At the time the Kalenjin community of the North Rift was said "to be together as one to go against the *bunyot*. The "fraudulent" elections were perceived as an attack on the community as a whole. Consequently, armed men claimed to defend the community by violently confronting their neighbours (den Broeck, 2009). They claimed to protect their Kalenjin kin from dangers posed by neighbouring enemy communities. In this they were driven by pervasive feelings of ethnic communality and antipathy that bring with them a series of culturally prescribed actions and responsibilities.

According to the TJRC report (2013) indicated Land became a major conflict issue with economic marginalization and violation of socio-economic rights common in post-

colonial Kenya and grand corruption and economic crimes becoming the order of the day. The question of the use, ownership and access to increasingly scarce land and related resources has been at the centre of unending conflicts between ethnic communities in Kenya (Kamau, 2021). Uasin Gishu County in the North Rift region which is multi-ethnic and dominated by the Kalenjin community has been the epicenter of ethnic violence. The county is considered a hotspot of ethnic conflict due to the repeated episodes of violence that affected the area in 1991/1992, 1993, 1997 and 2007/2008 (Hull, 2008). Arguably the North Rift Region where Uasin Gishu County lies is one of the luckiest regions in Kenya politically speaking considering that Kenya's longest-serving President, Daniel Arap Moi hailed from the region. In this regard, it could be argued that the region has not faced political horizontal inequalities because Moi (a Kalenjin by ethnicity) was the President (one of the most powerful presidents in Kenya's history) from 1978-2002 and had every chance to rectify any inequalities facing his co-ethnics.

When Moi's stay in power was threatened by multi-party politics of the early1990s, he and the politicians who supported him evoked ethnicity as a tool to protect the political power and position of privilege. Ethnicity effectively became a political tool that was used to manipulate ethnic emotions and mobilize conflicts. This is what Stewart (2002) meant when he opined that relatively privileged groups may initiate violence to preserve their power and their access to important resources. The Kalenjin Community thus mobilized widely in Uasin Gishu county to protect 'their position of being in power'. At this point and with Moi facing stiff opposition and competition from political leaders from the Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya communities Moi and his inner cycle exacerbated the

ethnic conflicts, by creating the "us versus them" narrative. As Veit, (2019) argues Moi and other Politicians mainly from the Kalenjin community evoked *majimboism*.

According to Mwamba, Kagema & Kanga (2019) As far back as 1969, the *majimboism* debate had created serious animosity in Uasin Gishu County with people from the Kalenjin community feeling as though their ancestral land had been taken from them and given to other people from other regions mainly the Kikuyu community through land buying companies. The land question in the County of Uasin Gishu has therefore been major factor for horizontal inequalities because of its association with wealth generation. Agriculture, property development, and all other economic activities are all associated with one being able to own a parcel of land. It was on this basis that the Honorable Jean Marie Seroney, who was Member of Parliament for Tinderet Constituency had drawn a controversy when he authored '*The Nandi Declaration'* that demanded all non-Nandi residents vacate the ancestral land of Nandi. The Moi regime revived these feelings in the 1990s and appealed to the emotions of the Kalenjin community, giving new hope that the Kalenjin land that had been taken away unfairly will finally be repossessed. As Mwamba, Kagema & Kanga (2019) aver, while *majimboism* was not fully or officially defined, it was interpreted as a "get the land back issue." To recover "stolen" land, the Kikuyu were evicted from areas where they had settled in the Rift Valley with Uasin Gishu being one of the most affected areas. Much of the violence was centred in areas where so-called "immigrant" groups were located. These incidences in the 1990s led to ethnic mobilization and the violence that affected the region between 1991 and 1997.

Steep changes in the relative status of groups can foment new grievances that increase the risk of violence (World Bank, 2018). This led to the build-up to the bloody 2007/2008

ethnic skirmishes in the county began when the Kalenjin community lost their status in power to the Kikuyu (Kibaki presidency) who just like Kenyatta was perceived as a leader who would use ethnic patronage to continue to deny Kalenjins resources and the rights to 'reclaim their land'. Gordon (2019) argued that Patronage was at the heart of the electoral violence of 2007. The re-election of Kibaki, a Kikuyu, prompted Luo and Kalenjin leaders to mobilize mass violence in the Rift Valley. The argument was that if a Kikuyu occupied the executive office, patronage would continue to only benefit Kikuyu at the expense of the Kalenjin and Luo. In this regard, the political narrative of 2007 in the Uasin Gishu was similar to the one of the 1990s which equated electing Kibaki's biggest rival, in the election (Raila Odinga) to evicting Kikuyus from 'Kalenjin lands'. The narrative was driven home by political players and the media, especially vernacular stations (CIPEV, 2009). This led to the massive violence witnessed in 2007/2008. Ethnic patronage and politicization of ethnicity have been major factors attributed to the creation of horizontal inequalities in the county.

Therefore economic and political processes and policies have not only hollowed out traditional morality and ruptured the social organization of communities in the Uasin Gishu, they have likewise devastated the economic and material basis on which people's lives were hinged (den Broeck, 2009). Economic uncertainty due to increasing demographic and ecological pressures, government neglect and failing policies seems to have the biggest impact on the younger generations hence the intergenerational tensions. The despair of young men regarding their economic and physical situation is widely agreed to be one of the underlying causes of conflict in the North Rift region and specifically Uasin Gishu County (Kahura, 2019). Consequently, some of the violence can

be retraced to economic competition over various scarce resources, survival and opportunism.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

In the event that the secondary causes that have produced the great convulsions of the world are removed, one will always find the principle of inequality at the bottom. Either the poor have attempted to plunder the rich or the rich to enslave the poor (Stewart, 2015). If, then, a society can ever be founded in which everyman shall have something to keep and little to take from others, much will have been done for peace(Stewart, 2010). Kenya has had ethnic related violence over the years which have been attributed to socio-economic or political horizontal inequalities. The fact that major conflicts in Kenya occur around electioneering periods and mostly affect cosmopolitan areas is a clear signal that peace has remained elusive in the country with social, poliotical, economic and cultural factors being at the of these conflicts (Oucho, 2008). Juma *et. al.* (2018) furthers avers that Politicization of ethnicity and political exclusion have also been cited a key drivers to ethnic conflicts in Kenya.

According to Stewart (2010), any type of horizontal inequality can provide an incentive for political mobilisation, but political inequalities (that is, political exclusion) are most likely to motivate group leaders to instigate a rebellion. He further adds that by contrast, economic and social inequalities, as well as inequalities in cultural status, are more likely to motivate the mass of population. Cultural status inequalities bind groups together and thereby increase the salience of identity differences.

Uasin Gishu County has been the epicentre of ethnic conflicts due to horizontal inequalities in the area. Boone *et al.* (2021) indicated that the unequal distribution of land and economic resources in the County, with certain ethnic groups enjoying better access

to productive assets, such as agricultural land and business opportunities, while others face marginalization and limited economic prospects was a major conflict issue in the area. Kahura (2019) added that political representation and decision-making processes in Uasin Gishu County have been marked by ethnic imbalances, further deepening horizontal inequalities. He added that specific ethnic communities have historically held more power and influence in local governance structures, leaving other groups marginalized and disenfranchised. The horizontal inequalities in the county have been associated with ethnic conflicts, this is because the inequality in the distribution of resources and opportunities creates feelings of injustice, unfairness and the perception of marginalization by among ethnic communities that are disadvantaged. Such feelings lead to ethnic animosity, and tension thus creating fertile grounds for ethnic violence as witnessed in the county in the 1990s and 2007/2008. According to the Minorities at Risk Project (2004), ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County often erupt over land disputes, political competition, and access to economic resources. In their findings, they opine that disputes over land ownership and allocation were major triggers for conflicts between different ethnic communities in the county.

Several attempts have been made at managing horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. The County government and national government have made attempts to empower marginalized communities with access to productive assets, skills training, and income-generating opportunities for example according to the County Government of Uasin Gishu, the provision of enterprise funds and capacity building has made an effort to ensure economic empowerment to disadvantaged groups. The government has initiated land reforms through the National Lands Commission to ensure

transparent land allocation processes and equitable access to land resources for all communities. The Kenyan Constitution (2010) and County Government Act (2012) have addressed political imbalances and promoted inclusivity to enhance the representation of marginalized groups in governance structures. Some of the affirmative action attempts include sensing 30% of non-dominant ethnic groups are employed by the County government of Uasin Gishu County.

Through community forums, workshops, and grassroots campaigns, civil society organizations have facilitated constructive dialogue and promoted peaceful coexistence. For example, according to International Crisis Group (2017), the state and non-state actors identified 80 male elders- 40 from each of the main ethnic communities, the Kalenjin and Kikuyu to participate in a peace process that lasted sixteen months before a local agreement was reached. There have also been efforts at improving access to social services education, healthcare, and infrastructure, to address horizontal inequalities. According to Kimathi, (2017) Investments in education infrastructure, scholarships for disadvantaged students, and healthcare outreach programs have aimed to bridge the gaps in service provision and ensure equal opportunities for all communities.

In spite of these government and civil society efforts towards peaceful coexistence among ethnic communities in Uasin Gishu County, it is apparent that old wounds are far from healed, and the situation in many ethnically-mixed settlements in the county remains volatile. In this regard, beyond the superficial differences between the ethnicities in Uasin Gishu County, there are deep-rooted horizontal inequalities which have not received the attention they deserve in explaining the intractable conflicts, hence the current study.

1.3 Research objectives

The overall objective of the study was to critically interrogate the contribution of horizontal inequalities towards intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.

The specific objectives were to:

i. Examine the nature of horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.

ii. Analyse the nexus between horizontal inequalities and intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.

iii. Assess the challenges and Opportunities in managing horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.

1.4 Research Questions

i. What is the nature of horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County, in Post-Colonial Kenya?

ii. What is the nexus between horizontal inequalities and intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County in Post-Colonial Kenya

iii. Which challenges are experienced in the management of horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County in Post-Colonial Kenya?

1.5 Justification of the Study

1.5.1 Academic Justification

Uasin Gishu County has been the epicentre of ethnic conflicts since the 1990s despite being in a region that has been considered highly privileged after producing Kenya's second and longest-serving president. The county has been involved in ethnic conflicts

mainly due to socio-economic inequalities with Land being at the center of these conflicts. The Nandi Declaration of 1969 had put the Kalenjin community on a collision course with other communities who were not considered natives of Uasin Gishu County. The declaration created tension in the region with the local community agitating for the eviction of non-Kalenjins from the county. The situation was exacerbated by local politicians who advocated for *majimboism.* The fact that the Moi, A Kalenjin community headed the government between 1978 and 2002 meant that political patronage favoured the community for 24 years of the Moi presidency and as such the community should be comfortable and not decry horizontal inequality. Yet there are still feelings disenfranchised in terms of socio-economic inequalities with land being one of the major problems in the county. Non-Kalenjin communities living in the county having been constantly threatened with violence and evictions have also found themselves in situations in which they live in fear, especially in the 1990s when the political elite of the KANU party supported threats against them. In this regard, political differences between ethnic groups in the county have been a major driving factor for violence and ethnic tension.

A study of Kenya's political crisis in early 2008 is illustrative on the issues of horizontal inequalities in Kenya. Broadly speaking, stability had been sustained in Kenya by a balance, with political power favoring some groups which were deprived in socioeconomic terms, for some periods (notably under President Daniel arap Moi), or by inclusive government (during much of Jomo Kenyatta's regime and early in the presidency of Mwai Kibaki). However, when the Kibaki regime became politically exclusive and with the events leading to the contested presidential election results of

2007, the opposition groups reacted violently. The introduction of a more inclusive political regime in early 2008 was an essential step towards stopping the violence (Stewart, 2008). The structured mediation process led by Koffi Annan and panel of eminent persons in Kenya brought a favorable solution to all Kenyans people (Okoth, 2008). It is however, important to note that in the subsequent elections of 2013 and 2017, tension has flared up in Uasin Gishu County with certain ethnic groups going upcountry for the fear of violence, this was a reflection of the negative peace that has bedeviled the county over the years.

This study therefore sought to generate knowledge on why horizontal inequalities still remain a major conflict issue in the county despite the county's presumed position of privilege having been one of the regions that were presumably favoured by the Moi regime for 24 years. The study also sought to present the knowledge on the nexus between relative privilege and conflict *vis-à-vis* relative deprivation and conflict. In this regard, the study to explains why relatively privileged communities like the Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities that have been favoured by political patronage in post-colonial Kenya would still engage in ethnic violence under the guise of horizontal inequalities. Additionally, the study attempts to explain the aspects of relative deprivation as caused by political clientelism, political exclusion and unfair distribution of resources.

Studies on horizontal inequalities and conflicts have been conducted in Kenya, yet no particular study has focused on the unique situation in Uasin Gishu County. Frances Stewart conducted a study in 2010 titled *Horizontal Inequalities in Kenya and the political disturbances of 2008: some implications for aid policy.* This study indicated that horizontal inequalities were an underlying cause of the 2007 disturbances in Kenya but

did not point out to what extent each type of horizontal inequality, however, the study focused on how the inequalities would impact aid distribution during the conflict. The study did also not focus on the unique challenges of Uasin Gishu County which was an epicenter of the conflict.

Another study by Muhula (2009) and titled *Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-regional Politics in Kenya* was more focused on the nature of horizontal inequalities in Kenya since independence and their implication for political stability in the country. This study also did not address specific issues affecting Uasin Gishu County. The study was also conducted before the onset of devolution and as such did not address the unique aspects of ethnic conflicts in the post-devolution dispensation which this current study addresses.

Another study by Kimenyi, (2013) titled The Politics of Identity, horizontal inequalities and Conflict in Kenya. In *Preventing Violent Conflict in Africa: Inequalities, Perceptions and Institutions* also focused on Kenya and did not address the conflict issues in Uasin Gishu County. The study focused on the political aspects without giving much attention to the root causes of these conflicts that are exacerbated by political factors.

In this regard, the current study generates knowledge on the interplay between horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflicts, not only focusing on the political aspects of the conflicts but also on the social, cultural and economic aspects of the conflict in Uasin Gishu County. The study also explores the role of devolution in attempting to bridge horizontal inequalities and the shortcomings of these efforts. The knowledge from this study will be helpful to academics as it will present aspects of the 21st-century challenges in dealing with ethnic conflicts and Horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County.

1.5.2 Policy Justification

The conclusions and recommendations emanating from this study provide guidelines for policy frameworks in dealing with issues of ethnic conflicts and horizontal inequalities within the county of study, nationally as well as internationally. This will make a positive contribution towards the realization of sustainable peace. Additionally the study reinforces the existing capacities and institutions as they look into the historical concerns of social, political and economic inequalities with the aim of promoting national cohesion and peaceful coexistence among communities. Horizontal inequalities are three namely social, political and economic inequalities.

The study was anchored on the United Nations Agenda 2030; the sustainable development, with the aim of coming with recommendations that could be implemented by policy makers to achieve the Agenda 2030. The social and economic horizontal inequalities revolved around SDGs 1,2,3,4,5,6 and 10. These SDGs are as indicated: SDG 1: Eliminate Poverty; SDG2: Erase Hunger; SDG3: Establish Good Health and Well-Being; SDG4:Provide Quality Education; SDG5:Enforce Gender Equality; SDG6: Improve Clean Water and Sanitation and SDG10: Reduce Inequality

The Political Horizontal inequities was addressed by SDGs 10 and 16. SDG 10 is on Reduced Inequalities and SDG 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. SDG 10 entails reducing inequalities and ensuring no one is left behind in matters of growth and development. The study, therefore, discussed persistent horizontal inequalities from a historical perspective in post-colonial Kenya, focusing on how these inequalities have either impacted on, contributed to and/or exacerbated ethnic conflicts in the study area.

The study further gives credence to SDG 16 which focuses on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. The findings of the study speak to issues of conflict management and social

justice. Goal 16 is about promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, providing access to justice for all and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Horizontal inequalities that lead to the marginalization of culturally defined groups at all levels of society and governance are thus addressed in this study. The findings of the study recommend fairness, Accountability and equal treatment of all people from all cultures, ethnicities and classes.

In this regard, the findings of the study, have made important policy contributions to a policy with specific reference to the two SDGs. The recommendations of the study can thus be used by policymakers, development partners, national and county governments, the United Nations, and civil society organizations to address the issues of social justice, inequality, Inclusivity, human rights protection, peace and institution building not only in Kenya and Uasin Gishu county but also in other parts of Africa that experience similar challenges.

1.5.3 Philosophical Justification

The study was anchored on the philosophy of Interpretivism. The Philosophy also, known as interpretivist integrates human interest in research. The interpretivist philosophy traces its roots to German idealism in social theory, particularly to Immanuel Kant's (1929) idea that the mind contributes to the construction of knowledge in the world. Interpretivism also has its roots in the philosophical traditions of hermeneutics and phenomenology, and the German sociologist Max Weber is generally credited with being the central influence (Chowdhury, 2014). Interpretivists look for meanings and motives behind people's actions like: behaviour and interactions with others in the society and

culture. Additionally, Edmund Husserl (1931) and Alfred Schutz (1967) took up the critical question of how subjective meanings were shared, they advanced interpretive work by exploring cultural knowledge, or the ways that humans developed shared beliefs and norms from personal experiences.

Accordingly, "interpretive research operates on the assumption that access to reality (given or socially constructed) is only through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, and instruments. According to Interpretivists individuals are intricate and complex and different people experience and understand the same 'objective reality' in very different ways and have their own, often very different, reasons for acting in the world. Interpretivists argue that in order to understand human action we need to achieve '*Verstehen*' or empathetic understanding i.e we need to see the world through the eyes of the actors doing the acting.

Based on the understanding that horizontal Inequalities (HIs) emanate among groups of people that share a common identity *vis-à-vis* members of "an out-group" who may also be sharing a common identity. The comparison that could occur between two or more culturally defined groups may in some cases portray inequalities based on economic, social, political and cultural status dimensions. These comparisons may lead to feelings of marginalization or disenfranchisement between these socially diverse groups and could a major breeding ground for animosity and ethnic hatred.

Uasin Gishu County is a cosmopolitan county with many culturally defined groups on the basis of ethnicity and religion. The county was ranked by NCIC (2022) among the most high risk counties to electoral conflicts before the 2022 general elections. Considering that rural urban migration has brought people from different ethnic groups together in the

county, the diversity within the county could be a major contributing factor towards ethnic conflict that has been experienced in the county over the years.

These ethnic groups have coexisted for many years despite sharp divisions normally witnessed during political and electioneering seasons. The "us-versus them" ideologies normally set in at such periods, and ethnic groups that loose the elections in many cases are most likely disenfranchised and feel left out for governance. In this regard, ethnic conflicts could be interpreted from the perspective that ethnic groups may equate economic, social and cultural inequalities to the benefits that they have been denied for being politically excluded as a result of losing elections. Ethnic mobilization could then take place among ethnic groups on this basis.

1.6 Scope of the study

The geographical scope of the study was within Uasin Gishu County where data was collected. The county of Uasin Gishu County has for years been considered a hotspot of ethnic conflict in the country with repeated episodes of violence in 1992, 1997 and 2007 (Hull, 2008). The content scope of the study was limited to the research objectives intended. The study covered the period between 1963 When Kenya got its indepence from the British up to 2022 when data collection was concluded. The period between 1963 to 2022 was significant for this study because it was the period whne Kenya had internal self goverence and mony things that occurred in the county in that period had eld to both horizontal inequalities as well as ethnic conflicts. Data collection was done between the month of July 2021 and January 2022.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter thematically reviews literature guided by the objectives of the study. The literature was reviewed under the following themes nature, extend and roots of Horizontal inequalities, nature and extent of ethnic conflicts and the challenges and opportunities. The chapter also presents the conceptual framework of the study.

2.1   Nature Horizontal Inequalities

The post-colonial African Identity experienced a major outbreak civil wars and internal unrest with coups d'états experienced in many parts of Africa. The problem became even larger in the post war world when identify conflicts became the order of the day across the world. As the divide between Islam and the West has replaced the ideological divisions of the Cold War; the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Israel–Palestine conflict are clear examples. Today, then, mobilisation along by group identity has become the single most important source of violent conflict. This raises a critical question: why does serious violent conflict erupt in some multi-ethnic societies while the majority of groups live peacefully together? The central idea explored here is that violent mobilization is most likely when a group that shares a salient identity faces severe inequalities of various kinds, i.e. confronts Horizontal Inequalities. Such inequalities may be economic, social or political or concern cultural status. Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) are inequalities among groups of people that share a common identity. Such inequalities have economic, social, political and cultural status dimensions. Horizontal inequality differs from vertical' inequality (VI) in that the latter is a measure of inequality among

individuals or households, not groups furthermore, the measurement of VI is often confined to income or consumption

2.1.1 Understanding Horizontal Inequality

Horizontal inequalities are differences in access and opportunities across culturally defined (or constructed) groups based on identities such as ethnicity, region, and religion. They create fertile ground for grievances, especially when they accumulate across multiple realms, such as economic and political, and social (Østby 2008a; Justino 2017). The hypothesis that horizontal inequality makes countries more vulnerable to conflict derives from the idea that political, economic, and social inequalities are likely to create grievances among a relatively disadvantaged group whose members can mobilize along ethnic (or other identity-based) lines to cause violent conflict.

Horizontal inequality as an explanatory factor for violent conflict rests on three points (Nygård *et al.* 2017). First, there is a positive relationship between horizontal inequality and the onset of violent conflict. Second, this positive relationship is due to the presence of group identity and of a subjective, collective sense of inequality, that creates group grievances. Third, group grievances can lead to violent conflict when the group has the opportunity to collectively mobilize around its feeling of injustice (Gurr 1993; Østby 2013).

For horizontal inequality to spur collective action—which may or may not involve violence objective inequality must be translated into an "inter-subjectively perceived grievance" (Nygård et al. 2017); that is, the grievance is experienced collectively by the group. Gurr's (1970) pioneering theory of relative deprivation builds a conceptual model to provide an understanding of the conditions under which individuals resort to violence.

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He argues that relative deprivation will lead to frustration and aggression that will motivate individuals to rebel. This reasoning could arguably apply as well to social groups, with relative deprivation defined as actors' perceptions of a discrepancy between what they think they are rightfully entitled to achieve and what they are actually capable of achieving. Horizontal inequalities are categorized into for broad types; Economic, social, political and Cultural.

Economic HIs include inequalities in access to and ownership of assets financial, human, natural resource-based and social. In addition, they comprise inequalities in income levels and employment opportunities, which depend on such assets and the general conditions of the economy. Social HIs include inequalities in access to a range of services, such as education, health care and housing, as well as in educational and health status. Political HIs include inequalities in the distribution of political opportunities and power among groups, including control over the presidency, the cabinet, parliamentary assemblies, the bureaucracy, local and regional governments, the army and the police. They also encompass inequalities in people's capabilities to participate politically and to express their needs. Cultural status HIs include disparities in the recognition and standing of different groups' languages, customs, norms and practices.

Investigations of the relationship between horizontal inequalities and conflict provides strong evidence that the probability of conflict increases as socio-economic HIs rise, and that it rises most when there are both socio-economic and political inequalities. Data problems have prevented econometric research into the effect of cultural status inequalities(Brown and Langer 2010). Empirical evidence linking HIs to conflict comes from cross-country econometric work, econometric investigations within particular

countries and detailed case studies. Yet not all countries with high HIs experience conflict(Stewart, 2015). For example, both Ghana and Bolivia have high socioeconomic HIs, yet have avoided substantial conflict. It is therefore important to investigate when high Horizontal Inequalities lead to conflict and when they do not.

2.1.2 Economic Inequality among Ethnic Groups

Most of the cross-country literature that discusses horizontal inequality examines economic inequality that occurs along ethnic and religious lines. Ethnicity is broadly defined along ethno-religious and ethnolinguistic groups (Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009); Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). Issues related to measuring and defining ethnicity, including questions related to endogeneity. Scholars have tried to understand the relationship quantitatively by building summary indices of economic horizontal inequality and by measures of relative position. Cross-country studies that construct summary indices of economic horizontal inequality generally find a positive and statistically significant relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict (Østby 2008a, 2008b). These studies mostly use data from a range of countries, such as data from the Demographic and Health Survey, to measure the difference in asset ownership between each country's two largest ethnic groups and to study its relationship with violent conflict (Østby 2008a, 2008b). Nepal, Bohara, and Gawande (2011) use village-level data to evaluate the relationship between intergroup inequalities and violence during the Maoist armed conflict in Nepal, which began in 1996 and has killed 10,000 people and displaced more than 200,000 people. They find that inter-group horizontal inequalities, measured according to religion, caste, and language are associated with Maoist killings.

In a study measuring horizontal inequality, Alesina, Michalopoulos, and Papaioannou (2016) take a new approach. They combine satellite images of nighttime luminosity with historical homelands of ethnolinguistic groups and find that ethnic inequality has a significant and negative association with socioeconomic development. Celiku and Kraay (2017) find that this measure of horizontal economic inequality is a good predictor of the outbreak of conflict. Other cross-country studies focus on measures of the relative position an identity group holds within the wealth distribution in a geographic area (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). These studies allow the likelihood that each group will take part in a conflict in a given area to be examined.

One important advantage these studies have in comparison with the summary indices mentioned is that they create the opportunity to disentangle the effect of relative deprivation from the effect of relative privilege. This is an important distinction that relies on different theoretical underpinnings for why certain groups would want to incite violent conflict. These studies find robust evidence of a positive relationship between relatively disadvantaged groups and violent conflicts (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann 2015).

Deprivation is measured as the distance between the deprived group's estimated gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and the average GDP per capita of all groups. However, there is evidence that sometimes relatively privileged groups are the ones that initiate violence.

Human resource-based horizontal inequalities such as high level of youth unemployment renders a section of the population idle and unable to meet its daily needs. The higher the poverty level a group has, the more likely it can indulge in violent situation; and vice versa; since in the first place –they don't have much to lose in the event of a conflict. (Nyukiri, 1997). Youth comprise the largest percentage of the world population. The youth are considered core to the societal development. Skewed employment opportunities for the youth have compelled them into child soldiers, idlers, militias, rebels and vigilante groups (Duffield, 1997).

In any conflict situation, the dominance of youth cannot be overemphasized. Many of the youth have high level of experience in violence, in that they are not employed, their projects are under –funded and stressed. Being primary actors in peace building, scholars have not fully explored the contribution of youth in frontline peace keeping (Kapteijns, 1993).

During the early years in Africa, uneducated, unemployed and idle youth posed no threat to the society. This perception has however changed since the youth currently engage in violent activities in search of solutions (Turton, 1993).As a reactionary group, the youth have turned into a social group that responds to poor government policies. In Africa, the youth are viewed both as vulnerable and innocent group involved in armed conflicts. This has been occasioned by the fact that they lack both in protection and resources (Khadiagala, 2003).

The youth have in many occasions been used as child soldiers and portrayed as an unruly social group. The youth, who constitute the largest percentage of any society, have been imaged as both makers and breakers of society; in that, while they are simultaneously

being made and broken by the society Politically, the youth act as a political force; a source of resilience and resistance . Those youth who lack training, formal education and skill end up involving themselves in acts of conflict and violence as an easy way of making their ends meet.

Majority of the youth are poverty- stricken and therefore are easily lured into warring groups. That is why Chigunta (2002) puts it that the youth mainly have no personal properties or dependable employment thus they have the lowest opportunity cost in war. The idea of the youth being used/misused as tools for achieving goals is more eminent in politics; where social, political and economic goodies depend on politics of manipulation and patronage .In conflict and violent situations, the youth have been active participants. Although conflicts are common in every society, the exponential rise in adverse effects of conflicts with the youth as active participants is exasperating (Mkangi, 1997).The use of drugs among the youth in ethnic conflicts erodes their "self-control and enhances free-will behaviour and encourages bravery" (Chigunta 2002).

According to a 2007 UNDP report and the Government of Kenya, social, unstable governments, economic marginalization, insecurity, poverty and development challenges have helped drive the youth into armed conflicts and violent situations. Since the youth militant groups have dominated Kenya's political history, such groups as Taliban, Jeshi la Mzeee, Baghdad Boys, Angola Msumbiji, Chinkororo, Alshabab and Mungiki are a new face of youth (Nyukiri, 1997). Apart from the involvement of the youth in conflict situations, such other actors as the state and its mercenaries, militias, rebels, vigilantes, criminal bands, ethnic and religious armed wings, private companies and others have played a role in influencing inter-ethnic conflicts in most African countries.

The most important natural resource that has caused most conflicts in many parts of the world is land (Musau, 2008). It has affected many parts of the world since the beginning of industrial revolution in Europe and eventually to Africa during the colonial period (Tijani, 2006). Land is a factor of production which has played a pivotal role in influencing most inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya. Since 1991, inter-ethnic violence has erupted with high intensity and worrying regularity, not seen before in the country's decades of relatively peaceful independence. The cause of the conflicts have in most cases been attributed to land-based issues (White, 1990).

Land and related resources such as water and biodiversity play a vital role in the livelihoods of communities .Given its significance, access to and availability of land-based resources are critical in ensuring real and long lasting improvement in social , economic and political well-being; especially in vulnerable societies that are prone to turmoil and conflict. The question of the use, ownership and access to increasingly scarce land and related resources has been at the centre of unending conflicts between ethnic communities in Kenya.

Any type of horizontal inequality can provide an incentive for political mobilisation, but political inequalities (that is, political exclusion) are most likely to motivate group leaders to instigate a rebellion. By contrast, economic and social inequalities, as well as inequalities in cultural status, are more likely to motivate the mass of the population. Cultural status inequalities bind groups together and thereby increase the salience of identity differences.

The relevance of any element depends on whether it is an important source of income or well-being in a particular society. For instance, the distribution of housing (a key source

of discord between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland in the 1970s) is likely to be more relevant in an industrialized country than in a country where people still build their own homes (Stewart, 2005). Land, however, is extremely important in places where agriculture accounts for most output and employment, but it becomes less significant as development proceeds. Each type of HI is notable in itself, but most also have wider impacts, affecting other types of inequality. Political power, for example, is both an end and a means, as inequalities in political power often lead to social and economic inequalities. Similarly, there are causal connections between educational access and income: lack of access to education leads to poor economic opportunities, and low income tends to result in poor educational access and achievements in a vicious cycle of deprivation.

Mobilisation along group lines only occurs if people identify strongly with their own group, and if they view others as being different in fundamental respects. As anthropologists emphasise, group boundaries are socially constructed and not innate or primordial. However, because of history, education, and propaganda, often orchestrated by political leaders, people can *perceive* their most salient identities and those of other as essential or primordial. As David Turton (1997) notes, the very effectiveness [of ethnicity] as a means of advancing group interests depends upon its being seen as primordial by those who make claims in its name'. Such essentialisation' occurs despite the fact that generally, people have multiple identities, and salient group boundaries may change over time in response to events, leadership and opportunities.

There are clear synergies between the concept of HIs and other approaches to understanding inequalities and the dynamics of mobilisation in multi-ethnic countries.

For instance, Charles Tilly's (1998) concept of categorical inequalities' describes similar group inequalities. Ted Gurr's (1993) concept of relative deprivation' as a cause of minority rebellion represents another similar view. However, the HI hypothesis differs from relative deprivation in its view that the relatively rich, as well as the relatively poor, may initiate conflict. In Burundi, for example, the Tutsis have attacked the poorer Hutus; and the relatively rich area of Biafra initiated the Nigerian Civil War of the late 1960s. Such incidents seem to be motivated by fear that an existing situation is not sustainable without force and that the relative prosperity of the group is, or may be, subject to attack.

Studies in many conflict-affected countries have also shown a relation between HIs and intensity of conflict. In an examination of the Moro rebellion in the southern Philippines, Magdalena (1977) records a strong link between the relative deprivation of Muslims, measured in terms of differential returns to education, and conflict intensity. Murshed and Gates (2005), using a gap' measure of human development, note strong econometric support for a relationship between regional deprivation and the intensity of the Maoist rebellion across districts of Nepal. A later study by Do and Iyer (2007) replicates the finding that conflict intensity is related to regional deprivation, although in this case it is measured by the regional poverty rate and the literacy rate. They point out, too, that caste polarisation affects conflict intensity.

Higher levels of horizontal inequality are thus correlated with a higher risk of conflict, but not all violent mobilisation in high HI countries is primarily identity-driven, at least not in terms of the discourse associated with it. This was the case, for example, in Guatemala and Peru, where the rebellions were primarily presented in ideological terms. Prominent leaders of the movements came from outside of the deprived indigenous

groups and were motivated by ideology, not ethnicity (Caumartin, Gray Molina and Thorp, 2008). In these societies race/ethnicity and class are virtually coterminous, that is they are ethnically ranked systems (Horowitz, 1985). In such societies, mobilisation by *class* may alternate with or be a substitute for mobilisation by ethnicity. However, research as shown there is a strong ethnic dimension to the conflicts, as evidenced by a willingness among indigenous people to be mobilised against the state and the victimization almost genocidal targeting of indigenous peoples by the non-indigenous-dominated governments. In Guatemala, for example, Francisco Bianchi, a government adviser in the early 1980s, openly declared that for the most part the Indians are subversives; and how can one counter this subversion? Obviously by killing the Indians (CEH, 1999). In Peru, despite the historical policy of suppression of ethnic identity through repression and discrimination, HIs still meant indigenous peasants were vulnerable to the recruitment techniques of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), which offered material benefits and used coercion.

These factors suggest that HI was an underlying element in these conflicts, a proposal confirmed in the Guatemalan case by the commission that investigated the historical origins of the conflict. The *Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico* stated that the roots of the conflict lay in the exclusionary, racist, authoritarian and centralist' characteristics of the Guatemalan state, society and economy (CEH, 1999).

It is important to emphasise that what has been found is increased *likelihood* of a greater incidence of conflict with higher HIs. Not all countries with high levels of horizontal inequality experience conflict, though. Indeed the studies of Bolivia and Ghana reveal high economic and social HIs yet both countries have avoided substantial conflict.

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Consequently, it is essential to examine when high HIs lead to conflict and when they do not. The nature of political HIs is one variable that determines whether high economic and social HIs generate conflict.

Conflict is more likely where political, economic and social HIs are consistent. Conflict is less likely when a particular group faces deprivation in one dimension and dominance in another. In cases where political, economic and social HIs are severe and consistent, both the leadership and the mass of the population in the deprived group(s) have a motive to mobilise. The leadership is motivated by political exclusion (that is, political HIs) and the population by economic and social His leaders can use these inequalities to mobilise people, as illustrated by Côte d'Ivoire. Thus in a sense, as has been widely suggested (Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Cohen 1969; Ignatieff 1995).

Socioeconomic deprivation tends to produce mass grievances that make mobilisation for opposition and even violence possible. Effective mobilisation, however, depends on both elite and mass participation. Most serious conflicts are organised, rather than being spontaneous, and require strong leadership. The motives of the elite of a group, or its potential leaders, are particularly important, because the elite controls resources (including, sometimes, military assets) and can win support by accentuating common identities, and denigrating the other', while heightening perceptions of inter-group inequalities. According to Brass (1997), they play the role of conflict entrepreneurs'. In areas where the group's elite hold power, though, they are not likely to encourage or lead a rebellion. This holds true also when members of the elite do not dominate political power but do participate in government, as they can still enjoy the perks' of office, including opportunities for personal enrichment and the dispensing of favours to

supporters. Consequently, even in the presence of quite sharp economic and social HIs, people are unlikely to initiate violent conflict if their own group leaders are included in political power, and even less so if they are politically dominant.

The experiences of Malaysia, as well as of Nigeria after the civil war, exemplify this. In both countries, the group that was economically impoverished constituted a numerical majority and was politically advantaged. In Malaysia, the *bumiputera* (an umbrella term for indigenous groups in the country) accounts for roughly two-thirds of the population (depending on the precise categorisation), while in Nigeria, the northern peoples are estimated to make up more than 50 per cent of the population. In each country, this numerical advantage has translated into dominance of political power (continuously in Malaysia and for most of the time in Nigeria). Having political power and the pork-barrel' gains this confers obviously greatly reduces the motives of a group's elite to lead a rebellion. Furthermore, it permits action to be taken to correct other inequalities. In Nigeria, such action has been confined primarily to the political sphere (including the bureaucracy and the army through the Federal Character Principle). In Malaysia, though, systematic action also has occurred in the socioeconomic realm through the New Economic Policy.

At a local level, Ukiwo (2008) has shown the need for consistency of HIs in the socioeconomic and political realms if they are to lead to conflict. Contrasting the experiences of two Nigerian cities conflict-ridden Warri in Delta State and the more peaceful Calabar in Cross River State, he shows that if economic and social HIs are not high, political exclusion will not be sufficient to provoke conflict. There were political, economic and social HIs in Warri, but in Calabar, although the leaders of certain groups

felt excluded and tried to mobilise support, their potential followers believed that they were well treated and were not ready to rise in protest.

Østby (2008) provides econometric support for the importance of consistency among economic and social HIs and political HIs if they are to provoke conflict. She reports that while political exclusion on its own (as an independent variable) does *not* affect the likelihood of conflict, statistically it has a strong interactive with inter-regional asset inequality. That is, asset inequality has a stronger effect in increasing the probability of conflict in the presence of political HIs. Østby also identified a similar effect with regard to educational inequality, although not a statistically significant one.

2.1.3 Political Inequality among Ethnic Groups

Recent quantitative studies and qualitative analysis support a strong and positive link between political exclusion of certain groups and violent conflict, making political inclusion a particularly significant goal for prevention of violence (Jones, Elgin Cossart, and Esberg 2012; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013).

Political horizontal inequality can be broadly defined to include inequalities in the distribution and access to political opportunity and power among groups, including access to the executive branch and the police and military. It also relates to the ability of individuals to participate in political processes. Theories of political horizontal inequality draw on literatures of ethno-nationalism and self-determination, as well as on the idea that ethnic capture of the state provides politically excluded groups with motivation to challenge the state (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013).

Early empirical investigations used data from the Minorities at Risk project, which considers indices of political discrimination among ethnic groups and political differentials measured by political status between groups. Results using the Minorities at Risk data set were mixed, in part because of the quality of the data (Gurr, 1993). More recent quantitative studies have used the Ethnic Power Relations data set, which includes measures of the exclusion of ethnic groups from executive power (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014; Vogt et al. 2015). Several of these studies find that group-level exclusion from the executive branch increases the risk that these groups will participate in conflict; an ethnic group's recent loss of power also increases that risk (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann 2015).

When aggregated to the country level, political inequality has been found to increase the risk of violent conflict (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). By disaggregating conflict types into territorial and governmental conflict, Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch (2014) find that the presence of large groups that are discriminated against boosts the probability of governmental civil wars. They attribute this to the discrepancy between a group's demographic power and its political privileges.

It is useful to differentiate three types of conflict, although the distinction between them is not watertight: these are 'communal' conflicts; separatist conflicts; and civil war (Brown and Langer 2010). Communal conflict refers to conflicts between groups *not* involving the state; separatist conflict is conflict in which particular regions seek separation from a state; and civil war concerns conflict where the aim is control over the state.

With reference Communal conflicts, there is less systematic evidence on this than the other two types because this has not yet been widely studied due to data deficiencies. Nonetheless, the available investigations show a relationship between HIs and the extent of communal conflict. For example, econometric evidence of conflict in different parts of Indonesia after the fall of Suharto's New Order finds a statistically significant relationship between the level of inter-communal inequality and the extent of communal violence (Mancini 2008). Similarly, statistically significant results were found for the Southern Philippines in the Christian-Muslim communal conflict that preceded the separatist conflict – the best predictor of conflict was found to be the level of relative deprivation in education among the local Muslim population (Magdalena 1977). Similarly, sociological research in the U.S. has shown that racial inequalities are an important explanatory factor of urban interracial violence (Macall and Parker 2005).

Case studies tell a similar story. For example, in Indonesia, in Ambon previously privileged Christians took to violence to protect their position against a potential reversal of their position (van Klinken 2001) and evidence has shown similar developments elsewhere in Indonesia (Van Klinken 2007). In Nigeria, (Ukoha 2008) tells a broadly similar story concerning communal violence in two cities – Calabar and Warri. The colonial era managed and ruled by giving privileged position to one or more particular group(s). In Calabar, most groups were included in local governance structures and had 'relatively equal socio-economic standing, in Warri non-indigenous groups suffered both political and relative socio-economic exclusion' (Brown and Langer 2010). Ukiwo argues that this difference accounts for endemic violence in Warri, while Calabar was largely peaceful. The case studies show how HIs enter the dynamics of violence. But they also

emphasise the way in which local 'ethnic entrepreneurs' are able 'to generate, manipulate and utilise perceptions of such inequalities in order to mobilise individuals to violence' (Brown and Langer 2010).

Identity difference is often instrumentalised by leaders when they themselves have a strong motive for rebellion, but it is only effective in mobilising people where there are grievances among the mass of the population. In Ivory Coast for instance, while Félix Houphouët-Boigny was President (1960-93), political inclusion was in effect, despite some large HIs in the north–south basis (Langer, 2008), and the country was peaceful. Nonetheless, discontent over socioeconomic deprivation and the absence of equality in the area of cultural status, particularly a lack of recognition of the Muslim religion, was articulated in the *Chartre du Nord* of 1992. The death of Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993 and the end of his regime was followed by explicit political exclusion, with former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, a presidential candidate from the north, barred from standing in both the 1995 and 2000 elections. No concessions were made and violent conflict broke out in 2002.

The Nigerian Civil War (1967-70), which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, also illustrates the importance of a coincidence in political and economic incentives and interests in provoking violent conflict. Initially, the Igbos and the Yorubas, the more educated groups, shared many of the high-level posts in the new federation. The coup d'état of 29 July 1966, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Murtala Mohammed, a northerner, resulted in the exclusion of the Igbos from power and established an increasingly anti-Igbo climate. Amidst widespread anti-Igbo sentiment and the subsequent attacks, many Igbos migrated to their home regions in the eastern part of

Nigeria and became a powerful lobbying group for an independent Biafra, in which they now had a vested economic interest' (Nafziger, 1973). Fear that without political power in the Nigerian federation, there would be an increasingly disadvantageous distribution of oil revenues—by then the most important source of government funds compounded economic and political exclusion. At the same time, the oil revenues promised an independent Biafra relative wealth.

2.1.4 Social Inequality among Groups

While most of the quantitative literature on horizontal inequalities has focused on the economic and political dimensions, social inequality among groups is also important to any discussion of conflict risk. Social inequality can be broadly defined to include inequalities in access to basic services, such as education, health care, and benefits related to education and health outcomes, which could be monitored through the for Sustainable Development Goals, specifically SDGs 1,2,3,4,5,6, and 10: These SDGs address specific social aspects that contribute directly to social inequalities:-

> SDG 1: Eliminate Poverty; SDG2:Erase Hunger; SDG3: Establish
> Good Health and Well-Being; SDG4:Provide Quality Education;
> SDG5:Enforce Gender Equality; SDG6: Improve Clean Water and
> Sanitation and SDG10: Reduce Inequality (UN Agenda 2030)

Education is particularly relevant, given that it is strongly connected to future economic activity and well-being and plays an important role in national identity and social cohesion. Although quantitative evidence on the social dimension of horizontal inequality is rather limited. Studies have sought to examine the association between social inequality and conflict (Omoeva and Buckner 2015). Omoeva and Buckner (2015), for example, build a cross-country panel data set of educational attainment and find a robust

relationship between higher levels of horizontal inequality in education among ethnic and religious groups and the likelihood of violent conflict. They find that a one standard deviation increase in horizontal inequality in educational attainment more than doubles the odds that a country will experience a conflict in the next five years; this relationship was statistically significant in the 2000s and was robust to multiple specifications while not being present in earlier decades (Omoeva and Buckner 2015). The authors hypothesize that in the 1970s and 1980s, high levels of education inequality were not perceived as a sufficient reason for grievances to build. It could also be that large differences between ethnic or religious groups in educational attainment signal higher levels of exclusion of specific groups (Omoeva and Buckner 2015).

Social differences between ethnic groups can sometimes represent group discrimination. Education policies have been used to discriminate against minorities or other ethnic groups, as has been shown in post apartheid South Africa and Sri Lanka, for example (Gurr 2000; Stewart 2002b). Using Demographic and Health Survey data on a set of developing countries, Østby (2008b) finds that for a country with low levels of horizontal social inequality (5th percentile), the probability of onset of civil conflict in any given year is 1.75 per cent. This probability increases to 3.7 percent when the level of horizontal social inequality rises to the 95th percentile. Horizontal social inequality is measured by the total years of education completed. Murshed and Gates (2005) find that horizontal inequalities were significant in explaining the violent conflict in Nepal. Specifically, they find that higher life expectancy and educational attainment, the latter measured by average years of schooling, was associated with a lower risk of civil war. However, reverse causality can be a potential problem because conflict can sometimes

increase horizontal social inequality. A district-level study of Indonesia finds that horizontal inequality in child mortality rates was positively associated with ethnic-based communal violence (Mancini, Stewart, and Brown 2008). Other measures of horizontal inequality include civil service employment, unemployment, education, and poverty. In another analysis, Østby et al. (2011) find that in Indonesian districts with high population growth, horizontal inequality in infant mortality rates is related to violence.

2.1.5 Cultural Status inequalities

Ridgeway (2014) opines that the concept of cultural status inequality is linked to ideas of multiculturalism and cultural discrimination. According to Langer & Brown (2008), Cultural status inequalities are defined as perceived or actual differences in the treatment, public recognition or status of different groups' cultural norms, practices, symbols and customs. Recent research on the causes of civil wars and communal, ethnic or religious conflicts has focused predominantly on political and economic grievances. However, in many conflicts, political and economic issues are complemented by perceptions of cultural discrimination, exclusion or inequality of treatment. The analysis of cultural status inequalities in plural societies is thus an important complement to political and economic analysis in understanding the emergence of (violent) group mobilisation.

Langer, Mustapha & Stewart (2007) further opined that cultural status inequalities cover a range of practices and intentionality on the part of the state in question. They can be grouped into three broad categories: Recognition of religious practices and observances: In multi-religious societies, differing levels of formal recognition or restrictions on the observance of religious practices are often an important source of cultural status

inequality; Languages and language recognition: The privileging of one or a few languages over others often signals, or is at least perceived as signalling, the dominance of those for whom these languages are the mother tongue. Conflicts revolving around language have been notable in India, where a high level of linguistic diversity has created status problems since independence; Recognition of ethno-cultural practices: The state's recognition of, and support for, the cultural practices of different groups is another important aspect of cultural status inequality. Also important in this respect are the ethno-cultural practices and customs employed in the functioning of the state itself, which express the 'identity' of the state.

According to Langer & Brown (2008) Cultural status inequalities are particularly prone to group mobilisation, and potentially violence, because of the inherent link with group identity. This can take the form both of 'entrepreneurial' mobilisation by self-interested elites or grievance-based mobilisation on the part of disadvantaged groups, If the state attributes inferior status to certain cultural identities, members of these cultural groups are more likely to feel alienated from the state and to mobilise along cultural lines in order to improve their group's cultural status.

2.2 The Nexus between Horizontal Inequalities and intractable Ethnic Conflicts

The discussions in this section gives insights into the nexus between that horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflicts. The discussions are based literature that suggest that horizontal inequalities can play a significant role in exacerbating and perpetuating ethnic conflicts. The discussion revolve around the idea that when certain groups within a society experience systematic discrimination and are denied equal access to resources,

opportunities, and political power, it can lead to a sense of injustice and marginalization. This perceived or real inequality can fuel grievances and grievances, in turn, can escalate into violent ethnic conflicts.

2.2.1 Types of Intractbale Ethnic Conflicts

In the realm of intractable ethnic conflicts, various types of conflicts emerge, each with its unique dynamics and underlying causes. Three prominent categories of conflicts discussed in this section include ethnic conflicts, land conflicts, and politically instigated conflicts. These conflicts often share overlapping characteristics but differ in their primary drivers and manifestations as discussed.

2.2.1.1 Ethnic identity conflicts

According to McCauley & Bock (2017) the power of ethnic identification is evident in five observations: first ethnicity mobilizes sacrifice for the group, secondly ethnicity is easier to mobilize for intergroup conflict than economic interest or other shared identities. Thirdly history is a crucial issue in mobilization for ethnic conflict, an ethnic group perceives itself as related not only by blood descent but by a common history fourthly Perceived threat is the immediate occasion of ethnic mobilization for violence. When the threat involves territory, there may be a "sons of the soil" conflict to the extent that one ethnic group perceives a sacred entitlement to territory and finally double minorities, where two ethnic groups in conflict can both see themselves as an endangered minority, are the most intractable ethnic conflicts.

During the Cold War, many conflicts presented themselves as disputes about class or ideology, following the East-West division, with each side supported by the major powers along ideological lines. The identity basis of conflicts has become much more

explicit since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, as ideological differences have diminished; socialism no longer seems a serious alternative to capitalism and its use as a banner no longer guarantees external financial support.

The Center for Systematic Peace, avers that a virtual cornucopia of these seemingly intractable (and previously invisible) social identity conflicts have exploded onto the world scene and captured the public and policy eyes'. Data on conflict confirm this rise, revealing a major increase in the proportion of all conflicts labelled as ethnic': from 15 per cent in 1953 to nearly 60 per cent by 2005 (Marshall, 2006).

According to Ajulu (2002) historically, ethnicity in its ordinary usage, that is- groups of people sharing common consciousness based on language, culture or common ancestral heritage has not always constituted negative connotation or identification. However, the tendency among political elites to mobilize ethnicity for political ends has been the major cause of political ethnicity and hence, ethnic conflicts. Ethnic conflict is rooted in a situation where one group's core sense of 'self' (identity) or 'interest' is perceivably or actually threatened by the demands of or denials by another group, there by eliciting the former group's defensive response. For each group, the fulfillment and acceptance of the other's 'self-interest' amounts to the annihilation or undermining of its own 'self' and eroding of its own 'interest.

Ethnic conflict is a form of 'struggle for power' between one group that controls power and institutions (the majority in most cases) and another that seeks to acquire power (mostly the minority). Each group has a goal of countering the other to capture power and position. The political incumbent group seeks power through its centralizing tendencies and intrusive behavior (into the cultural and political space provided for the weaker

minority). The minority group insists on power sharing with the majority as the basis for interethnic amity, because it believes that its weak position in the structure of power relations is the fundamental cause for all its problems. It is therefore, a contest involving the majoritarian ethnic ideology facing a real or perceived threat, from the minority/weaker ethno-nationalist assertion for equality aimed at ensuring its survival from the threat of the powerful majority. Shared identity is the most prominent feature that defines ethnic conflicts with people who have the same identity forging groups to fights for a particular course (Brown &Stewart, 2015). In the process of fighting, each group is united under a common banner, with broadly common purposes (Aremu, 2010). The issues of intractable ethnic conflicts is not a new phenomenon in the world, these conflicts have been experienced in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa for many years.

In the twentieth century, one of the most explosive issues of European history was the ethnic-national question in East Central Europe. From the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and the struggle of minorities for nationhood leading up to World War I, to the rise of National Socialism and the horrors of the Holocaust, to the recent bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia, the ethnic-national question in East Central Europe significantly altered the course of European as well as world civilization (Gallanger, 1998). Arguably the most controversial ethnic-minorities of East Central Europe were the Germans. Sometimes referred to as the 'fifth column' or as 'Himmler's auxiliaries' in popular and academic minds, the German Diaspora in Eastern Europe is often viewed as having been Hitler's willing accomplices in his eastward expansion.

Ethnic conflicts in Europe took a worse turn in the post-cold war world with many ethnic minorities seeking independence from their mother states. Ethnicity in East and central

Europe took the form of nationalism which then gave birth to ethno-nationalist conflicts in the region (Griffins, 1993). The historical development of nationalism in Central Europe has been most commonly understood in contrast to its development in Western Europe. Although nationalism, as a 'kind of philosophy of European history', has its origins in the 'Western Enlightenment', the concept is often described as undergoing important changes when it was transposed to the regions of Central Europe. Hans Kohn has written:

> so strong was the influence of ideas that, while the new nationalism in western Europe corresponded to changing social, economic, and political realities, it spread to central and eastern Europe long before a corresponding social and economic transformation . . . Nationalism in the west arose in an effort to build a nation in the political reality and struggle of the present without too much sentimental regard for the past; nationalists in central and eastern Europe created, often out of myths of the past and the dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland, closely linked with the past, devoid of any immediate connection with the present, and expected to become sometime a political reality(Kohn, 1967).

An important reason for the difference lies in the relationship between homogeneity of populations and the development of the nation-state. In Western Europe, according to Kohn (1967), the nation-state developed out of necessity. Of course, the task was made easier by the achievement of 'relative national homogeneity' in the 18th and 19th centuries. This happened as a result of two factors: large-scale migrations had ceased in Western Europe by the start of the 19th century; and the Roman Catholic Church had acted as a funnel of assimilation in Western Europe since the early middle ages (Griffins, 1993). By contrast, in Central and Eastern Europe, nationalism appeared 'at a more backward stage of social and political development', the borders of Eastern states were still fluid, and migrations, sometimes forced, continued into the 20th century (Negash, 2015).

The Balkan states, the famed "powder-keg" of European history consisting of the ex-Yugoslavian republics, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and to some extent southern Hungary and Romania once more became an important source of conflict and instability. At the core of Balkan problems in the post-cold war world was the condition of Yugoslavia. Although the term 'Yugoslavia' did not come into official use until 1929, *Yugoslavism*, an over-all nationalism, was a significant factor in the creation of a state of the southern Slavs in the wake of the collapse of the Habsburg Empire and the defeat of the Central Powers in 1918 (Griffins, 1993). Despite the religious, social, cultural and political differences of the three main national groupings: the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs they had come, since the end of the 19th century, to share certain geostrategic and economic interests, and had begun to see the advantages of collective security

In the 70 years after the formation of a southern Slav state, Yugoslavism proved to be a durable idea, especially when it was combined with Titoism in the second Yugoslav state after World War II (Pejic, 2001). However, the history of Yugoslavia started to be littered with ethnic disputes. The 1921 constitution brought about the formation of a centralist state that reflected Serbian domination. This was naturally opposed by Croatia, which called for a much more federal system. In an effort to promote greater unity, King Alexander I announced himself to be a Yugoslav patriot and sought to crush both Serbian and Croatian nationalisms. Although Serbian-Croatian relations improved for a while, extremists also flourished, including the now notorious 'Ustashe', and prepared the ground for the formation of the Nazi puppet state of Croatia and wider Serbian–Croatian conflicts in World War II(Griffins, 1993). Almost a million Yugoslavs died at the hands

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of fellow countrymen during the war, but the emergence of Tito, the communist guerrilla leader with support from the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, as victor in the brutal war against Germany at the end of 1944, seemed to promise a new era of respect for the equality of nations within the framework of the Yugoslav state.

However, there were many problems unresolved, especially for the Croatians, and pressures for autonomy grew once again throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and in the 20 years up to 1980 and Tito's death, The cumbersome power-sharing constitution created by Tito in 1974 was designed to serve Yugoslavia's needs in the years after Tito's death. The constitution was seen as protection for Croatians, Slovenians and the Albanians of Kosovo, who 'were fearful of Serbian hegemonic ambitions'(Gallanger, 1998). However, the constitution prompted the development of a sense of real grievance among Serbians that was not addressed effectively until Milosevic rose to power in 1987. The reason for this was that the constitution provided for the effective disintegration of Serbia. Serbia was divided into three constitutional units, allowing Vojvodina and Kosovo to become de facto republics. In addition, the constitution, which now left Serbia largely undefined, allowed Kosovo and Vojvodina a say in Serbian affairs but ensured that Serbia had no say in the affairs of its former provinces. At the time, it appears that there was little formal resistance to the changes in Serbia; the communist leadership was too loyal to Tito (Griffins, 1993). However, after Tito's death, scholars and artists started drawing attention to what they perceived as the discrimination that Serbia endured in Yugoslavia; the constitution of 1974 was their primary target. The result was a significant resurgence of Serbian nationalism.

Milosevic's rise to power prompted a further resurgence of nationalist feeling among Serbians and equally nationalist feelings in many of the other republics, especially Slovenia and Croatia (Negash, 2015). Milosevic had built a formidable nationalist reputation by defending the interests of the Serbian minority in the Albanian-dominated autonomous province of Kosovo, an area sacred to Serbian nationalists because this was where the Serbs had been defeated by the Turks in 1389. In post-Tito Yugoslavia the Albanians, who make up 90 per cent of Kosovo's population, had demanded a degree of self-determination (Pejic, 2001). In Serbia these demands were considered a challenge to Serbian territorial integrity, and Milosevic was thus determined to suppress Albanian demands. However, Milosevic, a communist as well as a nationalist, also refused to give economic reform, as demanded by the Western-oriented republics Slovenia and Croatia, any kind of priority until there was a solution to the situation in Kosovo, on Serbian terms. As the situation in Kosovo deteriorated and solutions seemed further away than ever, so the patience of Slovenia and Croatia also deteriorated (Negash, 2015). By the autumn of 1989, Yugoslavia seemed in turmoil; Slovenia's decision to introduce a new constitution, guaranteeing the right to secede from Yugoslavia, caused widespread anti-Slovene demonstrations in Serbia and Montenegro, and in Kosovo violent demonstrations and riots were being ruthlessly suppressed by the Serbian military authorities (Griffins, 1993). What followed was a wave of violent ethnic confrontations and violence all across Yugoslavia, leading to one of the worst episodes of ethnic conflicts in the history of Europe.

Ethnic power rivalry in South Asia invariably involves two sets of groups, a national majority versus a regional majority, and a national minority (which is otherwise a

regional majority) versus a regional minority (Waseem, 1996). The first pair of parties forms the standard set found in most conflicts; only a few conflicts have parties belonging to the second category.

The level of threat that each group faces and its capability to undertake offensive or defensive tactics determines the variations in the nature and intensity of power-contest. In Pakistan, where the Punjabis dominate the highly centralized garrison state structure, the rise of provincial power centers was not allowed at all. Nor was the dominant ethnic group prepared for any meaning fulpower-sharing arrangement with the regional majorities. Punjabis vetoed rule by the national majority (East Bengalis) at the Center, even after the electoral verdict went in the Bengalis' favor. This display of hegemony by the Punjabi power elite evoked counter-measures and militant defensive postures from minority groups as an assertion of their equality (Sislin, 2006). The East Pakistanis countered the Punjabi hegemony with a demand for federal autonomy and after the right to govern the country was denied in 1971, they demanded a separate Bengali state. The survival of the group in every sense culturally, economically and politically was linked to vesting power in the hands of the East Bengalis whom the Punjabi power elite viewed as a threat to their hegemony.

In Sri Lanka, the contest for power is the direct result of the majoritarian thrust of the post-colonial state that left little leeway for local power dispersal. This structural framework evolved from constant tensions and perceptional differences between the Sri Lankan Tamils who consider themselves a dependent group and the Sinhalese who have an ingrained feeling of vulnerability and fear of extinction (Carter *et al*, 2015). While the former group places its faith in the federal framework as an effective safeguard against

Sinhalese majoritarianism, the latter believes that a powerful Center can alone contain the threatening fissiparous tendencies of the Tamils. The Central government's intrusive behavior and hegemonic control over the hill tribes in Bangladesh increased their grievances and strengthened their alienation.

Treating the autonomy demand of the tribal nationalists as a secessionist challenge to Bengali nationalism and as a conspiracy against the sovereignty of Bangladesh, successive regimes in Dhaka used political and military power to contain autonomy aspirations (Sislin, 2006). The resultant alienation of the tribal minority from the national mainstream provided the source for a calamitous ethnic conflict. Although the assertion of cultural and religious nationalism formed the mainspring of the Punjab conflict, the political context in which it became a force cannot be ignored. Sikh nationalists believed that the Indian political system was highly centralized because the Union government exercised hegemonic control over Punjab through constitutional subversion. The party in power at the Center made undue partisan political interventions aimed at strengthening its electoral interests and de-legitimizing the claims of Sikh nationalism (Snitwongse & Thompson, 2005). Thus a desire for political power vested in the Sikh community arose, as demanded by the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1973). Secession became the goal of the militant nationalists when the autonomist movement of the Akali Dal did not make any impact on the Center's lackadaisical approach to their problem.

Institutional decay in Kashmir resulting from constitutional subversion and electoral manipulation by the ruling Congress party provided the necessary impetus for ethnic resurgence and the outbreak of insurgency (Snitwongse & Thompson, 2005). Even though the Dravidian nationalists emphasized the distinctiveness of Tamil identity as the

basis for their secessionist demand, the grievances of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) stemmed from the domination of the Hindi-nationalists over the state.

The complexity surrounding ethnic conflicts in different parts of Africa is characterized by the confusion that emanated from the disruption in sovereignty caused by colonialism followed by hastily formed independence governments during the cold war, which spawned conditions of corruption, scarcity, and violent competition (Moe, 2010). In many countries that were colonized, the Europeans created ethnic rivalry through their divide and rule tactics. Ethnicity in Africa and its salience in politics and in conflicts for that matter therefore took a strong footing during the colonial period (Musau, 2008). Thomson (2004) contends that, African Ethnic groups are modern social constructions which are traceable back to the colonial period. Ethnic differences were manipulated and seeds of inter-ethnic exploitation, suspicion and animosity were created.

The colonial experience reinforced ethnic rivalry especially where colonist entrenched ethnic minority elite, as in Rwanda and Burundi, or even created them, as in Liberia, Sierra-Leone and Angola where freed slaves became rulers, or European settlers intermarried to form Creole elite (Omuabor, 2000). They created ethnic groups and created resentment among ethnic groups. According to Nwosu (1999), at the end of colonization, ethnic communities were all bundled together into nation states that were non-existent in the pre-colonial period. These ethnic communities were however not well integrated into these new Nation states hence leading to competition for power and control (Jonyo, 2003). The result was a series violent exchange of governments in many

post-colonial societies especially in Africa. These violent exchanges of government happened based on ethnicity as each ethnic group struggled to be in control.

Adedeje (1999) argues that in four decades; between the 1960s and the 1990s, the Sub Saharan Africa has experienced approximately 80 violent changes in government in the 48 countries; these were mainly ethnically motivated. Coup d'états have been a very common phenomenon in Africa. In the last quarter of the 20th Century Africa had over seventy Coups (Ali, 2004). The result was ethnic based civil wars, some of which have kept on recurring to date. Typical examples in Africa are Rwanda and Burundi where the Belgians created the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. These two communities have been in struggle for control of these respective countries since independence. The Peak of the Rwandan ethnic conflict was the genocide of the 1994, since then Rwanda has witnessed relative calm.

The Burundian civil war that ended in 2005 seemed to be right on course again following the controversial re-election of President Nkuruzinza for a third term in 2015. Other countries in Africa that have faced instability in Africa, in the post-colonial period due to the colonial legacy have included Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Nigeria, just to mention a few. All these states have been involved in ethnic conflicts and power struggles. This can be blamed on poor integration efforts by the post-colonial governments across Africa. Welsh (1996) viewed the violent and intractable internal conflicts in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan as the failure of states in sub-Saharan Africa to cope with ethnicity. He agreed with argument that ethnicity was invented by colonialist for political

reasons, he further noted that in as much as the colonial powers did not do much to prepare African states for independence, considering how the colonial system was structured, there was not much, the colonialists could do to prepare these countries for independence through integration of various ethnicities . Based on this argument then, African leaders should have taken the leading initiative towards ethnic integration in their respective states   from the time of independence. This, however, did not happen in many African countries and that is why more than fifty years after independence, ethnicity is still a major problem in Africa.

Kenya is a multi-ethnic society and has approximately over 40 ethnic communities that have lived together for a long time. The dominant ethnic groups in Kenya are the Kikuyu, the Kalenjin, the Luo, the Luhya, the Kamba and the Kisii. However, there are many other 'smaller' ethnic communities in Kenya. Therefore these explain how ethnic issues are so fundamental in the linguistic landscape of Kenya. The history of ethnic conflicts in Kenya is long traced from the colonial era. One of the long-term causes of the clashes in Kenya is attributed to the colonial legacy. It is a historical fact that the indirect rule administered by the British colonialists which applied the divide-and-rule strategy polarized the various ethnic groups in Kenya. The strategy led to the creation of administrative structures such as districts and provinces without regard for the wishes of Kenyan Communities. These structures were later inherited by the postcolonial administration. This contributed to the subsequent incompatibility of these ethnic groups in Kenya.

Throughout the period of its political independence, Kenya has had a fairly limited experience with competitive multi-party politics. There was the short-lived experiment

with political pluralism from independence in 1963 to the "Little General Election" in 1966. The second began in the early 1990s and included the multiparty elections of 1992 and 1997. In both periods, ethnicity has emerged as the single most important factor in political competition (Ajulu, 2002). Political activity since the renewal of competitive politics in 1992 has seen the reconstruction of ethnicity, ethnic mobilization and ethnic conflict as the main instruments of political contestation. Political parties have been organized along ethnic identities and state-power aggressively contested on the basis of mobilized ethnicity. Therefore, Kenya has since independence been using the same divisive system that was used by the colonialists.

In Kenya, administrative units like districts and provinces were structured along ethnic lines (Onyango *et al.,* 2011). This colonial creations made most of the communities in Kenya value ethnicity more that national unity. This has therefore been a major weakness that has been exploited by those in the political cycles to polarize communities and use ethnicity to gain power and control during election periods. For instance, the *Majimbo* rhetoric was used by politicians in 1992, 1997 and 2007 as a basis to incite communities against one another and indeed people from particular ethnic groups been removed from some regions in the name of *Madoadoa* and this has been a recipe for conflicts (Onyango *et. al.,* 2011; Nyukuri, 1997).

Ethnic identity in Kenya has pursued other factors other than the common and basic ones of language, culture and ancestral origin or even ethnic boundaries. Different ethnic groups identify themselves politically by the criteria of 'political muscle'. The birth of the nation created an immediate awareness of the ethnic identity of those who are in power, which could easily turn hostile at the first suspicion of allowing ethnicity to affect

national politics. The ethnic identities of the leaders suppressed their intentions of nationhood. Kenyan leaders and political individuals have owed their power game more on ethnic identities rather than nationhood. The ethnic and community identity dimensions have resulted to ethnic conflicts due to the fighting for ethnic superiority.

According to Wambua, (2017) therefore sums up that while the triggers of ethnic conflicts in Kenya are multi-dimensional and include historical, structural, institutional, legal, and cultural factors, they have always reflected an underlying ethnic-identity problem. This is because the foundation of pluralist democratic politics in the country was anchored on political party structures and strategies that originally segmented the country along ethnic alignments. Political leaders blatantly camouflage ethnic alignments as issues of nationalism as they attempt to secure ethnic backing and patronage that can propel them to power.

2.2.1.2 Ethnically Instigatged Land conflicts

The most important natural resource that has caused most ethnic conflicts in many parts of the world is land (Musau, 2008). It has affected many parts of the world since the beginning of industrial revolution in Europe and eventually to Africa during the colonial period.

According to Arowosegbe, (2017) the problematic character of land as a source of conflict has been widely acknowledged across Africa. Empirical studies and theoretical treatments of the land question as a problematic byproduct of elite control in Africa have also been undertaken. Between 1988 and 2000, a strip of sandy land on the Eritrean border was the source of a war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which claimed the lives of

at least seventy thousand civilians and combatants between the two countries The conflict in Darfur, western Sudan, which began as a civil war in 1987–89 between Arab nomads and other ethnic groups, included ethnic cleansing, indiscriminate killing, and mass slaughtering on both sides as a result of unregulated land grabbing. The land question has been expressed in a variety of ethnic and racial conflicts in Zimbabwe. Twenty years after independence, land has remained the most hotly contested area of policy reform in the country. Over six million people live in rural areas in Zimbabwe without access to fertile soil and reliable rainfall; they lack water rights and have restricted access to the bulk of the country's natural resources Land has similarly been a major national issue in most countries in southern Africa as well. In Nigeria the conflicts and disputes have historically been driven by struggles over land-based resources. Examples of such conflicts include that of IfeModakeke in Osun State, the Jukun-Chamba conflict in the Takum Local Government Area of Taraba State, the Tiv-Jukun conflict in Benue and Plateau States, and the Umuleri-Aguleri war of attrition over Otuocha land in Anambra State.

Several studies have been provided as potential explanations for land conflict in Africa. One such explanation associates land problems within colonial legacy, emphasizing pre-independence (re)distributive land policies (Austin 2010; Blanton, Mason, and Athow 2001). The core argument here is that, if land conflicts continue to persist in Africa, it is largely because of the restructuring processes that accompanied the social, political and economic policies, of which land governance plays a central role. A primary example of this is the continued use of state borders created by colonial occupiers in an effort to

administer territories without taking into account previously existing land traditions (Boone 2012; Klaus 2017).

Consistent with this perspective, Yamano and Deininger (2005) also observe that "in many African countries, formal institutions for land administration were often simply superimposed on traditional structures without a clear delineation of responsibilities and competencies, implying that they lack both outreach and social legitimacy." In essence, such practices are believed to have contained communities to specific geographic areas (Khadiagala, 2010). Of course, some have contended that "Africa's history does not begin with colonialism and its legacy" and that political organization in Africa, such as kingdoms, influenced varying forms of political violence before colonial occupation (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014). Since land conflicts existed before colonial occupation (Keller, 2014), the exact foundations for the ongoing land problems requires close examinations of local contexts and shifts in property rights that took place during colonization (Haugerud 1989; Kanogo 1987; Okoth-Ogendo 1989).

Another dominant view on land conflict in Africa situates competing land claims within the context of growing environmental concerns. Here, the literature on conservation, however polarized, invokes the urgent need to address human-nature relations in order to increase the sustainability of natural resources (Baynham-Herd et al. 2018; Redpath et al. 2013). Agriculture and urbanisation are both primary topics of discussion since they both represent Africa's primary economy. Africa's overall GDP is approximately 17% based in agriculture (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2019), whereas its urbanisation projects are exemplary of global modernization processes. For countries that

depend so heavily on agriculture for their livelihoods, the dynamics of climate change steadily exacerbate these problems, especially in relation to land arability, erosion, infertility, and water drought (Ani, 2013). Socioeconomic fallout continues as a domino effect, with diminished levels of potable water for sanitation and health, economic instability from lack of agricultural resources, as well as annual food shortages. At the international level, climate change further aggravates humanitarian concerns such as higher rates of environmental refugees, leading to increased fragility and eventual threats made against state sovereignty (Environmental Justice Foundation, 2014).

Other studies on land conflicts specific to Africa have also centred on the politics of natural resource extraction and unbalanced rent sharing between the elite and ordinary citizens (Janus 2012). At the core of these studies is the assumption that a handful of corrupt rent-seeking elites play a central role in determining who enjoys most of the rents from natural resources (Boone 1990; Ovadia 2013). This duality-based relationship between elites and citizens is hierarchal and exists as a vertical-dependence system (Rigon 2014), meaning citizens do not have the power to question the imbalances of sharing natural resources. For the most part, these arguments subscribe into the "resource trap" and "resource curse" themes, establishing the connections between natural resource abundance or scarcity and the likelihood of violent conflict over land (Carmignani and Chowdhury 2010; Frynas, Wood, and Hinks 2017). Whereas the elites keep the predominance of natural resources under their control to maintain power, these arguments suggest that violence is more likely to erupt amongst citizens who have less access to such resources or more to gain from them.

Increasingly, however, a growing number of scholars have shifted their attention to the "sons of the soil" literature to highlight the cultural dimensions of conflict, and how they inform people's identity and sense of belonging with regard to land use, access or ownership (Boone 2017; Mitchell 2018). Here, land is negotiated as a form of identity, often tied to lines of ancestry (Keller 2014) that is comparable to modern understandings of citizenship. There is an emotional context entrenched within the historical significance of land and how it is attributed to individuals who are born into a shared community (Lonsdale 2008; Boone 2012; Mitchell 2018). When this affective connection is threatened—through land grabbing, climate change, political take-over, etc.—, then the threat against that shared community's identity of land, autonomy and/or security is met with popular outrage (Boone 1990; Dunn 2009; Klopp 2000).

These arguments, although not exhaustive, provide a window into understanding the broad questions surrounding land claims in Africa and related conflict. The next sections focus on the particularities of land problems in Kenya specifically, and how they have informed land conflicts over time and space.

Land politics in Kenya are of particular interest for several reasons. As Boone (2012) rightly points out, "unlike land politics in many African countries, which often centers on the use and abuse of ostensibly customary authority, the major land disputes in much of Kenya are focused on how the power of the central state has been used to allocate land.

Land questions in Kenya are complex, multilayered, and highly politicised. Understanding the dynamics of land problems in Kenya therefore invites discussion on the colonial and post-colonial political contexts that have informed the structure of property rights across time and space, and an understanding of how national elites have

used land and land access rights to influence the narratives on land ownership and control land institutions.

In the pre-colonial era, land rights were mainly managed as Commons. That is, "by a social hierarchy organized in the form of an inverted pyramid with the tip representing the family, the middle as the clan and lineage, and the base, the community" (Okoth-Ogendo 2002). For the Kenyan Law Professor Okoth-Ogendo, such structures allowed societies to govern their lands based on collective values and principles, taking into consideration both the current and future needs as well as the responsibility to protect group's territory. In essence, the pre-colonial land management depended on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism systems.

During colonization, land in Kenya considered unoccupied by the British settlers was declared Crown land, i.e. land on which the Commissioner acted on behalf of the Queen of England (Crown Lands Ordinace of 1902), as well as Trust Land (Kanogo 1987; Okoth-Ogendo 1989). Access to and control over land thus shifted from earlier forms of social ownership to "market-oriented" or private ownership systems. As Haugerud explains, "nowhere… [did] the Kenyan state [have] the capacity to keep the land registers up to date…" (Haugerud, 1989), which is why the "objectives were to replace the uncertainty of customary tenure with a system of individual land titles registered and guaranteed by the state; and to expand cash crop production, improve agricultural techniques and encourage agricultural investment once fragmented holdings were consolidated into units of economic size once registered titles could be used as security for agricultural loans". This view is not shared by all Kenyan scholars, such as Okoth-

Ogendo, who argue that the introduction of concepts such as "ownership" by the colonial regime masked other forms of property ownership that existed, and that the absence of land registries *per se* did not imply absence of a land regime.

The post-colonial era mainly saw the "elite capture" of property rights. The land that had been occupied by white settlers, particularly the British, were acquired by the post-colonial regime of Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and eventually sold to national elites who gained control of the property ownership structure (Kanyinga 1998; Okoth-Ogendo 1989). The trend was continued under Daniel arap Moi's regime (1978-2002), known for distributing public lands for political purposes (Greiner 2013; Klopp 2001). Land regimes therefore became connected to post-colonial national politics in Kenya, with successive governments becoming reluctant to transform land regimes in a manner that would address irregular land allocations over the years. This is because land rights have become instruments of structuring political relationships, connecting elite "landlords" in various regions to the central state (Greiner 2013; Onoma 2010). This link of interdependency is captured by Boone's observation, suggesting that "the direct tie between central state agents and land users often persisted over time through relations of indebtedness, patron clientage, and/or access to land in the absence of official titles… [and that] these past and ongoing relationships provided a historical and political (if not legal) basis for Rift Valley politicians' claims to prerogative over land allocation in the present and near future" (Boone 2011: 1313). This may explain why national elites seeking electoral support repeatedly manipulate land-tenure relationships to influence land-related grievances in some parts of the country such as the Rift Valley, as witnessed during the 1992, 1997, and 2007 elections (Bates 2005; Boone 2011; Klopp 2001).

In short, post-colonial land-tenure regimes have been manipulated by varying national elites to influence ethnic conflicts (Médard 1996; Oucho 2002), to illegally distribute public lands such as forestland for personal interests and political gains (Klopp 2001; Ndung'u Report 2004), and to stifle the operations of land institutions (Okoth-Ogendo 2002; Onoma 2010). And, as Klopp (2000: 15) puts it, "one might say that Kenya was founded by successive acts of land grabbing, and hence, land grabbing is as old as Kenya itself, if not older."

In recent years, there has been a growing interest among scholars to examine the intricate relationship between identity and territorial affinity, and how they recursively interact to influence conflict over land (Lonsdale 2008; Horowitz and Klaus 2018; Medard 2008; Dunn 2009; Gray 2011). In writing about what he calls the "sons of the soil" claims in Kenya, Lonsdale (2008) observes that: To be 'sons of the soil' (it is always sons) is only one and, in terms of historical depth, not the most convincing means to make a claim on the Kenyan state. It tends to rest on recently acquired or ideologically constructed rights. In the 1920s white settlers, beneficiaries like the Sudanese of arbitrary state favour at the expense of others more native than they, resented being termed immigrants by the British government (Lonsdale 2008: 308).

This informs us about the complex relationship between identity, territory, and citizenship claims, and how they interact to generate conflict over land (Oduntan 2015). For some Kenyan communities, one cannot separate land from the people because of the dialectic and existential pull the two exert from one another. "Autochthony," as a local understanding of land conflict in Kenya, describes the close bond of citizens born in a certain geographic area, the same as their ancestors, and have a shared identity claim to

the land (Kameri-Mbote and Kindiki 2008; Médard 2008). Territorial identity of certain populations, especially in rural agricultural lands, often revolve around ancestral claims, and such claims are more significant to such populations than any land laws (Keller 2014). The problem is that the claims of territorial identity rooted in ancestral claims create a sense of land entitlement or ownership and subsequent politicization of inter-group cohabitation, more so during election periods. Those who "do not belong" to the acclaimed territories therefore become vulnerable to the politics of eviction which the national and local elites incite.

The challenge of advancing the "autochthony" rationale over land ownership in Africa, particularly in Kenya, is that such claims shift depending on political context and perceived gains and losses. While "autochthony discourses appear to provide a sense of primal security and certainty" (Dunn 2009: 114-115), the sub-division of the already numerous ethnic groups in Kenya makes it difficult to honour such claims (Médard 2008; Akoth 2018). This illustrates that although "autochthony" may serve as a means to claim land ownership, the question of identity remains a deep-rooted barrier to the enactment of land policies that are inclusive and respectful of people's shifting sense of identity. This is because of the "ethnic appeals" that not only characterize socio-political landscape in Kenya, but also incentivize conflict over land.

Consistent with this perspective, scholars such as Horowitz and Klaus have observed that "appeals to ethnic grievances can encompass multiple logics, connecting to feelings of economic and political powerlessness stemming from the inability to secure land, alongside the belief that the victory of an ethnic patron will produce material benefits related to land, employment, or security" (Horowitz and Klaus 2018: 5). While the

narratives of autochthony have increasingly become a common explanation of conflict over land in Kenya, other scholars have warned about its traction in African contexts. Precisely, scholars such as Dunn argue that "the growing multiplicity and contingency of identities available to persons in the contemporary world can produce a daunting sense of uncertainty about people, places, events and even cosmologies" (Dunn 2009: 121).

Political dynamics of land conflict in Kenya revolve primarily around the politicization of land-related grievances by political elites and the struggles to control the state machinery, which, for the most part, oversees the institutions of land governance and property access (Boone 2011; Greiner 2013; Klopp 2000; Klaus 2017). The result of this is that whoever controls the state machinery has the ability to partially influence the opportunities associated with land ownership (Keller 2014; Khalif and Oba 2013; Williams 2009), including the organization of people's concept of territoriality through "spatial ordering" (Sikor and Lund 2009). This is because "the process of seeking authorizations for property claims also has the effect of granting authority to the authorizing politico-legal institution" . For instance, following independence, "Kenyatta used the former settler land as patronage to solidify his support and build alliances, and many former loyalists became prominent in the new KANU government" (Klopp 2000: 16). This, in part, explains why the politics around land rights and land ownership have become a common theme in Kenya's electoral processes, as historically rooted grievances and claims over the need to recapture land in the "lost" territories often resurface (Keller 2014; Mwita 2017; Klaus 2017).

Having access to senior political leadership is, in this regard, seen as a potential means or authority to undo the perceived injustices surrounding historical land allocations and/or

acquisitions because political leadership serves as "the 'contract' that links property and authority" (Sikor and Lund 2009). Indeed, targeted killings and evictions in areas such as Rift Valley have been attributed to the politicization of historical grievances by political elites. The findings by the Akiwumi Report on "tribal" clashes in Kenya provides important details to this end. Put differently, "the process of seeking authorization for property claims also works to authorize the authorizers and, at the same time, institutions underpinning various claims of access—hence catering for particular constituencies—undermine rival claims to the same resources" (Sikor and Lund 2009).

Although Kenya adopted a new Constitution in 2010, which provides the ground for the implementation of the National Land Policy through institutions such as the National Land Commission (NLA), increased politicization of these institutions means that they are likely to make politically motivated decisions. Yet, the 2007-2008 post-election violence is a stark reminder of the risks associated with the politicization of land ownership. It is to be noted that before 2010, Kenya did not have a comprehensive system for land laws, particularly those relating to women's land rights. Women, more so in rural areas, were more likely to be systematically excluded from family and patriarchal land ownership (Ministry of Lands 2009). Overall, the complex nature of land and/or property access paired with the political goals for land claims has already in the past incited violence and stokes its continuation.

2.2.1.3 Politically intigated Ethnic Conflicts

There is evidence to suggest that where ethnic conflict has emerged in Africa, there have always been political machinations behind it. The politicization of ethnicity often takes place in a situation characterized by an inequitable structure of access. Such a structure

gives rise to the emergence of the "in-group" and the "out-group" with the latter trying to break the structure of inequality as the former responds by building barriers to access that ensure the continuation of its privileged position (Langer & Kuppens, 2019). At the centre of this scenario are the elites who, feeling excluded or threatened with an exclusion, begin to invoke ethnic ideology in the hope of establishing a reliable base of support to fight what is purely personal and/ or elite interests (Yieke, 2010). Over the years, Kenya has experienced the rise of ethnic tides and tensions which if left to continue may eventually turn into ethnic hatred and violence as witnessed in South Africa, Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia.

Kenya had regional and ethnic foundations and leadership even from an early stage. The early political parties had ethnic conglomerations. The Kikuyu for instance, formed the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), the Akamba formed Ukambani Members Association (UMA), the Luhya formed The Luhya Union (LU), the Luo: Young Kavirondo Association (YKA), the Kalenjin formed the Kalenjin Political Alliance (KPA), the Coastal tribes formed the Mwambao Union Front (MUF) and the Taita formed the Taita Hills Association (THA) (Diamond & Burke, 1967). These early political formations in the country took an ethnic dimension and this trend has continued for decades. Nyström, (2000) argued that In the period between December 1963, and 1992, Kenyan politics was shaped primarily by the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the de facto one-party system in place (which became a de jure one-party state in 1982). This system of politics made the issue of ethnic politics even worse with the KANU leadership working with loyal politicians hence making other political players feel left out of the leadership of the country. This trend led to the clamour for a multi-

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party system in from 1990 eventually leading to the repeal of section 2A of the constitution.

According to Nyukuri (1997) since the 1992 General Election, there has emerged an ugly fact of politics in this country- that political parties are vehicles of ethnic sentiments and interests. For instance, KANU was a party of the so-called minority ethnic groups such as the Kalenjins, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu. The FORD-Kenya was mainly composed of the Luo ethnic community and a few Bukusu sub-ethnic groups of the Luhya ethnic community. The FORD Asili was mainly composed of members from the Kikuyu ethnic community and so was the Democratic Party of Kenya, which of course had a few supporters from the Akamba, Meru and Embu ethnic communities. The other parties like PICK, KSC, SDP, KNC and even Safina have no national outlook in their leadership and composition. The clashes that took place in Kenya between 1991 and 1995 not only increased ethnic animosity and prejudice but also made ethnic politics a reality. Indeed, the common ideology, especially among leaders of different political parties, was national democracy, but the practice or reality was ethnic democracy for their supporters. There was common talk that the Kikuyu `ate' during the Kenyatta era, the Kalenjin have `eaten' during the Moi era and it was the turn of other ethnic groups like the Luhya, the Luo and the Kisii to eat. In essence, 1992, 1997, 2008, 2013 and 2017 election results reflected numerous manifestations of block voting, this time closely related to ethnic nationalism, sectarianism and other forms of parochialism.

Markakis (1994) further argues that though one of the major causes of ethnic conflict in the Horn of Africa competition over resources or the motive to secure access to resources, the struggle for power is the most important cause of ethnic conflicts when

government policies and institutions, which distribute resources , are based on ethnicity. Similarly, Horowitz (1993) points out that "in divided societies ,ethnic conflict is at the center of politics. Ethnic divisions pose challenges to the cohesion of the states and sometimes to peaceful relations among states. Ethnic conflict strains the bonds that sustain civility and is often at the root of violence that results in rooting, death, homelessness, and the flight of large number of people. In divided societies, ethnic affiliations are powerful, permeative, passionate, and pervasive. Almost all regimes in any ethnically diverse area of politics are the causes and not solutions of the historical contradictions in their respective countries.

According to Oucho (2010) myriad of factors related to politics contribute to conflicts. These factors include: ethnic balkanization whereby some area for bloc votes and some swing provinces in which three parties scramble for votes, the electorate's consciousness of and sensitivity to the changing political climate, reinvigoration of the revolution which began in 2002 but stalled midstream , political leaders' mistrust and bigotry, and the spirited crave for devolution/regionalism to educe centralized governance. Kenya's politics are based on ethnic aspirations by political parties and also the regime in power. Studies have underlined the existence, and indeed the potential dangers inherent in these regional variations. Sundet, Moen & Barasa, (2009) have shown regional differences in cabinet and public service appointments in the immediate post-independence years, and that these differences were artificially determined by the power-holding political elite. Political alliances have for years been made with regard to gaining ethnic support. For instance; the Luo, the Luhya, the Akamba, and the Coast communities teaming up together to gain political power in the recent elections (2013, 2017 and 2022). Post-

independence political bargaining and coalition formation have largely assumed regional or ethnic dimensions. Access to political power has, by and large, determined the distribution of socio-economic and political benefits in post-independence Kenya. In this regard, the ethnic competition to gain political power has been a do or die situation leading to ethnic tension that have in the past spiraled to violence as witnessed in 2007/2008.

2.2.2 Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnic Conflicts

Stewart (2002; 2008) theoretically linked the presence of HIs to the outbreak of violent conflict via a grievance-based discourse. In particular, she argued that HIs are likely to cause profound frustrations and severe grievances among relatively disadvantaged ethnic groups, which in turn may encourage these groups to mobilise along ethnic lines in order to redress their situation. In the same vein, Cederman *et al.* (2011) argued that 'objective political and economic asymmetries can be transformed into grievances through a process of group comparison driven by collective emotions', which in turn could 'trigger violent collective action through a process of group mobilization'. Horizontal inequality theory compares closely with Gurr (2000) argued that when resentment caused by perceptions of relative deprivation was combined with a sense of cultural group belonging, minority groups were more likely to mobilise politically, whether violent or not, against the dominant group(s) in society (Gurr, 2000). It is worth noting here that while the 'relative deprivation theory does not explicitly focus on interpersonal or intergroup wealth comparisons' (Cederman *et al*., 2011), the HI theory 'explicitly hypothesizes that if there are sharp inequalities between different groups in society, these inequalities may directly

lead to violent conflict because the relatively disadvantaged groups will feel aggrieved about their inferior position' (Langer & Demarest, 2017).

Intimately related to issues of power and wealth distribution in society, inequality plays a central role in classical theories of conflict. In an influential article, Davies (1962) argued that revolutions were motivated by frustration resulting from an evolving gap between individual aspirations and actual economic status. Also adopting an explicitly psychological perspective, Gurr's (1970) well-known theory of relative deprivation characterizes various types of collective violence as reactions to frustrations stemming from unfulfilled aspirations, usually related to material well-being (Brush, 1996). Such a perspective differs radically from earlier sociological theories of mob behaviour that explained collective violence as a societal pathology (Le Bon, 1913). Instead, relative deprivation theorists argue that individuals' widespread discontent with their social situation triggers conflict, especially where modernization fuels a "revolution of rising expectations" (Davies, 1962).

Before grievances can be acted upon, they need to be cognitively linked to social identities through self-categorization (Hogg & Abrams 1988). Clearly, the salience of ethnic distinctions varies over time and from case to case (Gurr, 2000), but once group identities become salient, members of the involved groups are prone to make social comparisons that hinge on the distinction between in-group and out-group categories (Turner, 1981). According to "realistic conflict theory," conflicting claims to scarce resources, including power, prestige, and wealth, are likely to produce ethnocentric and antagonistic intergroup relations (Tajfel & Turner 1979). In stratified social systems,

social comparison reflecting superiority or inferiority should be especially likely to trigger conflict (Horowitz 1985).

These processes of social comparison and intergroup evaluation are far from emotionally neutral. As argued by Kalyvas (2006) and Petersen (2002), attempts to reduce the violent excesses of civil wars to entirely calculative and cognitive processes fly in the face of countless testimonies of the emotional escalation processes leading to the outbreak of collective violence. In particular, violations of norms of justice and equality will typically arouse feelings of anger and resentment among members of the disadvantaged group. As observed in a pioneering study by T. H. Marshall, such emotional responses are present in class systems, which "are based structurally on chronic asymmetries of power and reward" (Barbalet, 1992). What is true for cases of class resentment also applies to inequalities among ethnic groups. In agreement with Petersen (2002), Cederman *et al* (2011) postulate that resentment based on intergroup comparisons involving HIs often provokes ethnic mobilization. Petersen thus explains that "resentment is the feeling of being politically dominated by a group that has no right to be in a superior position. It is the everyday experience of these perceived status relations that breeds the emotion. Protracted land struggles and perceived historical inequalities in access to social, economic and political resources - horizontal inequalities - have promoted a collective feeling of difference between the ethnic groups and have led to grievances and ethnic conflicts in various parts of Africa.

Horizontal Inequalities have been experienced between the Aguleri and Umuleri communities in the Anambra State of Nigeria. Onwuzuruigbo (2011) argued that the British colonization set the foundations for Horizontal Inequalities between the Aguleri

and Umuleri communities of Nigeria in different ways. First, Christian missionary activities which ensured unequal distribution and access to educational institutions laid the foundations of future horizontal inequalities between Aguleri and Umuleri, especially in the provision and acquisition of Western education and social amenities. Second, growing migration and urbanization instigated by trading and missionary activities placed increasing demands on Otuocha land (Obiakor, 2016). The missionaries needed land to build schools and churches to educate and evangelize the local population; European companies required more land to establish trading posts; local migrants requested land to settle on in order to trade and enjoy the peaceful and cosmopolitan lifestyle in Otuocha; and the colonial authorities sought to establish unquestionable control over all lands in Otuocha. Third, as in most agrarian societies, land and communities in Igboland are interwoven. Apart from its relevance to agrarian production, the land is linked to identity as it binds the living to the dead and unborn members of the group. Emotional attachment to the land is intensified by the scarcity of land that characterizes most Igbo communities including Aguleri and Umuleri (Obiakor, 2016). With rapid urbanization, modernization and a British colonial land policy that promoted land privatization and commercialization against communal ownership, land increasingly acquired monetary value and conferred immense wealth and power on its owner under both colonial and post-colonial dispensations. Ownership, control and access to Otuocha land translated into an improvement in the everyday lives and opportunities of individuals and their communities (Onwuzuruigbo, 2011) Under these circumstances, an intense struggle for Otuocha land escalated among the emerging and growing number of land speculators, on the one hand, and between Aguleri and Umuleri communities on the other.Onwuzuruigbo

(2013) further indicates that although the land is a major cause of the dispute, horizontal inequalities have deepened existing rifts and protracted the conflict. Narratives of horizontal inequalities are drawn from the history of missionary adventures and unequal access to Otuocha land, which further influenced access to political and employment opportunities, including basic social services, in the embattled communities during the colonial and post-colonial periods.

Onwuzuruigbo (2011) adds that Aguleri pre-eminence is attributable to its early acceptance of Christianity and acquisition of missionary education. Aguleri hosted the first church and educational institutions established by the missionaries in the territory. These institutions produced Aguleri elites. The bulk of missionary activities and projects were concentrated in Aguleri. This prompted a spate of Aguleri conversion to Christianity, establishment of churches, educational institutions and infrastructure in Aguleri. Missionary education came later to Umuleri than to its neighbour. Umuleri leaders, for a long time, were drawn from elders and chiefs with minimal education, who lacked knowledge of the workings of the colonial civil service and barely understood the mindset and temperament of British colonizers. Umuleri had little access to public offices and political positions, and possessed no more than a slight understanding of administrative procedures and British etiquette (Onwuzuruigbo, 2010). Anglo-Umuleri relations deteriorated rapidly as Umuleri was always on a collision course with colonial officials (Onwuzuruigbo, 2010).

According to Onwuzuruigbo (2013), Education not only fostered the hegemony of Aguleri in Aguleri-Umuleri relations, but also gave Aguleri undue advantage over Umuleri in filling employment opportunities. In 1910, when Idigo became Warrant Chief,

he relied on his exalted position and rapport with colonial officials to facilitate the appointment of many Aguleri to respectable positions in the Native Administration - a partisan service to his own community that earned him hatred among Umuleri members of the Native Administration. Idigo, indeed, extended his control beyond Aguleri to the disputed Otuocha land. On behalf of Aguleri, he secured approval of colonial officials to sell and grant Otuocha land to European companies even though ownership of the land was the subject of litigation. Between 1924 and 1932, Aguleri sold or leased portions of Otuocha land to the Royal Niger Company, John Holt and CFAO, and appropriated rents accruing to them. Umuleri enjoyed no such favour. It was denied access to the land and barred from engaging in any transaction involving Otuocha land. Aguleri emerged from each land transaction richer and able to finance the numerous court cases over land In any case, the financial implication of the leases and grants was not lost on Umuleri (Obiakor, 2016). Establishing the link between unequal access to the land, rents and the disputes, Adegunle Soetan, in his petition to the authorities, asserted that 'it is repugnant to the feelings of your petitioners that their erstwhile customary tenants, namely the Eziagulu people of Aguleri, through the influence of Idigo should enrich themselves with proceeds of leases improperly granted to European firms'. Umuleri felt frustrated that it could not have unrestrained access to Otuocha land while Aguleri grew richer and stronger from rents accruing to its leases of this land.

According to Onwuzuruigbo (2010) Aguleri dismissed Umuleri claims to Otuocha land as frivolous. The etymology of Otuocha as rendered by Aguleri seems to remove every shade of doubt about its ownership of Otuocha. According to an Aguleri interviewee, 'Otuocha is derived from the words 'Otu' and 'Ocha', meaning 'waterside' or 'beach' and

'white' in the local language respectively. The Umuleri version argues that Otuocha 'is a misnomer, the right name being "Otuoche" Umuleri asserts that Otuoche is derived from two words 'Otu', meaning waterside and 'Oche', abbreviated from Ony eche of Umuleri, who lived in Otuocha prior to the arrival of the Royal Niger Company. Otuoche simply means 'Onyeche waterside' but was corrupted by the Europeans who mispronounced it as 'Otuocha (Onwuzuruigbo, 2011).In spite of these unresolved controversies, colonial authorities officially treated the disputed land as if it was owned solely by Aguleri. This was manifested in both words and actions. Colonial administrators inscribed 'Otuocha Aguleri' rather than 'Otuocha' on milestones indicating mileages to Otuocha and billboards showing locations of important establishments.

In the realm of politics, Umuleri remains an underdog in any political calculation involving Aguleri. In 1964, Paul Ndigwe, an Aguleri, who represented both communities in the Eastern Regional House of Assembly, obtained government authority to change the official name of Otuocha to 'Otuocha Aguleri' (Chinwuba 1981). Umuleri detested this government action, which tactically confirmed Aguleri as the owner of the disputed land. More annoying was the fact that the opinion of Umuleri was neither sought nor consulted in taking the decision. Umuleri therefore violently protested against the change of nomenclature. It attacked Aguleri and pulled down billboards and milestones which bore 'Otuocha Aguleri' on them.

Onwuzuruigbo, (2011) argued that since its establishment in 1976 and the subsequent creation of local government areas, specifically Anambra Local Government, Umuleri is yet to produce a local government chairman. Aguleri has held the post during four separate periods. Generally in Africa, occupation of executive political positions is

important for dispensing patronage and favours to networks of clients, often bound together by communal and primordial affinities. The more-privileged Aguleri elites have been considerably favoured over their less-privileged Umuleri counterparts. Besides prioritizing Aguleri interests, most Aguleri political appointees have acted like Ndigwe by taking advantage of their powerful positions in government to embark on actions that jeopardize Umuleri aspirations. Allegations of political marginalization by Umuleri have received strong condemnation from Aguleri. Aguleri sees itself as having suffered greater injustice and political marginalization than Umuleri, especially in the delineation of electoral wards and allotment of councillorship positions in the local government council. Because the allotment of political wards derives mainly from official population figures, Aguleri believes that given accurate population figures it should have been allotted a greater number of wards than Umuleri. Unfortunately, this is not the case; both communities have three wards respectively. Short of blaming Umuleri for what it considers a gross underestimation of its population in the 1991 census, Aguleri, however, contends that Umuleri has benefited from the situation. Assigning equal numbers of wards to Aguleri and the less-populated - by Aguleri's judgment - Umuleri amounted to deprivation and injustice.

Just like Nigeria, Kenya has grappled with incidences of ethnic conflicts linked to horizontal inequalities. According to Muhula (2009) Ethno-regional political patronage remains a pernicious aspect of Kenyan politics. It determines access to both political and economic resources. The resulting horizontal inequalities are further exacerbated by the alignment of electoral with administrative regions. Electoral constituencies sometimes combine three to four administrative divisions headed by a civil servant. Since most

constituencies (politico-electoral) and provinces (administrative) are dominated by one ethnic community, policy decisions made on the basis of political considerations account for much of the existing horizontal inequalities. Central province received much of the political and economic benefit under Kenyatta, while Rift valley was the main beneficiary under Moi.

In all three post-independence regimes these inequalities have been reflected in appointments to the Cabinet, Judiciary, Diplomatic Corps, and State Corporations, and in the nature of public service delivery. National poverty estimates indicate that Central and Rift Valley provinces with poverty indices of 31 percent and 44 percent respectively are the wealthiest provinces in the country. Both regions have produced a President at least once. The poverty indices in Nyanza and Western provinces are 61 percent and 65 percent respectively (Muhula, 2009). These regions have never produced a President and are the poorest (GoK 2006). The ruling elites use political power to direct resources to areas that enjoy their patronage. These group based advantages in economic and socio-political realms have provided the advantages that make horizontal inequality a persistent feature of socio-economic and political structure in Kenya. The result has been unequal access to education (Amutabi 2003), health (Grab and Priebe 2009, Nyanjom 2006), water and sanitation services and a disproportionately better quality of life in provinces associated with political power (Alwy and Schech 2004). For instance, Grab and Priebe (2009) note the paradox around low malnutrition rates and high mortality rates of children in Nyanza province. Accordingly, they state that ―an interaction of cultural, geographic and political factors can reverse the positive relationship between a good nutritional status and the survival chances of children

Ethno-political patronage is also the main determinant of horizontal inequalities in land distribution in the country. The political origin of landlessness as a manifestation of horizontal inequalities is the ―Million Acres Scheme. This land redistribution program immediately after independence opened up Rift Valley, the traditional home of the Kalenjin, to external purchasers from Central province who enjoyed massive economic advantages during the Kenyatta era. It brought about 35, 000 non- Rift Valley families, mostly from Central province into the Rift Valley. While it helped the departing colonial and the newly independent Kenya government settle immediate short-term instability, the magnitude of inequalities that would result from it were not immediately apparent (Leo 1981: 202-222). The land buying companies that were formed by the Central province elite during the Kenyatta era helped negotiate better prices for their members and therefore led to their disproportionate migration into the Rift Valley (Oyugi 2000, Atieno-Odhiambo 2002). More importantly, because of political advantages accruing from he Kenyatta presidency, members of the Kikuyu community had more access to the loans than any other community. This disparity in the distribution of state resources would continue henceforth. For instance, by 1966 about 64 per cent of all industrial and 44 per cent of commercial loans given by the state owned Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC) went to Kikuyu clients (Rothchild 1969: 693). As a result, there ensued an expansion of kikuyu reserves to include Nakuru, Laikipia, Nyandarua, Eastern Nandi, Eastern Kericho and Southern Uashin Gishu (Leo 1984).

Land pressure in the greater Rift Valley precipitated much of the animosity to the Central province immigrants and other migrant communities in this region. This would be exacerbated by an imminent loss of political power (Muhula, 2009). Thus in recent years

political conflicts among elite have degenerated into local conflicts over land. It is not a coincidence that these conflicts have routinely coincided with general elections, as witnessed with the targeting of Central province Diaspora communities in the Rift Valley after the 2007 elections. Similarly, in both 1992 and 1997 ethnic conflict occurred in the Rift Valley, Nairobi and Coast provinces. The findings and recommendations of a government-appointed commission of inquiry (Kiliiku Commission and Akiwumi Commission) to investigate the violence were never considered,

In addition, the HI theory hypothesises and has empirically shown that it might be the relatively advantaged groups – instead of the relatively disadvantaged or deprived groups – who initiate violence in order to maintain or safeguard their relatively advantaged position in society (Stewart, 2008). Importantly, the emphasis of the HI theory on linking group inequalities via a grievance-based narrative to violent conflict does not preclude the view that violent group mobilisation might be more 'feasible' in certain political, economic, regional and geographical contexts and settings (Langer and Stewart, 2014). Moreover, the HI theory is largely complementary to the conflict feasibility hypothesis, which draws attention to the feasibility or opportunity of rebellions rather than insurgents' motivations (Collier, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Recently, a new analytical framework was introduced, which has clear parallels with the HI framework. The so-called 4R framework identifies four spheres of influence: Redistribution, Recognition, Representation and Reconciliation (Novelli et al., 2017). With the exception of the fourth R (Reconciliation), the 4R-framework largely overlaps with the HI-framework. In particular, inequalities in the distribution of educational resources and opportunities clearly speak to the sphere of redistribution, while grievances

over cultural status inequalities seem to overlap with issues of recognition. Novelli et al. (2017) opine that further, representation is about whether or not different groups can participate on an equal footing in educational decision-making processes, which points to issues and dynamics of political HIs.

2.3 Challenges and Opportunities in the Management Horizontal Inequalities

Managing horizontal inequalities, which are disparities in socio-economic, political, or cultural status and opportunities among different groups within a society, presents both challenges and opportunities. Addressing these disparities is crucial for promoting social cohesion, peace, and sustainable development. This section explores literature on key challenges and opportunities in the management of horizontal inequalities.

2.3.1 Unequal cultural Recognition as a Trigger for Conflicts

Cultural status inequalities can be extremely important. Fundamentally, culture (ethnicity or religion) itself is often the factor that binds people together as a group. Hence the more important it becomes in the way people see themselves and others, the more likely it is that they will mobilise along group lines. Cultural status inequalities can therefore increase the salience of group identity (Stewart & Brown, 2006). There are three important elements involved in cultural status: treatment with respect to religion and religious observation; language recognition and use; and respect for ethno-cultural practices. In some countries, notably Ghana, conscious efforts have been made to grant equal recognition across groups with regard to each element. In other countries, there have been periods of explicit cultural discrimination (such as against the use of indigenous languages in Guatemala and Peru) or informal discrimination (such as that towards non-Christians in Côte d'Ivoire or non-Muslims in Malaysia). Such inequalities

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make other inequalities (economic, social or political) more powerful as mobilising mechanisms (Stewart, 2005).. Moreover, cultural discrimination also weakens political and economic capabilities, thus accentuating these inequalities, with the consequence of cumulative disadvantage.

Culturally discriminating events are also frequently a trigger of riots and even major conflict, as exemplified by the Protestant Orange Order marches in Northern Ireland, language policy in Sri Lanka, and the desecration of religious buildings and sites in India and Palestine. In Malaysia, recent attacks on cultural status in the form of the destruction of Hindu temples have led to serious politicisation of this community for the first time (Fenton, 2009).

2.3.2 Perceptions of Horizontal Inequalities affect the Likelihood of Conflict

People take action because of perceived injustices rather than because of measured statistical inequalities of which they might not be aware. Normally, one would expect there to be a relation between perceived and observed inequalities, so the objective' HIs are clearly relevant to political action. Yet it is also important to investigate perceptions and their determinants, since leaders, the media and educational institutions can affect the discernment of inequality, even when the underlying reality remains unchanged. A study by Langer and Ukiwo, (2008) in Ghana and Nigeria illuminates that some identities become more politicized than others. In both countries, the majority of those questioned believed there to be very little difference in educational access according to group, despite records of school attendance showing large differences. This may be because

perceptions of difference are based on opportunities at the local level and much of the recorded difference is between regions.

Furthermore, respondents in both Ghana and Nigeria, considered their religion to be much more important than their ethnicity in the private sphere (for example, in relation to social interactions, including marriage) but ethnicity to be much more important in the public sphere, in terms of their views on government job and contract allocations. This highlights the importance of maintaining ethnic balance in the political administrative sphere.

In general, Nigerians felt ethnicity to be more important to them than did Ghanaians, both in relation to their own individual identities and, they believed, as determinants of allocations of government jobs and contracts. At the same time, a significantly greater number of respondents in Ghana than in Nigeria stated that their national identity was important to them. Differences in perceptions of the significance of ethnicity may be because

Nigeria has experienced more inter-ethnic conflict than Ghana; they may also help to explain the higher incidence of such conflict. Kirwin and Cho (2009), for example, using Afro-barometer data, found that there was a significant association between perceptions of group inequality and the acceptability of political violence across 17 African countries.

The importance of the role of perceptions in provoking action means that leaders, institutions and policies that influence perceptions can affect the likelihood of political mobilisation. In post-Houphouët-Boigny Côte d'Ivoire, political leaders launched an active campaign to market identities and differences via the media (Akindès, 2007). In

Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah himself, the first post-colonial leader, placed great emphasis on national unity, in contrast to leaders in Nigeria who adopted a far more regional perspective. Educational institutions are relevant here, too. In Ghana, boarding schools dating back to colonial times have brought together members of the future elite from across the country and have contributed to a national project. These factors may partly account for the finding that Ghanaians valued their national identity more highly than did Nigerians in the perceptions surveys conducted by the researchers (Langer & Stewart, 2013).

A variety of actions (including symbolic ones) can influence perceptions. For example, both Houphouët-Boigny and Nkrumah initiated investment programmes in the deprived northern regions with the goal of reducing inequalities (Langer, 2005). Although they were insufficient to close the gaps, these measures led people to believe that there was an effort to achieve a fairer distribution of resources. Moreover, the elite in the north benefited particularly from some of the programmes through, for example, the allocation of contracts, reducing their incentive to mobilise their members for group conflict. Post-conflict support for indigenous economic and social programmes in Guatemala, while also too small to make a major difference to the extent of inequality, has changed perceptions of inequality, with more people thinking the society is inclusive.

Political inclusion is a major reason for many countries to avoid conflict despite having serious horizontal inequalities as is the case in Ghana where inclusion of all major ethnic groups into political positions in the government has made the country peaceful for a long time. In contrast, political underrepresentation can provoke conflicts especially when there are sudden changes in the political structure as has been the case in Ivory Coast.

Scholars contend that that violent conflicts mainly emerge from existence of political and socio-economic inequalities at the same time. In this case therefore, political inequalities energize leaders to mobilize in order to gain power while the socio-economic inequalities provide followers with serious grievances that push them towards rebellion and hence participation in conflicts.

2.3.3 Inclusivity in Government (or power-sharing) and Reduction of conflict

In states where power is shared, political HIs are lower, hence peace is likely even where there are severe economic and social HIs. When there is genuine power sharing, no single group dominates politics, but all (major) groups have a real sense of participation in government. Econometric evidence shows that formal power-sharing arrangements reduce the potential for conflict, as argued by Lijphart (1969). For example, Binningsbø (2005) explores the impact of proportional representation (PR) and territorial autonomy within countries, while Reynal-Querol (2002) finds that PR has a positive influence on the reduction of conflict propensity. In the federal context, Bakke and Wibbels (2006) report that co-partisanship between central and sub-national governments, which implies shared political power (at least regionally) and consequently lower political HIs, significantly reduces the chance of conflict.

Both Bolivia and Ghana, for example, have included deprived groups in government. In the case of Ghana, there is an informal tradition in the Fourth Republic that whenever a southerner is president, the vice-president is northern. In Bolivia, informal arrangements have involved the political participation of indigenous representatives for much of recent history, and political participation has made for greater toleration of continued economic

and social HIs. Guatemala, Indonesia and Peru, which have each experienced conflict at certain times, practiced exclusionary government prior to their conflict periods.

It is important to stress the implication of this finding: political cooption of the leadership of disadvantaged minorities by the dominant group is often sufficient to prevent conflict without introducing policies to improve the socioeconomic position of these groups in the short run (Langer, 2005). This was arguably the case with the Indian population of Malaysia, which is represented in the governing coalition through the Malaysian Indian Congress, but which has received little in the way of targeted developmental aid, despite pockets of acute socioeconomic deprivation (Loh, 2003). Similarly, in Nigeria, while northern political power has helped to prevent major north–south confrontations, the northern part of the country has remained seriously deprived in socioeconomic terms. It does not, of course, follow that this is a satisfactory situation, given that severe HIs are undesirable in themselves, quite apart from their instrumental role in fomenting violent conflict. Moreover, so long as socio-economic HIs persist, the potential for conflict remains. Nonetheless, political inclusion does appear to play an important part in preventing violence, and it may comprise a significant step towards more inclusive development. This is because ethnic leaders who do not deliver development to their constituency are likely to be challenged in the long term by new leadership contenders more willing to press their group's developmental claims.

2.3.4 Relatively Privileged Groups and Violent conflicts

While there is robust evidence that high levels of horizontal inequality among the relatively deprived increase the likelihood of conflict, evidence on relatively privileged groups is mixed. Relatively privileged groups may initiate violence to preserve their

power and their access to important resources (Stewart 2002a). A privileged group that produces wealth may develop a sense of injustice if it sees a redistribution of that wealth as an unfair benefit to another region or group.

Asal *et al* (2016) find that ethnic groups that face political exclusion and live in an area that produces oil wealth are more likely to experience violent conflict than groups that experience only exclusion. Economically privileged groups have more resources with which to sustain violent conflicts, but their higher opportunity cost means they also have more to lose by participating in violence (Nygård et al. 2017). There is also evidence that in the case of separatist movements, relatively privileged groups sometimes initiate violence (Brown 2010). Whether relatively wealthier groups are more likely to participate in conflicts is debatable. Several authors find that this is the case by conducting studies comparing a group's GDP per capita to the GDP per capita of all groups (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Weidmann, and Bormann 2015), but other studies fail to find a significant relationship (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2014; Fjelde and Østby 2014). In their theoretical model of conflict and economic change, Mitra and Ray (2014) show that increasing a specific group's income lowers the chances of that group's participating in violence.

Meanwhile, it is worth noting that they also find that raising one group's income may increase the chance that that same group will be the target of violence because other privileged groups would perceive that increase as losing their own comparative advantage (World Bank, 2018). As explored in more detail below, steep changes in the relative status of groups can foment new grievances that increase the risk of violence, even if the change reduces inequalities for example Keil (2017) opined that after the

disintegration of the former Yugoslavia Serbs in the three countries of Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo lost or feared to lose their privileged position once these states declared their desire to become independent and consequently attempted to secede. These secession attempts led for civil war in several republics within the newly created countries such as the Republic of Srpska Krajina in Croatia and the Republika Srpska in Bosnia, however, the Serbs were defeated militarily and many Serbs became victims of the very nationalist discourses that their leaders had instigated.

2.3.5 The Importance of Political Exclusion in Conflict Risks

Some qualitative case studies and quantitative evidence suggest that political exclusion is very important in fostering between-group tensions that can lead to violence. Political exclusion provides leaders of deprived groups with an incentive to act to change the situation. Some have argued that political exclusion is more visible and therefore groups can more easily assign blame, one of the steps considered essential in stirring grievances to violence—than economic disadvantage (Jones, Elgin-Cossart, and Esberg 2012; Vogt et al. 2015). Data limitations regarding political exclusion, however, are even more severe than they are for economic exclusion. Some recent work tries to address the limitations. The latest Ethnic Power Relations data set compiles data for the period 1946–2013 that includes all "politically relevant ethnic groups" in 141 countries and their access to power in the executive branch, including cabinet positions and control of the army (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). The indicator for SDG target 16 which is being developed, will provide additional possibilities for measuring political inclusion.

Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013) show that politically excluded groups experience conflict at a much higher frequency in comparison with included groups.

They also show that the less included a group is politically, the more likely it is to fight the incumbent government. This effect is even more pronounced when groups have experienced a change of power. The size of the politically incumbent group makes little to no difference to the probability of conflict. But size has a strong positive effect on violence for excluded groups. This finding is interpreted as evidence that conflict is to a large extent driven by grievances since one would expect the perceived injustice to increase with the size of the excluded population, rather than group size being regarded as simply a proxy for resource endowment (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). Other evidence suggests that excluded groups will be more likely to engage in collective violent action when they perceive the political system to be completely closed to their group, as opposed to when they believe they have minimum representation (Jost and Banaji, 2004). A group may well suffer exclusion in several dimensions at once, and the overlap of different types of exclusion can heighten the risk of violent conflict. Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013) find that groups excluded both economically and politically will be more likely to participate in violent conflict than groups excluded in only one dimension.

They conclude that the effect of economic horizontal inequality on violent conflict is conditional on political exclusion. In fact, economic horizontal inequalities can be compensated for by a politically inclusive society. Østby (2008a), in a study at the country level, finds a strong link between asset inequality and violent conflict, especially in countries with higher levels of political discrimination. Different types of exclusion tend to reinforce each other. Political exclusion often leads to social and economic exclusion.

Social exclusion is related to power relations and tends to involve discrimination against or exclusion of groups from the regular activities of the society. There are causal connections between educational access and income: lack of access to education, lack of education, or both, lead to fewer economic opportunities, which is correlated with low income (World Bank, 2018). At the same time, the low income of certain groups leads to lower educational attainment, which creates a vicious cycle for relatively deprived groups.

Exclusion in recognition of culture, especially related to language use, can also affect educational and economic opportunities and outcomes as a result. It also reinforces group identities. Stewart (2009) suggests that conflict is less likely when a particular group that is relatively deprived in one dimension is privileged in another. In cases in which a group is economically or socially excluded (or both), but the group's elite holds power or participates in the government, the elite are less likely to organize or lead a rebellion. She cites the examples of Malaysia and Nigeria, suggesting that after their civil wars, the group that was economically disadvantaged held a numerical majority and was also politically advantaged. Having political power reduces the elites' motives to rebel and gives them an opportunity to correct the inequalities faced by their group.

2.3.6 Role of Civil Society in advocating Equality

Horizontal inequalities between ethnic and religious groups are increasingly recognised to be an important causal factor in violent ethnic conflict in the developing world (Stewart, 2008). An important general conclusion that arises from the case study and econometric work associated with the concept is that the impact of socioeconomic horizontal inequalities on conflict likelihood is crucially mediated by political factors. To

date, however, attention to this political dimension has largely focused on the role of the state and of ethnic leaders (Brown, 2011).Civil society as a distinct realm of political activity is a relatively unexplored dimension of horizontal inequalities, and one which deserves closer attention.

The institutional dimension of civil society is strongly linked to ethnic cleavages. While civil society is often reified as a 'bringing together' phenomenon which is thought to promote democracy, tolerance and 'communicative action', in Habermas' terminology, it can also be a site of exclusion, intolerance, and even oppression (Whitehead, 1997; Alexander, 1998). Civil society is also theorised to be institutionally reflective of the underlying political economy of the country – an idea that has led to its enshrinement at the centre of the 'modernisation' thesis linking economic development with democratisation (White, 1994; Brysk, 2000; Zuern, 2000). Yet where political economies are severely divided along ethnic or religious lines, so by implication may civil society be divided (Tan and Singh, 1994; Kaneko, 2002; Verma, 2002).

Secondly, civil society plays a crucial role in the public interpretation of inequality. Inequalities, particularly horizontal inequalities, will not lead to social mobilisation and conflict unless they are perceived to be severe and unjust (World Bank, 2018). Whereas a lot of research on horizontal inequalities has focused on the role of political elites in providing public interpretation of such inequalities, there need to understanding the role of civil society in a way that can both mitigate and exacerbate ethnic tensions; indeed civil society is rarely a homogenous entity, and different sectors of it may pursue these different interpretive stances at the same time which could make the inequality question

better of worse (Brown, 2011). In Kenya for example the church has been accused of playing politics and not being objective in their duty as part of civil society.

2.4 Knowledge Gaps

The findings from previous studies on have been more focused on role of political horizontal inequalities in propagating ethnic conflicts. The data that is available on horizontal inequalities have been country specific and has not gone deep into discovering the existence of horizontal inequalities within specific localized settings like Uasin Gishu County. The mention of Uasin Gishu County in previous studies has been in general terms and in referece to Kenya without giving specific contextual reference and addressing the specific forms of horizontal inequalities that Uasin Gishu contends with and how they are manifested. The current study intends to fill this particular gap.

Previus studies have given the nexus between horizontal inequalities and conflicts but without being specific on the way each form of horizontal inequality exacerbates ethnic conflicts. The reference to horizontal inequalities in previous studies has been fragmented with many scholars focusing more on electoral politics and Land conflicts without looking at these conflicts as aspecst of horizontal inequalities. The current study fills this gap by using empirical data to perform indepth anaylsys on the correlation between horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflicts.

Finally, previous studies have not looked at the role of of devolved governmnts in the addressing horizontal inequalies. Most studies on Uasin Gishu have made reference to the 2007/2008 post-election violence without giving credence to the post devolution dispensation. The current study, empirically looks into the challenges and opportunities that come from devolution in addressing horizontal inequalities. Previous studies in

Kenya have also failed to looks at the paradox of relative previlage *vis-à-vis* relative deprevation in conflicts. The current study addresses this gap as well.

2. 4 Conceptual Framework

The study was underpinned by three theories namely; Relative deprivation theory, Primordialism ethnic Conflict theory and Conflict Transformation theory.

2.4.1 Relative Deprivation theory

The main proponent of Relative deprivation is Ted Robert Gurr (1971) who refers to Relative Deprivation (RD) as:

> The tension that develops from a discrepancy between the 'ought'
> and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction, and this disposes men
> to violence (Gurr, 1971).

According to the definition provided by Gurr, Relative Deprivation is the discrepancies between what people want that is, their value expectations, and what they actually gain, which is their value accruing capabilities. He contends that people are more likely to revolt when they lose hope of attaining their societal values, and the intensity of discontent or frustration 'varies with the severity of depression and inflation' (Gurr, 1971).

Ethnicity, Gurr asserts, 'is the obvious basis for mobilizing oppositions' against the state. Gurr states that, the higher the degree of frustration, the greater the political instability. In short, the intensification of RD with regard to political participation, prosperity, collective or communal values and societal status can lead to a 'decline in ideational coherence' which consequently leads to a breakdown in the social order and to violence.

Gurr while speaking of societal security dilemmas maintains that in such cases 'the benefit of one group is an automatic loss for all the others.

Politicisation and Mobilisation of collective ethnic identity is an ideology which elites construct for instrumental reasons so as to gain greater political power and achieve their goals. In doing so, elites politicize ethnic identity such that they can mobilise their members to support their politico-cultural aspirations.'

Ethnic identity is socially constructed and collective identity formation 'becomes part of the conflict itself. According Esman (1994) the concept of relative deprivation refers to the gap between a group's current status and prospects and what appear to be reasonable and legitimate expectations, or to a gap between what comparable groups are believed to enjoy and what is available in material, cultural, and political satisfactions to the collectivity and its members. The mere existence of relative deprivation, however, is not sufficient to pose a great enough threat to the state's security, transforming such deprivations and grievances into collective action against the regime, however, requires a politicization of ethnic identity in order to mobilise the people.

In Mohammed Hafez's words:

> To be able to wage a fight, individuals will have to mobilize resources, recruit committed members, and establish organizational structures that can withstand repression (Hafez, 2004).

Gurr argues that politicized discontent is a necessary condition for the resort to violence in politics (Gurr, 1971). The key reason for ethnic rebellion is always of a societal nature. Ethnic groups may find themselves disadvantaged in many facets of life - economic, socio-cultural, political and ideological. Ethnic elites, through the use of communication facilities such as television, radio and the internet, have been enabled to politicize such

sentiments, to publicise their goals and views, to mobilize ethnic activists both in peaceful and violent ways, and to direct people's anger towards the people they perceive to be responsible for their being disadvantaged

According to Esman (1998), Mobilization is the process by which an ethnic community becomes politicized on behalf of its collective interests and aspirations. This process requires awareness, usually promoted by ethnic entrepreneurs, that political action is necessary to promote or defend the community's vital collective interests. This awareness results in the recruitment of individuals into the movement or into organizations that purport to speak for the movement (Esman,1998). Sense of deprivation alone cannot lead to the mobilization of societal groups under oppression. This sense of deprivation, need to be politicized. Societal groups often move to the violent stage only when they see the potential to win and when they expect to gain from the outcome of conflict.

To further understand this, the study looks at the group motivation hypothesis by Stewart *el al.* (2002) who argue that intra-state conflicts primarily arise from conflicts between different groups, these groups can be divided based on cultural, religious, geographical, or class distinctions. They further aver that the driving forces behind these conflicts are the group's motives, resentments, and ambitions. However, such differences become significant enough to fuel violence when coupled with other important disparities, particularly in the distribution and exercise of political and economic power. In their opinion, when relatively deprived groups perceive a lack of political redress, they may turn to war as a means of seeking redress. This is often influenced or encouraged by their leaders. The deep-rooted resentments arising from these group differences, known as horizontal inequalities, are a major catalyst for conflicts. These inequalities manifest in

various dimensions, such as economic, political, and social aspects. Furthermore, not only relatively deprived groups but relatively privileged groups may also be motivated to engage in acts of violence to safeguard their privileges from potential attacks by less privileged groups.

In Uasin Gishu county, deep rooted feelings of inequalities regarding distribution of land and other natural resources that can be traced back to the colonial period have a major concern to the local communities. The Kalenjin community has for years viewed other communities, especially the Kikuyu as having taken away their land because there are associated with the Government. This has led to deep rooted animosity that has in many cases culminated into violent conflicts as witnessed in 1992, 1997 and 2007 electoral cycles. Uasin Gishu being a multi-ethnic society, there is need for cohesion among communities living in the area.

The ethnic diversity in the county should not only serve as a weakness towards conflicts but rather as an opportunity towards a cohesive society. While relative deprivation theory highlights elite manipulation or politicization of ethnic identity as the foundational source of deprivation, grievances and mobilization which induce ethnic conflicts, however, it cannot independently explain why people easily, cooperatively, and effectively mobilize along ethnic lines. In this regard the study draws on the wisdom of Primordialism Ethnic Conflict theory in recognizing the power of ethnicity to perpetuate a sense of 'common blood', a sense of shared values, shared interests, shared threats, and most fundamentally, a sense of solidarity, which is indispensable for collective action

2.4.2 Primordialism theory of Ethnic Conflicts

The main proponent of this theory is Clifford Geertz (1963) and Tatu Vanhanen (1999).

According to the primordialism theory, primordial groups such as ethnicities, clans or

racial groups are major actors in a polity within which culture, economy and social life is

organised. In this regard, ethnic identity for instance is given at birth and is passed

through genealogy from one generation to another (Geertz, 1963). Therefore under

primordialism ethnicity as an identity is fixed through the shared blood relations. In this

regard, primordialism envisions cordial and cooperative relationship among members of

an ethnic group (in-group) and hostile and conflictual relations with members of an out-

group (another ethnic group). By putting emphasis on the differences in ethnic identities

as the foundational basis of inter-ethnic hatreds, fear, and conflicts, primordialists suggest

that, ethnically heterogeneous societies will unavoidably experience ethnic conflicts.

Clifford Geertz further avers that humans have primordial attachments to what he

describes as the 'givens' of social existence, be it an immediate kin connection or a

particular religious and/or linguistic community. He explains that:

> These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on…have an ineffable,
> and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is
> bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbour, one's fellow believer, *ipso
> facto*; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity,
> common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue
> of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. The
> general strength of such primordial bonds, and the types of them that are
> important, differ from person to person, from society to society, and from
> time to time. But for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all
> times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural—
> some would say spiritual—affinity than from social interaction (1973:
> 259-260).

These attachments, in Geertz's view, are deep-rooted and perhaps even inescapable to the

individuals constituting the ethnic group or ethnic nation. Vanhanen (1999) opines that

according to primordialism, ethnic conflict fundamentally springs from differences in ethnic identities. As a function of myths of 'common blood' shared within each ethnic group, primordialism anticipates hospitality and cooperation among members of the in-group and hostility and conflict against out-groups (Horowitz 1985; Smith 1996; Hammond & Axelrod 2006,). Because ethnic differences under primordialism are ancestral, deep, and irreconcilable, ethnic conflicts arise inevitably from 'ancient hatreds' between ethnic groups and 'mutual fear' of domination, expulsion or even extinction (Geertz, 1963). By emphasizing differences in ethnic identities as the foundational source of inter-ethnic hatred, fear, and conflicts, primordialists suggest that, ethnically heterogeneous states will unavoidably experience ethnic conflicts (Vanhanen 1999). The separate peace in some heterogeneous states could well be a function of special structural policies as argued by Mulinge (2008). Primordialism Ethnic conflict theory therefore complements the Relative Deprevaition in explaining why people easily mobilize along ethnic lines especially when varying political and socio-economic structural conditions are stuck against them in a maner perceived to be unfair by members of the ethnic group. However, the two theories are silent on the solution to the intractibale conflicts. Considering that these conflcits occur in an area with multiple ethnic groups, there is need for these communities to live together harmoniously. This is only possible when the conflictual relations between the ethnic groups in the county are transformed. The study therefore utilizes conflict transformation theory to explain how the hostilities emanating from horizontal inequalities can be transformed to create a more cohesive society.

2.4.3 Conflict Transformation Theory

The study was anchored on Johan Galtung's Conflict transformation theory, which posits that conflicts consist of both life-affirming and life-destroying aspects, arising from societal contradictions. Galtung's triangle model represents conflict with attitude (A), behavior (B), and contradiction (C) at its vertices (Galtung, 2000).

The contradiction in a conflict reflects the incompatibility of goals between the parties involved, which can be either symmetric (involving conflicting interests) or asymmetric (involving conflicting interests within a relationship) (Galtung, 2000). Attitude encompasses parties' perceptions of themselves and each other, which can be positive or negative, but in violent conflicts, negative attitudes and demeaning stereotypes often prevail, influenced by emotions like fear, anger, and hatred. The attitude includes emotive, cognitive, and conative elements (Galtung, 2000). Behavior in conflicts can range from cooperation to coercion, with violent conflicts characterized by threats, coercion, and destructive attacks.

Conflict is a dynamic process where structure, attitudes, and behaviors constantly influence and change each other. Conflict formation occurs as parties' interests clash or their relationship becomes oppressive, leading to the development of hostile attitudes and conflictual behavior (Galtung, 1996). This results in the growth and spread of the conflict, involving other parties and giving rise to secondary conflicts, complicating the resolution of the core conflict.

Galtung (2002) argues that conflict resolution must involve dynamic changes, including de-escalation of conflict behavior, a shift in attitudes, and transforming relationships or clashing interests at the core of the conflict structure. Transformational processes

encompass articulation or disarticulation, conscientization or de-conscientization, complexification or simplification, polarization or depolarisation, and escalation or de-escalation. The incompatibility between parties can be resolved through transcending contradictions, compromise, deepening or widening the conflict structure, and associating or dissociating actors.

Cultural violence, as described by Galtung *et al*. (2002), operates through direct, structural, and cultural means. Direct violence involves physical harm, while structural violence arises from oppressive social structures and institutions that deprive individuals of their rights and basic needs. Structural violence can be vertical (involving political, economic, and cultural alienation) or horizontal (keeping groups apart who wish to live together or separate) (Galtung, 2000). Cultural violence aims to harm or justify direct or structural violence using words and images. To effectively end conflicts in Uasin Gishu County, it is essential to manage horizontal inequalities and change conflictual behaviours by implementing structural and institutional changes that promote social justice and address underlying contradictions and injustices.

2.5 Conceptual Model showing the Interraction Between the Independent Variable and and Dependent Variable

The conceptual model illustrates the connections between the Independent Variable (Horizontal Inequality) and the Dependent Variable (Intractable Ethnic Conflicts). These connections signify a cause-and-effect relationship where the presence of Horizontal Inequality can be associated with the occurrence of intractable ethnic conflicts. Horizontal inequalities are expressed in three different ways.In this study, the researcher

examined horizontal inequalities across three main categories. The first category focused on Economic Horizontal Inequalities, which encompassed disparities in asset ownership, income levels, employment opportunities, and land ownership disparities. The second category, Political Horizontal Inequalities, involved disparities in the allocation of political opportunities, ethnic favoritism, inequalities in political participation, and disparities in resource distribution. Finally, the third category, Socio-Cultural Horizontal Inequalities, addressed discrepancies in access to education, healthcare, loans, and variations in cultural status. The independent variable, which is influenced by intervening variables such as Government policies, the Constitution of Kenya, Civil Society Organizations, Political goodwill/competition, and the role of State actors in conflict management, can lead to outcomes that depend on the nature of the intervening variables' impact on the independent variable. In this context, intractable ethnic conflicts manifest as violence, skirmishes, ethnic tension, and antagonism.

Therefore, horizontal inequalities and intractable ethnic conflicts are two interconnected variables that have played pivotal roles in shaping the dynamics of communities in Uasin Gishu County. These variables are intertwined in a complex relationship, where horizontal inequalities often serve as a significant catalyst for the emergence and perpetuation of intractable ethnic conflicts. This study explored the intricate connections between these two variables, emphasizing how horizontal inequalities contribute to the escalation and persistence of ethnic conflicts. These conflicts exact a heavy toll on society, causing suffering and hindering development. Recognizing the role of horizontal inequalities as a key driver is essential for devising effective strategies to prevent and resolve such conflicts.

Independent Variable

Dependent Variable

Forms of Horizontal Inequalities **Economic HIs:** Inequalities in ownership of assets; Inequalities in income levels and employment opportunities and Inequality in land ownership **Political HIs**: Inequalities in the distribution of political opportunities, ethnic patronage, inequality in political participation and Inequality in Resource distribution. **Socio-Cultural HIs**: Inequalities in access to education, health care; access to loans and cultural status inequalities.	**Intractable Ethnic conflicts** • Violence • Skirmishes • Ethnic tension • Protagonists

Intervening variable
- Government policies
- Constitution of Kenya
- Civil society Organization
- Political goodwill/Competition
- Role of State actors in conflict management

Figure 2. 1: Conceptual Model of showing the Relationship between Horizontal inequalities and Ethnic Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County

Source: Researcher, 2020

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the research methodology which consists of the research design, study area, study population, sampling strategy, data collection instruments, validity and reliability of data instruments, data analysis and presentation. It also covers the limitations and ethical considerations of the study.

3.1 Research Design

This study adopted descriptive research design, historical and correlational research designs. The descriptive design was used to obtain data on personal experiences, events and situation with respect to the variables of the study (Creswell, 2013). Descriptive research is directed at making careful observations and detailed documentation of a phenomenon of interest (Bhattacherjee, 2019). In this study the researcher conducted surveys using household questionnaires and conducted in-depth interviews and Focus Group discussions to have a deeper understanding on the issues of horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. Therefore, in this study, the descriptive design was useful in describing the nature and the manifestation of horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County.

The study also adopted a historical Research Design. According to Buckley (2016), Historical design involved the systematic and objective location, evaluation, and synthesis of evidence to establish facts and draw conclusions about past events. Historical research aims to show the importance of past events in the present situation. Historical design provided a perspective for understanding issues of horizontal inequality and ethnic conflict and to paint the picture of how a combination of factors from these variables

resulted to persisntent ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County from a historical perspective. The researcher mainly synthesized information from secondary sources including research articles, books, journals, magazines, websites and newspapers.

Finally the research utilized Correlational research design. According to Price *et al* (2017), Correlational research is a type of non-experimental research design in which the researcher measures two variables and assesses the statistical relationship (i.e., the correlation) between them with little or no effort to control extraneous variables. In correlational research, the researcher measures two continuous variables with little or no attempt to control extraneous variables and then assesses the relationship between them. In this study, the researcher measured the correlation between horizontal inequalities and intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

Therefore, the researcher adopted a mixed research approach in which both qualitative and quantitative (QUAL+QUAN) approaches were used. According to Demir & Pismek (2018), QUAL+QUAN entails a convergent parallel design that a researcher uses to concurrently conduct the quantitative and qualitative elements in the same phase of the research process. In this regard, therefore, as suggested by Creswell & Clark (2017), the researcher collected and analyzed both quantitative and qualitative data and mixed the two forms of data in different ways that allowed generalizations and discussions from the findings.

Table 3. 1: Research Designs per Objective

Research objective	Research design
i. Examine of horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County	Descriptive and Historical

ii. Analyse the nexus between horizontal inequalities and intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County in Post-Colonial Kenya.	Descriptive and Correlational
iii. Assess the challenges and Opportunities in managing horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County in Post-Colonial Kenya.	Descriptive

Source: Researcher, 2020

3.2 Study area

The study was conducted in Uasin Gishu County, The county is situated of Rift Valley region of Kenya. The County is located 30^0N, 4.5^0 S and 35^0 E and 20^0 W. Uasin Gishu County borders Kericho county to the South, Nandi to the South west, Bungoma to the West, Elgeyo Marakwet to the East, Baringo to the South East and Trans Nzoia to the North**(**Soft Kenya, 2011). Uasin Gishu covers an area of 3345.2 square kilometres. The County is divided into six sub-counties namely: Turbo, Soy, Ainabkoi, Moiben, Kessess and Kapseret and it is further sub-divided into 30 wards. Soy sub-county has the following seven wards Kuinet/ Kapsuswa, Kapkures Ziwa.Segero/ Barsombe, Kipsomba, Soy and Moi's Bridge. Turbo sub-county has the following six wards Ngenyilel, Tapsagoi, Kiplombe, Kapsaos, Huruma and Kamagut. Moiben sub-county has the following five wards; Tembelio, Kimumu, Karuna/Meibeki, Moiben, Sergoit Ainabkoi, Kapsoya, Ainabkoi/Olare and Kaptagat. Kapseret sub-county has the following five wards Simat/Kapseret, Langas, Ngeria, Megun and Kipkenyo and finally Kesses has the following four wards Tarakwa, Cheptiret/ Kipchamo, Tulwet/Chuiyat and Racecourse Department of Devolution (Uasin Gishu County, CIDP, 2018). The major towns in Uasin

Gishu County include Eldoret, Moi's Bridge, Burnt Forest, and Turbo with Eldoret town being the county capital (Uasin Gishu County CIDP, 2018).

Figure 3. 1 Map of Uasin Gishu County

Source: Researcher 2020

This study was conducated in Uasin Gishu County because the county has been the epicentre of conflicts in Kenya especially since 1991. As Onyango (2009) one of the worst episodes of conflicts in the county was recordered during the 2007/2008 post election violence. Onyango' study established that the post-election violence in Uasin Gishu District targeted members of the Kikuyu community who occupy Lelmolok and

Bindura farms which are Settlement Transfer Fund schemes; was caused by inadequate ECK legal and administrative framework, poor governance structures and poor land tenure systems; and that the post-election violence was poorly managed by the government as it didn't take into the consideration the underlying causes of the violence.

The County which considered to be one of the most ethnically diverse in the Country has been considered a hotspot area for ethnic conflicts. For instance a report by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) titled *Towards a violence-free 2022 Election: Conflict hotspot mapping for Kenya* listed Uasin Gishou County as one of the high-risk counties for violence in the 2022 elections. According to the NCIC report, Uasin Gishu County's major threat was based on historical unresolved conflicts, effects of the 2007/2008 PEV, low trust in IEBC and fear of excessive use of force by the police during the electioneering period. In fact, given its high spillover potential, the County was said to be a pacesetter to the supporters of one of the major political parties.

It is therefore clear that the conflict In Uasin Gishu County are persistent and are of ethnic nature with aspscts of political, social and economic inequalities that were not brought out clearly by previous studies. The current study therefore unearths the interplay between horizontal inequlaities and ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

3.3 Study Population

According to the Kenya Population and Housing Census (KPHC) of 2019, Uasin Gishiu county has a population of 1,163,186; of these 580,269 are male, 582,889 are female and 28 are intersex (KNBS, 2019). The KPHC report further indicted that there are 304,943 households in Uasin Gishu county with an average household size of 3.8. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of population by sub-county in Uasin Gishu county.

Table 3. 2: Distribution of population and number of households by sub-county in Uasin Gishu County

Sub-county	Population	Number of households
Ainabkoi	100,018	22,241
Kapseret	131,065	33,975
Kesses	121,088	26,343
Moiben	150,875	33,638
Soy	162,018	32,080
Turbo	203,673	49,792
Total	**866,737**	**198,069**

Source: KNBS, 2020

The study targeted the following categories of study population in Uasin Gishu County. Household heads, County Commisioner, County Secretary, CDF Officials local administration (Chiefs), Religious leaders, civil society organizations, local political leaders (MCAs), security personnel (senior Police officers) and opinion leaders. These categories of respondents were sampled from various sub-counties within the study area. The researcher randomly selected two sub-counties in the county for the study. The two sub-counties that were selected are Kapsaret sub-county with a population of 131,065 and a total of 33,975 households and Kesses sub-county with a population of 121,088 and a total of 26,343 households. Considering that household heads were the major target population for the study, the total number of household heads from the two sub-counties was 60,318.

Table 3. 3: Study Population

Sampling Frame	Target Population
County Commissiner	1
County Secretary	1
CDF Officials	6
Chiefs	50
Members of County Assembly	37
Senior Police Officers	10
Household Heads	60,318
Religious leaders	50
Civil Society Organizations (CBOs, FBOs, NGOs)	50
Opinion leaders (FGD Participants)	100
Total	**60,623**

Source: Researcher, 2020

3.4 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size Determination

Uasin Gishu was purposely selected for the study due to the incidences of intractable ethnic conflicts and tension in the area associated by horizontal inequalities.

3.4.1 Sampling of Household Heads

The study used a four-stage multi-stage sampling technique. In the first stage, Cluster sampling was used to classify Uasin Gishu County into six clusters based on the six sub-counties namely Turbo, Soy, Ainabkoi, Moiben, Kessess and Kapseret. Two sub-counties were randomly sampled from the six sub-counties based on 30% sampling units as supported by Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) who indicated that a sample of 30% of

sufficiently representative of the study population. Hence 30% of the six sub-counties are two sub-counties. The researcher wrote the names of all the six sub-counties on pieces of paper, put them in a basket and randomly pick two sub-counties. The two sub-counties that were selected randomly were Kapsaret and Kesses.

In the second stage, census sampling was used to sample all nine wards in Kapsaret and Kesses sub-counties. Kapseret-sub-county has the following five wards Simat/Kapseret, Langas, Ngeria, Megun and Kipkenyo and Kesses has the following four wards Tarakwa, Cheptiret/ Kipchamo, Tulwet/Chuiyat and Racecourse (Uasin Gishu County, CIDP, 2018). Hence all the wards in the two sub-counties were part of the study.

In the third stage, sample size for the household heads was determined as follows, since the main Unit of analysis for this study is household heads, data from Kenya National Bureau of statistics show that Kapsaret had a total of 33,975 households and whereas Kessess has a total of 26,343 households. Hence the total number of household heads is 60,318 (KNBS, 2019). The researcher therefore determined the sample size for the nine wards using Fisher *et al*., (1983) cited in Mugenda & Mugenda, (1999) which states that for a target population greater than 10000, the desired sample size can be determined using Fisher's formula for sample size determination. The formula indicates that:

$$n=\frac{z^2pq}{d^2}$$

Where n=desired sample size (the target population is greater than 10,000).

    z=the standard normal deviate at the confidence level of 95% is 1.96.

    p=the proportion of the target population estimated to have characteristics being measured is set at 50%

q=1-p (probability of non-success)

d=level of statistical significance set at 0.05

$$n=\frac{(1.96)^2*0.5*(1-0.5)}{(0.05)^2}$$

n=384

The third stage utilized stratified proportionate sampling to determine the sample size for each of the nine wards in the two sub-counties based on the sample size of 384. In this regard, the sample size of 384 was broken down into smaller samples based on the number of household heads in each of the nine wards in the two sub-counties as shown in Table 3.4.

Table 3. 4: Proportionate sample for Household Heads

Sub-Counties	Wards	Number of Households	Sample size
Kapaseret	Simat/Kapseret	6427	41
	Kipkenyo	6049	39
	Ngeria	3647	23
	Megun	2404	15
	Langas	15,448	98
Kesses	Race course	5692	36
	Cheptiret	5416	35
	Tulwel/Chiyat	7478	48
	Tarakwa	7757	49
Total		**60,318**	**384**

Source: Researcher, 2021

Finally, in the fourth stage simple random sampling, systematic sampling and convenience sampling were used to reach each household head who participated in the study. The researcher randomly selected a starting point for each of the nine wards in the two sub-counties in order to determine the household to start from; this was done by tossing a coin in order to determine a random starting point. The researcher and research assistants then applied systematic sampling by counting five households from the random starting point and picked each fifth household as a respondent in this study. The process was repeated in each ward until the required number of respondents was reached. In cases where the fifth household did not have an occupant at the time of data collection, the researcher and research assistants employed convenience sampling to get a respondent from the next available household.

3.4.2 Sampling of Key Informants and FGD participants

In the case of the key informants; County commissioner and county secretary were purposeively sampled. Chiefs, MCAs, senior police officers, religious leaders and CSOs, 10% of the target population was sampled as recommended by Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) who justified the sample of 10% where the sample frame is large and exceeding a minimum sample size of 30 respondents. Therefore, for these categories of respondents simple random sampling was used to select 10% of respondents on each category. For CDF officials, 1 CDF official was selected from each of the two sampled constitucies of Kesses and Kapseret.

 In the case of the opinion leaders who participated in FGDs, 40 respondents were sampled based on the rules that guide the constitution of the FGDs as justified by Stewart, & Shamdasani, (2014) who indicated that traditionally recommended size of the

focus Groups in research is 10 to 12 people. They further argue that focus groups with more than 10 participants should be avoided because large groups are difficult to control and they limit each person's opportunity to share insights and observations. In this instance, therefore, there were four FGDs of 10 participants each, two in each sub-county.

3.5 Data Collection Methods and instruments

The study utilised both primary and secondary data. Various methods were utilised in the process of data collection to meet the objectives of the study.

3.5.1. Primary Data

The study adopted the three primary methods of data collection which comprised of the following instruments: questionnaires, interview schedules and focus group discussion guides.

3.5.1.1 Questionnaires for Household Heads

Pre-tested household questionnaires were used to get information from the household heads. Household Questionnaires were used to collect data on all the three objectives of the study. Th questionnaires (Appendix 1) were administered directly to the respondents through face to face interviews by the researcher and the research assistants so as to avoid misinterpretation of the questions.

3.5.1.2 Key Informant Interview schedules

Interview guides were used to obtain rich and contextual information from Key informants who were major actors and stakeholders in conflict management in the county. Key informants (Appendix 2) were used to obtain qualitative data from

respondents mobilised from among various core actors in the conflict from government administrators, CSO and political leaders.

3.5.1. 3. Focus Group Discussion Guides

In this study, Focus Group Discussions (Appendix 3) were used to collect data where groups formed were homogenous on the basis of gender, ethnicity and the setting of the community. According to Silverman (2009), Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) are defined as semi structured group discussions, which yield qualitative data on the community level by facilitating interaction between participants. The strength of an FGD is the forum it creates for discussion between participants, thus eliciting new ideas and explanations, which would not have come up during an individual or a household interview. During FGDs, the researcher asked questions which the respondents reacted to by way of discussions which were recorded by the researcher. Table 3.5 shows the summary of the study population, sampling techniques and and Data Collection.

Table 3. 5: The summary of the study population, sampling techniques and and Data Collection

Population Category	Population size	Sample Determination	Sampling Techniques	Sample Size	Method of Data Collection
County Commisioner	1	Purposive	Purposive	1	Interview
County Secretary	1	Purposive	Purposive	1	Interview
CDF Chairperson	6	30%	Simple Random	2	Interview
Chiefs	50	10%	Simple Random	5	Interview
Members of County Assembly	37	10%	Simple Random	4	Interview
Senior Police	10	Purposive	Simple	10	Interview

			Random		
Officers					
Household Heads	60,318	Fishers Formula	Simple Random and Convenince	384	Questionnaires
Religious leaders	50	10%	Simple Random	5	Interview
Civil Society Organizations (CBOs, FBOs, NGOs)	50	10%	Simple Random	5	Interview
(FGD Participants)	100	10-12 members per FGDs	Simple Random and Convenience	40	Interview
Total	**60,623**			**457**	

Source: Researcher, 2020

3.5.2 Secondary Data

Various documents such as research publications, policy reports, government reports, reports by various commissions of enquiry and other relevant minutes from meetings such as records from chief's office, website searches, newspaper and magazine publications and other relevant literature were reviewed as secondary data. These provided essential information that guided the study and helped in discussing the research findings and interpreting the variables appropriately.

3.6 Validity of data collection instruments

Validity is the level of accuracy in an instrument based on the results of a study (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). In order to control the validity of the instruments, the preliminary research instruments were be pre-tested on a pilot set of respondents for comprehension, logic and relevance as recommended by Biddix (2009). The feedback obtained from the pilot study was used to determine face validity, construct validity and

content validity of the three instruments employed for data collection. Validity of research entails factual information and accuracy of the information presented by a study (Schroder, 2003). Joppe (2003) further contends that validity of research is about the truthfulness of the research results and whether the research actually measures what it was intended to measure in the first place. Validity of research instrument can be determined through expert examination (Cohen & Marion, 1994). To ensure the validity of the data collection instruments, all the three instruments that were used during the study were pre-tested through a pilot study conducted in Kisumu County.

The pilot group consisted of 38 participants who constituted 10% of the sample population and was made up of a population with similar characteristics to those of the actual study population. The respondents of the pilot study were not part of the target study population due to the need to avoid biases and contamination of the actual study (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).

The results of the pilot study were used to obtain face validity, construct validity and content validity of the data collection instruments. Face validity refers to the face value accuracy and suitability of the research instruments relative to the objectives of the study (Holden, 2010). Content validity refers to the extent to which the content of the study corresponds with the content of the data it is meant to collect (Wilson *et al.,* 2012). Construct validity is the extent to which a test measures what it is meant to measure.

In this study, face validity was measured by the reactions of the respondents through their comments from the pilot study. Construct validity was determined by consulting experts from the department of Peace and Conflicts Studies at Masinde Muliro University of

Science and Technology. Further, pilot study results were discussed with the supervisors and the items with ambiguities were adjusted accordingly to improve the quality of the data collection instruments.

The Content Validity Index (CVI) was calculated for all three instruments to determine statistical proof. The CVI is commonly used because it is easy to compute, understand and focuses on agreement of relevance rather than just agreement. CVI also focuses on consensus rather than consistency and provides both item and Scale information (Polit, Tatano & Owen, 2007). The following recommended CVI formula was used to calculate contents validity for questionnaires, interview guides and FGD guides.

$$CVI = \frac{\text{Number of Items declared Valid}}{\text{Total Number of Items}}$$

The formula was applied for each of the research instruments under the various sections for each item as indicated in Table 3.6.

Table 3. 6: Determination of the CVI of Instruments of Data Collection

Instrument	Section	Valid Item	Invalid Item	Total
Household Questionnaire (HHQ)	A	6	2	8
	B	32	8	40
	C	9	3	12
	D	7	1	8
	Total	54	14	68
Interview Guides (IG)	A	0	0	0
	B	5	1	6
	C	4	0	4
	D	3	0	3
	Total	12	1	13
FGD Guides (FG)	A	0	0	0
	B	5	1	6

C	4	0	4
D	3	0	3
Total	**12**	**1**	**13**

Source: Pilot Survey Results, 2020

$$\text{CVI (HHQ)} = \frac{53}{68} = 0.7794 \qquad \text{CVI (FG)} = \frac{12}{13} = 0.9231$$

$$\text{CVI (IG)} = \frac{12}{13} = 0.9231$$

According to Polit *et al.* (2007) data collection instruments are deemed to be valid if the CVI is above 0.70. In this regard, the household questionnaire was valid by 0.7794 (77.94%) while interview guides and the FGD guides were valid by 0.9231 (92.31%). Therefore, all three data collection instruments were valid since they surpassed the recommended 0.70 range.

Data collection was done by the researcher and research assistants. Two research assistants, who were familiar with the study area were recruited. The research assistants were University graduates who were familiar with the research process and were also fluent in the local languages. They were trained for a period of one week by the researcher.

3.7 Reliability of data collection instruments

An instrument is considered reliable when presented to the same respondents at varying periods and the resultant responses are similar (Scotto, 2016). In this study, the reliability of the research instruments were established using Cronbach Alpha Coefficient (CAC) analysis. The reliability test covered computable responses to the research items of the

pilot study instruments particularly the questionnaire and interview guide. According to the SPSS reliability test, CAC for the questionnaire was 0.955 while that of the interview guide was 0.946. Similarly, a research instrument is reliable if it is within the recommended range of 0.7- 1.0 (Weiner, 2007).

3.8 Data analysis and presentation

3.8.1 Analysis and Presentation of Quantitative Data

Quantitative, data was processed using the Statistical Packages for Social Scientists (SPSS) version 25.0. SPSS was used to generate descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics was in the form of percentages and frequencies and the inferential analysis included Pearson's Product Moment Correlation Coefficient (PPMCC). Pearson's Correlation Coefficient Analysis was used to generate a 2-tail Bivariate Pearson's correlations tables from the SPSS data set. The statistics included correlation coefficients (r) and probability values (p- values) or significance indices, for analysis and interpretation of both positive and inverse (negative) covariance.

Pearson's Correlation co-efficient value (r) varies between +1 and -1, where +1 is a perfect positive correlation, and -1 is a perfect negative correlation. 0 means there is no linear correlation at all. The strength of relationship can be anywhere between -1 and $+1$. The stronger the correlation, the closer the correlation coefficient comes to ±1. If the coefficient is a positive number, the variables are directly related (i.e., as the value of one variable goes up, the value of the other also tends to do so). If, on the other hand, the coefficient is a negative number, the variables are inversely related (i.e., as the value of one variable goes up, the value of the other tends to go down) (Swinscow & Campbell,

2002). Any other form of relationship between two continuous variables that is not linear is not correlation in statistical terms. The study was also interested in the 2-tailed significance value, with the standard Alpha value (P-value) being set at 0.05. The P-value showed the level of significance of the Pearson correlations (r). The findings were then presented inform of charts, graphs and tables.

3.8.2 Analysis and Presentation of Qualitative Data

Qualitative analysis was used for the interview and focus group discussion findings. The data included responses to the open-ended questions in the interview and focus group discussion guides. The analysis was done using content and interpretive analysis method to give in-depth and comprehensive descriptions and the related implications of research findings. Data was be transcribed before coding into categories, organised according to the respective research items reflecting the study objectives. The themes were separately structured based on the objectives. Generalization of the analysed data was subsequently made and results presented in narrative form as well as through verbatim quotation of respondents.

3.9 Limitations of the Study

Conflict is a sensitive subject of discussion in the area, considering that this research was carried out in a volatile multi-ethnic area. The sensitivity of the conflict issues is likely to challenge of getting information as the intention of the researcher was not clear the respondents. To deal with this problem, the researcher had a letter of introduction from the University and local administration to assure the respondents that the study is strictly for academic purposes. Additionally, the researcher had a research permit from NACOSTI to assure the respondents of the purpose of the research. At the village level,

the researcher and research assistants were accompanied by local village elders to gain psychological access of the respondents making them to willingly give information.

Language barrier was another limitation of the study which could be attributed to the fact that the study involved interviewing elderly people as well as people in the villages who were not conversant with interviews in English. To counter this shortfall, the researcher utilised the services of research assistants who were conversant with the local languages as well as the Kiswahili language. Additionally, all interviews were audio recorded and transcribed into English by the researcher and research assistants.

During data collection, security of the research team was a concern considering that the research was being conducted at a time when tension was high in the region due to the political environment of brough about by the building Bridges initatitive, the Huster-Dynasty Politics and the build-up to the 2022 elections. The researcher therefore informed the office of the county commissioner and the Office of the county governor about the ongoing research for security reasons. The researcher also reported to

3.10. Ethical Considerations

To ensure the study conforms to ethical requirements, the researcher acquired permission to conduct research from the University and other relevant bodies. The process of data collection was done on voluntary basis. None of the respondents were compelled to provide information they are were not willing to give. Respondents were encouraged to provide information freely and in good faith to the researcher on the basis that confidentiality of their views was guaranteed. The permission to conduct research was obtained from the National Commission of Science, Technology and Innovation and the local administration after the proposal had been approved and accepted by the Directorate of Postgraduate Studies (DPS) of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology.

All academic work and publications used in this research have been acknowledged to avoid plagiarism.

CHAPTER FOUR

NATURE OF HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY

This chapter present findings in line with the first objective of the study. The researcher analysed, presented, interpreted and discussed findings on the nature of horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County. The chapter covered aspscts of questionnaire return rate, demographic characteristsics and the nature of Horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County. The chapter also has a chapter summary.

4.1 Questionnaire Return Rate

The study was conducted in Uasin Gishu County and self-administered, structured questionnaires were used in the study. The total sample size for Household heads was 384. Therefore, the researcher administered 384 questionnaires, out of which 375 were returned, representing a 97.7% return rate. According to Saldivar (2012), person-person surveys with a response rate of 80-85% are considered good and thus considered sufficiently informative in a study. Therefore, this is an indication that the questionnaire return rate of 97.7% is sufficiently representative and as such can be used to draw biding conclusions in the current study.

4.2 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY

4.2 .1 Ethnic Composition of Household Heads in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish the ethnic composition of household heads in Uasin Gishu County. The findings of the study revealed that 70 (18.7%) were Kikuyu; 121 (32.3%) were Kalenjin; 30 (8.0%) were Kisii; 52 (13.9%) were Luo; 67 (17.9%) were Luhya; 14 (3.7%) were Kamba; 1 (0.3) was Teso; 2 (0.5%) were Maasai; 1 (0.3) was Turkana; 5

(1.3%) were Meru; 1 (0.3%) was Mijikenda 1 (0.3%); 1 (0.3%) was Somali and 10 (2.7%) were from other ethnic groups in Kenya. The findings are as shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4. 1: Ethnic Composition of Household heads in Uasin Gishu County

Ethnic Group	Frequency	Percentage
Kikuyu	70	18.7
Kalenjin	121	32.3
Kisii	30	8.0
Luo	52	13.9
Luhya	67	17.9
Kamba	14	3.7
Teso	1	0.3
Maasai	2	0.5
Turkana	1	0.3
Meru	5	1.3
Mijikenda	1	0.3
Somali	1	0.3
Others	10	2.7
Total	**375**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data, 2021

The study, therefore, noted that Uasin Gishu County was Cosmopolitan and had various ethnic groups from all parts of Kenya. An indicator of diversity within the urban county of Uasin Gishu.   It was also important to note that the ethnic composition of households in the county had a role to play in regard to catalyzing ethnic conflicts as reported in 1992, 1992 and 2008.

Globally, incidences of diversity and ethnic conflicts have been a major concern, with various parts of the world facing the challenge of increased incidences of conflicts. There has also been a concern that diversity can create conditions for ethnic conflicts. For instance India's two states with the highest degree of ethnolinguistic diversity namely Nagaland and Himachal Pradesh, Eberle *et al*. (2020), reported that these two states are in

the top 3% of diversity and in the top 6% of conflict incidence (1975–2015) across provinces worldwide.

Uasin Gishu County is one of the counties that are considered to be urban counties with its headquarters of Eldoret ranking fifth interms of urban population in Kenya (KNBS, 2020). Therefore establishing the ethnic composition was important in establishing how urbanization influenced horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflicts ethnically diverse areas. The study established that inequalities within the county were clear based social and economic status. There existed social classes that was demarcated by the estates where people lived in the town. For example Langas Estate which is a major slum in Eldoret town was mainly made up of the urban poor whereas Elgon View estate was made up of the rich within the town. Interestingly, incidents of violence and ethnic conflict were more prominent within the poor neighborhoods like Langas as compared to the areas where the rich people lived like Elgon view. This was in indictor that poverty exacerbated the conflict situation within Uasin Gishu County with the urban poor from mobilizing within their ethnic groups and ganging up against rival ethnic groups. In this regard, perceptions of horizontal inequalities were more prominent among the poor as compared to the rich in the county.

The situation was always worsened by politics in the county. Local politicians often concentrated their campaigns in the slum areas and rural parts of the county where majority of the voters dwell. The study established that voter mobilization within the county was based on ethnic polarization with the political players contributing to voter threats and intimidation. For example in the run up to the 2022 general elections several

incidences were reported of voter threats and intimidation in various parts of the county with leaflets being distributed in some parts of the county targeted certain ethnic groups.

> According to a police report, on 3rd January, 2021, Mau Kipkaren village elder Tanui raised the alarm over threatening leaflets dropped at the village. The leaflets, with the message written in Kiswahili, warned "outsiders" from other ethnic communities to leave farms immediately .It went on to say, "*Kipkaren iko na wenyewe* (Kipkaren has its owners)."(Star News Paper, 3rd January, 2021)

The leaflets further stated that:

> *Na yale mashamba yumeyaweka fence pia aguse aone moto. Hii ni 2021 hatutaki madoadoa Kipkaren* (Even the farms that have been fenced - try touching them and you will see. This is 2021 and we don't want outsiders in Kipkaren)(Star News Paper, 3rd January, 2021).

The issue of leaflets was confirmed by the Uasin Gishu NSC coordinator who indicated that it was common to hear about people waking up to cases of leaflets in the county especially when elections were nearing. She indicated that negative ethnicity has in some instances contributed to tension between ethnic groups in the area with some unscrupulous people taking advantage to make the situation worse by use of tactics like dropping of leaflets to threaten some ethnic groups.

In further support of this issues CJPC coordinator indicated that it is not only local politicians who were involved in creating ethnic tension in the area, he also indicated that property brokers where active participants in creating an environment filled by ethnic tension especially in areas where there was diversity of ethnic groups mainly within urban and sub-urban areas. He further stated that these property brokers would facilitate some rowdy youths from the dominant ethnic group to go around threatening the so

called "non-locals" with the aim of forcing these people to sell properties at a throw away price so that they would buy and later sell the same property at high cost.

From the foregoing therefore it's clear that there was a myriad of factors and players that influenced ethnic tension and conflict in the county with resources, politics and ethnicity being at the center of it. The fact that Eldoret town at the center of the county was a major town even made the situation more complex because of the diversity it presented.

4.2.2 Age Distribution of Household Heads in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish the composition of household heads based on gender. The findings of the study revealed that out of the 375 household heads 58 (15.5%) were aged 18-21 years; 224 (59.9%) were aged 22-35 years; 77 (20.5%) were aged 35-55 years; 14 (3.7%) were aged 55-75 years and 2 (0.5%) were aged above 75 Years. The results are shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4. 2: Age Distribution of Household Heads in Uasin Gishu County

Age	Frequency	Percentage
18-21 Years	58	15.5
22-35 Years	224	59.7
35-55 Years	77	20.5
55-75 Years	14	3.7
Above 75 Years	2	0.5
Total	375	100.0

Source: Field Data, 2021

In this study, getting to understand the age distribution was an important factor to consider in order understand which is the most active age group and factors that could be predisposing them to conflicts. The study findings therefore affirmed that the majority of the household heads were aged 22-35 years representing 224 (59.9%) of the household heads.   This implies that the majority of these respondents could be categorized as youthful. In fact this number if added to the age category of 18-21 years then it translates cumulatively to 75.4% of the total household heads. According to the African Union, Youth Charter, a youth or young person is described as a person between the ages of 15-35 years of age (African Youth Charter, 2006). The UN Habitat youth fund further gives the definition of youth as persons between the ages of 15-32 years (Agenda 21). In this regard, its important to note that there is youth bulge in the county of Uasin Gishu when linked to factors of horizontal inequalities could have a direct implication of conflicts.

Having a relatively young population (below age of 35) can create some great benefits to a society especially if the young population is involved in the labor market and contribute to socio-economic development. On the flipside however, a relatively youthful population without skills, training and/or proper income could be major players in political violence. It is assumed that that the youth bulge increases the risk of armed violence and such risk is mediated by the effect of two factors; structural conditions and social agency of young people.

Social injustice has become one of the major risks factors for violence especially for people especially of the productive ages (the those with defendants) in this regard therefore structural problems create institutions or processes that create or assist in maintaining institutionalized and patterned systems of inequality and exclusion. There

are institutions or practices of doing things that promotes inequality, marginalisation, exclusion and injustices, which blocks certain groups from fulfilling their potential or discriminate against them and constrain them from exercising their citizenship. Such systems are not natural but socially constructed historically

Horizontal inequalities affect all categories of the population. The youths being the majority may react violently to grievances stemming from inequalities. However, the older members of the society can also be active players in ethnic conflicts that are instigated by the Horizontal inequalities. As one member of the FGD posited:

> How would you feel if you son or daughter who you struggled to educate denied opportunities simply because he or she is from the wrong ethnic group? (Youth FGD participant at Catholic Diocese of Eldoret Compound on August 1, 2021).

Youth bulge has been viewed as one of those factors that exacerbates conflicts. In areas where youths are empowered then youth bulge may not be as problematic as it would be where the youths are put a point of disadvantage. Therefore Youth bulge has both advantages and disadvantages. Demographic dividends can be achieved when a country enjoys the benefits of a youthful population which is absorbed into the labour market and contributes to socio-economic. Youth often play an important role in political violence and the presence of a 'youth bulge' has been linked with political crisis especially in areas where wealth resource allocation and distribution of positions in the society disproportionately affect the youths.

According to world development report (2007) 'Youth bulge' discourse in the sphere of conflict situations is often mistakenly understood as a cause-effect relationship, when it is better described as a correlation mediated by the impact of several intervening

variables. In other words, it assumed that the youth bulge increases the risk of armed violence and such risk is mediated by the effect of two factors; structural conditions and social agency of young people. Structural conditions, similar to structural violence, refer to institutions or processes that create or assist in maintaining institutionalized and patterned systems of inequality and exclusion. There are institutions or practices of doing things that promotes inequality, marginalisation, exclusion and injustices, which blocks certain groups from fulfilling their potential or discriminate against them and constrain them from exercising their citizenship. Such systems are not natural but socially constructed historically.

Horizontal inequalities could transcend generations thereby affecting all the ages of a particular ethnic group, however, youths being the most active members of the community could take matters a notch higher as away of doing what the previous generations might have failed to do. In Uasin Gishu County, the youths have often been associated with violent clashes with the issues of historical land injustices becoming serious areas of discussion among the dorminant Kalenjin group in the area. In an interview one religious leader reiterated that:

> The question of land buying company that were brought by late President Mzee Kenyatta and allowed Kikuyus to acquire large tracks of ancestral land that the Kalenjin community believe belong to them has remained of the biggest threat to peace in this county. Any small trigger to conflicts between these two communities always boil down to the land issue (Interview with Religious leader from Inter-Faith Council of Kenya at Wagon Hotel on August 3, 2021).

The general belief that specific areas belong to specific ethnic groups has exacerbated the conflict situation over land. This belief has been passed from across generations thereby creating a situation in which young people from specific ethnic groups feel like people

from outside the community have stolen their future hence high possibility for violence if triigered by political factors. This is what Oyugi (1997), described as the notion of 'a people's own area' which resulted from the formal politico-administrative enclaves. Arusei, *et al* (2019) argue that this enclaves have led to the heightening of ethnic self-identity or sense of belonging, this process created a sense of exclusiveness which sooner or later manifested itself in the rejection of 'outsiders'. This resulted into heightened tension especially during the ushering in of multi-party democracy (Oyugi, 1997).That transition created hatred contributing to self-identity resulting to rejection of those seen to be intruders in other people's land.

The effects of horizontal inequalities vary especially in the way it affects specific age groups. For people of school going age, horizontal inequalities could deny them a chance at getting proper education and as such when they get to their product ages as youths they lack marketable and for those with skills they may feel disenfranchised when denied opportunities. The older generations could also be disgruntled and be part of the incitement to violence based on the challenges they have faced as a community and also based on what the younger generation (their children) are going through. All these factors put together could create strong grounds for ethnic mobilization and incitement to violence in across ethnic groups.

The findings of this study were in agreement with Feseha (2018) who opines that when there is poor governance and weak social and political systems, complaints, disagreements and rivalry for resources are more likely to become violent. For example, an expanding corpus of works explains the Arab Spring and the expansion of religious

extremist movements in the Middle East through demographic shifts and the youth bulges. This is the contrast in strong governance settings with healthy political and social systems, incompatible interests are managed and ways found for various groups to pursue their goals peacefully. This the case with countries like Malawi, Zambia and Botswana where states with a relatively high youth bulge are free from armed conflict. It can also be argued that youth bulge presents a 'demographic window of opportunity' if it is backed by economic opportunities in countries like China, South Korea and Japan.

Trends such as mass urbanization, growth in diasporas and disruptive climate change could interact destructively with youth bulges, as traditional social and economic patterns are disrupted. But not necessarily, For example, one recent study on youth bulges and urbanization notes that young people migrating from the countryside to the cities could lead to greater inclusion as the urban centers afford more potential for earning income (Urdal & Hoelscher, 2009). Likewise, the triggers that set off most crises— elections, assassinations, legislative acts.

Indeed, it has been duly noted that youth bulges may not only make conflict more desirable to some, but also more feasible (Collier 2007; Fearon & Laitin 2003). Beyond simply fermenting discontent, widespread unemployment matters. Militias and terrorist groups, however, can offer immediate economic benefits in the form of looting, patronage or payment. Even in extremist groups, where the leadership is typically well-off and educated, the vast majority of new recruits are low-to-middle class young men between the ages of 15 and 29 (USAID, 2005). On the issue of feasibility, young people may simply be more impressionable; this implicit logic underwrites many conflict resolution programs that hope to instill positive values and attitudes in youth "before it is

too late." Unfortunately, if this is true, it also suggests that extremist groups may also be able to catch recruits while they're young. Peer influence appears to exert a strong influence on young people who join terrorist groups, for instance (USAID 2005).

4.2.3 Gender of Household Heads in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish the gender composition of household heads in Uasin Gishu County. The findings revealed that 212 (56.4%) of the household heads were male and 163 (43.5%) of the household heads were female.

Figure 4. 1: Gender of household heads

Source: Data, 2021

Gender is an important factor in the study of horizontal inequalities for several reasons, first and foremost, according to Sustainable development Goals (SDG-5) gender equality is not only a fundamental human right, but a necessary foundation for a peaceful,

prosperous and sustainable world, Therefore, inequalities among socially defined groups could disrupt peace and be a major cause for ethnic conflicts. This is because these inequalities affect individuals belonging to specific underprivileged ethnic groups disproportionately as compared to the privileged ethnicities. The issues of inequalities get even more complex within the underprivileged groups because the inequalities among men and women even within the underprepared ethnic groups is also disproportionate with women always bearing the brunt of these inequalities considering the patriarchal nature among the major communities living in Uasin Gushu County. Gender inequality manifests itself through inequalities in education and scholarship, employment, political representation and appointments among other factors. All these factors combined with horizontal factors could lead to an unbalanced and unfair society in which one gender apart from suffering from factors of horizontal inequalities could suffer from the double tragedy of both horizontal and gender inequalities.

Within the realm of horizontal inequalities, one form of inequality that has a great impact on gender is social inequality with factors like education and economic inequalities being the most important factors that exacerbate gender inequality. Several factors are attributed to gender based horizontal inequalities.

First and foremost inequality in education could make gender inequality worse especially if the one gender underprivileged with regards to education. Education based gender inequality can be attributed a myriad of factors among them poverty and the traditional views on the education of girls.

The poverty stricken individuals possess this viewpoint that acquisition of education is of utmost significance in sustaining one's living conditions. Hence, they aspire to get their

sons enrolled in schools. They possess this viewpoint that education should be provided to the sons, so they are able to get engaged in good employment opportunities in future. Whereas, girls are trained in terms of performance of household responsibilities and minor jobs to earn some income to support their families. For instance, when parents are engaged in production of items, then they encourage their children, both boys and girls to assist them in production and sales. The boys are required to get engaged in this job after school hours (Kapur, 2019). The girls are usually discouraged from acquisition of education, due to limited financial resources. Their male siblings teach them, what they have learned in schools, primarily to enhance their basic literacy skills of reading, writing and numeracy.

The individuals and communities usually possessed traditional viewpoints regarding the education of girls. Particularly, when they possessed limited financial resources, then they believed that these resources should be saved for marriage of their girls and should not be spent on education. Another viewpoint was that in marital homes, girls would not be able to utilize their educational skills and would primarily have to implement the household responsibilities. Taking this aspect into consideration, from the initial stage, they train their girls regarding the implementation of household responsibilities. In the past period, girls and women were merely confined within their homes and not allowed to participate in any social functions or events. They were not allowed to express their viewpoints and perspectives in the decision making matters. They primarily sustained their living conditions on the income earned by men and were meant to obey the decisions and rules formulated by them. Hence, due to the prevalence of traditional

viewpoints, they were discriminated against and were deprived of certain rights and opportunities.

The acquisition of education of girls, is usually affected by traditional practices associated with adolescence. In some rural communities, prevalence of certain traditional practices prove to be hindrances within the course of acquisition of education on the part of the girls (Linda, 2014). Due to the prevalence of traditional viewpoints and perspectives, girls are not only deprived from acquisition of education, but also in attaining self-independence. In other words, these are barriers within the course of attainment of empowerment opportunities. Therefore, for bringing about empowerment opportunities among women and girls, it is necessary to bring about transformations in traditional viewpoints and give equal rights and opportunities to women and girls.

According to Kılınç *et al* (2018) Ethnic conflict exacerbates gender inequality in education and economic development different ways. First, violence reinforces traditional societal patriarchal structures. Second, ethnic conflict inhibits the diffusion of national economic development that could ameliorate patriarchy's effects in the conflict-ridden regions and thirdly, the fear of cultural assimilation might lead parents not to send their children to school, however, political mobilization could undermine traditional patriarchal relations and promote a national identity, unintentionally contributing to some level of gender equity in education. A number of scholars point to socio-economic marginalization as the explanation for the low educational attainment and empowerment for women and girls. Language and ethnicity differences minority and relatively deprived groups is a significant source of marginalization in education and economic

empowerment. Cultural patterns and patriarchal social structure is also viewed as key to understanding the low level of women's empowerment.

Relatively privileged groups *vis-à-vis* relatively deprived groups therefore have different set of challenges when it come to horizontal inequalities based on gender inequality. For the relatively privileged, the impacts of inequalities may affect women based on the patriarchal nature of the society but still the fact that one's ethnic groups have a favorable position would make the situation relatively friendly even to the women fron the relatively privileged groups as compared to those from the relatively deprived. In the case of the relatively deprived, it's a double tragedy of both horizontal inequalities and gender inequality with the underprepared gender namely women facing the the challenge of deprivation not only from the point of their ethnic affiliation but also based on gender.

In the situations of the ethnic conflict, the gender question become even more complex, for as argued by Lori Heise (2011)who opined that the discriminatory attitudes toward women and girls which underlie gender inequality are the most consistent predictor of the use of violence by men against women and girls. Although violence against women is with some exceptions not usually "organized", its pervasive nature, the targeting of a specific social group and the widespread failure of states to prevent and respond to it arguably make it systemic, placing it within the scope of "organized violence". There is considerable evidence that gender inequality – in the form of social, economic, legal and political inequalities – is a root cause of violence against women (UK DfID, 2012; UN Women, 2012). For example Heise (2011) found access to social services has fuelled inter-group hostility in Kosovo; gender inequality has perpetuated violence against women in Melanesia; political exclusion has underpinned destabilizing protests and

violence in Yemen; and unequal security and justice provision has deepened conflict divides in many countries across Africa and South and Central Asia. All these factors related to horizontal inequalities have a disproportionate effect on women based in this evidence.

The patriarchal gender roles, which lie at the heart of gender inequality, can also fuel armed conflict within and among communities. According to Saferworld (2012) participatory conflict analysis in South Sudan, cultural notions of masculinity, in which gun ownership and participation in cattle-raiding are seen as a rite of passage for adolescent boys and key part of being men, are fuelling cycles of violence between communities. This is further exacerbated by early marriage and rising bride prices – practices which are the result of discrimination against women and girls. This phenomenon – perpetuated by women's disempowerment, lack of education and customary marriage practices – in turn perpetuates and deepens conflicts by locking communities into cycles of revenge (Saferworld, 2012). There is emerging evidence that a high prevalence of violence against women within societies may be a structural cause or enabling factor for armed conflict and instability at the national level (Hudson, Ballif-Spanvill, Caprioli, McDermott & Emmett, 2009). Various possible explanations exist as to why the normalization of violence at the micro level may make violence more likely at the national level (Carpenter, 2006). While women are undoubtedly negatively-affected by violence, research indicates that at the global level, male homicide rates are roughly double female rates. At the national level in poor settings, the ratio can be even more extreme (Brender & Muggah, 2012). Conflict and violence also impact boys and men in numerous detrimental ways, including through forced military recruitment and

underpinning violent concepts of masculinity. Often, sexual violence against men and boys in conflict situations may be overlooked. While it is not always conceptualized as such, gender-based violence against men and boys, including sex-selective massacre, forced recruitment as combatants and sexual violence also increase during times of conflict (Carpenter, 2006). Because this violence is based on traditional, patriarchal notions of the role of men and boys within societies, it is closely connected with gender inequality.

4.2.4 Marital Status of the Household heads in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish the marital status of household heads in Uasin Gishu County. The findings revealed that out of the 375 household heads who responded to the questionnaires, 209 (55.7%) were single; 152 (40.5%) were married; 8 (2.1%) were divorced/separated and 6 (1.6%) were widowed.

Figure 4. 2: Marital Status of household heads

Source: Field Data, 2021

The findings indicate that more people are single as compared to those who are married. This can be attributed to a variety of factors. First people choose to remain single the fact that they have not found a suitable marital partner in the cosmopolitan setting of the county. This could be the case because of ethnic mistrust among communities, that makes it difficult for one to marry from another ethnic group due to the fear of the unknown. Therefore in this regard one would either marry from his or her own ethic group or choose to remain single to avoid dealing with the consequences of marrying from another ethnic group in the event of violent conflicts triggered by political differences between ethnic groups. The study revealed that ethnic groups living in the county had specific attitudes towards one another which generally impacted on the way communities would relate whenever tension arose from the political class. Marital status is an important factor for study of horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflicts due to the fact that conflicts based on horizontal inequalities have an impact on family which is considered the basic social unit. It is through marriage that families are created and any disruptions caused by conflicts, especially ethnic conflicts anchored on horizontal inequalities, could have long standing impacts on the cohesion of the communities in cosmopolitan areas like Uasin Gishu county. This can be evidenced by past incidences of conflicts that led to massive violence and destroyed marriages and families.

According to Witness accounts given to Waki Report, the 2007 post-election violence had specific impacts on marriages in Uasin Gishu County with violence being meted on the so-called "outsiders" who were mainly non-Kalenjins, many of who were married to

Kalenjins. For example, a Kisii woman who has been married to a Kalenjin man for more than 20 years, and whose marriage survived severe pressure imposed by the post election violence, informed the Commission that through every-day interaction with Kalenjin people, it became clear to her that they expected that, as a result of the enforcement of *majimbo*, other communities would have to leave the Rift Valley, and that this included people like her, who were non-Kalenjin married to the Kalenjin. According to the witness "they were saying nobody should be left there who is not born into the Kalenjin" (Waki Report, 2009). Such incidences show the gravity of ethnic conflicts on marriages and how far this could go into creating disunity among various ethnicities.

The consequences of ethnic conflicts on marriage in Kenya were exemplified by Nyikuri (1997) who indicated that the clashes in Kenya demonstrated the potential and real consequences of conflict on inter-ethnic marriage, family and social life. According to the study conducted by Nyikuri in different parts of Kenya that were affected by conflicts since 1992, there were cases of breakdown of marriage and family life. Inter-ethnic marriage between the Luhya (i.e. especially the Bukusu) and the Sabaot, Iteso and Sabaot, Kalenjin and Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo were viewed with fear and suspicion. This was one of the far-reaching social consequences of the clashes which also created mistrust, prejudice and psychological trauma characterized by mental anguish and general apathy, among the various ethnic groups in Kenya. This negative tendency contradicted the view that the conflicting ethnic communities have co-existed and inter-married for several decades

When conflicts occur based on the horizontal inequalities people from the perceived relatively privileged groups could easily become a target for violence even within the

family context. Different political opinions between a husband and wife or among in laws or even within the community could easily create a situation where one would be attacked not because they are responsible for any perceived inequality but due to their perceived association with the relatively privileged group that the relatively deprived group is blaming for their woes. According to US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration services (2000) the effects of ethnic conflicts in the context of marriages were seen during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda where societal attitudes were subject to fluctuations and there were reports of Hutus killing their Tutsi spouses during the genocide. This was a situation that had been perpetuated by government-related campaigns including a 1990, government-sponsored publication named any Muhutu (Hutu) who married a Tutsi a traitor. As late as 1996, there were reports that Tutsi men married to Hutu women were threatened by their Tutsi family members and driven off of their land. These torments, along with the reintegration of refugees and the insurgence of former FAR and *Interahamwe* members into society's folds, made ethnic reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi difficult, further jeopardizing an opportunity for stability in Rwanda. McCoy, (2008) averred that he genocide in Rwanda was the result of deep and systemic horizontal inequalities within the political, economic and military sectors of society. The inequalities were suffered by both 'identities' and resulted in widespread violence against both Hutu and Tutsi. These inequalities and the thirst for power, coupled with systemic social and economic insecurity, bred extremism which resulted in one of the most efficient and most deadly violent outbreaks of the modern era.

The complexities relating horizontal inequalities and marriage can also be attributed to the different the attitudes of relatively deprived and relatively privileged groups towards

inter-ethnic marriage. To bring this into perspective, McDoom, Omar Shahabudin in his 2016 publication titled *Horizontal inequality, status optimization, and interethnic marriage in a conflict-affected society* argued that although several theories of interethnic conflict emphasize ties across group boundaries as conducive to ethnic coexistence, little is known about how such ties are formed. Given their integrative potential, he examines the establishment of cross-ethnic marital ties in a deeply divided society and asked what drives individuals to defy powerful social norms and sanctions and to choose life partners from across the divide. He further theorized such choices as the outcome of a struggle between social forces and individual autonomy in society. In the study, he identified two channels through which social forces weaken and individual autonomy increases to allow ethnic group members to establish ties independently of group pressures: elite autonomy and status equalization. First he found that as an individual's educational status increases, and second, as between-group inequality declines, individuals enjoy greater freedom in the choice of their social ties. However, he also found that in an ethnically ranked society, this enhanced autonomy is exercised by members of high-ranked and low-ranked groups differently. Members from high-ranked groups become more likely to in-marry; low-ranked group members to out-marry. This means that a status-optimization logic lies behind this divergent behaviour. Ethnic elites from high-ranked groups cannot improve their status throughout marriage and their co-ethnics, threatened by the rising status of the lower-ranked group, seek to maintain the distinctiveness of their status superiority through in marriage. In contrast, as their own individual status or their group's relative status improves, members of low-ranked groups take advantage of the opportunity to up-marry into the higher-ranked group. McDoom's findings were based in the context of

Mindanao, a conflict-affected society in the Philippines, using a combination of census micro-data on over two million marriages and in-depth interview data with in-married and out-married couples.

4.2.5 Religion of household heads in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish the religion of the household heads in Uasin Gishu County. The findings revealed that 358 (95.5%) were Christians, 12 (3.2%) were Muslims, 3 (0.8%) were traditionalists and indicated that they were others.

Figure 4. 3: Religion of Household heads

Source: Field Data, 2021

Tenaw (2018) argues that religion touches upon the deepest levels of identity. It can mobilize people for war, but also for lasting peace, in his words religion is a source not only of intolerance, human rights violations, and extremist violence, but also of non-

violent conflict transformation, the defense of human rights, integrity in government, and reconciliation and stability in divided societies.

From the findings of this study, the dominant religion in the study area is Christianity. The residents of Uasin Gishu County congregate in churches to worship despite their ethnic differences and as such it would be assumed that the church would be one unifying factor to this ethnically diverse population. During the interviews one of the Christian priests indicated that

> In the Places worship, there are no ethnicities or classes, we only have worshipers who are equal in eyes of God (Interview with Catholic Priest, at Catholic Diocese of Eldoret, 10th August, 2021)

An assumption would then be made that religion could provide a safe haven for all amid conflicts perpetuated by horizontal inequalities. This assumption was supported by an assertion from one priest who indicated that during the 2007/2008 post-election violence, many of the internally displaced persons were housed in church and particularly the Catholic Sacred Heart Cathedral in Eldoret town. The Church housed people from all denominations and all ethnicities including non-Catholics who were running away ethnic persecution which was a characteristic of the 2007/2008 post election violence. On the flipside, however, some of the houses of proved to be dangerous places to seek shelter for instance, one of the most horrendous incidents associated with electoral violence in Kenya's post-independence history occurred in a church in Kiambaa area of Uasin Gishu County. The massacre at the Kenya Assemblies of God Pentecostal Church in Kiambaa Uasin Gishu County, claimed the lives of at least 40 people who had sheltered in the church following the grim situation caused by the politically instigated ethnic conflict that rocked the nation after the declaration of the 2007 presidential electoral results.

These two incidences confirm the double age role of places of worship as safe haven for those facing persecution and as a dangerous place to seek shelter when ethnic tension flare-up.

The convergence between religious and ethnic identity is exemplified by Adelana & Osifo (2020) through their study titled *Ethno-religious issues and electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa: the cases of Nigeria and Kenya* in which they opined that that Religious identity differences have permeated Kenya's ethnic discourse as religious leaders openly enter into political alignments during election periods and there is an emerging tendency for regional and religious arguments to assume ethnic alignments. These acts by religious leaders have made religious leaders lose trust of many people who view men of the cloth as those who have picked political sides and who use their podiums to further ethnic based political narrative. In this regard, many religious leaders have lost credibility in the eyes of members of the public and as such, the religious leaders have been seen as people who either tolerate or perpetuate social injustice by supporting relative deprivation against those who feel that they have been marginalized, socially, economically and politically.

4.2.6 Educational Attainment of Household heads in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish the level of education among household heads in Uasin Gishu County. The findings revaled that 5 (1.3%) did not have any Education, 3 (0.8%) had non-formal education, 6 (1.6%) dropped out of primary school, 9 (2.4%) completed primary education but did not proceed to the next level, 7 (1.9%) had droped out of seconadry school, 75 (20%) completed secondary school, 190 (50.7%) had college level/ tertiary education and 80 (21.3%) had university education.

Figure 4. 4: Educational Attainments of Household Heads

Source: Field Data, 2021

Langer & Kuppens (2019) argue that educational HIs can clearly cause severe grievances by themselves. From a conflict or mobilisation perspective, it is important to note that group grievances caused by severe educational HIs will arguably most acutely be felt by the younger generation in society, because they are the ones most directly negatively affected by these inequalities. Disparities in access to education and educational attainment levels are often used as a proxy for social HIs. These educational inequalities are positively related to the outbreak of civil conflict (Østby, 2008). The likelihood of violent conflict further seems to increase when absolute levels of education are lower (Østby et al., 2009) and, conflict intensity also appears to go up as the gap in schooling

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between rural areas and the urban areas widens (Murshed and Gates, 2005). According to a research FHI 360 Education Policy and Data Center (2015) countries where group differences in educational attainment are high are substantially more likely to experience violent conflict – particularly since the 2000s (FHI 360 EPDC, 2015). These findings suggest that over time exclusion from education has become more consequential.

Langer & Kuppens (2019) further avers that disparities in access to education and/or attainment levels are however just one part of the puzzle. In an effort to meet the Millennium Development Goals, global primary school enrolment levels have overall gone up, suggesting a reduction in inequalities in access to education. Yet, a reduction in overall educational inequalities might well be accompanied by a worsening of group-based inequalities concerning the quality of education. More generally, they argue that applying a HI-perspective to the educational sphere requires going beyond analysing and assessing disparities in access to education and educational attainment levels. While these indicators are extremely important, it is also important to analyse, among other things, whether different groups are included in educational decision-making processes, to what extent different groups are represented among the teachers corps, how different groups are represented in textbooks, to what extent vernacular languages are being recognised as official languages of instruction, and to what extent different groups are able to translate their education into income (i.e. returns to education) and social status in society

Dabla-Norris *et al* (2015) further opined that opined that Education can play an important role in reducing income inequality, as it determines occupational choice, access to jobs, and the level of pay, and plays a pivotal role as a signal of ability and productivity in the job market. From a theoretical perspective, the human capital model of income

distribution suggests that while there is an unambiguously positive association between educational and income inequality, the effect of increased educational attainment on income inequality could be either positive or negative depending on the evolution of rates of return to education (that is, the skill premium). Moreover, there can be opposing forces at play stemming from "composition" (that is, increasing the share of high-wage earners) and "wage compression" (that is, decline in the returns to higher education relative to lower levels) effects. Overall, the evidence suggests that the inequality impact of education depends on various factors, such as the size of education investments by individuals and governments and the rate of return on these investments. It is in this spirit that Rajan (2015) notes that "prosperity seems increasingly unreachable for many, because a good education, which seems to be today's passport to riches, is unaffordable for many in the middle class.

4.3 Nature of Horizontal Inequalities In Uasin Gishu County

4.3.1 Economic Horizontal Inequalities

The study sought to establish the economic Horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County. The findings were as shown in Figure 4.6.

Figure 4. 5: Forms of Economic Inequalities

Source: Field Data, 2021

4.3.2 Inequalities in ownership of Assets

The findings in figure 4.6 revealed that with regard to inequalities in ownership of financial assets 250 (66.7%) agreed that there was massive inequality, 61 (16.3%) did not agree and 64 (17.1%) were not aware of such economic inequalities.

There was unequal distribution of wealth with regards to ownership of assets in the county especially within the cosmopolitan areas where the people from different ethnic groups resided. During the Focus group discussion that were conducted in Langas Slums, the findings of the study revealed that majority of the people who owned rental properties in the area were either from the Kikuyu community or the Kisii community. The Kalenjin community did not own a lot properties within such areas. The fact that many Kikuyus in particular owned a lot of property in the cosmopolitan areas had been a factor for conflict

in the study area due to the fact that some of the places which are dominated by these ethnic groups had names that are attributed to the ethnic group. For example within the outskirts of Eldoret town there are estates like *Yamubi, Munyaka, Kiambaa, Rurigi* and *Kimumu* which are associated with the Kikuyu community. In Langas area, there is *Kisumu Ndogo* which is also mainly associated with the Luo community. Interestingly, the most volatile areas for ethnic conflicts in the Uasin Gushu County were these places where the so called 'outsiders' owned property and lived in large numbers.

One of the elders in the elders indicated during the FGDs stated that;

> We are all residents of this county, many of us were born here and we don't understand why owning a rental property should make us a target of ethnic attack during political seasons. The Kalenjin community has always profiled the Kikuyu community claiming that they were brought here by the government of Mzee Kenyatta which has made us always live in fear of attack (Elder FGD held at the Catholic Diocese of Eldoret Compound on 31/07/2021).

The ownership of assets was also attributed to people being able to run their own businesses within the county. It emerged from the study that there was a lot of discrimination directed towards the people perceived as non-locals whenever they applied for business permits. During an interview by youths in Eldoret town, it emerged that people with names that were perceived to belong to non-Kalenjin ethnic group were particularly frustrated when they tried to the get services from the county government offices. This hindered their ability to successfully acquire wealth that could enable them have assets.

From the FGD is emerged that one could not easily own assets in the town for the fear of losing them assets when political temperature flared. the narrative that non-Kalenjin were not supposed to own assets in the twin was so deeply rooted in the county that people

would take advantage of the situation to create fear with the aim of either making people sell their assets cheaply or abandon the assets entirely. During an interview with the CJPC coordinator, he revealed that there were Real estate brokers who had the habit of paying off youths from the Kalenjin community to threaten non-Kalenjins who owned property in the area with the sole purpose of making people sell of their properties in the area cheaply. The end game for them is to buy the property cheaply when it suits them and sell them off at higher prices when the tension in the area has gone down. Such uncouth acts had been another cause of inter-ethnic tension in the study area and had led to many people trying avoid to own property in the area.

Inequality in the ownership of assets is a major hindrance to economic empowerment because it limits individuals to financial capital that can help one grow economically. In an interview conducted by women at Langas Market, it emerged that, many of the small scale traders could not access loans or other forms of financial help because they did not have collateral for the loans. One of the women further lamented that even government funds like Uwezo fund and youth enterprise funds were not easily accessible. He stated that:

> *Hata kupata hii Pesa pesa ya Uwezo fund yenye inafaa isaidie maskini kama sisi inapeanwa kwa kujuana* (there is corruption involved even in getting Uwezo fund) (FGD Participant) Women's FGD at the New Langas County Market, Kisumu Ndogo on July 31, 2021).

This means that those people without the so called right networks are more likely to suffer and never be able to own any assets because they cannot meet the threshold of either getting bank loans due to lack of collateral or due to lack of networks that could help them get government loans to fund either businesses or other forms of investments. Such people are likely to feel like everything is rigged against them. When such feelings

of disenfranchisement coincide with ethnic feelings of discrimination then ethic groups that feel deprived are likely to mobilize along ethnic lines and cause inter-ethnic conflicts.

This observation was affirmed by one Muslim cleric who indicated that within Uasin Gishu County, much as the county hosts over 40 ethnic communities living in Kenya, the narrative that had often been pushed is that nothing can happen in the county until Kikuyus and Kalenjins 'sit on one table'. The cleric stated that this mentality had let to marginalization of all the other ethnic groups in the area. He reiterated that the importance of all the ethnic groups in the county should not be overlooked because they are all part of the county and contribute to the economy of the county. The cleric further stated that it was important to find away for all the other communities that live in the county to feel like they area treated as part of the county for the sake of peace and for progress of the county. Moreover, inequality can increase as those with higher incomes and assets have a disproportionately larger share of access to finance, serving to further increase the skill premium, and potentially the return to capital (Claessens and Perotti 2007).

Champernowne & Cowell (1998) observed that the distribution of income-generating assets has an impact on income distribution. The distribution of land is particularly used as a proxy for asset distribution because data on the distribution of other income-generating assets, such as bonds and equity, are available for only a limited number of countries. Inequality in the distribution of land is expected to be positively correlated with income inequality for two reasons. First, the distribution of land has a direct impact on the distribution of income in a given time period, particularly in societies where

income from land constitutes a large share of total income. Second, land can be used as collateral for borrowing and investing; therefore, inequitable land distribution limits the ability of the poor to borrow and increase their lifetime income.

Champernowne & Cowell (1998) further observed that High concentration of asset ownership can influence public policy and increase income inequality. In a society where asset ownership is concentrated in a small elite, asset owners can use their wealth to lobby the government for favourable trade policies, including exchange rate, spending programs, and preferential tax treatment of their assets. These policies will result in higher returns to the assets owned by the wealthy and lower returns to the assets owned by the less well-to-do, thereby increasing income inequality. Furthermore, assets can be used as collateral to borrow and invest; therefore, inequality in the ownership of assets will limit the ability of the poor to borrow and increase their lifetime income and will perpetuate poverty and income inequality. In this regard, the relatively privileged groups will most likely benefit at the expense of the relatively deprived thereby creating a conducive environment for group mobilization to ethnic conflicts.

4.3.3 Inequalities in Land Ownership

Regarding inequalities in ownership of land, 231 (61.6%) were in agreement that such inequalities existed, 97 (25.9%) did not agree and 47 (12.5%) were not aware of the land ownership inequalities. The findings were in agreement with the findings from one a religious leaders who indicated that one factor that has always hanged over peace and harmony in the county was the issues of historical Land injustices. He indicated that the Kalenjin community had always felt as though a lot was taken away from them at the time Kenya got its independence under President Mzee Kenyatta. He further explained

that when most of the white settlers where leaving Kenya, Land buying companies were used to acquire the settler farms with total disregard to the local community whose land were taken by these colonial settlers. He further indicated that President Kenyatta's stand of *Hakuna Kitu ya Bure*, meant that the local community had no right over what they termed as ancestral Land. He further stated that the perception by the local community that their ancestral land was taken away from them has always been a reason for ethnic tension in the county.

In another interview, one religious from the Inter-faith council indicated that in as much as Uasin Gishu county is cosmopolitan, ethnicities still view each other as autonomous nations and that one's ethnic affiliation makes them a target of discrimination. He stated that:

> In this county, if you are a Luo, you will be associated with Luo Nyanza, and some people will be daring enough to tell you to go get land in Kisumu or Siaya, if you Kikuyu, people will simply associate you with Nyeri or Kiambu and if you are Kamba you wil be told to go back to Machakos or Kitui. This is the reason why the so called non-locals who won land here sometimes become the target of attacks when political tension run high. Kalenjin majority here feel as though this is their ancestral home and that no other ethnic group should own land here. They always talk of historical land injustices in the Rift valley and this narrative has often been advanced by political leaders as a way to remain politically relevant (Interview with Religius leader from the Inter-faith Council held at Wagon Hotel on August 3, 2021)

In another interview another religious leader stated that;

> At independence Kenyans were not prepared to live together as a nation. The divide and rule tactic that was used by the colonialist left the country divided and our leaders at independence continued the colonial narrative by divided the country further. Land become a major factor of division with many people in the political cycles taking advantage of the value that land had to the people. In the County of Uasin Gishu, since 1992, one of the reasons why the county has always been categorized volatile is due to the land issues in the county. The use of words *Madoadoa* has often been in reference to other ethnic groups acquiring land and inhabiting the

county. The land issues is the mother of all conflicts in the county (Interview with Religius leader from the PCEA church held at PCEA Langas, Eldoret on 11/08/2021)

The findings were in tandem with a study done by Boone (2012) in which she stated that in the late 1960s and 1970s the Kenyatta government also encouraged the formation of private land-buying companies that were often headed by regime notables and politicians. Land-buying companies (LBCs) purchased or leased farms or estates in the former White Highlands from the government, often from the Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT), and then subdivided these holdings among individual (family) shareholders. Many ordinary Kenyan citizens, mostly Kikuyu and Luo, acquired land in the Rift by purchasing shares in the companies.

As Onoma (2008) explains, this process was often very politicized. Boone *et al* (2021) further agued that the government created settlement schemes, and the scheme beneficiaries were selected by government officials and appointees at the district level. The Kenyatta-era settlement schemes were structured by a patronage politics logic of transferring land to government-selected beneficiaries, as well as a logic of state territorialization that involved the segmentation of space to affirm ethnic territories and land entitlements. Boone (2012) also indicated that in the whole of Rift valley political players were at the center of land allocation, she gives an example of Nakuru where the SFT acquired estates and then sold them to land-buying companies headed by high-ranking members of the Kenyatta regime who had often received state financing for this purpose.

The Akiwumi Report (1999) further detailed that Uasin Gishu has a large population of former squatters and workers on European farms who were settled there under the aegis

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of the Commissioner for Squatters. They were more particularly settled on what is now referred to as Kondoo farms, numbered I to IX, which were formerly managed by the Central Agricultural Board. There were also other settlement farms under the aegis of the Settlement Fund Trustees. The various communities settled there between 1963 and 1970. The clashes in the County, especially in the 1990s affected Ainabkoi constituency which is the home of a large population of Kikuyu, among other tribes.

Boone (2012) further elaborates that the land problems in the rift valley could be traced back to colonial period and were made worse by land policies of the first regime of independent Kenya under president Jomo Kenyatta. She avers that the state appropriation and allocation of land in the Rift Valley, starting in 1905, created clear winners and losers. The transition to independence under the Kenyatta regime introduced a clear bias in the allocation of farmland in favor of the core constituencies of the ruling party. Those who claimed these same lands as their ancestral birthright were at the losing end of Kenyatta-era land allocations. What they saw as their birthright was transferred by the government to settlers and immigrants from other parts of Kenya, regime dignitaries, and key allies of the ruling elite. The option of opening the Rift to settlement by "all Kenyans" - that is, to those who could not claim ancestral or precolonial rights to these lands - was bitterly resisted in the 1950s and 1960s by politicians representing those claiming to be indigenous to the Rift. They had argued for restitution of land that had been taken from them by the British. In this regard, Chabeda-Barthe & Haller (2018) therefore opined that the skewed redistribution of land in the Rift Valley, has consequently created tension between three major categories of social actors; the 'so-called pastoralists, such as Kalenjin sub groups, "forest dwellers" such as the Ogiek of

Mau forest and so-called "immigrant guests, such as the Kikuyu ethnic group who traditionally are agriculturalists.

The land question in the County of Uasin Gishu has therefore been major factor for horizontal inequalities because of its association with wealth generation. Agriculture, property development, and all other economic activities are all associated with one being able to own a parcel of land. In this regard, those who own land would defend it will everything they have and those who do not have land would do whatever it takes to acquire land. The County which was predominantly inhabited by the Kalenjin community in pre-colonial Kenya, was made a settlement area by the first Kenyan government of post-colonial, Kenya making it effectively cosmopolitan, however, the land that the local community lost at independence has been a major factor for ethnic tension and conflicts as there has always been a push by the Kalenjin to get back what they still believe is land that was stolen from them by the colonialists and was never returned even at independence.

The other non-Kalenjin communities living within the county bought land that they own but are still viewed as the people who aided the theft of Kalenjin lands and hence the tension associated with ethnic conflicts in the area has often been brought by the imagination that evicting non-Kalenjins from the County, would make the Kalenjins acquire what they lost. The political leaders in the county had been accused of advancing this narrative especially in the run up to the 2007 election which turned to be the most violent Post-election conflict in the history of Independent Kenya. During the ICC proceedings in 2014, an ICC witness accused the then Deputy President William Ruto and former Nandi Hills Member of Parliament Henry Kosgei of inciting Kalenjins to

evict non-Kalenjins from Kalenjin Lands in Uasin Gishu and other parts of the Rift Valley. According to an Article written by Tom Maliti for International Justice Monitor on February 21st 2014, Witness 409 narrated incidences of in which he believed the political leaders were involved in incitement has led to the violence witnessed in the county in 2007/2008. The article reported that;

> According to the Witness when Ruto Spoke in Kalenjin dialect during the 2007 political rallies he asked his fellow Kalenjin to evict Kikuyus, Kisiis, Luhyas, and Luos from the Rift Valley. The Witness gave examples of occasions in which he believed that there were incidences of incitement one at the Nandi Hills stadium rally, the witness said that Ruto said, "*Makimache ketit ne kiibu chumbek*." Which the witness interpreted as "We don't want trees that were brought by the whites." The witness explained that after the rally his interpretation of the sentence was the Kalenjin did not want non-Kalenjins in the Rift Valley. In another incident, witness 409 also said that Ruto told those attending the Nandi Hills stadium rally, "*Makimache ometai suswek kolanda agoi got*." He said that he understood this to mean, "Don't leave the grass to grow into your homes." The witness said that he later understood this to be a reference to non-Kalenjins who had bought land in the Rift Valley. The witness stated that the area Member of Parliament, Henry Kosgey, spoke before Ruto at the Kapchorua rally. He said that Kosgey also spoke in Kalenjin about the trees brought by the whites, but Kosgey also added something else. The witness said Kosgey said, "*Kimache kesich kelyek ab ketit*." The witness translated this to mean the trees should be uprooted (Maliti Thomas: International Justice Monitor February, 21st 2014).

The ICC cases collapsed, however, this witness account is an indication of the feelings and attitudes of the people living in this region when it came to land issues. The tension between the Kalenjin and other ethnic groups in the region has boiled over the years and has been seen through incidences of violence in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1997 and 2007 with the 2013, 2017 and even 2022 with politics always being at the center of the violence.

According to Minorities at Risk Project (2004) titled, *Chronology for Kalenjin in Kenya*, Ethnic clashes that erupted in 1991, started at Meteitei farm in Tinderet, Nandi District,

on the border of Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Western Provinces, when Kalenjin warriors attacked the Luo community. Although the incident began as a land dispute, the fighting had escalated within days. The victims claimed that the attackers intended to expel non-Kalenjins and political opponents from the Rift Valley Province. After the violence broke out, leaflets signed by a group calling itself the Nandi Warriors, were distributed in the area calling on non-Kalenjins to leave the area by December 12 1991. This study therefore avers that Land distribution in the County and across the Rift valley region has been a major source of horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflicts with politics always taking center stage in the land disputes and the ensuing violence. Land ownership is post-colonial Kenya is a problem in the county which has created a lot of animosity between the Kalenjin and Non-Kalenjin communities living in the County.

4.3.4 Inequalities based on Employment Opportunities

The study also sought to find the opinions of the household heads on inequalities based on employment opportunities, the findings revealed that 303 (80.8%) were of the opinion that there were massive inequalities in employment opportunities, 47 (12.5%) were not aware.

Employment was another major aspect of horizontal inequalities in the county. During focus group discussions conducted with the Youths at the Eldoret Cathedral of the Catholic Church, they stated that getting a job in the County was a tall order and only the people from the Nandi sub ethnic group of the Kalenjin community were favored with employment. One of the Youths who was part of the FGD stated that.

> I am a Keiyo, which makes me a Kalenjin and anyone would think that my
> name would give me a job in the county but that is not the case. This jobs
> are only given to people with personal connections to the top county

leadership and most of them are Nandis. In fact some of us Kalenjins suffer more than one would imagine. During campaigns, Governor Mandago once told my sub-ethnic group that *hatutoshi gorogoro* so we can't demand anything from him. This means we cannot be considered for anything in the county (Youth FGD at Catholic Diocese Compund on August 1, 2021)

Another youth in the FGD argued that those who were mainly seen to be deserving of employment opportunities were those from the Kalenjin community. He stated that if you were a non-Kalenjin your chances of getting hired in the county were close to zero because the county officials would simply look at your name and place you in a different county. He stated that he once took an application to the county to be considered for an internship position without success. He later learnt that his papers were not considered because he was a Kikuyu. He went ahead to elaborate that he was convinced that his ethnicity denied him the job based on the way county government employees such as county enforcement officers treat other ethnic groups in Eldoret town. The Young man who was working as a *boda boda* in Eldoret town at the time of the study stated that;

> There have been several incidences whereby boda boda operators have been arrested by these county *Askaris.* Personally I have been a victim several times and we sometimes get arrested for very unjustified reasons. Even with these unjustified reasons yiu can see open discrimination for the *Askaris* whom on several occasion would arrest non Kalenjins but signal the Kalenjins to disappear. The normally speak in their local dialect and tell them *wewe Potea* (disappear from this place). I am convinced that this is the attitude even of people working in offices. They believe other 'tribes' should not work in this county (Youth FGD at Catholic Diocese Compund on August 1, 2021)

During interviews by both the Muslim clerics and the Priests it emerged that one thing that had shown a lot of inequality was the issue of employment. The Muslim cleric for instance indicated that there were people who might have names indicating they belong

to other tribes but they were residents of Uasin Gishu county, born there and everything about their lives is there yet, when came to things like employment opportunities they were treated as aliens. The Christian Priest who was a member of the Inter-faith council of Kenya also stated that employment issues were some complex in the county that one would think it was an ethnic issue but it was not. He indicated that there was a lot of nepotism in the whole employment story. He revealed that the political leaders who were running counties were in the business getting all the benefits for themselves, families and their friends. He further explained that the issues of nepotism in counties was running deep with various political leaders not only in Uasin Gishu but also in using unorthodox means to try and meet the 70:30 county government act requirement. He gave an example by stating that;

> For example if the governor of Uasin Gushu wanted to be seen to have employed a Luhya, to meet the 70:30 threshold he would simply liaise with a governor from one of the county in western Kenya such Bungoma or Kakamega to get one of his own people employed there and then governor from Western would also send one of those people close to him to be employed in Uasin Gishu. This is the trick they use to get the threshold. There is no fairness in the counties, employment is only given to friends and relatives of the county leaders. Even with such tricks the counties are still dominated by one ethnic group (Interview with Religious leader from Inter-faith Council held at Wagon Hotel in Eldoret Town on August 3, 2021).

The same sentiments came from an Interview conducted by an official from the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission who stated that whole issues about ethnic inequality in employment was serious and Uasin Gishu had been flagged as one of the those counties that were not complying with the County governments Act which stipulated that 70% of employees were supposed to be locals while 30% were supposed to be non-locals. The official further stated that the interpretation on who was a local resident of the county was

another controversial issue because to the politicians, the locals were supposed to be Kalenjins yet there were people who had been born the county and since they are either Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo or Kisii among other ethnicities they were treated as non-locals. The CJPC officer went ahead to elaborate that the NCIC findings revealed that over 90% of the county employees were from one ethic group, this was far from the possible 70% from the County Governments Act.

The findings were in tandem with those of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission released in 2016. The report *titled Ethnic and Diversity Audit of the County Public Service* revealed that several counties had not observed the requirement of the County Governments Act (2012). The CG Act (Section 65 1e) requires the County Public Service Board to ensure that at least thirty per cent of the vacant posts at entry level are filled by candidates who are not from the dominant ethnic community in the county. The NCIC (2016) report however found out that the county violent the CGA with regard to new appointments into the County public service board since the inception of the County governments in 2012. The report revealed that 94.4% of the new county appointments by the County public service board were from the Kalenjin community against the CGA requirements. This was also in violation of the Kenyan Constitution 2010 whose Article 232 (1i) (ii) provides for affording adequate and equal opportunities for appointment, training, advancement at all levels of the public service of…the members of all ethnic groups. Articles 10, 56 and 232 of the Kenyan Constitution further advocate diversity and equality of all ethnicities and minority groups in Kenya as part of the national values which the NCIC found to have been violated on matters relating to employment in Uasin Gishu Couny. These articles state as follows:

Article 10 on National Values and Principles of Governance (b) human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, human rights, non-discrimination and protection of the marginalized; Article 56: The State shall put in place affirmative action programmes designed to ensure that minorities and marginalized groups - (c) are provided special opportunities for access to employment; Article 232-The values and principles of public service include-(g) subject to paragraphs (h) and (i), fair competition and merit as the basis of appointments and promotions; (h) representation of Kenya's diverse communities; and (i) affording adequate and equal opportunities for appointment, training and advancement, at all levels of the public service, of- (i) men and women; (ii) the members of all ethnic groups; and (iii) persons with disabilities (Constitution of Kenya, 2010).

Additionally, section 7(1) of the National Cohesion and Integration Act stipulates that all public establishments shall seek to represent the diversity of the people of Kenya in the employment of staff. The NCIC (2016) report indicated that the NCI act had been violated by 32 out of 47 county governments one those counties being them being that of Uasin Gishu. Therefore, there was a clear indication of the national problem of inequality in employment which had been an issue at national level become a problem of devolution.

The findings were in agreement with those of Simson (2019) who opined that Public employment is controlled by politicians and can be used to buy the support of politically influential individuals or groups, he refers to this as political clientelism. Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007) define clientelism as a 'contingent exchange', where a client is rewarded with a public sector job or another benefit in exchange for delivering votes or other forms of political support. Clientelism in Africa is thought to be organised along ethnic lines, as ethnicity provides the trust and social sanctioning mechanisms that enable the exchange. Ethnic leaders use state resources to reward trusted members of their own ethnic groups who will in turn share resources with co-ethnics further down the chain,

creating cascading, ethnically-based patron-client networks (Simson, 2019). Clientelism is expected to lead to a public service staffed by people ill-suited for their official responsibilities and skewed towards politically-influential individuals or groups, be it ethnic or otherwise. The study by Simson revealed the public sector employment in Kenya was highly ethnicized with people from the ethnic community inn power being the majority of government employees. This same trend had been devolved to the counties with the dominant ethnic group which forms the largest voting block taking control in the counties like Uasin Gishu.

4.3.5 Inequalities in Income Levels

The findings of the study revealed that inequalities in income levels was common as supported by 265 (70.7%) of the household heads who agreed that this form of inequality existed as compared to 66 (17.6%) who disagreed and 44 (11.7%) who were not aware. The findings were as indicated in Figure 4.6

In an interview with an officers from the CJPC, due to the difference in income levels there is a lot inequality within the county and this can be seen even from the way the estates are established. For example an Estate like Elgon View is for the *crème de la crème* of the society such that in some parts of such posh estates they do not allow *boda boda* to go to some of those areas since that it's a vehicle for poor people. Past some hours they don't even allow people to walk in the area and in fact in such an estate. There is an argument among the locals that one should either be driving or they don't go to Elgon view. The estate does not even allow *matatus* to ply any route in the area. Therefore this is a clear indication that there is economic segregation in the area showing that the haves and the have nots do not share anything in common.

The Elgon View situation is a sharp contrast to what is happening in Langas slums which hosts majority of the urban poor in the county. Langas is less than 5 kilometres from Elgon view estate yet the security situation in the two places is extremely contrasting. The economic segregation seem to have been accepted by the government based on the way the government treats the security situation. For example, there is a lot of crime in Langas yet the police rarely patrol the area as compared to Elgon view which has police patrol vehicles moving around almost every ten minutes despite the perception that the areas is very safe since people live in gated communities. This is an indication of social stratification in the society which makes it possible for class related conflicts in the area.

The political narrative of the hustlers versus dynasty created a ripe environment for possible class conflicts based. Within the county there was an idea especially among the young people that stealing for the rich would be considered a lesser sin as compared to stealing for your "brother" hustler (the poor people).

People from the poor estates would use phrases like, *kwani ikuchukua ya ma dysnasty, kuna shida gani?* This can be demonstrated by the way criminals are treated in the county. For example if someone steals or commits robbery in Elgon views and runs to hide in Langas they will be protected by the residents but when a person steals from the people living in Langas they will be burnt. The inequality has driven a further wage between the rich and the poor such that even *boda boda* riders consider the rich people "enemies" for example when a *matatu* driver accidentally knocks down a *boda boda* rider, nothing serious really happens, they just negotiate and agree and end the who matter amicably. However, when a *Boda Boda* rider is accidentally knocked down by a person driving a private car, the *Boda Boda* crown normally charges towards the car with

the sole intention of burning down the car. They feel that the driver intentionally knocked down a poor man and as such, he has to be punished by burning down the car he was driving.

However, the whole class conflict idea was complicated by the ethnic nature of the politics in the county. At the time of the study, one of the leading presidential candidates was from the county and his party of UDA which had the slogan of rooting for hustlers was opposed to the handshake side of politics. In this regard, the division was more of a politicized idea that a real economic issue. The hustler narrative took and ethnic tone with those supporting the UDA referring to those who were on the other side of politics as dynasty. One of the women who worked at Langas market stated that she had problems getting a stall in the New Langas that had been built by the county government because of her ethnicity. She said she was once told that the stalls were for hustlers and since the perception was that she belonged to a different political side, it was assumed that she was not a hustler.

The findings further agreed with a study by Bodea & Houle (2021) who opined that high income and wealth inequality between ethnic groups, coupled with within-group homogeneity, increases the salience of ethnicity and solidifies within-group preferences vis-à-vis the preferences of other ethnic groups, increasing the appeal and feasibility of a Coups d'État.

4.3.6 Correlations between Economic Horizontal Inequalities and Experiences of Ethnic Conflicts

The study sought to establish the correlation between the economic horizontal inequalities and the experiences of ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. The findings were as shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4. 3: Correlations between Horizontal Inequalities and Expediencies of Ethnic Conflicts

Correlations

		Experienced Ethnic Conflicts	Ownership of assets	Ownership of Land	Employment opportunities	Income Levels
Experienced Ethnic Conflicts	Pearson Correlation	1	.143**	.126*	.074	.065
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.005	.015	.155	.208
	N	375	375	375	375	375

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Field Data, 2021

In comparing the correlation between inequality in ownership of assets and the experience of ethnic conflicts, there was Pearson Correlation value (*r*) of .143**, with a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.005, which was significant at 0.01. This was an indication that there was a positive significant correlation between ownership of assets

and ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. In this regard inequalities in asset ownership can lead to ethnic conflicts in the county.

The study also compared the correlation between inequality in Land ownership and experience of ethnic conflict in Uasin Gishu County. The findings revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) of 126[*], with a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.015, which was significant at 0.05, therefore, there was a positive significant correlation between Land ownership and ethnic conflicts. Inequalities in Land ownership can therefore lead to ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

The study further compared the correlation between inequality in employment opportunities and experience of ethnic conflicts. The findings revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) of 0.074, with a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.155. p value was larger than 0.05 indicating that there was no statistical significant. In this regard there was a weak positive correlation between employment and ethnic conflicts, however, this relationship was not significant. There is therefore a weak indication that inequality in employment could lead to ethnic conflicts since there no significant relationship between the two variables.

The study further compared the correlation between inequality in income levels and experience of ethnic conflicts. The findings revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) of 0.065, with a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.208, therefore there was a weak positive correlation between income levels and ethnic conflicts, however, this relationship was not significant. Since there is no significant correlations between these variables, it means that inequality in income levels cannot lead to ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

It is therefore apparent from the findings that inequalities in land ownership and inequalities ownership of assets are the two forms of economic inequalities that have a serious implication on the occurrence of ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu. In this regard, any discussion on conflict management in the county must take of land and asset ownership issues if cohesion between the diverse ethnic groups in the county has to be realized.

4.4 Political Horizontal Inequalities in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish forms of political Horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County. The findings are as shown in table 4.4.

Table 4. 4: Political Horizontal Inequalities in Uasin Gishu County

Variable	Yes		No		Not Sure	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Ethnic Patronage	277	73.9	48	12.8	50	13.3
Inequalities in the Distribution of Political appointments and Opportunities	259	69.1	81	21.6	35	9.3
Inequalities in people's capabilities to participate politically e.g in Voting	144	38.4	186	49.6	45	12
Inequalities in Resource Distribution	259	69.1	70	18.7	46	12.3

Source: Field Data, 2021

4.4.1 Ethnic Patronage

The findings revealed that there was Ethnic Patronage as indicated by 277 (73.9%) who agreed with this assertion as compared to 48 (12.8%) who said there were not such practices and 50 (13.3%) who stated that they were not sure.

The findings from the household heads were supported by those from interviews and Focus Group Discussions. During an FGD conducted in Eldoret town at the Catholic diocese it emerged that there was a lot of corruption and favouritism in the county favouring some ethnic groups against others. One of the participants stated that in the county, there was unfairness in getting services especially a person belonged to an ethnic group different from the dominant ethnic group. He stated that most of the people who were working at the county were from the same ethnic group, and were mostly friends or relatives. Another participant stated that he had applied for a business permit at the county using his credentials and that made him regret the decision because the people who were processing the permit made him pay more to get the permit. He indicated that he realized this when a friend of his who later applied for the permit paid an amount less that what he had been made to pay by six thousand shillings. He further revealed that even after being overcharged for the business permit he had to wait longer to get the permit. According to the participants in this FGD, those who did not belong to the Kalenjn community were treated differently as compared to those who belong to the ethnic group. One of the youths in the FGD stated that whenever you visit the county to receive services people will insist of knowing your second name so that they would know how to treat you.

In another FGD conducted in Langas area in which women were the key participants, there was consensus that even the way the county enforcement officers treated people was based on some sort of ethnic discrimination. They stated that the enforcement officers would in many cases harass people in the market places and would some times use foul language meant to remind people that they came from other counties and should therefore go back to their home counties. The attitude by some of the county officers was a reflection of the attitude of county leadership towards other ethnic groups in the county. One FGD participant stated that;

> These county officers were from one ethnic group and had mainly brought to work in the county by those in powerful positions in the county, therefore they treated people from other ethnic groups with disdain because that is what their 'god fathers' preached. Many of them have a lot of impunity and arrogance, because they know they are untouchable (Women's FGD at the New Langas County Market, Kisumu Ndogo on July 31, 2021).

One of the women who was part of the FGD in Langas stated that in giving market stalls to people at the Market they always prioritized the Kalenjin traders in those markets, other ethnic groups would be considered last and in some cases people had to give a bribe to be allocated spaces. The FGD participant went ahead to elaborate that, in some cases county officers would collude with some people who were not traders in the markets, such people would be officially allocated the spaces using the normal process and then later on they would sell these spaces to the actual traders who were deserving of this chance in the first place. Such practices of corruption had made some of the traders feel like they are not respected by the county leadership despite them paying taxes.

Another FGD participant stated that county leaders including MCAs always prioritized those who voted for them for service delivery as compared to those whom they perceive

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as opponents. The leaders would work towards improving roads, installing security lights and ensuring that their strong had the best services as compared to other area. One of the participants in the FGDs pointed to Langas Ward which one of the most populous and ethnically diverse in the county. He stated that the MCA who was from the Kikuyu community always tried to develop places that are inhabited by the Kikuyu like Kona Mbaya and Yamumbi area while other places like Kisumu Ndogo were left behind with bad drainage systems, poor lighting and poor roads. He further stated that the MCA who was now serving his second term as an MCA had an office in Kona Mbaya area instead of putting it a neutral place which could be accessible to all people in the ward. From the foregoing, it was emerging that the political leaders only wanted to help their supporters and not all members the public. Such feelings of disenfranchisement could lead to ethnic tension and animosity that could be a pathway to future conflicts. Ethnic patronage has been witnessed in Kenya at national level over the years and has been one of the major cause of ethnic tension and conflicts in post independence Kenya.

The findings agreed with Gordon, (2019) who opined that Ethnic patronage networks have hampered the institutionalization of democratic procedures as the formal rules of elections, political appointments, and the management and distribution of resources are overridden by ethnic patronage systems. Violence has accompanied nearly every election in Kenya, largely due to the high stakes that patronage politics places on elections.

The findings further supported*,* Ranta, (2017), whom In Chapter 14 of the book *What Politics? Youth and Political Engagement in Africa,* discussed *Patronage and Ethnicity amongst Politically Active Young Kenyans*. In this chapter, Ranta describes the occurrence of way ethnic patronage occurs in Kenya at the local level. According to

Ranta, the networks of patronage are inextricably tied to ethnicity and amount of wealth a person has. At the local level, the wealthiest members of society are most likely to win political office, as voters perceive them to be most able to provide for the community after taking office. She writes that "this is an indication that implies that instead of the state or county governance functioning as a redistributive agent, the distribution or lack of it in the case of resources is seen by community members to be strongly dependent on individual political leaders and their networks." This is an indication that the political elites have use their power to grab resources to distribute to supporters, rather than using institutions to protect all citizens. In this regard, those in power only care about those whom they perceive as their voters, normally the ethnic groups that have supported them and as such the rest of the ethnic groups can go to "hell".

Therefore, before the creation of counties, ethnic patronage had become deeply rooted in post independent Kenya through the politics of the executive arm of government by the first two founding presidents and the next two seemed to follow suit and the situation is not any different in the post 2010 dispensation with the birth county governments. Gordon, (2019) opines that the extent of ethnic patronage that extended from the executive branch was made evident once Kenyatta's vice president, Daniel arap Moi, became president in 1978. Moi, a Kalenjin, had functioned as an ally of the Kikuyu for years, but upon achieving executive power began to shift the power of the state in favor of the Kalenjin. This was made easier once Moi transformed the country into a single-party state by amending the constitution and concentrating personal power. He began to remove Kikuyu from the civil service, government positions, and state-owned enterprises and replace them with Kalenjin. Infrastructure development in Kikuyu-dominated regions

was abandoned and redirected to Kalenjin areas. Politicians who complained of ethnic favoritism were labeled "tribalists" and often lost their positions. During this era, detentions, political trials, torture, arbitrary arrests and police brutality became normalized and took on ethnic dimensions. As Moi's regime became more and more authoritarian, domestic and international pressure for a return to a multiparty state increased. Moi gave in to the pressure in 1991, warning that a return to a multiparty state would result in chaos. The ban of multiple parties was repealed in December. The return of multiple parties opened the political system to a vicious struggle for political power, as marginalized ethnic groups jockeyed for control of the nation's resources. Moi was reelected by a small majority in 1991, the first elections after the one-party era. The election was riddled with accounts of fraud, and a wave of violence swept the country for several days after the election. Even with the return of multiple parties, ethnic patronage was still rampant. Gordon, (2019) further argues that Patronage was also at the heart of the electoral violence of 2007. The re-election of Kibaki, a Kikuyu, prompted Luo and Kalenjin leaders to mobilize mass violence in the Rift Valley. The messages were hinged on patronage: if a Kikuyu occupied the executive office, patronage would continue to only benefit Kikuyu at the expense of the Kalenjin and Luo. In this instance, Kalenjin and Luo feared that Kibaki would redistribute the fertile Rift Valley land to the Kikuyu.

The findings further agreed with Hope (2014) who averred that Political patronage has been made worse by Bureaucracy and political rent seeking behavior among public officers. German sociologist Max Weber was the first person to formally study bureaucracy. In his 1921 book "*Economy and Society*," Weber argued that a bureaucracy

represented the most proficient form of organization, due to its possession of specialized expertise, certainty, continuity, and unity of purpose. However, he also warned that uncontrolled bureaucracy could threaten individual freedom, leaving people trapped in an "iron cage" of impersonal, irrational, and inflexible rules. According to Longley (2022) the hierarchical structure of bureaucracies can lead to internal "empire-building." Department supervisors may add unnecessary subordinates, whether through poor decision-making or in order to build their own power and status. In the absence of adequate oversight, bureaucrats with decision-making power could solicit and accept bribes in return for their assistance. In particular, high-level bureaucrats can misuse the power of their positions to further their personal interests. Bureaucracies (especially government bureaucracies) are known to generate a lot of "red tape." which refers to lengthy official processes that involve submitting numerous forms or documents with many specific requirements.

Hope (2014) in his paper titled *Kenya's corruption problem: causes and consequences*, further argued that Bureaucrats and politicians who have been successfully maximising their take without regard for such perdition on the size of the overall pie and thereby accounting for the growth of corrupt activities and the particularly adverse impact that corruption has in the country. He further argued that Whatever the transaction – getting a driver's license, a national identity card, tax administration decisions, and government contracts for goods and/or services, for example – it required the bureaucratic exercise of assumed powers. This, in turn, meant that bribes were demanded and had to be paid for the transactions to be completed. This can be regarded as the systematic exploitation of illegal income-earning opportunities by public officials and the enhancement of rent-

seeking opportunities. Incentives for corrupt behaviour have therefore arisen in Kenya, as well as in some other African states, because public officials have considerable control over the instruments regulating valuable socio-economic benefits and private parties are willing to make illegal payments to secure those benefits. The centralized and personalized presidential power that emerged under President Moi resulted in what can only be characterized as the total exercise of all power attached to national sovereignty. This exercise of State power led to the supremacy of the State over civil society and, in turn, to the ascendancy of predatory forms of neopatrimonialism with its stranglehold on the economic and political levers of power, through which corruption thrived for it was through this stranglehold that all decision-making occurred and patronage was dispensed (Bach, 2011).

Additionally, Mueller, (2008) argued that controlling the state was the means used by President Moi to entrench an ethnically defined class and to ensure its enrichment'. Khadiagala, (2009) further argued that 'under Moi, economic mismanagement, corruption, and wanton destruction of national resources became rampant. The 'control of state power meant control of public wealth leading to patronage, looting and bribery. Consequently, no distinction was made between public and private interests and government officials simply plundered the state resources.

The use of terms like it's our turn to "eat" became synonymous with one's ethnicity being in power. The system of patronage therefore thrived and corrupt behaviour cascaded down to the society at large (Hope, 2012). Being part of, or regarded as belonging to, particular groupings became a more acceptable qualification for a given position or contract, for example, than actual capabilities. The result was that the stage

became set for corruption to become rampant. It became truly ubiquitous. It also became a way of life, particularly for transactions at a governmental level or with public officials. The tradition of corruption and ethnic patronage has become a way of life in Kenya that even county governments have adopted and has been one of the reasons for continued inequality and ethnic animosity in cosmopolitan counties like Uasin Gishu.

4.4.2 Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Appointments and Opportunities

The study further sought to find out whether there was Unfairness in the distribution of political opportunities, with 259 (69.1%) saying yes, 81 (21.6%) saying no and 35 (9.3%) stating that they were not sure.

The findings of the study were supported by those from interviews and Focus group discussions. The during an interview with one of the religious leaders from the inter-faith council of Kenya he noted that there was a lot of ethnic exclusion in appointments into public offices both at national level and at county level which had made cosmopolitan counties like Uasin Gishu volatile areas for ethnic conflicts he further noted that

> The power that the president wields has a lot of impact on the ordinary citizens. Whenever people see public appointments always going to one two ethnic groups that are in power and the other 40 ethnic groups are left in the cold, it does not paint a good picture and this is why people would kill themselves to go to state house (Interview with member of the Inter-Faith Council of Uasin Gishu County held in Eldoret Town held on August 3, 2021).

In an interview done at CJPC, it emerged that ethnic tension was always caused by the fact that those who have tasted power want to stay in power and those who have never been in power also want a taste of what they have been missing since independence. He went a head to state that in as much as the counties were formed with the mindset of creating opportunities at the lower level, a kin to the *majimbo* that had been proposed

after independence, the bigger chunk of the national cake still stays with the central government which means that the national government still controls everything just like before. This was supported by an FGD participant who stated that the presidency still remain the most coveted position in Kenya. She elaborated by stating that;

> Every ethnic group in Kenya wants to be at state house, counties have just become places for local ethnic groups to have some small place to benefit but that national government still runs the show and therefore political appointments by the president still count. Having the presidency still means getting development and having people from your ethnic group being in powerful positions, this means that people from your ethnic group can easily get jobs. This has been and continues to be the situation in Kenya before devolution and even with devolution nothing has changed (Elders FGD held at the Catholic Diocese of Eldoret Compound on 31/07/2021).

In support of these arguments, one of the youths in another FGD stated that;

> *Hapa Kenya ni connection inaweza kukuokoa, kama mtu wenu amepewa post kubwa kwa gava mtafeel fiti juu huyu msee atawaletea development, lakini kama hamna mtu huko juu hata kupata job inakua ngori juu hamna god father. So sisi kama ma youth tunafeel pia ni poa tukipewa that consideration. Si ati ni wasee wa kabila moja an most of them ni wazae ndio wanapewa jobs. Hii story za ku favor watu wa tribe moja ndio pia hufanya vijana watumike vibaya wakati election kwa kuleta tension na vita*(In this country what matters is connections, the moment a person from your ethnic group is given appointment at a higher office, there is likely to be a feeling as satisfaction and as a community you are likely to feel like there is someone to look after your interests in government. Its good to important that those in positions consider young people from all ethnic groups for such appointments. The issue of favoring specific ethnic groups with appointments has been one of the factors that enable youth mobilization for conflicts during electioneering periods (Youth FGD held at Catholic Diocese of Eldoret Compound on August 1, 2021)

In another interview by a religious leader he stated that the;

> Look at the BBI proposals on issues of rotational presidency and even the political tone of those who are pro-BBI, it is an indication that some people feel as though there is need to give all ethnic groups and equal opportunity to get the presidency because that is where power lies. The devolved systems of governance do not attract as much ethnic division as the one cause by the presidency. I can dare say that ethnic conflicts in this county and other counties are caused by one thing, the presidential

election, all the other electoral positions are rarely cause division or never attract as much emotion as the presidency (Interview with a Priest at RCEA Ushirika, July 31, 2021).

The findings agreed with Nyabira & Ayele, (2016) who opined that the political exclusion of many ethnic communities in Kenya is the legacy of colonial rule and a decades long centralized, ethicized, and personalized presidential system. The presidency has always been used for the political and material benefit of the holder of the office and his close political associates, often belonging to the ethnic community from which the president hails. The Founding Father, President Kenyatta abolished the Independence Constitution that provided for a semi-federal political system and centralised all political powers in his office. He justified the centralisation of powers by the ideal of nation-building, a project that was predicated on a denial of the ethnic diversity of the Kenyan people. Dubbed pejoratively "majimboism", the semi-federal system was viewed as a system that would exacerbate the ethnic cleavages of the Kenyan people and sabotage the nation-building project. The centralised system however had the opposite effect of ethnic-based exclusion and division. This trend continued under the second President, Daniel Arap Moi, who, having assumed the presidency after Kenyatta died in 1978, also used it to empower the Kalenjin, an ethnic community to which he belongs. Even worse, Moi formalised a mono-party political system- which had in any case been the de-facto system in Kenya since 1969 - thereby ending any semblance of democratic pluralism in the country. President Mwai Kibaki, the third President of Kenya, who was also from the Kikuyu ethnic group like President Kenyatta, was no exception to this since, having assumed the presidency after Moi, he also increasingly preferred his Kikuyu kinsmen in political appointments, during the presidency of Kenyatta, the percentage of cabinet

ministers from the Kikuyu community was 28.5. However, in 2001 the percentage of ministers from the Kikuyu community dropped to just 4% and that of the Kalenjin rose to 22 %. Moreover, a maximum of 10 ethnic communities were represented in the cabinet of both Kenyatta and Moi out of about 43 ethnic communities. The same trend followed in the appointments of the Permanent Secretaries (PS).

Further the perspective given by Sundet, Moen & Barasa, (2009) also was in tandem with the findings, they opined that in 1970s, for example, the PS from the Kikuyu community constituted 37.5% while those from the Kalenjin community were just 8.3%. The percentage of PS from the Kikuyu community dropped to 8.7% in 2001 while that of the Kalenjin community rose to 34.8%. This was once again reversed when Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, came to power in 2002. When Uhuru Kenyatta become the President he continued the Kikuyu dominance with the aspect of negotiated democracy between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu communities and saw President Kenyatta form a government dominated by the two ethnic groups. Major appointments including those of ambassadors, parastatal heads, and appointments to state agencies were dominated by ethnic groups that were in the ruling coalition.

The ethnic composition of the 2013 cabinet was as follows; Kikuyu (3), Kalenjin (4), Somali (3), Luo (1), Meru (1), Kisii (1), Kamba (1), Luhya (1), Arab (1). In fact, In 2019, the Uhuru Kenyatta's government had to contend with a court case in which the appointment of the board of the Postal Corporation of Kenya, as well as the Tana and Athi Rivers Development Authority, had been challenged in court on grounds that they did not consider ethnic balance. Reports by Citizen Digital on May 15 2019 indicated that Chama Cha Mawakili, in a petition, argued that the appointment of Mike Rubia, Fred

Gachie, Munyua Waiyaki, Simon Kiuta, Pauline Muthangani, James Muriithi, Jane Githinji, Ndogo Waweru, and Robert Murimito to the boards of the two institutions did not meet the constitutional requirement of ethnic and regional balance and should therefore be quashed. The petitioners argued that regional and ethnic balance is a constitutional edict that runs through the entire Constitution and therefore the composition of all national or public institutions at all levels should reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya (Citizen Digital, May 15, 2019).

In a nutshell, those holding the presidency effectively entrenched the politics of "it's our turn to eat" in Kenya, leaving other ethnic communities with a feeling of exclusion. In such a centralised and personalised political system, and in the absence of alternative sub-national political institutions, controlling the national government, in particular, the presidency, becomes a life and death-matter for every ethnic community during general elections.

Gutiérrez☐Romero (2013) further avers that there had been sporadic inter-ethnic violent conflicts in what came to be known as Kenya even before the emergence of colonialism towards the end of the 19th century. The creation of the Kenyan State and the systematic exclusion of the various ethnic communities, in particular after independence, however, politicised the conflict to the extent that it reached a catastrophic proportion in the aftermath of the 2007 general elections. The political exclusion of, and economic discrimination against the various ethnic communities, and the urgency to curb these problems triggered persistent demands for constitutional reform from the 1980s. At the centre of the call for constitutional reform was the demand to remove the centralised government system and replace it with a decentralised one. There was an even stronger

demand for equitable representation in the national government of all regions and communities, which had been the domain of a few communities and individuals. These demands could not be ignored after the 2007 post-elections violence. Thus serious moves were begun towards constitutional reform resulting in the adoption of the 2010 Constitution. The Constitution, among other things, introduced a devolved government system composed of 47 counties and a national government.

According to Bosire (2013) each of the major ethnic communities holds the possibility of clinching the presidency and might not see the weak county powers as an alternative to the control of the presidency. The bulk of political powers and resources are retained at the centre, with the Constitution retaining a pure presidential system, albeit with clipped presidential powers. The limited county powers diminish the "political significance" of counties, meaning that the presidency may thus remain a highly attractive prize to these communities. Barkan (2012) that this situation could make the large ethnic groups rush to form "counter-coalitions" and in the process deeply divide the country in a deadly "zero-sum" game of ethno-political competition. Indeed, the run-up to the March 2013 and August 2022 general elections saw gradual ethnic and political polarization as coalitions and counter coalitions formed around the big five ethnic communities.

Political appointments, positions and opportunities are therefore a major factor for ethnic tension conflicts that even the attempt at consociational democracy through the devolution that was brought about by the 2010 constitution has not solved the conflicts, not only in the county of Uasin Gishu but also in Kenya. Uasin Gishu County being Cosmopolitan in nature literally represents that face of Kenya, and as such if all the Kenyan ethnic groups were to be put together in one large basket, then Uasin Gishu

County would be that basket. The findings have shown that the most lucrative position in Kenya, is the presidency and that every 5 years Kenyan go for election, each ethnic group want one of their own to be a president because of the amount of power, influence and resources that the president holds, including making all the important appointments. This is an indication that ethnic conflicts in Kenya are easily influenced by the decisions that the office of the president makes with regards to appointments into public offices.

Political appointments can hence be an indicator of whether the leadership of the country is inclusive or excludes some ethnic groups. As an indicator of political horizontal inequalities, political appointments, positions and opportunities have a bearing on how different ethnic groups look at the power that the appointing authority holds. It therefore means that, if the appointing authority only appoints people from his ethnic group or his allies then the feelings of disenfranchisement and exclusion will set in for those who have been left without any appointments. As indicated from the FGDs, those how have one of their own appointed feel as though their interest are taken into consideration as opposed those who lack appointments.

In this regard, having inequalities in distribution of political positions among various ethnic groups can be a strong ground for ethnic mobilization and conflicts, unless the powers that be find ways to make all the ethnic groups feel like they are part of the government in away that does show open bias and exclusion of other ethnic groups. One way through which this could be done is through the adoption of principles that would make even the minority have feeling that they have been represented in a way.

The can be done through Lijphart's model of a *mutual veto* in which the those in power can include all segments of the society in the decision making process thereby enabling

the minorities to protect their special interests. As Stewart (2009) suggests, conflict is less likely when a particular group that is relatively deprived in one dimension is privileged in another. In cases in which a group is economically or socially excluded (or both), but the group's elite holds power or participates in the government, the elite are less likely to organize or lead a rebellion.

4.4.3 Inequalities in people's capabilities to participate politically

The study sought to establish whether there were Inequalities in people's capabilities to participate political process. This variable sought to establish whether there was interference with people taking part in the process of elections such as voting, running for political office or joining political party. The findings revealed that, 144 (38.4%) stated that yes, there was interference with political participation while 186 (49.6%) stated that there was no interference with political participation and people had equal rights to participate in the political processes, however, 45 (12%) stated that they were not sure. The finding from the household heads therefore indicated that the issue of people being denied to take part in political processes like voting, running for political offices or joining political parties was not witnessed in the county. However, during FGDs and interviews, it emerged acts of people being intimidated not to participate in political process were present indirectly. One issue that emerged in both interviews and FGDs was the issue of voter intimidation during electoral periods. This was done both by the politicians and ordinary citizens who seized opportunities to threaten their perceived political nemesis at such times. In one of the Focus Group discussion conducted in Langas one women stated that:

Wakati wa campaign ikifika, watu huwa hawaamini wenzao, utapata hata landlord wako kama ni wa kabila ingine na mko mrengo tofauti kisiasa, atakuambia uhame uatfute mahali utaishi. Hii ni njia ya kufukuza mtu asipige kura mahali anafaa kupigia kura. Saa zingine inabidi watu wengine waende ushago na walichukulia kura huku. Sasa si unajua kura kama hio itakua imelala (During political campaigns, some landlords ask their tenants to leave the houses especially if they belong to different ethnic groups and different political sides. This has in some cases forced people who have registered to vote in the town to go back to the village, meaning that such individuals are likely to miss out in the voting process). (Women's FGD at the New Langas County Market, Kisumu Ndogo on July 31, 2021)

In an interview with one of the clergy, he affirmed that voter intimidation always manifests itself through politicians with the use of words like *madoadoa* making people fear for their safety. The clergy further added that:

One of the common things that I have witnessed in this county that I could categorise as voter harassment is the issue of leaflets. Its common practice during electioneering period to wake up to threats of leaflets especially in areas where multiple ethnicities live. The messages from these leaflets are always meant to scare people and even make people run away so that they do not vote within this area. Some of these acts are often instigated through politics of incitement (Interview with Religius leader from the PCEA church held at PCEA Langas, Eldoret on 11/08/2021)

There was a general consensus among the respondents that people were never stopped from running for political offices or joining political parties. So in this regard, political participation was free for all. However, it in an interview with an officer at CJPC, it emerged that, in as much as there was freedom to run for office and join political parties, many of the political parties that were present in the county were ethnic based and as such people from different ethnic groups would associate more with a party that was having candidates from parties with their ethnic group. He gave example indicating that:

Today in Kenya and even in Uasin Gishu, you can predict who will win what and in which political party. For example if you talk about the Luos,

they associate more with ODM party and it is known that all governors in Luo Nyanza for example will be elected on an ODM ticket. That means if one of the candidates running for governor of Uasin Gishu county was to run on ODM tick, there is a 99% chance that he will not win because it is known that Uasin Gishu is a UDA zone. This is not even the biggest problem, the bigger issue is that for example if a Kikuyu who is a member of UDA would run for governor in Uasin Gishu, he would not win the ticket and even if he wins the local political brokers would not allow him to proceed to run for the governors race on that ticket because it is believed that the governor of this county must be a Kalenjin. So ethnicity still plays a role on who is elected where, whether they belong to the most popular political party or not. (Interview with CJPC Coordinator, July 29, 2021).

The findings were in agreement with a Human Rights Watch (2017) report that revealed that voter intimidation as the election nears was common in cosmopolitan areas in Kenya. The report indicated that in the run-up to the 2017 election, there were threats to perceived opposition supporters in Nakuru county with the Naivasha area being one of the most affected in the county. According to Human rights watch   Some real or perceived opposition supporters in Naivasha said that they have begun to pack up their belongings to flee the area out of fear of a return to ethnic conflict. As registered voters in Naivasha, they would not be able to vote in other parts of the country.

An article published by the Star Newspaper on June 10, 2017, indicated that Bishop Maurice Muhatia, head of the Nakuru Catholic Diocese, had expressed alarm over the rate at which families were fleeing the county ahead of the August elections. The report stated that "Some families are first transporting their children, then wife and personal effects to their rural areas ahead of the election" (The Star, June 10, 2017). Human Rights Watch documented at least six incidents of direct threats against opposition supporters, with people from both sides of the political divide saying that such threats were increasingly prevalent. Eight opposition supporters said a group of young men in the

Kinamba and Kihoto neighbourhoods of Naivasha, whom they said they believed were behind some of the 2007 violence, have repeatedly told them to stay away from polling places if they do not intend to vote for the ruling party (Human Rights Watch, 2017). This scenario was not unique to Nakuru County as there were similar situations on other cosmopolitan counties including Uasin Gishu which affected people's ability to participate freely in elections.

The findings further agreed with Horowitz (2022) who opined that in Kenya, ethnicity was an important aspect of voting patterns due to the fact that it conveyed important information on patronage allocation and community representation. In this regard, Horowitz argued that individual voters preferred their co-ethnics or candidates who were in the same coalitions with their co-ethnics to be elected, therefore, candidates who were opposed to co-ethnics and their supporters were viewed as threats to an ethnic group and as such would most likely be treated as political enemies during campaign periods. In many cases, this enemy treatment of other ethnic groups then became a basis for ethnic clashes in post-election periods as witnessed in the 1992, 1997 and 2007 elections. As Arusei et al (2019) puts it, before the 2007 election, voter intimidation and harassment was almost the order of the day, this was done with aim of either manipulating voters to distort their preferences or sway preference expression or scaring them away and making them not to vote.

Voter intimidation therefore contributed to horizontal inequalities because it denied people a chance to choose leaders whom they believed could help them. Considering that some of the registered voters from Uasin Gishu county took off to their respective villages and failed to vote, this meant that these people did not elect leaders who running

affairs either at county level or national level, this indicated that such people did not have a choice of who represents them at both levels of governance and as such, in the 5 years that these leaders would be in office, their interest were not going to be taken care of as compared to a situation where they had a say on who gets elected.

The zoning of Kenyan regions based on ethnicity has also been another problem affecting people's ability to participate in political processes. The assumption that specific counties belong to specific ethnicities has made political choices particularly difficult to many people in cosmopolitan areas. According one a Muslim cleric who was interviewed in this study, Uasin Gishu county for example has many ethnic groups most of whom live within town. He indicated that most of the people from the dominant ethnic group which is the Kalenjin's live in the peri-urban or the rural areas, he indicated that Eldoret town which had a large population multi-ethnic of could not be made a sub-county or constituency because the local political leadership always fear that the town may have a member of parliament from another ethnic group other than the Kalenjin. The cleric further indicated that this had made service delivery a problem to the people living within the town because a person could be on one side of town but on a different sub-county. He noted that;

> If you come from West Indies which part of Eldoret town, an you need something processed in your sub-county, you may have to go all the way to turbo because you belong to Turbo sub-county. All the constituencies and sub-counties in Uasin Gishu start from the villages and end up on a particular part of the town(Interview with Catholic Priest, at Catholic Diocese of Eldoret, 10th August, 2021)

This is an indication of well choreographed strategy by the political elites in the county to ensure that only those who belong to the dominant ethnic group can successfully run for

and win elections within the county. In a way, this limits the political choices of the other residents of the county because in a democracy the majority will always have their way.

4.4.4 Inequalities in Resource Distribution

The study sought to establish whether there were Inequalities in resource allocation across the county. The findings revealed that 259 (69.1%) indicated that indeed there were inequalities in resource allocation while 70 (18.7%) stated that such inequalities did not exist. However, 46 (12.3%) stated that they were not sure.

The findings from the household heads were supported by those from the interviews and FGDs. During an interview conducted at NCCK, emerged that the issues of resource allocation have been a major reason for inequality. The NCCK officer stated that

> Resource distribution in Kenya has been one of the biggest challenges for inter-ethnic cohesion due to the fact that since independence, there are communities who have always felt short changed. There is a lot of power politics involved in resource allocation not only at the national level but also at the county level (Interview with NCCK Official on July 26, 2021)

This sentiments by the youths who were part of the Focus Discussions conducted in Eldoret town. They indicated that issues of development were always done by those in county leadership in a way that was not fair to everyone. They indicated that the county had some areas with better lighting, better county roads and people from some parts of the county would be involved in the *Kazi mtaani* programmes more than other. One of the youths particular stated that

> Some of those serving in the counties as either County executives, Member of county Assembly or even the governor and senior officers in the county had ensured that their home areas had some of the best services as compared to other places. Some of these people have tarmacked roads heading to their homes but the rest of the residential places have poor roads with bad drainage and sewerage systems (Youth FGD held at Catholic Diocese of Eldoret Compound on August 1, 2021).

In support of the findings, the CJPC coordinator stated that,

> Unequal resource allocation has been one of the biggest factors for ethnic tension and conflicts in Kenya since the time of President Kenyatta, Moi, Kibaki and now Uhuru. The political class has always used resources as a bargaining chip and as a tool to control the masses and win support. This has always been done based on the ethnic nature of Kenyan politics. The first Kenyatta always worked on aplan to benefit Kikuyus, Moi worked to benefit Kalenjins especially the Tugen, Kibaki was always trying to benefic Kikuyus and the paradox continues. It's always either you benefit you ethnic group or your allies. This had been the nature of Kenyan ethnic politics (Interview with CJPC Coordinator, July 29, 2021).

The CJPC coordinator added that, in as much as counties get 15% revenue allocation from the government, this allocation is not enough because it still leaves the national government in control of almost everything and this why all ethnic groups want to win the presidency so that they can be favored in the distribution of the resources. He stated that, since independence it has been a norm that those who control statehouse benefit more from the national cake.

These arguments were further supported by one of the religious leaders from the inter-faith council who stated that;

> The reason our politics is always so heated from national to county level is because everyone want to control resources. Here in Uasin Gishu, during campaigns, candidates running for Governorship even used threats in campaigns to get elected. It's always about control of resources. Everyone want to be in charge of the resources and distribute them in the way that pleases them (Interview with member of the Inter-Faith Council of Uasin Gishu County held in Eldoret Town at Wagon Hotel held on August 3, 2021).

It was therefore evident that there was a consensus among all the respondents that resource distribution is matter of concern the Uasin Gishu county. These findings were in agreement with Hassan (2020) who opined that ethicized distribution of resources in Kenya has occurred through numerous and varied channels. He argued that resource

distribution strategies have been into two tracks based on the distributing patron, a centre-led track largely driven by each president, and a local-led track largely driven by Members of Parliament (MPs) within their individual constituencies. Kenya achieved independence with a devolved, *majimbo* state where the bulk of the country's resources were distributed at the provincial level (Branch, 2017). Under *majimboism*, the central government played little role in development; instead, development monies were devolved to the country's eight regional assemblies which individually lead development within their province (Maxon, 2016). Each province was to hire its own administrators to administer regional programs. The founding President (Jomo Kenyatta) felt that this system greatly disadvantaged his co-ethnic Kikuyus and quickly dismantled *majimboism* and instead used his executive power to create a centralized, unitary state by 1964 with the central government overseeing the largest development programs. According to Hassan (2015), *majimboism* did not favour that president's co-ethnic for two reasons. First, *majimboism* mechanically limited the number of resources that Kenyatta could divert to Kikuyu areas. Kikuyus were a majority only in their home Central province. The Kikuyu also comprised a sizable 20% minority in Rift Valley. Moreover, many Kikuyu were hoping to migrate to other less-densely populated provinces after the removal of colonial-era restrictions on movement. But with regional assemblies distributing the country's devolved resources, the Kikuyu were guaranteed the resources devolved to the Central province. While the regional assembly of Rift Valley (or other provinces) could theoretically distribute resources to areas with pockets of Kikuyus within the province, the prevailing rhetoric of the time suggested that the province's pastoralist majority would use their numeric strength to box Kikuyus out of these resources. In this regard,

the founding president devised a system of governance that would favour the diversion of resources to favor his co-ethnics. He created ministries and each national ministry funnelled resources to the grassroots for the creation of new development projects and the maintenance of existing ones.

The central allocations in this manner made sense for Kenyatta for the same two reasons which had limited resources to Kikuyus under *majimboism*. First, central ministries could divert their budget anywhere across the country, without regard to minimum spending thresholds outside Central Province. Second, Kenyatta was able to staff the state largely with Kikuyu bureaucrats (Horowitz 2017). By 1969, at the very beginning of Kenyatta's consolidation of power, almost 40% of permanent secretaries were Kikuyu (Hornsby, 2011), as were half of the country's PCs and DCs, as well as the vast majority of parastatal bosses.

As Hassan (2015) indicated, for the same reasons that centre-led development led by Nairobi benefited Kenyatta and his co-ethnics, they hindered the country's second president, Daniel arap Moi (1978 - 2002), from distributing resources to his own co-ethnic base. The centralization of distribution decisions to the ministries and a large number of Kikuyu bureaucrats institutionally ensured a Kikuyu bias in center-led resource allocation even after Kenyatta's death. To be sure, Moi did begin to circumvent this bias through the replacement of Kikuyu bureaucrats and senior government elites in Nairobi (e.g., by 1990, roughly two-thirds of permanent secretaries were Kalenjin (Lynch 2011). But this strategy proved gradual as there was a significant dearth of educated pastoralists. Instead, Moi, like Kenyatta before him, sought to institutionally change center-led resource distribution to best advantage his base.

Hassan (2020) opined that Moi inaugurated a new central-led resource distribution program, District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD, or simply, "District Focus") in 1982 that decentralized central resources away from Nairobi. DFRD promised to "bring development closer to the people" by allocating each of the country's (then) 40 districts a lump sum of money to enact development programs within its boundaries. Spending decisions within each district were finalized by each district's internal District Development Committee (DDC). The DDC was chaired by the presidentially-appointed DC and also included all district MPs and other local stakeholders. Each central ministry would then create its nationwide budgets according to the demands of each of the country's districts. Moreover, Moi mandated that each ministry list and justify the specific projects that the ministry spent resources on. This accounting trick made (Kikuyu) central government bureaucrats more accountable for their spending decisions; because bureaucrats' decisions were now recorded and reviewable, lay bureaucrats had to justify their decisions to their largely Kalenjin superiors.

According to Hassan (2020), District Focus benefited Moi's ethnic base by leveraging their geographic spread across districts. Moi's co-ethnic Kalenjin comprised a majority in 6 of the country's 40 districts even though they only comprised 14% of the population. Rift Valley's other pastoralists – the rest of his base – were a majority in 4 districts despite comprising only 3% of the country's population. To put these numbers into comparison, Kikuyus – the plurality ethnic group at 21% of the population – comprised the majority in 7 districts Moi's co-ethnics were facilitated by loyalties, and Moi ensured this loyalty through active management. Within his first five years, Moi rotated out 75% of Kenyatta's appointees and replaced them with new appointees. He cultivated neo-

patrimonial relationships with these officers by allowing them to use their authority for personal enrichment in the expectation that they carry out his political orders. Moreover, Moi increased the number of Kalenjin DCs. The percentage of Kalenjin DCs rose from circa 10% at the start of his presidency to 25% by 1992 (Hassan, 2016). By decentralizing resource distribution to individual districts, Moi ensured that many of his co-ethnics would receive a disproportionate share of central government resources regardless of the bureaucratic inclinations of lay bureaucrats in Nairobi. Moi changed his centre-led resource distribution strategy in the run-up to his re-elections to benefit unaligned ethnic groups in an attempt to win their electoral support. Moi did this by creating new administrative districts within the basic institutional structure of District Focus. From 1992 - 2002, the number of administrative districts rose from 41 - 71 with the vast majority created or announced before the 1997 election (Horowitz, 2015).

District creation in Kenya continued after Moi left office. Mwai Kibaki, Moi's main opposition candidate in 1992 and 1997, won the 2002 election with 66 percent of the vote. Kibaki was elected by a multi-ethnic coalition that had support from the country's largest ethnic groups (Arriola 2012). By 2007, however, this coalition broke down and Kibaki faced a competitive reelection campaign against Raila Odinga. Head-to-head polls in the run-up to the election showed a dead tie or gave Odinga a narrow advantage. Among numerous other strategies that he employed to win votes, Kibaki began to promise new districts to areas inhabited by unaligned ethnic groups in the lead-up to the election. Just weeks before the election, the number of proclaimed districts had more than doubled from 71 to 145 (Horowitz, 2022). He only announced three in areas dominated by the misaligned Luo, co-ethnics of Odinga, despite persistent demand. Instead, Kibaki,

like Moi, announced many districts among unaligned indigenous local ethnic minority groups. Importantly, because Moi had created districts for the majority of local ethnic minority groups, Kibaki targeted smaller sub-ethnic groups or even clans. As under Moi, these districts were in a (sub) group's homeland and were often named after the (sub) group to further impart symbolic benefits to the group (Horowitz, 2015). Overall, district creation during Kibaki 's first term implies the same electoral logic as had been under Moi.

New units largely went to unaligned groups that would receive the material marginal ben from a new unit and whose votes were up for grabs (Hassan, 2016). While it may seem that Kibaki did not have a co-constraint for creating new districts, in reality, his strain was so high that most new districts were operational before the 2007 election. Budgetary allocations from 2007 to 2008 reveal that money was allocated to districts that had been in existence since 2002. Most new districts did not have sufficient staff to open the district headquarters until 2009. Furthermore, in 2009, the Kenyan High Court declared the unilateral creation of districts by a president unconstitutional (Hassan, & Sheely, 2017).The court declared that presidents only had the authority to "gazette" a new district, or make known the government's intention to create it. Final legal approval ultimately rested with the legislature (this rule was bypassed completely under Moi). In a compromise with Kibaki to approve those districts that he had gazetted, parliament pushed through a new unit creation policy stating that "every constituency is a district and every district a constituency."

By 2012, Kenya had 290 districts based largely on parliamentary constituencies. Thus, while district creation under Kibaki's first term was similar to Moi's and followed the

contours of the theory, units were created in his second (lame-duck) term in an attempt to appease parliament. Since then, districts have become less relevant as units of governance because of rampant proliferation. With the passage of Kenya's new constitution in 2010, and full promulgation in 2013, the main tier of governance shifted to the newly created counties. District proliferation since 1992 made it difficult for the state to govern effectively through the multitude of districts, which not only were significantly smaller than before but lacked capacity (Hassan, 2016). Indeed, Kenya's counties have the same boundaries as districts in 1992 and are governed as they had been before proliferation (Hassan 2015). Resource allocation for counties has also faced challenges with the central/ national government retaining the biggest chunk of the allocation.

Since 2013, 84.5 per cent of the revenues have been allocated to the national government while a mere 15 per cent is allocated to county governments, with the remaining 0.5 per cent being in the equalization fund (Kimenyi, 2013). This means that the president still controls almost all resources just as it has been since independence, making the ethnic competition for the presidency a major issue in resource allocation and ethnic conflicts.

Resource distribution has been more of a struggle between the country's ethnic groups about 'whose turn it is to eat.' Just like in many multi-ethnic societies with salient ethnic cleavages, the geographic concentration of ethnic groups allows politicians to distribute resources to particular ethnic groups by targeting the areas where specific groups live. Put simply, those in charge of distributing resources have used existing ethnic settlement patterns to co-opt ethnic groups that they need support from while overlooking ethnic groups associated with their political opposition. Resource distribution patterns in Kenya are both strongly influenced by, and reinforce, the logic of ethnic politics.

From the foregoing, it was evident from the findings that the issue of resource allocation was more of a national issue than county issue, and therefore ethnicities represented in the county who were not part of the national government would always harbor feelings of unfair treatment that would ethnic breed tension in the region. Just like resource allocation at national level which is skewed to benefit some ethnicities at the expense of others, county administrators seem to be reading from same script that has been used by the national government since 1964. Even with this kind of attitude, the amount of resources controlled by counties is still too small, making the national resource distribution a big concern as it has been used and continues to be used to perpetuate horizontal inequalities.

4.4.5 Correlation between Political Horizontal inequalities and Ethnic of Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to find out the correlation between Political Horizontal inequalities and Ethnic of Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. The findings are as shown in Table 4.5

Table 4. 5: Correlation between Political HIs and Ethnic Conflicts

Correlations						
		Experience Conflict	Ethnic Patronage	Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Positions and Appointments	Inequalities in people's capabilities to participate politically e.g in Voting	Inequalities in Resource Distribution
Experienced Conflict	Pearson Correlation	1	.265**	.095	.003	.060
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.067	.951	.243

	N	375	375	375	375	375
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).						

In comparing the correlation between Ethnic Patronage and the experience of ethnic conflicts, there was Pearson Correlation value (r) of 265** and statistical significance (p-value) of .000. The study also compared Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Positions, Appointments and Opportunities against ethnic conflicts which showed the values as $r=0.095$ and p-value=0.067; Inequalities in people's capabilities to participate politically e.g in Voting against the experience of ethnic conflicts which gave $r=0.003$ and p-value=0.951 and finally, the correlation between Inequalities in Resource Distribution and ethnic conflicts revealed $r=0.060$ and p-value=0.243

In the regard therefore from the findings of the study, a cross tabulation of between Ethnic Patronage and the Experience of ethnic Conflicts in Uasin Gishu gave conflicts gave statistically significant bivariate association between the two variables. An indication that Ethnic Patronage had significant influence on the occurrence of inter-ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. However for the other three independent variables namely; Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Positions and Appointments; Inequalities in people's capabilities to participate politically e.g in Voting and Inequalities in Resource Distribution, a cross tabulation against experience of ethnic conflict revealed that there was not a statistically significant association. Thereby indicating that these three variable could influence the occurrence of ethnic conflicts but not to a significantly.

4.5 Horizontal Inequalities in accessing essential Social Programmes and services in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish whether there were horizontal inequalities with regards to accessing essential social programmes and services in Uasin Gishu County. The findings in Table 4.6 were as discussed in the subsequent sub-sections.

Table 4. 6: Horizontal inequalities with regards to accessing essential social programmes and services in Uasin Gishu County

Variable	Agree		Disagree		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Inequality in Access to Educational Funding and School Fee Bursaries	281	74.9%	70	18.7%	24	6.4%
Inequality in Access to Health care	168	44.8%	194	51.7%	13	3.5%
Inequality in Access to Government Loans and grants(Uwezo fund and Youth Fund)	247	65.9%	58	15.5%	70	18.7%
Cultural Status Inequalities	124	33.1%	251	66.9%%	0	0%

Source: Field Data, 2021

4.5.1 Inequalities in Access to Educational Funding and School Fee Bursaries

The study sought to establish whether there horizontal inequalities with regards to accessing Educational funding and School fees bursaries in Uasin Gishu County. The finding revealed that 281 (74.9%) agreed that such inequalities existed in the county

while 70 (18.7%) stated that there no inequalities in access to these services. However, 24 (6.4%) indicated that they did not know whether there were inequalities.

The findings from household heads were supported by those from interviews and Focus Groups discussions. In an interview with a Muslim Cleric in the county, he stated that bursaries that were supposed to help in improving education standards for all Kenyan student had become something that the political were using to benefit a few people without consideration of who was needy. He went ahead and stated that;

> Bursaries were given to students on the basis of 'who knows who', which meant that those from poor backgrounds and had no one to fight for them in the constituency bursary offices had no chance at getting the funding. The problem gets even worse when the political classes uses ethnic enclaves to award such monies to their co-ethnic and leave out other ethnicities who may be perceived to be non-locals yet they could be locals, only that they are perceived as non-locals because of their ethnicity (Interview with Muslim Cleric at Asis Hotel in Eldoret Town on July 31, 2021).

This arguments by the cleric were supported FGD participants who stated that there was a lot of ethnic based discrimination in the award of bursaries. They further stated that majority of those considered for bursaries were either from the Kalenjin community and if not a person from the non-kalenjin community had a chance at getting the bursary then they were well connected people with the means to reach those who awarded the bursaries. One of the youths indicated that

> There were two issues involved in the award of bursaries in the county, first was your ethnic group which was dictated by your second name and secondly who do you know or who can you contact in the CDF offices. Even those from the Kalenjin community had to know someone, either a politician or a CDF official, otherwise, chances of getting the bursary was close to nil (Youth FGD held at Catholic Diocese of Eldoret Compound on August 1, 2021)

In another FGD by women, it emerged the issue of inequality in the award of bursaries was not only an ethnic issue but also a class issue. One of the women in an FGD conducted in New Langas market stated that;

> *Sisi maskini si rahisi kupata hata hii pesa ya bursary ya CDF, ni wale masonko ndio watoto wao wanapewa. Sisi tunanganaga na watoto kulipa fee ya day school na hakuna usaidizi unapata hata kwa MCA. Hio bursary inapeanwa kwa kujuana na saa zingine pia kuna ukabila huko ndani.* (its not easy for the poor people to get the CDF bursary money, most of the times it's the children of the rich and connected people who get awarded the bursary fund, even the area MCA rarely comes to our aid. There is a lot of favourism and even ethnicity involved in the award of CDF bursaries in this county). (Women's FGD at the New Langas County Market, Kisumu Ndogo on July 31, 2021)

The findings of the study agreed with a study by Bungei (2012) in which he averred that there was political interference in the award and disbursement of bursaries, especially the constituency Bursary Fund (CDF) Wareng District. According to the findings of the study conducted by Bungei, 55% of students who participated in the study reported that they were assisted by political leaders to get bursary funds. Therefore implying that political leaders do influence the distribution of bursaries using their powers by deciding to assist some students and not others regardless of the stipulated procedures. Bungei further added that the bursary committee members appointed by the political leaders are liable for manipulation by the same leaders. He further stated that according to a Government report in 2009, politicians meddled in the award of bursaries by recommending the beneficiaries and that politicians were hurting the poor and delaying school fees disbursements for their own interests.

The issue of unfairness in the allocation and distribution of education funding was not unique to Uasin Gishu County as Musili (2013) reported that in Kitui there were awards of bursaries to people who were not deserving yet needy students were left without any help. Musili states that some of the bursary beneficiaries did not deserve and the deserving cases lost the opportunity which could have led to their dropping out of school. This scenario means that the undeserving students were allocated the bursary while the neediest were denied the opportunity. Onkoba (2011) further opined that nepotism and political influence downplay the objective of improving access, retention and completion of the education in Gucha District of Kisii County. He stated that there was a need to eliminate the above problems and supervise the bursary award to ensure equity and equality in schooling for the vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society. Onkoba further revealed that Nepotism was exercised by the constituency bursary committee to deny needy and vulnerable students the opportunity for education leading to dropping out of school and hence no access to education.

Inequalities in educational funding have a historical perspective from the colonial period and have continued to be seen for many years in post-colonial Kenya. Funding as a factor of horizontal inequalities was not only based on school fees bursary for students but was also linked to extent to which the government pumped resources into schools, taking a dimension of regional disparities in funding for educational institutions. Kenya inherited an education system that was set up to offer unequal treatment based on racial or ethnic criteria. The greatest resources went to the so-called 'white schools', then the national schools, followed by provincial schools and, at the bottom of the table, district schools. This was the result of biased pupil selection, teacher posting, bursary allocation and

general provision of facilities (Alwy & Schech, 2004). This system has been and continues to encourage social stratification among pupils and in Kenyan society more generally, some of the specially favoured have been national schools. In as much as today there are more national schools in almost all the 47 counties, the traditional system of inequality created during the colonial period still exists. For example, Kiambu County and Nairobi Counties have six (6) national schools each as compared to other Kenyan counties that have an average of two national schools each, this is an indication that the schools around the former white highlands still receive more funding and resources from the government than the rest of the country. When schools within a region get better funding, better resources and highly trained teachers, then the socio-economic aspects of life in such regions get improved as compared to regions that lack better education facilities. In this regard, education acts to perpetuate economic disparities rather than bridging them.

In a nutshell, inequalities in access to educational funding and School fees bursaries may lead to low attainments there by exacerbating Horizontal educational inequality (HEI). The interference in access to educational funding further aggravates horizontal inequalities because the political class who were involved in the meddling would only work to benefit their co-ethnics, political allies, relatives and friends, thus leaving the needy people who do not fall in these four categories of preferred beneficiaries out of these government funding programs. This in the long run would create Educational horizontal inequalities which then has a direct link to economic inequalities. Lack of education translates to a lack of marketable skills among those who have been marginalized leading to a vicious cycle of poverty and aggravated horizontal inequalities

in the society. These factors create a ripe environment for group mobilization for ethnic conflicts by elites from the marginalized ethnic groups.

4.5.2 Inequalities in Access to Healthcare Services

The study sought to establish whether there were inequalities in access to healthcare services in Uasin Gishu. The findings revealed that 168 (44.8%) agreed that there existed inequalities in access to these services while 194 (51.7%) disagreed indicating that such inequalities did not exist, however, 13 (3.5%) stated they did not know whether such inequalities existed.

The findings from the household heads were supported by those from Focus Group discussion who sated that health facilities were mostly available in the county and getting a hospital was not such a big deal. However, many of the public hospitals did not have medicine. One of the women in the Langas FGD stated that

> You can go to a public hospital and get checked by doctors and then given a list to go and buy medicines from a chemist. The county has many hospitals which are within a good distance since they area all within town, therefore the problem of access in not there, however, the services are not as good. (Women's FGD at the New Langas County Market, Kisumu Ndogo on July 31, 2021)

In an interview with on of the Chiefs in Kesses, he indicated that accessing the hospitals was not a problem for those who lived in the urban parts of the county, because all major hospitals such as Moi teaching and General hospital and Wareng District Hospital were all situated in town including some of the best private hospitals such as Mediheal Hospital, St. Lukes and even Eldoret Hospital. He however indicated that that for those how live the rural parts of the county, it was a challenge because they had to travel quite a distance to get to Eldoret town and get these services. He further indicated that the main

hospital which was the Moi Teaching and referral hospital was the only Referral facility in the whole of Western region and was therefore always crowded with patients and from all over thereby, reducing the quality of service that the patients get.

In another interview, the coordinator CJPC stated that the county had some of the best health facilities, however, not everyone could access the best health services in the county due to the fact that some of the best equipped facilities were private hospitals that were extremely expensive and could only be afforded by the rich people in the society. The available public facilities were also good but overstretched since the resources such as human resources and even wards were sometimes over crowded. He gave an example stating that it would not be shocking to get patients sharing beds in the public hospitals due to the huge number of patients that they serve. He further stated that even the ration of patients to Doctors was not good and as such some patients could be forced to wait longer to get served. This makes this situation even worse of such patients have travelled long distance to get medical assistance.

The study finds agreed with Ajwang' (2023) who revealed that access to health services was determined by the socio-economic status of individuals within a population. He further indicated that the facets of social class were defined by factors including land or house ownership, and access to resources. If these factors are not proportionally distributed then access to health care access by various social groups will be disproportionately affected. Ajwang further stated that components of socio-economic status were intertwined with crucial features of life that affect health care including age, sex, and ethnic structure of a population, along with its geographical and occupational distribution. He further stated that Individuals living in different neighbourhoods have a

different likelihood of visiting different kinds of healthcare facilities, this is to say healthcare varies with social class, for example, public healthcare is used mostly by individuals from low-income households, while the private sector is predominantly used, by the people by those with higher incomes.

The challenges in the public health sector such as lack of adequate personnel, low funding and lack of medicine in hospitals have left many poor people more vulnerable to health risks that the richer members of the community. Even with the poor condition in the public facilities are still not sufficient with only Just 63 per cent of Kenyans having access to government health services located within an hour of their homes (Kimathi, 2017). In Uasin Gishu County, there are several private hospitals that are expensive and can only be afforded by the rich members of society. From the foregoing, it's evident that the amount of wealth one has determines the quality of health care services that one seek or receives.

Ilinca *et al* (2019) further affirmed that richer Kenyans use privately owned care facilities more frequently than lower socio-economic status individuals do, even after controlling for differences in care needs. They further stated that measured inequality increases considerably, both in the case of outpatient and inpatient care use, favouring richer individuals for privately owned services. Conversely, pro-poor inequality in the use of health services offered by publicly owned facilities. In other words, if we consider just the population who seeks care, lower socio- economic status individuals will rely on services provided by publicly owned facilities and non-profits more frequently, while richer individuals will represent the largest proportion of care users of for-profit, privately owned facilities.

Horizontal inequalities in access to health care are mainly defined along the social classes. The richer members of society who have the resources and can afford expensive health care services provided by private hospitals have access to better health care services, as compared to the poor members of society who have to rely on poorly funded and ill-equipped public hospitals. The situation is even made worse by the fact that many people have to move quite a distance to access healthcare facilities. The question as to whether an individual gets to become rich or poor for them to access quality health services is related to the issues of resource allocation, access to education and employment which fall squarely within the realm of horizontal inequalities. In this regard, horizontal inequalities have a direct bearing on whether or not people get to access quality healthcare services in Uasin Gishu County. Those who are denied access to health care services due to their economic status would most probably feel disenfranchised and blame the system of inequalities for their woes and could those mobilize along ethnic lines, especially if the system of inequality is skewed along ethnic lines.

4.5.3 Inequalties in access to Government Loans and Grants (Uwezo Fund and Youth Fund)

The study sought to establish whether there were inequalties in acess to government loans and grants such as Unwezo Fund. The findings revaled that 247 (65.9%) agreed that there was inequality while 58 (15.5%) stated that there no inequalties however, 70 (18.7%).

The findings from the household head were suppprted by those from Focus group discussions. During one of the youths FGDs, it emered that it was not easy to access governennt funds such as the Uwezo fund and Youth Enterprise developmemnmt fund.

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One of the youths stated that he applied for the fund and it took him 3 years to get the money and there was a lot of bureacracy even in the application process. he stated that as a young enterprenuer in Uasin Gishu county he faced several obstacles in accesing the fund and the money also came too late to help him as he had hoped it would. He stated that:

> Originally when we applied for thr fund there were lot of reguirements that we met as a group, and we were told that it would take two weeks to get the funds of Ksh. 100,0000. This turned into a 3 year wait. Such things demoalize people who want to empower themselves economically Youth FGD held at Catholic Diocese of Eldoret Compound on August 1, 2021).

Another youth stated that;

> Depending on where one applies for the funds, the come faster, for example, we applied for the Uwezo fund almost at the same time with another youth group. The difference wa that we were majorly people from ethic communities out or this county and the other group mostly had a groupf of locals youths from the dorminant ethnic group. Their money come much sooner that ours. This means that those that who process these funds at county level do it with some sort of favorism towards some ethnicities (Youth FGD held at Catholic Diocese of Eldoret Compound on August 1, 2021).

It was therefore evedent that in as much as many of those who applied has a chance at getting the funds, some of the applicants got prefrential treatment over others. One of the youths who was part of the FGD stated that at some point whne he was folloiwng up on why the funds had takne too long to come, he was asked by one of the officials why he did not make the application at his home County countituency offices. He revealed that this answers shocked him because as much as he was from the Kamba ethnic group his family lived in Uasin Gishu county that where his home was, so he just wondered why the issue of him being from the Kamba community was denying him opprtunities in Uasin Gishu county yet he was also a Kenyan.

According to information from the Uwezo Fund webiste, people applied for the funds through constiuecy offices which entailed approcess that was open to abuse by officials and as such could lead to ethnic discrimination as it emrged from the Focus Group Discussion. For example the websiate states that;

> The Applicant Group must apply for the loan from the constiunecy, be appriased and recommended for funding by the respective Constiunecy Uwezo Fund Management Committee (CUFMCs) (Uwezo Fund Webiste, 19th January, 2023).

In this regard, inequalities in acess to suhc essentail governemnt services could create ethnic tension especailly whne some ethnic groups benefit and others are deniied due to open discrimiantions. Such practices can create an impetus for group mobilization and ethnic conflicts if proper checks and balances are not put in place.

4.5.4 Cultural Status Inequalities Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish whether there were inequalities in the recognition of the status of cultural/ethnic groups in Uasin Gishu County. The findings revealed that 124 (33.1%) of the household heads agreed that there were inequalities in in cultural/ethnic status of the communities living in the county as compared to 251 (66.9%) who disagreed with this assertion. In this regard, the household heads in the county of Uasin Gishu were of the opinion that there cultural and ethnic status inequalities were not prominent in the county. However in the FGDs it emerged that this form of inequality was attributed to the constant way in which various ethnic groups were often associated with specific regions of the country. For example Luos being associated with Nyanza and Kikuyus being associated with Central Kenya and so on and forth.

One of the religious leaders in support of these arguments stated that there was no case of the government openly discriminating against or castigating cultures of other ethnic groups. He stated that the government has always been respectful to various cultures, however, the political class, some associated with the government have always targeted some ethic groups for political relevance and for other unknown reasons. He went ahead and stated that during the post-election violence of 2008, the Luo community suffered greatly in the hands of Kikiyu community in various parts of the county. The use of words like *kihi* to mean the uncircumcised was prominently used by Kukuyu political elite to justify their attacks on Raila Odinga who was the lead presidential contender and was from the Luo community. In fact during the violence, it was common to hear politicians from the Kikuyu community talking about circumcising Luos. This was an open attack on Luo culture and identity since the Luo don't culturally circumcise. The Kikuyu elites used their Kikuyu culture as a yardstick of deciding who was supposedly considered and adult and thus decided that Luos who were not circumcised were all children, such attacks aggravated the 2007 violence.

In another interview, the coordinator CJPC, stated that there was lot of ethnic based stereotypes among the communities living in the county. He stated that

> Sometimes people from various ethnic groups refer to one another in ways that could be considered offensive, for example you could hear someone from the other ethnic group referring to the Kalenjins as *Wajinga* (fools) and another person referring to the Kikuyus as *Wezi* (Thieves) (Interview with CJPC Coordinator, July 29, 2021).

Such utterances border on disrespecting other ethnic groups and could create a ripe environment for escalation of conflicts whenever they there is tension in the area like during periods of elections. The CJPC coordinator further indicated that local politics has

sometimes been geared towards making some ethnic groups feel like outsiders in their areas of residents. He elaborated that within Uasin Gishu County for example, the Kikuyu community have had specifically faced local political attacks with some of the political elite in the county talking about returning them back to where they came from namely central Kenya. He stated that some of the areas that were pre-dominantly inhabited by the Kikiyu community such as like *Yamubi, Munyaka, Kiambaa, Rurigi* and *Kimumu* had been some of the greatest hotspots of ethnic violence. This was attributed to the fact that some of the areas had been given Kikiyu names which the local Kalenjin elite felt was not right. One of the religious leaders stated that some of the local political elite had been heard saying that;

> These people should not come here and start naming our area Kiambaa or Rurigi, why can't they go back to Rurigi where they came from and leave our land to us (Interview with a Priest at RCEA Ushirika, July 31, 2021).

Such acts of ethnic profiling were bordering on denying the Kikuyu ethnic recognition and threatening their identity and as such could be serious factor for ethnic tension and even conflicts. According to Aktar & Alam (2021) Cultural inequality is generally intertwined with social, political and economic issues that defy inequality in income, wealth, gender, information, principles, arts, regulations, standards, values, and other abilities, as well as customs that are required to be the part of a society. Horowitz (2002) Further asserts that cultural matters, 'associated with various ethnic groups, and freedom of cultural expression more generally, often play a central role in the emergence of violent conflicts.

The findings were in agreement with Ahlberg & Njoroge (2013) who opined that the open cultural attacks by the political class during the 2007 election campaigns led to

some of the most gruesome forms of violence during the 2007/2008 Post election violence. According to Opondo (2014), culturally, the Kikuyu community circumscised their adolesecents while the Luo Communiity did not follow this culture. In the Kikuyu culture, Circumcision was a symbol of power and wealth (Ahlberg & Njoroge, 2013). The Kikuyu political elite have hence for along time used their cultural standrds as a yardstick to who should or should not be President without respect or consideration of other communities, specifically targeting the Luo who have been their arch political rivals since the 1960s. The cultural attacks that were metted agaist the Luo for many years have therefore created ethnic animosity between the two communities and hence led to gross violation of human rights during the 2007/2008 Post elections vioalnce and sustanined ethnic tensions between the two communities.

The findings agreed with Langer & Brown (2008) who argued that while severe socioeconomic horizontal inequalities can persist for decades without raising violent responses, changes in cultural status inequalities, like changes in political horizontal inequalities, can be important in the politicisation of inequalities. They can also be a factor in group mobilisation for violence. Symbolic events which reinforce or publicly 'perform' cultural status inequalities have an important role in triggering group violence. In some cases, this may be a deliberate and cynical provocation.

Fear of cultural or ethnic inequality and exclusion can lead to conflicts or civil strife and could lead to an attempt by some ethnic groups to secede as witnessed in the Balkans for example Keil (2017) while writing about the conflicts in the Balkan states argued that many Serbs voiced reasonable concerns once Croatia and Bosnia became independent, in particular pointing out that they would be reduced to minority status and dominated by

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other ethnic groups, this scholar further states that the leaders of Croatia and Bosnia did little to encourage Serbs living in their territory that they had a place in the new states and would be protected and recognized. This was an indication that the fear of not being recognized as an ethnic group in the newly created states of Bosnia and Croatia drove the Serbs to fight for their own secession.

Generally cultural status inequality does not officially exist in the county of Uasin Gishu as indicated by the household heads. This is attributed to the fact that there is no open government policy that discriminates ethnic groups in the county as the constitution protects people from such discrimination. However, there are several indictors for such inequalities to feature in the interactions between the local communities in the counties based on the ethnic card that is always played by the political elites when political temperatures flare-up. Ethnic and cultural stereotypes that have often been used by political players have a potential of escalating to ethnic based and cultural status discrimination that has the likelihood of causing or escalating violent conflicts because attacks on ethnic identity and cultural status is an attack on the identity of an ethnic or cultural group.

4.5.5 Correlation between socio-cultural inequalities and Ethnic conflicts Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish the correlation between the socio-cultural inequalities and the experiences of ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. The findings were as shown in Table 4.7.

Table 4. 7: Correlation between socio-cultural inequalities and Ethnic conflicts Uasin Gishu County

		Experienced ethnic Conflicts	Inequality in Access to Educational Funding	Inequality in Access to Health care	Inequality in Access to Government Loans and grants	Cultural Status Inequalities
Experienced ethnic Conflicts	Pearson Correlation	1	.018	.026	.061	.136**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.729	.613	.241	.009
	N	375	375	375	375	375
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).						

Source: Field Data, 2021

Based in the figures presented in Table 4.7 a cross tabulation of Inequality in Access to Educational Funding against ethnic conflicts revealed the Pearson Correlation coefficient (*r*) = .018 and p-value=.729; cross tabulation of Inequality in Access to Health care against experience of ethnic conflicts had *r*=.026 and p-value=.613; cross tabulation of inequality in Access to Government Loans/grants against experience of ethnic conflicts had *r*=.061 and p-value of .241 and finally a cross tabulation of Cultural/ethnic Status Inequalities had r=.136**and p-value of .009(significant).

The findings of the cross tabulation therefore affirmed that there was a weak positive correlation between all the four variable when tabulated against experience of ethnic conflicts. However cultural/ethnic status inequalities have a significant correlation against

ethnic conflicts, while the other three variable did not have significant correlation to ethnic conflicts. Therefore based on these findings, inequalities based on cultural and ethnic status could cause conflicts to a large extent with those bordering on education funding, healthcare and access to grants could cause conflict but not to a significant extent.

4.6 Chapter Summary

The chapter has discussed the nature of horizontal inequalities. The findings in the chapter have revealed that there is positive correlation between economic, political, social and cultural inequalities with ethnic conflicts. Regarding economic inequalities, the findings revealed that was a positive significant correlation between ownership of assets and ethnic conflicts an indicator that inequalities in asset ownership can lead to ethnic conflicts in the county. There was also a positive significant correlation between Land ownership and ethnic conflicts. In reference to political horizontal inequalities, the findings indicated that Ethnic Patronage, Bureaucracy and Corruption had a positive significant correlation with ethnic conflicts, an indication that Ethnic Patronage, Bureaucracy and Corruption influenced the occurrence of inter-ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County and finally the findings revealed that cultural status inequalities have a significant correlation with ethnic conflicts. An indication that inequalities based on cultural and ethnic status could cause conflicts to a large extent. The next chapter presents findings on Nature and extent of Intractable ethnic Conflicts In Uasin Gishu County

CHAPTER FIVE

THE NEXUS BETWEEN HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES AND INTRACTABLE ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY

This chapter present findings in line with the second specific objective of the study. The researcher analysed, presented, interpreted and discussed findings on the the nexus between horizontal inequalities and Intractbale ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. The chapter mainly focused on the types of intracbale ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County and the Correlation between Horizontal inequalities and various types of intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. The chapter also has a chapter summary

5.1 Period of residence in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish how long the household head had lived in Uasin Gishu County. This was important in assessing whether the respondents were familiar with any forms of horizontal inequalities that aided conflict in the study area. The finding revealed that 149 (39.7%) of the household heads had lived in the county for less than 5 years, 143 (38.1%) had stayed in the county for a period between 5-20 years and 83 (22.1%) had lived in the county for more than 20 years. The findings were as indicated in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5. 1: Period of Stay in the Area

Source: Field Data, 2021

The findings indicated that more than 60% of the household haeds had stayed in the

county for more then 5 years an indication that they were all aware of the issues of

conflicts withni the study area. During one of the FGD one of the women in Langas

marhert stated that she had stayed in the county since 1990 amd as such she wa aware of

the changin nature of conflicts in the study area. She stated that

> Having lived in this county for more than 30 years I know that the ethnic
> conflicts in this county normally go with the dynamics of of national
> politics and elections, for exmaple if 'your person' (ethnic King pin)
> belongs to a certain political persutaion then you get to know that things
> may be bad or not bad. For example in 1992 and 1997 ethnic conflicts
> were mostly between the Kalenjin and other communities that were anti-
> government, in 2008 the conflicts were mainly against the Kikuyu
> community (who were in Government) *vis-à-vis* the Luo, Kalenjin, Luhya
> among other major ethnic groups being one the same side, come 2017, the
> Kalenjin and Kikiyus were on one team and hence the Luo, Luhya and

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Kamba being on the opposing side. We are heading into 2022 with things looking heated between the Luo and Kalenjins with Kikuyus seemingly divided. (Women's FGD at the New Langas County Market, Kisumu Ndogo on July 31, 2021).

Therefore, there is clear indication the nature of ethnic conflicts in the county is predictable with ethnicity and national politics being at the center of what happens between various ethnic groups that inhbait the county.

5.2 Whether Respondents had Experienced Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish wether household heads had experienced conflicts over the perid they had stayed in the area. The findings revaled that 260 (69.3%) indicated that yes, they had experienced conflicts in the area whereas 115 (30.7%) stated that they had not experienced conflicts in the period that they had resideded in the area. The findings were as indicated in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5. 2: Whether Household heads had Experienced Conflicts

Source: Field Data, 2021

The findings from the household heads were in tandem with those from interviews and FGDs. During an interview with an officail from the CJPC he indicated that Uasin Gishu county had been the epicenter of major conflicts that had affected the county in the the past. He indicated that most of the ethnic conflicts that had occurred in kenya, Uasin Gishu has always been at the center of the violece due its cosmopolitan natire and also beased on the fact that the region has had powerful people in political positions. He went frther to elaborate that

> In this county, during Moi regyme, the local Kalenjin community always had some previlgaes for being part of the government and this why when their status of holding the presidency was threatened by other communtities like the Luo and Kikiyu in the 1992 and 1997 elections, local politicians inciated violence by calling other ethnicitites madoadoa. Such sentiments provkoed violence in the area and the trend continued in 2008 when the political narrative was mainly agaimts kikiyu community. (Interview with CJPC Coordinator, July 29, 2021).

These findings were affirmed by FGD participants who indicated that Uasin Gishu was one of those counties where tension was common especailly when the elections area around the corner. One of the Peace committee members stated that

> Conflicts in Uasin Gishu have been common since the 1990s with incidences of ethnic classhes whereby people get killed has been there. The last serious incidences were witnssed in 2007/2008. However, since 2013 there has been relative calm riddled with inter-ethnic tension as witnssed in the last two eelctions of 2013 and 2017. The 2022 election is also looking heated but we hope for the best (FGD Participant, 03/03/2021).

5.3 Frequency of the Conflicts in Uasin-Gishu County

The sought establish how frequent conflicts were experienced in Uasin Gishu County. The findings from the household heads revealed that 31 (8.3%) opined that the conflicts annually, 14 (3.7%) stated that the conflicts occurred times in a year. However, majority

of the household heads representing 330 (88%) emphatically stated that conflicts occurred during electioneering periods. The findings were as indicated in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5. 3: Frequency of Conflicts

Source: Field Data, 2021

The findings from the households were corroborated with those from key informant interviews as well as the Focus Group discussions. During an interview with a chief in Langas he stated that elections provided an opportunity for political players to to use the ethinic narrative to look for votes and this is the time when ethnic identity gets weaponised. He further added that;

> In as much as kenyan communities are subdivided into several ethnic groups, people only get a reminder that they belong to a particular ethnic group during campaigns. Politicians have more often than not used ethnicity as a way of gaining political millage and even intimidating ethnic groups that they feel do not support them. Geneneral its all about politicization of ethnicity.

In an interview with one of the religious leaders he added his voice to this by indicating that national politics has been the biggest cause of ethnic tension and resultant conflict in the election calendar he elaborated that;

> At what point does a person realise that he is A luo or a Kalenjin and that a Kikuyu next doo is his or her enemy? These people live together as neigbours for fours with their children palying together and going to same schools. They even borrow from one another and buy from the shops owned by the people from other ethnic groups. It is untill a politician comes and creates a narrative about enemity that you see peope staring to look at each other with suspicion. Conflicts in this county and in other parts of the countrty can only be contianed once we fix the politics of the nation. One way to deal with it is to probably get a more inclusive system of governance that deals with this whole narrative of Winner takes all and loser gets nothing (Interview with a Priest at RCEA Ushirika, July 31, 2021).

5.4 Types of Ethnic Conflicts experienced in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish the types of conflicts expereinced in Uasin Gishu county. The findings are as shown in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5. 4: Ethnic conflicts Conflicts experienced in Uasin Gishu County

Source: Field Data, 2021

5.4.1 Land Clashes

The findings in Figure 5.4 revealed that Land clashes was one of the conflict that was experiened in the area. The responses from the household heads revealed that 157 (41.9) agreed that land issues were deeply rooted and were a conflict factor in the county, 84 (22.4%) disgreed however, 134 (35.7%) indicated that they did not know whether land clashes were a type of conflcit in the area.

In supporting the findings, the CJPC coordinaotor indicated that Land was a major conflict issue in Uasin Gishu County. He revealed that there was a general feeling by the Kalenjin community that their ancestoral Land had been taken away unfairly and given to other communities mainly the Kikuyu community. He added that;

> Uasin Gushu County has been volatile and prone to conflicts due to the Land issues that can be traced back to the Colonial times and the the post colonial period. The Settlement schmes and Trust Farms such as Nyakinywa Trust farms which are mainly inhabitted by the Kikuyu community have been a major conflict issue in the area because the Kalenjins feel that the Kikuyus were brought here from central province and Given Kalenjin Lands for free (Interview with CJPC Coordinator, July 29, 2021).

The finding were further supported by one of the Priests who stated that:

> When Kenya got its independence in 1963, the way in which the government handled Land issues put Kenya in a position where ethnic groups especially the traditional inhabitants in the Rift valley felt short changed. This feeling had remained deeply rooted in the Kalenjin community in particular, they have always felt that they were left without Land and yet the white settlers took away these Land from them during the colonial period. The reason why Political temperatture normally reach a boiling point this county in every election is because of the belief by the locals that the next governement that would come to power would ensure that they effect the *majimboism* so that everybody goesback to their anscestoral homes. Many local politicians in this region have often used

the Land issue to sway the whole community in one particular political direction and this can be seen the voting patterns of the community since 1992. (Interview with a Priest at RCEA Ushirika, July 31, 2021).

The Land narrative has been perpututed in the political cycle so much that it has become one of those things that is known to send shivers down the spines of many non-Kalenjins living in Uasin Gishu county. The CJPC coordinator indicated that sometimes, leaflets have been found in various pars of the county threeatening the non-locals to vacate the area might not be meant for any political millage but some are alawys done by property brokers who take advantage of the sensitivity of Land issues with the aim of making people dispose of propety cheaply so that they can be able to acquire such property and later on sell them cheaply.

During Interviews with Peace committee members at the Catholic Diocese of Eldoret, the land issues was unanmously endorsed as one of the major types of conflicts in the study area. The Peace committee members indicated that theuse of terms like *Madoadoa* has been common by polticians in since the 1990s and it hit peak in 2007 campaigns hence the violence. The Peace committee members stated that the pattern of the 2007 violence was telling of the ethnic nature of the Conflict and how Land played at the centre of the conflict. Many people were eveicted from their farms, and these farms were taken by those who eveicted them, an indicator just how badly some people wanted to remove people from their Lands. Those evicted were mainly the non-Kalenjins.

The findings agreed with Veit, (2019) who opined that the re-distribution of Land in Kenya after independence became the source of ethnic animosity especially in the Rift valley region with Uasin Gishu and Nakuru Counties being the most affected. Veit indicated that animosity over land especially between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin

communities in the Rift valley can be traced back to post 1963 events in whereby after independence, much of the colonial-era "Crown Land" was categorized as government land. The native reserves became Trust land, but were still governed by statutory trustees the County Councils and the Commissioner of Lands rather than directly by traditional institutions. The Kenyatta government also established the Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT) to facilitate the purchase and distribution of settler farms to landless Kenyans (Boone, 2012). The high-density settlements provided some land to landless households, but the schemes were based on a market system and principally benefited Kenyans with the financial means to purchase land. Those who had customarily owned the land generally did not have access to the needed capital, or refused to purchase land which they considered to be theirs. Kenyans who purchased such land were seen as "immigrants" or "incomers." By 1977, about 95% of the former White Highlands had been transferred to black African ownership, principally Kikuyu. Ethnic favoritism and political patronage also played an important role in land acquisitions, as did corruption. Given the role of powerful Kikuyu politicians in Kenyatta's government, the system favored wealthy Kikuyu (and their land-buying companies) with political connections, at the expense of other ethnic groups, such as the Luo, Maasai and Kalenjin. Kikuyu gained access to settlement scheme lands in Coast Province, Rift Valley Province, and other locations across the country (Veit, 2019) Kenyatta himself illegally acquired large tracts of settlement land. By 1989, "incomers" comprised 35% of the Rift Valley population. Other ethnic groups were outraged, a source of long-term ethnic animosities.

The land Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County can therefore be traced back to the 1960s. For instance according to Mwamba, Kagema & Kanga (2019) As far back as 1969, the

Honorable Jean Marie Seroney, who was Member of Parliament for Tinderet Constituency had drawn a controversy when he authored '*The Nandi Declaration'* that demanded all non-Nandi residents vacate the ancestral land of Nandi. The Kenyatta government reacted by imprisoning Seroney for sedition but his ideas did not die.

Onguny & Gillies, (2019) added that Land tensions were exacerbated by President Moi, who held office from 1978 until 2002. Like Kenyatta, Moi used land to reward loyalists and achieve short-term political ends. He offered sizeable parcels of prime land in Trans Nzoia, Nandi, Uasin Gishu and other Rift Valley Districts to loyalists largely drawn from his Kalenjin community at well-below market prices. Much of this land had been in protected forest reserves or in the hands of parastatals such as the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) and Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI).

Veit (2019) further argued that with the exception of the 2002 elections, all elections held since multi-partyism was re-introduced in Kenya in 1991 have been marred by land conflicts, violence and population displacement. In an effort to deflect the political threat of multi-partyism, President Moi portrayed the opposition as Kikuyu-led and focused on controlling land. He evoked *majimboism*, which, while not fully or officially defined, was interpreted as a "get the land back issue." To recover "stolen" land, Kikuyu were evicted from areas where they had settled in the Rift Valley and western Kenya. Much of the violence was centered in areas where so-called "immigrant" groups were located. Clashes throughout the 1990s left thousands of people dead and over 350,000 displaced (Oucho, 2002). Ethnically charged land-grabbing further undermined customary tenure arrangements. Political manipulation of land grievances, however, helped Moi win elections in 1992 and 1997 (Oucho, 2010). As Mwamba, Kagema & Kanga (2019) put

it, this was an irony since the violence that was experienced in the region from 1991/1992 looked like President Moi's government adopted Jean Marie Seroney's template for ethnic exclusivity by expanding to the larger Kalenjin community and evicting the Kikuyus, Luos, Luhyas and Kisiis in his bid to secure political victory in the Rift Valley.

Onguny & Gillies, (2019) further revealed that during the 2007 elections, just as it was in 1992 and 1997 elections, *majimboism* was evoked and historic land grievances were used to stir up ethnic tensions. Violence was centered in areas where "immigrant" groups were located such as the Rift Valley. CIPEV noted that there was an expectation of the eviction of non-Kalenjin people from South Rift long before the elections were held, there was an expectation that, as a result of the enforcement of *majimbo,* other communities would have to leave the Rift Valley. Viet (2019) indicated that the recurrent conflicts that have been experienced in Kenya and especially in the Rift valley stem in large measure from unresolved and politically aggravated land grievances. Counties with the highest percentage of land expropriated by the government or Trust land such as Kajiado, Laikipia, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Nakuru and Kwale have been the epicentres of violence over the past 30 years. He added that that 95% of recent violence in the Rift Valley has occurred in areas where settlement schemes are located.

Wambua (2017) further opined that indeed the land question was an underlying factor behind much of the organized violence in the Rift Valley, as well as being critical to the more localized ongoing conflicts in Mt Elgon and Molo. Indeed, since the 1990s certain leaders have exploited grievances over perceived 'historical injustices' and poorly handled settlement schemes for electoral advantage. These grievances are perceived as

favouritism and corruption by successive governments in the allocation of fertile land, including a refusal to prevent and reverse the settlement of outsiders (notably Kikuyu) in the land originally appropriated from the local residents by the colonial authorities. Horowitz and Klaus (2018) have observed that "appeals to ethnic grievances can encompass multiple logics, connecting to feelings of economic and political powerlessness stemming from the inability to secure land, alongside the belief that the victory of an ethnic patron will produce material benefits related to land, employment, or security"

Onguny & Gillies, (2019) avvered that in 2010, Kenya promulgated a new Constitution which ushered in significant changes to land governance and tenure. Accrording to the 2010 constitution, all land belongs to the people of Kenya, land is public, community or private, it also establishes a National Land Commission (NLC), and allows non-citizens to hold land only on the basis of leasehold tenure. They added that despite Kenya adopting a new Constitution in 2010, which provides the ground for the implementation of the National Land Policy through institutions such as the National Land Commission (NLC), increased politicization of these institutions means that they are likely to make politically motivated decisions.

From the foregiong, ethnic nationalism in Uasin Gishu has always been coalesced around the Land issues and whenever conflicts erupt, the aim is always to evict the so-called outsiders from the region. The Nandi declaration of 1969 has been one of those driving forces towards the quest for land in the county with political players incluidng Moi governmemnt playing the same card in the 1992 and 1997 elections. Yet, the 2007-2008 post-election violence is a stark reminder of the risks associated with the politicization of

land ownership. Therefore, the complex nature of land access paired with the political goals for land claims has already in the past incited violence and stokes its continuation.

5.4.2 Ethnic idenity Conflicts

The study sought to establish whether ethnic idenity conflict were experienced in Uasin Gishu were ethnic. The findings in Figure 5.4 revealed that Ethnic violence was one of the types of conflicts in the county with 215 (57.3%) of the household heads in agreement, as compared to 65 (17%) who did not agree with this assertion. However, 95(25.3%) inidicated that they did not know whether ethnic violence was a type of conflict in the study area.

The Findings were supported by those from Women's FGD held in Langas. The women stated that one way that was used to idenity people and separate those who get attcked and those who do not get attacked was through their ethnicity. They stated that people could simply be idenified as Luo, Kikiyu, Kalenjin, Kisii etc. the women ststed that their experience in the 2007/2008 Post election violence was that the attacks were not random but rather targeted. One woman stated that

> *Vita ya 2007 watu wa makabila filani ndio walivamiwa na ilikua wale makabila wanashindana, kwasababu ungepata mjalua anaishi kwa ploti ya Mkikiyu na wale vijana walukua wanavamia watu na mapanga wangeviamia nyumba ya huyu mjaluo na wasivamie wale wakikuyu wanaishi hapo. Inamaanish walijua ni nani wanaedna kuvamia na kabila yake ni gani. Hata hawagenge choma manyumba za watu wao. Kama ile Kanisa ya Kiambaa si ni wakikuyu tu walichomekeaka ndani*. (During the violence of 2007, those who attacked people only targted ethnic groups that were oppposed to them. For example if you were a Luo living on a rental house owned by a Kikuyu, those Kikiyu millitia with machetes would come for you but not attack the Kikuyus living within the same rental property. This means they knew your ethnicity before coming to attack. Even those who burned houses only targeted the houses of enemy ethnic group. The Kiambaa church only had Kikuyus inside for example)

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(Women's FGD at the New Langas County Market, Kisumu Ndogo on July 31, 2021).

In agreement with these findings, during an interview with one of the officials of the inter-faith Council in Uasin Gishu county indicated that the County was one of the few areas that truly had the face of Kenya and that what was happening in the County was a reflection of hown Kenyans Coexisted. He added that ethnic nationalism was still very strong and had taken the form of negative ethnicty. He added that ethnic labelling had become a common feature of how people relate, for example it was common for people to ask for 'your second name' in Kenya for them to know how to treat. The reason why someone would want to know your second name is simply to know your ethnic identity. The CJPC coordinnator supprted this argument by stating that theeven in employment its like your second name plays a bigger role on whether you get a job or not.

The findings agreed with Mitullah (2021) who opined that the identity prism of "us vs. them" whether with respect to economic status, ethnic group, or religion places Kenyans in difficult situations. Over the years, Kenya has experienced conflicts triggered by activated emotions related to ethnicity and socio-economic status, whether in historically disadvantaged communities or regions, during the competition for limited resources such as water and pasture, or as part of political competition among leaders looking for support and votes. For example, post-election violence in 2007 was triggered by historical grievances related to land, privileges, and inequalities among ethnic groups (Government of Kenya, 2008; Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009. Mitullah (2021) further avers that Political party affiliation, a fickle identity that mostly pops up during elections but is also to a large extent tied to ethnic identity. Intolerance

during elections may be fanned by agents of political parties, especially in regions that are strongholds of particular parties, and individuals affiliated with a non-dominant party may be exposed to hostility, eviction, even the burning of their homesteads. However, according to Barreto, (2011) and Brass (1991) ethnic identity is is not a problem unless it is activated for undesirable ends. Ilorah, (2009) affirms that in Kenya, as in many other African countries, such activation occurs when people are treated unequally based on their ethnicity with respect to access to resources and services.

The findings further supported the arguments by Oyugi (1997) who opined that that the identity dimension, most especially the ethnic-identity dimension, is one of the most significant when it comes to analysing ethnic conflicts in Kenya. Kenya is composed of forty-four ethnic identities, commonly defined in the derogatory form as 'tribes'. The argument is therefore used that electoral conflicts in the country are based on ethnic affiliations (Ishiyama, Gomez, & Stewart, 2016). It is however important to note that Kenyans co-exist peacefully until the political leadership elevates ethnic persuasions and sensitivities in their quest for political power especially electoral campaigns.

Additionally the study findings were in tandem with Wambua (2017), who revealed that the apparently fallacious 'Kikuyunisation' and 'Kalenjinisation' of political debates on power distribution in the country propagate ethnic hatred and repudiate any well-intended argument for national unity. 'Kikuyunisation' and 'Kalenjinisation' subtleties are used to promote the continued domination of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic identities in national leadership. Three of Kenya's presidents; Jomo Kenyatta, Mwai Kibaki, and Uhuru Kenyatta, are from the Kikuyu ethnic group while the other two Daniel Moi and William Ruto are from the Kalenjin ethnic group. Since these two ethnic identities have

dominated political leadership, there is a growing agitation against them. Additionally, ethnically biased political appointments into various state positions and positions of authority have intensified intensify the ethnic identity-based political discourses that have created a ripe environment for ethnic violence albeit the negative peace experienced in Kenya today.

Identity conflicts are further exacerbated ethnic stereotypes which has been a common feature of Kenyan politics. Such acts of stereotype were have been in seen within the Kenyan Political cycles since the 1960s just after Kenya's indepndendence Ahlberg & Njoroge (2013) indicted that During the Kenyatta era, the emerging political Elite continued entrenching a process where male circumcision was appropriated to mean somebody of wealth and power, thus further entrenching ethnic chauvinism. By the mid-1960s Kenyatta made his infamous rebuke of Bildad Kaggia, a Gikuyu man who had been jailed together with him by the colonial state. Kenyatta had publicly asked what Kaggia had done for himself, since his release from detention and wondered why he behaved like a *kihii*. Unlike Kenyatta and some former freedom fighters, Kaggia refused to a mass land or wealth for himself. Kenyatta also accused Kaggia of being a traitor to the Gikuyu people for joining the Kenya People's Union Party (KPU), then led by Oginga Odinga, a Luo, and a *kihii*. The rebuke of Kaggia for not enriching himself and for acting like an uncircumcised man (*kihii*) and as a traitor to the Gikuyu for supporting a political party led by uncircumcised man implies that male circumcision has become a symbol of ethnic stereotype, political discrimination, and economic power.

The narrative of ethnic chauvinism that had been propaged in the Kenyatta era came back strongly in Kenya politics during the 2007 election campaigns and created ethnic animosity among the Luo and Kikuyu communities led to massive being atrocities committed against the Luo by Kikuyu Millitia during the 2007/2008 PEV. For example according to Ahlberg & Njoroge (2013) On the night from 30 to 31 December 2007 alone, 38 Luo men were forcibly circumcised and left bleeding to death. Forced circumcision was allegedly 'carried out in a crude manner with objects such as broken glass. The Waki report (2008) illustrated how Luo men were forcibly circumcised, the Report revealed that Men rather than women were hunted down and forcibly circumcised or had their penis cut or mutilated, sustaining long-lasting, and debilitating injuries. Opondo (2014) further contends that the circumsion debate has been used in the past to throw shades at the Luo community during political contests. In his own words, Opondo describes this form of ethnic chauvinism as primordial sentiments and stereotypes which have been used to discriminate the Luo community during electoral contests in Kenya.

The findings further agreed with Mwamba, Kagema & Kanga (2019) who opined that Ethnic stereotypes in Kenya are a major cause of ethnic tension that has led to bloodshed and displacement for many years in the county. In their study which was conducted in the Context of Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), it emerged that that stereotyping is a major reason for the persistence of conflicts in Kenya. The study conducted in the Coast, Nakuru and Eldoret revealed that the Kikuyus are stereotyped by all the other tribes as thieves, opportunists and land grabbers, people who love money excessively. They added that, the Kikuyus on the other hand regarded the Coastal people and Kalenjins as lazy, non-industrious and envious; just waiting for handouts. The findings of

the study from one of its FGDs held in Eldoret Presbytery further revealed that the Kikuyus stereotyped the Kalenjins as war-mongers; people who fight for no apparent reason and are ready for a fight all the time.

Ethnic identity therefore emerges as one of the key indicators of ethnic conflicts. In as much as sometimes, ethnic identity may not lead to direct physical violence between ethnic groups, the feelings of disenfranchisement associated with ethnic discrimination and worst cases when such discrimination is institutionalized may lead to ethnic hatred that may at an opportune time justify ethnic mobilization for violence. The fact that Uasin Gishu County and the rest of the Country have never experienced a fullmobilization blown ethnic civil war except for the pockets of violence during elections is not an indicator of positive pis eace but rather negative peace that is shrouded by social injustice, discrimination and inequalities that against various ethnic groups and that is why in every electoral cycle, ethnic tension and risk of ethnic violence always reaches a high level.

5.4.3 Politically Instigated Violence

The study sought to establish whether Politically instigated violence was a type of conflict in Uasin Gishu county. The findings in Figure 5.4 revealed that 246 (65.6%) of the household agreed that politically instigated violence was one of the most common types of conflicts that had been experienced in the area, this was in contrast to 36 (9.6%) of the household heads who stated that they disagreed while 93 (24.8%) indicated they did not know whether Politically instigated conflicts were experienced in the county. The findings from Interviews and Focus Group Discussions were in suppprt of those from household heads. There was a general consecus among all the Key informants that the

people who played the biggest role in creating ethnic division and mobilizing their co-ethnic and supporter for conflicts were those in the Political class.

The CJPC coordinator stated that;

> For policians to remain relevant they must evoke the ethnic card. This is is because the ethnic card speaks to the emotions and to the identity of their supporters. Politicians in Kenya have been forming ethnic based coalitions with the aim of ensuring that they lock the other ethnicities opposed to them out and hence potraying the other ethnicities as enemies. Sometimes those in political leadership or those aspirants who want to be elected use foul langauge to refer to their opponents and at the end of the day, these acts lead to possible violence in the course of campiaigns which with time could town out to be violent ethnic conflicts(Interview with CJPC Coordinator, July 29, 2021).

In another inteview conducted at the RCEA Ushirika, the religious leader indicated that Politicians always use ordinary *mwanainchi* (citizen) as a ladder towards acquiring political power and in many cases the politicians do many terrible things including inciting their supporters so that they can get into these leadership positions. he further added that one card the politicians have always played is the issue of resource distribution. He affirmed that

> Kenyan politics has always been based on the presimise that who ever wins the Presidency gets to control resource distribution. Therefore every ethnic groups alawys seeks to get a person to state house for them to benefit. This idea of an ethnic group winning the Presidency or being in a position to benefit ftom it has been one factor that has made many political players resort to dirty tactics while mobilizing for votes or disrediting their opponents. Some of the dirty tactics that have been used in the County includes threatening those who don't support the popular candidate in the region with eviction through use of leaflets and even in some cases policians themselves encouraging such threats by labelling other ethninc groups *madoadoa*. (Interview with a Priest at RCEA Ushirika, July 31, 2021).

During an interview with an Imman in Eldoret town, he indicated that the reason why political incitement to violence has been common in the Country is because, each communty wants a cahnce at controlling the national Cake. He that the political competition was mainly motivated by the desire to benefit from the national coffers because if your 'person' is not in statehouse, then you are doomed untill the next election.

The findings were consistenment with those of Wambua (2017) class patronage in the unequal distribution of resources during the reign of President Jomo Kenyatta (1963–1978) entrenched structural differences amongst the indigenous communities. The Kenyatta administration entrenched structural injustices that have transcended political regimes to present-day Kenya. The distribution of political resources, especially in the personalisation of power during the Kenyatta administration, established genuine resource distribution grievances that entrenched political divisions in the country.

Ajulu (2008) opined that the political leaders in the Kenyatta administration would have known too well that the inequitable distribution of resources, both economic and political, was a recipe for ethnic violence given the overlap of ethnic and regional identities in the country. As Musau (2008) notes through domination and manipulation of the political institutions, these leaders turned elections into structures for rewarding loyalists and punishing dissenting voices.

According to Ajulu (2008), President Daniel Moi's administration (1978–2002) heightened the unfettered accumulation of state resources. The personalisation of state power, and the articulation of the political interests of the ruling elite, led to the massive plunder of state coffers and heightened the demand for constitutional and institutional

reforms in the country. Nevertheless, Moi engaged in the divide-and-rule tactic thereby playing the ethnic card instituted by President Kenyatta into Kenya's political contest. The president fiddled with ethnicity to gain political mileage.

Wambua (2017) added that the re-introduction of democratic multiparty politics in Kenya in 1991 led to the embattled history of electoral conflicts in the country. Democratic politics occasioned the creation of a multiplicity of political parties, most of which were conceived without substantive political ideologies and served solely as political instruments to acquire political power. These parties were established by regional kingpins who made their ethnic positioning the basis for their power. The political parties were therefore rendered ethnic in their configuration against the nationalistic Kenya African National Union (KANU) party that had a well-established nation-wide support and patronage (Ajulu, 2008).

The 1992 general elections were a major milestone in the development of the embattled democratic discourse in Kenya. According to Oyugi (1997), the 1992 election was a huge disappointment to democracy because, during this election, electoral malpractices were observed, in particular vote rigging and voter buying. The well-coordinated electoral conflict that was experienced in the Rift Valley during this election was disastrous. In addition, political participation in this election had been reduced to ethnic mobilisation of the unemployed youth through propaganda and violence (Wamwere, 2008). Osamba (2001) added that ethnic politics and violence seem to have resurfaced with the advent of political pluralism in Kenya in 1991. The violence adversely affected Kenya's most fertile region of the Rift: Valley, Nyanza and Western Provinces. The Rift Valley covers 40% of Kenya. The farms acquired by non-Kalenjin in the Rift Valley were the focus of violence.

The Kalenjin laid claim to all the land in the province, based on the so-called rights of previous ownership of those lands in pre-colonial times. The Kalenjin vented their anger on other ethnic groups, whom they viewed as supporters of the political opposition.

A similar situation was witnessed in the 1997 general elections which were organised against a backdrop of an unrelenting quest for change of the Moi regime. The electoral campaign during the 1997 election had exhibited signs of looming violence. Brown (2011) reported that during the electoral violence was witnessed in towns like Mombasa and Eldoret with observed loss of human life, and the increase of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), especially in the Rift valley, Nyanza, Western and Coastal regions.

Wambua (2017) indicated that the rather peaceful general election of 2002, sometimes described as a 'transition election', realised the democratic intentions of regime change and assured the people a period of relative, albeit negative, peace. The Kibaki administration, however, failed to inspire the resolve to pursue positive peace in the country. The immediate breakdown of the coalition over an alleged failure to honour a pre-election power deal, a supposed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) as defined by the coalition partners' leaders, Raila Odinga of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Kibaki of the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK), led to renewed political antagonisms in the quest for constitutional reforms in the country (Ajulu 2008).In this regard the 2007 general election was held amidst deep political tensions. According to the Independent Review Commission (2008), the campaign process was generally peaceful, the political parties, largely the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), the Party of National Unity (PNU), and ODM-Kenya, established nation-wide campaign machinery, with a tight race poised between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga.

The Kriegler and Waki Reports of 2009 indicated that most media houses avoided hate speech but several FM stations incited ethnic animosity during the 2007 elections According to IREC (2008) report Kass FM radio, broadcasting in Kalenjin language, allegedly aired materials of xenophobic nature against the Kikuyu community. Kameme and Coro FM radio stations broadcasting in Kikuyu dialect had programmes that encouraged ethnic chauvinistic divisions. In addition, phrases such as 'madoadoa' (blemishes) and 'getting rid of weeds', in reference to the non-Kalenjin community living in Rift Valley, were aired by Kass FM. In addition, Inooro FM played Kikuyu dialect songs that imaged Raila Odinga as a murderer and even characterised the Luo community as lazy hooligans who do not pay rent. In this regard, hate messages targeted towards specific ethnic groups were used to create political mileage in the campaigns and in the process polarizing the country further along politicized ethnic lines.

Ethnic patronage has been a defining character of Kenyan politcs of resource distribution since independence. Subsequent post colonial administrations have entrenched the politics of brinkmanship, in which only the co-ethicsnof the person in statehouse get to benefit from the national cake. The Politics of 'eating" have been charactersied by unfair and unequal distribution of resources that have led to ethnic mobilization by those who benefit from patronage and those who don't benefit. For the beneficaries, the fight has been about maintaing the status quo and those who have been sidelined in resource allocation, the fight has been about getting a chance to enjoy the national cake just like others have done since independence.

5.5 Nature Ethnic the conflicts

The study sought to establish the nature of ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu county. The findings in Figure 5.5 revealed that 203 (54.1%) of the household heads opined that the conflicts were brutal in nature while 172 (45.9%) stated that the conflicts were not brutal.

Figure 5. 5: Nature of Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County

Source: Field Data, 2021

The findings from the household heads were consistent with those from Key informants and Focus group Discussions. During an interview with a senior Police officer at Eldoret Police station, he stated that the conflicts that had been experienced in the county in the past were violent with incidences of property damage and even deaths. The officer cited the 2007 violence in which many violent activities were witnessed in the county. He

stated that during the 2007/2008 violence they had in some cases to respond with force including through the use of teargas and shooting in the air in order to protect life and property. The officer further added that in some instances especially like the one of 2007/2008 in which violence was widespread they were forced to also protect themselves against charging crowds and rowdy youths and this is why in some cases there were reports that some officers had used excessive force. The officer however indicated that there very few and isolated cases of such incidences which he said that were always investigated and if foul paly was found them such officers would face the law like any other persons. Conflicts in the county mainly come through Politics and area meant to cause massive destruction that the Police always try to prevent.

The Police officers also stated that just like the rest of Kenyans, the issues of ethnicity were also present in the force. He stated that;

> The Police Officers are also Kenyans and they are part of the society so anything that affects people including the issues of ethnicity sometimes can come to play even within the service, although as disciplined forces such feelings are always suppressed since they must serve all equaly. It however does not mean that you will not fimd a few bad apples. We are a society like the rest of the Kenyan socities with the same weaknesese that anyother socity woud have (Interview with Senior Police Officer at Eldoret Police Station, July, 29 2021).

The findings were alos supported by religious leaders who indiacted that the type of conflits that have been witnessed in the county have mainly been brutal and when they are not brutal they spark tensions that can lead to highest levels of vioelence when they erupt. In an interview with a Muslim Cleric, he stated that;

> Uasin Gishu County is always peaceful though tensions norammly skyrocket during election periods like now that were are heading for the 2022 elections. In my more than 30 years of stay in this county, i was here during the 1990s whne the quest for multiparty democracy was happening and I can assure you that when violence breaks out in this area, its is not a

place you would want to be in. I have seen houses burn, people killed and several injured in the past incidences of violence that I have bee able to witness. Indeed it has always in brutal whne it happens (Interview with Muslim Cleric at Asis Hotel in Eldoret Town on July 31, 2021).

The sentiments of the Sheik were supported by another Priest who stated that;

The type of violence that has been witnessed in this county in past electoral violence has been brutal to the core. Did you hear about Kiambaa church? Can you imagine a person burning people in a church? If that is not brutal then I don't know another definition of brutal. The people who sought refuge thought that the house of God was the safest place to run to but even there, they were not spared so that example alone is an indicator of the level of brutality that has often been expireinced when there are fullblown conflicst in this area. The level of violence seen in 2007 can only be an indicator of how deeply ethnic hatred is entrenched in this county (Interview with member of the Inter-Faith Council of Uasin Gishu County held in Eldoret Town held on August 3, 2021).

The CJPC coordinator further Indicated that the brutal nature of the conflict made the then Catholic Biship, the Late Cornelious Korir to convert the compound of the Catholic Diocese into an IDP centre that was receiving people who had run awat from their homes for fear of being killed. He added that the Diocses housed people from all ethnicities and protected them against further harm during the violence. The coordinator added the violence was not only metted on people by groups rowdy youths who were attacking and Killing people but even the Police palyed a role in making the violence worse. He indiaced that;

Generally the Police have always shown some bias in responding to incidences of ethnic conflicts. it is something that its open for everyone to see. The Police always serve the interests of those in power and will always act according to the orders from above and this is why their human rights record is always poor whenever human rights reports are released. Since the 1990s, the Police have always been used by the government in popwer to terrorize the opposition and its supporters. Moi did it, Kibaki did it and even Uhuru Kenyatta has done it. The Police have always contributed to making the conflicte even more brural (Interview with CJPC Coordinator, July 29, 2021).

In a nutshell, the conflicts that have been experienced In Uasin Gishu in Post-colonial Kenya have had incidences of Killings and mass displacement of populations and sexual violence being witnessed during the conflicts. These brutal acts of violence were perpetrated not only by the civilians who attacked the so-called 'outsiders' but also by the Police.

The Findings agreed with Wambua (2017) who opined that the state of internal conflict in Kenya has prevented the maintenance of peace in the country. Since independence in 1963, the country has experienced electoral reversals and tensions. This has led to a situation in which peace is mostly absent, or, if present, is just negative peace. The negative peace is, however, periodically interrupted by periods of manifest conflict, especially during general elections. According to During KNHCR (2017), in the 1992, 1997, 2007, and 2017 general elections, the country experienced brutal electoral violence that led to loss of lives and internal displacement of persons.

The Findings further agree with Oyugi (2000) who indicated that the incidences of brutal ethnic violence can be traced mainly to the first multiparty election in Kenya that was held in 1992. In the run-up to the multiparty elections, the Luo and Kikuyu community wanted to dislodge President Moi (a Kalenjin) from Presidency. The two groups had formed an alliance of convenience and out of necessity to dislodge the Moi regime. Radicalized politicians from Gusii and Luhyaland later joined them. By coincidence, all these communities had benefited from the land settlement in and around Rift Valley and therefore became the target of "revenge" by the KAMATUSA coalition that controlled led political power at the time. Expecting at the time to be humiliated at the forthcoming elections, the KAMATUSA group in KANU got together and decided that those ethnic

groups that were betraying them should be taught a lesson. The lesson in question involved their expulsion from especially the " Kalenjin-Maasai lands" in the Rift Valley. Such an expulsion would also rid the province of anti-KANU, anti-Moi voters; thereby denying the opposition critical votes needed to attain the 25% requirement. The ethnic ideology was at once invoked and politicized in order to mobilize the KAMATUSA group throughout the Rift Valley to evict the "outsiders" from their ancestral land.

The mobilization campaign was spearheaded by some very senior cabinet ministers who addressed rallies in major towns in the Rift Valley and exhorted their kinsmen to protect their "own" government. As put by (Oyugi 1997), most of these statements were very inflammatory, and in normal circumstances would have earned a sack for a minister. As the elections drew closer, war-like speeches increased in intensity. Cases of ethnic clashes erupted towards the end of 1991 directed practically against all non-KAMATUSA Rift Valley inhabitants. Cases of people being killed here and there began to appear frequently in the local press. But the most effective strategy employed was the destruction of homes and property of the victims in the hope that they would flee to their "ancestral lands". Those who sought refuge in mission centres became targets of ruthless attacks.

Oyugi (2000) added that in some areas, whole communities were dislocated on flimsy grounds. A case in point is in Narok where the then Minister for Local Government declared a settlement scheme at Enoosupukia trust land on the grounds that it was a catchment area. This was intended to weaken the voting power of outsiders in the area. The same was the case with the Luo in Kericho who were removed from an area they had settled for over sixty years. In the meantime, the non-KAMATUSA who had reached

majority age were denied identity cards and thereby registration as voters in the hope that they would go back to their ancestral land. The total number of deaths between was estimated to be between 700 to 1000 with a total of between 150, 000 to 250, 000 people displaced from the conflicts. There was a deliberate effort to evict people forcefully and other people also abandoned their lands due to fear of being attacked. In the meantime efforts were being made on the ground to acquire the lands that had been abandoned out of fear of attacks. The conflict situation as bad that 1993. The Conflict situation was so bad that in 1993 President Moi invoked the Preservation of Public Security Act and declared Molo, Elburgon, Londiani and Burnt Forest areas "Security Zones" as a way of controlling violence.

Similar tactics were used during the 1997 elections which were also brutal and led to massive loss of lives and proper. According to Mutahi & Ruteere, (2019) in the 1997 general elections, new 'ethnic clashes' were witnessed in the Rift Valley and at the Coast where 'upcountry' communities who were seen as core opposition supporters were targeted in a replay of the 1991 to 1993 violence. Post-election ethnic violence was then used in some cases to punish those who had voted for the opposition.

The role of the Police the conflicts could not be ignored in this study, as Mukaria, (2019) posits amid these ethnically tense political landscapes, police have found themselves in the middle, compromised in taking sides in favour of the government and violating the rule of law and constitution. The police have had a huge role to play in the brutal nature of electoral-related ethnic conflicts with many of them being accused of using excessive force and live ammunition among other forms of brutal acts including rape. During the 2007/2008 post elections violence the Police killed several protesters in opposition

strongholds with places like Eldoret town in Uasin Gishu County being among those places that were affected by police brutality. The 2007-2008 violence that followed a disputed presidential election left at least 1,133 people dead, more than 600,000 displaced, and unmasked ethnic tensions that still haunt the country.

According to Mutahi & Ruteere, (2019) in all of the cases of election-related violence since 1992, the police had emerged as complicit through acts of commission and omission. Reports from official investigations and non-government organizations had all indicted the police for taking sides in the ethnic violence against opposition supporters. At the same time, a failure to arrest the perpetrators of ethnic violence led many to conclude that the police were part of the political instrumentalization of violence against the opposition. The role of the police became even more glaring in the 2007/8 post-election violence. As CIPEV found, the police did not only fail to respond when needed to save lives but also in some cases acted unprofessionally, with some officers supporting their ethnic kin during the violence. The deployment of administrative police disguised as civilians in opposition areas also further dented the credibility of the police as impartial bureaucratic enforcers of law and order

According to Human Rights watch (August 27, 2017) August 8, 2017, was marred by serious human rights violations and brutality, including unlawful killings and beatings by police during protests and house-to-house operations in western Kenya. The Star Newspaper on December 20, 2017 reported that following August 8 and the repeat election help on October 26, 2017, the Police killed 92 people. Human Rights watch (2017) reports revealed that since the Kenyan politics is characterized by inter-ethnic tensions. Political alliances are often formed along ethnic lines, and one's ethnicity is

easily associated with support for a certain political party or candidate. As in the 2007-2008 violence, sexual violence during the 2017 political violence was directed at women and girls because of their gender but also their ethnicity and was used to punish the individual women and their communities for the way they voted. Kenyan authorities deployed large numbers of paramilitary units in many opposition areas ahead of elections in anticipation of potential violence. These included agents from the General Service Unit (GSU) police, Administration Police (AP), and units from Prisons, Kenya Wildlife Service, and National Youth Service. Many survivors and witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch described their rapists as policemen or men in green uniforms who often carried guns, batons, tear gas canisters, whips, or wore helmets and other anti-riot gear. This was an indicator that Police brutality was massive during conflicts. The excessive use of force let to several incidences of the killings, sexual violence and assault were also perpetrated by the men in uniform.

From the findings it is therefore evident that the conflicts in Uasin Gishu County have often been brutal whenever physical violence erupts as witnessed in the incences of violence that surrounded the 1992, 1997, 2007 elections. One important thing to naote however is that most of these acts of violence are witnessed mainly when political temperature rise to uncontrolbale levels which is during electioneering periods. This was proved following the 2013 election which did not have incidences of conflicts because two ethnic communities i.e the Kalenjin and Kikuyu who were always at conflict had a political pact and were thus on the same team. However, if the Kind of tension that was experienced in Uasin Gishu County following the Political fall out between President Uhuru Kenyatta and his Deputy Willam Ruto was anything to go by, then it would be

right to say that even the absence of Violence in the county in 2013 and 2017 was not a reflection of genuine Peace (Postive Peace) but rather an indication that the Political marriage of convenience that only served to stop physical violence and bring about some semblance of peace (negative peace). Therefore in Uasin Gishu County, there many underlying issues would probably lead to much worse incidences of ethnic conflicts in the future if not handled well.

5.6 Major Perpetrators of Ethnic Conflicts in Uasin-Gishu County

The study sought to find out the opinions of the household heads on who the major perpetrators of ethnic conflicts were in Uasin Gishu county. The findings were as discussed in the subsequent subsections. The findings were as indicated in Figure 5.6.

Figure 5. 6: Perpetrators of Ethnic Conflicts

Source: Field Data, 2021

The findings in Figure 5.6 study revealed that politicians were major perpetrators of ethnic conflicts as indicated by showed that 307 (81.9%) of the household heads who strongly agreed with this assertion and 31 (8.3%) agreed, however, 24 (6.4%) were undecided, 10 (2.7%) disagreed and 3 (0.8%) strongly disagreed with the argument that politicians were major perpetrators of ethnic conflicts in the study area. In reference to the youths as perpetrators of ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County, study found that 92 (24.5%) of the household heads strongly agreed with this assertion and 136 (36.3%) agreed with, 79(21.1%) being undecided, 46 (12.3%) disagreeing and 22 (5.9%) strongly disagreed with the argument that youths were major perpetrators of ethnic conflicts in the study area. Finally the findings on Criminal gangs as perpetrators revaled that that 61 (16.3%) of the household heads strongly agreed with this assertion and 54 (14.4%) agreed. However, 95(25.3%) were undecided, 125 (33.3%) disagreed and 40 (10.7%) strongly disagreed with the argument that Criminal gangs were major perpetrators of ethnic conflicts in the study area.

The findings from the household heads were consistent with those from household heads. During the Interviews it emerged that Politicians played the biggest role of funding and inciting violence especially during elections. In an interview conducted with an official from the NCCK, it emerged the Policians worked with organized groups of young men whom they would occasionaly use to terrorise their opponents. This was supported by the CJPC coordinator who stated that it was difficult to separate the Politicians, Youths and gangs from ethnic conflicts. he stated that the politicians played the bigger role of finding

activities that would earn the political capital even if it meant terrorisng their opponents.

The furher added that during election periods groups of organized youths would always been seen haging around these policians as either security or ardent supporters and these groups always look like they could defend such politicians with their lives. Such youths could probably the criminals gangs who find more relevance in the chaotic political environment that is always witnessed in Kenya.

During an interview with a senior police officer, he revealed that:

> When it comes to ethnic violence, the people whos should carry the biggest responsibility are politicians because people are always peaceful until they get incited and the incitement normally emerge from the political class (Interview with Senior Police Officer at Eldoret Police Station, July, 29 2021).

The Police Officer further indicated that within Uasin Gishu county there were no known Criminal gangs that would be accused of aiding ethnic conflicts, however, he indicated that criminals are there and the Police often do their best to nub them, however, those that could be used for Political gains culd be there but until one is found commiting a crime they cannot be labelled criminals. The officer also state that it is indeed true that some young people have always been used to further Politucal goals at the expence of peace. He indicated that on several occasion people had been arrested for distributing leaflets taregeting specific ethnic group, most of these people were youths who probably were

sent by specific politicians to do these things and get paid, and since they want money they just did that.

The findings agreed with Anderson (2002) who opined that the competitive nature of electoral politics in Kenya has frequently served as a pretext for both government and opposition political players to employ vigilantes, criminal gangs, and other criminal organizations to propagate ethnic violence in different regions of the country. Anderson provides illustrations of several gangs and militia groups that have been associated with politicians and used as instruments to fuel ethnic violence. For instance, *Sri Lanka* and *Kuzacha Boys* were infamous criminal gangs operating in the slums and estates of Mombasa during the 1980s, with their actions linked to rival political factions in the town during that period. Another notable group, the *Baghdad Boys*, emerged in Nyanza during the Iraqi war in 1991, a time when Kenya experienced a surge in political violence before the 1992 elections. The *Baghdad Boys* targeted opponents of a prominent political clique in Kisumu.

This group gained nationwide notoriety when its members successfully raided a police station and a chief's camp to liberate detained associates. An even more infamous group was the *Kaya Bombo* Youth, allegedly recruited, trained, and organized in the Kwale district, with the instigation of prominent politicians and the support of the government and military. They were deployed to incite ethnic violence in the lead-up to the 1997 elections along the coast. The activities of *Kaya Bombo* Youth have been linked to government supporters. Among the various incidents they were accused of, *Kaya Bombo* was held responsible for the massacre of around 70 people in Kwale and the murder of six policemen in Likoni.

According to Samuel (2021), some of the criminal gangs originated from rural areas. For instance, the *Chinkororo* and *Amachuma* gangs were traced back to rural Kisii. Traditionally, *Chinkororo* was a term used among the people of Kisii to refer to any group summoned when an alarm was raised. However, during the election campaigns of the 1990s, local politicians mobilized *Chinkororo* groups to garner support. In response to the *Chinkororo*, the *Amachuma* group was subsequently formed and gained fame when recruited as bodyguards by a contestant in the South Mugirango by-election in Kisii, which was triggered by the death of MP Enoch Magara. The local politics among the Gusii were marked by deep rivalries, and in combination with the significant impact of ethnic clashes, the district experienced a high incidence of violence during the election campaign of 1992, which continued into the campaign of 1997. In this district, KANU struggled to maintain political supremacy.

Chome (2020) further asserted that several gangs had direct connections with politicians and were involved in electoral violence. One well-known group was *Jeshi la Mzee*, formed in April 1997 by senior members of KANU to demonstrate against opposition groups at public events. *Jeshi la Mzee* gained broader public attention a month later when they disrupted a pro-reform rally at Nairobi's Kamukunji grounds. Later that year, the group played a significant role in the election campaign of Fred Gumo, the KANU candidate in the fiercely contested Nairobi constituency of Westlands. Accusations of ballot-rigging and voter intimidation by *Jeshi la Mzee* surrounded KANU's victory in this seat over the DP by a narrow margin. The vigilantes also disrupted Charity Kaluki Ngilu's presidential campaign in the Kamba area. In 1999, members of *Jeshi la Mzee* were caught on camera attacking and inflicting serious injuries upon Presbyterian Church

of East Africa clergyman Timothy Njoya during a peaceful demonstration near the parliament buildings in Nairobi.

According to Anderson (2002), there was another gang known as The *Jeshi la Embakasi*, a Nairobi-based group comprising many fervent supporters of opposition MP David Mwenje. This gang was associated with land protests and vigilantism in the estates of Nairobi's Eastlands. Despite Mwenje's political defection from KANU to the Democratic Party, his "private army" of *Jeshi la Embakasi* members remained loyal to him. However, like many other "vigilantes for hire" in the city estates and slums, individuals within the group did not always restrict themselves to a single affiliation. There were rumours that some members of *Jeshi la Embakasi* also supported the Mungiki movement.

Beyond Nairobi, the Runyenjes Football Club was initially formed as a sports association by local MP Njeru Kathangu. The club's banning was seen as an attempt to suggest that Kathangu had been using it as a platform to mobilize political support. However, this action might have been an opportunistic move by senior government members who aimed to undermine Kathangu. Like Mwenje, Kathangu enjoyed immense popularity among his constituents and had a deeply devoted following. During the 1997 election, he ran as a candidate for the FORD-Asili party and secured victory with 55 per cent of the vote, even though the party was facing internal leadership disputes. In contrast, FORD-Asili's presidential candidate, Martin Shikuku, received only 1 per cent of the vote in Runyenjes. KANU performed poorly in Runyenjes in the 1997 elections.

The *Jeshi la King'ole*, established by Politician John Harum Mwau to counter external political aggression in the Ukambani region, mirrors a similar pattern. According to Anderson (2002), there is another prominent pro-government gang known as Majeshi la

Wazee (Armies of the Elders) with deep roots in Kenyan politics, dating back to the organization of the KANU Youth Wing in the 1960s. Even during that time, this group was used to harass and intimidate political opponents of Jomo Kenyatta's government. It is noteworthy that many influential Kenyan politicians maintain what can be described as "private armies" composed of "Youth Wingers." For example, Joseph Kamotho was reported to employ a "hit squad" in the Murang'a district, while Darius Mbela operated his private militia, *Jeshi la Mbela*, in Taita-Taveta. These gangs were widespread across the country and played a significant role in perpetuating violence, particularly during elections.

According to Wambua (2017) the heated political activities of the early 1990s led to ethnic activation of gang-related activities in Kenya. Politicians used gangs to advance political agenda and intimidate ethnic groups that were perceived as opposition. In the Rift Valley for example the Self-proclaimed 'Kalenjin Warriors' warned the Luo and other non-Kalenjin to leave the Rift Valley or face the consequences. This escalated into retaliatory and counter-retaliatory attacks, leaving approximately 1,500 dead and 300,000 displaced. A parliamentary report found that the 'Kalenjin Warriors militia was supported and funded by KANU officials. The Kikuyu were particularly persecuted, providing recruits for the Mungiki vigilante group who saw themselves as modern Mau Mau. Mutahi and Ruteere (2019) further oponed that opined that during this election, and especially the pre-election campaigns, militant groups instigated fear among Kenyans, for a long time, communities in Kenya had nurtured youths who had graduated from militias. These militias were supported by politicians. The Mungiki, Kalenjin Warriors and

Baghdad Boys, for instance, were aided with financial support and weapons (machetes and arrows) that were subsequently used in the 2007 violence.

Politicians from Marginalized communities supported criminal gangs and militias to agitate for inclusion. According to Wambua (2017) It is due to such marginalisation that there is increased proliferation of militia groups, for instance, the Sabaot Land Defence Force, the Mungiki, Taliban and Mombasa Republic Council, gangs such as the China Squad and Marines in Kisumu who seek to agitate for inclusivity in the distribution of economic resources, and in particular, land.

5.7 Correlation between Horizontal Inequalities and Intractable Ethnic Conflicts

In this a study cross tabulation of the independent variable (Horizontal inequalities) was performed against the Dependent Variable (Intractable ethnic conflicts) in order to get the pearson product moment correlation coefficient (PPMC) and the level of significance. The findings were as shown in the subsequent sections and tables.

5.7.1 Correlations between Ecomonic Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnic Conflicts

A cross tabulation of the economic horizontal inequalities performed against ethnic conflicts experienced in Uasin Gishu county yielded the results indicated in Table 5.1.

Table 5. 1 Correlation between Economic Horizontal Inequalities and Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County

Dependent Variable		Independent Variable (Economic Horizontal Inequalities)			
		Inequalities in ownership of Assets	Inequalities in Ownership of Land	Inequalities in Employment opportunities	Inequalities in Income Levels
Politically Instigated Ethnic Violence	Pearson Correlation	.162[**]	.153[**]	.096	.053
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.003	.064	.304
	N	375	375	375	375

255

		.128*	.102*	.039	.010
Ethnic Identity Conflicts	Pearson Correlation	.128*	.102*	.039	.010
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.013	.048	.455	.842
	N	375	375	375	375
Land Clashes	Pearson Correlation	.152**	.157**	.127*	.081
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.003	.002	.014	.117
	N	375	375	375	375

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Field Data, 2021

5.7.1.1 Correlation between Economic Horizontal Inequalities and Politically Instigated Ethnic Violence

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in ownership of assets against politically instigated conflicts revealed that there was Pearson Correlation value (r) =0.162** and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.002. Therefore since p<0.05, this is an indication thar there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in and politically instigated conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in Ownership of Land against politically instigated conflicts revealed that there was Pearson Correlation value (r) =0.153** and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.003. In this regard, since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in Ownership of Land and politically instigated conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in Employment opportunities against politically instigated conflicts revealed that there was Pearson Correlation value (r) =0.096 and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.064. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is

an indication that there is not a statistically significant association between between Inequalities in Employment opportunities and politically instigated conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

Finally the cross-tabulation between Inequalities in Income Levels against politically instigated conflicts revealed that there was Pearson Correlation value (r) =0.053 and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.304. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is an indication that there is not a statistically significant association between Inequalities in Income Levels and politically instigated conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

5.7.1.2 Correlation between Economic Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnic Idenity Violence

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in ownership of assets against Ethnic Identity Conflicts revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) =0.128* and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.013. Therefore since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in ownership of assets and Ethnic Identity Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in Ownership of Land against Ethnic Identity Conflicts revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r)=0.102* and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.048. In this regard, since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between between Inequalities in Ownership of Land and Ethnic Identity Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in Employment opportunities against Ethnic Identity Conflicts revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) =0.039 and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.455. In this regard, since p>0.05, this evidence that there is not a statistically significant association between Inequalities in Employment opportunities and Ethnic Identity Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

Finally, the cross-tabulation between Inequalities in Income Levels against Ethnic Identity Conflicts revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) =0.010 and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.842. In this regard, since p>0.05, this reveals that there is not a statistically significant association between Inequalities in Income Levels and Ethnic Identity Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

5.7.1.3 Correlation between Economic Horizontal Inequalities and Land Clashes

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in ownership of assets against Land clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) =0.152[**] and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.003. Therefore since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in ownership of assets and Land clashes in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in Ownership of Land against Land clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) = 0.157[**] and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.002. In this regard, since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in Ownership of Land and Land clashes in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in Employment opportunities against Land clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) =0.127* and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.014. In this regard, since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in Employment Opportunities and Land clashes in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in Income Levels against Land clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) =0.081 and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.117. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is an indication that there is not a statistically significant association between Inequalities in Income Levels and Land clashes in Uasin Gishu County.

5.7.2 Correlation between Political Horizontal Inequalities and Intratable Ethnic Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County

A cross-tabulation of the Political horizontal inequalities performed against ethnic conflicts experienced in Uasin Gishu county yielded the results indicated in Table 5.2.

Table 5. 2 Correlation between Political Horizontal Inequalities and Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

		Independent Varibale (Political Horizontal Inequalities)			
Dependent Variable		Ethnic Patronage	Inequalties in Distribution of Political appointments and Opportunities	Inequalities in Political Participation	Ineqaulities in Resource Distribution
Politically Instigated	Pearson Correlation	.229**	.122*	.064	.040

Violence	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.018	.215	.443
	N	375	375	375	375
Ethnic Idenity Conflicts	Pearson Correlation	.297**	.102*	.049	.088
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.048	.343	.089
	N	375	375	375	375
Land Clashes	Pearson Correlation	.209**	.168**	.133**	.167**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.001	.010	.001
	N	375	375	375	375
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).					
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).					

Source: Field Data, 2021

5.7.2.1 Correlation between Political Horizontal Inequalities and Politically instigated Violence in Uasin Gishu County

The cross-tabulation of Ethnic Patronage against Politically Instigated Violence revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (*r*) of 0.229** and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.000. In this regard since p<0.05, it is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Ethnic Patronage and Politically Instigated Violence in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation of Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Appointments and Opportunities against Politically Instigated Violence revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (*r*) of 0.122*and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.018. In this regard since p<0.05, it is an indication that there was a statistically

significant bivariate association between Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Appointments and Opportunities and Politically Instigated Violence in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation of Inequalities in Political Participation against Politically Instigated Violence revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (*r*) of 0.064 and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.215. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is an indication that there was not a statistically significant association between Inequalities in Political Participation and Politically Instigated Violence.

Lastly, the cross-tabulation of inequalities in Resource Distribution against Politically Instigated Violence revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (*r*) of 0.040 and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.443. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is an indication that there is not a statistically significant association between inequalities in Resource Distribution and Politically Instigated Violence.

5.7.2.2 Correlation between Political Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnic Identity Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County

The cross-tabulation between Ethnic Patronage against Ethnic Identity Conflicts revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (*r*) of 0.297[**] and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.000. In this regard since p<0.05, it is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Ethnic Patronage and Ethnic Identity Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Appointments and Opportunities against Ethnic Identity Conflicts revealed that there was a Pearson

Correlation coefficient (*r*) of 0.102* and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.048. In this regard since p<0.05, it is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Appointments and Opportunities and Ethnic Identity Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in Political Participation against Ethnic Identity Conflicts revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (*r*) of 0.049 and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.343. In this regard, since p>0.05, this reveals that there is not a statistically significant association between Inequalities in Political Participation and Ethnic Identity Conflicts.

Finally, the cross-tabulation between inequalities in Resource Distribution against Ethnic Identity Conflicts revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (*r*) of 0.088 and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.089. Therefore, since p>0.05, this is an indication that there is not a statistically significant association between inequalities in Resource Distribution and Ethnic Identity Conflicts.

5.7.2.3 Correlation between Political Horizontal Inequalities and Land Clashes in Uasin Gishu County

The cross-tabulation between Ethnic Patronage against Land Clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (*r*) of 0.209** and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.000. In this regard since p<0.05, it is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between between Ethnic Patronage and Land Clashes Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Appointments and Opportunities against Land Clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.168[**] and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.001. In this regard since p<0.05, it is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between between Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Appointments and Opportunities and Land Clashes in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in Political Participation against Land Clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.133[**] and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.010. In this regard, since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in Political Participation and Land clashes in Uasin Gishu county.

Finally, the cross-tabulation between inequalities in Resource Distribution against Land Clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.167[**] and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.001. Therefore, since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in Resource Distribution and Land Clashes in Uasin Gishu county.

5.7.3 Correlation between Socio-Cultural Horizontal Inequalities and Intractable ethnic Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County

A cross-tabulation of the Socio-cultural horizontal inequalities performed against ethnic conflicts experienced in Uasin Gishu county yielded the results indicated in Table 5.3.

Table 5. 3 Correlation between Socio-cultural Horizontal Inequalities and Inter-ethnic Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

		Cultural Status inequality	Inequality in Education Funding/ Bursaries	Inequality in access to Healthcare	Inequality in Access to Government Loans
Politically Instigated Violence	Pearson Correlation	.121[*]	.021	.038	.054
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.019	.683	.468	.299
	N	375	375	375	375
Ethnic idenity Conflicts	Pearson Correlation	.169[**]	.096	.081	.033
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.064	.118	.527
	N	375	375	375	375
Land Clashes	Pearson Correlation	-.075	.034	-.122[*]	.139[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.148	.515	.018	.007
	N	375	375	375	375
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).					
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).					

Source: Field Data, 2021

5.7.3.1 Correlation between Socio-Cultural Horizontal Inequalities and Politically Instigated Violence in Uasin Gishu County

The cross-tabulation of Cultural Status inequality against Politically Instigated Violence revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.121[*] and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.019. In this regard since p<0.05, it is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Cultural Status inequality and Politically Instigated Violence in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation of Inequality in Educational Funding/Bursaries against Politically Instigated Violence revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.021

and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.683. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is an indication that there was not a statistically significant association between Inequality in Educational Funding/Bursaries and Politically Instigated Violence.

The cross-tabulation of Inequality in access to Healthcare against Politically Instigated Violence revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.038 and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.468. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is an indication that there was not a statistically significant association between Inequality in access to Healthcare and Politically Instigated Violence.

The cross-tabulation of Inequality in Access to Government Loans against Politically Instigated Violence revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.054 and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.299. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is an indication that there was not a statistically significant association between Inequality in Access to Government Loans and Politically Instigated Violence.

5.7.3.2 Correlation between Socio-Cultural Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnic identity Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County

The cross-tabulation of Cultural Status inequality against Ethnic identity Conflicts revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.169[**] and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.001. In this regard since p<0.05, it is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Cultural Status inequality and Ethnic identity Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation of Inequality in Educational Funding/Bursaries against Ethnic identity Conflicts revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.096

and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.064. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is an indication that there was not a statistically significant association between Inequality in Educational Funding/Bursaries and Ethnic identity Conflicts.

The cross-tabulation of Inequality in access to Healthcare against Ethnic identity Conflicts revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (*r*) of 0.081 and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.118. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is an indication that there was not a statistically significant association between Inequality in access to Healthcare and Ethnic identity Conflicts.

The cross-tabulation of Inequality in Access to Government Loans against Ethnic identity Conflicts revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (*r*) of 0.033 and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.527. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is an indication that there was not a statistically significant association between Inequality in access to Government Loans and Ethnic identity Conflicts.

5.7.3.3 Correlation between Socio-Cultural Horizontal Inequalities and Land Clashes in Uasin Gishu County

The cross-tabulation of Cultural Status inequality against Land Clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (*r*) of -0.075 and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.148. In this regard, since p>0.05, this indicates that there was not a statistically significant association between Cultural Status inequality and Land Clashes in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation of Inequality in Educational Funding/Bursaries against Land Clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (*r*) of 0.034 and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.515. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is an

indication that there was not a statistically significant association between Inequality in Educational Funding/Bursaries and Land Clashes.

The cross-tabulation of Inequality in access to Healthcare against Land Clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of -0.122* and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.018. In this regard, since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequality in access to Healthcare and Land Clashes.

The cross-tabulation of Inequality in Access to Government Loans against Land Clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.139** and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.007. In this regard, since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequality in Access to Government Loans and Land Clashes.

5.8 Chapter Summary

The chapter has discussed the findings on the nexus between horizontal Inequalitues and ethnic Conflicts of ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. The finding in this chapter have revelaed that ethnic conflicts were experienced mostly during electioneering periods. The major types of conflicys experienced in the study area were land clashes ethnic based violence and politically instigated viooence. The findings further revaled that the conflicts were brutal in nature and involved massive desturution of property, deaths and discplacement with the main perpetrators being policians who work in together with criminals gangs mainly made up of youths to reign terror on the soc-called

ousiders.The study chapter alsp revaled that there was a significant bivariate correlation between horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflicts. The Next chapter presents findings on challenges and opportunities for the management of Horizontal Inequalties in Uasin Gishu County.

CHAPTER SIX

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY

This chapter present findings in line with the third specific objective of the study. The researcher analysed, presented, interpreted and discussed findings on the Challenges and opportunities in the management of horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County. The chapter also presents findings on various challenges such as politicization of ethnicity, impunity by perpetrators of ethnic conflicts, use of media and technology to perpetuate ethnic hatred and violence and institutionalized discrimination on the basis of ethnicity were among the biggest challenges in the management of horizontal inequalities. The chapter also discusses role played by both state and non-state actors to diffuse tension and manage horizontal inequalities and conflicts.

6.1 Challenges faced in the management of horizontal Inequalities and Ethnic Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish the challenges associated with horizontal inequalities that have hindered the process of ethnic conflict management in Uasin Gishu County. The findings are as indicated in the Table 6.1

Table 6. 1: Challenges in the Management of Ethnic Conflicts

Challenges	Yes		No		Don't Know	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Politicization of Ethnicity	308	81.2	34	9.1	33	8.8
Corruption and Impunity by Public Officers	251	69.9	32	8.4	92	24.5

Use of Media and Technology to Stimulate Ethnic Tension and hostilities	309	82.4	36	9.6	30	8.0
Institutionalized discrimination	266	71	47	12.5	62	16.5
Historical injustices	169	45.1	130	34.7	76	20.3
Violation of human rights	259	69.1	77	20.5	39	10.4
Marginalization	220	58.7	75	20	80	21.4

Source: Field Data, 2022

6.1.1 Politicization of Ethnicity

The findings of the study revealed that Politicization of ethnicity was a major challenge for the management of Horizontal Inequalities in the County of Uasin Gishu. These findings as presented in Table 6.1 showed that 217 (57.9%) strongly agreed with this assertion and 91 (23.3%) agreed with Politicization of ethnicity as a challenge, however, 16 (4.3%) strongly disagreed and 18 (4.8%) disagreed, finally 33 (8.8%) stated that they did not know.

The information from households was corroborated by Chairman of the Council of Elders in Uasin Gishu County who opined that;

> Kenyan our politics is ethnic in nature. In this County the role of ethnicity in politics is as clear as day and night. That is why you find that when election time comes, political leaders from various ethnic communities group themselves and form coalitions with other leaders from other communities. The unfortunate part of these collaborations is that it paints the people from the opposing ethnic groups as enemies. In as much us ethnic coalitions can be used to unite communities that are fueding, the have also been used create further divisions with those who are not part of the winning coalitions being sidelined by those in power (Interview with Council of Elders Chairman at Wagon Hotel, Eldoret Town on August 2nd 2021).

The findings were further supported by FGD participannts at tge New Langas County Market who stated that electoral periods were the worse times to belong to the 'unpopular ethnic groups' because you would easily become a target of attack by the so called dorminant ethnic groups. They further added that the voting pattern was often used by political as a justification ton deny development or opportunities to people who were perceived to have opposed those who win elections. One of the participants stated that it was possible for parts of the county to lack essential services such as water simply because they had not voted a particular candidate or political party. This was one way in which political scores were settled and it some time took ethnic dimesion especially if the competitor is from a different ethnic group.

The CJPC coordinator added that within the county politics was palyed along ethnic lines and that it was impossible to separate the two. He added that the county was dormintated by the Nandi and Kikuyu communities who decided the trajectory of everything including resource allocation. He further indicated that whenever these two commnuties were on the opposing sides of politics then it was almost sure that conflicts would rock the county. He gave the contrasting examples of 2007 elections and 2013 elections. In 2007 having been on opposing sides, the county saw massive blood shed yet the coalitions of 2013 and 2017 saw peace in the elections.

This point of view was greatly criticised by a Muslim cleric who faulted the mode through which politics was conducted in the county as one that aided Horizontal inequalies. The Imam stated that it was unforttuate that in Uasin Gishu there was a trend that for peace to prevail, only the Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities had to sit on the 'table'. The Imam posed the flowing questions: 'what about other 40+ communities in

the county? Does it mean they are not impprtant? Does it mean they do not exist? The Imam reiterated that the whole Kikuyu-Kalenjin Alliance in Uasinn Gishu had made other ethnic groups in the county marginalized and that this had further propaged inequality in the area. He indicated that it was important that everybody in the county is treated as a Kenyan without looking at their 'second or third name'.

The findings agreed with Ndiku (2012) who opined that Political competition have always caused sharp divisions and polarization on basis of political alliances in various parts of the world. These divisions, among various political groups and players, have in many cases divided groups in terms their political affiliations which in many instances are often on the basis of ideology or various forms of identity including ethnic identity. Division normally occurs in political competitions because Political players tend have vested interests (favouring a particular clique or ethnic group), with narrow perspectives and strong elements of rivalry. Odongo (2011) further affirmed that political polarization and ethnic politics were key in aggravating ethnic tension and grienacces since they played a part in who get what and thus exacerbating inequalities and Conflicts. In further support to this view Dida (2012) argued that politicians are characterized by caginess and biased attitudes in intervention of issues of conflicts between different ethnic groups. In this regard, political players would favour their own co-ethnics at the expence of other ethnicities hence making the play ground 'unleveled' for 'unfavoared' ethnic groups.

The findings were also in tandem with Kilonzo & Onkware (2020) who averred that the phrase "*ondoa madoadoa,*" which translates to "remove or uproot the aliens" in Swahili, represented a political strategy that emerged with the introduction of multi-party politics.

Its primary goal was to expel individuals who were deemed as not belonging to specific regions in the Rift Valley and Central Kenya. During this period, Kenya was home to approximately 42 distinct ethnic groups. The ruling party; Kenya African National Union (KANU), led by then-President Daniel arap Moi, who was a Kalenjin, employed this tactic to suppress any potential competition by encouraging political leaders and the public to expel those perceived as a threat to his continued leadership. The "ondoa madoadoa" politics were essentially aimed at ethnically cleansing certain regions and undermining any formidable ethnic groups that posed a challenge to the government's survival in elections. Additionally, this slogan was utilized as a means to instill fear in the opposition.

In this regard, Juma *et al*, (2018) refaffimed that the politics of division meant to serve interest of politicians at the expense of peaceful co-existence between communities has often been used by political players to keeps communities divided on the basis of their ethicized political identities thereby making it an uphill task to have a common point of view on how horizontal inequalities can be dealt with.

It is therefore evident from the the foregoing that politicization of ethnicity is a major hianrance to management of Horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County. The fact that political leaders use the ethnic card as a factor to mobilse voters is the same cript used by these politicians to share resources such that only those perceived to have supported a particular political faction would benefit if that faction and those perceived to have been on the opposing side would remain marganilized when it comes to sharing of opportunities and even resources.

6.1.2 Corruption and Impunity by Public Officers

The findings of the study revealed that Corruption and Impunity of Public Officer was a major challenges in the management of Horizontal Inequalities in the county. The findings in Table 6.1 indicated that 159 (42.4%) of the household heads had strongly agreed with this point of view and 92 (24.5%) agreed with this view as well. However, 13 (3.5%) strongly disagreed and 19 (5.1%) disagreed, on the other hand, 92 (24.4%) stated that they did not know how Corruption and Impunity of Public Officers hindered the management of Horizontal Inequalities in the county.

In support of the findings from the household heads youths in an FGD stated that there was massive corruption in public offices both at County and National level. One of the Youth Indicated that;

> We live in a society where for oen to get services you may have to part with an amount of money or atleast know someone in those high places. If you don't have any of these two things then its not easy to get anything to improve your life. Personally I went through hell just to get a single business permit in this county. I remember I was once overcharged for the permit. How would I be empowered economically if we have people in public offices who are keen on literally killing our dreams. The corruption in ths county is linked to ethnicity as well (Youth FGD at Catholic Diocese Compound on August 1, 2021)

In further support of these argument another FGD participant stated that;

> In this county even getting scholarships is a problem. Those in position either want their won kin to benefit from such scholarships of bursaries or they would sell them to the highest bidder, this simply means that those from the poorest backgrounds who are genuinley needed and cannot afford to buy scholarships would miss out on opportunities that would have otherwise changed their lives. You can imagine how difficult it would be for the poor who are marginalized to get out of poverty with such attitides in our society (Youth FGD at Cathloc Diocese Compund on August 1, 2021)

The sentiments from the FGD were supported by one of the Muslim clerics in the County who stated that;

> I know for sure that there is a lot of corruption, nepotism and favoristims in this county when it comes to things like employment, issuance of bursaries and other opportunities. The Public officers who should ensure fairness and non-discrimination are the ones who take advanagte of their position to do the opposite of wht is expecfed of them. The unfortunate thing is that even when some of of these people are implicated in these corruption cases no action is taking against them in law. This kind of impunity has embolded many public officers to keep doing bad things that keep harming the ordiary and margianlised people. We literaly live in a vicious cycle of corruption not only in Uasin Gishu but also in Kenya (Interview with Muslim Cleric at Asis Hotel in Eldoret Town on July 31, 2021).

In another Interview one priest reiterated that it was impossible to remove corruption from the way public officers worked and this not only done on the basis of ethnicity but also on the basis of nepotism and favoritism. He indicated that;

> We say devolution was brought to ensure that those who were maraginalized get what could not be provided through a centralized system. It is however important to know that this system actually came to benefit a few people. If you look at the way public resources are plundered by indiviuals in counties, you would wonder whether devolution is actually helping. Infact in oour counties the issue of 30% no locals has been abused by those in power. You get a situation where a person holds office in a County like this one of Uasin Gishu then he would talk to a frind of his in Bungoma, Kakamega or even Kisumu to swap employment opportunities with another person there. This means that if for example there is Luhya who deserved that Job in Uasin Gishu, his or her chance would have been corruptly given to another person who should have been otherwise working in another county. The corruption here is more on who knows who. There a lot of inequality propagated through corruption. Acts like this are what make the society so unequal (Interview with a Priest at RCEA Ushirika, July 31, 2021).

The findings agreed with a study by Zúñiga (2017) who noted for the negative impact of corruption on income inequality included lower economic growth, a biased tax system, and lower levels and effectiveness of public spending. Zúñiga added that income distribution's connection to sustainable development and social welfare is well-documented in the literature. Aidt (2011) conducted a study on 110 countries from 1996 to 2007, revealing that high levels of perceived and experienced corruption across nations

significantly hinder the growth of genuine wealth per capita, indicating corruption's adverse impact on sustainable development. Other research, such as Gyimah-Brempong (2002) in Africa and Dincer & Gunalp (2008) in the US, demonstrates that corruption leads to an increase in income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient. This is primarily because corruption tends to benefit the well-connected with higher incomes, thereby undermining government efforts to achieve a more equitable distribution of resources.

The role of corruption in shaping an unequal distribution of wealth extends to biased tax systems that favor the wealthy and well-connected, as highlighted by Gupta *et al.* (2002). Corruption facilitates tax evasion, which hampers a government's ability to collect taxes and distribute wealth fairly. Consequently, this can create pressure on the system, leading to potential future implementation of progressive taxation to address the inequalities caused by corruption. However, these compensatory measures may incentivize the elites to intensify corrupt practices, such as evading tax increases through political corruption and influencing officials, perpetuating a vicious cycle. As a result, such dynamics leave the economically disadvantaged more vulnerable to corruption and hinder their ability to demand accountability (Chêne, 2014).

As Zúñiga (2017) further asserts, the impact of corruption on income inequality is a subject of debate, with some arguing that corruption exacerbates inequality by reducing resources available for social spending, thereby disadvantaging the poorest members of society. Additionally, corruption can have detrimental effects on the quality and quantity of public services, including education and health services. For instance, a study conducted in the Philippines reveals that corruption negatively affects education

outcomes by lowering test scores, school rankings, and satisfaction ratings (Azfar & Gurgur, 2008). Similarly, in public health services, corruption leads to delays in treatment provision, longer waiting times for patients, and discouragement in clinic utilization (Azfar & Gurgur, 2008). Addressing corruption becomes crucial as research suggests that investing more funds in social programs may not yield desired outcomes without tackling corruption (Suryadarma 2012).In Africa, a study emphasizes the potential enhancement of citizens' well-being by utilizing domestic resources without resorting to external aid, if corruption can be curbed (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002). Therefore, corruption's role in increasing income inequality is evident in various cases, impacting social spending, education, and health services.

Apart from exacertaing inequality corruption and impunity increased ethnic tension and potential for conflicts. According to as study by Rohwerder (2015), Citizens believe police corruption, impunity, and judicial tractability are sustaining violence in Kenya, he added that citizens generally blame local and national political leaders, their business partners and shady criminal connections for ethnic violence. The failure of the central government to 'resolve small wars indicates, in the minds of the citizens, is seen as a form of approval', where people see political leaders being rewarded for their belligerence. According to Scott-Villers *et al*., (2014), people feel like they are offered little choice but to line up behind political leaders who encourage violence as a result of their economic vulnerability. In the absence of justice, people's ways of coping with the intermittent violence, such as through revenge attacks, often fuel the fire, reinforcing the likelihood of further violence. Ombaka (2015) adds that Kenya's weakness as a state is a result of longstanding inequitable policies and endemic corruption which has 'severely

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compromised the institutions of security of the state including the police and the armed forces'. Recently, internal violent events such as inter-ethnic clashes, livestock theft, boundary clashes, and inter-clan rivalries have 'acquired an ominous character in that the combatants no longer brook the interference of the state security apparatus in their activities.

6.1.3 Use of Media and Technology to Stimulate Ethnic Tension and Violence

The findings of the study revealed that Ethnic Tension and hostilities were stimulated through the use various media and technology platforms and hence this affected in the management of Horizontal Inequalities in the county in Uasin Gishu County. The findings presented in Table 6.1 show that 211 (56.5%) strongly agreed with this assertion and 98 (26.1%) agreed. On the other hand, 17 (4.5%) strongly disagreed and 19 (5.1%) disagreed and finally, 30 (8%) indicated that they did not know.

The findings were further supported by FGDs and Interviews. In one of the youth FGDs held in the Catholic Diocese Compund, it emrged that one of the ways through which ethnic conflicts and inequality were propagated was through the use of social media. One of the participants indicated that;

> Bloggers have been known to create a lot of division in Kenya. Digital media has become a tool for propagation of negative ethnicity and lies which on several occasions has led to increased risk of ethnic violence (Youth FGD at Cathloc Diocese Compund on August 1, 2021)

In support of these arguments from the FGD were suppprted by coordinator of the CJPC who noted that in the digital age there a lot of fake news and use of blogs as well as other social media cites including WhatsApp, facebook, twiiter, Instagram to do things that impact the society negatively. He also indicated that in as much as the digital space has

been abused and used to cause division, the ability of the digital space to inform people and create some sort of ethnic consciousness cannot be under estimated. He indicated that in recent past the digital space has been used to send messages that could easily be an indicator of some communities either feeling discriminated or marginalized. In particular he indicated cases where #hashtags have been created to criticize the government of the day for making ethnic based appointments. He particularly refereed to cases where such trending hastags would be used to potray the Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto's government between 2013-2021 as ethnic based for mainly appointing Kikuyus and Kalenjins major positions in their government. Some of these #hashtags have been away one way in which people from other ethnic groups express their discontent with status of things as for as ethnic balance is concerned when it comes to sharing of the national cake.

The findings were in tandem with Kabugi (2017) who opined that Social media in Kenya operates as an unregulated platform, lacking a concrete and enforceable regulatory framework. Within this space, ethnic prejudice and negative profiling thrive, and hate speech, along with ethnic prejudice, spreads rapidly, essentially becoming an online 'underground' hub. The situation worsens due to tech-savvy Kenyans who repost hateful content even after the original uploader removes it. False information also circulates widely without restrictions. To ordinary Kenyans, such content is often unquestionably believed, stirring strong emotions. Those responsible for generating this ethnic profiling patiently wait for the right moment to translate their hatred into action.

Mukhongo (2020) further observed that the use social media to influence the political process and control ethnic narratives in Kenya was common. According to the study he conducted about the 2013 and 2017 elections, he noted that there were several trending topics and hashtags by the so-called influencers in the country to marshall their supporters. In the 2017 and 2013 elections there were several #hashtags used to by various political sides some of the commonly used #hashtags included, #DigitalvsAnalogue #UhuRuto, #TanoTena, #Canaan, #Lastbullet among many others. In addition to the use of social media for political campaigns, some of the the hashtags used were offensive and were meant to stir ethnic emotions and polarize ethnic relations in the country. For instance, Africa Digital Democracy Observatory (2022) reported that the rise of a widespread and polarizing strategy employed by prominent political figures and their supporters on platforms like Facebook and Twitter was evident. This strategy involved targeting opposing political candidates. It's important to note that this approach utilized colloquial expressions like '*kihii*,' a Kikuyu term that is derogatory and aimed at individuals from the Luo community, often referring to them as 'uncircumcised.' These derogatory terms have been utilized to fuel provocation which could be seen as disrespect for cultural status of the target community. Furthermore, there has been a utilization of veiled language, such as *'madoadoa,'* a Swahili word meaning 'spots' or 'stains.' This term has a historical context of inciting violence against specific ethnic groups, dating back to 1992. 'Madoadoa' has been employed to spark violence along ethnic lines, particularly targeting ethnic groups residing in regions where they are in the minority. The intention behind this usage has been to label these groups as undesirable or problematic. This

labeling has resulted in the targeting and mistreatment of these ethnic groups, often leading to violence and their displacement from regions where they are not in the majority.

The Findings also agreed with Asego (2014) who revealed that Kenya's media, particularly the community-based radio stations, played critical roles before and after the 2007 Kenya's general elections. While in some cases they provided important information on the election, in other cases, they have been charged with inciting violence through the dissemination of hate speech. During the 2007 election, hate speech played a crucial role in inciting deadly violence. As the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Communications, Bitange Ndemo, argued, "According to intelligence reports, the political violence that engulfed various parts of the country in 2007 and early 2008 was largely a result of the use of irresponsible and inflammatory language in the run up to and immediate aftermath of the elections". Digital media also played a role as well in spreading generating an environment of tension. There were bulk messages sent via Short Message Services inciting people to violence and tribal profiling. As Goldstein (n.d) indicated in his Blog. Ethnic hate messgaes were common place in the violence of 2007/2008 and SMS platforms enabled this for example one message that was flagged as reported by Goldstein stated that "No more innocent Kikuyu blood will be shed. We will slaughter them right here in the capital city. For justice, compile a list of Luos you know".

Ogeto (2019) further revaled that social media platforms are gaining more popularity among the young generation in Kenya and the world over. He further indicated it is this platform that created hate speech among Kenyans during the 2013 elections. KNHRC defines hate speech as all forms of utterances that demeans others, create hatred, and

provoke violence directed at a targeted group of people based on their religion, race, colour, or ethnic belonging. It includes coverage in speech, written content, and radio or television messages that are demeaning and dehumanizing a certain populace.

In Côte d'Ivoire, the general elections of 2010 were marred with media taking sides, whichresulted to misreporting and news sensationalization as opposition parties strived to discredit the other (Viggo, 2011). According to Media Foundation for West Africa (2011, April 18) Media's position also exposed journalists to intimidation and frequent attacks. The post-poll predicament that ensued after the pronouncement of the poll outcomes for the presidency revealed influences from the print media (Ogeto, 2019). In the Central African Republic, media broadcast content bordering on hate speech and profiling groups, which created a sectarian environment and set the precedence for a conflict in 2013 (MRG, 2013).This resulted to the displacement of close to one million people, and reports suggesting over 75,000 refugees were affected

The use of media to fuel ethnic violence is not only a problem in Africa as Buric (2000) stated that in the Balkan War of 1992-1995 the traditional media played a huge part in fueling ethnic skirmishes and hatred leading to violence. While hate messages were not aired plainly, the general bias and misreporting over time heightened tensions, fueled differences and eventually erupted into a conflict. Broadcasters conveyed polarizing content that legitimized violence as a tolerable tool for addressing grievances (Vladimir & Schirch, 2007). The Bosnian civil war between Serbs, Bosnia and Croats claimedan estimated more than 150,000 persons.

6.1.4 Institutionalized Discrimination

The findings of the study showed that institutionalized discrimination was another factor that was considered a threat to efforts of in managing Horizontal Inequalities in the County. The findings in Table 6.1 show that 175 (46.7%) strongly agreed with this point view and 91 (24.3%) also agreed with this assertion. In contrast however, 21 (5.6%) strongly disagreed and 26 (6.9%) disagreed and finally, 62 (16.5%) stated that they did not know whether institutionalized discrimination affected management Horizontal Inequalities.

The findings from the household heads were supported by Focus Group discussions. In the youth FGD it emerged that there was a lot of ethnicity within various institution with the coynty which created a conducive environment for the discrimination of the non-dorminant ethnic groups. One of the FGD participnats stated that

> Even in places where you one should not expect any form of discrimination, there is a lot of it. in Eldoret polytechnic for example, the workers there treat Kalenjins better than they treate students from other ethnic groups. You go to an office as a student and some and some of the workers would shamelessly talk to their co-ethnics in the local dialect and serve them and you are left wondering whether this a public institution or not (Youth FGD at Cathloc Diocese Compund on August 1, 2021)

Another FGD particiapant stated that;

> You only need to watch TV sometimes to realize how bad the situation of discrimination is within thus County. it was not a long time ago when the leadership of this county with various members of parliament and even the senator led a street protest to oppose the appoint of a vice-chancellor at Moi University simply because the proffosor was not from the Nandi community. If this can happen to a highly qualified individual like a professor, can you even begin to comprehend what happens to ordinary people like me and you? The situation is bad and it is deeply entrenched in various institutions within the County and even national government (Youth FGD at Cathloc Diocese Compund on August 1, 2021).

These findings supported those of Mwamba *et al* (2019) who found out that the Kenyan political elites have over time institutionalized ethnic politics and have used simmering ethnic grievances relating to land and exclusion to instigate ethnic-based electoral violence. Kenya Human Rights Commission (2018) reported that when and where ethnicity and race are politicized and politicization is institutionalized in the party system, the political landscape becomes frozen along an ethnic dimension. A good number of scholars agree, and empirical evidence suggests, that such a situation is generally bad for democracy. Amongst other things, the politicization of ethnic identity significantly diminishes citizens' trust in and satisfaction with political processes and institutions.

6.1.5 Historical Injustices

The findings of the study revealed that historical injustices were a major underlying challenge in the management of Horizontal Inequalities in Uasin Gishu county as supported by 169 (45.1%) of household heads. This assertion was however opposed by 130 (34.7%) of the household heads while 76 (20.3%) stated that they did not know.

The findings were corroborated by those from qualitative data. During an interview with one religious leader in the county he stated that one particular issue that can be linked to historical injustice in Uasin Gishu is the issue of of land. The fact that in land was not given back to the native Nandi community after independence is one thing that has made the community feel like the independence government gave them a raw deal. The religious leader thate since the 1960s there have been attempts to reclaim the land through various initiatives such as majimboism and even the Nandi declaration. All these have been issues brought about by the feeling of many local leaders that their land was unfairly taken away by the high and mighty in the Kenyan government.

The findings were intandem with the TJRC Report (2013) which indicated that the violations, abuses and historical injustices committed out between 1895 to 1963; 1963 to 1978; 1978 to 2002; and 2002 to 2008 have been the major causes of ethnic tensions and conflicts that have affected the country for decades. The report suggests that these trends give a picture of what happened between the colonial and Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Moi and Mwai Kibaki regimes, respectively. TJRC further reported that there were thematic and regional-based violations, within the historical dimensions, which fluctuated between the colonial and post-colonial regimes. While the report clearly blamed the colonial government for entrenching the retrogressive systems, and for committing gross atrocities, it admonished the Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Moi and Mwai Kibaki regimes, for maintaining the status quo. "President Kenyatta made no substantial changes to the structure of the State. Under President Moi, the status quo remained for a couple of years, before becoming notably worse, it was not long before autocratic tendencies and KANU-like practices began to emerge in the Kibaki administration". Key violations and atrocities committed from a historical perspective entailed affronts by security agencies and aggressions. Incidences of massacres, political assassinations, detentions, torture and ill-treatment were common characteristics of the government and acted to flare up ethnic tensions in the country. Land became a major conflict issue; economic marginalization and violation of socio-economic rights was common in post-colonial Kenya and grand corruption and economic crimes became the order of the day. All these factors have over the years culminated into ethnic tensions and violence that has been experienced in various parts of the country since the 1990s.

6.1.6 Human Rights Violations

The findings of the study revealed that violation of human rights was a major underlying factor in intractable ethnic conflict in Uasin Gishu county as supported by 259 (69.1%) of household heads. This assertion was however opposed by 77 (20.5%) of the household heads while 39 (10.4%) stated that they did not know that whether human rights violation caused ethnic conflicts.

During an interview with CJPC coordinar, it merged that the subject of human rights abuses in Kenya was not not new, he indicated that political leaders at various levels of governenmnt had often exercise their powers in a manner that at times went overboard and hurt the citizens. He particularly added that the powers that be have ofteb used the so- called enforcenment of law and order to abuse the rights of citizens not only at national level but at local level. The coordinator added that it not suprsing in Kenya for people to accuse the police of brutality and massive abuses because this had been a trend for a long time. He further added that those in government had often used the monopoly of violence that the government owned to frustrate their opponents. he added that in post indedence Kenya political detensions, arrests and disappereances were common during Kenyatta's presidency, Moi's presidency, Kebaki and even Uhuru Kenyatta's time as haed of state.

One of the religious leaders further added that the kind of human rights abuses that were witnessed in Uasin Gishu County during the Post-election violence of 2007/2008 remians traumatic to many who went through it. He added that the abuses were not only perpetrated by the police but also by ordinary citizens. The clergy man went ahead to

describe the horrors of human rights abuses in the county that ont only made it to national and international news but also shocked the world. He indicated that;

> Uasin Gishu County was the most affected by the violence of 2007/2008 and every time there is tension in the country, this county feels it the most because we have all ethnic groups livinh here. Remember the burning of people in Kiambaa Church? That happened here. People were beheaded, others burnt alive, others were maimed and there those who died through police bullets. The County has seen it all. The violence affects all communities and all communities in onme way or another participate in the violence (Interview with Catholic Priest, at Catholic Diocese of Eldoret, 10th August, 2021).

The CJPC coordinar further added that the story of the so-called *Kanjo* (County enforcement officers) seemed to have taken cue from the police and politician and have been involved in abusing the rights of people in the streets of Uasin Gishu County and particular in Eldoret town especially in those involved in trade and *boda boda* business (motorcycle riders) within the town. He added that the *Kanjo* could arbitrarily arrest these people in the markets and on the streets, beat them up and rought them up in some incideces without any mistake. Some times they were even accused of confiscating items being sold by individuals as away of soliciting for bribes. The coordinar further added that the Kanjo who were mostly from the Kalenjin or Nandi which is the dorminant ethnic group in the county, often targeted people from other ethnic groups for these vices. These findings were further supported by Women's FGD held in Langas Market. The women agreed that there was a lot of unfair treatment and harrassment by some county *Askaris* (enforcement officers) who sought bribes.

Human rights violations in Kenya have been responsible for sustained ethnic tension in Post Colonial Kenya. Korwa G. Adar and Isaac Munyae in their article titled *Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi* published in 2001 indicated that under

Kenyatta and Moi, human rights were violated as the leaders sought to consolidate power. These acts of human rights violations were often masterminded by those who belonged to the president's inner cycle. For example, under Kenyatta, the so-called Kiambu Mafia, from Kenyatta's home district was seen as the President's henchmen. This group undermined President Kenyatta's nationalist and populist background, alienating other ethnic groups, as well as many non-conforming Kikuyus (Adar & Munaye, 2001). Adar (2000) added that the Period between 1978 and 2001 when President Moi was in power was characterized by massive human rights violations and ethnic discrimination that further divided Kenya along ethnic lines. Moi was concerned about consolidating power and therefore surrounded himself with co-ethnic and loyalists, some of whom were involved in gross human rights violations of Moi's opponents. For example in 1982 When Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and George Anyona sought to register a socialist opposition party, Moi struck back by making the country a *de jure* one-party state and criminalized competitive politics and criticism of his leadership. In this regard, Patronage and loyalty therefore remained characteristic of Moi's leadership style which has enabled him to centralize and personalize his rule.

The Moi government controlled freedoms and rights in the Country with the legal channels being under state capture. For example, the executive arm of government always influenced political cases that were in court. Adar & Munyae (2001) several British expatriate judges complained of government interference in cases. This interference was extended to the Law Society of Kenya which had been critical of Moi's government with several lawyers being detained by the regime. To fully control the LSK, Adar & Munyae stated that, in 1990, the Office of the President succeeded in

manipulating the LSK elections which saw its sponsored candidate, Fred Ojiambo, defeating the pro-multiparty supporter, Paul Muite, for the chairmanship.

According to Adar (2000) the leading critics of Moi's government were non-Kalenjins with Church leaders like the late Anglican Bishop Alexander K. Muge and The Presbyterian minister Rev. Timothy Njoya being at the forefront of criticizing the government. The Wave of arrests, detentions and in some cases assassinations rocked the Country with those who were opposing the regime being the main victims. According to Adar & Munyae (2001) Clergymen, lawyers, and other pro-democracy and human rights advocates were persistently arrested, harassed and some died mysteriously, for example Bishop Muge's death in a car crash in August 1990 is still shrouded in mystery. Some of the political detainees included politicians Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, Raila Odinga, and Gitobu Imanyara. The government also cracked down on politicians like Masinde Muliro, Martin Shikuku, James Orengo, and Paul Muite who managed to go into hiding.

Adar (2000) further averred that Detentions and political trials, torture, arbitrary arrests and police brutality reminiscent of the colonial era have become common during Moi's tenure. He perceives human rights generally as alien and Euro-centric conceptions inconsistent with African values and culture. He views the pro-democracy and human rights advocates in Kenya as unpatriotic, disloyal, and ungrateful individuals influenced by what he calls foreign masters. Between 1989 and 1991 Kenya saw one of the worst human rights violations in its history. Moi accused advocates of multiparty politics of subversion and thereby got a fresh excuse for detaining a new generation of his critics. A number of the champions of multiparty politics John Khaminwa, Raila Odinga, Mohammed Ibrahim, Gitobu Imanyara, Kenneth Matiba, and Charles Rubia among

others, were detained under inhuman conditions and without trial. Human rights lawyers, Gibson Kamau Kuria and Kiraitu Murungi, fled to the United States to avoid being jailed (Adar & Munyae, 2001) .In the advent of Multi-partyism in the early 1990s, the KANU government went as far as instigating ethnic violence in order to portray the multi-party system as inappropriate for Kenya. Ajulu (1998) affirmed that under the KANU regime, the human rights record was extremely poor as the state had instigated ethnic cleansing that had clearly been unleashed on members of the Kikuyu community residing in the Rift Valley province. Ethnic cleansing was introduced in order to eliminate opposition in "KANU-only zones." From various independent human rights reports, the 1992 and 1998 ethnic violence in the Rift Valley Province was deliberately inflamed for political purposes by members of the government.

Adar & Munyae (2001) further argued that the use of militia to instigate violence on behalf of KANU and the government began with the 1991-1993 ethnic clashes. To attack opposition groups, "Kalenjin warriors" donned traditional attire and used arrows from South Korea transported by helicopters. Political violence also occurred in 1997 and 1998 in the Rift Valley Province, particularly in Trans Nzoia and Nakuru Districts. As in the 1992 ethnic clashes, the conflict was between pro-KANU supporters and ethnic communities that were deemed sympathetic to the opposition. According to human rights groups, the fact that the Provincial Administrators, the GSU, and the police were involved in the conflicts again implicated the state. Kagwanja (2003) stated that the Kenya Human Rights Commission estimated that state-sponsored or state-condoned violence in Kenya in the period 1991-2001 killed 4,000 people and displaced 600,000 others. The problem of state sponsored human rights violations were not unique to

Kenya. Matanga & Nzau (2013) stated that many African regimes were accused of mass violations of human rights including rape, mutilation and mass murder, most of them have proved to be pure neo-benevolent despots.

The Kibaki regime was not spared of human rights violations either. The 2007/2008 post-election violence marked the Peak of Human rights violations under the Kibaki administration. The Violence that broke after the disputed 2007 elections were made worse by state actors namely the Police who brutalized and violated the rights of people perceived to be opposed to the Kibaki. As Ruteere (2011) affirmed, a large number of those killed during the 2007/08 PEV were killed by the police and they were overwhelmingly supporters of the opposition Orange Democratic (ODM) party. It is also incontestable that long before the December 2007 general elections, the Kenyan police had demonstrated their willingness to abuse their powers to advance the partisan interests of the incumbent government of President Mwai Kibaki. It was against this backdrop that Eldoret in Uasin Gishu County, Kisumu and Nairobi which were opposition strongholds experienced the worse incidences of human rights violations that were perpetuated by the Police, under the orders of the inspector general of police.

Okia (2011) added that during the 2007/2008 PEV, the police used lethal force to quell protests in Kisumu and Nairobi, they were largely impotent during the initial round of violence in the Rift Valley Province. Around Eldoret town in the North Rift, settlements with significant Kikuyu populations like Kiambaa, Matunda, and Rurigi erupted in violence. Large groups of young men from the Kalenjin communities that supported ODM roamed the countryside, with virtual impunity, torching the homes of PNU supporters, mainly from the Kikuyu, Kisii and Kamba communities. After the initial

round of violence, there was an unstable calm until the end of January when another wave of violence struck following the murder of the ODM Member of Parliament (MP) David Too.

In other towns Like Nakuru and Naivasha people from the Kalenjin and Luo community were persecuted by pro-government militia, the Mungiki who committed atrocities including forced circumcision which targeted the members of the Luo community through killings, rape, torching of houses, some with people inside among other atrocities (Ahlberg & Njoroge, 2013). According to Human Rights watch (2009), the official total killed as a result of the clashes in Naivasha was 41, Twenty-three were burned, including 13 children, seven were shot dead by police and the rest were killed with machetes. There were four victims of forced male circumcision treated at the hospital, all of whom survived.

The Uhuru Kenyatta government also had human rights lapses with the first attempt at legalizing human rights violations being made in December 2014 through the security laws amendment bill. According to Human Rights Watch (2014) the cumulative effect of the amendments could return Kenya to the police state of the 1980s and 90s, and nullify recent progress in protecting human rights. The Poor human rights record of the security agencies was a cause for alarm because this amendment sought to give Police, National Intelligence Service and prosecutors unchecked powers that would lead to massive human rights abuses. Indeed the 2017 general election which was marred by incidences of violence mainly perpetuated by the Police in opposition strongholds proved that human rights abuses were still a big concern among the police despite the reforms that were made to the Police force following the promulgation of the 2010 constitution. The

violence of 2017 was an ethnic dimension since the majority of Killings were committed and other human rights violations were committed in Western Kenya. The Star Newspaper on December 20, 2017 reported that following August 8 and the repeat election held on October 26, 2017, the Police killed 92 people. Human Rights watch (2017) reports revealed that since the Kenyan politics is characterized by inter-ethnic tensions. Political alliances are often formed along ethnic lines, and one's ethnicity is easily associated with support for a certain political party or candidate. Therefore the 2017 political violence was directed at women and girls because of their gender but also their ethnicity and was used to punish the individual women and their communities for the way they voted.

6.1.7 Marginalization

The findings of the study revealed that marginalization was a major underlying factor for intractable ethnic conflict in Uasin Gishu county as supported by 220 (58.7%) of household heads. This assertion was however opposed by 75 (20%) of the household heads while 80 (21.4%) stated that they did not know that whether Marginalization caused ethnic conflicts.

The findings were in Tandem with Stiftung Friedrich Ebert (2012) report which indicated Ethnic conflicts often emerge in multiethnic underdeveloped societies when the behaviour of the state is perceived as dominated by a particular group or community within it, when communities feel threatened with marginalisation or when no recourse for redressing grievances exists. Ethnic thinking and mobilisation generally emerge from the resulting inequitable access to power and resources and not from an intrinsic hatred (Aapengnuo, 2010). Thus, ethnic mobilisation is likely to thrive in situations of low

interpersonal trust (fear of others), little to no interethnic dialogue when individuals feel marginalised, and it is in this sort of environment that nefarious politicians can fuel ethnic tensions that boil up into outright violence. This is likely to occur especially in the event that that ethnic groups antagonised are different ethnic entities that were outside the power circle, producing marginalisation, massive deprivation and inequalities that would trigger inter-ethnic conflicts as various groups struggled for scarce resources in the state.

6.2 Strategies Applied by State and Non-State actors in the Management of Horizontal inequalities and Ethnic Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to establish the opinion of the household heads on whether the strategies applied by state and non-state actors could provide an in Management of Horizontal inequalities in Uasin County. The findings were as indicated in Table 6.2.

Table 6. 2: Strategies to Manage Horizontal inequalities and Ethnic Conflicts

Strategies	Agree	Disagree	Don't Know
Establishment of Constitutional Commissions	283 (75.5%)	44 (11.7%)	48 (12.8%)
Reconciliation Initiatives	281 (74.9%)	57 (15.2%)	37 (9.9%)
Devolution/County Governance	277 (73.9%)	65 (17.3%)	33 (8.8%)

Source: Fielda Data, 2021

6.2.1 Establishment of Constitutional Commissions

The findings revealed that Establishment of Constitutional commissions by the state provided an opportunity in management of Horizonatal lnequalities as supported by 283 (75.5%) of the household heads. This was however disputed by 44 (11.7%) of the household heads who disagreed and 48 (12.8%) who stated that they don't know.

The role of various constitution commission as an opportunity to

6.2.1.1 National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)

The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) is a legal entity established by the National Cohesion and Integration Act No.12 of 2008. The establishment of the NCIC acknowledged the necessity for a nationwide institution to foster national identity and values, diminish ethno-political rivalry and ethnically driven violence, eradicate discrimination based on ethnicity, race, and religion, as well as advance national reconciliation and healing.

The commission's responsibilities encompass various aspects: It is tasked with facilitating and encouraging equal opportunities, positive relationships, harmony, and peaceful coexistence among individuals from diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds, while also advising the government on related matters. The NCIC is committed to eradicating all forms of racial or ethnic discrimination and discouraging individuals, institutions, political entities, and groups from endorsing or propagating such discrimination. It aims to boost tolerance, comprehension, and acceptance of diversity across all domains of national existence.

Moreover, the NCIC is focused on promoting regard for religious, cultural, and linguistic diversity within a pluralistic society. It is responsible for designing, supervising, coordinating, and advocating educational and training initiatives aimed at raising public awareness and supporting the advancement of peace and harmony among various ethnic and racial communities. The commission promotes mechanisms like arbitration, conciliation, mediation, and other conflict resolution techniques.

Additionally, the NCIC investigates complaints of discrimination and puts forth recommendations to the Attorney General, Human Rights Commission, or other relevant authorities for necessary corrective actions. It has the authority to independently investigate or respond to requests from institutions, offices, or individuals concerning issues that impact ethnic and racial relationships. The commission can advocate for policy, legal, or administrative reforms concerning matters related to ethnic relations, and it conducts research and provides recommendations to the government on ethnic affairs, including the progress of ethnic relations.

The NCIC is responsible for monitoring and reporting to the National Assembly on the implementation and success of its recommendations. It also formulates strategies and priorities within the government's socio-economic, political, and developmental policies that influence ethnic relations and offers advice on their implementation.

6.2.1.2 Kenya National Human Rights Commission

The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) is an independent entity dedicated to safeguarding human rights on a national level. Established in accordance with Article 59 of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution and further outlined in the KNCHR Act of Parliament (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Act,

2011), this institution holds the responsibility for championing and safeguarding human rights.

The Commission undertakes two primary and expansive roles: Firstly, it acts as a vigilant overseer of the government's actions in the realm of human rights. Secondly, it assumes a pivotal leadership role in guiding the nation towards becoming a state that upholds human rights as a fundamental principle. The overarching objective of KNCHR is to investigate instances of human rights violations, provide remedies for these violations, conduct research to assess adherence to human rights norms and standards, deliver human rights education, facilitate training, launch campaigns and advocacy initiatives centered on human rights, and collaborate closely with other stakeholders within Kenya

6.2.1.3 National Land Commission

The National Land Commission (NLC) is a constitutional body established in accordance with Article 67 (1) of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. The commission's operational framework was established through the National Land Commission (NLC) Act, 2012, the Land Act, 2012, and the Land Registration Act, 2012. Mandated by the constitution, the commission has been assigned several key responsibilities, which include managing public land on behalf of both the national and county governments. Additionally, it is tasked with proposing a national land policy to the national government, offering advice on a comprehensive program for nationwide land title registration, conducting research on land and natural resource utilization, and presenting recommendations to relevant authorities. The commission also has the authority to launch investigations, either at its own discretion or in response to complaints, into past or ongoing cases of land injustices.

It is authorized to recommend suitable remedies and promote the use of traditional dispute resolution methods in cases of land conflicts.

During its initial decade of operation, the commission has achieved notable accomplishments. For instance, it has received 3,665 claims related to Historical Land Injustices (HLIs). Among these, 126 cases have been analyzed and resolved, while the remainder are under consideration for admission, investigation, and hearing. Additionally, the commission has effectively managed over 5,000 land disputes through Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and Traditional Dispute Resolution (TDR) methods, contributing to enhanced national unity and peaceful coexistence among communities. Furthermore, the commission has played an integral role in addressing numerous court cases concerning land matters across various judicial levels, including the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, High Court (Environment and Land Court), and Magistrates Court. It has also been instrumental in conducting investigations and providing forensic services to uncover fraudulent public land transactions. Collaborating closely with entities like NEMA and NCA, the commission has taken measures to safeguard riparian land, even issuing notices for the withdrawal of construction permits to individuals erecting structures on such land

6.2.2 Reconciliation Initiatives

The findings of the study revealed that reconciliation initiatives were an important conflict management and peace building strategy in the county of Uasin Gishu as supported by 281 (74.9%) of the household heads. On the other hand, 57 (15.2%) disagreed with this assertion and 37 (9.9%) stated that they did not know.

The supported by interview by the CJPC coordinator who indicated that the CJPC and the Catholic diocese of eldoret had spearhead a program name the Amani Mashinani project and the Peace connector program that had played a significant role towards reconciling the ethnic groups in the county. He avvered that:

> We have been running the Peace Connector Projects to reconcile various ethnic groups in the County. The projects brought together communities that were previously divided by conflicts. They are the result of effective interethnic collaborations. The initial peace projects and actions that began after the 2007/8 post-election violence included the distribution of planting seeds, food, young goats, and farming equipment. Some efforts were community-wide, involving the construction of bridges and roads, while others were aimed at enhancing the socioeconomic standing of communities in Yamumbi/Kapteldon and Burnt Forest. The projects further advanced through activities such activities like merry-go-rounds, table banking, and social gatherings like weddings and dowry payments (Interview with CJPC Coordinator, July 29, 2021).

The findings agreed with those of study conducted by Kirimi, Stephen (2018), titled: The Role of Local Networks for Peace in Kenya. *Local Network for Peace: Lessons from Community-Led Peacebuilding.*In his findings Kirimi (2018) averred that in the after the post-election violence of 2007/2008, Mediation and reconciliation efforts were undertaken in the Rift Valley, specifically targeting eight areas within Uasin Gishu County that had been severely impacted by post-election violence. The primary goal was to restore unity within the communities. These endeavors enabled the communities to concentrate on strengthening social bonds while also identifying the root causes of tension and violence.The Rural Women Peace Link organization spearheaded a groundbreaking and highly effective conflict resolution initiative nationwide, aimed at fostering unity among communities and bridging divides. This initiative encompassed some of the regions most affected by conflicts, including Uasin Gishu County (specifically, Burnt Forest, Kesses, Bindura, Turbo, Kipkaren, Kapsaret, Ya Mumbi,

Kiambaa, and Eldoret), as well as Bungoma County–Mount Elgon (comprising Cheptais, Kopsiro, and Kapsokwony). Through organizing peace dialogues among ordinary citizens and leadership forums in these areas, RWPL provided a platform for women and youth to engage in open discussions, express their grievances, and propose strategies for preventing future violence. Consequently, the organization earned recognition from a wide range of stakeholders as an effective agent of change. Kirimi (2018) further indicated that several projects in the town of Burnt Forest, located in Uasin Gishu County, serve as exemplars of these initiatives. In March 2008, Rural Women Peace Link conducted a series of dialogue sessions, exchange visits, and interactive forums focused on fostering reconciliation and generating conflict resolution ideas to be shared with community leaders in Burnt Forest. One of these dialogues resulted in the community reaching a consensus that it was crucial to rebuild the local market. RWPL subsequently entered into an agreement with the town of Burnt Forest to manage the new market with a specific emphasis on promoting reconciliation and implementing peace-related activities. The market officially opened on May 18, 2009, with a ceremony attended by then US Ambassador to Kenya Michael Ranneberger. This event provided an opportunity for leaders to encourage peace and reconciliation within the community.

6.2.3 Devolution/County Governance

The findings of the study irevealed Devolution/County Governance was an opportunity towards the management of Horizontal Inequalities as supported by 277 (73.9%) of the household heads who agreed with this initiative as an important role that has been played by the state towards ensuring equality in Kenya. On the other, 65 (17.3%) disagreed and 33 (8.8%) of the household heads stated that they did not know.

The findings agreed with those of Kanyinga, (2016) who avvered that devolution has been a transformative force in Kenya's development landscape. He argued that in 2014, a significant portion, around 20 percent, of the total expenditures was allocated to county governments for infrastructure projects aimed at boosting economic growth. These grants have had the effect of liberating local elites from dependence on central patronage. As the president has limited resources to offer to local constituencies, they are now free to disregard him without facing any repercussions in terms of regional development. Even opposition-controlled areas have equal access to state resources compared to those aligned with the ruling elites. The introduction of a bicameral Parliament and an independent judiciary also serves as a check on the president's decisions and commitments, providing an additional layer of oversight alongside independent bodies like the Commission on Administrative Justice (the Ombudsman) and the National Commission on Human Rights.The unconditional grants are swiftly altering rural Kenya's landscape in terms of access to essential services. Counties are giving priority to their local projects and allocating resources where they are most needed. County governments have initiated rural infrastructure projects, such as improving access roads, delivering water services, and establishing or enhancing healthcare facilities. These efforts from county government offer a great opportunity towards reducing horizontal inequalities.

6.4 Chapter Summary

The chapter has presented findings on various challenges and opportunities in the managememnt of Horizontal inequalities. The findings of the chapter revealed that politicization of ethnicity, impunity by perpetrators of thenic conflicts, use of media and technology to perpetuate ethnic hatred and violence and institutionalized discrimination

on the basis of ethnicity were among the biggest challenges in the management of horizontal inequalities. The chapter further highlights the strategies applied by the state and non state actors in the management of horizontal inequalities in the County. The state has instituted a myriad of measure to deal with horizontal inequalities in the County. Among the meaures include establishment of various constitutional commissions to deal with various issues araising from horizontal inequalities. These commission include the National Land Commission, Kenya National Human rights commission and National Cohesion and integration commission. The non-state actors have alson played a significant role in collaboration withs state actors through through reconciliation initatitaves. This chapter further revaled that devolution had a huge role in the process of managing horizontal inequality in the county and as such it was a massive opportunity to make this better in the county. Finally, the findings in this chapter indicated that Devolution/County Governance was an opportunity towards the management of Horizontal inequalities. The next chapter discusses Summary, Conclusions and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The overall objective of the study was to critically interrogate the contribution of horizontal inequalities towards intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County in Post-Colonial Kenya. The specific objectives were to: Examine the nature of horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. Analyse the nexus between horizontal inequalities and intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. Assess the challenges and Opportunities in managing horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. The findings of findings of the study have been discussed thematically on the basis of these objectives and this chapter provides a summarized version of these findings along with the conclusions, recommendations and suggestions for further research based on the objectives.

7.1 Summary of Findings

Based on the first specific objective, the study sought to examine the nature of horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. The study noted that Uasin Gishu County was Cosmopolitan and had various ethnic groups from all parts of Kenya. An indicator of diversity within the urban county of Uasin Gishu. It was also important to note that the ethnic composition of households in the county had a role to play in regard to catalyzing ethnic conflicts as reported in 1992, 1992 and 2008. The findings of the study revealed that 70 (18.7%) were Kikuyu; 121 (32.3%) were Kalenjin; 30 (8.0%) were Kisii; 52 (13.9%) were Luo; 67 (17.9%) were Luhya; 14 (3.7%) were Kamba; 1 (0.3) was Teso; 2 (0.5%) were Maasai; 1 (0.3) was Turkana; 5 (1.3%) were Meru; 1 (0.3%) was Mijikenda 1 (0.3%); 1 (0.3%) was Somali and 10 (2.7%) were from other ethnic groups in Kenya.

The study also found out that horizontal inequalities in the study area manifested in different forms namely: Economic inequalities, political horizontal inequalities, social and cultural status inequalities. All these forms of inequalities in one way or another contributed to ethnic conflicts. From a historical perspective, the roots of these inequalities can be traced back to 1963 when Kenya got its independence from the British colonizers. All the first four Kenyan regymes adopted policies that led to deep rooted horizontal inequalities that have catalyzed ethnic conflicts in Kenya for decades with the period starting 1990 becoming the starting point for intractable conflicts. in this study correlation between horizontal inequalities ethnic conflicts all indicated a positive correlation with some horizontal inequalities showing significant and other not. The finding are as shown in the following discussions.

In comparing the correlation between inequality in ownership of assets and the experience of ethnic conflicts, there was Pearson Correlation value (r) of .143[**], with a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.005, which was significant at 0.01. This was an indication that there was a positive significant correlation between ownership of assets and ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. In this regard inequalities in asset ownership can lead to ethnic conflicts in the county.

The study also compared the correlation between inequality in Land ownership and experience of ethnic conflict in Uasin Gishu County. The findings revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) of 126[*], with a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.015, which was significant at 0.05, therefore, there was a positive significant correlation between Land ownership and ethnic conflicts. Inequalities in Land ownership can therefore lead to ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

The study further compared the correlation between inequality in employment opportunities and experience of ethnic conflicts. The findings revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) of 0.074, with a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.155. p value was larger than 0.05 indicating that there was no statistical significant. In this regard there was a weak positive correlation between employment and ethnic conflicts, however, this relationship was not significant. There is therefore a weak indication that inequality in employment could lead to ethnic conflicts since there no significant relationship between the two variables.

The study further compared the correlation between inequality in income levels and experience of ethnic conflicts. The findings revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) of 0.065, with a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.208, therefore there was a weak positive correlation between income levels and ethnic conflicts, however, this relationship was not significant. Since there is no significant correlations between these variables, it means that inequality in income levels cannot lead to ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

It is therefore apparent from the findings that inequalities in land ownership and inequalities ownership of assets are the two forms of economic inequalities that have a serious implication on the occurrence of ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu. In this regard, any discussion on conflict management in the county must take of land and asset ownership issues if cohesion between the diverse ethnic groups in the county has to be realized.

In comparing the correlation between Ethnic Patronage, Bureaucracy and Corruption and the experience of ethnic conflicts, there was Pearson Correlation value (r) of 265[**]

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and statistical significance (p-value) of .000. The study also compared Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Positions, Appointments and Opportunities against ethnic conflicts which showed the values as r=0.095 and p-value=0.067; Inequalities in people's capabilities to participate politically e.g in Voting against the experience of ethnic conflicts which gave r=0.003 and p-value=0.951 and finally, the correlation between Inequalities in Resource Distribution and ethnic conflicts revealed r=0.060 and p-value=0.243

In the regard therefore from the findings of the study, a cross tabulation of between Ethnic Patronage and the Experience of ethnic conflicts gave a positive significant correlation. An indication that Ethnic Patronage, had significant influence on the occurrence of inter-ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. However for the other three independent variables namely; Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Positions and Appointments; Inequalities in people's capabilities to participate politically e.g in Voting and Inequalities in Resource Distribution, a cross tabulation against experience of ethnic conflict yielded a weak positive that was not significant. Thereby indicating that these three variable could influence the occurrence of ethnic conflicts but not to a significant extent.

Finally, a cross tabulation of Inequality in Access to Educational Funding against ethnic conflicts revealed the Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) = .018 and p-value=.729; cross tabulation of Inequality in Access to Health care against experience of ethnic conflicts had r=0.026 and p-value=0.613; cross tabulation of inequality in Access to Government Loans/grants against experience of ethnic conflicts had r=.061 and p-value of .241 and

finally a cross tabulation of Cultural/ethnic Status Inequalities had r=.136**and p-value of .009 (significant).

The findings of the cross tabulation therefore affirmed that there was a weak positive correlation between all the four variable when tabulated against experience of ethnic conflicts. However cultural/ethnic status inequalities have a significant correlation against ethnic conflicts, while the other three variable did not have significant correlation to ethnic conflicts. Therefore based on these findings, inequalities based on cultural and ethnic status could cause conflicts to a large extent with those bordering on education funding, healthcare and access to grants could cause conflict but not to a significant extent.

In line with the Second Objective of the study, Analyse the nexus between horizontal inequalities and intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. The findings indicated that more than 60% of the household haeds had stayed in the county for more then 5 years an indication that they were all aware of the issues of conflicts withni the study area. The household heads also indicated that they had expereinced conflicts in the study area as evienced from 260 (69.3%) household heads who stated that yes, they had experienced conflicts in the area in comparisn to 115 (30.7%) stated that they had not experienced conflicts in the period that they had resideded in the area.

The findings revealed that the conflicts took various froms with Land clashes being one of the conflict that was experienced in the area. The responses from the household heads revealed that 157 (41.9) agreed that land issues were deeply rooted and were a conflict factor in the county, 84 (22.4%) disgreed however, 134 (35.7%) indiaced that they did not know whether land clashes were a type of conflcit in the area. The findings also

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revaled that ethnic violence was another type of conflicts in the county with 215 (57.3%) of the household heads in agreement, as compared to 65 (17%) who did not agree with this assertion. However, 95(25.3%) inidicated that they did not know whether ethnic violence was a type of conflict in the study area. Additionally the findings in revealed that 246 (65.6%) of the household agreed that politically instigated violence was one of the most common types of conflicts that had been experienced in the area, this was in contrast to 36 (9.6%) of the household heads who stated that they disagreed while 93 (24.8%) indicated they did not know whether Politically instigated conflicts were experienced in the county.

The study also found out the conflicts were mainly expereinced during elections as supprted by 330 (88%) emphatically stated that conflicts occurred during electioneering periods. These conflict were mainly brutal in nature as supported by 203 (54.1%) of the household heads. The brutal nature of this conflict took the form of killings, mass displacement of people and damage to property. The brutality of the conflict also took the form of human rights violations with the Police being implicated for taking sides. As one scholar posits "amid these ethnically tense political landscapes, police have found themselves in the middle, compromised in taking sides in favour of the government and violating the rule of law and constitution".

The findings of the study also revealed that that Politicians played the biggest role as perpetrators of ethnic conflicts. Politicians work closely with gangs of youths for to gain political mileage. The politicians play the role of funding and inciting violence especially during elections. In an interview conducted with an official from the NCCK, it emerged the Politicians worked with organized groups of young men whom they would

occasionally use to terrorize their opponents. This was supported by the CJPC coordinator who stated that it was difficult to separate the Politicians, Youths and gangs from ethnic conflicts. The findings indiacted that the politicians played the bigger role of finding activities that would earn the political capital even if it meant terrorism their opponents. During election periods groups of organized youths would always been seen hanging around these politicians as either security or ardent supporters and these groups always look like they could defend such politicians with their lives. Such youths could probably the criminals gangs who find more relevance in the chaotic political environment that is always witnessed in Kenya.

The study also sought to establish the association between various forms of horizontal inequalities and the three types of conflicts experienced in Uasin Gishu County. cross tabulation was performed between the independent and dependent variables to determine the whether the correlations between the variables were significant or not. The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in ownership of assets against politically instigated conflicts revealed that there was Pearson Correlation value (r) =0.162[**] and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.002. Therefore since p<0.05, this is an indication thar there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in and politically instigated conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in Ownership of Land against politically instigated conflicts revealed that there was Pearson Correlation value (r) =0.153[**] and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.003. In this regard, since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in Ownership of Land and politically instigated conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in ownership of assets against Land clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) $=0.152^{**}$ and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.003. Therefore since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in ownership of assets and Land clashes in Uasin Gishu County. The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in Ownership of Land against Land clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation value (r) = 0.157^{**} and a statistical significance (p-value) = 0.002. In this regard, since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in Ownership of Land and Land clashes in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation of Ethnic Patronage against Politically Instigated Violence revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.229^{**} and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.000. In this regard since p<0.05, it is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Ethnic Patronage and Politically Instigated Violence in Uasin Gishu County. The cross-tabulation of Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Appointments and Opportunities against Politically Instigated Violence revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.122^{*} and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.018. In this regard since p<0.05, it is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Appointments and Opportunities and Politically Instigated Violence in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation between Ethnic Patronage against Land Clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.209^{**} and a statistical significance (p-value)

of 0.000. In this regard since p<0.05, it is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between between Ethnic Patronage and Land Clashes Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Appointments and Opportunities against Land Clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.168[**] and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.001. In this regard since p<0.05, it is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between between Inequalities in the Distribution of Political Appointments and Opportunities and Land Clashes in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation between Inequalities in Political Participation against Land Clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.133[**] and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.010. In this regard, since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in Political Participation and Land clashes in Uasin Gishu county. Finally, the cross-tabulation between inequalities in Resource Distribution against Land Clashes revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.167[**] and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.001. Therefore, since p<0.05, this is an indication that there was a statistically significant bivariate association between Inequalities in Resource Distribution and Land Clashes in Uasin Gishu county.

The cross-tabulation of Cultural Status inequality against Politically Instigated Violence revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.121[*] and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.019. In this regard since p<0.05, it is an indication that there

was a statistically significant bivariate association between Cultural Status inequality and Politically Instigated Violence in Uasin Gishu County.

The cross-tabulation of Inequality in Educational Funding/Bursaries against Politically Instigated Violence revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.021 and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.683. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is an indication that there was not a statistically significant association between Inequality in Educational Funding/Bursaries and Politically Instigated Violence. The cross-tabulation of Inequality in access to Healthcare against Politically Instigated Violence revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.038 and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.468. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is an indication that there was not a statistically significant association between Inequality in access to Healthcare and Politically Instigated Violence.

Finally, the cross-tabulation of Inequality in Access to Government Loans against Politically Instigated Violence revealed that there was a Pearson Correlation coefficient (r) of 0.054 and a statistical significance (p-value) of 0.299. In this regard, since p>0.05, this is an indication that there was not a statistically significant association between Inequality in Access to Government Loans and Politically Instigated Violence.

In line with the third specific objective of the study, assess the challenges and Opportunities in managing horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. The findings of the study revealed that Politicization of ethnicity was a major challenge for the management of ethnic conflicts in the County of Uasin Gishu as supported by 217 (57.9%) of household heads who strongly agreed with this assertion and 91 (23.3%) agreed with Politicization of ethnicity as a challenge. Another challenge to conflict

management was Impunity by perpetrators of conflicts as supported by 159 (42.4%) of the household heads had strongly agreed with this point of view and 92 (24.5%) agreed with this view as well. The findings of the study also revealed that Ethnic Tension and hostilities were stimulated through the use various media and technology platforms and hence this affected ethnic conflict management in Uasin Gishu County as supported by 211 (56.5%) of household heads who strongly agreed with this assertion and 98 (26.1%) agreed. Finally, the findings showed that institutionalized discrimination was another factor that was considered a threat to conflict management efforts in the County as supported by 175 (46.7%) of the household heads who strongly agreed with this point view and 91 (24.3%) also agreed with this assertion. The findings that there were several strategies put in place to manage horizontal inequalities and inter-ethnic conflicts. These strategies included establishment of constitutional Commissions, reconciliation initiatives and devolution.

7.2 Conclusions of the Study

Based on the first of objective, the study concludes that horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County are manifested through economic, social-cultural and political factors that are exacerbated through unfair policies and government practices that can be traced back to 1963 when Kenya attained its independence from the British. The economic factors that have led to deep-rooted horizontal inequalities in the county included land distributions, inequalities in access to employment, and inequalities in income levels. These economic factors have been worse by political factors such as Ethnic Patronage, Bureaucracy and Corruption, Unfairness in the distribution of political opportunities and inequalities in resource allocation. These political and economic factors in combination

with social and cultural factors such as inequalities in access to education, health care, and cultural status inequalities have created an environment that disposed the county to ethnic conflicts considering that Uasin Gishu County is a cosmopolitan county that hosts several major ethnic groups in Kenya. The four post-colonial regimes implemented policies that created tension, hostilities and ethnic mistrust due to the high levels of horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County.

Based on the second specific objective, the study concludes that there is a significant association between horizontal inequalities and intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. The conflicts were mostly experienced during elections. These conflicts were mainly perpetrated by politicians who use criminal gangs and rogue youths to disrupt peace through violence that often lead to deaths, displacement and damage to property. The violent nature of the conflict was also marred by police brutality which was witnessed mainly due to the fact that the police often took sides with political perpetrators from the government and hence committed atrocities and massive human rights violations.

Based on the third specific objective, the study concludes that there were several challenges and opportunities in the management of horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County. The challenges included politicization of ethnicity, impunity by perpetrators of ethnic conflicts, use of media and technology to perpetuate ethnic hatred and violence and institutionalized discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. However, there are a myriad of opportunities that can help in the process of managing ese horizontal inequalities and conflicts through various strategies that had been put in place by both state and non-state actors. Devolution, constitutional commissins, advocacy and

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reconciliation initiatives were were among meaures that provided an opportunity towards managements of the horizontal inequalities. The activities of these actors could create a conducive environment through which fair practices that would help to get rid of horizontal inequalities can be implemented and hence lasting peace.

The overall conclusion of the study is that horizontal inequalities have played a significant role towards intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County in Post-colonial Kenya. The long-standing differential treatment of various ethnic groups especially those who are 'not in government' and the culture of 'it's our time to eat' has led to various ethnic groups feeling disenfranchised and has led to the culture of 'Our person must be in the statehouse for us to benefit'. These factors have created a situation in which ethnic groups in the county are involved in political competition with ethnic nationalism taking centre stage. The incidences of violence that have been experienced in Kenya since the advent of political pluralism can be attributed to this ethnic nationalism since all the past presidents have preferentially treated their own co-ethnics at the expense of other ethnic groups. Uasin Gishu being a county has several ethnic groups and therefore hosts the so-called relatively privileged and the relatively deprived communities thus the kind of conflict experienced in the county is a reflection of what Kenya as a nation goes through in every election cycle. Therefore, horizontal inequalities has many faces through which they create an environment in which ethnic idenity thrives over national identity which are attributable to intractable ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County.

7.3 Recommendations of the Study

Based on the findings and conclusions, the study makes the following recommendations;

First the study recommends that there is a need for both county and national governments to Implement policies and programs aimed at reducing economic disparities, such as land reform, job creation, and income equality measures. The Focus of this should be on improving access to education, healthcare, and cultural opportunities for all ethnic groups within the county, thus reducing social and cultural inequalities. There is also a need to promote a culture of inclusivity and diversity in governance and public administration to ensure that different ethnic groups have representation and a voice in decision-making processes.

Secondly the study recommends transparency and inclusivity in political processes to reduce the manipulation of ethnic identities for political gains. This includes addressing the use of criminal gangs and rogue youths by politicians to disrupt peace before, during and during elections. There is also a need to promote accountability within the police force to prevent police brutality and ensure impartiality in maintaining law and order. there is also need to establish mechanisms to hold perpetrators of ethnic conflicts accountable for their actions. This includes prosecuting individuals responsible for inciting violence and human rights violations.

Finally, the study recommends a multi-pronged stakeholder approach to address the challenge of horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gihsu County. The approach should involve a wide range of stakeholders, including government agencies, civil society organizations, community leaders, and citizens, in the implementation of these strategies to ensure their success in the process of managing HIs. The stakeholders involved should prioritize and invest in comprehensive conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms that focus on addressing the root causes of horizontal inequalities and ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu

County. This should include education, reconciliation initiatives, law enforcement, and community engagement to create a sustainable environment for peace and harmony. Additionally there is need to further empower Constitutional Commissions in order to Strengthen their roles in addressing ethnic discrimination and promoting equality. These commissions can play a crucial role in advocating for fair treatment and ensuring that institutions are held accountable for discriminatory practices. There is also the need to leverage devolution by continuing to explore the potential of devolution as a means of promoting more equitable resource distribution and governance at the local level, this can be done by ensuring that devolution mechanisms are transparent and responsive to the needs of different ethnic groups. There should also be support initiatives that aim to educate and sensitize the public about the dangers of ethnic hatred and violence perpetuated through media and technology

7.4 Suggestions for Further Research

Based on the findings, conclusions and recommendations, the study makes the following suggestions for further research;

i. The study suggests that a research should be conducated to investigate the specific consequences of horizontal inequalities in Uasin Gishu County by analyzing how disparities in land distribution, access to employment, and income levels affect overall economic development, productivity, and poverty rates within the county.

ii. A Comparative study should be conducted on the dynamics of ethnic conflicts in Uasin Gishu County with other counties in Kenya that have similar or different ethnic compositions in order to analyze the nexus between horizontal inequalities and conflicts in these counties.

iii. A study should be conducted on potential policy interventions and economic, political and social strategies that can mitigate these inequalities and promote sustainable socio-economic development in the Uasin Gishu County.

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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1: HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRES

PART A: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

	A. Background information		Your answer
1	Residence (Please state in the Space provided)	....	
2	Ethnic Group (Please state in the Space provided)	....	
3	Age of household head	16-21...............................1 22-35...............................2 35-55...............................3 55-75...............................4 75 and above.................5	
4	Gender of Household Head	Male...............................1 Female...........................2	
5	Marital Status	Single.............................1 Married..........................2 Divorced/Separated........3 Widowed.......................4	
6	Religion	Christian.........................1 Islam...............................2 Traditional......................3 Hindu..............................4 Others(Specify)...............5	
7	Education	No Education....................1 Non formal Education.......2 Primary school dropout.....3 Primary level......................4 Secondary School dropout.5 Secondary level..................6 Tertiary level......................7	

		University level..................8	
8	What your Profession (Please state in the Space provided)	....	

PART B. HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY

1. To what extent do you are with the existence of the following forms of economic

   inequalities in this county.

Variable	Agree	Disagree	Not aware
Inequalities in ownership of Financial Assets			
Inequalities in ownership of Land			
Inequalities in Employment opportunities			
Inequalities in income levels			

2. Do the following Political Horizontal Inequalities exist in Uasin Gishu County

Variable	Yes	No	Not Sure
Unfair bureaucratic practices favoring some ethnicities			
Unfairness in the distribution of political opportunities			
Inequalities in people's capabilities to participate politically and to express their needs			

3. Have you as a person once felt that there are disparities in the recognition and

   standing of your ethnic group's groups customs and norms?

   Yes………………………….No…………………..

   If Yes, explain……………………………….

4. Do you feel that there is inequality in access to the following essential services

Variable	Agree	Disagree	Don't Know

Education			
Health care			
Housing.			

PART C. NATURE AND EXTENT OF INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS IN USIN GISHU COUNTY

5. How long have you stayed in this area?

1-5 years	
5-20 Years	
More than 20 years	

6. Have you ever witnessed any conflict?

      1. Yes   2. No

7. if YES, name the type of conflict.

Land clashes	
Politically instigated violence	
Ethnic violence	
None	
Others(specify)……………………	

8. What is the nature of conflicts experienced within the county?

    1. Brutal

    2. Less brutal

    3. Others……………………………. (Specify)

9. In your opinion what do you think motivated the conflict?

Variables	Agree	Disagree	Don't know

Political incitement			
Self defense			
Vengeance			
Ethnic hatred			
Scramble for resources			
Others (Specify)………….			

10. In your opinion who are the major perpetrators of inter-ethnic conflicts in the area? (Please tick where appropriate, where 1= Strongly Agree, 2= Agree, 3= Undecided, 4=Disagree, 5= strongly disagree)

	1	2	3	4	5
Politicians					
Youths					
Criminal Gangs					
I don't know					
Others (Specify)					

11. What are the main causes of intractable ethnic violence within the county

Variable	Yes	No	Don't Know
Political incitement			
Vigilant groups			
Historical injustices			
Violation of human rights			
Land issues			
Inter- ethnic struggles			
Marginalization			

PART D: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN MANAGING INTRACTABLE ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY

12. Do you think it is possible to have a long term solution to the incideces of ethnic conflict in the area?   Yes…………………No…………….

13. Do you believe that inequalities have been a major hindrance towards the attainment of lasting Peace in the area? Yes…………………No…………….

14. Can inclusivity in governance heal communities and lead to cohesion of ethnicities in this county? Yes…………………No…………….

15. How do you view the role of politicians in the process of conflict management in the county?

Responses	
Divisive	
Uniting	
Not concerned	

16. How best can do you think conflict management can be attained in this county?..
....

APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANTS

1. Do you think there are inequalities based on political, social and economic forms in this county?
2. Do you think people are not allowed to access certain services in this county because of their ethnic backgrounds ?
3. Have you ever experienced conflicts or skirmishes in this area?
4. What was the cause of such conflicts
5. Who were the main perpetrators of these conflicts
6. What were the main motivating factors to these conflicts
7. Were the conflicts brutal?
8. How best can such conflicts be managed?
9. What are the challenges in managing these conflicts

APPENDIX 3: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE

1. Do you think there are inequalities based on political, social and economic forms in this county?
2. Do you think people are not allowed to access certain services in this county because of their ethnic backgrounds ?
3. Have you ever experienced conflicts or skirmishes in this area?
4. What was the cause of such conflicts
5. Who were the main perpetrators of these conflicts
6. What were the main motivating factors to these conflicts
7. Were the conflicts brutal?
8. How best can such conflicts be managed?
9. What are the challenges in managing these conflicts

APPENDIX 4: UNIVERSITY PROPOSAL APPROVAL LETTER

MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MMUST)

Tel: 056-30870	P.O Box 190
Fax: 056-30153	Kakamega – 50100
E-mail: directordps@mmust.ac.ke	Kenya
Website: www.mmust.ac.ke	

Directorate of Postgraduate Studies

Ref: MMU/COR: 509099   22nd December, 2020

Juma James Omondi,
CPC/H/01-53063/2018,
P.O. Box 190-50100,
KAKAMEGA.

Dear Mr. Omondi,

RE: APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL

I am pleased to inform you that the Directorate of Postgraduate Studies has considered and approved your Ph.D. proposal entitled *"Role of Horizontal Inequalities towards Intractable Ethnic Conflicts in Uasin Gishu County in Post-Colonial Kenya"* and appointed the following as supervisors:

1. Prof. Crispinous Iteyo   -   SDMHA, MMUST
2. Prof. Frank K. Matanga   -   SDMHA, MMUST

You are required to submit through your supervisor(s) progress reports every three months to the Director of Postgraduate Studies. Such reports should be copied to the following: Chairman, School of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Graduate Studies Committee; Department of Peace and Conflict Studies & Departmental Graduate Studies Committee. Kindly adhere to research ethics consideration in conducting research.

It is the policy and regulations of the University that you observe a deadline of three years from the date of registration to complete your Ph.D. thesis. Do not hesitate to consult this office in case of any problem encountered in the course of your work.

We wish you the best in your research and hope the study will make original contribution to knowledge.

Yours Sincerely,

Prof. John Obiri
DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

APPENDIX 5: RESEARCH PERMIT FROM NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION (NACOSTI)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: 400387

Date of Issue: **15/May/2021**

RESEARCH LICENSE

This is to Certify that Mr.. James Omondi Juma of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, has been licensed to conduct research in Uasin-Gishu on the topic: ROLE OF HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES TOWARDS INTRACTABLE ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY IN POST COLONIAL KENYA for the period ending : 15/May/2022.

License No: **NACOSTI/P/21/10511**

400387

Applicant Identification Number

Director General
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Verification QR Code

NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document,
Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.

APPENDIX 6: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION FROM MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

REPUBLIC OF KENYA
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
State Department for Early Learning & Basic Education

Email: cdeuasingishucounty@yahoo.com
: cdeuasingishucounty@gmail.com
When replying please quote:

County Director of Education,
Uasin Gishu County,
P.O. Box 9843-30100,
**ELDORET**.

Ref: No. MOE/UGC/TRN/9/VOL.III/292

23rd July,2021

James Omondi Juma
Masinde Muliro University
KAKAMEGA

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION.

In reference to your Licence No. 400387 dated 15th May, 2021 from National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI), you are hereby granted the authority to carry out research on *"Role of Horizontal inequalities towards intractable ethnic conflicts,"* in Uasin Gishu County. Your request is granted for a period ending 15th May, 2022.

We take this opportunity to wish you well during this data collection.

Psinen Michael
For: County Director of Education
UASIN GISHU.

APPENDIX 7: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION FROM COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF UASIN GISHU

REPUBLIC OF KENYA
COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF UASIN GISHU

Tel. NOs:direct line:053-2016215
053-2016000
053-2016125

When Replying, Please Addres
County Secretary
Uasin-Gishu County
P.O. Box 40 – 30100
Eldoret, Kenya.

Fax: +254-053-2062884
Website:www.uasingishu.go.ke
Email:info@uasingishu.go.ke

REF: UGC/ADM.1/31/GEN/2021/VOL.II

26 July, 2021

Mr. James O. Juma,
Masinde Muliro University,
P.O. Box 190-50100,
KAKAMEGA.

APPROVAL TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH WITHIN THE COUNTY GOVERNMENT

Your letter on the above subject is in reference.

Authority is hereby granted to you to carry out your research within Uasin Gishu County Government, for your academic use and we request you to share your findings with the Office of the undersigned. Your findings may be useful in addressing the Role of Horizontal Inequalities towards Intractable Ethnic Conflicts in Post-Colonial Kenya in the County.

By copy of this letter, the Chief Officer, Education is requested to assist you accordingly.

Edwin Bett
COUNTY SECRETARY/
HEAD OF COUNTY PUBLIC SERVICE

Copy: Chief Officer, Education.