

**COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES AND PERFORMANCE OF THE  
NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN MANAGING TERRORISM IN LAMU  
COUNTY, KENYA**

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**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for Award of the Degree  
of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies of Masinde Muliro University of  
Science and Technology**

**October, 2019**

## **DECLARATION AND CERTIFICATION**

### **Declaration by Candidate**

This thesis is my original work prepared with no other than the indicated sources and support and has not been submitted elsewhere for a degree or any other award.

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this thesis to my able mum Mrs. Mary Awino Otieno for her moral support and unparalleled loving care throughout my life.

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## ABSTRACT

Terrorism remains a major danger to the world and safety at domestic, regional and international level. It undermines the basic principles of law, justice, human rights and freedom and proves to be an affront to the United Nations (UN) Global Covenant and the values and principles expressed in the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act of Africa. It also poses a serious and clear threat to states' territorial sovereignty, security and stability. Effective counter-terrorism approaches in this regard remain critical instruments to mitigate risks and deleterious effects of terrorism. In Kenya, the National Police Service (NPS) is one of the key agencies involved in counterterrorism operations. Given emerging trends of terrorist groups and continued attack in Kenya by terrorist elements, it is imperative that the NPS improves the overall direction of its counter terrorism strategy and adopt robust counterterrorism mechanisms in the fight against terrorism. The problem that necessitated this study was the continued attack by suspected *Al-Shabaab* terrorists in Lamu County despite the NPS adopting numerous counterterrorism strategies in its operations. The general objective of this study was to investigate counterterrorism strategies employed by the NPS, their performance and the challenges they face in managing terrorism in Lamu County, Kenya. The study was guided by the following specific objectives: evaluate counterterrorism strategies employed by the NPS in Lamu County; assess efficacy of policing approaches utilised in counterterrorism by the NPS in Lamu County; and examine challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies by the NPS in Lamu County, Kenya. The study adopted a conceptual framework and was informed by Expectancy Theory, Control Theory and Justice Theory of Performance. The study employed survey research design which entailed the use of *ex post facto* research design employing mixed method approach. The target population were members of the NPS, religious leaders, council of elders and administrators (chiefs and county commissioner) in Lamu County. The study used both probability and non-probability sampling methods. Members of the NPS comprising NCOs and members of the inspectorate were first stratified then randomly sampled to generate 189 respondents. Purposive sampling was used to select 12 gazetted officers of the NPS as well as 23 chiefs, 1 county commissioner, 35 council of elders, and 54 religious leaders for the study. Data collection was both interactive (interviews and FGDs) and non-interactive (questionnaires, document analysis, photography and observation). A pilot study was carried out in Lamu County. The reliability of the instruments was determined through the calculation of a correlation coefficient between the first and second administration. The instruments were tested for validity through consultation and discussion with supervisors. Data were analysed by use of descriptive statistics, through qualitative and quantitative techniques. The study found out that counterterrorism strategies employed by the NPS in Lamu County were ineffective and counterterrorism operation poorly handled. The fight against terrorism must involve all stakeholders and the strategies must take into account and address prevailing circumstances and conditions for operation to succeed. Policing approaches utilised by the police were found to be generally effective, acceptable and positively influence the performance of NPS to a great extent. The study also revealed that the challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies are numerous and varied. Therefore, the key to effective counterterrorism lies in addressing these challenges that have remained key impediments in implementing the strategies. Overall, the study concluded that as terrorism evolves so must counterterrorism strategies, taking into account the prevailing circumstances and dynamics on the ground such as socio-economic and political factors, technology, human resource and governance. The study recommended that all stakeholders be involved in counterterrorism, policing approaches be married with counterterrorism strategies, and underlying issues and challenges be addressed for effective and efficient counterterrorism campaign.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACO:	Allied Command Operations
ACSRT:	African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism
AIAI:	Al-Ittihad-Al-Islami
AMISOM:	African Union Mission in Somalia
AP	Administration Police
APCs	Armoured Personnel Carriers
AQIM:	<i>Al-Qaida</i> in the Islamic Maghreb
ATA:	Anti-Terrorism Assistance
ATPU:	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
AU:	African Union
CBC:	Canadian Broadcasting Cooperation
CBRNE:	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons
COE-DAT:	Centres of Excellence for Defence Against Terrorism
CORD:	Coalition for Reforms and Democracy
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
CIDP:	County Integrated Development Plan
CT:	Counter Terrorism
CTC:	Counter Terrorism Committee
CTED:	Counterterrorism Executive Directorate

CTITF:	Counter Terrorism Implementation Taskforce
CTSA:	Counter Terrorism Security Advisors
DCI	Directorate of Criminal Investigations
DRS:	Department for Information and Security
EU:	European Union
EUROPOL:	European Police
FBI:	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEM:	February Eighteen Movement
FN:	Forces Nouvelle
FNL:	Front for National Liberation
GCTF:	Global Counter Terrorism Forum
GoK:	Government of Kenya
GSPC:	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
GSU	General Service Unit
GWOT:	Global War on Terrorism
ICU:	Islamic Courts Union
IEDs:	Improvised Explosive Devices
IGAD:	Inter-Governmental Authority and Development
IIRO:	International Islamic Relief Organization
ILP:	Intelligence Led Policing
IPA:	Ireland Popular Army
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
IPOA:	Independent Police Oversight Authority

JEM:	Justice and Equality Movement
JTAC:	Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
JTTF:	Joint Terrorist Task Force
KANU:	Kenya Africa National Union
KDF:	Kenya Defence Forces
KNBS:	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KNCHR:	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
KQ	Kenya Airways
MIPT:	Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
MLF:	Maskini Liberation Front
MPS:	Metropolitan Police Service
MUHURI	Muslims for Human Rights
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCC:	National Counterterrorism Committee
NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIS:	National Intelligence Service
NPS:	Kenya National Police Service
NSAC:	National Security Advisory Committee
NSIS:	National Security Intelligence Service
NYPD:	New York Police Department
OAU:	Organization of African Unity
OCB:	Organizational Citizenship Behaviour
OSCE:	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PFLP:	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PNR:	Passage Name Record
POP:	Problem Oriented Policing
PSC:	Peace and Security Council
SARA:	Scanning, Analysing, Responding and Assessing Approach
SCUs:	Special Counterterrorism Units
SLDF:	Sabaot Land Defence Forces
SUPKEM:	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
TCC:	Troops Contributing Countries
TFG:	Transitional Federal Government
UNCTC:	United Nations Counter Terrorism Centre
UNSCR:	United Nations Security Council Report
UK:	United Kingdom
US:	United States
WMD:	Weapons of Mass Destruction

## DEFINITION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

### **Al - Shabaab**

A terrorist group in Somalia affiliated to *Al-Qaeda* operating beyond Somalia's borders and primarily carrying out terrorist attacks and transnational terror attacks. In the context of this study, some of these attacks have been carried out in Kenya.

### **Antiterrorism**

Measures designed to prevent or thwart terrorism. In the context of this study, these are measures such as raids designed to break up terrorist cells, intelligence gathering and arresting suspects.

### **Community Policing**

Model of policing which encourages community partnership with police. In the context of this study, community policing involve encouraging the community to help prevent crime by providing advice, giving talks and forming neighbourhood watch group.

### **Counterterrorism**

Practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments, militaries, police departments and corporations adopt in response to terrorism. In the context of this study, the government via the military

police and custom officials apply measures such as protecting government buildings and installations, infiltration of terrorist cells and community policing designed to keep away terrorists.

**Counterterrorism Strategy**

An elaborate and systematic plan of action intended to prevent or counter terrorism. In the context of this study, these plans of action include measures to ensure Lamu and the rest of Kenya is not used as terrorist training or hiding ground, strengthening coordination between different arms of the government and stakeholders in combating terrorism, and planning an elaborate operation to flush out terrorists and destroy their cells.

**Human Rights**

These are universal legal guarantees protecting individuals and groups against actions by the government that interfere with fundamental freedoms and human rights. In the context of Lamu County, these rights are all rights and freedoms as enshrined in the constitution of Kenya, 2010 and include freedom of worship and respect for diversity.

**Nyumba Kumi Initiative**

A model of community policing where ten households comes together to look into their own security and safety. This model of community policing is also applied in Lamu County, though the families range

from 10 to 20 depending on location and population.

**Performance**

What is expected of a police officer in undertaking sworn duties. Performance indicators in the context of this study include reduced crime and terror attacks, terror attacks foiled or pre-empted, terror elements apprehended or de-radicalised etc.

**Police Officer**

A member of the Kenya National Police Service (NPS). The NPS comprises of the Kenya Police Service (KPS) and the Administration Police Service (APS). They maintain peace and order in the whole country, including Lamu County.

**Police Service**

A body of government employees trained in methods of law enforcement, crime prevention and detection, and authorised to maintain peace, safety, law and order within a community. Police Service comprises the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service. The service is national and serves all parts of Kenya, including Lamu County.

**Policing**

The act of regulating, controlling and maintaining law and order as per regulations that have been set by a constitutionally constructed and authorised agency of government. In the context of this study, policing involves patrolling, intelligence gathering and community policing.



**Police Station**

The basic unit for police service delivery in an area headed by Chief Inspector of Police in rank, with the title of Officer Commanding Police Station. Police stations are gazetted in all counties in Kenya including Lamu.

**Terrorism**

The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives. In the context of this study, terrorism and terrorist activities are mainly perpetrated by *Al-Shabaab*, a militant group with origins from Somalia with sympathisers and recruits from Kenya and other countries.

**Terrorist**

A person, usually a member of a group, who uses or advocates terrorism. In the context of this study, they are mainly *Al-Shabaab*, a militant group originating from Somalia with sympathisers and recruits from Kenya and the other countries, operating mostly in Boni forest.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

This chapter presents background to the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study and corresponding research questions. The chapter further delineates the scope of the study and documents significance of the study and possible contributions of the research. The last section of the chapter highlights the summary.

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

The human cost of terrorism has been felt in virtually every corner of the globe. Terrorism poses a direct threat to security of citizens in countries all over the world, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly and will remain a threat in future. Terrorists have demonstrated their ability to cross international borders, establish cells, survey targets and execute attacks. The threat is aggravated by terrorist groups and individuals that continue to spread over the world. Modern technology increases the impact of terrorist attacks employing conventional and unconventional means, more so as terrorists continue to acquire chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities and cyber capacities (Hunsicker, 2006). Absence of peace and security can create an environment conducive for spread of terrorism, such as promoting radical ideologies, fundamentalism, intolerance and bigotry.

Terrorism is a long-standing political and religious strategy that has gained renewed international awareness following the devastating and unprecedented attacks in the United States (US) on the 11<sup>th</sup> September, 2001. While the events of that day have come to represent a turning point globally, the 9/11 attacks were not isolated events (Mahajan, 2002). The events did not reflect an unanticipated new threat to peace

and security. What was transpired brought a new dimension of terrorism worldwide. The world's trepidations about terrorism intensified following the 9/11 attack in the US.

As far back as 1992, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted a resolution aimed at enhancing co-operation and co-ordination between member states in order to fight the occurrence of extremism (Cilliers & Sturman, 2002). Africa recorded 6,188 casualties from 299 acts of terrorism between 1990 and 2003, making it the continent with the second most casualties in the world after Asia (United States of America, Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1990-2003). Going forward, many African states have been affected by acts of terrorism that has led to displacement of people, loss of lives and decline in economic growth and development. As far back as 1980s there have been warnings of new form of terrorism and terror acts. Unlike terror groups of 1970s that held together, the current wave of terror groups operates in pockets (Bunker, 2005). With the bombing in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August 1998, Tanzania and Kenya were the first countries in Africa to experience the new wave of terrorism.

From then onwards, Africa has witnessed numerous terror attacks. Most of the attacks are as a result of internal conflict and the spill-over from regional wars, as different belligerent groups have resorted to terrorism in an attempt to advance their objectives and intentions (Goredema & Botha, 2004). Over the past years, terrorist groups such as *Boko Haram* and *Al-Shabaab* have reinvented our thinking about terrorism and ignited debate on how to deal with the same. Their message of intolerance has had far-reaching consequences world wide. Their ability to use media to announce their activities has defied our core values of peace, tranquillity, humanity and unity (Onuoha, 2013).

Since 2011, there has been an increase in terror attacks in Kenya. The government acknowledged that most of the killings and explosions are perpetrated by *Al-Shabaab* in retaliation to Operation Linda Nchi. The operation is a joint military mission between the Somalia and Kenyan military that began on 14<sup>th</sup> October 2011. During this time, Kenyan troops crossed the border into Somalia to dislodge terrorists from their strongholds and annihilate them. According to security experts, majority of the attacks are perpetrated by youths who are radicalised. By 2014, growing attacks began affecting Kenya's tourism industry negatively. European nations started issuing travel warnings to their citizens against travelling to Kenya and visiting coastal region. This led to a decline in the number of tourists visiting Kenya. Since tourism is a major earner, Kenya's economy was badly affected.

To begin with, Kenya had its deadliest terrorist attack on 21<sup>st</sup> September, 2013 since the 1998 *Al-Qaeda* bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi. About 70 people lost their lives, 175 others were injured, and many individuals held hostage when terrorists stormed Kenya's upmarket Westgate mall in Nairobi and indiscriminately opened fire on customers. At the end of the siege, 18 foreigners were killed. They included citizens from Ghana, India, South Africa, China, Britain, France, Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands, (Mamdani, 2013). The Somali-based Islamist group *Al-Shabaab* through twitter claimed responsibility for the attack. One spokesman for *Al-Shabaab*, in an exclusive interview with *Al Jazeera*, stated that the Westgate mall was selected because it is frequented by foreigners.

*Al-Shabaab's* tweets suggested that Westgate attack was a revenge for the invasion of Somalia by Kenyan Defence Forces, which they regard as an occupation force. The Operation occasioned *Al-Shabaab's* loss of the strategic port of Kismayo, from

which it had derived significant revenues through selling charcoal and other trade on other contrabands (Joselow, 2011). Later in July 2012, the 4,000 KDF operating in Somalia were incorporated into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) force of over 17,000 soldiers with a UN mandate to safeguard the fragile Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Kenya is among the five troop contributing countries (TCCs) to the AMISOM that since 2011 has forced *Al-Shabaab* to retreat from Mogadishu, as well as other smaller towns the terrorist outfit had stranglehold on (Onuoha, 2013).

Lamu is, in one way, where Kenya's current conflict with *Al-Shabaab* really started; it was the centre of a series of events that triggered Kenya's full scale military invasion of Somalia. In September 2011, a British couple on a sailing holiday were kidnapped from a hotel near Lamu Island by *Al-Shabaab*. Three weeks later, a French woman was taken by the group from a different hotel. Although Kenya's intervention in Somalia was planned well in advance, these and other kidnappings along Kenya's border with Somalia proved to be the trigger for the launch of Operation *Linda Nchi* by the Kenya Defence Force (KDF) on 14<sup>th</sup> October 2011.

While the Kenyan Government had previously supported the militias fighting in Somalia against *Al-Shabaab*, Operation Linda Nchi was a full-scale military intervention aimed at creating a buffer zone along Kenya's border, prising *Al-Shabaab* from its control of the economically important Somali port city of Kismayo and ultimately eradicating the group. Lamu has felt the blowback from this intervention, witnessing complex entanglement of multiple conflict drivers and

a heavy-handed security response from the state as terrorist's threat continues to grow each day.

Mpeketoni Township in Lamu was raided in June, 2014 by suspected *Al-Shabaab* terror group. More than 60 people were killed. The gunmen raided the town, burnt down Mpeketoni Police Station and killed everyone on sight (*The East African Standard Newspaper*, 2016). Still in 2014, *Al-Shabaab* carried attacks in Mandera County that claimed about 60 lives. On 22<sup>nd</sup> November 2014, a group of gunmen stormed a bus which was travelling from Mandera to Nairobi. The militants killed 28 people who were mostly teachers and other government officials heading for the December holidays. *Al-Shabaab* also claimed responsibility for the death of 36 quarry workers, many of them non – Muslims, who were attacked and killed in the outskirts of Mandera town (*The East African Standard Newspaper*, 2016).

*Al-Shabaab* conducted another raid at Garissa University College in April, 2015. The Garissa attack was reportedly planned by Mohamed Kuno Gamadheere who was one of the *Al-Shabaab*'s Commander. Over 150 students were killed and hundreds seriously injured. *Al-Shabaab* claimed responsibility. They termed the heinous act retaliatory over non-Muslims occupying Muslim lands in Somalia and the rest of the world.

In response to numerous attacks, NPS has adopted counterterrorism strategies that include legislative reforms, institutional building, trainings and bilateral and multilateral collaboration with like-minded states including Britain and United States of America. Pursuant to UN resolution 1373 of 2001, Kenya has taken several counterterrorism measures which include establishment of the National Intelligence Service, Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program; creation of the

Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) in 1998, a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) in 2003; and the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC) in 2004 which has since been done away with. Kenya has also embraced the U.S. Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), which provides technology to screen travellers arriving at airports and other crossing points (Agbiboa, 2013b).

Kenya has further reaffirmed her commitment to international treaties and conventions on terrorism it had previously signed and ratified. Kenya has also ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 1999 and its 2002 Protocol at the African Union (Macharia, 2014). She has also taken into account the enactment of operational and practical actions to fight terrorism and terror cells. The NPS counter terrorism actions in Kenya has been focused on predominantly Muslim areas in North Eastern and Coastal regions, especially on areas bordering Somalia and Indian Ocean. These areas are inhabited by Muslim and Arab-Swahili and Somali communities. Counterterrorism has been concentrated in these areas, especially in Lamu, with minimal progress. That is why there was need to investigate counterterrorism strategies adopted by the NPS and their performance in managing terrorism in Lamu County.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Despite the NPS adopting numerous counterterrorism measures which include raids, patrols, capacity building, intelligence gathering and ambushes, acts of terrorism have continued unabated in Lamu County leading to massive loss of lives and destruction to properties. These counterterrorism measures are thus either deficient or have not been effectively implemented in the fight against terrorism in

Lamu County. Terrorism remains a fundamental threat to peace and security globally. It violates the key principles of law, order, human rights and freedom and remains an affront to the Global Charter of the United Nations and the values and principles articulated in Africa's Constitutive Act of the African Union. Worse still, it presents dangers to security and stability of nations all over the world. In this regard, effective counter terrorism strategies and approaches remain key in curbing the threats and devastating effects of terrorism. Scholars like Onkwere and Odhiambo (2010) assessed Kenya's pre-emptive and preventive incursion against *Al-Shabaab* in light of international law, while Chumba *et al.* (2016) examined the role of security based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somalia in an attempt to unearth effective counterterrorism strategies with little success.

It is therefore evident that weak political, economic and social structures in Africa have resulted in instability which terrorists have continued to exploit. Civil wars and strifes have further worsened the situation in countries like Somalia. Counterterrorism and policing measures in place are therefore mostly deficient given the situations in most African states. Kenya has suffered numerous terrorist attacks mainly in Nairobi, North Eastern and Coastal regions including September 2013 Westgate attack in Nairobi, June 2014 Mpeketoni and Mporomoko attacks in Lamu, November 2014 bus attack in Mandera, April 2015 Garissa University attack, and the recent January 15<sup>th</sup> Dusit D2 attack in Nairobi that left up to 21 people dead, scores maimed and properties worth millions of shillings destroyed.

The National Police Service (NPS) is one of the security agencies charged with counterterrorism in Kenya. The police have been deployed in large numbers Lamu County in an operation known as *Linda Boni* to counter terrorism but the attacks



still continue thus posing a big challenge. Terrorists have continued to exploit the expansive Boni forest as their transit point in and out of Somalia. They have also continued to use the same as their training ground as well as the launching pad for numerous attacks in Lamu County despite the NPS adopting counterterrorism strategies. It is in light of the above that the study sought to investigate counterterrorism strategies employed by the NPS and their performance in managing terrorism in Lamu County.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

The general objective of the study was to investigate counterterrorism strategies employed by the NPS and their performance in managing terrorism in Lamu County, Kenya.

The specific objectives of the study were to:

- i. Evaluate counterterrorism strategies employed by National Police Service in Lamu County.
- ii. Assess efficacy of policing approaches utilised in counterterrorism by the National Police Service in Lamu County.
- iii. Examine challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies by the National Police Service in Lamu County.

### **1.4 Research Questions**

The following questions guided the study:

- i. What are the counterterrorism strategies employed by the National Police Service in Lamu County?
- ii. How effective are the policing approaches utilised in counterterrorism by the National Police Service in Lamu County?

- iii. Which are the challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies by the National Police Service in Lamu County?

## **1.5 Justification of the Study**

This study envisaged to add important value towards counterterrorism policy formulation and implementation as well as academic development in the following ways:

### **1.5.1 Academic Justification**

Before Kenya sent its troops to Somalia in 2011, Kenya had not suffered large scale terror attacks as has since been witnessed. Counterterrorism measures were thus largely remote. Only few researches had been done on counterterrorism in Kenya. Moreover, researches that have been done since then show little information on counterterrorism strategies influencing performance of the National Police Service (Onuoha, 2013). Previous studies have concentrated on either general counterterrorism strategies or counterterrorism strategies employed by the military, thereby neglecting other security services which are also charged with maintaining peace and security, including counterterrorism. In Kenya, Carson (2005) studied the struggle against terrorism in Kenya, while Onkware *et al.* (2010) assessed counterterrorism strategies by Kenya against Somalia terrorism, which concentrated mainly around military strategies. Onuoha (2013) evaluated Westgate attack; *Al-Shabaab* renewed transnational *jihadis* while Chumba *et al.* (2016) examined the effectiveness of border surveillance strategies in the management of transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somalia, as well as the role of security based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somalia. The current study sought to fill the knowledge gap by investigating counterterrorism strategies, their influence on performance of the National Police Service and the challenges they

face in managing terrorism in Lamu County, Kenya. Such knowledge is useful to academicians and scholars for information and as a basis for further research and reference on terrorism and counter terrorism.

### **1.5.2 Policy Justification**

Law enforcement remains an integral part in the development and stability of a nation without which there would be no security to ensure economic and social development. They sustain the nationhood by ensuring that there is security and tranquillity to allow citizens to go about their daily activities (Pillar, 2001). The study sought to provide guidelines that support policy making in the field of counterterrorism and its contribution towards attainment of sustainable peace and security in Kenya and beyond. The findings are expected to help shape the fight against terrorism by bringing to fore the most effective counterterrorism strategies which will aid policing in Kenya, as well strengthening the already existing strategies in countering terrorism given terrorism is dynamic in nature and recent counter terrorism measures are always valued.

### **1.6 Scope of the Study**

The research was conducted in Lamu County, Kenya. The county is one of the 47 counties in Kenya. Lamu County was preferred for the study because it is one of the counties mostly hit by terrorists and borders Somalia, the home to *Al-Shabaab*, both by land and sea. It is also home to the expansive Boni forest that stretches all the way to Somalia and which acts as hiding ground for terrorists, and from where they launch their attacks. Currently, there is an active multiagency counterterrorism ‘Operation *Linda Boni*’ by security personnel going on in Boni forest to flush out terrorists.

The content scope was limited to research objectives intended to investigate counterterrorism strategies employed by the NPS and their performance in managing terrorism in Lamu County, Kenya.

In terms of methodology, the study was limited to survey research design. The target population were members of the National Police Service in Lamu County, county commissioner, chiefs, religious leaders and council of elders.

Time scope of the study covered the period from year 2011 to year 2019 when the study ended. The year 2011 is the period from which the new phase of terrorist attacks by terror groups from Somalia, including *Al-Shabaab* started carrying out sporadic terror attacks in Kenya.

### **1.7 Chapter Summary**

This chapter provided details on background information of the study on counterterrorism strategies influencing performance of the NPS in Lamu County. This led to statement of the problem, which highlighted critical gaps the study sought to fill, and eventually provided ground for research objectives and research questions that guided the study. There is a section on justification and scope of the study. The next chapter provides a detailed analysis of literature related to the study.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

This chapter provides an overview and review of various studies and empirical research findings relating to terrorism and counterterrorism. The literature focused on the issues of counterterrorism from a global, regional and national perspective. Pertinent issues such as terrorism, counterterrorism strategies and policing approaches are discussed. The chapter further reviews knowledge gaps that need to be addressed in counterterrorism. A conceptual framework is also analysed, from which a conceptual model is presented to show the relationship between variables informing the study. The chapter ends with a summary.

#### **2.1 Counterterrorism Strategies Influencing Performance of the National Police Service**

##### **2.1.1 Defining Terrorism**

The term terrorism is contested and has several definitions (Schmidt and Jongman, 1988). The word “terrorism” is applied and misapplied so extensively that it is almost missing any single meaning. Critical researchers want to know who has the authority to define both the terrorist and the terrorist act. Who has the power to deem some acts of violence as legitimate, and others as not (Masese *et al.*, 2014). Cultural studies theorists, taking the lead from Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci, have long stressed that the meaning making apparatuses historically are in the hands of the power elite (Fiske, 1987). Critical Terrorism Studies which emerged in opposition to traditional state-centric terrorism studies is constructed on an understanding of the socially and politically created nature of terrorism knowledge and an appreciation of the natural ontological precariousness of the term terrorism (Bartolucci, 2010).

Given that meaning is contextual and changes over time (Hodder, 2000), the meaning of terrorism has changed considerably since its first use. Terrorism, which is derived from the word terror (Bartolucci, 2010), is a political concept, a modern invention that first entered the English wordlist during the era of the French Revolution (Eagleton, 2005; Blain, 2007). This differentiation gives contemporary imperial states like Britain and France and expansionists the power to define their own violence as rightful or legitimate and others' violence, including reactive violence, as illegal and "terrorist".

As Kinsman and Gentile (2010) explain, the social construction of knowledge regarding terrorism in the West, for instance, excludes Western states from being deemed terrorist. Violent acts committed by the West are not regarded as terror acts. The Western construction of terrorism, they continue, "precludes the naming of American and Canadian military actions as terrorists." Before it was fully appropriated by power elites during the French Revolution, the word "terror," from which terrorism originates, signified violence carried out by the dominant forces of a society, "and it did not have the negative connotation that modern 'terrorism' has" (Bartolucci, 2010: 122). This definition was abandoned in favour of the opposite; and present definitions of terrorism hold negative connotations.

Gordon (2004) stresses that we must always be cognizant that the word "terrorism" is presently defined in such a way as to serve the interests of those who wield power. The common use of the word terrorist refers to "a member of a clandestine or expatriate organization aiming to coerce an established government by acts of violence against it or its subjects". Under this one-sided definition of terrorism, governments and states cannot be considered terrorist because terrorism is used to signify the violent actions of groups/individuals against those in power. This is the

description accepted and reproduced by the dominant classes in the western states as well as the corporately owned mainstream media (Whitehead, 2002). However, it negates and disregards a much more significant form of terrorism, state terrorism, which can be defined as “terrorizing the whole population through systematic actions carried out by force of the state” (Gordon, 2004).

Critical Terrorism Studies highlights the use of terrorism by states against their own citizens or against the citizens of foreign countries. While state terrorism has been massive throughout history, and the West and its clients have been the major perpetrators of state terrorism (Herman, 1999). When discussing terrorism the dominant official discourse normally refers to the use of terrorism by ‘extremist’ non-state actors targeting the state, neglecting the issue of state terrorism” (Bartolucci, 2010). Throughout history, especially the history of western imperialism, “terrorists” are constantly being redefined based on American interests and foreign policy (Chehade, 2007). In the Middle East and elsewhere, contemporary villains and terrorists were once the allies of the US and the west (Parenti, 2004). These include Saddam Hussein, Manuel Noriega of Panama, and Osama Bin Laden. All of them were at one time strategic allies of the US (Chehade, 2007). The opposite is also true: yesterday’s “terrorists” are today’s beacons of justice and resistance. At one time Canada considered Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress as terrorist” (Chehade, 2007)). The same can be said of all powerful imperial states. However, in 2001 Mandela surprised the world when he became the second person ever to be awarded honorary Canadian citizenship. This is one of the highest awards given to an individual by the Canadian government (CBC, 2001).

These are perfect examples of how meaning changes across space, time and circumstance. Yesterday's terrorists are today's heroes. Generally, terrorism is a socio-historical construction whose meanings are contextual, and shifting, and often serve the powerful and first world (Lapham, 2004). This has important implications on the strategies and approaches of counter-terrorism simply because terrorist label is never a fixed or essential identity and that it may change and expand depending on the needs and interests of the state and the wider context in which it is employed. This explains why there are many definitions of terrorism depend on who is defining it, thus every definition is viable on its own context and merit hence the saying "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."

In Kenya, Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 defines "terrorist act" as acts or threat of action which involves the use of violence against a person; endangers the life of a person, other than the person committing the action; results in serious damage to property; creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; involves the use of firearm or explosives; involves the release of any dangerous, hazardous, toxic or radioactive substance; interferes with an electronic system; interferes or disrupt essential services provision; prejudices national security or public safety; and which is carried out with the aim of intimidating or causing fear among members of the public; or intimidating or compelling the Government or international organization to do or refrain from any act; or destabilize religious, political, economic or social institutions of a country. It is this definition by the GoK that terrorism and terror acts will be defined in this study.

### **2.1.2 Counterterrorism Strategies**

Broadly speaking, counterterrorism refers to proactive security strategy put in place by the government to prevent terrorism. Unlike antiterrorism which is reactive,



counterterrorism is proactive measure hence ideal for this study. Martin (2003) defines counterterrorism as the “proactive policies that specifically seek to eliminate terrorist environments and groups”. The objective of any counterterrorism is to prevent loss of lives and destruction to property. It involves hunting down terrorists, enhancing safety and security, and any other defensive measures aimed at preventing attack.

Martin (2003) categorizes counterterrorism into three bounds. The first category is “diplomatic interactions, financial controls, military force, intelligence, and covert actions,” for example the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. The second category is that of “legal, repressive, and pacifying responses to terrorism” which involves formulating terrorist acts. The third category is that of “targeted and untargeted prevention” which involves targeting specific terror activities, for instance laying ambushes and protecting vulnerable targets.

Apart from the terrorist and crime perpetrated by terrorists, counterterrorism strategies should also take into account various tactics and behaviours terrorists employ. Pillar (2001) states that terrorism is “but one form of behaviour along a continuum of possible political behaviours of those who strongly oppose the status quo of a state”. Counterterrorism must take into account various tactics that can be adopted by terrorist which include insurgency and ambushes and nonviolent acts such as giving aid, either financial or weapon to terror groups.

Counterterrorism in itself requires cooperation of several players and cooperation of nation states across the world. No state can deal with terrorism alone minus partners or neighbours. Transnational terrorists have demonstrated that they can move across national boundaries, regions and continents (Chalk, 1998). This cooperation must cut across all spheres, including religion, political, ethnic and cultural.

Importance of cooperation can be seen through conventions and treaties developed by international and regional bodies such as United Nations and African Union. As Francis Taylor, a former US Assistant Secretary for Domestic once stated “if 9/11 has taught us anything, it is the strength of international cooperation in defeating terrorism,” cooperation with regional and international actors and states is therefore the way to go in countering terrorism.

### **2.1.2.1 Multilateral Bodies and their Approach to Counterterrorism**

#### **2.1.2.1.1 The United Nations (UN) Counterterrorism Strategy**

While countering terrorism has been one of the agenda of the United Nations for decades, the attacks against the United States on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001 prompted the Security Council to adopt Resolution 1373, which for the first time established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). Five years later, on 6<sup>th</sup> September, 2006, all Member States of the General Assembly for the first time agreed on a common strategic framework to fight the scourge of terrorism: the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The strategy is a unique instrument to enhance the efforts of the international community to counter terrorism along four pillars namely: addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; preventing and combating terrorism; building Member States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard, and; ensuring the respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for countering terrorism (UN Security Council, 2010a).


The General Assembly reviews the Strategy every two years, making it a living document accustomed to Member States’ counter-terrorism priorities. At the time of the adoption of the Strategy, the General Assembly also endorsed the Counter-

Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), which had been established by the Secretary-General in 2005. Consisting of 38 entities of the UN and affiliated organizations, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force works to promote coordination and coherence within the UN System on counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism to provide assistance to Member States (UN Security Council, 2010b).

Shillinger (2006) posits that the UN Counter Terrorism Centre (UNCTC) provides capacity-building assistance to Member States and carries out counter-terrorism projects around the world in line with the four pillars of the Global Strategy. The Security Council works to enhance the capacity of Member States to prevent and respond to terrorist acts through its subsidiary bodies, which include the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the 1540 Committee on the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Committees are supported in their work by different entities; whereas the Counter-Terrorism Committee has its Executive Directorate (CTED) to carry out its policy decisions and conduct expert assessment, judgement and valuation of Member States, the 1267 Committee draws on a Monitoring Team.

Guided by Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), the United Nations Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) works to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to prevent terrorist acts both within their borders and across regions. It was established in the wake of the 11<sup>th</sup> September terrorist attacks in the United States (UN Security Council, 2010b). The CTC is assisted by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), which makes policy decisions of the Committee, carries out expert assessments of each Member

State and facilitates counterterrorism technical assistance to countries all over the world (UN Security Council, 2010b). The four pillars of the UN Counterterrorism Strategy are:-



**Figure 2.1: UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy**

**Source: UN Website, 2018**

### **Pillar I: Addressing Conditions Conducive to the Spread of Terrorism**

According to UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy (2006), on measures to address conditions conducive for the spread of terrorism, the UN resolved to continue to strengthen and make use of the capacities of the United Nations in areas such as conflict prevention, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement, rule of law, peacekeeping and peace building, so as to contribute to the successful prevention and peaceful resolution of conflicts. The United Nations has taken into cognizance that peaceful resolution of conflicts would contribute to consolidation the global fight against terrorism and, to spur dialogue, tolerance and understanding among peoples, religions and cultures, and to promote mutual respect for and prevent the denouncement of beliefs, cultures, religions and religious values.

The UN also welcomes such initiatives that have been undertaken over the world, to promote a culture of peace, justice and human development, ethnic, national and religious tolerance, and respect for all religions, religious values, beliefs or cultures by establishing and encouraging, as appropriate, education and public awareness programmes involving all sectors of society. The UN therefore encourages the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to play a major role, including intra and inter-faith dialogue. To adopt such measures as may be necessary and appropriate and in accordance with UN obligations under international law to prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist acts and prevent terror conducts. The UN reaffirms her commitment to eradicate poverty and promote sustained economic growth, sustainable development and global prosperity for all (UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, 2006).

The UN sets out to pursue and reinforce development and social inclusion agendas at every level of any organization throughout the world as goals in themselves, recognizing that success in this area, especially on youth unemployment, could reduce marginalization and the subsequent sense of victimization that propels extremism, radicalization and the recruitment of terrorists and into terror cells. To make this a reality, the UN is conducting in the fields of rule of law, human rights and good governance, to support sustained economic and social development, and to consider putting in place, on a voluntary basis, national systems of assistance that would promote the needs of victims of terrorism and their families and facilitate the regularisation of their lives through ostensible means of income and livelihood (UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, 2006). In this regard, states are encouraged to request the relevant UN entities to help them to develop such systems at various levels in their sphere.

## **Pillar II: Measures to Prevent and Combat Terrorism**

On measures to prevent and combat terrorism, the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy (2006) sets out to abstain from consolidating, initiating, aiding, taking part in, funding, boosting or allowing terrorist activities and deny safe haven to terrorists and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle of extradite or prosecute, any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the sponsoring, organization or commission of terrorism.

The UN should ensure arrest and prosecution or repatriation of perpetrators of terrorist acts, in accordance with the law, in particular human rights law, refugee law. The UN should strive to put in place common judicial measures and repatriation arrangements, and to reinforce collaboration between law enforcement agencies, in exchanging data concerning fighting terrorism. The UN is to strengthen collaboration among states in fighting crimes that might be linked to terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and smuggling of CBRNE materials (UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, 2006).

The UN should, before permitting asylum, ensure that the asylum seeker has not been involved in terrorist acts and, after granting asylum, ensure that the refugee status is not used in a manner contrary to the provisions, and to support sub regional and regional organizations craft counterterrorism strategies. In the event that they need help or assistance, the UN encourage the UNCTC and its Directorate and, where need be, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime and INTERPOL, to facilitate the same (UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, 2006). In this regard, the UN should further strengthen cooperation in exchanging information regarding prevention and elimination of terrorism.

### **Pillar III: Measures to Build States' Capacity to Prevent and Combat Terrorism**

According to UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy (2006), on measures to build states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations, the UN resolves to encourage Member States to consider making voluntary contributions to UN counter-terrorism cooperation and technical assistance projects, and to look for extra sources of funding. States are further encouraged to consider reaching out to the private sector for contributions to capacity-building programmes, especially in the areas of civil aviation and maritime security, and to take advantage of the framework provided by relevant international and regional organizations to share best practices in counter-terrorism capacity-building.

The UN is to further consider creating proper ways to rationalize states' mechanism in the area of counter-terrorism and radicalization and eradicate duplication of reporting requests, taking into consideration the various obligations of the General Assembly, the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies that deal with counter terrorism, and to encourage measures to enhance more regular exchanges of information, United Nations organs dealing with counter terrorism, various agencies, relevant organizations, and the donor community, to develop states' capacities to implement applicable UN resolutions, and welcome the intention of the Secretary-General to institutionalize the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force within the Secretariat, to enhance co-ordination in the United Nations counter-terrorism initiatives and strategies (UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, 2006).

The UN should encourage the UNCTC and its Executive Directorate to enhance their technical assistance delivery in counter-terrorism, in particular by enhancing their positions with states and organizations, including through dissemination of information, with bilateral and multilateral technical assistance providers, and to encourage the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, including its Terrorism Prevention Branch, to boost its provision of technical assistance to states and help the realization of the international conventions and protocols related to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and applicable UN resolutions and encourage the World Bank, the INTERPOL, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to further cooperation with states (UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, 2006).

#### **Pillar IV: Measures to Ensure Respect for Human Rights and Rule of Law**

On Measures to ensure respect for Human Rights and Rule of Law, the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy (2006) supports that General Assembly resolution 60/158 of 16<sup>th</sup> December, 2005 gives cardinal framework for the "Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism". The UN reiterates that states must ensure that counterterrorism measures comply with international law such as refugee law, international humanitarian law and human rights law. They should also embrace and implement cardinal international instruments on refugee laws, human rights law and international humanitarian law.

The UN recognize that states may need help in establishing criminal justice system, and embolden them to resort to the technical assistance delivered by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. States are required to back the Human Rights Council, and to contribute to its work. The Office should play a role in scrutinizing



the question of protecting human rights while countering terrorism, by making general recommendations on states' human rights obligations and providing them with assistance and advice, in particular in the area of raising awareness of international human rights law among national law-enforcement agencies (UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, 2006). More still, states should endeavour to establish effective criminal justice system that can enhance the fight against terrorism on the basis of the principle to prosecute or extradite, with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

#### **2.1.2.1.2 The European Union (EU) Counter-Terrorism Strategy**

The major obligation of EU is to fight terrorism worldwide by respecting human rights and the rule of law. The EU counter terrorism strategy is aimed at developing a common approach to fight terrorists and counter terrorism. The EU Counter terrorism strategy was adopted in December 2005 and became operational in February 2006. Bendiek (2006) explains that the strategy is focused on four main pillars: Prevent Protect, Pursue and Respond. Across these pillars, the strategy recognises the importance of cooperation.

##### **1. Prevent**

EU strives to eradicate and deal a blow to factors that leads to radicalization and violent extremism. Towards this, the Council adopted an EU strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment. In light of changing trends, such as the growing potential of social media for mobilisation, the Council adopted a revised strategy in June 2014. Justice and home affairs ministers of corresponding countries adopted a number of guidelines for the revised EU counter radicalisation strategy in

December 2014. These guidelines set out a number of measures to be effected by the EU and its member states in Europe.

## **2. Protect**

Protection of citizens and infrastructure and the reduction of vulnerability to attack is another strategy employed by the EU. This strategy involves enhancement of security around transport network, fortification of external borders, and security of strategic installations and reduction of the susceptibility of key infrastructure. The EU, for instance, is regulating Passenger Name Record data for safety and security of air passengers.

## **3. Pursue**

The EU sets out to curtail terrorists' ability to carry out attacks and prosecute them. Towards this end, the EU has concentrated on strengthening national capabilities, improving coordination and information exchange between police and judicial authorities, tackling terrorist funding and depriving terrorists of the means by which they can carry out attacks. The Council and the European Parliament adopted new rules and regulations to prevent money laundering, and terrorist support and sponsorship in May 2015.

## **4. Respond**

The fourth tenet of the EU counter-terrorism strategy is to set to diminish the repercussion of terrorist attack. This is achieved through improving capabilities to deal with the aftermath, the organization of the response, and the needs of victims.

Bendiek (2006) explains that EU Member States support the strategy in four critical ways:

The first one is supporting states' capabilities through sharing of experiences and expertise in the area of counterterrorism, and intelligence analysis; secondly, promoting cooperation by putting in place and assessing mechanisms to expedite cooperation in the area of implementing key legislations, and cooperation between police and judicial authorities; thirdly, enhancing common capability by ensuring EU ability to comprehend and make collective policy responses to terrorists, and employing EU bodies such as the Sitcen, Europol and Frontex; and lastly, supporting international partnership through developing a working relationship with like-minded bodies such as the African Union, United Nations, NATO and other international and regional bodies to expand global consensus on the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. This is aimed at making the world safe and secure while observing human rights and the rule of law.

#### **2.1.2.1.3 The NATO Counter-Terrorism Strategy**

Terrorism poses a threat to security and safety of the citizens of NATO countries as well as to global security and stability. This is a situation that is unfortunate and all countries must strive to find solution for terrorism. Terrorism is a stubborn threat that is not bound by border, religion, ethnicity or races, hence a challenge that the international community must cooperate and coordinate in combating and eliminating totally round the globe. NATO focuses on improving awareness of the threat posed by terrorism, developing capabilities to prepare and respond, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other players. The Counter-Terrorism Policy Guidelines of NATO focus on three main areas: awareness, capabilities and engagement (NATO, 2018).

## **1. Awareness**

In her effort to counter terrorism, NATO, 2018 emphasizes that collective awareness of the terrorist threat through intelligence-sharing, consultation and constant strategic investigation and assessment. Intelligence reporting at NATO is based on contributions from Allies' intelligence services, internal and external, civilian and military. The new Intelligence and Security Division at NATO has continued to benefit from increased sharing of intelligence between member services, and come up with strategic reports concerning terrorism and its connection with other security threats. Intelligence-exchange between NATO and partner countries continues via the intelligence liaison cell at Allied Command Operations in Mons, Belgium and Intelligence Liaison Unit at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. In addition, experts with varying experiences are invited to brief Allies on specific areas of counter-terrorism and violent extremism. The experiences and views of partner countries affected by terrorism add greatly in enriching the fight against terrorism. Discussions also cover other aspects of peace and security not related to terrorism.

## **2. Capabilities**

NATO seeks to have enough capabilities to prevent, protect against and respond to terrorist threats. The development of capability and work on advanced technologies are part and parcel of NATO's core mandate, and methods that address asymmetric threats such as terrorism and the use of non-conventional weapons, are valued. The Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW), which safeguard civilians, security personnel and major infrastructure against attacks by terrorists such as suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), surface to air attacks against aircrafts and CBRNE materials. There are Centres of Excellence put in

place by NATO which backs various projects, providing expertise across a range of topics including military engineering for countering IEDs, explosives disposal, route clearance, cultural adjustment and network examination (NATO, 2018).

### **3. Engagement**

NATO countries continue to reinforce cooperation with national and international actors, as well as partner countries since the fight against terrorism requires renewed and joint efforts. In engagement with international actors, NATO major allies are the UN, the OSCE and the EU. This cooperation is meant to enhance intelligence sharing and swift actions against such intelligence. Various UN resolutions, UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and, international conventions and protocols against terrorism provide direction for efforts to combat terrorism and terror cells.

In engagement with partners, allies have continued to exploit partnership mechanisms for practical counterterrorism, including military capacity building and armament. Such partners are asked to incorporate a section on counter-terrorism in their separate cooperation agreements with NATO. Prominence is given to shared awareness, capacity building, crisis management and civil emergency planning to assist partners effectively combat terror and, locate and safeguard vulnerabilities (NATO, 2018).

In education, there are various educational and training opportunities for NATO and partners in counterterrorism. Among NATO training centers include Joint Force Commands at Naples and Brunssum, the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, and the Centers of Excellence (COEs) that support the NATO command structure. To strengthen the fight against terrorism, NATO has accredited more than

20 Centers of Excellence. This has made NATO have an upper hand in the fight against terrorism.

#### **2.1.2.1.4 African Union (AU) Counter-Terrorism Strategy**

According to Saul (2008), Africa plays a critical role in enhancing security within and beyond its frontiers. Putting in place robust counter terrorism capability entails moving beyond mere rhetoric to an organized, incremental approach that recognises the risk, manpower and necessary resources. In the same vein, the Bush administrations' National Strategy for Combating Terrorism places interest in AU as one of the "essential elements" in a collective front against transnational terrorism and violent extremism.

Africa resolve in the fight against terrorism have a long history. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), meeting at its 28th Ordinary Session, held in Dakar in 1992, adopted a Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States [AHG/Res.213 (XXVIII)] in which the Union vowed to combat terrorism. During the OAU 30th Ordinary Session in June 1994 in Tunis, the OAU adopted the Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations [AHG/Del.2 (XXX)], in which it rejected all forms of extremism and terrorism, whether under the pretext of religion, ethnicity, sectarianism or tribalism. The Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations also condemned all terrorist acts, methods and practices as criminal, and vowed to enhance cooperation to eliminate them (African Union Counterterrorism Framework, 2015).

Eventually, the previous effort of the OAU resulted in the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU Summit, held in Algiers, Algeria, in July 1999. The

Convention requires that States Parties criminalize terrorist acts under their national laws as defined in the Convention. The Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism further establishes state jurisdiction over terrorism, provides a legal framework for extradition and extra-territorial investigations and gives areas of interstate cooperation. Over 40 Member States have ratified the convention since coming to force in December, 2002 (African Union Counterterrorism Framework, 2015).

To give impetus to states commitment and responsibility under the 1999 Convention and the other international counterterrorism instruments, the AU High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, held in Algiers in September 2002, adopted the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The Plan of Action adopts practical counterterrorism processes that considerably address Africa's security challenges such as legislative and institutional framework, sponsoring terrorism, police and border control, judicial processes and sharing of intelligence.

The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in 2004 in Algiers, as part of the enactment of the 2002 Plan of Acton, to offer studies and analyses on terrorism, share intelligence and build capacity on counterterrorism. The Centre acts as a platform for cooperation among Member States and Regional Organizations. It also guides the AU's CT efforts and works in partnership with a number of regional and international partners in ensuring coordinated counterterrorism campaign. The Centre further conducts research and studies to help assess the threat of terrorism in the different countries and regions of the continent and develop strategies and recommendation to address such threats.

The Center also supports and reinforces cooperation among member states on issues relating to mutual legal assistance and cross-border counterterrorism campaigns, marshals international support and reinforces relations between the AU and its member states and the relevant international bodies, produces regular information on the terrorist threats in Africa and raise awareness on relevant issues and, develops capacity for early warning to enhance early response. States and regional economic communities are required to designate focal points to liaise with the Centre. Currently, only 20 out of 53 states have done so. Funding and human resource is still a challenge (African Union Counterterrorism Framework, 2015).

In July 2004, another Protocol to the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism was adopted by the 3rd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Addis Ababa. The protocol identifies the connection between terrorism and money laundering, terrorism and proliferation of small arms, and terrorism and drug trafficking. The protocol is aimed at ensuring that all member states initiate the fight against terrorism and associated crimes.

The Commission established the African Model Law on Counter Terrorism, which was endorsed by the decision of [Assembly/AU/Dec.369 (XVII)] and adopted by the 17th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Malabo, in July 2011. This formed part of the implementation of the various provisions of the 2002 AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which assigns the Commission with giving advice on counterterrorism. It came up with Model Law to enable members craft and strengthen their own legal framework (African Union Counterterrorism Framework, 2015). It also helps Member States implement



the provisions of various counter-terrorism instruments, including the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and its related Protocol

The level of incoherency at the multilateral level is demonstrated by the inability of the bodies to charter a comprehensive convention on international terrorism and the failure to enforce counter terrorism strategies. For instance, UN Member States still remain undecided on the core elements that define terrorism. UN also faces human, administrative and institutional capacity deficiencies that include overlapping mandates, lack of consensus over reporting requirements on counter terrorism by states and a duplication of work. Because of limitations experienced by operating in a highly politicized multilateral institution, the entities have been unable to effectively fulfil their mission of analysis, coordination, and information sharing.

#### **2.1.2.2 Counterterrorism Strategies in the Developed World**

Developed world is known to command enormous political and economic influence within the multilateral stage and have resources and expertise to easily counter threats of terrorism. A close study may provide valuable insights on determining appropriate and applicable counter terrorism strategies (Wilkinson, 2006). Naturally, developed countries always respond to terrorism by employing politics, law enforcement and the military or both.

##### **2.1.2.2.1 Counterterrorism Strategies in the United States of America**

Enhanced security is one of the approaches adopted by the US, especially around critical targets and infrastructure. It is known to reduce the appeal of vulnerable targets to terrorists. Individuals can vary their routines, including changing routes, places of residence and means of transportation. Whereas this measure can reduce the damage that attacks will generate; it is evident that it can only have temporary

effects in minimizing threats as terrorists are likely to limit their activities until such time that security is scaled down considerably (Gurr, 2003). Similarly, Enders and Sandler (2002) argues that increased security can result in negative consequences, for instance, the extensive use of metal detectors in airports led to deadly attacks with bombs in planes and runways.

Through intelligence, financing of terrorism can be prevented and funding intercepted. Terrorists have received funding in many ways including through direct revenue from sale of goods and services as well as through aid from foreign countries supporting terror groups. Money can also come from private sources. *Al-Qaeda*, for instance, got funding from Muslim nations such as Iran (Comras, 2005). When the financial sources of terror groups are cut their ability to carry out attacks is reduced and their activities crippled.

The US also gathers intelligence by penetrating terror groups. This is to retrieve vital information on details of terrorist attacks and prevent such attacks from taking place. Information that leads to identification and security of infrastructure is highly valued as it leads to disruption of terror activities before they happen. Intelligence that disrupts successive terrorist cells and terrorists is regarded as the most fruitful counter terrorism exercise (Pillar, 2004). Timely intelligence makes it possible to secure the target from deadly attack.

Strategic Intelligence provides information on trends and patterns in transnational terrorism. It can also be used to plot an action against terror groups. Strategic intelligence contributes to changes in foreign policy and the amount of resources that are allocated to the fight against terrorism. In the US, it is used as an instrument to highlight foreign Organizations and countries which sponsor terrorism, which

according to the US include Sudan, North Korea, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Cuba (Lutz and Lutz, 2004).

Retaliation by the US is one of the counter terrorism options available. Countries have been known to retaliate where it is evident that another country is supporting terrorist to wreak havoc within her borders. Apart from military as a form of retaliation, economic sanction can be applied to nations supporting terror activities. This ensures that a country grounds economically thereby putting pressure on her to comply with requirements.

In developing special counterterrorism units, the US is able to deal decisively with terror. Like most countries, US have trained Special Forces to deal with terrorist situations. They usually come in handy in rescue missions and are also useful in purposes of retaliation and pre-emptive action (Lutz and Lutz, 2004). Successful operations by SCU's are likely to deter terror elements.

International agreements achieved through diplomacy are an additional possibility to complement efforts in dealing with terrorism. Cooperation among nations in terms of dealing with terrorism has increased, providing prospects that this approach may be beneficial in countering terrorism (Jenkins, 2001). International conventions and diplomatic approaches are likely to be inhibited by the failure of the international community to arrive at a common definition of terrorism (Dartnell, 2000).

According to US Department of Defence (2014), her counterterrorism strategies include, The US Department of State (DoS) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism developed in 2003 which assumes a four dimension strategy (4D strategy) which seeks to 'defeat, deny, diminish and defend'. The strategy is aimed

at defeating terrorists and their sponsors. Terrorist locations are identified and mapped. This information is shared by federal state, other relevant organizations and allies.

The US also relies on technical intelligence and other types of intelligence needed to get inside terrorist organizations, locate their sanctuaries, and disrupt their plans and operations. This is done by law enforcement agencies and culminates in destruction of terrorists sanctuaries in collaboration with partners. It is also aimed at doing away with terrorists' sources of financing, including training, equipment and technology.

The US also aims at coming up with an international standard of accountability with regard to combating terrorism. The UNSCR 1373 clearly establishes states' obligations for combating terrorism. Together with other international counter terrorism conventions and protocols, they set numerous international obligations relating to counter terrorism. States are encouraged to become parties to and fully implement these conventions and protocols through a 'coalition of the willing'. The US has also established the Department of Homeland Security which helps securing states against terror attacks (US Department of Defence, 2014). Both the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism compliment and reinforce each other. There is also the FBI and US Coastguards who strive to prevent terrorist's use of WMD. The functions of these organs are crucial in counterterrorism.

Millar and Benjamin (2005) points out that the US also partners with other regional and international bodies by identify and diminish conditions contributing to state weakness and failure, as well as using its political influence to delegitimize

terrorism. Furthermore, the US sets out to defend its citizens and interests across the globe through integrated incident management capability and ensuring availability of critical physical and information-based infrastructure.

There is also the US National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States, 2005 which has four essential objectives: identify, assess, neutralize, and exploit the intelligence activities of foreign powers, terrorist groups, international criminal organizations, and other radical groups. The US aims to defeat global terrorism, ensure the security of homeland, counter weapons of mass destruction, transform defence capabilities, foster cooperation with other global powers, and promote global economic growth. The US thus utilises and extends the safeguards of strategic counterintelligence to counter the threat of terrorism (US Department of Defence, 2014).

As a result of the counterterrorism measures put in place by the US, there have been reduced attacks and threat by terrorists. Terrorists have been defeated to breach the US security and defence system. Both the intelligence community and law enforcement seem to be working in tandem to eliminate threats. The best way to deal with terrorism has been a joint and coordinated effort within the various forces of US and the international community. Although the strategies are working now, the US should know that terrorists are also evolving in space and time. They must therefore also keep abreast with the evolving faces of terrorism.

### **2.1.2.3 Counterterrorism Strategies in Developing World**

Developing countries are faced with many problems including developmental priorities that require more attention than counterterrorism. Countries exposed to strife, poverty and famine, may not realistically concentrate its efforts on

addressing such challenges. This has seen such countries devote fewer resources in the fight against terrorism.

#### **2.1.2.3.1 Counterterrorism Strategies in Algeria**

Kalidheen, 2008 posits that Algerian Constitution places international treaties and conventions on a higher legal status than national law, for instance, Algeria submits fully to UN Resolution 1373. Algeria's Penal Code provides for UN Conventions to be incorporated into national legislation automatically, once the international instrument is ratified. Algeria has moved away from having dedicated legislation to address terrorism, to treating terrorism as a criminal act within the Penal Code. The reason for this is that in 1992 Algeria was accused of being too harsh in its fight against terrorism, often in violation of human rights. Legislative Decree No 92-03 of 30 September 1992 on combating subversion and terrorism, amended and supplemented by Legislative Decree No 93-05 of 9 April 1993, defines the remit of the public authorities with regard to the sanctioning of terrorist acts (Janes Intelligence Review, 2006).

The Code of Penal Procedure and the Penal Code has also bolstered national legislations in combating terrorism. Algeria has dedicated its effort on domestic terrorism and the threat of terrorism against state security as the primary threat. Article 1 of Decree No 93/03 describes a terrorist or subversive act as "any offence targeting state security, territorial integrity or the stability or normal functioning of institutions through any action seeking to support activities that spread panic among the public and create a climate of insecurity by causing emotional or physical harm to people, jeopardizing their lives and the lives of other people or freedom or attacking their property and property of other people; disrupt traffic or freedom of movement on roads and obstruct public areas with gatherings; damage national or

republican symbols and profane graves; harm the environment, means of communication or means of transport; impede the activities of public authorities and bodies serving the public or free exercise of religion and public freedoms; impede the functioning of public institutions, endanger the lives or damage property of their staff, or obstruct the implementation of laws, procedures and regulations” (Goredema and Botha, 2004).

Algeria has also bolstered her counterterrorism capacity through the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). The AU adopted a plan to bring states in line with the convention regarding terrorism in a meeting held in Algiers in 2004 (Shillinger, 2006). ACSRT co-ordinate terrorism trends and counter terrorism activities on the continent with AU member states and the rest of the world.

Several civilian and military officers established the centre. Algeria has embraced international and regional partners, and is currently working closely with US. Other measures include the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative. To assist in combating transnational terror cells, Algeria works closely with France, Spain and the UK (Janes Intelligence Review, 2006).

Algeria's tactical approach to countering terrorism has shifted and security services are currently pursuing a new strategy to weaken the AQIM (Economist, 2007). Rather than launch large scale military operation on AQIM, Algerian authorities have resorted to surveillance of terrorists, arresting and prosecuting them (Economist, 2007; Tefft, 2006). According to Tefft (2006), counter terrorist operations also function through Department for Information and Security (DRS) which is an intelligence agency within the military that specializes in

counterterrorism and operates with great secrecy. The DRS acts unilaterally without any questioning from civilian authorities. It detains and interrogates terror suspects.

Algerian Police compliments the work of DRS. Algerian Police is charged with maintaining law and order, protecting life and property, investigating crimes, and apprehending offenders (Tefft, 2006). In Algeria, Military intelligence alone is therefore not enough to contain the growing threat of AQIM. There is need to develop other counterterrorism squads. DRS have been accused of human right abuses. This has made it unpopular with the population thus jeopardising its functions. There is bad relationship between the community and military intelligence services. This is troubling for the nation.

#### **2.1.2.3.2 The Genesis of *Al-Shabaab***

From the time the reign of Mohammed Siad Barre fell in January 1991, Somalia has lacked central government and there has been a state of lawlessness. Competing warlords and longstanding clan conflicts have prevented any single faction from seizing control decisively enough to effect widespread and lasting stability in the country.

The struggles and civil conflict that followed the end of Barre's government occasioned a major humanitarian crisis, creating a massive displacement of Somali population. The deepening crisis resulted in the arrival of a UN Peacekeeping Mission which operated in Somalia from 1992, as well as the arrival of the US military 'Operations Restore Hope' in a bid to protect food packages from warlords. In September 2001, however, the UN announced the withdrawal of its entire international staff from Somalia, saying it was no longer able to guarantee



their safety. In the following year, the US announced increased military operations in the country, which it suspected of being an *Al-Qaeda* refuge (Agbiboa, 2013a).

The most significant effort to resolve the protracted crisis in Somalia came on 10<sup>th</sup> October 2004, when a Transitional Federal Government (TFG), comprising representatives from Somalia's largest clans, was inaugurated in Kenya, with Abdullahi Yusuf elected president. Yusuf appealed to the international community to help them disarm the militias (Agbiboa, 2013a). The TFG was formed with a five-year mandate to establish permanent, representative government institutions and organise national elections (US Department of State, 2012).

In February 2006, the TFG occupied Baidoa with support from Ethiopia but could not extend their sphere of influence beyond the town. Later, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took over Mogadishu in June 2006 promising to usher in an Islamic state and bring tranquility (Wise, 2011). On 20<sup>th</sup> July 2006, the Ethiopian troops, with the backing of US, invaded Somalia with the goal of dispersing the ICU and setting up the TFG in Mogadishu.

According to Lorenzo *et al.* (2009), Ethiopia's invasion was construed as degradation. Many Somalis perceived Ethiopia as acting as a proxy for the US, and America's involvement was itself widely seen as a desire to avenge the 1993 shooting of the Black Hawk and invasion the Muslim world. This resulted to anti-Ethiopian, anti-American, anti-Western and anti-foreigners as a rallying call for Somalis (Agbiboa, 2013a).

As a result of the foregoing, *Al-Shabaab* was born from ICU (Fergusson, 2013). The *Al-Shabaab* is projected to have between 8,000 to 10,000 fighters, largely recruited within Somalia and the rest of the world (see Table 2.1). *Al-Shabaab*

draws support from several foreign fighters (Kay, 2013). US African Command officials note that these foreign fighters are the greatest threat to Western interests regionally and internationally (Rodriguez, 2013).

*Al-Shabaab* generates incomes from both local and international sources, including fees levied at ports, taxes on domestic produce, charcoal trade, road blocks and various forms of extortions justified in terms of religious obligation (Mwangi, 2012). Their main source of external funds remains Saudi Arabia.

In January 2009, Ethiopia withdrew its troops from Somalia, replaced by the AMISOM comprising thousands of Ugandan and Burundian peacekeeping forces (see Table 2.2). Even though Ethiopian incursion was successful in routing the ICU and pushing *Al-Shabaab* to the countryside, it failed to curb Islamic radicalism in Somalia. In fact it became worse. *Al-Shabaab* has continuously attacked targets both in Somalia as well as outside, thus exhibiting its operational competency and capacity.

**Table 2.1: Names and Nationalities of the Westgate Attackers as Released by *Al-Shabaab***

S/No	Name	Age	Country
1.	Ahmed Mohamed Isse	22	Minnesota, USA
2.	Abdifatah Osman Keynadiid	24	Minneapolis, USA
3.	General Mustaf Nuradin	27	Kansas City, USA
4.	Qasim Said	22	Garrison, Kenya
5.	Ahmed Nasir Shiridon	24	United Kingdom
6.	Zaki Jma'a Arale	20	Hergeisa, Somalia
7.	Islmail Guled	23	Finland
8.	Said Nuh	25	Kismayu, Somalia

**Source: Onuoha, (2013)**

**Table 2.2: Troop Contributing Countries to AMISOM**

S/No	TCCs	Commencement	Number of Troops
1.	Burundi	December, 2007	5,432
2.	Djibouti	December, 2011	930
3.	Kenya	February, 2012	4,652
4.	Sierra Leone	April, 2012	850
5.	Uganda	March, 2007	6,223

**Source: Onuoha, (2013)**

### **2.1.2.3.3 Kenyan Counterterrorism Approach**

The need for counterterrorism strategies were not taken seriously until the 9/11 attack that shocked the whole world. It is then that countries became aware that they were highly susceptible to terror attack. Kenya was designated as a major US hub in the fight against terrorism (Shinn, 2004). With the continuous attacks and threats by *Al-Shabaab* terror group, counterterrorism took centerstage.

#### **2.1.2.3.3.1 Measures to Strengthen Police and Military Capacity**

In Kenya, counterterrorism effort has been concentrated in training and provision of equipments. Various formations and units of the police and the military have undergone training in counterterrorism both in Kenya and abroad. Police curriculum has recently been reviewed to include antiterrorism training. The training has also extended to other government agencies such as airport and custom officials on border control and safety. The training has mainly been conducted by the US government as part of the partnership in the fight against terrorism and radicalization (US Department of State, 2003; Pope, 2005).

In this regard, France has signed a joint military training agreement with Kenya that is currently running (The Standard, 5 October 2004). Joint military exercises are a

key element of Kenya's effort to fight terrorism (Mwongo, 2004). Likewise, the UK has given training to military officers and police in crisis management, command and control, border control, airport safety and security, urban counter-insurgency, detection and investigation of terrorist incidents, and tracking of suspect financial flows while Israel has offered training in preparedness for medical emergencies and disasters management as well as crisis control (Chandler *et al.*, 2002; UK Government, 2006).

Other capacity building measures include the formation of well trained and equipped anti-terrorism Organizations, including the National Intelligence Service (NIS), created to identify threats, collect and analyse intelligence (US Library of Congress 2005); the Special Prosecution Unit (SPU) in the AG's office to prosecute terrorist offences, the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), established to coordinate counterterrorism in Kenya; the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), established to coordinate counterterrorism operation; and the Tourist Police Unit (TPU) established to offer protection to tourists (Pope, 2005).

#### **2.1.2.3.3.2 Measures to Eliminate Terrorist Network in Kenya**

Although there has been a debate on the existence of terror cells in Kenya, recent terrorist attacks in Kenya such as the Dusit D2 terroror attack, attack in Westage Shopping Mall and Mpeketoni attack clearly shows that there exist domestic terrorists in Kenya (Carson, 2003). In the aftermath of the attack, it was established that the attacks were planned and executed in Kenya. The intrigue is that the attacks were carried by Kenyan born terrorist, supported by sympathisers in Kenya.

This realization that there exist terrorists and their sympathizers domestically has led to the creation of various counterterrorism measures such as community

policing dubbed *nyumba kumi* which is meant to enable citizens know and report any suspicious person or activity happening within the neighbourhood (Mwakimako and Willis, 2009).

According to Oded (2000), other measures put in place are to ensure arrest and prosecution or repatriation of perpetrators of terrorist acts, in accordance with the law, in particular human rights law and refugee law. Kenya is to strengthen judicial measures and repatriation arrangements, and to reinforce collaboration between law enforcement agencies, in exchanging data concerning fighting terrorism. Kenya is to strengthen collaboration with other states in fighting crimes linked to terrorism.

#### **2.1.2.3.3 Measures against Transnational Terrorist Networks**

According to Human Rights Watch (2010), several counterterrorism measures have been put in place to curb the country being used as host for terrorist Organizations. *Al-Qaida* works with affiliates in most parts of the world, hence posing danger to peace and security in the region. As part of counterterrorism strategy, Kenya seeks to deny safe haven to terrorists and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle of extradite or prosecute, any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the sponsoring, organization or commission of terrorism.

Kenya has put in place a number of counterterrorism measures to disrupt these networks. In denying terrorists finances, the government has put in place stringent measures when transferring or withdrawing money in any bank in Kenya. This has led to unusual financial transactions being monitored and flagged by the regulator. Besides, organizations, including NGOs that would otherwise be used as conduits to finance and further terrorist agenda are now faced with strict registration laws

(Human Rights Watch, 2010). Organizations that flout or fail to meet requirements are deregistered.

#### **2.1.2.3.3.4 Protecting Vital Installations**

There are various facilities in Kenya that are considered vital. This is because such facilities are of high importance and delicate such that any slight disruption or destruction upon them can lead to huge losses and great danger to the nation and citizens. They include railway lines, airports, power generating plants, parliament and seaports. Such facilities require 24 hour round the clock surveillance (Wax, 2003; Wycoff, 2004).

In the past, they have been issues of security alerts, especially by US, on travel advisories in reaction to suspected terror attacks. Such kind of alerts affects mainly air and land transport. Kenya, for instance, introduced 24-hour surveillance of flight approach paths at all airports; put in place joint security patrols of the airports; created a no stopping zone, and constructed a perimeter wall around Jomo Kenyatta International Airport; introduced a new requirement that non-commercial private flights flying over or coming into Kenya to obtain written clearance 72 hours in advance; introduced baggage and passenger screening machines and CCTV cameras at airports among other measures (Khadiagala, 2004).

These are some of the measures that have been put in place to counter terrorist threats. However, most of these measures and strategies were put in place in reaction to UK and US concerns over the safety of their nationals in Kenya (Mbogo, 2003). Issuance of travel bans and security alerts are known to affect the economy of Kenya, especially tourism.

#### **2.1.2.3.3.5 International Cooperation**

International cooperation is a key aspect in counterterrorism. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack, states realized that the war against terror can only be won through cooperation and coordination with other states as well as multilateral organizations. This war required a joint effort (US Department of Defence, 2002). Kenya, through former Presidents Daniel arap Moi, Mwai Kibaki and current President Uhuru Kenyatta has shown commitment in cooperating with other countries, including UK and US, in the fight against terrorism.

Kenya lacks the resources and military capacity to counter terrorism alone. Many small countries have neither the means nor the ability to effectively respond to terrorism; hence they require international support (UN, 2001). The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) was supported by Kenya in order to get support from the superpowers, since the US made it clear that any military and economic assistance was pegged on supporting the war on terrorism (Barkan and Cooke, 2001). Given that US had suspended military assistance to Kenya in 1991, Kenya wanted this assistance to resume (Garcia, 2003). Critics like Otenyo (2004) argue that it is Kenya's support of GWOT and close working relationship with US and Israel on counterterrorism that has made Kenya experience many terrorist attacks. On the flipside, Kenya is caught between a stone and a hard surface, hence no option but to support the war on terrorism.

#### **2.1.2.3.3.6 Security Laws on Terrorism**

There have been several laws in Kenya in response to terrorism with varying degree of success. In 2003, The Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2003 was introduced in the parliament. It was however abandoned after firm opposition from the Muslims and

Human Rights Groups. Some politicians also opposed the bill as being unconstitutional (East African Law Society, 2003; Amnesty International, 2004).

In 2006 the government further published The Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2006. This bill was said to have addressed unconstitutional issues in the The Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2003. It was again thrown out without being enacted. This debacle meant that the international conventions that had been ratified by Kenya lacked the legal platform for enforcing; hence criminalising terrorism and the financing of terror acts (Reuters, 2005).

The government has since pushed for a number of changes in security architecture that seek to consolidate security powers around the Executive. In December 2014, parliament passed a hastily drafted Security Laws (Amendment) Bill 2014 which President Kenyatta said ‘gives security actors a firm institutional framework for coherent cooperation and synergy’. In 2014, Security Laws Amendment Act, 2014 was passed and it became law, though it’s dogged with some obscurity (The Standard, 4 November 2016). The security Laws Amendment Act, 2014 was a reaction to Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 which was passed in 2012.

Down the line, the Senate has since passed a Prevention of Terrorism (Amendment) Bill, 2018 which has since been published. This act amends Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012. The various amendments are a pointer to how contentious various legislations on terrorism are. This should be corrected.

#### **2.1.2.3.3.7 The National Counter Terrorism Centre**

The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) was established in 2004 by a decision of the Cabinet. This was in response to growing terrorist concerns in Kenya. It was conceived and launched as a multi-agency initiative to allow it to



effectively coordinate counter terrorism work, and serve as a national counterterrorism focal point for engagement with foreign partners. It is an organ of the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC) under the Office of the President, with various stakeholders such as The Kenya Armed Forces, National Security Intelligence Service, Kenya Police, Provincial Administration, Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Immigration Department, Kenya Revenue Authority, Kenya Ports Authority, Kenya Airports Authority, Office of The Attorney General (National Counter Terrorism Centre, 2016).

The Security Laws Amendment Act (2014) gave NCTC a legal coordinating mandate for counter terrorism, public engagement on counterterrorism issues; designing and coordinating national counter- and de-radicalisation strategies; training and capacity building; and some responsibilities in aviation security. Its Director is nominated by the National Security Council, which is chaired by the President. The NSC further has a role in deciding the additional bodies that constitute the centre through attaching their officers to it.

The NCTC is staffed by experienced officers from the ministries, departments and agencies that are leading national counter terrorism efforts. Its primary focus is on aligning operational needs with Kenya's national strategies and policies; being a proactive actor in identifying gaps in counterterrorism, and delivering solutions; rallying public support and engagement; deploying effective counter radicalisation efforts; providing training and expertise; building a strong preventive pillar for Kenya's counter terrorism strategy; and being a national focal point for bilateral and multilateral collaboration in counterterrorism (National Counter Terrorism Centre, 2016).

According to the Security Laws Amendment Act (2014), the Centre shall consist of offices from the following Organizations: the Director appointed by the National Security Council; the National Intelligence Service; the Kenya Defence Forces; the National Police Service; and such other agencies as may be determined by the National Security Council (other agencies have been attached to the Centre). The members of the Centre shall be seconded to the Centre for a period of three years. The Director shall be responsible for the management and implementation of the functions of the Centre. The Centre may request any person or government body for any information relating to terrorism, and members of the public have a responsibility to furnish the Centre with any information relating to terrorism which is within their knowledge and understanding.

From the foregoing, it is evident that focus on terrorism in Kenya began only after the US Embassy bombing and more significantly after the 9/11 attack. There is an apparent overarching role of the US, which has been the driving force behind Kenya adopting counterterrorism measures, and this in turn mirrors Kenya's dependence on the West. Lack of public support means that many counterterrorism measures lack goodwill and legitimacy.

## **2.2 Efficacy of Policing Approaches in Counterterrorism**

Policing approaches in counterterrorism are applied in situations where terror activities begin to undermining peace and security of a state. Police departments always approach terrorism as a criminal activity applying the most suitable policing approach or a combination of approaches to curb escalating crime (Hubschle, 2004). Policing approaches are strategies and tactics police use to control and manage crime, including terrorism (Bibes, 2001).

### **2.2.1 The Evolution and Mandate of the National Police Service in Kenya**

The National Police Service (NPS) consist of two distinct services as per the promulgated constitution of Kenya (2010) and the National Police Service Act, 2011, being The Kenya Police Service (KPS) and the Administration Police Service (APS). The Administration Police Service can be traced back to around 1902 when the village headmen ordinance by the colonial authorities was enacted to enable them penetrate into the native areas, enforce tax, control livestock movement, regulate agriculture, labour movement and other social economic activities (Muthondeki *et al.*, 2017a). In 1929, the tribal police service was enacted to give legal backing and recognition to the loosely constituted and untrained law enforcement arm of the village headman.

In 1958, the tribal police ordinance was revised to Administration Police Act during the state of emergency, necessitating the expansion of the establishment, deployment and mandate. This resulted in operationalization of Administration Police (AP) as one of the key government security agency. The Administration Police was thus established under cap 85 and Kenya Police cap 84. In the post-independence Kenya, the Administration Police has undertaken national security duties including counterterrorism and border security. This transformation has been reinforced by the new Constitution, 2010 and the National Police Service Act, 2011 (Kimunguyi, 2011).

On the other hand, Kenya Police Service can be traced back to 1896 when the British East African Protectorate established the first police station in Mombasa (Otenyo, 2004). During this time, the term *askari*, an Arabic and Swahili word ‘soldier’ was used to describe indigenous troops in East Africa. The colonialists

employed the *askaris*. The *askari* units served outside the boundaries of their colonies of origin especially during the first and Second World War. Their main role was to protect the interest of the Imperial British East African Company (IBEACO). With the increasing economy, the IBEACO employed the first policemen to protect some shops, store houses and banks. Soon after, the construction of police 'headquarters' was agreed at Sant Matias Bostion of Fort Jesus. The IBEACO had policing units at their disposal that mainly consisted of Indians, Somalis and Swahili to protect their trade and commercial activities. The *askaris* were well trained by the British and Indian cadets and subjected to rigorous selection process (Muthondeki *et al.*, 2017a).

In 1900, a railway engineer established the Uganda Railway Police to safeguard its construction. The security personnel were mainly recruited from Indian police, and watchmen were governed by Indian police statutes, giving the security force a quasi-police status. The police were tasked with observation, protection and control of the travellers at the railway stations. Additional duties were developed with the passing of the Palm Wine Regulation in 1900. This law required all persons tapping and selling wine '*tembo*' to acquire a license provided by the District Commissioner (Sommer, 2007). In 1902, more police stations were opened. Later, the railway police was merged into the force to become the British East Africa Police.

In 1906 the Kenya Police was established by Police Ordinance Act, and Sir James Hayes Sadler appointed a committee to look into the affairs of the police and improve their performance. One of their recommendations was the establishment of a police training school in Nairobi. In addition, improvement for all ranks was made in education, discipline and new uniform was introduced. By 1910, the

mandate of the force had expanded hence the police enforced laws in urban centres. In 1911, training depot was established. The tribal police was named and left to control the inland native reserves. The District Commissioners headed the tribal forces in their areas but in their daily operations, the tribal police were quite independently controlled by the local chiefs (Sommer, 2007).

During the First World War, police battalion was formed to fight against the German enemies in the neighbouring German East Africa (Tanganyika). After the war, civil police duties resumed and the police force expanded. The end of the First World War saw increased migration of white settlers in Kenya (Sommer, 2007). In 1920, the modern Kenya police was founded. Africans were recruited, but only to fill the lowest ranks of the force subservient to European and Asian officers. Within the urban areas, the police force strategy of keeping Nairobi safe for the settlers meant containing the potential crime and disorder perceived to emanate from the Africans residing illegally in the slum areas of Nairobi East lands. The police primarily served as a tool for colonialist right from the start (Sommer, 2007). The early Kenya Police Force was therefore described as a primitive citizen containment squad.

By the end of Second World War, Kenya Police had largely taken over most activities from tribal police forces and now comprised some 5,000 agents most of which were Kenya Africans. The Kenya Police metamorphosed into various policing formations; in 1948, the Kenya Police Reserve; Kenya Police Air Wing in 1949 and the Traffic in 1959 (Muthondeki *et al.*, 2017a). Nevertheless reOrganization and extension of skills within the police did not touch the function of Police Force as it was still a tool of colonial administration. In October, 1952 the state of emergency was affirmed and lasted for eight years and later the army took

over power from the police. In 1963, the British handed over the country to moderate African politicians and Kenya gained independence that year. The control and management of the police department thus went to the local politicians that took over power from the British.

Kenya Police have undergone many changes since independence, and currently it's referred to as the National Police Service, which comprises the Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service. The Kenya Police has various formation that include the General Service Unit (GSU), Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU), Department of Criminal Investigations (DCI), Traffic Department, Kenya Police Air wing, Kenya Railways Police Unit, Kenya Airport Police Unit, Kenya Police Dog Unit, Kenya Tourism Police Unit, Kenya Diplomatic Police Unit, Maritime Police Unit and Anti-Terrorist Police Unit (NPSA, 2011).

One of the mandate of the National Police Service is anti and counterterrorism. Other functions include: maintenance of law and order, apprehension of offenders, prevention and detection of crime, and investigation of incidences. Although Anti-Terrorist Police Unit was constituted specifically to counter terrorism, other police units also perform the same function (NPSA, 2011).

### **2.2.2 International and National Policing Approaches**

Law enforcement agencies implement a variety of strategies, philosophies and methods to combat crime and ensure public safety. Often, different approaches to policing overlap because different groups come up with similar solutions to the same problems. These various approaches may be aimed at goals that include crime prevention, effective use of police resources, or suspect location. Rigorous research can determine which strategies are the most effective in various circumstances.

Policing strategies extend beyond traditional models of responding to calls for service and often seek to increase crime prevention, intervention, and response effectiveness through techniques such as community outreach, efficient resource distribution, crime mapping, crime data collection, or suspect location. Policing styles are particular to individual situations and circumstances. Introducing the same approach into different historical and cultural settings results in very different scenarios (Brogden, 1999). Key policing approaches are military & para military approaches, community policing approach, intelligence-led policing and intergrated policing approaches.

### **2.2.2.1 Military Policing Approach**

Military is a set of beliefs, values, and assumptions that stress the use of force and threat of violence as the most appropriate and efficacious means to solve problems. It stresses the exercise of military power, hardware, operations and technology as its primary problem-solving tools. Militarization is the implementation of military ideology. It is the process of arming, organizing, planning, training for, and sometimes implementing violent conflict (Brogden, 2001). To militarize means embracing and applying the principal elements of the military model to an organization or situation.

Police militarization, therefore, is simply the process whereby civilian police increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the tenets of militarism and the military model, for instance; weaponry, equipment, and advanced technology; cultural-martial language, style, appearance, beliefs, and values; organizational-martial arrangements such as ‘command and control’ centers e.g. elite squads of officers patterned after military special operations patrolling high-crime areas as opposed to the traditional officer on the beat; operational pattern of activity

modelled after the military such as in the areas of intelligence, supervision and handling high-risk situations (Haggerty & Ericson, 1999).

Generally, police by mode of training and operation is ‘militarized’ since the foundation of military and police power is the same; the state sanctioned capacity to use physical force to accomplish their respective objectives (Kraska and Kappeler, 1997). We can therefore determine the degree to which the police are militarized. Any assertion that the police are or are not militarized is simply misguided. This is a distinction easily overlooked by police analysts who react defensively to using these organizing concepts (Kraska, 1999).

This approach is applied in high crime areas or in combating insurgents/fighters. It’s also applied by autocratic regimes whereby citizens are compelled to abide by legislation which is enforced usually by military personnel in some cases. States that experience irregular change in governance usually establish military policing as the foremost approach of enforcing the rule of law (Stokes, 2004). This form of policing approach is usually resisted and as such raises resentment.

#### **2.2.2.2 Para-military Policing Approach**

Paramilitary as a policing approach oscillates between conventional policing and use of military force. It is the application of quasi-military training, equipment, philosophy and Organization in policing (Jefferson, 1990).

According to Kraska and Kappeler (1997) para-military style of policing involves the threat to use force promptly and not automatically as an option of last resort. Paramilitary policing approach has been incorporated and normalised into conventional policing overtime, even though it was initially meant to be used in counterterrorism alone (McCulloch, 2001). Essentially, the word “paramilitary” is



used to define organizations that bear a resemblance to, are analogous to, or are supplementary to military specialists without being assimilated into regular armed forces in regards of specialised status.

Paramilitary police can be said to be an organizations within law enforcement bodies that in divergent ways are modelled after the military, but with the statutory powers and legitimate status of the police (Hills, 2009). The debate on paramilitary policing has continued over the years because the contexts of paramilitary policing have been undergoing a global change with the transformation of security landscape (Haggerty & Ericson, 1999).

Because of the terrorist attacks in the recent years, there have been calls for reorganization of police force all over the world. The relationship and operation between the police and the military agencies have also been affected. Deflem (2010) puts it that “As terrorism is conceived as war-like behaviour and is responded to by military actions, it brings up the problem of a potential militarization of the police”.

Since the war on terrorism kicked actively following the 9/11 terrorist attack, paramilitary police units have been advocated as a major force to counter terrorism given its institutional position that lies between military and police, combining civilian mandates and specialist knowledge in solving security problems and disorder (Friedrichs, 2008).

Obscuring of mandates and organizational spheres creates problematic relationships of police and military organizations wherein military tactics introduced to counter terrorism tend to get normalized and regularized and then transferred into everyday

policing methods, and thereby contrasts with other policing approaches applied in everyday policing.

### **2.2.2.3 Criminal Justice Approach**

This approach is common in democratic states where laws and structures are in place. The approach functions to prevent crime, effectively prosecute criminals, protect the public, assist victims and reassure communities. It takes into cognizance democratic ideals such as accountability and legislation (Lambertus and Yakimchuk, 2007). Criminal Justice has four components; law enforcement, prosecutors, courts and corrections.

Law enforcement loads the system through investigations and arrests. Prosecutors are the connection between law enforcement and the courts. Courts form the critical components of the administration of justice. In correction, there is retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation or reintegration. The criminal justice components work in harmony, although their functions are independent of each other, but also overlap and their activities are directed at a common goal which is justice and crime prevention (McCulloch, 2004). The foundation of this approach should be fairness, justice and accountability.

### **2.2.2.4 Community Policing Approach**

According to Ruteere & Pommerolle (2003), the concept of community policing is based on the principle of coordination and consultation between the police and the policed, on the definition of security needs and on the implementation of ways of preventing and curbing crimes and of enhancing safety. The concept is often said to have its origins in an article by two American scholars named James Wilson and

George Kelling. They argued that decaying neighbourhoods bred crime and disorder hence to prevent crime, disorder had to be contained.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa pioneered in implementation of community policing (Ruteere & Pommerolle, 2003). It follows from a long experience in the townships of fear and hatred of the police during apartheid together with the dependence of private security initiatives. After the period of apartheid, South Africa embraced the democratic aspect of community policing including its principles in the 1992 constitution. In Kenya, since the formation of the Police Force (now the National Police Service), there has not been any cordial relations with citizens. The police in Kenya just as in the rest of Africa have been seen by the public as a means of maintaining a certain order and representing the interests of some dominant groups or individuals. In 1990, community policing grew in popularity in Kenya and afterwards the New York based Vera Institute of Justice proposed to support related projects through the Kenya Human Rights Commission and the Nairobi Central Business District Association (Ruteere & Pommerolle, 2003). In 1996, Kenya police adopted community policing in crime management and crime prevention.

Implementation of community policing in Kenya commenced in May 2001 through establishment of community policing units in Kibera, Ziwani, and Isiolo. This was through a joint collaboration effort between Vera, the Kenya Police, UN-Habitat, 'Saferworld' and Nairobi Central Business District Association. The units developed valuable knowledge and experience in setting up and running Community Policing Forums (CPFs). The units have further been supported by the development of a national manual that is used in training communities in policing sites and police services (Gordon, 2001).

Since 2003, the government has embraced community policing as a core crime prevention strategy. This involves combining the efforts and resources of the law enforcement agencies and community members. Community policing facilitates partnership so that the public can seek assistance from law enforcement agencies. The government launched the community policing strategy in Ruai outside Nairobi in the year 2005. Nevertheless, the community policing strategy is undergoing some review under the National Taskforce for Community Policing.

Community policing focuses on building ties and working closely with members of the communities. A formal definition states: Community policing is a philosophy of full service personalized policing, where the same officer patrols and works in the same area on a permanent basis, from a decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership with citizens to identify and solve problems (Deflem, 2010). The central goal of community policing is for the police to build relationships with the community through interactions with local agencies and members of the public, creating partnerships and strategies for reducing crime and disorder. Although community policing mostly targets low-level crime and disorder, the broken windows theory proposes that this can reduce more serious crime as well.

Common methods of community-policing include: encouraging the community to help prevent crime by providing advice, giving talks at schools, encouraging neighbourhood watch groups, and a variety of other techniques; increased use of foot or cycle patrols; increased officer accountability to the communities they are supposed to serve; creating teams of officers to carry out community policing in designated neighbourhoods; clear communication between the police and the communities about their objectives and strategies; partnerships with other

organizations such as government agencies, community members, non-profit service providers, private businesses and the media; decentralizing the police authority, allowing more discretion amongst lower-ranking officers, and more initiative expected from them (Kraska, 1999).

In Kenya, the relationship between the police and the public has been shaped by the historical beginnings where the colonial government used the police to intimidate the civilian population. Before the new constitution and emergence of the new reforms momentum, the police was perceived as being coercive servicing the interests of the political and elite classes in the society. There was no cooperation between the police and the citizens thus the culture of lack of trust and cooperation (Lambertus and Yakimchuk, 2007). In many parts of the country, there is bad blood between the police and ordinary population hence citizens believe that cooperation with the police is a betrayal of their fellow citizens and as such it is not welcomed in the community. Those who cooperate are seen as sellouts.

However, this thinking has changed with time since the introduction of community policing in 2005. The Community Policing programme however has faced several challenges among them being lack of a national legal framework and guidelines on Community Policing, multiple complaints by the police and the communities being levelled against each other and low levels of trust and confidentiality. To address this problem, the government through the National Police Service Act, 2011 has mainstreamed Community Policing (Muthondeki *et al.*, 2017a). In addition, Community Policing Policy which guides the operation of the Community Policing has been drafted. Police curriculum has also incorporated Community Policing in recruit syllabus.

### **2.2.2.5 Intelligence Led Policing Approach**

According to Lemle (2007), Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) refers to a management framework for criminal intelligence and planned operational police work, in which intelligence is the foundation for defining priorities, strategic and operational objectives in the prevention and suppression of crime and other security threats such as terrorism, burglary, arson, housebreaking, murder, trespass, homicide etc. It also includes making the appropriate decisions on operational police work and actions, the rational engagement of available human resources and allocation of material, technical and operational capital.

ILP originated in Great Britain in 1990s and was originally called the Kent Policing Approach. It is basically defined as the application of criminal intelligence analysis as an objective decision-making tool in order to facilitate crime reduction and prevention through effective policing strategies and external partnership projects drawn from an evidential base (Ratcliffe, 2003).

ILP focuses on key criminal activities. Once crime problems are identified and quantified through intelligence assessments, key criminals are targeted for investigation and prosecution (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005). The approach can be deduced as follows:

The first level involves interpreting the criminal environment. This is executed by intelligence unit that relies on a range of information sources both internal and external. The information is then analysed and conveyed to key decision makers. Finally, in stage 3, decision makers explore ways to reduce crime and invest in initiatives that might impact positively on criminal environment and world (Ratcliffe, 2003).

At the heart of ILP is the fact that violent extremists related to recent terrorist incidents, including Mpeketoni attack, remained under the law enforcement radar has called for a proactive approach and highlighted the need for a comprehensive sharing and centralized analysis of relevant data and information. The realization that a terrorist attack and early detection of other serious incidents cannot be dealt with in a reactive way put ILP into the spotlight at the international law enforcement stage. This was apparent after the Westgate attacks, and reflected in the findings of the Parliamentary Committee on Westgate Attack that concluded that there were various pieces of information held at different levels before the attacks, but due to the agencies' failure to share them; they could not be coordinated to provide a comprehensive picture (Agbiboa, 2013a).

Therefore, risk identification and management is an integral part of modern policing. A properly functioning ILP approach to data and information gathering and analysis allows for identifying and assessing risks, including for major events, geographic areas, types of crime, social harm and criminal webs which should then be shared in time and appropriately.

#### **2.2.2.6 Integrated Policing Approach**

High crime rates or an escalation of a specific crime may warrant the need to re-examine the existing policing approaches to readily combat threat to peace and security. Traditional aspects form the basis of these approaches and additional methods are included to enhance the approaches. When more than one policing approach is employed to solve an emerging problem, it becomes an integrated policing approach (Murphy, 2005). The community becomes a strategic source of information and intelligence which could then be utilized to counter possible threats of terrorism.

With this kind of approach, policing responsibility may be distributed to diverse entities which may be affected by terrorism in whatsoever manner; these include other government agencies, like those responsible for immigration, finances and energy departments. Private security is also included in this multi-responsibility approach. Private security is responsible for the protection of certain critical infrastructure and also helps in some degree of policing. The aim is to create a joint stance against crime and disorder (Palmer and Whelan, 2006).

Murphy (2005) argues that in executing integrated policing approach, one may be forced to consider an approach of active interaction with communities. Police are encouraged to invite involvement from members of the community; they are penetrated to provide intelligence in this manner. In non-interactive situation, police may rely more on undercover operations, clandestine entries and other like processes to achieve their objectives of ensuring peace and security. Police may also choose aggressive approaches such as military and paramilitary to achieve their goal. This however may breed resentment and undermine the trust between communities and police.

Intergrated policing approach may also entail shared responsibility to diverse entities which may be affected by crime such as terrorism. These include other government agencies, like those responsible for immigration, finances and energy departments. Private security can also be able to contribute to this multi-responsibility approach, for instance, in protecting certain critical. Included in the shared responsibility is the public whereby an awareness campaign against terrorism can be carried out. The objective is to create a combined stance against crime irrespective of cultural and ethnic differences.



Too fully realize the potential policing approaches in counterterrorism; the NPS needs a philosophical shift and changed mindset. Instead of merely reacting to individual incidents, police must proactively solve problems, starting with petty crimes such as trespass to sophisticated crimes such as terrorism. Above all, NPS should contextualise its mechanisms of policing within emerging dynamics and evaluate the relevance of its current approaches to policing, taking into account the root causes of crime and understanding the circumstances that may contribute to crime as well as institutional and human resource capacity deficiencies.

### **2.2.3 Police Engagement with Communities to Counter Terrorism**

The process of engagement is a critical component of any effective counterterrorism or policing initiative. It requires that various key players work closely to develop effective programs and initiatives to govern their operations. Effective engagement is more than organizing a meeting with community members. It is a rigorous process that demands sensitivity and careful planning and execution. Any haphazard approach to police-community engagement can be more detrimental than no engagement at all.

According to OSCE (2014), engaging with the public offers police officers opportunities to enhance their situational awareness about what is happening in communities and improve their understanding of dynamics, risk perceptions and concerns within communities. This can then serve as a basis for informed and more effective policing. It also highlights their presence in communities, which can, in itself, both provide reassurance to the public and prevent or disrupt crime as well as help identify critical situations at an early stage in communities and refer them to relevant partners. Engagement also helps disseminate information and key messages to the public, including dispelling misperceptions and rumours. It helps

raise awareness of relevant issues and mobilize members of the public in support of addressing them. It also build trusting and mutually respectful relationships as a basis for further co-operation and develop arrangements to ensure public participation and co-operate with communities in solving problems, including addressing critical situations.

As stated, achieving community based initiatives requires that all stakeholders engage to develop effective programs and initiatives. On their part, the police should choose groups they engage with carefully. OSCE (2014) explains that police engagement with the public should be inclusive, reaching out to all communities and to a cross section of members within communities, including at the grass-roots level. The police should be careful not to engage only with particular groups, self-proclaimed community representatives or only with interlocutors sympathetic to them. They should strive to engage, in particular, with individuals or groups that are marginalized, hard to reach, or who display risk behaviours.

The police should take great care in establishing partnerships with individuals, groups or organizations when there is evidence that these individuals or groups are not explicitly committed to non-violence and respect for universal human rights. The short- and long-term benefits and risks should be properly assessed to decide how much the police should support and empower such individuals, groups or organizations, and for which purpose. For instance, while they might be effective partners in accessing individuals at risk of terrorism and drawing them away from such a path, they might also hold and impart views that are ambiguous towards, or at odds with, human rights and enhancing social cohesion.

Some forms of co-operation, such as the sharing of sensitive information, may require the police to limit their engagement to trusted members of the public, such as individuals who have undergone security vetting, and the police should also take into account the risk that engaging with individuals may be perceived as co-opting or legitimizing these individuals. The police should be careful not to undermine the perceived independence and credibility of those individuals in a position to exercise a positive influence within communities and support terrorism-prevention efforts. Conversely, the police should be careful not to legitimize individuals whose influence within communities is unclear, or possibly negative, in relation to countering terrorism (OSCE, 2014).

All engagements should be customized to the specific person, group or community engaged to be more effective. This may include careful choice of time, venue and words to show sensitivity and to best frame and raise the issue. It should also address both the concerns of the police and those of communities, and not one sided (OSCE, 2014). Such engagements should also be as regular as possible and conducted both in formal and informal settings to maximize opportunities for communicating, building mutual understanding and trust, and exchanging information and intelligence.

## **2.3 Challenges in Implementing Counterterrorism Strategies**

### **2.3.1 Global and Regional Challenges**

One of the most marked changes in the world of terrorism and counterterrorism during recent years is the increasingly sophisticated use of the internet and media by various terrorist groups to spread their propaganda and recruit supporters. The technology has improved, especially the use of slick production quality videos

designed to appeal to young men dissatisfied with their current lives or looking for a cause (Galvin, 2013).

The large numbers of foreign fighters, who may have tried to return to their home countries after receiving training, as happened in France, also is a major concern to law enforcement and counterterrorism officials. They can easily be mobilized by terror groups to carry out attacks. The easy availability of semi-automatic assault weapons in the United States compounds the problem (Rodriquez, 2013). These are people who, like some of the students and others who shot up schools in earlier mass killings, have had psychological problems that might have been detected and reported by their family or associates.

According to Galvin (2013), another major challenge in the arena of emerging technology is the threat of cyber terrorism. Hacking of government and private sector websites, some of it apparently perpetrated by hackers in China and Russia, for economic or espionage motives already has been taking place. But cyber terrorism aimed at disrupting a country's electric power supplies, communications and other vital systems is perhaps the most dangerous threat to a country's infrastructure and ability to function. In addition, there have been reports that the terrorists involved in the Paris attacks that killed 130 persons used encrypted communications as part of their successful effort to avoid detection.

The mass-casualty attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016, as well as the plethora of self-starter plots uncovered in countries like Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom over the last few years, have highlighted the extent of the terrorist threat across Europe. Terrorism has illustrated that it is borderless, and the cooperation between the European Union's 28 member nations has to seamlessly

confront that reality. But the EU's counter-terrorism strategy has not reached its full potential and significant challenges still remain despite the great steps taken since 2002 (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

On the flipside, the words of the EU and its member states are often not matched with action. This is largely illustrated by the unwillingness of member states to share intelligence and exchange information on security issues within the EU framework, including through institutions such as Europol. Instead, some nations opt for bilateral agreements to share intelligence. Although Europol, which doesn't have powers of arrest, has attained significant support from member states to facilitate the exchange of information, its operational role is limited. This, in turn, results in a restricted role and less influence for the EU institutions (Human Rights Watch, 2016).

Wolfendale (2006) states that another problem has been that Europol principally interact with national and federal police forces rather than intelligence agencies. This restricts access to potentially significant information. To try to mitigate this, in 2016 Europol announced the formation of the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) to combat terrorism in Europe and act as a central information hub and boost cooperation among between various countries in the region. Its success will take time to evaluate and weigh.

In Africa, there is a growing terrorist threat from North Africa to the rest of Africa. The emergence of ISIL terrorist group as a force in the region is cause for genuine concern. The ISIL challenge is compounded by the persistence of older terrorist organizations such as *Al-Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Although the

group has suffered air strikes from the coalition forces, her numerous fighters remains a threat to peace and security in the region (START, 2016).

In Africa, some countries are still struggling with the process of political stabilization and democratic consolidation. Countries like Somalia do not have an effective government after years of civil war. Somalia has a severe radicalization problem that has helped make it one of the largest havens of foreign terrorist fighters in the world. Due to lawlessness, Somalia serves as safe haven for terrorists who also engage in money laundering and illegal arms trade (MIPT, 2010). This has continued to pose danger to her neighbours including Kenya.

Galvin (2013) reiterates that counterterrorism needs for the region are very great indeed. To begin with, efforts to strengthen the reach of the state are essential to any lasting counterterrorism strategy. This must include not only training defense and interior ministry forces, ensuring they have the necessary intelligence and other means, but also ensuring that they are capable of working effectively together, and doing so in the context of a justice system that respects human rights and the rule of law. However all these are lacking in the region.

A key part of strengthening internal security is improving the ability of states in the region to control their borders. At present, financing, arms, other logistics, and terrorists themselves flow with relative ease across the borders of countries in the region. Tamping down on such movements is an essential step toward progress in hampering and containing the growth of the region's jihadist groups in the first place. Border security, like internal security, requires not only technical capabilities, but also effective policies, coordination practices between relevant agencies, command and control, and cross-border communication systems and

procedures. In nearly all cases, such systems and capabilities are weak or altogether lacking (START, 2016).

Effective regional strategy should also address the underlying radicalization problems. Understanding of radicalization processes and the effective means of stopping them is not as strong as it might be, but it is clear that if a country like Kenya is to escape from a long-term domestic terrorism challenge, counter-radicalization will be needed. Similarly, if Somalia is ever to regain statehood of some form, counter-radicalization is likely to be no less important there (Tefft, 2006). On one level, economic opportunity and efforts to control the malicious effects of efforts to spread radical ideologies outside the religious mainstream are desirable, but these must be complemented by programs that intervene directly to prevent youth from radicalizing.

### **2.3.2 Counterterrorism Experiences and Challenges in Kenya**

#### **2.3.2.1 Lawless Somalia and Porous Border**

Much of the Global War on Terror is based on its northern neighbour, Somalia. When the government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, it created a lawless society where crime and radical ideologies flourished. Lacking state capacity since that time has allowed unrestricted movement of people and goods into and out of Somalia. While many of these people were refugees seeking a better life in Kenya, the number of terrorists should not be underestimated. With a porous border and a confirmed presence of Islamic fundamentalists, Somalia poses a threat to Kenya and the rest of the world (Agbiboa, 2013a). In a joint press conference with Kenya and the United States in 2003, President Bush declared that stabilizing Somalia is essential in sustaining the war against terrorism.

Without a proper government that can take control of the country, Somalia continues to play a direct role in the security deficiencies of Kenya. For one, Somalia's geographic location gives it the longest coastline in Africa and makes it the closest African country to the Middle East. This allows Somalia to act as a transit hub in bringing illicit items into Kenya. Most notably, the perpetrators of the 2002 Mombasa attacks transited from Somalia and smuggled weapons into Kenya through the shared border (Agbiboa, 2013a).

Lack of border security, for instance, allowed the fugitive Fazul Abdullah Mohammed to transit between East African countries. Fazul was eventually killed in 2011 after exchanging gunfire with Somali forces. The invasion of Somalia by the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) re amplified an already shaky relationship between Muslims in the Horn of Africa and the Kenyan government. This offensive into Somalia, known as Operation *Linda Nchi* has been used as the basis for nearly all of the transnational violence directed at Kenya since the offensive began in October 2011. In fact, *Al-Shabaab* and its sympathizers have conducted more than sixty separate grenade attacks in Kenya, believed to be in retaliation for Operation *Linda Nchi* and more widely, the foreign policy of Kenya (Macharia, 2014). These attacks have caused both civilian and police casualties in Kenya.

### **2.3.2.2 Islamic Fundamentalism and Radicalization**

The Islamic fundamentalist is a major challenge in counterterrorism. Much of the international terrorism threat in Kenya is based on Islam. Much of the radical Islam originates from Somalia and due to the lack of border security, makes its way into Kenya. There are certainly a number of Kenyan born radical Imams who preach anti-Western and anti-Kenyan views (Shinn, 2004).



This extremism, nevertheless, is relatively limited in its scope. There is a crucially important differentiation between Muslim theological conservatives and those willing to mobilize. Besides the obvious connection between *Al-Qaida* and the instances of past terrorism, their proxies often have specific goals and use the brand of *Al-Qaida* to improve recognition. The Somali Islamist militant group *Al-Shabaab*, while seeking some goals specific to Somalia, operates to some extent in Kenya with an increasing amount of support from *al-Hijra*, a Kenyan Islamist fundamentalist group previously known as the Muslim Youth Center in Mombasa. The Muslim Youth Center was not inherently a violent or militant organization but as it evolved into *Al-Hijra*, theologically conservative Muslims were overshadowed by radical Kenyans with a desire to mobilize and carry out attacks after being radicalized (Rosenau, 2005).

Kenya may have a presence of both radicalized terrorists and theologically conservative Muslims. However, the former is made up almost entirely of foreign nationals and the latter consists of Swahili Muslims the same group that has consistently been treated as terrorists by the government. The Swahili Muslim community is assumed to be far more radicalized than current information suggests. As a target of antiterrorism legislation and actions by the Kenyan government, one would surely expect a deep hatred for the political system and the West (Rosenau, 2005). This hatred undeniably exists to some extent. It has created a coastal society that feels as if it is second class to the rest.

### **2.3.2.3 Capacity of Law Enforcement and Laws on Terrorism**

The role of counterterrorism increased significantly in Kenya in the aftermath of the 9/11. Prior to September 11, 2001, there were counterterrorism units that existed in both the law enforcement and intelligence arenas. The main problems, however,

were based on lack of funding and support from more experienced Western counterparts. The National Security Intelligence Service (currently National Intelligence Service) was established following the embassy bombings and Kenya was added to the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (Mogire & Agade, 2011).

The addition to ATA was largely a formality and no significant funding was dispersed until several years later (Aronson, 2013). This was, nevertheless, a statement made by both America and Kenya to reiterate their joint fight against terrorism. Since 2002, The ATA Program has trained more than five hundred Kenyan Security officials in the United States and many more in U.S. designated training facilities throughout East Africa (Ploch, 2010).

The Kenyan Government has also created an Anti-Terror Police Unit (ATPU), a Joint Terrorism Task Force that has since been disbanded (Aronson, 2013), a National Counter-Terrorism Centre, and a National Security Advisory Committee. The addition of these entities has required substantial funding from the United States. The direct funding for counterterrorism, which nominally existed prior to 9/11, increased roughly 15 times its previous value in the immediate year following the attack, but this is not enough (Aronson, 2013). The overdependence on Western countries has had a negative impact on Kenyan security service preparedness to deal with terrorist threats decisively.

Mogire & Agade (2011) argues that flawed terrorism laws in Kenya have caused grave problems and even with improved legislation over the last few years. Success has been obviously minimal. For one, the definition of terrorism is vague and thus, able to be contested by many opponents. The Kenyan government defines terrorism as anti-state violent activities undertaken by non-state entities which are motivated

by religious goals. This definition neglects terrorism based on political, ideological, and criminal rationales and thus, places an unfair target on the minority religion in Kenya (Islam). Second, actual legislation has been very difficult to pass and put into practice, therefore the government has been operating without official and encompassing anti-terrorism laws and standards.

The 2003 Suppression of Terrorism Bill did not make it into law after a public outcry over unconstitutionality, international human rights violations, and overt discrimination against Muslims. Two years later, the Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2006 was again brought before Parliament. This bill contained many of the same issues as its predecessor and was, therefore, not passed into law. Certain crimes committed by terrorists (such as murder) can be prosecuted in Kenyan courts; however, there has yet to exist a comprehensive anti-terrorism law insofar as one exists in other Western democracies (Prestholt, 2011).

The lack of comprehensive legislation puts Kenyan law enforcement officials in positions where they perform questionable means and violate the human rights of many in the Muslim community (Prestholt, 2011). Intelligence officials have been accused numerous times of unlawfully detaining suspected terrorists for lengthy periods of time and torturing suspects in attempts to gain confessions and further intelligence.

Since proper prosecutorial infrastructure is hardly in place, Kenyan authorities frequently hand-off terrorism suspects to neighbouring countries or the United States. In one instance after the 2010 bombing in Kampala, Uganda the Government of Kenya transferred 13 Kenyan citizens suspected of taking part in the attacks to Uganda. The Minister of Justice declared that the rendition was illegal (Mogire & Agade, 2011).

In the aftermath of the Westgate attack in Nairobi, it is clear to academics and policy experts that Kenya is still heavily reliant on Western security resources. This is not surprising for a developing democracy still dealing with critical levels of poverty and corruption. Still, the counterterrorism units that were expanded and funded for the sole purpose of responding to acts of terrorism were quickly overwhelmed by an inability to work together. Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta activated the military in direct contradiction to its usual role essentially creating more confusion than would have occurred otherwise. This led to allegations that the success of the militants was a direct result of ineffective law enforcement and counterterrorism strategies, ultimately calling into question the extensive training and funding of recent years. After neutralizing the alleged hostage situation, stories began circulating that the Westgate mall was looted by KDF forces, using an opportunity of chaos to profit financially (Aronson, 2013). Additionally, Kenya detained and later released numerous Kenyan Muslims who were held under the country's existing anti-terrorism legislation and were subsequently released due to lack of evidence

Major terrorist incidents in the country have been perpetrated by foreign nationals who use Kenya for a number of reasons, including geographic location and a lack of state capacity. The fiscal aid offered by the American government becomes an irrelevant factor when counterterrorism strategies and laws in Kenya are flawed. There is also a need to better training offered to personnel across the entire spectrum of the NPS. Equipping and training only a small, specialized unit, such as the ATPU, will not be sufficient in keeping an entire country safe. Instead, all officers should obtain basic training in terrorism related investigations.

#### **2.3.2.4 Poor Interagency Coordination**

Good interagency cooperation and coordination are crucial elements in combating terrorism, especially transnational terrorism. Effective interagency cooperation depends on the timely and accurate sharing of intelligence and information, and requires a reliable means of communication. Most states have a variety of communication facilities available to their different agencies involved in counterterrorism measures, but these are often discordant.

Mwangi (2017), states that “Kenya’s counterterrorism operational effectiveness is hampered by poor intra-agency and interagency coordination, a lack of command and control of some terrorist incidents, and the politicisation of terrorist incidents. A number of the security lapses that have occurred in Kenya can be attributed to a lack of effective collaboration, coordination and cooperation between the different national security organs. The APS and KPS, as agencies of the NPS, conduct their operations almost independently of each other and not as anticipated by the Constitution. Consequently, the NPS is unable to work in a coherent and coordinated manner, hence creating serious shortcomings that pose a challenge to the country’s security. The lack of collaboration, coordination and cooperation also extends to the KDF and the NIS.”

Mwangi (2017) further narrates that “The lack of a coordinated and joint approach to security by the requisite security organs also adversely affects intelligence information-sharing, often resulting in blame-shifting and finger pointing among the security agencies. The Mpeketoni and Garissa University terrorist attacks of June 2014 and April 2015 in Lamu and Garissa counties, respectively, and their consequent counterterrorism security operations demonstrate some of the interagency shortcomings that the security agencies experience in the course of

their efforts. Mpeketoni town was attacked by 20 to 30 insurgents at approximately 8:45 p.m. on Sunday 15<sup>th</sup> June, 2014. Simultaneous attacks occurred on the APS Divisional Headquarters in Mpeketoni and in Mpeketoni town centre. Shortly afterwards, the gunmen attacked the Mpeketoni police station. Victims were shot at close range, 26 buildings were burnt and 44 vehicles were torched. The attack, which ended between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., resulted in the deaths of 49 people. The attackers thereafter proceeded towards Kibaoni, resulting in an exchange of fire between unconfirmed parties.”

On Monday 16 June 2014, another attack took place further inland in Kijijoni village, Kaisari, where 9 people were killed and 1 house was torched. Two days later, police recovered 2 bodies from Pangani. A total of 60 people were killed in both incidents, for which *Al-Shabaab* quickly claimed responsibility. The subsequent Mpeketoni counterterrorism operations were uncoordinated. Neither a full time command post nor operations centre was established to coordinate the operation. The APS rapid deployment unit (RDU) left its Mkunumbi base about 16 km from Mpeketoni at around 9:08 p.m. and arrived in Mpeketoni at around midnight but remained out of sight until 4:45 a.m. The GSU officers were the first to venture into the town at about 3:30 a.m., after the firing had stopped. The RDU was sighted later at 5:00 a.m. (Mwangi, 2017).

As Mwangi (2017) further narrates “The Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) team identified the involvement of NPS headquarters and the executive (although commendable for symbolic purposes and morale), as well as the lack of a centralised command structure, as the key factors which contributed to the slow and uncoordinated response by the NPS because they distracted from the effective and efficient planning of the counterterrorism operations. At one point, the operation

was taken over by senior commanders from the regional and national headquarters, and the local operational commanders were left with no functional role. KPS commanders complain that they cannot directly issue operational orders to officers from the APS and specialised units such as the GSU. These units have to obtain approval from their national headquarters before embarking on any operation. For instance, when the KPS County Commander ordered the GSU commander to respond to the attacks, the latter alleged that the Deputy Commissioner of Police had given orders that the GSU should not deploy at night to Mpeketoni. Prompt response failed because of conflicting orders and the lack of a centralised command structure at the county level that could coordinate all the NPS resources in the region. The attacks at Garissa University occurred at around 5:30 a.m. on 2<sup>nd</sup> April, 2015. The campus was stormed by 6 to 10 armed men, who killed two security guards at the main gate and then moved about the campus, hurling grenades and shooting everyone in sight. The terrorists entered the dormitories, where they separated Muslim students from non-Muslim ones by asking them to recite verses from the Quran. The terrorists released the Muslim students and started executing non-Muslims. The attack left 142 students, 3 police officers and 3 soldiers dead, with another 78 civilians injured. *Al-Shabaab* claimed responsibility for the attack. The success of *Al-Shabaab* in this attack was more due to a failure of communication than a lack of actionable intelligence.”

Westgate shopping mall attack in September 2013, and the slow response and lack of coordination by security organs further exposes national security organ’s underbelly in effective handling of counterterrorism operations. During the Westgate incident, there was lack of coordination. At the end of it all, 67 people were confirmed dead and more than 200 others injured. The attack which began at

around 12:30 p.m. on 21<sup>st</sup> September, 2013 was declared over on 23<sup>rd</sup> September at 10:00 p.m., about 60 hours after the attack commenced. The foregoing is an indication that the level of preparedness of security forces to terror attacks is below par and lacking in coordination and organization.

## **2.4 Conceptual Framework**

This study was guided by Expectancy Theory, Control Theory and Justice Theory of Performance. The three theories are ideal because they are vital in explaining individual or group performance in an organization. The three theories are elaborated as follows:-

### **2.4.1 Expectancy Theory of Performance**

Expectancy theory is a critical theory that emphasises the concept of performance management (Fletcher & Williams, 1996; Steers *et al.*, 2004). This theory was proposed in 1964 by Victor Vroom of the Yale School of Management. Performance management has been recognised as a system that creates framework for continuous monitoring and determining activities of individual employees in an organization as well as the performance of the entire organization so that organizational goals are met in an effective and efficient way (Lebas, 1995).

According to Kroth (2007), Expectancy is determined by individual belief that performance of a specific type of behaviour will certainly help individual in attaining desired performance goals. This property helps individuals in finding out if they possess the required skill sets for undertaking work perfectly. When performance goals are beyond the achievement, the corresponding motivation also degenerates.



Instrumentality is concerned with the process of rewarding for desired performance outcome. Therefore, individuals are motivated to perform works that would provide greater rewards after successful execution. Conversely, when the instrumentality or reward for a number of organizational performances is the same all the time, motivation to perform different kinds of work declines drastically (Burgoon, 1993; Kroth, 2007).

Valence is the significance of the reward individuals get for exhibiting desired performances. Therefore, individuals evaluate the rewards given to them for performance based on various aspects such as differential needs, values, goals and sources of motivation. On the basis of valence the motivations to accomplish different tasks also vary (Burgoon, 1993; Kroth, 2007). Therefore, while deciding to perform in a particular way, individuals give importance to the variable that has the greatest motivational force.

This theory is mainly used in employment relationship with focus on monitoring employee performance. Application of expectancy theory is practical in organizational processes such as recruitment and selection of employees for a particular job as well as scrutinizing the effect of Organization training and valuation of employee performance in line with the goals of an organization (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Noe, 1986; Rynes *et al.*, 1980).

In relation to the current study, this theory can be applied to identify counterterrorism strategies and policing approaches that have greater performance outcome among police officers, hence effective. Such strategies should be emphasized, and those with lower performance outcome should be reviewed. Besides, greater performance among officers should be rewarded accordingly, for

instance by way of promotion and salary increase, enhanced allowances or further training.

This theory is also applied to identify the variables that motivate individual employees in an organization. For instance, in case of recruitment and selection of employees, this theory helps in determining the motivators that influence individuals to join an organization based on needs, goals and past experiences.

In assessment of organizational performance, this theory works towards interpreting specific behaviour that employee exhibit based on their individual expectancy since different people expect different things from an organization, for instance, promotion or high salary.

In relation to the current study, this theory can be applied to identify the challenges faced by police in implementing counterterrorism strategies. Given the expectation (expectancy) of individual police officer, a strategy may be rewarding or punishing. It therefore enable the commanders know officers who are committed to counterterrorism operation from those who are not motivated at all.

Expectancy theory also helps in identifying particular determiners behind a particular behavioural outcome of individual trainees (Lunenburg, 2011). Basing on the current study, this theory is useful in the police service when identifying and selecting individual officers to undertake counterterrorism training and, or send for counterterrorism operation based on learning/performance outcome.

Expectancy theory helps in recognizing highly performing individuals in an organization. These employees can achieve maximum job satisfaction if the right motivator is provided to them. Therefore, this theory helps in interpreting

individual attitudes. This in turn helps in recognising the individual motivators that influence people to make choices based on their specific expectations and anticipation (Kanfer, 1990; Ramlall, 2004).

Expectancy theory also centres upon expectations of people and perceptions of the organization about their corresponding organizational behaviour. Therefore, it helps in making individual employees aware about organizational behaviour and consequent expectations from the organization. Organizations are also able to identify actual performance of their employees thereby retaining employees who are productive to the organization by recognising their respective intrinsic and extrinsic motivators (Ramlall, 2004; Samuel & Chipunza, 2009).

In relation to the current study, operation commanders can apply the theory to obtain actual performance of individual police officers when given tasks to perform. This can help the National Police Service in determining who to deploy when and where, as well as those to recommend for refresher courses and redeployment. For instance, one officer may be good in patrols and general operation, while the other may be useful in performing administrative duties.

One of the limitations of expectancy theory is that it makes a hypothetical assumption that employees are too rational and logical in calculating motivational variables. In reality the theory fails to provide specific solution to specific motivational problems. Secondly, involvement of a number of variables makes the theory complicated in nature. This not only makes it difficult to test the variables of employee motivation but also pose difficulty in implementing them in many situations (Parijat & Bagga, 2014). Similarly, the implication of the multiplier

effects of more than one motivator on employee performance cannot be accurately determined (Shermerhorn *et al.*, 2002).

Expectancy theory is too idealistic. The aspects for performance measurement in expectancy theory are motivation, employee effort and value of rewards among others. However, these variables are quite difficult to measure and quantify. Because of that, managers often need to incorporate additional performance measurement theories along with expectancy theory in order to measure and monitor individual performances effectively in an open organization (Parijat & Bagga, 2014). In order to fill up the gaps highlighted herein in Expectancy Theory, this study will employ a second theory of performance known as Control Theory of Performance.

#### **2.4.2 Control Theory of Performance**

The modern control theory originated with Norbet Wiener's 1948 Cybernetics, although it has been around dating back to the ages of Plato. Initially, this theory was applied to physical systems only. Currently, it has gained popular application to human behaviour (Krausert, 2009).

Control theory centres on control mechanism which should be imposed at all levels of an organization. These include organizational structure, behavioural controls e.g. norms and policies of an organization or rules and regulations. These results have to be compatible with the objectives and goals of an organization (Barrows & Neely, 2012).

Control theory encompasses three types of control systems namely; behaviour control in which an employer monitor and evaluate the actions of employees on a

regular basis, as per the standards of the organization and then reward accordingly; output control where the performance of an employee is controlled with rewards or sanctions after evaluating it on the basis of organizational standards; and input control in which systems seek to control the selection and training process of an employee. There must be availability of required competencies in the employees as desired by the organization for maximum output (Krausert, 2009).

Control theory helps in performance management by evaluating the output of the system for its reliability with pre-defined sets of parameters. When there is inconsistency, the controller adjusts the same. Control theory is commonly known as Cybernetic model (Barrows & Neely, 2012). The model helps managers control performance of employees. It also generates faster and better outputs by regular monitoring and feedback. Cybernetic model functions on the premises that if an Organization can execute control and performance more effectively and efficiently, it can easily cope up with the changes in its external environment.

Control theory is readily applied at workplace by managers. In order to increase performance of employees, managers must assign specific and challenging goals to employees that will upgrade their performance. However, organizations should avoid ambiguous goals which do not have specific standards and direct feedback. This is because without clear feedback, employees will not be able to correct their faults (Campion & Lord, 1982).

In relation to the current study, rules and regulations (Operation Orders, Standard Operating Procedures, and Standing Orders etc.) should be developed and made clear to officers. These are the guides that will control their behaviours. In addition, policy makers in the NPS should ensure that Counterterrorism Strategies and

Policing Approaches employed in Lamu County are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound (SMART). Commanders on the ground should also ensure that officers are assigned specific task(s) in the on-going operation to avoid ambiguity.

Employers and managers can use Control theory to facilitate continuous flow of feedback between them and employees in an organization to track and evaluate achievements as a team (Barrow & Neely, 2012). Organizations can therefore apply Control theory in the areas where there are evaluation of performances and team meetings. In case of human resource management, all three types of control system - behaviour control, output control and input control - can be utilized to analyse behaviour and performance of employees (Shell, 1992).

In relation to the current study, operation commanders in Lamu County should regularly review their progress in relation to the set standards. Strategies and mechanisms that are not yielding desired results may be reviewed, amended or dropped altogether, while those proved to be working can be upheld or improved for the success of the war against terrorism.

In the current workplace, there is open work culture which involves regular sharing of ideas and opinion. Employee behaviour, output and input cannot be controlled completely in such liberal environment. Equally, organizations should ensure that employees have freedom to handle the complexities and challenges they are facing. So, more research is required on control theory to tackle dynamic and liberal work culture and environment.

One of the strength of control theory is that all humans have some basic needs (physiological, safety, belongingness, esteem and self-actualization) which employee hopes to meet by working in an organization. Once employee's needs align with the organization's standards and demands, desired behaviour will be realized (Luria, 2008). The needs make control theory more applicable as it acts as a controller in aligning employee behaviour with organizational behaviour standards thereby achieving desired performance.

On limitations, control theory assumes that employees look at their feedback which controls the quality of the output. This feedback can have a negative impact, as it could result in decreased motivation and productivity level of an employee. Employee performance is also controlled by rewards and recognition which an employee achieves once his performance meets the standards of an organization. Generally, control theory is too mechanical and fails to anticipate that humans are not mechanical entities (Locke, 1991).


Because of its mechanical nature, control theory can only work best in bureaucratic organizational environment where employee actions are continuously monitored and controlled like the previous Kenya Police Force. Present day work environment has become more dynamic, liberal, challenging and competitive as is the current National Police Service. Given the limitations highlighted herein, this study will employ the third theory known as Justice Theory of performance.

### **2.4.3 Justice Theory of Performance**

Justice theory, also known as organizational justice, was introduced by Greenberg in 1987 with regards to how an employee judges the behaviour of an Organization and the employee's resulting attitude and behaviour (Allameh & Rostami, 2014). It

refers to the extent in assessing the perceptions of the employees regarding organization's performance management system. These performances can influence attitudes and behaviour of the employees. These behaviours can have a negative or positive impact on employees' performance and the organization's success (Baldwin, n.d.).

There is a positive correlation between organizational justice and job satisfaction. If employee perceives organization positively, his or her satisfaction increases. Organizational justice is also positively correlated to motivation i.e. where justice is observed, a general positive attitude emerges by itself (Çelik and Saritürk, 2012). According to Allameh and Rostami (2014) there is a strong relationship between organizational justice and Organizational Citizenship Behaviour (OCB). Organizational justice is known to create confidence and loyalty among employees.



**Figure 2.2: Properties of Justice Theory**

**Source: (Baldwin n.d.)**

The four basic principles of organizational justice according to Baldwin (n.d.) are: Voice; employees are given chance to be heard and present their views. This can enhance the feelings among them that they are being listened to hence valued.



Dignity and respect; Employees must be treated with respect. This boosts morale and enhances productivity which results to maximum productivity and output on the side of employees.

Interaction; employees often seek interaction with their supervisors. This enables employees share information appropriately. An explanation or apology can eliminate sense of anger created and avoids offensive statements.

Authority; Perceptions on a manager's authority can affect organizational justice judgments. One should take decisions on the basis of facts and not on vested interests and personal feelings.

One of the advantages of justice theory is that it advocates for well-defined system that promotes fair and unbiased justice in an organization thus improving employee productivity and helps in achieving goals of an organization. Just treatment by work organizations is advantageous in that it leads to commitment and loyalty to an organization, foster job performance hence enhancing overall performance of the organization, reduces absenteeism and enhances the level of organizational justice, and improves health outcomes.

Although Justice Theory is sometimes viewed as time-consuming, this is not a big problem with NPS since NPS is a disciplined service with a Service Standing Order (SSO) that governs every stage of operation. Furthermore, positive organizational justice perceptions usually triggers positive emotions and help employee in fulfilling the need for a meaningful existence.

Justice theory promotes better planning for organization, which results in achieving employee goals to organizational goals. In today's competitive and liberal

workplace, it is important for employers to provide employees with organizational justice in order reap the positive outcomes of well performing employees. Furthermore communication and participation by both parties results in increased trust and conviction.

In relation to the present study, officers at the lower rank who are the majority, and are directly involved in the actual counterterrorism operation should be heard (voice) and respected by their commanders so as to build their motivation and confidence. When this is done, officers are likely to discharge their mandate with dedication and diligence. This automatically results to success. Organizational justice should also be extended to their welfare, remuneration should be improved and their allowances should be promptly paid to them so as to make them discharge their duties accordingly.


Furthermore, local residents of Lamu County should also feel Organizational Justice. Once this is done (respect and voice), they are likely to participate effectively in community policing initiatives and volunteer the much needed information/intelligence to the police. NPS should therefore not harass residents, or arbitrary arrest innocent citizens. Suspects arrested should get justice in courts and human rights should be observed despite counterterrorism campaign in Lamu County.

#### **2.4.4 Conceptual Model**

The conceptual framework shows that employee's performance is complex because it is affected by a number of variables as indicated in figure 2.6.

Different individual, operational and organizational factors, experiences and events such as strategies, rules, regulations and procedures, individual abilities, skills,

personality and experiences, external environment etc. affect behaviour which in turn determines the outcome/performance. Expectancy predicated on the concept that individuals behave in a specific manner because they get motivated by the desirable outcome of such behaviour.



**Figure 2.6: Conceptual Model Showing Interaction of Variables in Counterterrorism Strategies and Performance of National Police Service**

**Source: Researcher, 2018**

Performance of an individual should always be aligned with Organizational expectations regarding achievement of identified goals. The motivation that influences individuals to behave in a particular manner over other forms of behaviour is their expectancy. This expectancy is regarding the effect of the selected behaviour. In the final analysis, a worker will be motivated to put forth the necessary effort when it will result in the attainment of desired goals.

The NPS in Lamu County should promptly identify strategies that are working and those that are not. Strategies that are working will hence making officers achieve their goals will easily motivate them hence result in improved performance. NPS should also appropriately identify and select individuals who are truly motivated to undertake counterterrorism training and operation.

Control Theory of performance suggests that control mechanism should be imposed at all levels of an organization. It helps in performance management by evaluating the output of the system for its consistency with pre-defined sets of parameter. In case of any kind of deviation, it will be adjusted by the controller in the system. Therefore, if an Organization can execute control and performance more effectively and efficiently, it can easily cope up with the changes in its external environment. Policy makers in the NPS should ensure that counterterrorism strategies and Policing Approaches employed in Lamu County are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-bound (SMART). Commanders on the ground should further ensure that officers are assigned specific task(s) in the on-going operation. Once this is guaranteed, the fight against terror in Lamu County is likely to be won pretty fast. Commanders in Lamu County should also regularly review their progress, both achievements and setbacks so as to clearly identify the

underlying issues. Strategies and approaches that are not yielding desired results may be reviewed, amended or dropped altogether, while those proved to be working can be upheld or improved for the success of the war against terrorism.

According to Justice Theory of performance, there is a positive correlation between organizational justice and job satisfaction i.e. better the employee perception of an organization, the higher the satisfaction level of an employee. Organizational justice is also positively correlated to motivation, implying that where justice is observed, a general positive attitude emerges by itself. Organizations need to ensure the practice of organizational justice so that it can create confidence and loyalty among the employees. This will influence employee's Organizational Citizenship Behaviour (employee behaviour that go beyond the call of duty).

NPS must determine on how to make work better, more rewarding and challenging. The service should accomplish the environmental and internal variables as such as good working conditions (welfare), promotion, allowances. Low cadre police officers who are the majority, and are directly involved in the actual counterterrorism operation should be heard (voice) and respected by their commanders so as to build their motivation and confidence. When this is done, officers are likely to discharge their mandate with dedication and diligence. This automatically results to success. Human Rights should be observed and organizational justice extended to locals so as to have a meaningful community policing initiative and sharing of the much needed intelligence.

Literature review dwelt on terrorism and counterterrorism strategies. Observed was that theoretical accounts, which form the bulk of counterterrorism strategies, are limited in scope and methodology. Existing research tend to enumerate, rather than

demonstrate counterterrorism strategies and approaches as well as performance outcomes. Such research gaps can be filled by studies that assemble the complex factors of counterterrorism operation in study area and the outcomes.

The comparative analysis of counter terrorism strategies and approaches in both the selected developed and developing countries outline the common elements that are proving to be necessary in developing effective counter terrorism strategies and policing approaches should be considered in Kenya's approach to counter terrorism. They include enabling legislation - most of the countries analysed have in place enabling counter terrorism legislation which gives law enforcement agencies the necessary authority to neutralize current and prospective terrorist threats; a common institution to integrate the efforts of varying state agencies, which are responsible for counter terrorism; international cooperation - all countries analysed attached significant importance towards working with other countries to combat the threat of terrorism. In many instances, terrorism has grown to become a transnational threat with networks and cells in many countries across the globe. As such, to counteract the threat of terrorism requires an international commitment.

Literature review has also demonstrated that serious scholarly and policy focus on terrorism in Kenya began only after the US Embassy bombing and more significantly, when it became apparent that the country had a major role to play in the GWOT. What is evident from our examination of counterterrorism in Kenya is the overarching role of the US, which has been the driving force behind Kenya adopting counterterrorism measures, and this in turn is a reflection of Kenya's dependence on the US and the West. There is, accordingly, recognition within official circles that cooperation with the US has been pivotal (Wax, 2003).

Inevitably, such cooperation has come at much cost. The 'cooperation' is skewed in favour of the US, an expected outcome in unequal relationships.

As Walt (1985) argues, bandwagoning involves unequal exchange whereby the vulnerable state makes asymmetrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role. It is for this reason that critics argue that Kenyan counterterrorism policy serves as a cover for US imperialism. Analysis also shows that with the government and its partners defining the terrorist threat as basically Islamic, counterterrorism in Kenya has targeted local Muslims who it and the West accuse of supporting or sympathising with *Al-Qaeda*. This focus has not only elicited criticism and opposition but, ironically, has alienated the Muslim community whose support and cooperation the government badly needs if it is to be effective in fighting terrorism.

In addition, the inability of the government to engage and obtain public support has meant that many counterterrorism measures lack popular support and legitimacy and are viewed as operating in service of external interests. In the ultimate analysis, therefore, counterterrorism policy as it is presently pursued in Kenya is unable to provide a viable framework for fighting terrorism and eliminating violent extremism, which remains a real threat to peace and security in the country.

The other thematic gap in literature is the lack of an evidence based assessment of counterterrorism strategies and operation outcomes in the study area, including the antecedents and performance outcomes of counterterrorism operation. The literature needed more growth on the influence of counterterrorism strategies and the performance of police officers. Furthermore, there are limited counterterrorism strategies specific to NPS.

## **2.5 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has provided the theoretical framework and reviewed literature that shed light on the concerns of this study. The threat of terrorism has completely altered security arrangements. Empirical review reveals studies on counterterrorism strategies and performance are few. The theories have illuminated on how thoughts and assessment of variables can influence the way one react to situations, and hence affects or influence the outcome which is performance. The next chapter on research methodology delineates matters related to the collection of data and analysis of the same.



## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter focuses on research methodology that was used in the study. It covers research design, study area, target population, sampling techniques and procedures, sample frame, data collection and research instruments, validity and reliability of research instruments, limitations of the study and ethical considerations. The chapter ends with a summary.

#### 3.1 Research Design

This study employed survey research design which entailed the use of *ex post facto* design employing mixed method approach in data collection and analysis. Ex post facto research design is a method of bringing out possible antecedents of events that have happened and cannot therefore be manipulated by the investigator (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). The design allowed the researcher to reach a wide population of respondents and to scan a wide field of issues. The choice of these designs was influenced by the purposes and circumstances of the researcher as well as the strengths and limitations of each approach. The study design was also anchored on the theoretical underpinnings of the study aimed at gaining a holistic inquiry on the study. The three theories (Expectancy, Control and Justice Theory) formed a key part of the study's qualitative techniques, aimed at explaining real phenomenon and stimulating meaning on how counterterrorism strategies impact on performance of the NPS in managing terrorism in Lamu County. Mixed method approach which combines elements of both qualitative and quantitative methods was also employed. Mixed method research builds on the strengths (Crenshaw, 2000) and reduces the weaknesses (Creswell, 2009) of both qualitative and quantitative approaches to draw inferences which can lead to an increased understanding of the topic being


researched. Observation, photographs, questionnaires, FGDs and interview schedules were employed. Quantitative and qualitative analysis was done with information from secondary data and holding interviews with key informants. A review of counterterrorism strategy documents and reports was carried out for a comprehensive understanding of the topical issue and clarification of intricate areas arising from the research.

### **3.2 Study Area**

The study was conducted in Lamu County, Kenya. Lamu County is located in the northern coast of Kenya. It borders Garissa County to the North, the Indian Ocean to the South and South East, Tana River County to the South West and West, and Republic of Somalia to the north east. It covers an area of 6,273.1 Km<sup>2</sup> with 130 Km of sandy beach coastline and over 65 islands that forms the Lamu archipelago (KNBS, 2009). According to the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census the population was 101,539 with a population density of 16 people per square Km and an annual growth rate of 2.47%. The total number of households is 22,184 (Government of Kenya, 2010).

The county is made of cosmopolitan population composed of indigenous communities made of Swahili, Arab, Koreni, Boni and Orma, and migrant communities from the rest of the country notably Kikuyu (Lamu CIDP, 2013-2017). The main economic activities are farming, livestock rearing, fishing, mining and tourism. Lamu is rich in minerals such as titanium, salt, limestone, coral stones and sand. There is titanium mining and on-going exploration for oil and gas in Pate Island. It consists of two constituencies namely, Lamu East (Faza, Basuba and Kiunga divisions) and Lamu West (Witu, Bahari, Hongwe, Mkunumbi, Hindi, Mkomani and Shella divisions). There are 10 wards, 23 locations and 38 sub

locations in the County. The county physical infrastructure has remained underdeveloped with only 6 Km of the 688.6 Km total road network in bitumen standard. This makes most of the roads impassable during rainy season. Main road is Garsen - Mokowe - Kiunga (Lamu CIDP, 2013-2017).



**Figure 3.1: Map of Lamu County**

**Geographical Coordinates:**

Latitude: 1° 40' and 2° 30' S

Longitude: 40° 15' and 40° 38' E

Elevation: 308m (1 010ft)

**Source: Arch. Peter Otieno, 2018**

**Cartographer, Siaya County**

**Table 3.1: Lamu County Wards**

<b>Constituency</b>	<b>County Wards</b>	<b>Land Area (Km2)</b>
<b>Lamu West</b>	Shella	54.7
	Mkomani	172.5
	Hindi	1150.8
	Mkunumbi	1366.1
	Hongwe	128.5
	Bahari	123.3
	Witu	975.4
<b>Lamu East</b>	Faza	79.2
	Basuba	1708.7
	Kiunga	513.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6273.1</b>

**Source: Lamu CIDP, 2013-2017**

Lamu is a home to expansive Boni, Witu and Utwani forests among others and mangrove vegetation. Boni forest is the largest with Lamu Game Reserve and Kiunga Marine National Park. Other physical features include lake Kenyatta (Mukunganya) and lake MOA; river Dudori and river Tana; Lamu hills; Coastal plains, Island plains and Dudori river plains. These physical features are a source of tourist attraction, religious responsibility (Maulid festivals) and source of water and catchment for the region. Generally, the county is flat lying between altitude zero and fifty metres above sea level. The low altitude exposes some parts of the county to flooding during rainy seasons for instance areas around Lake Kenyatta, along Tana River delta such as Chalaluma in Witu and areas on the coastal line that experience flooding during high tides. The area experiences bimodal rainfall pattern, with average temperature being 27.3 °C and rainfall averages 950mm per annum (Lamu CIDP, 2013-2017).

The location is chosen because it is one of the counties most prone to terrorist attacks. Lamu County borders Somalia, home to *Al-Shabaab*, by land and ocean. Lamu County is also the home to the expansive Boni forest which covers about 1,339 square kilometres and stretches to Somali, where *Al-Shabaab* terrorist has established their cell and operation base that they use to hide, train and launch attacks in Kenya (Fergusson, 2013). It is in this forest that there is currently a multiagency operation consisting of the Kenya Police, the Administration Police, the Anti-Terrorism Police and the Kenya Defense Force going on to flush out *Al-Shabaab* terrorists who have established their bases in the forest. It is this forest that the terrorist and are using to launch attacks on security personnel, security installations and on civilian population across Lamu County. The operation which was launched on Friday 11<sup>th</sup> September, 2015 is christened ‘Operation *Linda Boni*’ that is still under-way.

### **3.3 Target Population**

A population can be defined as complete group of objects or elements relevant to a particular research project because they possess the information the research project is designed to collect and analyse (Babbie, 2013). They are selected on the basis of inclusion and exclusion criteria which relate to the variables being studied. In this study, the target population were 1900 officers of the National Police Service in Lamu County according to National Police Service (2018). These officers work in police stations, police posts, camps and operational bases and are currently engaged in counterterrorism Operation *Linda Boni*. Additionally, there were 75 council of elders, administrators (23 chiefs and 1 county commissioner), and 102 religious leaders affected by terrorism and counterterrorism operation and purposively sampled.

**Table 3.2: Target Population**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Population</b>
NPS Officers	1900
Chiefs	23
Religious Leaders	102
Council of Elders	75
County Commissioner	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>2013</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

### **3.4 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size**

Sampling is the process of selecting a number of individuals for a study to represent the larger group from which they are selected. A sample is a small representation or a subset of the entire population (Welman, 2005). The minimum acceptable sample size for descriptive and explorative research is 10% of the total population (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).

The study used both probability and non-probability sampling method. Stratified random sampling technique was employed to draw respondents from the NPS target population. Police service is hierarchical in structure as shown in Table. 3.3 hence the need to sample categories.

Stratified random samples provide detailed information (Kothari, 2004). According to Mugenda & Mugenda (2003), the minimum acceptable sample size for descriptive and explorative research is 10% of the total population. The researcher used simple random sampling to pick 189 officers of Other Ranks and Members of Inspectorate who together form a huge chunk of the NPS population. Gazetted Officers, who were 12 in number, were purposively sampled and were subjected to interview schedule.

**Table 3.3: NPS Ranking Structure**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Rank</b>
<b>Gazetted Officers</b>	Inspector General (IG)
	Deputy Inspector General (DIG)
	Senior Assistant Inspector General (SAIG)
	Assistant Inspector General (AIG)
	Commissioner of Police (CP)
	Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP)
	Superintendent of Police (SP)
	Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP)
<b>Members of Inspectorate</b>	Chief Inspector of Police (CI)
	Inspector of Police (IP)
<b>NCOs and Other Ranks</b>	Senior Sergeant (SSgt.)
	Sergeant (Sgt.)
	Corporal (Cpl.)
	Police Constable (PC)

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**Source: Field Data, 2018**

Lamu County was chosen because it is prone to terrorist attacks and currently there is a large scale counterterrorism operation going on, especially in the expansive Boni forest. An ideal police station has 48 officers, although this varies on need basis. The officers are composed of 1 chief inspector who is the OCS, 2 inspectors one deputizing the OCS and the other in charge of crime branch, 3 sergeants, 6 corporals and 35 constables. A police camp comprises of an inspector, a sergeant, 6 corporals and 35 constables. A post is made up of a corporal and 9 constables. A

division is headed by an OCPD who is of the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police (SPP) and deputized by Superintendent of Police (SP). Both are gazetted officers.

**Table 3.4 Sample Size**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Target Population</b>	<b>Sampling Strategy/Procedure</b>	<b>Sample Size</b>
Other Ranks,NCOs & Members Of Inspectorate	1888	Simple Random Sampling (10%)	189
Gazetted Officers (Senior Officers)	12	Purposive Sampling	12
Chiefs	23	Purposive sampling	23
Council of Elders	75	Purposive Sampling	35
Religious Leaders	102	Purposive Sampling	54
County Commissioner	1	Purposive Sampling	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>2013</b>		<b>314</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

The sample size was drawn from other respondents purposively selected from various institutions. For administrators (county commissioner and chiefs), council of elders, religious leaders and gazetted officers, purposive sampling was applied to select the sample size for each case. Since they were fewer in number and crucial for the study result, they were purposively selected for the study. Whereas religious leaders and council of elders were subjected to focus group discussion, gazetted officers of the NPS, county commissioner and chiefs were subjected to interview schedules. The research used available data in literature to examine cases of terrorist attacks in Lamu County. The documents included police and judicial records, published research and reports addressing security situation in Lamu



County during the period under review and journals on counterterrorism. Photographs of notable places were also collected in the field.

### **3.5 Data Collection Instruments**

Data collection was both interactive (interviews and focus group discussions), and non-interactive (questionnaires, observation, photographs and document analysis). This triangulation enabled the researcher obtain a variety of information on counterterrorism and management of terrorism in Lamu County.

#### **3.5.1 Quantitative Instruments**

Questionnaires were administered to a total of 189 Members of Inspectorate, NCOs and Other Ranks in the NPS. In developing the questions, both closed and open ended questions were used in a five point Likert Scale questionnaire. The questionnaires were divided into four sections. Section one solicited demographic information of the respondents, whereas section two, three and four carried questions on the three objectives of the study. The respondents filled structured and unstructured items. For unstructured items, respondents expressed themselves. The open ended format allows spontaneity of response and provides opportunity for self-expression (Mutai, 2000). They were subjected to questionnaires and were coded as Police Officer B1 to Police Officer B189. Sources of documentary data including photographs, newspapers, newsletters, books, security reports, occurrence books (OB), and journals on counterterrorism in Kenya were used corroborate official discourse and triangulate information obtained.

#### **3.5.2 Qualitative Instruments**

Qualitative data was collected through face to face interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). Face to face interview schedules were administered to 12

Gazetted Officers from the NPS, 1 County Commissioner and 23 Chiefs. Interview schedules helped in in-depth information gathering. The responses helped in getting patterns, themes of the respondent's reaction and perception about the influence of counterterrorism strategies on police performance. Gazetted officers were coded as Police Officer A1 to Police Officer A12 and Chiefs coded as Chief 1 to Chief 24. Focus group discussions were used when dealing with special interest groups; religious leaders and council of elders who were affected and had better understanding of the central phenomenon, counterterrorism in Lamu County. FGD is defined as a dialogue between a researcher and a group of people with common experiences (Biddix, 2009). FGDs was conducted with 54 Religious Leaders and 35 Council of Elders who were purposively sampled. They were grouped into 9 to 10 participants per group of homogenous characteristics. In FGDs, Elders were grouped into 4 groups with 3 groups having 9 members and the last group having 8 members. The groups were code as A, B, C and the last D. Individuals were numbered 1, 2, 3,...in every group. For religious leaders, they were divided into 6 groups with each group having 9 members. The 6 groups were coded as A, B, C, D, E and F, and individuals in each group numbered from 1 to 9 respectively. Relevant photographs on thematic areas were also taken and observations made.

### **3.6 Validity of Data Collection Instruments**

Validity is the extent to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure and performs as it is designed to perform. As a process, validation involves collecting and analysing data to assess the accuracy of an instrument (Biddix, 2009). In order to ensure content validity, the preliminary questionnaire was pre tested on a pilot set of respondent for comprehension, logic and relevance. Respondents who took part in the pilot study were purposively drawn from the

study population which was similar to those in the actual survey in terms of background characteristics. The pre-tested respondents were excluded from the sampled population of study since this could bring about assessment biases and contamination of the respondents (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). All the aspects of the questionnaire, FGD and interview schedule were pre-tested including question content, wording, sequence, question difficulty, layout and form. The instruments were also discussed with supervisors. Feedback obtained was used to revise interview schedule, FGD and questionnaire before administering them to study respondents.

### **3.7 Reliability of Data Collection Instruments**

The reliability of the research instruments for this study was measured and using the test-retest method. Reliability refers to the degree to which an instrument measures the same way each time it is used for data collection in the same condition with the same subjects. A measure is considered reliable if a person's score on the same test given twice is similar (Golafshani, 2003). In this study, the reliability of the research instruments was established using Cronbach Alpha Coefficient (CAC) analysis using Scientific Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). Cronbach Alpha Coefficient is an appropriate package for determining instrument reliability necessary for quality of research findings. The questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions were administered to a pilot group twice with a break interval of two weeks between the first and the second administration. The reliability test also covered computable responses to the research items of the pilot survey instruments, particularly the questionnaires and interview schedules. The test considered all research items in logical sections related to the research objectives and research questions. Research instrument reliability level in the pilot

study was determined based on the recommended scale that ranges from 0.7 and 1.0 (Weiner, 2007).

### **3.8 Administration of Research Instruments**

Six research assistants were used to assist in questionnaires, FGD and interview schedule administration after a thorough training in the procedure of administration. They were oriented on the content of the questionnaire, FGD and interview schedule. They accompanied the researcher in piloting and modifying research instruments so that they fully comprehended the process of data collection.

### **3.9 Pilot Study**

Pilot study involved administering research instruments to two different sets of selected individuals. Pilot study was conducted in Garissa County. Garissa County was chosen because it borders Lamu County and shares similar characteristics with the area of study, including similar demographics and common border with Somalia. In this study, respondents were purposively selected including twenty (20) police officers from various stations within Garissa County, five (5) religious leaders, 5 (five) assistant chiefs and four (4) elders. During this process, questionnaires were administered to members of inspectorate, NCOs and Other Ranks, while interviews done with assistant chiefs and gazetted officers. Focus Group Discussion was conducted with religious leaders and elders. The intent of the pilot study, which was carried two weeks apart, was to help determine possible flaws, limitations, or other weaknesses within the instruments design and allow making the necessary revisions prior to implementation of the study (Kvale, 2007). All the aspects of the questionnaire, FGD and interview schedule were pre-tested including question content, wording, sequence, question difficulty, layout and form

and weaknesses corrected. The reliability of the instruments was determined through the calculation of a correlation coefficient between the first and second administration using Cronbach Alpha Coefficient (CAC) analysis and the resultant score was 0.5, which is within the recommended range of 0.7 to 1.0 (Weiner, 2007). Apart from the two administrations, the study's instruments were tested for validity through consultation and discussion with supervisors.

### **3.10 Data Analysis Procedure**

Data analysis is the process of transforming raw data into information that addresses the research objectives (Chambers and Skinner, 2003). Quantitative and qualitative analysis methods were used to transform data into the required information in line with the research objectives. Data analysis systematically followed through data processing of the raw data, presentation, analysis and interpretation.

Quantitative analysis was used for closed ended items in the questionnaire and interview schedule. Analysis was done using Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) version 16.0. The programme was used to run both descriptive and inferential statistics. The descriptive statistical techniques included frequencies, percentages, mean, mode and standard deviation. Inferential statistics was limited to factors and narrative analysis.

Qualitative data analysis in this respect included responses to open ended questions in the interview schedules, questionnaires and FGDs. Analysis was done using the content and interpretive analysis technique. The technique was used to interpret detailed perspectives on variable relationships into simple information. This applied to data associated with themes and items related to the study objectives.

Data was transcribed before coding into categories. During this process, irrelevant data were edited out. The relevant data were organized according to themes of the study objectives. The purpose of this system was to assemble or reconstruct data in a meaningful and comprehensible fashion (O'Dwyer, 2004). Generalization of the analysed data was subsequently made.

### **3.11 Limitations of the Study**

Terrorism remains a sensitive and contested topic globally, regionally and nationally; hence counterterrorism. Reluctance by some respondents to give information out of fear was observed. Furthermore, the police sub culture of secrecy limited free flow of vital information. The researcher assured respondents of utmost confidentiality and anonymity on the information gathered. The six research assistants were also drawn from the police and local population to bridge the gap.

Lamu County lags behind in education and illiteracy level is high. Understanding English language, which was used to construct data collection tools, was therefore difficult for some respondents. To overcome this, the researcher translated data collection instruments in Kiswahili which is the common language spoken along the coastal region and is the Kenyan national language.

Lamu County is remote and expansive with no proper road network and transport as well as high level of insecurity. Confronting the threat of terrorism everywhere required some rudimentary level of political/local good will and security capacity especially from law enforcement agencies. To overcome this, the research utilized research assistants from the local community well versed with the area and further requested security escort from the office of the County Commissioner which was

provided. The researcher also hired three four-wheel vehicles to tackle the difficult terrain and two speed boats to access the numerous islands.

### **3.12 Ethical Considerations**

Ethics can be defined as the reasons or principles used in a research to guide or determine right from wrong conduct or practice in research (Hammersley & Traianous, 2012). Okoth (2012) observes that research control involves evaluation of research quality in regard to the type of research, particularly applied research, taking into consideration ethical concerns that must be jealously guarded (Okoth, 2012: 53). In this study, participants' right to privacy was protected by ensuring confidentiality and guarantee that data collected would not be shared with unauthorised persons. Informed consent was obtained by visiting the participants at their various locations and explaining to them the purpose of research. Researcher sought and obtained permission from relevant authorities which included a permit from the National Commission for Science Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI), Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST), Lamu County Commissioner and County Director of Education before embarking on research.

### **3.13 Chapter Summary**

The chapter has described the research methodology including research design. This study employed ex post facto research design, employing mixed methods research. The study covered Lamu County and the total sample size for the study was 314. The study used both probability and non-probability sampling techniques; and utilized stratified, simple random and purposive sampling to determine the setting and participants. Piloting of the study was done to ensure validity and reliability of the research instruments. The chapter has also shown how data was

collected and analysed amidst certain limitations which were however overcome. Ethical issues are also explored and undertaken. This chapter sets the stage for providing and discussing research findings in chapter four, five and six based on the three specific objectives. Thus, the next chapter (Chapter Four) is based on the first objective which evaluates counterterrorism strategies influencing performance of the NPS in managing terrorism in Lamu County.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES EMPLOYED BY THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN LAMU COUNTY


This chapter begins with the presentation of key demographic information of respondents that gave insight on the fight against terrorism, for instance, how age or length of service of a police officer makes him capable of effectively performing in an operation area. It then provides findings and discussion on the first objective of this study; counterterrorism strategies employed by the National Police Service in Lamu County. This chapter ends with a summary.

#### 4.1 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

This section presents information on key demographic characteristics of various categories of respondents that are vital for this study.

##### 4.1.1 Distribution of Respondents by Gender

This subsection presents information on gender of members of inspectorate and other ranks.



**Fig. 4.1 Distribution of Members of Inspectorate and Other Ranks by Gender**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

Members of Inspectorate and Other Ranks were asked to indicate their gender. The study revealed that 93.7% (177) of the respondents under this category were male while 6.3% (12) were female. The findings are presented in Figure 4.1.


The findings show that there is huge disparity between the number of women and men in the National Police Service. Women are far much fewer than men in the service. This is because of recruitment policies, historical and operational precedents. The National Police Service was previously not recruiting women in the service. It is only recently that the service started recruiting women. The Administration Police Service for instance, started recruiting women in the year 2001. According to Bossong (2008) barriers to women entering law enforcement have gender bias and gender ideology. In policing, for instance, there is a widespread belief that women cannot adequately perform what has been hitherto a male dominated profession.

In 1998, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) surveyed 800 of its members and found out that 28% expressed a concern that women lacked “sufficient physical strength, capacity for confrontation, size, strength and force” to be effective police officers. This study also found out that there were fewer women in policing compared to their male counterparts; women officers still face bias from male officers; women officers faced discrimination and glass ceiling that inhibits promotion; sexual harassment still occurred in many departments (Chan, 2001). While the need is great, there are few mentoring programs for women officers. Besides, women are rarely sent for operations and to hardship zones. Handling female suspects is thus a problem. In an interview, Police Officer A3 stated that:

Police women in the General Service Unit (GSU) are never, and have never been deployed to the field or operational areas like

Lamu. Only men are deployed in the field while women remain in the Headquarter. It is only the General Duty and Administration Police Services that sends very few women to forward areas. In fact, women are often referred to as ‘flowers of the service’. That is why we have few police women in Lamu County (Interview with Police Officer A3, 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

From the foregoing, it is evident that women are underrepresented in operational areas. This is supported by Bossong (2008) who states that women have proved that they cannot operate in battle field and active operational areas. They can only perform light duties compared to their male counterparts.



**Source: Field Data, 2018**

**Fig. 4.2 Distribution of Religious Leaders and Council of Elders by Gender**

The survey further revealed that only 3.4% (3) of religious leaders and council of elders are women, while 96.6% (86) are men. The same is presented in Figure 4.2. According to Menkhaus and Boucek (2010) Islam, like other religion does not permit women in leadership positions. This was emphasized by Elder A2 during Focus Group Discussion that:

Women, since time immemorial, are never allowed to lead. They are regarded as unholy. During their menstruation, they cannot go near the holy place. We buy women like commodities in the market. It is only men who can therefore decide the destiny of the community. Women cannot even decide for themselves, leave alone the community. They can only be summoned before the elders for questioning (FGD with Council of Elders, 2<sup>nd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that women play less responsibility in the lives of the community. This explains why a paltry 3.4% (3) of respondents are women, representing traditional religious groups, but not mainstream Christian or Muslim faiths. All the council of elders were men.

#### 4.1.2 Distribution of Respondents by Rank

Members of inspectorate and other ranks were asked to indicate their ranks in the National Police Service. The findings were as presented in Table 4.1.

**Table 4.1 Distribution of Members of Inspectorate and Other Ranks by Rank**

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Chief Inspector of Police (CI)	9	4.8
Inspector of Police (IP)	10	5.3
Senior Sergeant (SSGT)	3	1.6
Sergeant (SGT)	12	6.3
Corporal (CPL)	25	13.2
Police Constable (PC)	130	68.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

The result in table 4.1 show that majority of the respondents under this category were Police Constables at 68.8% (130) followed by Corporals at 13.2% (25). Those at the rank of Sergeant were 6.3% (12) while Inspectors of Police were 5.3% (10). Chief Inspectors were 4.8% (9) and Senior Sergeants at 1.6% (3).

Ransley (2009) report on police reforms indicates that the structure of police and the organogram is pyramidal. Rank is related purely on the function which one performs. This explains why we have many officers at the lower rank (Constables) and few officers as the structure progresses. Senior Sergeant was initially not a separate rank until it was made one in 2014 (National Police Service Amendment Act, 2014). It was a rank that was mostly awarded to officers on merit as opposed to going through rigorous training like for other ranks in the service. That is why we have fewer officers in the rank of senior sergeant.

#### **4.1.3 Distribution of Respondents by Length of Service**

Members of inspectorate and other ranks were asked the duration in which they have served in the NPS. Their responses were as presented in Table 4.2.

**Table 4.2 Distribution of Members of Inspectorate and Other Ranks by Length of Service**

<b>Length of Service</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Less than 1 year	53	28.0
2 – 5 Years	94	49.7
6 – 10 Years	21	11.1
11 – 15 Years	13	6.9
16 – 20 Years	6	3.2
21 – 25 Years	2	1.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

The findings in Table 4.2 indicate that 28.0% (53) of respondents had served for less than 1 year, while 49.7% (94) of respondents who are the majority had served for between 2-5 years. The findings also revealed that 11.1% (21) of respondents had served for between 6-10 years, while 6.9% (13) of respondents had served for

between 11-15 years. Generally, this shows that majority of those interviewed were young and had just left police colleges recently. According to Ransley (2009), after graduation, most officers are first posted to operational and forward areas to gain experience. During an interview, Police Officer A7 stated that:

It is a regulation in the police that fresh graduates are posted to forward areas to gain hands on skills on police work as well as relieve those who have stayed in forward areas for long. Furthermore, fresh graduates are enthusiastic, energetic and still have no responsibilities to take care of. Officers who have served in operational areas for long tend to cease. Many tend to work out their transfers to major towns while few others resign or desert. That is why we have a high turnover rate in the service, especially in difficult forward areas (Interview with Police Officer A7, 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

From the foregoing assertion, it is important to note that contrary to the notion that these fresh graduates are to gain experience in forward areas, it is sometimes hard for them to cope in operational areas given the fact that they lack the experience they are expected to have in these areas. This partly explains the low morale and lack of experience/training among officers as revealed by research findings.

#### 4.1.4 Distribution of Respondents by Age Bracket

**Table 4.3 Distribution of Members of Inspectorate and Other Ranks by Age Bracket**

Age	Frequency	Percentage
18 – 23 Years	62	32.8
24 – 29 Years	87	46.0
30 – 34 Years	32	16.9
35 – 39 Years	6	3.2
40 – 44 Years	2	1.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>100.0</b>


**Source: Field Data, 2018**

On age bracket, the findings indicated that majority of Members of Inspectorate and Other Ranks at 46.0% (87) were aged between 24 – 29 years, followed by 32.8%

(62) of the respondents aged between 18 – 23 years. Others were 16.9% (32) aged between 30 – 34 years, 3.2% (6) aged between 35 – 39 years, and 1.1% (2) aged between 40 – 44 years. The results are presented in Table 4.3.

Majority of respondents under this category are young officers (46.0% aged between 24 – 29 years). According to Ransley (2009), after graduation, most officers are first posted to operational areas to gain experience. They are sent to forward areas which are known for high degree of risks and volatility. Such areas are known for routine contacts. However these new officers in the service, as revealed by the findings, have little requisite skills and experience required in operational areas.

#### 4.1.5 Distribution of Respondents by Level of Education




**Fig. 4.3 Distribution of Members of Inspectorate and Other Ranks by Level of Education**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

Members of Inspectorate and Other Ranks were asked to indicate their level of education. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.3

The findings in Figure 4.3 indicate that 84.7% (160) of respondents under this category had secondary education, 6.3% (12) had diploma, 8.5% (16) had bachelor's degree, while 0.5% (1) were master's degree holder. According to National Police Service Act, 2011 the minimum grade for recruitment into the police service is secondary certificate, grade D+ (plus). In addition, one must be aged 26 years and below. Furthermore, there is high attrition rate on the number of graduates recruited in the service (Ransley, 2009). This explains why majority of the respondents in this category (84.7%) have secondary school qualification.

Religious leaders and council of elders were also asked to indicate their level of education. Findings are as presented in Figure 4.4.



**Fig. 4.4 Distribution of Religious Leaders and Council of Elders by Level of Education**


**Source: Field Data, 2018**



Results in Figure 4.4 show that 43.8% (39) of the respondents under this category had primary qualification while 39.3% (35) had secondary school qualification. Both diploma and bachelor’s degree holders were each represented by 7.9% (7) of the respondents. 1.1% (1) of the respondents had master’s degree. In overall, respondents with primary qualifications are the majority under this category of respondents. According to Lamu CIDP (2013 -2017) Lamu lags behind in education compared to other counties. Few schools available are dilapidated, lacks critical infrastructure and manpower. There is also high dropout rate in schools. From this insight, it is clear that Lamu County has high illiteracy rate. This can be attributed to the low number of schools within accessible distance, and perceived or real marginalization.

#### 4.1.6 Distribution of Respondents by Ward of Residence

The study further sought to find out the distribution of religious leaders and council of elders by their wards of residence. The findings are as presented in Figure 4.5.




**Fig. 4.5 Distribution of Religious Leaders and Council of Elders by Wards of Residence**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

The findings in Figure 4.5 show that 15.7% (14) of religious leaders and council of elders reside in Hindi as well as Faza ward. Further 11.2% (10) of respondents in this category reside in Mkomani as well as Bahari and Witu ward. 7.9% (7) of respondents reside in Shella as well as Hongwe ward. The findings also revealed that 6.8% (6) of the respondents reside in Mkunumbi as well as Kiunga ward. Finally, 5.6% (5) of the respondents reside in Basuba ward. From the data, it is evident that respondents under this category were well distributed across all Lamu County wards.

#### 4.1.7 Distribution of the National Police Service by Religious Affiliation


In establishing religious affiliation of Members of Inspectorate and Other Ranks, it was revealed that 80.4% (152) of respondents under this category were Christians while 19.6% (37) were Muslims. The findings are as shown in Figure 4.6.



**Fig. 4.6 Distribution of Members of Inspectorate and Other Ranks by Religious Affiliation**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

The study further sought to establish religious affiliation of religious leaders and council of elders. The findings are as shown in Figure 4.7.




**Fig. 4.7 Distribution of Religious Leaders and Council of Elders by Religious Affiliation**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

From the findings, 83.1% (74) of respondents under this category were Muslims, 12.4% (11) were Christians, while 4.5% (4) are Others. The category Others comprises Indigenous African Religion.

Garcia (2003) reiterates that Lamu is predominantly Muslim. However, there are other religious groups including Christianity. This explains why majority of religious leaders and council of elders profess Muslim faith. Chiefs and County Commissioner were also asked to indicate their religious affiliation. From the findings gathered, 62.5% (15) were Muslims, 33.3% (8) were Christians, while 4.2% (1) professed Indigenous African Religion. The findings are as presented in Figure 4.8.

From the findings in Figure 4.8, it is evident that Muslims are the majority (62.5%). This is because Lamu County is predominantly Muslim, and chiefs are drawn from the local population, unlike County Commissioner.



**Fig. 4.8 Distribution of Chiefs and County Commissioner by Religious Affiliation**


**Source: Field Data, 2018**

#### **4.2 Examining Counterterrorism Strategies Influencing Performance of the National Police Service in Lamu County**

This subsection presents findings on counterterrorism strategies employed by police in the fight against terrorism, how the strategies influence their performance and the level of terrorism in Lamu County. Key elements considered include: extent of terror threat in Lamu County, existence and components of counterterrorism strategies, induction on counterterrorism strategies, perception of strategies and operation by the National Police Service, and how they influence police performance, and suggestions on best strategies and approaches to counter terrorism in Lamu County.

#### 4.2.1 Extent of Threat by Terrorists to Peace and Security in Lamu County

The study sought to find out the extent to which terrorists pose a threat to peace and security in Lamu County. Findings were as presented in figure 4.9.



**Fig. 4.9 Extent to Which Terrorists Pose a Threat to Peace and Security in Lamu County**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

From the findings, 10.6% (33) of the respondents indicated that terrorists pose a threat to peace and security in Lamu County at very great extent, 36.3% (114) of respondents indicated great extent, 29.2% (92) were neutral, 23.0% (72) indicated less extent while 0.9% (3) indicated not at all.

From the findings, it is clear that the extent of threat posed by terrorists to peace and security in Lamu County is great. According Saferworld (2016) Lamu is, in one way, where Kenya's current conflict with *Al-Shabaab* really started; it was the centre of a series of events that triggered Kenya's full scale military invasion of Somalia. In September 2011, a British couple on a sailing holiday were kidnapped

from a hotel near Lamu Island by *Al-Shabaab*. Three weeks later, a French woman was taken by the group from a different hotel. Although Kenya's intervention in Somalia was planned well in advance, these and other kidnappings along Kenya's border with Somalia proved to be the trigger for the launch of Operation *Linda Nchi* (protect the country) by the Kenya Defence Force (KDF) in October 2011.

While the Kenyan Government had previously supported the militias fighting in Somalia against *Al-Shabaab*, Linda Nchi was a full-scale military intervention aimed at creating a buffer zone along Kenya's border, prising *Al-Shabaab* from its control of the economically important Somali port city of Kismayo, and, ultimately, at eradicating the group. Lamu has felt the blowback from this intervention, witnessing the complex entanglement of multiple conflict drivers and a heavy-handed security response from the state as terrorist's threat continues to grow each day.

The foregoing only adds to other peoples view that indeed terrorists pose a threat to peace and security in Lamu. During Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader B4 asserted that:


The threat posed by *Al-Shabaab* in Lamu is bigger than what most people believe. This is because they are recruiting locals and having their factions in Lamu, for instance *Jaysh Ayman* and *Al-Hijra*. *Jaysh Ayman* is known to have been carrying out attacks in Lamu County. *Al-Hijra* on the other hand has turned its attention to attacks within the county and creating propaganda in Swahili directed at Kenyan Muslims thereby playing on 'the many disadvantages faced by Muslims, and on their history of political alienation and exclusion in Kenya, seeking to harness their long-standing disaffection and dissent. The problem is that their message is resonating well with the Muslims thus winning more converts. If not checked, this trend may get out of hand (FGD with Religious Leaders, 5<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Witu).

Indeed, Saferworld (2016) explains that in places where Muslim population is concentrated, social services have historically been weaker than elsewhere in the country. Muslims in these places typically express frustrations emerging from lack of job opportunities and a sense of exclusion from the mainstream political economy. Male youth are especially disaffected, a factor identified as important for *Al-Shabaab* recruitment. Where economic deprivation is most extreme, as in the towns close to the Somalia border where large refugee communities have congregated, recruitment is often linked to the provision of some kind of social service and mostly religion which *Al-Shabaab* has used successfully to rally Muslims to terrorism.

Despite the fact that this information would be very beneficial if shared with authorities, there should be some formal information sharing arrangement since information givers are somehow targeted by both security agencies and terrorist elements because of mistrust. That is why they do not volunteer intelligence report to security agencies.

#### **4.2.2 Frequency of Terrorist Attacks in Lamu County**

Due to terrorist attacks in Lamu County, the government deployed a large number of security personnel in the county to counter attacks. The operation that is still continuing to date is dubbed Operation *Linda Boni*. The researcher sought to find out how frequent terrorists carry out attacks in Lamu County. From the results, 17.5% (55) of respondents indicated that the attacks were very frequent. 15.6% (49) indicated that the attacks were frequent while 54.2% (170) were neutral. Lastly, 12.7% (40) of the respondents indicated that the attacks were less frequent while none of the respondents indicated that there were no attacks at all. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.10.



**Fig. 4.10 Frequency of Terrorist Attacks in Lamu County**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

Generally, there are attacks in Lamu County based on the findings. That explains why the Operation *Linda Boni* has not been called off. The findings agree with Saferworld (2016) who stated that terrorist have continuously attacked targets in Lamu County killing both civilians and security personnel. It all started with a large scale attack at Mpeketoni Police Station on Sunday 15<sup>th</sup> June, 2014 at around 8.15pm. Mpeketoni Police Station, Plate 4.1, was completely razed to the ground. Simultaneous attacks occurred on the APS Divisional Headquarters in Mpeketoni and in Mpeketoni town centre. Victims were shot at close range, 26 buildings were burnt and 44 vehicles were torched. The attack, which ended between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., resulted in the deaths of 49 people. The following night, attacks occurred in a nearby village, killing 15 people. Another village was attacked on 23<sup>rd</sup> June, 2014. On 5 July, similar attacks by large groups of armed men were launched in Hindi



and Gamba, both urban centres mainly populated by Kikuyus, Kenya's dominant ethnic group, who are largely viewed as outsiders by Lamu locals. Then on 19 July, 2014 a bus on the road between Malindi and Lamu was attacked, killing 30 passengers. In only one month, Lamu and nearby areas had witnessed over 100 killings. The attacks have since continued despite the large presence of security personnel.


During the interview, respondents indicated that there are many underlying issues that should be addressed by the Government of Kenya if at all they need to win the war against terrorists. At the moment, the terrorists are taking advantage of these issues to win sympathy from the locals, who now feel that the terrorists are fighting for their course. Indeed, during FGD, most respondents indicated that they feel safe with terrorist elements in their midst than security personnel. The issues are mainly socio-economic and political factors. During Focus Group Discussion, Elder B9 stated that:

Terrorists attack is routine. Even the government knows. Many attacks happen but are not reported. The government is taking advantage of the remoteness of Lamu County. Just last week, one security officer was killed in Basuba while two sustained serious injuries when they were ambushed by *Al-Shabaab*. Many security personnel are losing their lives. These attacks are far from over, as long as the security personnel continue to torture and kill innocent locals! The civilian are getting justice from terrorists (FGD with Elders, 7<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Witu).

From the discussion, it is imperative that the police are trained on how to deal with civilians. It is only when there is good blood between the two that the police may get the much needed credible intelligence and cooperation to deal with the terrorists. At the moment, the terrorists are getting sympathy from the locals as they continue to carry out attacks, and as asserted by Erwin (2013), the best way to counter terrorism to win the confidence of the locals.

### 4.2.3 Existence of Counterterrorism Strategies in the National Police Service

The police, alongside other security agencies, have been deployed in Lamu County in large numbers to counter terrorists who have been carrying out attacks. It is against this backdrop that the study sought to find out if counterterrorism strategies existed in the National Police Service. Data was analysed and results presented as shown in Figure 4.11.



**Fig. 4.11 Existence of Counterterrorism Strategies in the National Police Service**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

From the findings, 12.4% (39) of respondents strongly agreed that counterterrorism strategies existed in the National Police Service, whereas 63.2% (198) of the respondents agreed. Further 18.4% (58) were indifferent, while 5.0% (16) disagreed. Only 1.0% (3) of the respondents strongly disagreed that the strategies existed in the National Police Service.



**Plate 4.1: Researcher at Mpeketoni Police Station. In June, 2014, the station was attacked and completely burnt down by suspected *Al-Shabaab* terrorists.**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

The study revealed that respondents who disagreed (5.0%) and strongly disagreed (1.0%) that counterterrorism strategies exist in the National Police Service indicated that they had not been trained on counterterrorism nor inducted on counterterrorism strategies. The majority of respondents (63.2%) who agreed that counterterrorism strategies existed indicated that they have been employing the same in Operation *Linda Boni* hence were aware that they existed. Further 18.4% who were indifferent indicated that they couldn't tell because they were not sure of


what counterterrorism strategies entail. From the findings, it was evident that counterterrorism strategies existed in the NPS. Despite some respondents being unaware of the strategies, they were employing them in counterterrorism operation.

#### **4.2.4 Counterterrorism Strategies Employed by the National Police Service in Lamu County**

According to Shinn (2004), the need to develop a counter-terrorism strategy only received systematic attention after the US Embassy bombing and the later designation by the US government of Kenya as an anchor state in the Horn of Africa and a frontline in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The US government perception of the Horn of Africa as a new front for *Al-Qaeda* also raised the profile of Kenya as a staging point for combating *Al-Qaeda* and allied groups in the region. The prior lack of Western interest in counterterrorism in Kenya was due to the perception that the earlier terrorist incidents were too isolated and minor to warrant any serious attention, and in any case did not seriously threaten western interests. In this context, the study sought to establish the actual counterterrorism strategies employed by National Police Service in managing terrorism in Lamu County. Data collected were analysed and results presented in Figure 4.12.

Findings show a number of counterterrorism strategies with patrols leading with 89.5% (281 responses) followed by erection of physical barriers at 87.6% (275 responses). The two strategies are useful in preventing smuggling of arms, goods, narcotic and persons. Patrols and barriers deny enemy the freedom of dominating the ground. Patrols also aid in quick and timely response to incidences. Other strategies are prosecution at 44.9% (141 responses), joint operation at 28.3% (89 responses), intelligence gathering at 64.6% (203 responses), raids at 62.7% (197

responses), protecting vulnerable targets at 74.5% (234 responses), surveillance at 46.8% (147 responses), and ambush at 64.6% (203 responses).



**Fig. 4.12 Counterterrorism Strategies Employed by the National Police Service in Lamu County**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

In an interview, Police Officer A5 stated that:

Counterterrorism strategies exist and are useful to our operation in Lamu County. Without these strategies, we cannot achieve any meaningful progress in the fight against *Al-Shabaab* (Interview with Police Officer A5, 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

From the foregoing, it is apparent that before any counterterrorism operation is mounted, there must be well thought strategies. As reiterated by Wilkinson (2006), the prevention of terrorism across the globe requires robust and well-crafted counterterrorism strategies accepted by all relevant players. No single state can

prevent or combat any form of terrorism without some form of counterterrorism strategies and co-operation.

The definitive objective of counter-terrorism is to prevent the loss of lives by proactively preventing or decreasing the number of terrorist attacks. The consequences obviously involve the hunting down of terrorists and targeting their movements; enhancing security domestically, continentally and internationally; and any other defensive measures seeking to contain or prevent terrorist attacks from dominating the ground.


#### **4.2.5 Areas Addressed by Counterterrorism Strategy**

In establishing the areas addressed by counterterrorism strategy, the respondents were asked to indicate the level at which different thematic areas had been covered by the strategy. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.13.

From the findings in Figure 4.13, it is evident that measures to address police welfare e.g. pay, allowances, housing, transfers etc. is poorly addressed as indicated by 92.6% (291) of the respondents. Individuals are motivated to perform works that would provide greater rewards after successful accomplishment. However, when the instrumentality or reward for a number of Organizational performances is inadequate, motivation to perform different kinds of work declines (Burgoon, 1993; Kroth, 2007). This view was held by several respondents who revealed that the proponents of counterterrorism strategies forgot to factor police welfare, despite them being the main manpower expected to enforce the same strategies in combating terrorism in Lamu County. This has led to low morale among officers, and could be attributed to failure of counterterrorism operation in Lamu as explained by Police Officer B25:

Although we swore to protect life and property, we cannot endanger our lives for the government that has refused to appreciate our sacrifice. I have not seen my family for the past nine months because of this operation. We live in tents and spend most of our times inside the dangerous Boni forest, but look at our pay? We earn peanuts! To add salt to an injury, operation allowances running to thousands of shillings that we are supposed to be paid have been squandered by our seniors in Nairobi. If you ask, you are threatened with dismissal. Furthermore, the changeover was to take place after six months, but I have been here for almost two years. That is why I have decided I can no longer risk my life for nothing (Interview with a Police Officer B25, 9<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Witu).

What comes clearly from the foregoing response is that human resource aspect of the strategy should be considered if any meaningful performance is to be achieved.



**Fig. 4.13 Areas Addressed by Counterterrorism Strategies**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

Burgoon (1993) and Kroth (2007) support this assertion by pointing out that individuals evaluate the rewards given to them for performance based on various aspects. This includes differential needs, values, goals and sources of motivation. On the basis of valence the motivations to accomplish different tasks also vary. Thus, while deciding to perform in a particular way, individuals give importance to the variable that has the greatest motivational force and reward. Police must therefore be fully motivated.

Findings in Figure 4.13 also show that measures to protect citizens and infrastructure are well addressed with 63.5% (199) of respondents giving affirmation. This can be attributed to the deliberate effort by the government to deploy large number of security personnel in Lamu County. In Kenya, airlines, tourist facilities and embassies are considered particularly vulnerable. Indeed, there have been several warnings by the West of terrorist plots to attack airlines, foreign embassies and Western tourists leading them to issue adverse travel warnings, close their embassies temporary and to suspend flights to and from Kenya (Wax, 2003; BBC, 2003; Wycoff, 2004). In one of the interviews, Chief 16 noted that:

Regular contacts between *Al-Shabaab* and security personnel continue to portray Lamu as insecure county hampering economic activities, particularly tourism given that Lamu has been gazetted as UNESCO World Heritage site. The government has however stepped up security through patrols, road blocks and security escorts to civilians, including few buses plying Lamu. Heritage and tourist sites have continued to be guarded since the abduction of two tourists in 2011 (Interview with Chief 16, 16<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu).

The assertion disagrees with Saferworld (2016) analysis indicating that curfew and roadblocks have made mobility and nightlife around Lamu a nightmare. In view of



the foregoing, it is evident that the strategies adopted by police to ensure protection of life and key installations have brought mixed reactions among locals.

From the findings in Figure 4.13, measures to enhance cooperation between police, other authorities and locals (50.8%) as well as measures to enhance intelligence gathering (52.9%) have been averagely covered by counterterrorism strategy, however results shows that the same is not true on the ground because of the mistrust between the police and locals. The police – public relationship is very poor. As a result locals are not ready to volunteer information/intelligence to the police.

According to Prestholdt (2011), intelligence officials have been accused numerous times of unlawfully detaining suspected terrorists for lengthy periods of time and torturing suspects in attempts to gain confessions and further intelligence. Local people thus see police and other security forces as a threat. As Religious Leader D5 puts it:

Security forces arbitrary arrest and beat up locals in their houses and mosques. Last month, nine young men were arrested in Witu. We have not heard from them since. It is like they were executed since they were not arraigned in court. Police treat every Muslims with suspicion. Instead of protecting us, they are arresting us without genuine reason (FGD with Religious Leaders, 17<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu).

Elder D1 had this to say:

People have sympathy for *Al-Shabaab* but fear police. Police are torturing and killing Muslims, whereas *Al-Shabaab* are not killing us. I would therefore protect *Al-Shabaab* if encountered with such a situation (FGD with Council of Elders, 18<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu).

In an encounter with Police Officer B12, the following was revealed:


Efforts to enhance cooperation with locals have been initiated but with little success. The locals do not provide information because a Muslim will not report a fellow Muslim. Muslims anywhere is

bound by religion (Interview with Police Officer B12, 3rd October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

Statements like these make it clear that security services have to do much to win the confidence of the locals in Lamu County. Security providers and users must communicate something that is currently lacking. Police must therefore change tact on the strategy to enhance cooperation with the locals, as well as intelligence sharing, which is an important element in prevention of terror activities. As stressed by Prestholdt (2011), coordination and cooperation is key.

#### 4.2.6 Involvement in Developing Counterterrorism Strategies

The study further sought to find out the extent of involvement of respondents in developing counterterrorism strategies. Data collected was analysed and results presented in Figure 4.14.



**Fig. 4.14 Involvement in Developing Counterterrorism Strategies**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

From the Findings in Figure 4.14, 0.5% (2) of the respondents indicated that they were involved to a very great extent while 1.1% (3) indicated that they were involved to a great extent. Findings also indicate that 16.4% (51) of the respondents were neutral while 19.0% (60) of the respondents indicated they were involved to a less extent. Majority of respondents at 63.0% (198) indicated that they were not involved at all.

From the findings, it is apparent that officers were not properly involved in developing counterterrorism strategies. This is in contradiction to the Ransley (2009) report that recommended that for acceptability, any policy change in the police should involve officers of all cadres. In an interview, Police Officer A6 stated that:

It is not possible to involve all officers in the process. Policy makers collect views from few officers and other stakeholders in coming up with these strategies. This means that everyone is represented in one way or the other (Interview with Police Officer A6, 19<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

However, some officers disagreed with that assertion whereby Police Officer B11 stated that:

We are never involved at all. These strategies are made in Nairobi and brought to us here. It is pathetic (Interview with Police Officer B11, 19<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu).

In FGD with Council of Elders and religious leaders, they too maintained that nobody has ever asked for their opinion on what counterterrorism strategy can best work in Lamu County. They have also never been invited in any meeting to discuss counterterrorism strategies. From the foregoing, it is clear that only a representative of officers and locals are involved in the process. The National Police Service should develop a framework of enlightening various stakeholders and even creating

awareness on the same to inculcate ownership of strategy and operation as envisioned by Ransley (2009).



**Plate 4.2: Researcher and other passengers disembark to go through security screening at a road block near Witu Township. This is one of the numerous road blocks in Lamu County.**


**Source: Field Data, 2018**

#### **4.2.7 Induction on Counterterrorism Strategies**

The study sought to establish whether the respondents had been sufficiently inducted on counterterrorism strategies. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.15.

The results in Figure 4.15 show that 1.1% (3) of the respondents indicated that induction on counterterrorism strategy was very sufficient, 26.5% (83) said they were sufficiently inducted while 29.6% (93) were neutral. Respondents who indicated they were insufficiently inducted were 35.9% (113) while 6.9% (22) indicated that the induction was very insufficient. Those who indicated they were

sufficiently inducted said the same were taught while in police training institutions. They were also taken through pre deployment briefing.



**Fig. 4.15 Induction on Counterterrorism Strategies**

**Source: Field Data (2018)**

Respondents who indicated they were insufficiently inducted stated that they were deployed without any prior briefing or specialised training. During an interview, Police Officer B42 indicated that:


Training and induction programs here are skewed. It's majorly ATPU (Anti-Terrorist Police Unit) and MPU (Marine Police Unit) who are selected for these trainings. Other formations are overlooked yet we are all expected to combat terrorists (Interview with Police Officer B42, 19<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu).

Drawing from the foregoing response and findings, it is clear that induction and training on counterterrorism strategies are not all encompassing, a fact that is unfortunate. The National Police Service should ensure that all officers, especially those involved in counterterrorism operation, are inducted or trained on counterterrorism. As observed by Onuoha (2013), with the assistance of U.S.

authorities (most likely the ATA Program), there needs to be better training offered to personnel across the entire spectrum of the police force. Equipping and training only a small, specialized unit, such as the ATPU, will not be sufficient in keeping an entire country safe. Instead, all officers obtain basic training in terrorism related investigations. Given the state of events, it is important that Training Needs Assessment (TNA) be carried out in the NPS, especially in special duty areas like Lamu to identify training gaps. This is useful in enhancing the capacity of officers involved in such like special duty.

#### 4.2.8 Perception of Counterterrorism Strategies

Researcher was interested in knowing how respondents perceived counterterrorism strategies. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.16.



**Fig. 4.16 Perception of Counterterrorism Strategies**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

From the finding, 5.3% (17) of the respondents view counterterrorism strategies as very effective, 16.9% (53) view them as effective whereas 31.7% (100) are neutral. Findings also indicate that 35.5% (111) of the respondents view counterterrorism strategies as ineffective while 10.6% (33) view them as very ineffective.

Respondents who indicated that the strategies are effective said this is because the attacks have not been as they were in previously, and especially 2014. They said attacks have reduced considerably, an indication that the strategies are effective. On the other hand, respondents who indicated that the strategies are ineffective explained that most strategies are not working. In an interview, Police Officer B28 indicated that:


Counterterrorism strategies are not effective here. Residents have greatly complained about roadblocks that are erected. They don't want to be searched. They have said this is infringing on their rights. This has brought about blood between us. As a result, they have been hiding information from us since they view us as enemies. Raids, ambushes and patrols that we have been conducting are not bearing fruit because there are many *Al-Shabaab* sympathisers amidst locals who are giving out information to terrorists about any impending operation. They are observing our manoeuvres and alerting terrorists who plant IEDs on our paths. That is why they have blown so many security vehicles and APCs and killed many officers (Interview with Police Officer B28, 16<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

In view of the foregoing, Virta (2008) views trust and confidence towards the police as a precondition to community intelligence. It would be very difficult for the police to get community intelligence if people do not trust the police. Saferworld (2016) highlights the importance of high trust relationships between the public and the police for effective national security in the age of home grown terrorism.

From the discussion, it is evident that the community is an important and integral part in any security plan. Their perception can greatly affect the implementation of any policy. Any break down on police-public relations can have serious consequences on policing. Therefore, there should be a concerted effort to deliberately win their hearts and mind before and during implementation of any strategy.

#### 4.2.9 Perception of Counterterrorism Operation

Counterterrorism operations are known to bring about mixed reactions from different categories of people. The researcher sought to establish how the respondents perceive the on-going counterterrorism operation. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.17.



**Fig. 4.17 Perception of Counterterrorism Operation**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

From Figure 4.17, 8.8% (28) of respondents indicated very good, 16.0% (50) indicated good, 28.3% (89) were neutral. 33.6% (105) indicated poor while 13.3



(42) indicated poor. Those who perceived counterterrorism operation to be good explained that normalcy has returned in towns like Mpeketoni and Hindi which were affected by *Al-Shabaab* attack in 2014. They further stated that trade has started flourishing and is expected to go a notch higher with the opening of Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopian Transport (LAPSSET) project, all courtesy of operation. In an interview, Chief 7 stated that:

We feel good because with the police around us. We immigrant populations are always targeted. These other people feel we came to take their land. With the on-going operations, threats have somehow diminished (Interview with Chief 7, 4<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

Respondents who perceived counterterrorism operation as bad explained that it has been inconveniencing them. They have also been stereotyped and targeted by the security forces. During Focus Group Discussion, Elder A8 stated as follows:

Curfew that was imposed and a ban on night fishing were harmful to fishermen whose main livelihood was on fishing. Complex fishing permissions that have been initiated have also pushed many residents from the trade. Curfew also meant that wedding ceremonies that are usually performed at night could not go on. Furthermore, police are beating up locals, carrying out raids and arresting our people. One is lucky if he comes back alive (FGD with Council of Elders, 2<sup>nd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

From the foregoing assertions, it is clear that identity based inequality is seen as connected to the provision of security and how safe different people feel. Social and economic issues also seem to be intertwined therein. Security agencies should work towards winning the heart and support of all members of the public.

On the other hand, police officers too feel that they are under punishment and neglect. In an interview, Police Officer B100 stated that:

This operation is already bungled! I was to be here till March, 2018 but up to now I have not been relieved. I am stressed and burnt out. My productivity and morale is low. Nobody is telling

me when I will leave this place. When I complain I am threatened. To me, this operation is a punishment. To make the matters worse, our allowances are squandered by our seniors. This operation is meant to make our seniors rich. That is why when we go out on patrol, we avoid choke points. We can't lose our lives for no apparent reason (Interview with Police Officer B100, 21<sup>st</sup> November, 2018 in Panda Nguo).

Allameh and Rostami (2014) fully support the foregoing assertion when he state that performance of an individual is based on the perceptions an employee regarding organization's performance management system. These performances can influence attitudes and behaviour of the employees. These behaviours can have a negative or positive impact on employees' performance and the organization's success (Baldwin, n.d.). According to a study there is a positive correlation between organizational justice and job satisfaction. In other words better the employee perception of an organization, the higher the satisfaction level of that employee (Allameh & Rostami, 2014).


Organizational justice is also positively correlated to motivation, implying that where justice is observed, a general positive attitude emerges by itself (Çelik & Saritürk, 2012). Allameh & Rostami (2014) studied the relationship between organizational justice and Organizational Citizenship Behaviour (OCB). In the study authors found strong relationship between the two. Similarly, study by (Wan and Morgan, 2016) shows that citizenship behaviour are employee behaviours that go beyond the call of duty.

Author concluded that there is a positive association between organizational justice and citizenship behaviour. Similarly authors also suggested that organizations need to ensure the practice of organizational justice so that it can create confidence and loyalty among the employees. The police service therefore needs to go an extra

mile in ensuring justice by giving incentives such as allowances to officers involved in the operation, as well as taking care of their welfare issues e.g. transfers, promotions etc.

#### 4.2.10 Involvement in Counterterrorism Operation

Basically, counterterrorism calls for involvement of various stakeholders for any meaningful progress to be realized. It should not be left to the security agencies alone, since other stakeholders have roles to play. The study therefore sought to know if the respondents were involved at all in counterterrorism operation. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.18.



**Fig. 4.18 Involvement in Counterterrorism Operation**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

From Figure 4.18, 10.6% (33) of the respondents indicated they were involved in counterterrorism operation to a very great extent, 26.5% (83) indicated great extent

while 30.1% (95) were neutral. Further findings indicated that 18.6% (58) of the respondents indicated less extent while 14.2% (45) of the respondents indicated they were involved to a very less extent.

Respondents who indicated that they are involved to a great extent in counterterrorism operation were mainly police officers and chiefs. Those who indicated that they were not involved were mainly religious leaders and council of elders. This means that government agencies (police officers and chiefs) are largely involved whereas locals (religious leaders and council of elders) are not largely involved in counterterrorism operation. This difference was brought out clearly in one of the Focus Group Discussions where Religious Leader A9 stated that:

On matters terrorism, we are never involved in any decision making or implementation process because we are Muslims. The government believe if you are a Muslim then you are a terrorist or a relative to a terrorist (FGD with Religious Leader, 1<sup>st</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

This assertion was, however, disputed by Chief 22 during an interview. He stated that:

The problem is that locals perceive police officers to be Christians and from upcountry, by design or as a reflection of the make-up of Kenya's security services. This brings distaste between them and locals, non-Muslim locals included. They believe that the police are after them. As a result, they refuse to be involved in anything to do with the police. Efforts to change such narrative have been fruitless (Interview with Chief 22, 17<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

From the foregoing, it is imperative that the police should devise more inclusive plan of engaging moderate Muslims and including them in their operational strategy. If the police are to succeed in counterterrorism operation, they must understand the complex religious tension and how this may affect long term peace and security in Lamu County. One contemporary tool to meet the challenges that


religion and religious differences bring is the utilization of inclusivity. Inclusivity capitalizes on the opportunity to use faith and religion, not as divisive force, but as a chance to bring people together and find a common ground (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a).

By engaging Muslims and other faiths, the police have the opportunity to have a greater reach in Lamu, and avoid being seen as outsiders that disregards faith that so many locals hold dear, but that has been politicised and used as a pawn for terrorists to garner support for their cause (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a). Saferworld (2016) reaffirms this notion and suggests that continued exclusion of groups and repeated efforts to highlight separateness are dangerous to peace and security. As Prestholdt (2011) puts it, make it a priority to include Muslims in politics, the economy, and everyday life. This inclusivity has been an important strategy of the Global War on Terror, “winning the hearts and minds of target populations,” In view of the foregoing, a key step then calls for considering religious differences as part of the solution rather than part of the problem, thus inclusivity.

#### **4.2.11 Satisfaction with Counterterrorism Strategies**

The study sought to know if the respondents were satisfied with counterterrorism strategies. Various respondents indicated their stand and the findings were as presented in Figure 4.19.

From the Figure 4.19, 7.1% (22) of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied. 16.8% (53) indicated that they were satisfied whereas 26.5% (83) were neutral. Findings further indicated that 38.9% (122) of the respondents indicated they were dissatisfied while 10.7% (34) of the respondents indicated they were very dissatisfied with counterterrorism strategies.



**Fig. 4.19 Satisfaction with Counterterrorism Strategies**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

From the findings in Figure 4.19, it is evident that majority of the respondents are not satisfied with counterterrorism strategies. The reasons advanced by this group are that the strategies do not take of their welfare, and that the strategies are punitive and discriminatory. In an interview, Police Officer B65 stated that:


The strategies have failed to address the welfare of officers like allowances, pay, relief system, changeover and equipment. We can't risk our lives for nothing (Interview with Police Officer B65, 7<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

The assertions are in line with that of Lunenburg (2011) who points out that employees can achieve maximum job satisfaction if the right motivator is provided to them. Further, these inadequacies affect morale and the temptation for corruption, which breeds an environment conducive for insecurity. Therefore, there

is need to inculcate welfare issues in the strategy. Police also must build confidence with the general public in order to gain their trust and good will. At the moment, this is lacking, going by the complaints from the locals that strategies as skewed. To them, the strategies are meant to punish them. Such perception must be changed.

#### 4.2.12 Influence of Counterterrorism Strategies on Performance of the National Police Service in Managing Terrorism

The study sought to know the level at which counterterrorism strategies influence performance of police in managing terrorism. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.20.



**Fig. 4.20 Influence of Counterterrorism Strategies on Performance of the National Police Service in Managing Terrorism in Lamu County**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

From Figure 4.20, results revealed that 6.0% (19) of the respondents indicated very positively, 19.5% (61) indicated positively, while 31.0% (97) were neutral. Further results revealed that 35.6% (112) indicated negatively whereas 7.9% (25) indicated very negatively. Respondents who indicated very positively, (6.0%) and positively (19.0%) explained that the strategies have streamlined their duties thus bringing efficiency and enhancing their performance. They further explained that the application strategies has enabled them reduce the frequency of terrorist attacks.


Respondents who were neutral (31.0%) were indifferent on whether their performance has been enhanced or not. They also indicated that there is no influence in their performance despite the strategies. Respondents who indicated negatively (35.5%) and very negatively (7.9%) explained that the strategies have widened the rift between security officers and the locals thus negatively influencing their performance.

Generally, there is negative influence in the performance. From the interviews, a large number of respondents expressed great mistrust between the security agencies and the locals, brought about by the use of the strategies, as one major challenge hindering their performance. Chumba *et al.* (2016a) highlights the importance of inclusivity for enhanced performance by asserting that while security apparatus have a key role to play in counterterrorism, the responsibility for implementing counterterrorism strategies should not be theirs alone. Social organizations such as the locals, religious institutions such as churches and mosques, schools etc. and the police must together take lead in counterterrorism campaign. This will definitely lead to positive performance being realized in the management of terrorism in Lamu County and its environs.



#### 4.2.13 Efficacy of Counterterrorism Strategies in Counterterrorism Operation

Counterterrorism is only successful if the strategies are effective. Security agencies should strive to enhance effective strategies and re-evaluate those strategies that are not working well. Those found not to be working can be modified accordingly. It is against this backdrop that the researcher sought to know efficacy of counterterrorism strategies employed in counterterrorism operation in Lamu County. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.21.



**Fig. 4.21 Efficacy of Counterterrorism Strategies in Counterterrorism Operation in Lamu County**

**Source: Researcher, 2018**

Based on the findings from Figure 4.21 majority of the respondents cited protecting vulnerable target as the most effective strategy at 84.6% (170 responses) followed by joint operations at 82.6% (166 responses). Other effective strategies include

surveillance at 69.7% (140 responses), patrols at 54.7% (110 responses), erecting physical barriers at 52.2% (105 responses), ambush at 37.8% (76 responses), intelligence gathering at 23.0% (46 responses), raids at 17.4% (35 responses) and prosecution at 14.9% (30 responses).

### **Protecting Vulnerable Targets**

Protecting vulnerable target (84.6%) was cited as the most effective counterterrorism strategy. Respondents explained that protection of vital installations such as county assembly (Plate 4.3), administrative offices, plants, churches, mosques etc. and security escort given to buses, trucks and vessels have been successful. During Focus Group Discussion, Elder C3 supported this when he mentioned that:

Attack on bus convoy plying Lamu route has reduced since security escort was beefed up. At least one can now be sure of reaching his/her destination (FGD with Council of Elders, 15<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

From the sentiments, it is evident that much concentration has been put in protecting vital installations and other key spots, although much still needs to be done. In agreement, Chumba *et al.* (2016a) states that protection of people and property must be the key objective of any successful counterterrorism strategy.

### **Joint Operation**

Joint operation (82.6%), which was also identified as one of the most effective strategy, is key to any security operation. Chumba *et al.* (2016a) noted that one security agency alone, however strong and capable, may not be able to deal with threat of terrorism. The new terrorism calls for a revamped intelligence apparatus at the national level and reinforced co-operation that involves all security agencies.



**Plate 4.3: Researcher at County Assembly of Lamu. The County Assembly is one of the most vulnerable targets in Lamu County.**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

In line with the security sector reorganization outlined in the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the government of Kenya divided counterterrorism functions among the three branches of the National Police Service i.e. the Kenya Police (which also includes Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and the paramilitary General Service Unit), the Directorate of Criminal Investigation, and the Administration Police as well as non-police agencies such as the National Intelligence Service and elements of the Kenya Defence Forces. Initially, operational effectiveness was impeded by poor interagency coordination among and within the police, intelligence and military forces; limited resources; insufficient training; endemic corruption; and an unclear

command and control of, and politicization of some terrorist incidents. In an attempt to reverse this trend and improve operational effectiveness, the government made significant leadership changes (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a).

### **Surveillance**

Surveillance (69.7%) is a vital counterterrorism strategy geared towards securing sensitive facilities and combating terrorism. It is primarily intended to protect and secure individuals and infrastructure. Surveillance can be defined as intended ‘to detect, identify, track and intercept hostile action.’ In the modern day, especially with the ever present danger of terrorism, new innovations which emerging technological advancements have progressively introduced are vital (Renade, 2011). During an interview, these views were also expressed by Police Officer A9 who noted that:

Although security apparatus has embraced surveillance, terrorists still seem to be ahead of our intelligence planning and execution. That is why we are still experiencing attacks. The techniques are poor due to some old and out-dated equipment. Security forces have therefore been more reactive (Interview with Police Officer A9, 21<sup>st</sup> October, 2018 in Faza).

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that terrorist attacks constitute a significant shift to surveillance. Although some viewed the failure to improve operations management and resource allocation by the government, Narayan (2014) notes that rapid advances in science today ensure that technology contributes considerably to more effective surveillance and additionally plays a predictive role.

It is also important to note that new wave of terrorism has accentuated the need for ‘passive, ‘archival’ and real time active surveillance. ‘Passive’ surveillance includes all forms of surveillance intended to routinely monitor normal human

activity in sensitive or protected areas. ‘Archival’ surveillance comprises in-built recognition features in surveillance technology that identify particular individuals as well as their being in specific place at a specific time and stores this data. ‘Real-time’ or ‘active’ surveillance is the monitoring of an event or activity as it occurs.

### **Erecting Physical Barriers**

One significant consequence of terrorist attacks carried out world over in recent years is the increased linkage between the movements of people measures taken to safeguard national security. This is because the very processes that facilitate travel, economic and cultural exchanges are also exploited by terrorists. Measures aimed at preventing terrorism have become explicitly linked to the management and regulation of movements.

Erection of physical barriers (52.2%) is a major strategy in Lamu County. There are several roadblocks in Lamu County manned by police and other security personnel. In these roadblocks, passengers and other travellers are searched and their identity established to ensure that only genuine individuals are allowed through. Although these roadblocks initially brought some feeling of discrimination, they are somehow being accepted now. In Focus Group Discussion, Elder A1 stated that:

At the road blocks, Muslims feel awkward because when it comes to me, the security officers hardly check, but when a Muslim, one is thoroughly searched and interrogated. I feel for them because it is like they are being humiliated, and they feel like am being favoured. Am happy that the police have realized that and some officers have begun to treat people equally (FGD with Council of Elders, 2<sup>nd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

The foregoing assertion implies that improvement in management of road blocks and barriers can help enhance security while facilitating movement of people. Measures like road blocks and barriers should always be justified by the level of

threat faced, particularly as increased security can lead to increased obstruction and to potential intrusion into privacy and civil rights (Chumba *et al.*, 2016b).

Another major barrier is wall. Most Kenya's security problems seem to begin and end with Somalia. This explains the current wall being constructed along Kenya – Somalia border. The porous border is responsible for the illicit smuggling of arms, smuggling of goods and free movement of terrorists. Inadequate presence of state in the area and the thick Boni forest has made it easy for terrorists to launch attacks. It is believed that building a wall will keep terrorists and illegal arms at bay. The same was cited by Chief 1 during an interview when he categorically stated that:

Although there is huge Somali population here in Kenya and some *Al-Shabaab* operatives live within us, when the wall is completed, it will considerably reduce cross border movement of terror groups and arms as it is happening now (Interview with Chief 1, 9<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Witu).

The implication of this statement is that building a wall may be a stop gap measure of a larger problem. However, Kenya's decision to build a wall is not a new phenomenon in the world. Most countries have had to construct perimeter walls to deter a belligerent neighbour or to try and protect it from cross border attacks. Israel has the most infamous wall that separates its territory with Palestine. Spain has built fences to deter illegal African immigrants. United States has a wall to deter illegal Mexican immigrants, and Saudi Arabia too has a wall separating it from Yemen (Narayan, 2014).

### **Intelligence Gathering**

Intelligence (23.0%) plays a fundamental role as a counterterrorism strategy. Among other advantages, it can help identify individuals and groups engage in terrorism as well as their location and source of recruitment. It enables security

agencies track down suspects and their logistic and financial support (Jenkins, 2003). Intelligence provides advance warning of potential terrorist threat. It can provide tactical information for counterterrorism operation to disrupt terrorist activities and terrorists command and control structures (Cline, 2011).

Intelligence can equally be understood as secret information, set of missions, process and organization. New emphasis on intelligence sharing creates new challenges, including how to widely disseminate classified information, overcome sensitivities regarding intelligence sources and methods, and maintain counterintelligence vigilance.

Effective decision making in counterterrorism lies in having access to the right information at the right time. A simple increase of information flow is not the goal of counterterrorism: the fundamental goal is to use that information to improve the actions that are being taken. Onkware and Odhiambo (2010) posit that intelligence is so central to counterterrorism because good and timely intelligence gives government the capacity to prevent terrorist attack from taking place. Terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 revealed severe deficiencies in the FBI's intelligence analysis and information sharing capabilities and processes.

An effective response against *Al-Shabaab* terrorist threat and terrorism generally require extensive international cooperation and infrastructure. Stronger capabilities are needed to authorise and support offensive against terrorists; to build capacity and support other strategies against terrorism; to implement a robust legal and normative framework; to further articulate state responsibilities; and to support tactical cooperation on intelligence and financing.

Overall, there is need is need to foster training to police on area of intelligence collection and sharing. Law enforcement officers need to know which information to collect and what to share. Members of the public also need to be inducted on the same. In an interview, Chief 2 was quoted as follows:

Effective training is likely enable better sharing of intelligence and ultimately will help change negative public attitude and mistrust between the police and members of the public (Interview with Chief 2, 10<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Dide Waride).

In view of the foregoing, capacity building should be enhanced to help police officers sharpen their skills in investigations, operations and collection of intelligence. Besides that, the police should be trained on customer care and public relations to break the barrier between them and the public. The public should also be inducted and used to aid in timely reporting of suspicious activities.

### **Prosecution**

Because strong prosecutorial infrastructure is hardly in place, Kenyan authorities frequently hand-off terrorism suspects to neighbouring countries or the United States. In one instance after the 2010 bombing in Kampala, Uganda the Government of Kenya transferred 13 Kenyan citizens suspected of taking part in the attacks to Uganda (START, 2016). Kenya has however affirmed its commitment to the eleven existing international treaties and conventions it had previously signed and ratified in relation to counterterrorism and later signed and ratified two subsequent conventions in 2002 and 2005. Kenya has also complied with Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001: Enactment on Act N0. 9 of 2009, Proceed of Crime and Money Laundering Act. The most contentious was the introduction of the Suppression of Terrorism Act, 2003 which had controversial provisions. Although Security Laws Amendment Act, 2014 was passed, it still lacks strength.





**Plate 4.4: Researcher at the entrance to Mpeketoni Law Court. Counterterrorism Laws in Kenya are not water tight.**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**


Those opposed to the bill saw it as a threat to personal liberties, freedom and fundamental human rights; as arbitrary hence prone to abuse by agents of the state even when there is no threat of terrorism. During Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader F7 retorted that:

These laws are very discriminatory. They are based on religious and ethnic prejudice. They target Muslims (FGD with Religious Leaders, 18<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

This assertion is a pointer to how injustices are meted. Furthermore, it is evident that there is absence of a strong legislative framework to regulate counterterrorism and impunity by state officials. This has resulted in violation of rights with little judicial remedies or redress in our courts such as Mpeketoni Law Court in Plate 4.4.

#### 4.2.14 Other Strategies that can Best Be Employed to Achieve Effective Police Performance in Managing Terrorism in Lamu County

The study further sought views from respondents on other strategies that can be employed to achieve effective police performance in managing terrorism in Lamu County. Strategies suggested were as presented in figure 4.22.



**Fig. 4.22 Other Strategies that can Best be Employed to Achieve Effective Police Performance in Counterterrorism Operation in Lamu County**

Source: Researcher, 2018

Findings show numerous strategies that include improving interagency coordination at 67.1% (210 responses), equipping and training officers at 93.3% (292 responses), improving working condition and welfare of officers at 89.5% (280 responses), improving infrastructure at 81.5% (255 responses), improving police-public relationship at 83.7% (262 responses), addressing historical injustices at 79.2% (240 responses), addressing drug and substance abuse at 46.0% (144 responses), addressing ethnic/religious animosity at 73.5% (230 responses), solving youth unemployment at 80.0% (250 responses), creating awareness on counter and radicalisation measures at 59.1% (185 responses), securing Kenya-Somalia border at 82.8% (260 responses), strengthening judicial systems at 61.0% (191 responses), and eradicating corruption at 69.6% (218 responses).

As the findings suggest, equipping and training officers (93.3%) and improving working condition and welfare of officers (89.5%) remains major issues. From the interview, respondents indicated that police need specialised equipment and weapons to deal effectively with terrorism. Police also need better welfare and pay, including prompt payment of allowances and good working condition. Due to rapid changes in technology, police need specialised training in counterterrorism and other technological and modern equipment for their use. During an interview, Police Officer B17 noted that:

For us to deal decisively with terrorists, we need proper weapons and equipment that can outsmart them. Currently, the APCs that were bought the government for our use are death traps. They are being blown by IEDs planted by the terrorists on our roads, thus hampering patrols. Besides, we need better equipment to manoeuvre the dense Boni forest where most terrorists are hiding. Drones that have been deployed for surveillance are also not helping at all. They rarely detect terrorist movements. We need modern drones that conform to current technology (Interview with Police Officer B17, 12<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Baure).

In another interview, Police Officer B32 complained about the skewed training in the National Police Service. He stated that:

We are sent here to battle *Al-Shabaab* yet we are not adequately trained on counterterrorism. When it comes to counterterrorism training, only ATPU officers are given priority, yet they hardly go on combat (Interview with Police Officer B32, 10<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Basuba).

From the foregoing, it is evident that capacity building is much needed for all cadres of officers for successful counterterrorism. Bossong (2008) says developing a successful capacity to tackle terrorism requires a focus on three main areas of counterterrorism activity: first, to overcome vulnerability to terrorism for example training security personnel and equipping them; second, to deny terrorists a safe haven and ensure that terrorists are prosecuted and/or extradited, to deny terrorists entry into a country and reinforcing law enforcement agencies; and third, to deny terrorists the means to commit terrorist acts for instance, preventing financing of terrorism, and denial of weapons. For peace and security of the world, it is important that all countries should enhance the capacity of security agencies.

On improved working condition and welfare of police officers (89.5%), respondents emphasized pay and payment of allowances as key. They also indicated that changeovers and leaves should be regularised to allow officers recuperate. Their working conditions must also be improved. In an interview, Police Officer B19 indicated that:

Allowances meant for officers should be paid promptly. Currently, the morale is low because the little allowances are pocketed by senior officers. The meagre that remains comes three months late. It is difficult to discharge our mandate under these deplorable conditions. It's worse now that we are not sure of changeover and leaves have been cancelled (Interview with Police Officer B19, 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

Despite the challenges highlighted, the National Police Service has regularly detected and disrupted terrorist threats. While the Westgate attack showed glaring gaps in Kenyan command and control, and the unsuitability of conventional security forces to respond to a civilian incident such as the Westgate, the response by the Crisis Response Team of the elite General Service Unit Recce Company was more competent. There has been even considerable improvement in response and coordination as witnessed during Dusit D2 terror attack in February, 2019 when GSU Recce squad responded effectively ((Daily Nation, 18 January, 2019).

Improving police – public relationship (83.7%) was also suggested as a key strategy. Relations between the public and the police are strained by highhandedness of the police, alleged abduction of the youths, disappearance and extrajudicial killings. Indigenous Lamu community feel discriminated by security services. This was brought out clearly during an interview with Police Officer B33 who stated that:

Residents have greatly complained about roadblocks that are erected. They don't want to be searched. They have said this is infringing on their rights. This has brought about blood between us. As a result, they have been hiding information from us since they view us as enemies. Raids, ambushes and patrols that we have been conducting are not bearing fruit because there are many *Al-Shabaab* sympathisers amidst locals who are giving out information to terrorists about any impending operation. They are observing our manoeuvres and alerting terrorists who plant IEDs on our paths. That is why they have blown so many security vehicles and APCs and killed many officers (Interview with a Police Officer B33, 12<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Baure).

From the foregoing, it is imperative that the police should devise more inclusive plan of engaging moderate Muslims and including them in their operational strategy. If the police are to succeed in counterterrorism operation, they must understand the complex religious tension and how this may affect long term peace

and security in Lamu County. One contemporary tool to meet the challenges that religion and religious differences bring is the utilization of inclusivity. Inclusivity capitalizes on the opportunity to use faith and religion, not as divisive force, but as a chance to bring people together and find a common ground (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a).

By engaging the locals, the police have the opportunity to have a greater reach in Lamu, and avoid being seen as outsiders that disregards faith that so many locals hold dear, but that has been politicised and used as a pawn for terrorists to garner support for their cause (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a). Saferworld (2016) reaffirm this notion and suggests that continued exclusion of groups and repeated efforts to highlight separateness are dangerous to peace and security. As Prestholdt (2011) puts it, make it a priority to include Muslims in politics, the economy, and everyday life. This inclusivity has been an important strategy of the Global War on Terror, “winning the hearts and minds of target populations,” In view of the foregoing, a key step then calls for considering religious leaders and religious differences as part of the solution rather than part of the problem, thus inclusivity.

Respondents also suggested securing Kenya-Somalia border (82.8%) and improving infrastructure (81.7%) as other strategies. Lamu is has poor road network and several islands which are not easily accessible. Transport is mostly by boats (Plate 4.5), donkeys and motorbikes (Lamu CIDP, 2013-2017). The county has a large and expansive Boni forest that stretches all the way to Somalia. It is in this forest that terrorist hide in and uses to launch terror attacks. Poor road network has also hampered movement of security personnel given that no single road in Lamu is tarmacked, although the road is currently being upgraded for tarmacking.

The terrain and demographic composition of the border area make it conducive for terrorist groups to sneak into Kenya and also get assimilated into the populace.



**Plate 4.5: Researcher and research assistants leaving Lamu Island for Faza Island for data collection mission. Lamu County has over 20 islands and movement is hampered by poor infrastructure.**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

Kenya –Somalia border is large and unsecure thus porous. This has been made worse by lack of effective government in Somalia. This has enabled terrorists and criminal cross at will, as well as enhanced smuggling of weapons, arms, contraband goods and drugs thereby creating insecurity. Different factors have contributed to the problem on both sides including corruption among border communities, poor immigration and border policies, limited surveillance and inadequate security cooperation with Somalia.

For a secure border, security and community intelligence partnership is important. Sensitizing border community on key partnership areas is such as information sharing to facilitate counterterrorism efforts at the local level is a vital element in

the fight against terrorism. This is important based on the fact that many terrorists who carry out attack in county enter and live with the community before they attack. Therefore, there is need for cooperation between the community and security agencies which can be boosted through community involvement in border counterterrorism planning especially by effective and efficient communication and exchange of relevant information.

Response from FGDs and interviews noted that constant border surveillance, data collection, processing and sharing of information is fundamental in monitoring and weeding out terrorists posing threat to national security. Similar to findings by Chumba *et al.* (2016a), lack of effective and efficient intelligence gathering and sharing among relevant cooperating agencies has compromised counterterrorism efforts aimed at denying terrorist access to Kenya. In an interview, Police Officer A12 stated that:

The government need to invest in border control and surveillance technology. They also need to sensitize the communities living along the border on patriotism and improve infrastructure (Interview with Police Officer A12, 16<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

In view of the foregoing, intelligence gathering and cooperation provides a cornerstone in the fight against terrorism in any state without which terrorism cannot be contained. This concurs with the Kenyan situation where many attacks have been blamed on immigrants who penetrate Kenyan borders and live in Kenya illegally, where they carry out their terror activities.

Most Kenya's security problems seem to begin with and end with Somalia. This explains the current wall being constructed along Kenya – Somalia border. The porous border is responsible for the illicit smuggling of arms, smuggling of goods



and free movement of terrorists. Inadequate presence of state in the area and the thick Boni forest has made it easy for terrorists to launch attacks. It is believed that building a wall will keep terrorists and illegal arms at bay (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a). The same was cited by Chief 2 during an interview when he categorically explained that:

Although there is huge Somali population here in Kenya and some *Al-Shabaab* operatives live with us, when the wall is completed, it will considerably reduce cross border movement of terror groups and arms as it is happening now but not completely (Interview with Chief 2, 10<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Dide Waride).

The implication of this statement is that building a wall may be a stop gap measure of a larger problem. However, Kenya's decision to build a wall is not a new phenomenon in the world. Most countries have had to construct perimeter walls to deter a belligerent neighbour or to try and protect it from cross border attacks. Israel has the most infamous wall that separates its territory with Palestine. Spain has built fences to deter illegal African immigrants. United States has a wall to deter illegal Mexican immigrants, and Saudi Arabia too has a wall separating it from Yemen (Narayan, 2014).

Given that globalization and technological advancements have greatly impacted on border security e.g. the use of CCTV cameras, a more comprehensive planning is needed to achieve control over the border. Geocentrality of Kenya and the fear of the unstable neighbouring state of Somalia, economic resources and military strength have impacted on mutual relations. Furthermore, since border control challenges are common to both Kenya and Somalia, they should be addressed collectively. The collective effort is key to effective monitoring of borders against movement of terrorists and weapons hence should be strengthened. This is because no state in isolation can be successful in the fight against terrorism.

Respondents further indicated solving youth unemployment and education standard (80.0%), and addressing drug and substance abuse (46.0%) as others strategies. Lamu has continued to perform poorly in education. There is low transition rate to secondary schools (Lamu CIDP, 2013-2017). Many youths shun education. There is also high poverty and youth unemployment rate in Lamu County making the youths vulnerable to recruitment into terror groups. On drug and substance abuse, many youths are addicted to drugs. Terrorists are targeting such vulnerable groups.

Youth unemployment is a problem in Kenya and has created a reservoir of discontent among the youth. Lack of education also translates to limited employment opportunities. Young people therefore remain idle and prone to anything that can get them cash. They become frustrated with their inability to achieve culturally recognised adulthood and seek validation by joining violent extremist groups, which give them an adult like status through responsibility, purpose, and often financial compensation. Terrorists are also exploiting unemployment to recruit the youth to join their network (Onuoha, 2013). In an interview, Chief 4 stated that:

We hear of parents complaining that that their children have disappeared without trace, only to be linked to *Al-Shabaab*. We have even identified some *Al-Shabaab* killed in combat as our siblings. The government has not done enough to address the issue of low education standard and unemployment in Lamu. Even the TSC has denied us teachers. There is nothing we can do to help given the situation on the ground (Interview with Chief 4, 11<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Katsakairo).

The foregoing response confirms that youth unemployment is a crisis in Lamu. The county and national government should make initiative to counter these problems. As long as circumstances that produce terrorists are not taken into account, it is inevitable that the vulnerable youths will often appear as a ‘rebel without a cause’.

Credibility and legitimacy are core ingredients of any political narrative hoping to catch the imagination of people at home. These can be exploited by terrorists (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a).

Counter-radicalisation and radicalisation measures (59.1%) are other strategies suggested by respondents. Respondent indicated that radicalisation is majorly influenced by unemployment, social exclusion, political alienation, religion and globalisation.

Marginalisation has eroded trust in the government among Kenyan population which has a bearing on the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation measures in the management of terrorism. The socio-political scene with regard to Kenyan politics is heavily defined by ethno-religious affiliations, wherein certain religious groups such as Muslims form a multi-ethnic group representing the minority of the population. Although inter-ethnic tolerance has generally been the status quo in Kenya, power remains centralised in Nairobi, despite the new County Government dispensation. Within this context, the secularisation of Kenyan politics, although enshrined in the constitution, has continued to ignore certain groups, with some regions that still suffer from lack of infrastructure and social programs , which heighten the feeling of marginalisation (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a).

Religion does play a significant role in radicalisation. Globalisation also creates an acute awareness about opportunities available elsewhere. This leads to frustration, victimization, and humiliation among growing cohorts of uneducated and unemployed youth who are able to make comparisons across countries. The scale of youth frustration is compounded by a demographic explosion, growing expectations, weak state capacity, and diminishing opportunities.

Respondents also cited the following as recruitment strategies for radicalisation in Lamu County: inflammatory rhetoric of extremist clerics; internet; propaganda; religious ideologies and twisted literature. Targeting programs for particular themes of terrorist radicalisation is likely to have positive results. Therefore, the government should roll out such programs.

Kimunguyi (2011) argues that East African region is vulnerable to terrorism because countries in the region experience: conflicts; weak governance; collapsed state institutions; porous borders that allows uncontrolled movement; increased extremist religious ideology and radicalisation of vulnerable groups. These factors generally coincide with poor socio-economic conditions and create fertile ground for the existence of terrorism.

Counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation programs are very pertinent for any state faced with growing terrorism threat. These programs are long time processes needing tact and patience. The recent indication of Kenya's *madrasa* teaching Arabic and the *Wahhabi* creed have existed to indicate that not much has been done. The perception has been that the government has not done much to deal with the problem of terrorist radicalisation in Lamu County. As indicated in a Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader E1 stated that:

I have not seen any meaningful counter-radicalisation program in the ground. The government is not helping at all. Security agencies are only interested in carrying out raids and swoops which have made interfaith relations sour (FGD with Religious Leaders, 11<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Moa).

Drawing from the foregoing response, the challenges faced by the government compounds the effect of counter-radicalization measures on the management of terrorism in Lamu County. For instance, *madrasa* system needs to be modified, but

there is insufficient will to draft a strategy. According to Chumba *et al.* (2016a), counter-radicalisation initiatives include good governance; democratic institutions and the rule of law; promoting coexistence across ethnic/religious groups; and conflict resolution and peace building mechanisms

Addressing economic/social injustices (79.2%) and ethnic/religious animosity (73.5%) were also suggested as strategies for effective police performance in managing terrorism. As with the other five coastal counties of Kenya, Lamu scores low on development indicators (Lamu CIDP, 2013-2017). After the north-eastern region, also bordering Somalia and generally marginalised from development processes since independence, the coastal area of Kenya has the highest rate of poverty in the country. Its economy and broader socio-economic development is, nonetheless, undergoing a substantial upheaval with the construction of a US\$ 5 billion 32-berth port, which will act as the gateway into East Africa's largest proposed infrastructure project, the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopian Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor.

Settlement of Kenyans from other parts of the country in Lamu, especially in Mpeketoni, Hindi, Moa and Mkunumbi is a major source of sour relationship and discord between the communities in Lamu County. This unending suspicion fuels resentment and is a catalyst for radicalisation and terrorism. Fear of land grabbing undermines investment opportunities due to resistance which arises from suspicion.

During Focus Group Discussion, Elder A3 stated that:

Indigenous Lamu residents do not have title deeds for their lands. The government has deliberately refused to issue us title deeds. We suffer a lot when big people come from Nairobi with title deeds and drive us from our land that we have farmed from our forefathers (FGD with Council of Elders, 2<sup>nd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

Although all Kenyan citizens are entitled to the same rights, including ownership of property, these perceived or real inequities in land ownership and tenure have created rift between local indigenous people and people from up country. Critically, these identity divides extend beyond ethnicity into religion: not all coastal people are Muslims, and not all newly-arrived settlers are Christians from up-country – indeed, some move from other parts of the coast – but the division between ‘indigenous’ and ‘outsider’ is all too easily presented and described as a Muslim-Christian one.

According to Saferworld (2016), the genesis of this can be traced back to 1970s, then-President Jomo Kenyatta allocated parcels of public land to ‘up-country’ settlers – from his own Kikuyu ethnic group. Kenya’s largest ethnic group, the Kikuyus, have been in economic and political ascendance since independence. They were awarded title deeds to land that historically belonged to ‘indigenous’ communities – including the Mijikenda, Bajuni, Sanye, Boni and Swahili.

Over decades, growing numbers of Kikuyus and other up-country ‘outsiders’ have moved to the area, buying up land and altering the county’s demographics. The bulk of Lamu County’s population is now in the mainland’s farming areas, away from its traditional centre, Lamu Island, and in mainland towns such as Mpeketoni which have large populations of ‘nonindigenous’ people. Lamu is now the only county in Kenya where nearly 50 per cent of the population is ‘non-indigenous’.

The LAPPSET project also risks fuelling other forms of economic disparity. While the government has sought to provide training to local youths so that they can benefit from broader development in the area, some still say that better educated people from upcountry get the jobs in the big projects and in the hotels. Huge land

speculation by investors – who are often non-local, politically-connected Nairobi based elites and referred to as land grabbers – has driven the value of land up, especially in areas of close proximity to the Port.

Ethnicity and injustices has also assumed political and social dimension. With devolution, there are winners and losers. Many people interviewed noted the common narrative among indigenous people. Religious Leader D8 indicated that:

First, the Kikuyu people arrived, then they took the land, then they took the jobs, and then they took the political posts. They want it all (FGD with Religious Leaders, 17<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Hindi).

Indeed by virtue of constituency boundaries, solidarity and block voting across the settlers population, the Kikuyu community have the position of deputy governor, one of the County's two MPs, and disproportionate share of seats in the County Assembly of Lamu (Saferworld, 2016).

Strengthening judicial system (61.0%) is another strategy to achieve effective police performance. A major transformation within the judicial sector is necessary for timely prosecution of offenders. There is also need to devise a pragmatic means to trace, freeze or confiscate the assets of terror gangs and their associates if found guilty. This will serve as a great disincentive to them and deterrent to those intending to be recruited in terrorism. Capacities of institutions that gather analyse and exchange intelligence should be enhanced to complement judicial effort. To reinforce judicial power, Kenya has taken the following legislative and executive measures since 2002 in order to ensure compliance with Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001: Enactment on Act No. 9 of 2009, and Proceed of Crime and Money Laundering Act. The most contentious was introduction of Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2003. As Religious Leader D7 observed:

This bill was discriminative. Making it an offence to wear or use items associated with terrorists. This was perceived as an attack to the Muslim community and their mode of dressing. Many felt that that counterterrorism agenda of the country sought to promote religious and ethnic prejudices (FGD with Religious Leaders, 17<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Hindi).

The same sentiments are echoed by Nzumbi (2010) who points out that: the bill was seen as a threat to personal liberties and human rights; as arbitrary and therefore prone to abuse by agents of the state even when there is no threat of terrorism; as religiously and racially discriminatory; as an imposition by the western world; the definition of terrorism, terrorist organizations, terrorist property in the bill are so wide that being drunk and disorderly or in possession of a pen knife can fit the definition.

Indeed, weak terrorism laws have hampered the function of the judiciary to adequately prosecute terrorism cases. During interview, this came out clearly when Police Officer A6 indicated that:

We can no longer depend on the courts. We have arrested many terrorists and terror suspects but the moment they are taken to court, they are let free. This endangers our lives since when they are left, they target arresting officer (Interview with Police Officer A6, 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

In a Focus Group Discussion with Council of Elders, Elder A9 stated that:

The police are conducting abusive operations in Lamu County. They are targeting Muslim and ethnic Somali men and boys for beatings, arrest, theft of property, and detention. When they take them to court, they are released because they are innocent. When one is released, one is either killed in cold blood or they kill and disappear with the body. The genesis of extra judicial killing is the innocent individuals being released by court because of lack of evidence (FGD with Council of Elders, 2<sup>nd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

From the foregoing, it is evident that the absence of legislative framework and strong counter-terrorism laws to guide courts, coupled with impunity by the well-endowed state officials engaged in counterterrorism operation has resulted in



outright violations of the rights of the locals leaving them without any judicial remedies of distress, and at the same time putting the work of the security agencies into jeopardy.

Despite the failure by Kenya to enact specific counterterrorism legislation, it has sought to fight terrorism in several ways including the establishment of the National Intelligence Service with support from the US Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program, creation of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) in 1998, a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in 2003; and the National Advisory Committee (NSAC) in 2004 which has since been scrapped (Agbiboa, 2013a).

Improving interagency coordination and cooperation (67.1%) was also cited as another strategy. Interagency coordination in the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. Erwin (2013) asserts that lack of cooperation between agencies due to organizational structure, technical incompatibilities or competing interests, along with the absence of a central mechanism for coordinating among agencies can lead to operational failures. Indeed these observations motivate a systematic examination of law enforcement structure and capabilities of state.

Pooling all available resources and drawing together multiple strands of expertise can remove the barriers to effective interagency cooperation so the dots can be connected more accurately (Erwin, 2013). This argument resonates with response from an interview where Police Officer B72 indicated that:

Terrorist threat in Lamu can be brought to an end if only there was collective responsibility. However, mistrust and interests

limits cooperation (Interview with Police Officer B72, 7<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Pate Island).

This view suggests that interagency coordination and cooperation in the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. A conducive environment for cooperation is therefore of paramount importance in ensuring successful operation. While not all agencies might want to share the proverbial stadium, it is in their best interests to help one another on overlapping and complementary issues. Various interviewees stressed the importance of contacts in counterterrorism operation.



**Plate 4.6: Researcher and some research assistants leaving Shella Island for Kizingitini Island under the escort of security personnel. There is insecurity posed by terrorists around Lamu archipelago and the Indian Ocean.**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

Despite these efforts by the government, Agbiboa (2013a) maintains that Kenya's counterterrorism operational effectiveness is hampered by poor intra-agency and interagency coordination, a lack of command and control of some terrorist incidents, and the politicisation of terrorist incidents. A number of the security

lapses that have occurred in Kenya can be attributed to a lack of effective collaboration, coordination and cooperation between the different national security organs. The APS and KPS, as agencies of the NPS, conduct their operations almost independently of each other and not as anticipated by the Constitution. Consequently, the NPS is unable to work in a coherent and coordinated manner, hence creating serious shortcomings that pose a challenge to the country's security. The lack of collaboration, coordination and cooperation also extends to the KDF and the NIS.

The lack of a coordinated and joint approach to security by the requisite security organs also adversely affects intelligence information-sharing, often resulting in blame-shifting and finger pointing among the security agencies. According to Mwangi (2016), "The Mpeketoni and Garissa University terrorist attacks of June 2014 and April 2015 in Lamu and Garissa counties, respectively, and their consequent counterterrorism security operations demonstrate some of the interagency shortcomings that the security agencies experience in the course of their efforts. Mpeketoni town was attacked by 20 to 30 insurgents at approximately 8:45 p.m. on Sunday 15<sup>th</sup> June, 2014. Simultaneous attacks occurred on the APS Divisional Headquarters in Mpeketoni and in Mpeketoni town centre. Shortly afterwards, the gunmen attacked the Mpeketoni police station. Victims were shot at close range, 26 buildings were burnt and 44 vehicles were torched. The attack, which ended between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., resulted in the deaths of 49 people. The attackers thereafter proceeded towards Kibaoni, resulting in an exchange of fire between unconfirmed parties."

On Monday 16 June 2014, another attack took place further inland in Kijijoni village, Kaisari, where 9 people were killed and 1 house was torched. Two days

later, police recovered 2 bodies from Pangani. A total of 60 people were killed in both incidents, for which *Al-Shabaab* quickly claimed responsibility. The subsequent Mpeketoni counterterrorism operations were uncoordinated. Neither a full time command post nor operations centre was established to coordinate the operation. The APS rapid deployment unit (RDU) left its Mkunumbi base about 16 km from Mpeketoni at around 9:08 p.m. and arrived in Mpeketoni at around midnight but remained out of sight until 4:45 a.m. The GSU officers were the first to venture into the town at about 3:30 a.m., after the firing had stopped. The RDU was sighted later at 5:00 a.m. (Mwangi, 2016).

Mwangi 2016 further reiterates that “The Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) team identified the involvement of NPS headquarters and the executive (although commendable for symbolic purposes and morale), as well as the lack of a centralised command structure, as the key factors which contributed to the slow and uncoordinated response by the NPS because they distracted from the effective and efficient planning of the counterterrorism operations. At one point, the operation was taken over by senior commanders from the regional and national headquarters, and the local operational commanders were left with no functional role. KPS commanders complain that they cannot directly issue operational orders to officers from the APS and specialised units such as the GSU. These units have to obtain approval from their national headquarters before embarking on any operation. For instance, when the KPS County Commander ordered the GSU commander to respond to the attacks, the latter alleged that the Deputy Commissioner of Police had given orders that the GSU should not deploy at night to Mpeketoni. Prompt response failed because of conflicting orders and the lack of a centralised command

structure at the county level that could coordinate all the NPS resources in the region.”

What the foregoing episode means is that lack of coordination and cooperation between security agencies impedes their ability to provide fast and efficient services. The necessity of coordination boils down to the fact that similar issues confront security agencies and one agency will be limited to deal with them single handedly. This is what informs adoption of an integrated approach in counterterrorism.

Eradicating corruption (69.6%) was also suggested by respondents as a strategy in enhancing effective police performance. Elder D5 quoted during Focus Group Discussion said that:

It is the police and other government officials who receive bribes to allow free movement of contraband goods like sugar, weapons and allow free access for criminal and terror elements to enter Kenya from Somalia and roam freely. If only the government can eradicate corruption from government officers, then the terror attacks in Lamu and the rest of the country will be a thing of the past (FGD with Council of Elders, 19<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu Town).

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that a number of terror activities in Lamu and the rest of Kenya have been blamed on corruption involving government officials such as the police who are law enforcement officers, immigration officials and other administrators. Corruption and terrorism have been cited to go together. Corruption acts have facilitated influx of terror groups and thriving of terrorism in Kenya as supported by Chumba *et al.* (2016a) who observes that poor governance creates a favourable environment for thriving of terrorism and terror activities by facilitating their ability to form up, mobilize, attack and organize.

Kenyan Government inability to implement existing laws, ethics and anticorruption measures have also enabled corruption to thrive and water down efforts geared towards counterterrorism efforts, especially along the borders. This has demoralised efforts by other committed personnel to scale up the fight against terrorism and related extremist activities. In addition, lack of integrity among border and custom officials has created a formidable challenge in the fight against terrorism perpetrated along the Kenyan borders. This has put into question the commitment of the government in enhancing security in Kenya to an extent of drawing both local and international criticism.

In line with the results of a past study by Chumba *et al.* (2016a), the high incidences of corruption among security agents and other staff has been linked to greed for money and feeling of vulnerability to criminal threats. In addition, use of repressive methods in fighting terrorism has prompted those feeling discriminated against and oppressed to seek out criminal and shadow structures instead of appealing to government agencies and law enforcement support. Such individuals provide the support the terror groups require to succeed through corruption and unethical practices as a way of revenging and sympathising. As such, terrorism is facilitated through well formulated and executed architecture of colluding cartels within the same institutions mandated to prevent such deals.

A major dissatisfaction to security personnel is their low remuneration and lack of incentives to boost their morale. This partly explains why most of them act unprofessionally. During an interview, Police Officer B112 retorted that:

The reason why National Police Service always leads in corruption perception index (CPI) in Kenya every year is because of meagre salary and incentives. As long as this matrix is not

changed, the story will be the same next year (Interview with Police Officer B112, 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

This sentiment implies that bribery and corruption has become part and parcel of the work culture of this institution. Increase in salaries and incentives may change this picture (Muthondeki *et al.*, 2017b). At the moment, officers who refuse to follow the practice are regarded as lone rangers.

### **4.3 Chapter Summary**

The purpose of this chapter was to examine counterterrorism strategies employed by the National Police Service in Lamu County. The findings revealed that terrorist attack in Lamu County continue to happen hence pose a threat to peace and security. Although majority of police officers and other stakeholders are in agreement that counterterrorism strategies exist in the service, they were hardly involved in developing these strategies, a situation that has made them not embrace these strategies fully. It is also revealed that they are not sufficiently inducted on these strategies, a situation that paints a grave picture on their preparedness to manage terrorism. Furthermore, findings also reveal that they perceive counterterrorism strategies as ineffective, and counterterrorism operation as being poorly conducted. Empirical findings shows that the National Police Service has not fully involved its rank and file as well as other stakeholders in counterterrorism, a situation that has seen resentment and dissatisfaction with the operation brew as terror attacks continue.

Among the strategies influencing performance of National Police Service in Lamu County, protecting vulnerable targets (84.6%), joint operations (82.6%) and surveillance (69.7%) were cited as most effective. Other strategies mentioned were patrols (54.7%), ambush (37.8%), erecting physical barriers (52.2%), and

intelligence gathering (23.0%). Raids (17.4%) and prosecution (14.9%) were cited as the least effective strategies. This was mainly because of the existence weak laws on terrorism that hardly convict terror suspects in courts, as well as raids that do not bear fruits but breeds resentment.

On strategies influencing performance of National Police Service, measures to address police welfare e.g. police pay, allowances, housing, transfers etc. (92.6%) is poorly addressed. Other areas that are poorly addressed in the strategy are measures in addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism (53.4%), measures to ensure respect for human rights and rule of law (46.0%), and measures to build police capacity including training and weapons (44.4%). Although measures to enhance intelligence gathering, detection and prevention (52.9%) and measures to enhance cooperation with local organization and other partners (50.8%) are well addressed, they are not effective on the ground given that findings has revealed that there is mistrust between the police and the public and non-cooperation of members of the public with security agencies making intelligence sharing nearly impossible.

Lastly, a number of other strategies that can best be employed to achieve effective police performance in managing terrorism were suggested. Equipping and training officers (93.3%), improving working condition and welfare of officers (89.5%), and improving police public relations (83.7%) were cited as key strategies. Other strategies include: improving interagency coordination (67.1%); improving infrastructure (81.5%); addressing historical injustices (79.2%); addressing drug and substance abuse (46.0%); addressing ethnic/religious animosity (73.5%); solving youth unemployment/education standard (80.0%); creating awareness on



radicalisation (59.1%); securing Kenya – Somalia border (82.8%); strengthening judicial systems (61.0%); and eradicating corruption (69.6%).

This chapter has noted that the fight against terrorism must be all encompassing. Counterterrorism strategies must take into account that not only the security agencies have parts to play, but all key stakeholders must be involved to bring about ownership and rout out suspicion. Leaving anyone out at any stage will simply complicate the whole process leading to failure of strategies. Justice Theory's notion that human resource (welfare, remuneration and training) is key in performance management is also supported. Apart from counterterrorism strategies, police also employs various policing approaches in counterterrorism. This is the subject of the next chapter.

**CHAPTER FIVE**

**EFFICACY OF POLICING APPROACHES UTILISED IN**

**COUNTERTERRORISM BY THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN**

**LAMU COUNTY**


This chapter assesses efficacy of policing approaches employed by the police in the fight against terrorism, and how the application of such approaches influence police performance in Lamu County. The chapter provides findings and discussions as well as a summary of key findings.

**5.1 Policing Approaches Utilised in Counterterrorism in Lamu County**

Police Service is facing increasing obstacles in policing. Unstoppable economic, social and political forces are having a profound effect, not only upon the world in which we function but also upon the manner in which each and every one of us does his or her job. And while we may be able to take some comfort from the fact that criminals do not change appreciably over time, the resources and opportunities available to them have increased exponentially along with the magnitude of their potential profits. Police services are now dealing with crime that would be unrecognisable to the police officers of a generation ago and must do so with a rapidly shrinking resource base.

As Ratcliffe (2007) argues, the old models of policing no longer apply. Police can no longer afford to simply react to each new situation, nor can we rely upon our traditional notions of crime and criminal behaviour. Contemporary policing approaches are therefore important in counterterrorism operation and crime control in general. Law enforcement agencies rely on a multitude of information sources and utilize a variety of approaches to prevent and respond to crime and disorder problems. These approaches, whether broad or specific, are typically tactical,

operational, or strategic, and each requires that information be collected, synthesized, and analysed into a usable format. The sources of information may vary (arrest data, wiretaps, informants, crime data, etc.) depending on the objective, but the analysis of these sources into useful information and data is largely the task of law enforcement analysts who focus their efforts on trying to identify crime patterns, trends, and linkages between individual offenders and/or organized groups. Law enforcement officers should be conscious different approaches that are applied in policing, their merits and demerits as far as different operations are concerned. It is on this back drop that the study sought to establish policing approaches employed by the NPS in counterterrorism in Lamu County. The findings were as presented in Figure 5.1.



**Figure 5.1: Policing Approaches Utilised in Counterterrorism in Lamu County**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

Findings from Table 5.1 show that 4.5% (14) mentioned military, 21.6% (68) paramilitary, 6.4% (20) criminal justice, 15.3% (48) community policing, 18.5% (58) intelligence led policing, 28.7% (90) integrated policing approach, and 5.0% (16) others.

Integrated policing approach (28.7%) is the approach most utilised in counterterrorism in Lamu County. This type of policing encompasses the use of different policing approaches in a single situation. While most police formations espouse the view that they have access to various approaches, the reality in many police operations is different. In fact, some are known to apply paramilitary tactics, while others have only intelligence framework, and this creates significant challenges for integrating them. Moreover, few officers have any information on the criminal world outside their jurisdiction. Intelligence sharing is therefore key, but few know how to make it happen. Most police formation such as RDU, GSU, ATPU, RBPU apply integrated approach since they work side by side in Lamu County. Respondents indicated that sometimes they also employ different strategies for different situations in their counterterrorism operation. In an interview, Police Officer B162 indicated that:

Given the fluidity of security in Lamu County, it is only inherent to explore different policing approaches in counterterrorism and involve all security agencies and locals. It is foolhardy to stick to one approach (Interview with Police Officer B162, 11<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Dide Waride).

This sentiment is supported by Murphy (2005) who indicates that law enforcement agencies must explore possible methods of executing different policing approaches. Most approaches encourages a central coordinated policing structure to ensure amongst others, strategic direction and effective sharing of intelligence.

Policing approaches evolve and new ones are developed just as crime and technology also evolves. Police also need to keep abreast with new approaches. Ratcliffe (2007) supports this when he asserts that many police executives learned their trade many years ago when contemporary crime did not exist and criminal management was a largely manual. Consequently, they may not have been trained to appreciate the bigger decision-making options that become available with a more complete picture of crime and criminality. It is not sufficient to say what should happen; you have to demonstrate the value that flows from greater integration (Ratcliffe, 2007).

It is important to instill attitudes within the service that value contemporary ways of dealing with crime. If the police department is a largely reactive with little capacity to explore more productive methods of crime control, then there is little value in an integrated model. Indeed, in such an environment there is little value in crime management. Innovative and reflective departments will need to become more objective in their decision making, and instilling this attitude from the top to the bottom is essential in fostering an integrated-focused attitude among all levels of the organization (Anzar, 2003).

Whereas military policing (4.5%) is hardly employed by the police, save for the use of APCs that have been given to the police for counterterrorism, paramilitary (21.6%) according to the respondents, is employed during active operation in raids, ambushes and patrols in Lamu. This approach is common with the General Service Unit and the Administration Police Units who are generally trained as paramilitary police. As Jefferson (1990) puts it, paramilitary units straddle the lines between conventional policing and military forces and have been defined as: the application of (quasi) military training, equipment, philosophy and Organization to questions of

policing. Generally, this approach to policing is popular in quelling and managing stubborn situations such as riots and violent extremism, as explained by Police Officer B35 in an interview:

As for me, paramilitary have worked so well. Terrorists here are so lethal that if you don't act swiftly and ruthlessly, they will kill you, or even overran the camp. They are not your ordinary everyday criminals (Interview with Police Officer B35, 9<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Witu).

What the statement suggest is that terrorist employ sophisticated fire power that rivals or supersede that of the police. As stated by Graaf (2011), terrorist major objective is to cause as much destruction as possible. It should also be noted that the police since their inception have been to some extent 'militarized.' After all, the foundation of military and police power is the same—the state sanctioned capacity to use physical force to accomplish their respective objectives.

As a result of the 9/11 terrorist attack, the focus on terrorism and the “new security agenda” has acted as a strong driver for the reorganization of police institutions in many countries around the world (Brodeur, 2007; Deflem, 2010). This has also affected the relationships between police and military agencies. As Deflem (2010) puts it: “As terrorism is conceived as war-like behaviour and is responded to by military actions, it brings up the problem or advantage of a potential militarization of the police.”

Intelligence led policing (18.5%) is employed for both overt and covert operations. Respondents indicated that this is done prior to carrying out operations such as raids or ambushes so as to be sure of the target. National intelligence agencies by themselves, however strong and capable may not be able to deal with threat of terrorism. The new wave of terrorism calls for revamped intelligence apparatus and

reinforced cooperation mechanism that involves the local community. Intelligence is a key feature of policing, for this is the basis upon which crimes are both prevented as well as solved.

Bergen and Swati (2006) points out that the analysis required in an intelligence-led policing environment goes beyond that which has traditionally been practised in most law enforcement agencies. It requires the exploitation of all pertinent information and the analyst must be prepared to go beyond traditional sources such as police files to other government and regulatory agencies, private databases and open sources. The current proliferation of information sources through media like the Internet has increased the resources available to analysts by several orders of magnitude, meaning that they must work to a much higher standard than was acceptable ten, or even five, years ago.

Community regards intelligence sharing as a strategy that demands cooperation, confidentiality and surveillance. Some view it as intrusive and sensitive tactic. However, the most critical aspect revealed during the interview was that the community is unwilling to give information to the security agencies. During an interview, Police Officer B30 revealed that:

The problem with the locals is that they hate security personnel. They are very uncooperative and secretive. They don't give information against their Muslim brothers. When you get information from them, consider it fake and meant to make terror suspects escape (Interview with Police Officer B30, 21<sup>st</sup> October, 2018 in Faza).

The statement highlights the need for police and community to work together and cooperate in intelligence sharing. Of particular importance is the issue of why they do not see eye to eye and work closely together to provide a more holistic approach to counterterrorism. Law enforcement agencies are increasingly recognizing that

they are no longer in an information-poor world: data and information about the criminal environment and criminal activity abound. The challenge is to corral this wealth of data into knowledge that can enhance decision making, improve strategies to combat crime, and increase crime prevention benefits. In other words, the aim is to convert data and information into actionable intelligence that can be readily consumed (Ratcliffe, 2007).

On the flip side, this increase in data has not necessarily translated to an increase in knowledge. The structure of information handling processes within policing is not set up for the new millennium and ideas about intelligence management and dissemination from many years back still pervade the thinking and organizational culture of police agencies in the twenty-first century.

For much of the history of law enforcement, criminal intelligence—information that relates to the activities of criminal individuals or groups of offenders—was retained by specialized units or by individual detectives. Even with the introduction of intelligence units, these analytical groups often kept their information within the narrow confines of their specific unit. The focus of intelligence units was first and foremost on reactive, investigative support. This situation continues in most places today given that NPS is still undergoing integration where the two wings, the Administration Police Service and the Kenya Police Service are merging. The same was echoed in an interview where Police Officer A5 stated that:

Even among us there is a problem with flow of information because of bureaucracy. Officers from NIS, DCI or Anti-Terror sometimes get intelligence but fail to share, or share after time has lapsed. What they don't understand is that we are not working at cross purpose. We may be serving different units, but we are one security apparatus (Interview with Police Officer A5, 19<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu Town).



From the foregoing, it is apparent that there is need to speed up integration of the NPS or still, creation of a single communication command centre for purpose of counterterrorism operation. Ratcliffe (2007) maintains that in the new environment of intelligence led policing; these information silos are too valuable as strategic resources for the whole police department to squander on the needs of an individual investigator or unit. As we learn more about the abilities of organized crime groups to involve themselves in a range of criminal enterprises such as terrorism, narcotics, human smuggling, and money laundering, it has become necessary to restructure law enforcement analytical services to better reflect this criminal environment. The risks are too high to stick with unit isolation and specialization out of simple bureaucratic convenience. To change this situation will require executive leadership within policing.

Ratcliffe (2007) further points out those law enforcement officers who are tasked with crime reduction and prevention responsibilities need quality information in order to make good decisions. How best should they receive this information, and how should they organize their department to make the best use of information? Ideally, information passes through the hands of an analyst so that it can be combined, filtered, synthesized, and placed into context with other information so that the end result, an intelligence product, can give decision makers a succinct picture of the criminal environment. Nearly every modern policing strategy, from problem-oriented policing to intelligence-led policing, requires an analysis of the criminal environment as the starting point to choosing a crime reduction strategy.

Since technical problems seem to plague every department. The rapidity with which technology advances always appears to leave many aspects of policing operating in a proverbial dark age. Nowhere is this more apparent than in crime analysis and

intelligence, both areas that make significant technological demands. It is important that new tools and technology are embraced by the police to make intelligence gathering and dissemination remain at par with latest technological advancement if policing is to be successful. Whatever form it takes, intelligence-led policing requires commitment. Police must be prepared to stand away from traditional police philosophies and methodologies; to believe that operations can and should be driven by intelligence; to act rather than to react. They must be prepared to have faith in the intelligence process and in the judgements and recommendations of their intelligence staff.

Community policing (15.3%) is another policing approach employed by the National Police Service. Community policing entails a shared public responsibility on crime. Community policing is generally described as emphasizing a conciliatory rather than coercive approach to policing. Crime is addressed by methods which include strategic partnerships with the police and the communities living around the area of jurisdiction (Lemle, 2007).

Community policing emphasizes full partnership between the community and its police in identifying and ameliorating local crime and disorder problems. The philosophy of community policing is built on the belief that people deserve and have a right to say on how their communities are policed in exchange for their involvement and support (Liou & Savage, 1996). The police cannot effectively prevent and investigate crime without the willing participation of members of the public. Community policing therefore transforms the police from being an emergency squad in fighting crime into a proactive organization with ready solutions to answers bedeviling the society they live in (Thacher, 2001: 158).

This type of policing should extend to offering effective protection to communities against radical elements within them. As such, effective community policing strategies, including inclusion of community based policing programs, can protect and support vulnerable persons who are at risk of exclusion. This view was expressed by Elder C1 who indicated that:

People are scared of *Al-Shabaab* sympathisers among us. We are very careful on what we say and how we relate with security agencies, lest we are targeted for elimination by those who will view us as traitors (FGD with Council of Elders, 15<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

The sentiments agree with Chumba *et al.* (2016a) who says that community engagement and community oriented policing initiatives should be tactfully and carefully tailored to the local conditions and cultures such that no group feel or are actually endangered. This means that there is need for a strong legal framework for successful community policing. Lack of an enabling legislative and administrative environment to support community policing approaches and the development of partnerships has also hindered effective implementation of community policing initiatives (Mwaura, 2014). This has been due to the slow pace of legal and administrative reforms in both the police and the county government departments.

Fundamental principles of community policing strategies include building partnerships between security agencies and communities, volunteerism among community members and adherence to existing laws and procedures of public safety and security (GoK, 2009: 82). Others are empowerment of the community in public safety and security, awareness and respect of regional diversity and respect for and promotion of human rights. Other fundamental principles are enhancing trust between security agencies and the community and sharing information between security agencies and the public, developing shared values between police

and the communities, and developing shared responsibilities between police, community and other stakeholders.

However, these principles are rarely adhered to in implementation of community policing. Bureaucracy in conventional policing in which members of the community are regarded as outsiders in crime prevention discourages community members from active participation. Failure by the police to change their culture has resulted in poor public image and poor relationship with the public which has hindered efforts to build sustainable partnerships. In a Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader D1 noted that:

If community policing is to succeed in Lamu County, police should be advised to change their attitude towards the Muslim population. This idea of regarding every Muslim as a terrorist sympathizer should stop. Not every Muslim is a terrorist. They should also learn to relate with members of the public, otherwise they should expect little cooperation (FGD with Religious Leaders, 17<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Hindi).

From the sentiment, it is clear that fundamental principles of community policing are a precursor to good police public relationship, hence a successful community policing program. Gimonde (2007) further explains that community policing should adopt various strategies to build trust and partnership with the policed. This includes reaching out to community stakeholders to ascertain their needs, public involvement in intelligence, neighbourhood surveillance and the creation of police posts and liaison offices within short intervals in residential neighbourhoods, and sensitization of the public to the needs, difficulties and challenges of the police with a view to eliciting understanding and sundry supportive actions.

Countering the poor public image of police, to improve perceptions of both the police and residents on community policing programmes, and to strengthen the

police measures for managing confidentiality of information and intelligence obtained from residents is key to community policing (GoK, 2004). In an interview, Police Officer A3 indicated that:

We need a strong public relations department to communicate to the public. Most often we have no one to defend our image. This is because only gazetted officers are allowed to speak to the public and press. Hardly do they do because they have no formal training. The few customer care desks that we have are rarely manned because the service is overstretched (Interview with Police Officer A3, 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

What this means is that implementing community policing requires important changes in the ways that police departments are structured and managed as well as in the ways that their purposes and operating philosophy are understood (Mwaura, 2014). This can be enhanced by observing the core elements of community policing.

According to Saferworld (2008), the core elements of community policing include service orientation, partnership, problem solving, empowerment, accountability, mobilization, and sensitization. Mwaura (2014) explains that service orientation is provision of a professional police service responsive to community needs and accountable for addressing these needs while partnership is the facilitation of a cooperative, consultative, participative and inclusive process of problem solving. Problem solving on the other hand is the joint interrogation, identification, analysis and justification of the causes of crime and conflict allowing development of innovative measures to address the same.

Another element of community policing is empowerment which is the creation of voluntary joint responsibility and capacity for addressing crime holistically whereas accountability is the establishment of a culture of accountability for addressing the

needs and concerns of communities within frameworks that uphold the needs and concerns of communities within frameworks that uphold human rights irrespective of socio-economic station of life. One way of doing this is sharing of information with police at various Customer Care desks available in Police Stations such as Lamu Police Station in Plate 5.1.



**Plate 5.1: Researcher and the OCS Lamu Police Station C.I. Kipkurui Bor at Lamu Police Station's Customer Care Desk. Community policing in Lamu County is hampered by lack of cooperation from the locals.**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

Mobilization and sensitization element of community policing includes mobilization and sensitization of communities towards understanding criminal procedures like bail able offences and police bonds in order not to violate a suspect's human rights. When these principles are practiced, stakeholders will accept the legitimacy of the institutions and the program as well as the legitimacy of the individuals themselves.

Criminal justice (6.4%) is one of the policing approaches least employed in counterterrorism in Lamu County. According to respondents, it is least desired because it does not usually bring about the desired results. This approach is dependent on the court and legal frameworks that in themselves are not watertight. In an interview, Police Officer B88 echoed the same sentiments when he indicated that:

Courts are a big let-down. We arrest suspects today and tomorrow they are let free by the court. Perhaps, it is time to develop laws that are punitive to terrorism, even if it means amendment to existing laws (Interview with Police Officer B88, 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

The foregoing sentiment indicates that some components of the criminal justice approach are handicapped. According to Lambertus and Yakimchuk (2007) there are four distinct components of the criminal justice approach. These are law enforcement, prosecutors, courts and corrections. Law enforcement loads the system through investigations and arrest. Prosecutors are the bridge between law enforcement and the courts. Courts form the critical components of the administration of justice. Under the component of corrections, the four commonly cited goals are retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and either rehabilitation/reintegration. The criminal justice components work in tandem with each other. However, these components have functions which are independent of

each other, but also overlap and their activities are directed at a common goal: crime prevention and justice. For efficiency, all components should function properly. In one of the Focus Group Discussions, religious leaders however complained about the criminal justice system. Religious Leader A3 said that:

The criminal justice system in Kenya is not fully anchored in the rule of law. Many at times suspects are detained arbitrarily even if there is no offence disclosed. At times, suspects disappear without trace, or even executed in cold blood by the authorities (FGD with Religious Leaders, 1<sup>st</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

What this means is that for the fight against terrorism to be effective and sustainable, it should be conducted at all times in accordance with the rule of law and international human rights standards. The state's response to the threat of terrorism should be evidence-based and proportionate to avoid losing the trust and support of the public, as well as to avoid victimization and other forms of unintended validation of terrorist narratives. Moreover, it cannot be limited to repressive actions focused on pursuing terrorists, denying them material capabilities and thwarting their plans. The traditional counterterrorism work of law enforcement and intelligence agencies needs to be supplemented with prevention efforts to address conditions that are conducive to the spread of terrorism, disrupt terrorist radicalization and stem recruitment (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a).

OSCE (2014) emphasizes that countering terrorism requires both effective criminal-justice action against those who incite others to terrorism and seek to recruit others for terrorism, and comprehensive, multi-disciplinary efforts to address conditions that are conducive to terrorism. Preventing terrorism should be based on a legislative framework that provides for the appropriate criminalization of preparatory offences. Definitions of such offences in national legislation, similar to defining acts of terrorism, should be clear, precise, non-discriminatory, non-



retroactive and accessible to the public. The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism has been identified as an international good practice. It defines the criminal offences of “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence”, “recruitment for terrorism” and “training for terrorism”.



**Plate 5.2: Researcher outside Mpeketoni Law Court. There are inadequate Counterterrorism Laws in Kenya.**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

UN Security Council resolution 1373 obliges states to suppress terrorist recruitment, and resolution 1624 (2005) calls on states to prohibit, by law, incitement to commit terrorist acts. To comply with international standards, the criminalization of incitement to terrorism must be accompanied by adequate safeguards in line with the principle of legality, and should uphold fundamental rights, including the freedom of expression. In particular, the offence of incitement to commit a terrorist act will be human rights-compliant if it focuses on direct incitement, with an intention to promote terrorism, and if it establishes an evidence-

based causal link between the incitement and the likely realization of a terrorist act (OSCE, 2014).

Other policing approaches (5.0%) cited were hot spot policing, predictive policing and problem oriented policing approach. The three relies much on technology. Predictive policing tries to harness the power of information, geospatial technologies and evidence based intervention models to reduce crime and improve public safety. This two pronged approach – applying advanced analytics to various data sets, in conjunction with intervention models – can move law enforcement from reacting to crimes into the realms of predicting what and where something is likely to happen and deploying resources accordingly. Murphy (2005) points out that predictive policing approach does not replace other policing approaches, instead it enhances existing approaches such as intelligence led policing and community policing.

Bures (2006) explains that the operational value of predictive policing tools is in their contribution to broader law enforcement strategies that use the tools' risk assessments to inform resource allocation and problem-solving decisions. The collection and use of data on individuals has raised a number of concerns about privacy rights and civil liberties. An understanding of the legal precedent, along with regular audits, public outreach strategies, and greater community involvement and buy-in, have helped police departments address these concerns.

Weisburd & Mezerolle (2000) further reiterates that predictive policing tools should be compatible with the data needs and capabilities of individual law enforcement agencies. Small agencies investigating few crimes are unlikely to need much more than core statistical and display capabilities. Larger agencies with large volumes of

incident and intelligence data will want to consider more sophisticated systems. They may also want to consider how well the systems disseminate and display key supporting information on recent crime and disorder, intelligence, and policing activity, in addition to the predictions themselves, to better support decision making at all levels. The government should be aware of the major financial limitations that law enforcement agencies face in procuring and maintaining new systems, and they should avoid promising crystal ball-like capabilities when it comes to these systems.

To be effective, predictive policing must include interventions based on analytical findings. Successful interventions typically have top-level support, sufficient resources, automated systems providing needed information, and assigned personnel with both the freedom to resolve crime problems and accountability for doing so. In all cases, law enforcement agencies should respect civil liberties and privacy rights. When implementing a predictive policing strategy, they should use good judgment in sharing information about possible offenders and victims, and they should work to involve and educate the community to address these concerns.

Another policing strategy is hot spot policing. According to Weisburd & Mezerolle (2000), hot spot policing is premised on the fact that identifying and formulating a strategic response to hot spots can reduce crime in both the hot spot and surrounding areas. Evaluation of hot spot policing support a growing body of evidence that suggest that crime strategies focused on a specific area do not inevitably lead to the displacement of crime problems; displacement occurs when criminals who are under pressure from a focused strategy move away from the focus area and bring their criminal activity to another area that is not getting special

attention from law enforcement. This may be beneficial to law enforcement agencies in dealing with terrorists and their sympathisers. In an interview, Police Officer B38 stated that:

We mapped Hindi, Basuba, Baure and Milihoi as terrorist hotspots in Lamu and subsequently launched mop up operations in these areas. After one month of operation, terrorists in these areas crossed the border into Somalia while some moved to other areas such as Mangai and Milimani (Interview with Police Officer B38, 9<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Witu).

What this sentiment means is that hot spot policing can actually displace criminals while at the same time create problems in other areas. This in essence supports a growing body of evidence which suggests that crime strategies focused on a specific area do not inevitably lead to the displacement of crime problems; displacement occurs when criminals who are under pressure from a focused strategy move away from the focus area and bring their criminal activities to another area that is not getting special attention from law enforcement. Therefore introduction of a crime-prevention strategy in a small, high-crime area often creates a "diffusion of benefits" to nearby areas, reducing crime (rather than increasing it) in the immediate catchment zone around the target area. Weisburd *et al.* (2010) add that crimes depend not just on criminals, but on policing in key places and other factors such as policing strategies adopted. Areas such as Hindi, Basuba, Baure and Milihoi are described as terrorist hotspots because they are found in or along the fringes of Boni Forest where terrorists hide and carry attacks against targets. These areas should therefore be placed under hot spot policing.

Problem oriented policing approach involves the identification and analysis of specific crime in order to develop effective response strategy. According to Murphy (2005), this approach requires police to be proactive in identifying underlying

problems by: repeated incident; occurring in a community; with related characteristics e.g. behaviour, people, location, time; that concerns both the community and the police.

Under the POP (problem oriented policing) model, police agencies are expected to systematically analyse the problems of a community, search for effective solutions to the problems, and evaluate the impact of their efforts. POP represents police-led efforts to change the underlying conditions at hot spots that lead to recurring crime problems. It also requires police to look past traditional strategies and consider other possible approaches for addressing crime and disorder. Today, it is one of the most widely used strategies among progressive law enforcement agencies (Weisburd *et al.*, 2010).

The approach is premised on SARA model. The POP approach was first advanced by Herman (1979), who argued that the standard model of policing (which is primarily reactive and incident driven) should be replaced with a more proactive approach to identifying and targeting problems that contribute to crime, disorder, and other community issues. Eck & Spelman (1987) later developed a framework for implementing POP through the use of the SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment) model. SARA is just one of numerous potential methodologies for implementing POP in practice.

In the first step, scanning, police rely on several different sources to identify and prioritize potential problems associated with crime and disorder in a jurisdiction. This can include identifying problems of concern to the community, confirming that the problem exists, figuring out the consequences of the problem, and determining how frequent the problem occurs. Once the problem is identified, the

next step is analysis. This stage of the process involves identifying and analysing relevant data to learn more about the problem, including potentially narrowing its scope and figuring out possible explanations why the problem is occurring. This information is essential for selecting the most effective and appropriate response to the problem, which occurs in the next step.

In the third step, response, police and their partners select one or more responses or interventions based on the results from the Analysis conducted in the previous step.

During an interview, Police Officer B63 indicated that:

Response is one of the most important stages in POP. This is because the type of response selected determines whether the problem will be eradicated or blown out of proportion. The delicate nature therefore calls for sobriety in selection and execution (Interview with Police Officer B63, 11<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Dide Waride).

This means that the police should choose the most appropriate strategy or strategies in execution. A response plan is outlined that includes the nature of each response, the specific objectives these responses are intended to achieve, and the responsibilities of the various partners involved in implementing the response. Once the response is selected, it is implemented by the police and their partners.

Finally, the Assessment step involves evaluating whether the responses were implemented in a way that was consistent with the Response plan, and whether the responses achieved their intended effects. Thus, the assessment phase includes both process evaluation and impact evaluation components.

POP approaches can take on a variety of forms. Strategies may focus on crime hot spots or they may target nongeographic concentrations in crime and other problems, including repeat offenders, repeat victims, and repeat times. The key ingredients in POP are the selection of a narrowly defined problem type and the application of a

wide range of targeted responses intended to reduce the incidence or severity of that problem type. Other important ingredients include the inclusion of partners outside of the police agency and the central role of data and information in selecting a problem type, analysing it, evaluating the responses, and adjusting as needed (Weisburd *et al.*, 2010).

POP relies primarily on a diverse range of tightly focused policing strategies, some of which involve traditional law enforcement approaches and some of which involve alternative approaches. POP overlaps to some extent with other recent innovations in policing, including community policing, third-party policing, focused deterrence, and hot spots policing. Nonetheless, POP's central elements are distinctive.

Focused deterrence approach is problem-oriented policing strategy that target specific criminal activity committed by a small number of chronic offenders who are vulnerable to sanctions and punishment. Offenders are directly confronted and informed that continued criminal behaviour will not be tolerated. Targeted offenders are also told how the criminal justice system will respond to continued criminal behaviour; mainly that all potential sanctions, or levers, will be applied. The deterrence-based message is reinforced through crackdowns on offenders, or groups of offenders who continue to commit crimes despite the warning. In addition to deterring violent behaviour, the strategies also reward compliance and nonviolent behaviour among targeted offenders.

Focused deterrence strategies generally target a specific type or group of offenders. Many focused deterrence interventions have primarily targeted incidents of serious

violence - criminal activities that usually involve chronic offenders (Kennedy, 1997). Some strategies have focused on eliminating public forms of drug dealing.

Focused deterrence strategies seek to directly influence perceived sanction risks among offenders by communicating directly with them about the consequences of their actions and administering swift punishment. Since many focused deterrence strategies target groups rather than individuals, another key element is the idea of collective responsibility: holding all members of the group responsible for the actions of any individual member. Together, these program elements are intended to influence the perceived risk of sanctions among potential offenders, thereby altering their decisions about whether or not to carry out an offence.

## **5.2 Frequency of Applying Policing Approaches in Counterterrorism in Lamu County**


The respondents were asked to state how frequent the NPS are applying policing approaches in counterterrorism in Lamu County. The findings were as presented in Figure 5.2.

Findings from Figure 5.2 shows that 10.8% (34) indicated very often, 51.6% (162) indicated often, 23.2% (73) were neutral, 9.6% (30) indicated rarely, while 4.8% (15) indicated very rarely. Most respondents indicated that the NPS apply policing approaches often. Reasons cited for this are that they are well trained and inducted on policing approaches hence competent and comfortable applying them. They also indicated that policing approaches are civilian oriented hence acceptable by the civilian population. For instance, community policing plays a major part in police-community relations and problem solving from the grass root level in the community. In an interview, Chief 4 indicated that:



Community policing has helped in enhancing police understanding of communities around them through communication. It has also helped in identifying and addressing community safety issues and grievances as well as facilitating timely identification and referral of critical situations in the community (Interview with Chief 4, 11<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Katsakairo).

What this means is that in order to develop a partnership with the community, first the police must form a great relationship with the neighbourhood in pursuit of controlling crime. Most community concerns and solutions are identified through problem solving. The objective is to lessen crime and disorder by diligently examining the attributes of concerns in communities and then applying the most suited problem solving solution.



**Figure 5.2: Frequency of Applying Policing Approaches in Counterterrorism in Lamu County**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

Another reason cited was that policing approaches are flexible and capable of changing. The solutions and strategies change as the community changes. In an interview, Police Officer B13 indicated that:

These approaches are flexible in the sense that most of them such as community policing and intelligence led policing are community driven. The community is therefore given a leeway to adopt them in their unique circumstance (Interview with Police Officer B13, 11<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Dide Waride).

What the foregoing mean is that if a plan works in one community, it doesn't mean that it will work in all communities. They can also be implemented in a limitless number of ways thus offering a myriad of benefits. In the end policing becomes a philosophy, not a program (Weisburd *et al.*, 2002). If the philosophy is not understood by all that are involved, then the program does not succeed. The biggest obstacle that policing approaches and programs have to face is the idea of change. Officers have to change the concept of policing and citizens have to be willing to accept the change.

The manner in, and degree to which policing strategies could incidentally benefit countering terrorism depend on the level of trust and co-operation that already exists between the police and the public. Significant time and police effort may be required to (re-)build public confidence, explain the stakes in engaging with the police, and provide evidence of the tangible benefits of such engagement for the community. This is best achieved by engaging communities on broader security and safety issues that are of concern to them, not necessarily in relation to preventing terrorism (OSCE, 2014).

The police should also take great care in establishing partnerships with individuals, groups or organizations, especially when there is evidence that these individuals or

groups are not unequivocally committed to non-violence and respect for universal human rights. Intelligence-led policing and community policing are complementary but distinct approaches. Intelligence may emerge as a by-product of effective community policing, where the public has developed trust and confidence in the police. Community policing, however, is not, and should not be, about purposeful intelligence-gathering for counterterrorism.

This therefore means that countering the appeal of terrorism requires more specific interventions. The narratives and ideas that underpin terrorism need to be understood to address any legitimate grievances they may exploit and to avoid initiating actions that validate the case made by terrorists. Terrorists may use a broad range of arguments, and it is critical that they be each challenged by relevant and credible voices. This includes both proving these narratives ideologically and factually wrong, and frequently spreading positive counter-messages to the very audiences that are targeted for violent radicalization and recruitment into terrorism.

### **5.3 Influence of Policing Approaches on Performance of Police Officers**


The respondents were asked the extent to which application of Policing Approaches influence the performance of police officers. The findings were as presented in Figure 5.3.

From the findings in Figure 5.3, 7.3% (23) of the respondents indicated very great extent, 39.2% (123) indicated great extent, 32.2% (101) were neutral, 17.5% (55) indicated less extent while 3.8% (12) indicated not at all. Based on the findings, most respondent (39.2%) indicated that the policing approaches influence performance of NPS to a great extent. Response from them was that they always apply policing approaches in their daily operations and performance of duty since

they are well versed with them as police officers. They also indicated that the approaches tend to yield results. In an interview, Police Officer B5 indicated that:

With policing approaches, we don't need further induction. We have been trained and used them over and over. They are also yielding results (Interview with Police Officer B5, 9th October, 2018 in Witu).

The foregoing sentiment is an indication that the police could be more comfortable with policing approaches to other strategies. Policing approaches lowers the community's level of fear when focused on increasing community-police interaction. The approaches are meant to influence fear of crime by making police easily accessible and more visible presence, or reducing the sense of physical, social, and psychological distance between ordinary citizens and police officer.



**Figure 5.3: Influence of Policing Approaches on Performance of Police Officers in Lamu County**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**


According to OSCE (2014), policing approaches with focus on enhancing police performance and establishing partnerships between the police, other public authorities and communities for proactive counterterrorism, can make a tangible and durable contribution to wider strategic efforts to prevent terrorism and counter violent extremism. However, policymakers, communities and police leaders should have realistic expectations about the results that policing approaches can deliver in response to what is often a low-incidence, highly complex and multidimensional problem that is terrorism. In one Focus Group Discussion, Elder D7 indicated that:

Although policing approaches aren't achieving much, they are having a positive influence in the performance of the police. With time, police performance will improve if the police are committed to the rule of law and justice. We are looking forward to times when the police will stop considering almost everyone with suspicion and stop victimization. I repeat, this is possible if police adhere to the rule of law (FGD with Council of Elders, 18<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu).

The foregoing sentiment suggests that for the fight against terrorism to be sustainable and have positive influence, it should be conducted at all times in accordance with the rule of law and international human rights standards. The police therefore need to be acquainted with policing laws. The state's response to the threat of terrorism should be evidence-based and proportionate to avoid losing the trust and support of the public, as well as to avoid victimization and other forms of unintended validation of terrorist narratives. Moreover, it cannot be limited to repressive actions focused on pursuing terrorists, denying them material capabilities and thwarting their plans. The traditional counterterrorism work of law enforcement and intelligence agencies needs to be supplemented with prevention efforts to address conditions that are conducive to the spread of terrorism, disrupt terrorist radicalization and stem recruitment (OSCE, 2014).

## 5.4 Efficacy of Policing Approaches Applied in Counterterrorism in Lamu County

The respondents were asked to state efficacy of policing approaches applied in counterterrorism in Lamu County. The findings were as presented in Figure 5.4.



**Figure 5.4: Efficacy of Policing Approaches Applied in Counterterrorism in Lamu County**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

Findings from Figure 5.4 indicate that integrated policing with 51.0% (160) is the most effective policing approach applied in counterterrorism in Lamu County. Others are paramilitary at 44.6% (140), intelligence led policing at 38.3% (120), others at 33.8% (106), military at 28.7% (90), community policing at 19.1% (60), and criminal justice at 14.1% (44).

Integrated policing (51.0%) is the most effective policing approach. Respondents indicated that they use different approaches for different situations and circumstances. They sometimes form joint policing units that combine all police formations such as the GSU, RDU, AP, RBPU, ATPU and even the military in their policing duties. In an interview, Police Officer B99 indicated that:

We sometimes bring all policing functions under one roof. The strategy seems to be wholesome in the sense that all heads come together in cases pertaining to major incidents to choke out a joint strategy for productive results. This minimizes unnecessary rivalry between different police unit and duplication of duty while bringing rich experiences and expertise from the diverse groups making counterterrorism easier. What remains is a standing framework for such cooperation (Interview with Police Officer B99, 7<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Pate).

The foregoing sentiments are supported by Terrill (2003) who indicates that in any security operation, exchange of experience, knowledge, resources and technical expertise under different perspective is crucial. That is why integrating different policing approaches for different police operations is crucial for yielding effective results in counterterrorism. Integration implies sharing of resources, skills and approaches for better results.

A holistic approach to crime and criminal analysis will identify offenders for targeting, as well as places and times for a problem-oriented response. An integrated analysis could provide police and operational commanders with a better picture of the criminal environment and, as a result, more options for reducing crime. Whereas crime analysis will generally produce areas for targeted patrol, and intelligence analysis produce offender target packages, an integrated analysis can suggest a broader range of tactics and can give an operational commander the opportunity to weigh a greater number of options with great efficacy.

Paramilitary policing approach (44.6%) is usually effective when acting on intelligence, and usually reactive in nature. Respondents indicated that police formations such as the GSU, AP, RDU and RBPU employ this approach, especially when responding to attacks by *Al-Shabaab* or carrying out raids or laying ambushes. In an interview, Police Officer B42 explained that:

Paramilitary is part and parcel of police operation given that GSU and AP undergo paramilitary training. When confronted by militants like *Al-Shabaab*, one has no option but to employ paramilitary tactics in policing for survival (Interview with Police Officer B42, 21<sup>st</sup> November, 2018 in Pandanguo).

This view suggests that paramilitary approach calls for coordination and cooperation. When this is observed, raids and ambushes are likely to be successful and also minimizes friendly fire. As Erwin (2013) asserts, lack of cooperation between security agencies due to organizational structure, technical incompatibilities or competing interests can increase the propensity for operational failure. In Lamu, this approach has been used with considerable success as evident in findings.

Intelligence led policing (38.2%) is also mainly effective through cooperation and coordination. It is evident that no effective counterterrorism strategy can exist without intense and substantial intelligence cooperation among security agencies and the community. Furthermore, the fact that intelligence sharing hamper war on terrorism underscores the need to increase incentives and sharing programs to increase threat pre-emption. Virta (2008) explains that low trust in police can inhibit the willingness of individual to pass community intelligence on range of issues. This may be disastrous in counterterrorism operation. That is why police – civilian cooperation is emphasized and stressed as much. In an interview, Police Officer A7 emphasized that:



Police are now dealing with crime and criminals that would be unrecognisable to the police officers of a generation ago and must do so with a rapidly shrinking resource base. The old models of policing no longer apply effectively. We can no longer afford simply to react to each new situation, nor can we rely upon our traditional notions of crime and criminal behaviour. Intelligence-led policing may hold the key to our survival (Interview with Police Officer A7, 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

What this means is that whatever form it takes, intelligence-led policing requires commitment. Police must be prepared to stand away from traditional police philosophies and methodologies; to believe that operations can and should be driven by intelligence; to act rather than to react. They must be prepared to have faith in the intelligence process and in the judgements and recommendations of their intelligence staff, it may be a difficult, even painful, step, but it is a necessary one.

Angus (1997) explains that in intelligence led policing, analysis is undertaken for both short-term (tactical) and long-term (strategic) purposes. Law enforcement decision-making is required in both instances and the facts and analysis that underlie those decisions are critical. At the tactical level, analysis can be used to support community and problem-solving policing, crime prevention and investigations of all sorts. Problem-solving policing is a form of intelligence-led policing. It involves the collection of all available data on crime symptoms, determination of the extent of the problem through analysis of the data and provision of potential solutions to decision-makers. Generally, data are collected from a variety of sources (crime scene evidence, subpoenaed records, records checks, commercial, etc.), analysed and prepared for indictment and prosecution.

At the strategic level, some of the same data collected for tactical purposes can be combined with other information to produce assessments of crime problems and to

develop potential longer-term solutions to those problems. For example, a department might be investigating and prosecuting a member of an ethnic-based organized crime group on a tactical level. On the strategic level, however, the department might gather information on the group, its finances and business ventures, increases in its membership, its geographic range, its various criminal activities and its history. This information would then be used in the long range planning process and in the development of effective enforcement strategy. Strategic assessments of this nature allow individual police agencies to order their priorities, an important consideration in an age of diminishing resources. In an interview, Police Officer A5 indicated that:

Intelligence officers and analysts must not just be simply statisticians or compilers of charts, but rather to be managers, forecasters and, most of all, thinkers. This is because development of conclusions and recommendations is an integral part of the intelligence process (Interview with Police Officer A5, 19<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu Town).

This implies that analysis required in an intelligence-led policing environment goes beyond that which has traditionally been practised in most law enforcement agencies. Angus (1997) reiterates that it requires the exploitation of all pertinent information and the analyst must be prepared to go beyond traditional sources such as police files to other government and regulatory agencies, private databases and open sources. The current proliferation of information sources through media like the Internet has increased the resources available to analysts by several orders of magnitude, meaning that they must work to a much higher standard than was acceptable ten, or even five, years ago.

The intelligence-led policing environment requires the analyst to be capable of viewing multiple data and finding both small and large patterns to guide police

efforts. So too, the basic facts of current violations may not provide a true picture of a particular crime phenomenon. The analyst must be prepared to examine crime in the historical sense and to consider how similar crimes have manifested themselves in other jurisdictions. In this way, other motives may appear, larger groups and conspiracies may reveal themselves. Crime and criminal behaviour is multi-faceted and complex. Its true nature only becomes apparent when it is examined through a broad and powerful lens (Angus, 1997).

Military policing approach (28.7%), though not always popular with the police has been effectively applied in difficult and stubborn circumstances such as during combat and ambushes. This has been made possible through government decision to supply police with APCs and heavy machinery. It is also applied during interagency operation and manoeuvres that involves the military, as explained by Police Officer B78:

Military policing approach is most of the time aided by the military during joint operation. This is because they own the hardware appropriate for such operations. Soon, the police will purchase the same (Interview with Police Officer B78, 12<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Baure).

Just like in most countries, police have limited military capabilities, except police formations such as GSU, AP that undergo paramilitary training and are equipped with military hardware. It should be obvious that the police, since their inception, have been to some extent 'militarized.' After all, the foundation of military and police power is the same - the state sanctioned capacity to use physical force to accomplish their respective objectives, external and internal security (Kraska, 1999). Military policing should however only be applied in circumstances when other policing approaches can least yield desired results.

Community policing (19.1%) has also been applied in Lamu County with a small degree of efficacy. Respondents indicated that local residents view the police as not friendly due to atrocities committed by them against the population such as arbitrary arrests, torture and extrajudicial killings. Mistrust between the Muslims and predominantly Christian police are also cited as contributing factors. In a Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader C8 indicated that:

Strong relationships of mutual trust between police agencies and the communities they serve are critical in maintaining public safety and effective policing. Police rely on the cooperation of community members to provide information about crime. Similarly, community member's willingness to trust the police depends on whether they believe that police actions reflect community values and incorporate the principles of procedural justice and legitimacy. At the moment, this is lacking (FGD with Religious Leaders, 7<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kizingitini).

The sentiments agrees with a report by Ransley (2009) indicating that public confidence in Kenya's Police Service has been eroded due to accusations of impunity, excessive use of force and brutality, disregard for human rights, abuse of due process and malignant corruption. Public outcry for transformation in the police sector in particular has been driven by ills in the police whose nefarious reputation has eroded public trust. Those feelings continue to persist but the on-going reforms have brought some hope that the 'force' will transform into a 'service' that is accountable, professional, transparent and possessing a human rights sensitive approach.

According to OSCE (2014), when pursued in its own right and as a genuine application of democratic policing, community policing may incidentally contribute to the prevention of terrorism and elimination of violent extremism in a number of ways such as: -

Anchoring policing into respect for human rights and the rule of law: Community policing can help reduce potential violations of human rights and the undermining of the rule of law by the police service or individual police officers, which might otherwise fuel grievances and alienation in certain segments of the population. Implementing community policing as a human rights-based approach to policing requires the development of operating rules and procedures that are in line with international human rights standards. It also entails equipping police officers with the necessary knowledge, attitudes and skills to protect human rights in their work. Human rights should be an integral part of all training for law enforcement officials. Police officers involved in counterterrorism should be provided with specialized training on human rights in the context of counterterrorism.



**Plate 5.3: Researcher leaving Lamu Jetty for Shella Island. Terrorists are known to violate the water of Indian Ocean around Lamu Archipelago.**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

Improving public perceptions and interaction with the police: Public support for the counterterrorism actions of the police hinges on how the public perceive and

interact with the police. Public trust in the police is not only a desired outcome of community policing, but also a precondition for its success. All members of the community, men and women, must believe that efforts to address their common and separate security concerns are genuine, that dialogue with the police is possible, and that their rights are respected, before they even consider participating in joint efforts.

Improving communication with the public on counterterrorism: The public should understand the nature of the threat, how they should respond in an emergency, what their rights are, where to report information, and what the police are doing to protect them. Police should consider making information available through a variety of means. This might include distributing information in different languages, as well as in formats that can be accessed by those with sight or hearing impairments.

Increasing public vigilance and resilience: Providing an accurate and balanced assessment of a terrorist threat is critical to the successful mobilization of public support and the encouragement of public vigilance. It is vital that the nature and extent of the threat be neither exaggerated nor minimized. The public must have confidence in the reliability of the messages they are given about the terrorist threat. Police and government must carefully balance the need to gain the public's attention against the risk of frightening the population and creating anxiety and instability. By raising awareness, providing information and advice, as well as encouraging relevant citizen initiatives, the police can empower communities to develop their own internal resilience to terrorism such as developing mechanisms for detecting and suppressing terror acts or habits at early stage.

Enhancing police understanding of communities as a basis to better engage and cooperate with them: Police leaders should ensure that police officers working with communities are assigned for a long-enough period to allow them to develop a sophisticated understanding of those communities and to build trusting relationships with members that, in turn, can facilitate effective engagement and cooperation with the public. Valuing and promoting community policing as a good career choice for both men and women, and providing specialized training can help officers to develop the skills and knowledge necessary to better engage and support specific groups within the community. Police officers should be representative of the population, with diverse social and cultural backgrounds: this will allow them to engage and build partnerships with particular groups.

Helping to identify and address community safety issues and grievances: The reasons why people radicalize to violence are often linked to real or perceived grievances, including violations of their rights and experiences of discrimination, and controversial policies. Community engagement and joint problem-solving efforts provide police with the opportunity to identify and address grievances affecting both men and women that may be underlying terrorism in partnership with male and female representatives of communities and other public authorities. Where an issue falls outside the responsibilities of the police, police officers can advise the public on possible courses of action to strengthen community cohesion; they can facilitate the mobilization of community members, civil society organizations and competent public authorities, as appropriate.

Improving relations between the police and individuals and groups that have been hard to reach or not yet engaged with: Having better knowledge of communities and being able to rely on partners within communities will improve the ability of

the police to reach individuals or groups that are otherwise difficult for the police to approach. This is particularly true if the individuals or groups are distrustful or marginalized, or if they generally avoid contact with the public. As with any member of the public, these individuals might be witnesses to situations of concern, themselves be vulnerable to terrorism or be potential victims of violent extremism (OSCE, 2014).

Criminal justice (14.1%) is the least effective and this is blamed on the judicial system that respondents blame for lack of capacity to handle terrorism appropriately leading to many acquittals in courts. Respondents also cite lack of strong relevant laws and legislations on terrorism, antiterrorism and counterterrorism. In an interview, Police Officer A5 stated that:

The problem with our courts is lack of strong laws to convict terrorist. Many terror suspects are arrested, taken before court of law and released (Interview with Police Officer A5, 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

This means that states they have an obligation to provide protection against acts of terrorism, and this requires that they put particular emphasis on preventing terrorism, including strong laws. This is reflected in their international legal obligations and political commitments. The UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy notably defines a holistic approach to counterterrorism that includes: measures to address conditions that are conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to prevent and combat terrorism; and measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.

UN Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) imposes a legally binding obligation on all states to establish appropriate legislative, regulatory and institutional frameworks, including, to: refrain from providing any form of support, active or



passive, to entities or individuals involved in terrorist acts; prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism; suppress the recruitment of members of terrorist groups; eliminate the supply of weapons to terrorists; prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups; deny safe havens to those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens; ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice; and afford each other the greatest measure of mutual legal assistance in connection with criminal matters related to terrorism.

UN Security Council resolution 1456 (2003) and subsequent resolutions oblige states to ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism complies with international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law.

In the group of Others (33.8%), hot spot policing approach is effective due to the fact that mapping is done to known places of frequent attacks. As such, it is easy to intensify patrols and lay ambushes in such areas thereby reducing terror incidents.

Police Officer B29 demonstrated this when he indicated that:

Milihoi, Baure, Basuba, Hindi and Nyongoro are known hotspots due to previous attacks. We therefore decided to set camps and intensify patrols in those areas. Since then, we have hardly experienced attack in those spots (Interview with Police Officer B29, 15<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

The same sentiment is supported by Weisburd & Mezerolle (2000) who indicates that crime can drop substantially in hot spots without rising in other areas. The introduction of a crime prevention strategy in a small, high crime area often creates a ‘diffusion of benefits’ to nearby areas, reducing crime (rather than increasing it) in the immediate catchment zone around the target area. Crime depends not just on

criminals, but on policing in key places and other factors such as placement of fences, alleys and other environmental features. Furthermore, crime does not occur evenly over the landscape. It is clustered in small areas or hot spots that account for disproportionate amount of crime or disorder. In addition to location, crime and public disorder tend to concentrate at certain times of the day or week, for instance, housebreaking occur during day time when residents are not at home.

Predictive policing approach anticipates trends i.e. anticipating likely crime events and informing actions to prevent crime. Prediction can focus on variables such as place, people, groups or incidents. Demographic trends, parolee populations and economic conditions may all affect crime rates in particular areas. Using models supported by prior crime and environmental data to inform different kinds of interventions can help police reduce the number of crime incidents.


Problem oriented policing on the other hand reduces crime in the short term and improves community relation. To count as problem oriented policing, a program has to identify an issue in a community, mostly with input from community members, and develop strategies to solve it. The issue may be specific like juvenile crime, or broader like radicalisation or terrorism.

### **5.5 Groups Police can engage in Implementing Policing Approaches in Countering Terrorism in Lamu County**

Engagement with various groups in the community is a critical component of any effective policing initiative, particularly one aimed at preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism. Engagement is not just about organizing a meeting with group members. Effective engagement is a highly complex process that

demands sensitivity and very careful planning. Haphazard police-community engagement can be more detrimental than no engagement at all.

The study sought information on various groups the police can engage in implementing policing approaches to counter terrorism. Various groups identified are as presented in Figure 5.5. The study also sought to establish the mode of engagement and approaches that may be useful in such engagement. The findings are presented in this section.



**Figure 5.5: Groups Police can engage in Implementing Policing Approaches in Countering Terrorism in Lamu County**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

From the findings in Figure 5.5, 10.6% (33) indicated women, 26.5% (83) indicated youth, 30.1% (95) indicated religious leaders and elders, 18.6% (58) indicated civil society organizations, while 14.2% (45) indicated media.

Engagement with the youth (26.5%) can enhance situational awareness about what is happening around and improve understanding of dynamics, risk perceptions and concerns within communities; this can then serve as a basis for informed and more effective policing.

Respondents indicated that for meaningful engagement, the police should maximize opportunities for communicating, building mutual understanding and trust, and exchanging information with the youth. The police should also listen to concerns of the youth, recognize their perceptions of problems and not try to immediately reframe or redefine the problem to suit the police agenda. In an interview, Chief 16 stated that:

It is high time the police should consider youths as key partners in peace and tranquillity of Lamu County and stop stereotyping them. It's true that youths are the ones who are mostly radicalised; hence the police should give a listening ear if they are to get to the root cause of the problem of radicalisation and terrorism and cure it once and for all. The advantage with the youth is that the police can use technology to reach them en masse (Interview with Chief 16, 16<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu).

This argument is a pointer that the problem of radicalisation starts and ends with the youth. This could be attributed to the fact that the mind and world of the youth is such vast and open to receive anything both harmful and good. Dandurand (2013) explains that youths are inundated with information made available by new technologies including cell phones and internet which have revolutionized how youths communicate. On the other hand, OSCE (2014) posits that young people tend to use different methods of communication and get information from different

sources compared to those used by older people. For many young people, their social lives and friendships are maintained primarily via social-networking media. The use of social media can be an effective way of reaching young people and communicating key messages to them.

On approaches of engagement, respondents indicate that the police can organize events in which young men and women can learn about and experience police activities. This serves the purpose of demystifying police actions and approaches so that young people have a better understanding of police work. The police should also endeavour to have diverse personnel that reflect the population, with sufficient experience and an appropriate gender balance. Such composition can easily get along with the youth. The police can also organise recreation activities with the youth. They can also establish a presence on social media to engage with young people, including proactive dialogue and creating awareness on terrorism. They can establish or support peer-mentoring schemes, whereby young people who have acquired some skills or those who have been de-radicalised can be mentors to support members of their peer group.

Changing perceptions of the police among young men and women, and the perceptions of youth among the police, is a prerequisite for effective engagement and takes time. As representatives of the state, it is first and foremost of critical importance that the police empathize with young people in the community and afford them the same respect and protect their rights in the same manner as they would with any other members of the society. If young people feel respected and valued by the police, they are much more likely to be open to dialogue and engage effectively with the police. This is a plus in law enforcement (OSCE, 2014).

Engaging women (10.6%) is another strategy in implementing policing approaches to counter terrorism. Although women are greatly affected by terrorism and violence, they are mostly side-lined in efforts and programs to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Since they are affected, they should be brought on board to actively participate in initiatives designed to ensure the safety of their community. Women are therefore more likely to help in identifying and addressing specific political, social, economic or cultural concerns in the community that may lead to terrorism or radicalization. During Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader E9 indicated that:

The police should know that women and men have different security concerns. It is high time that they should engage us equally in finding solutions to security impasse in Lamu and stop gender bias. As it stands now, men can only speak for themselves (FGD with Religious Leaders, 11<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Moa).

In view of the foregoing sentiments, it is clear that integrating women into peace building processes offer new degrees of democratic inclusiveness and new ways of solving conflicts (Noor & Hussein, 2010). On the flip side, conventional literature has uncovered an alarming trend described as soft radicalisation of women. Over the world, women are being indoctrinated into a very austere and intolerant interpretation of religion. Women have perpetuated attacks and are being recruited for further plots. Several reasons have been cited for women involvement in terrorist acts, including individual and social- economic factors. Although motivation are complex, such factors include avenging death of relatives, the promise of a better life, unmet needs and unsolved grievances, need for companionship and feminism.

Some of the most notorious cases of female terrorists radicalised by spouses are Samantha Lewthwaite, the ‘White Widow’ believed to be one of the masterminds

of Westgate attack in Nairobi. Another is Violet Kemunto and Mariam Abdi who were some of the key masterminds of Dusit D2 terror attack in Nairobi on 15<sup>th</sup> January, 2019 that claimed over 21 lives. According to police report, a mysterious woman known as Mariam Abdi played a key role in delivering weapons that were used in the Dusit D2 attack from Somalia. Anti- Terror Police Unit (ATPU) failed to find her in Eldoret, where she was thought to be after failing to nab her in Mombasa. A separate team was dispatched to Malindi to hunt her down (Achuka, 2019).

The second mastermind, Violet Kemunto was the wife to one of the attackers, Ali Salim Gichunge. Violet Kemunto, a 2014 Journalism graduate from Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST), is believed to have slipped to Somalia moments before the attack. The terror couple lived a lavish lifestyle and in 2018 took a holiday at the coast to celebrate the first anniversary of their marriage (Daily Nation, 18 January, 2019). The recruitment of women in terror activities and religious indoctrination therefore calls for full involvement of women as policy shapers, law enforcement officers, educators, community members and activists in addressing conditions conducive to terrorism and the effective prevention of terrorism.

To engage effectively with the women, respondents indicated that the police should effectively engage women at all stages of development, implementation and evaluation of policing approaches, counterterrorism and counter-radicalization strategies. In a Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader A1 highlighted this when she stated that:

Women should be empowered and involved in counterterrorism operation. Look at the current composition of the police in Lamu

for instance, they are few. How do you expect Muslim women to interact with policemen? This cannot happen in the absence of women officers (FGD with Religious Leaders, 1<sup>st</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

This means that apart from inclusion of policewomen in operation, they should also institute mandatory gender training for all supervisors and police officers performing security checks and body searches on women. OSCE (2014) further reiterates that they should include specific gender benchmarks in the monitoring and regular evaluation of the effectiveness, as well as positive and negative impacts, of their policies and measures against terrorism, and increase the presence of women among the police involved in countering terrorism and in engaging the public on preventing terrorism at all levels.

On approaches that may be useful in engagements of women, respondents indicated that the police should encourage and support initiatives to empower women's participation in the public sphere, which is essential so that they can play an active role in addressing terrorism and radicalization threat in the community they live in. They should include awareness-raising about the risks of, and potential responses to terrorism as part of initiatives to inform women about measures to address their concerns. They should also identify women groups, their capabilities and needs, in order to expand partnerships thereby reaching out to various groups in the county. They should further ensure that women have better access to programmes that address gender issues and imbalances to disengage from terrorism and that guarantee them adequate protection and support. These programmes should also support the provision of platforms and safe spaces for women to share experiences and concerns in facing terrorism and violent radicalization, including skills and tools to respond more effectively to terrorism and radicalization.



OSCE (2014) emphasizes that the police should ensure that its engagement strategy is based on a sophisticated understanding of the culture, religion and gender roles within a particular community, and that such a strategy is free of stereotypical assumptions and does not have any negative consequences for the women engaged.

Religious leaders & elders (30.1%) are key stakeholders in implementing policing approaches and preventing terrorism. In the fight against terrorism, terror groups may employ propaganda to justify their cause, including using religion to whip up emotions. This was brought out clearly in a Focus Group Discussion by Religious Leader B2 who stated that:

Terrorist elements have easily radicalised residents into violence in Lamu County on religious grounds. The police have a task to reverse this in different fronts, but first and foremost, they need to engage religious leaders, more so Muslims on changing the narrative that terrorism is domiciled in one religion (FGD with Religious Leaders, 5<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Witu).

What the foregoing sentiment implies is that the police need to engage religious leaders, elders and faith-based organizations in realizing that they can provide crucial feedback on how counterterrorism measures have affected their communities and are perceived in the community. They should also be made to understand that they may be better placed to proactively and effectively challenge some aspect of the narratives used by terrorists to justify terrorism. Erwin (2013) adds that they should be aware of the presence of individuals or materials circulating within their community that are providing narratives justifying terrorism and intercept them, including handing them over to the law enforcement agencies. This group can as well provide crucial feedback on how counterterrorism measures are perceived within, and help law enforcement better understand their communities and tailor their outreach initiatives to their understanding.

For successful engagement with religious leaders and faith based organizations, the police should make it clear that they do not hold any religion responsible for terrorism, and actively challenge the association of terrorism with religion.

Religious Leader D4 strongly argued that:

The police should stop stigmatising religious beliefs if they want to achieve successful counterterrorism (FGD with Religious Leaders, 17<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Hindi).

From the foregoing, it is evident that the police should make every effort not to be seen to favour one group over another and engage with leaders and organizations from all religions and encourage them to mobilize jointly to denounce terrorism and express solidarity with all victims of terrorism. As reiterated by Weisburd *et al.* (2002), the police should also base their engagement on an accurate understanding of local demographics, dynamics and the complexities of religious communities and adopt reflective approach in identifying and rejecting the possible stereotypes and prejudices they may hold against the religious beliefs and religious leaders. The police should demonstrate knowledge sensitivity to religious beliefs, although it may not be practical to expect police officers to share the religious beliefs of the community that they are seeking to engage with.

Engaging civil society organizations (18.6%) was cited as another strategy in implementing policing approaches and preventing terrorism. Police should engage civil society and involve them in the development of partnerships; especially if there have been tensions between them in the past. Civil society can play a role in preventing terrorism. In an interview, Chief 16 indicated that:

Civil society organizations are central to public life and information sharing networks hence useful to police in counterterrorism (Interview with Chief 16, 16<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu Town).



**Plate 5.4: Researcher next to KCB Bank, Mpeketoni. In 2015 after the bank was burnt down during terrorist attack, the civil society advocated for its reopening.**

**Source: Researcher, 2018.**

These sentiments are supported by Chumba *et al.* (2016a) who explains that civil society can spot the signs of vulnerability and work towards protecting individuals from radicalization and terrorism through improved parenting, neighbourhood support, and community resilience. Civil society organizations can contribute in fighting terrorism by raising awareness among the public about nature of terrorist threat and applicable laws and measures to prevent and combat terrorism, and educating them on what they can do to protect themselves against terrorism as well

as what the police is expected of in maintaining human rights while countering terrorism. They can also bring to fore conditions conducive to terrorism and undertake specific activities to address such conditions.

In their engagement, they can actively speak out against terrorism and extremist ideologies, leaders and groups to delegitimize them, and engage individuals drawn into terrorism to divert them from a path of terror acts. Civil society organizations can enhance understanding among people about the role and functions of the police in countering terrorism and channel to police some of the views and concerns of communities with regard to fighting terrorism and countering terrorism (OSCE, 2014).

Engaging media (14.2%) as a strategy in implementing policing approaches and preventing terrorism can enable the police reach a wider audience. The use of media to disseminate information and its ability to give voice to the struggle of a range of actors, as well as the ability of this form of soft power to counteract terrorism can only be beneficial to security personnel (Chumba *et al.*, 2016b). In an interview, Chief 5 was quoted saying that:

Since media has been used for radicalisation and promoting violent extremism, it is only important that the police use the same to counter terrorism and extremism (Interview with Chief 5, 22<sup>nd</sup> October, 2018 in Hindi).

The foregoing assertion is a pointer to how media and terrorism hold each other in a strange balance; terrorism needs the media, and media needs terrorism. Government and media need to strike a balance about use of confidential information in the public sphere. Certain information cannot be made public in light of the importance of counterterrorism policy. However, increased competition in the media causes problems in making agreement with media outlets and the government. Indeed, this

has been the case terrorist attacks in Kenya, where the media has been blamed in some instances for wrong reporting (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a).

Media can contribute in fighting terrorism by using media platform to strengthen cohesion and mobilizing members of the community in support of problem-solving initiatives, including those designed to address community grievances and conditions conducive to terrorism, and actively speaking out against violent and extremist ideologies, leaders and groups to delegitimize them. They can also create safe spaces for discussing issues and concerns and facilitating the sharing of experiences and views among members of the public, and acting as an intermediary for communication between the police and different communities, groups and individuals, especially those that are reluctant to engage with, or are hostile to, the police.

Police on the other hand should consider media as independent and equal partners in addressing security issues of common concern within a community, in this case, terrorism. The police should not attempt to control or influence media for biased reporting. They should also engage various media houses in addressing various issues with less restriction and provide protection to media personnel when faced with unwarranted hostility due to their crusade against terrorism. This should be timely to avoid media being on unnecessary receiving end.

## **5.6 Chapter Summary**

This chapter reveals that policing approaches are very popular with the National Police Service given that findings has shown that they are often applied by the police in counterterrorism in Lamu County. The approaches also influence the performance of police officers to a great extent.

On policing approaches applied in counterterrorism in Lamu County, respondents indicated integrated policing approach (28.7%) as the most popular. Other strategies are paramilitary (21.6%), intelligence led policing (18.5%), community policing (15.3%), criminal justice (6.4%), others (hot spot policing, predictive policing and problem oriented policing) at (5.0%) and military (4.5%).

Efficacy of policing approaches was considered and results indicated that integrated policing approach (51.0%) is the most effective followed by paramilitary (44.6%). Others are intelligence led policing (38.2%), Others (hot spot policing, predictive policing and problem oriented policing) at (33.8%), military (28.7%), community policing (19.1%) and criminal justice (14.1%).

Groups that can be engaged by NPS in implementing policing approaches in countering terrorism were considered, and respondents cited women (10.6%), youth (26.5%), religious leaders & elders (30.1%), civil society organizations (18.6%) and media (14.2%). As espoused in Expectancy Theory, policing approaches that have a greater performance (effective) should be emphasized, and those with lower performance outcome reviewed. Greater performance among officers should also be rewarded, for instance, by way of promotion.


With counterterrorism strategies and policing approaches identified, it is prudent to examine the challenges in implementing these strategies by the police. This is the subject of the next chapter.

**CHAPTER SIX**  
**CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING COUNTERTERRORISM**  
**STRATEGIES BY THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN LAMU**  
**COUNTY**

This chapter presents findings and discussion on the challenges faced by the National Police Service in implementing counterterrorism strategies in Lamu County, including possible ways of addressing the challenges. The chapter ends with a summary of key findings.

**6.1 National Police Service and Achievements in the Fight against Terrorism**

Respondents were asked if they agreed that the police were making or not making major achievements in the fight against terrorism. Their responses were as presented in Figure 6.1.



**Figure 6.1: NPS and Achievements in the Fight against Terrorism**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

From Figure 6.1, findings reveal that 16.9% (53) strongly agree that police are not making major achievements, 39.5% (124) agree, while 22.6% (71) are neutral. Further 14.0% (44) of the respondents disagree while 7.0% (22) strongly disagree.

Following the launch of Operation *Linda Boni* in 2014 in reaction to terrorist attack in Mpeketoni, Witu, Hindi and adjacent areas, the threat of terrorism in Lamu has increased considerably. Initially, the perception was that the threat originated from Somalia and that Somali nationals or Somali-Kenyans committed attacks in Lamu. As arrests were made, the police realized that some Kenyan nationals were responsible for some of the attacks. These attacks have created fear and desperation among the locals who feels that the police are not making major achievements in the fight against terrorism.

As findings suggest, most respondents agree that police are not making achievement in the fight against terrorism. Among the reasons cited by respondents was that due to harsh way the police are treating locals, they have resented the police and are therefore unable to give intelligence on suspected *Al-Shabaab* elements among them. *Al-Shabaab* has taken advantage of bad blood between the police and locals to hit soft targets in Lamu County. Another reason postulated was that despite an increase in number of police officers since the onset of Operation *Linda Boni* in Lamu County, attacks has continued. Even police officers fear the wrath of terrorist such that they are no longer responding to distress calls or respond late. They have also reduced frequency of patrols for fear of IEDs. As a result, terrorist have continued to operate. In a Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader A7 indicated that:

The behaviour of security forces towards the locals, particularly Muslims provides fertile ground in which *Al-Shabaab* and other



terror elements can sow the seed of dissent. By victimising the Muslim population, the police are making things worse. There are no better recruiting agents for *Al-Shabaab* than the poorly trained, ill-disciplined and corrupt police officers. That is why the police are not making major achievements since they came here (FGD with Religious Leaders, 1<sup>st</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

In another Focus Group Discussion, Elder B5 stated that:

The war against terrorists cannot be won unless the NPS stop behaving cowardly. The police no longer respond to distress calls at night for fear of being killed by terrorists. Their vehicles no longer patrol the forests for fear of IEDs (FGD with Council of Elders, 7<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Witu).

Saferworld (2016) echo the same sentiments by stating that the operation is strongly criticised by Muslim leaders. While seeking to demonstrate its resolve in the face of insecurity, the operation only further alienate Kenya-Somali and Muslims. At best, this has dented prospects for cooperation between communities and the security forces. At worst, the Kenyan Government's securitised response has played directly into *Al-Shabaab's* strategy thus winning the hearts and minds of the Muslim population en masse.


Respondents who disagreed that the police are not making major achievement in the fight against terrorism argued that attacks to the scale of Mpeketoni in 2014 have not been witnessed again. They also indicated that frequencies of the attack are not as it used to be witnessed before the onset of the operation. In an interview with Police Officer B3 in Mpeketoni, he indicated that:

Before we were deployed here, deadly attacks used to be carried out almost on a daily basis. Since the operation began, the terrorist elements have retreated and only a few are still carrying out pockets of attacks. Furthermore, they are cowardly and have resorted to the use of IEDs which is not conventional. They fear engaging us one on one. That's why there has never been an attack like the one that rocked Mpeketoni in 2014 (Interview with Police Officer B3, 16<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

While there have been no attack on the scale of those seen in 2014, there is no doubt that *Al-Shabaab* still poses a real threat, and may be boosted by the reaction to poor and discriminatory security provision (Saferworld, 2016). Furthermore, the terrorists have devised new ways of carrying out attacks by use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). This has slowed patrols and surveillance, and claimed several lives of security personnel, since they are the most targeted.

## 6.2 Police - Public Relationship

The study sought to know the level of police-public relation since the inception of counterterrorism operation in Lamu County. The findings were as presented in Figure 6.2.



**Figure 6.2: Police- Public Relationship**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

Findings revealed that 2.9% (9) of the respondents indicated that police-public relationship is extremely good, 12.7% (40) indicated good, 25.5% (80) were neutral, 38.2% (120) indicated bad, while 20.7% (65) indicated extremely bad.



**Plate 6.1: Researcher and Customer Care Officer at Lamu Police Station. Police – Public relation in Lamu County is hampered by numerous factors.**

**Source: Researcher, 2018**

From the findings, most respondents indicated that the police-public relationship is bad. Although there are established police stations like Lamu Police Station in Plate 6.1 complete with Customer Care Desk, very few people visit the desk. Indigenous Lamu community feel discriminated by security services. This was brought out clearly during an interview with Police Officer A2 when he stated that:

Residents have greatly complained about roadblocks that are erected in Lamu. They don't want to be searched or frisked. They have said this is infringing on their rights, although this is a normal operation procedure in policing. This has brought about bad blood between us. As a result, they have been hiding information from us since they view us as enemies. Raids, ambushes and patrols that we have been conducting are not bearing fruit because there are many *Al-Shabaab* sympathisers amidst locals who are giving out information to terrorists about

any impending operation. They are observing our manoeuvres and alerting terrorists who plant IEDs on our paths. That is why they have blown so many security vehicles and APCs and killed many officers in line of duty (Interview with Police Officer A2, 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

From the foregoing assertion, it is imperative that the police should devise more inclusive plan of engaging locals and including them in their operational strategy. If the police are to succeed in counterterrorism operation, they must understand the complex religious tension and how this may affect long term peace and security in Lamu County. Besides, police should reconsider counterterrorism strategies that are not welcome by the local community or infringing on their religious beliefs.

One contemporary tool that can be employed to meet the challenges that religion and religious differences bring is the utilization of inclusivity. Inclusivity capitalizes on the opportunity to use faith and religion, not as divisive force, but as a chance to bring people together and find a common ground (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a). By engaging the locals, the police have the opportunity to have a greater reach in Lamu, and avoid being seen as outsiders that disregards faith that so many locals hold dear, but that has been disregarded and used as a pawn for terrorists to garner support for their cause.

Saferworld (2016) reaffirm this notion and suggests that continued exclusion of groups and repeated efforts to highlight separateness are dangerous to peace and security. As Prestholdt (2011) put it, make it a priority to include Muslims in politics, the economy, and everyday life. This inclusivity has been an important strategy of the Global War on Terror, “winning the hearts and minds of target populations,” In view of the foregoing, a key step then calls for considering religious leaders and religious differences as part of the solution rather than part of the problem, thus inclusivity.

Respondents who indicated that the Police – Public relationship is good argued that this is because they have been receiving intelligence and operational assistance from some locals. However, data collected established that majority of informers are non-Muslims and non locals. In a Focus Group Discussion, Elder C8 indicated that:


We have had cases of some people being targeted by terrorists on suspicion of cooperating with the police. Most of them are usually informers. These informers are usually immigrants who spy on Muslims. As a result, many Muslims have borne the brunt of police brutality and others have been arrested and charged because of false propaganda peddled by the informers. This has strained the relationship between the police and locals, mostly Muslims, and hatred between the locals themselves (FGD with Council of Elders, 19<sup>th</sup> October, 2018).

According to Muthondeki *et al.* (2017a), police operations should be handled well from conception to execution. If any stage is mismanaged, the recipe may be disastrous. This therefore means that the police should not compromise the lives of others by creating bad blood among them. Cooperation with the police should thus be structured and not seen to be divisive. Such situation in Lamu County where non-indigenous community are seen to be spying against non-Muslim community can only damage the already bad police – public relationship. Much care should therefore be taken in initiating such cooperation.

Although intelligence as a strategy establishes one of its core objective as ‘engaging and invigorating friendly local intelligence services among local population’ as one of the efforts that aids in the identification and disruption of terrorist organizations, high level of trust, acceptance and engagement needs to be taken care of if there is to be any success at all. As Chumba *et al.* (2016a) puts it, the overall goal is to mitigate backlash from any quarter, especially members of the public, while enhancing counterterrorism operation.

### 6.3 Morale of Police Officers

High morale among police officers is crucial for success of security operation. The study therefore sought to know the level of morale of police officers undertaking counterterrorism operation in Lamu County. The findings were as presented in Figure 6.3.



**Figure 6.3: Morale of Police Officers**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

From figure 6.3, 1.9% (6) of respondents indicated that the morale is high, 6.6% (20) indicated high, 21.0% (66) were neutral, 36.3% (114) indicated low, while 34.2% (108) indicated very low.

On average, it is clear that most respondents agree that morale of police officers is low (36.3%). This is attributed to several factors as indicated by respondents, key among them being poor pay, embezzlement and delay of allowances, irregular off duty, transfers and changeovers, poor working condition, inadequate equipment,

and general welfare. Improving morale is everyone's responsibility, but the idea is to improve morale in a way that creates the greatest positive impact. Individual officers can change behaviours and attitudes, but supervisors and administrators have much more control and are often able to influence at much greater levels. So even though morale is everyone's responsibility, the ultimate responsibility for declining morale is often placed back on leadership; at least through the eyes of the officer. In an interview, Police Officer B21 indicated that:

Allowances meant for officers should be paid promptly. Currently, the morale is low because the little allowances are pocketed by senior officers. The meagre that remains comes three months late. It is difficult to discharge our mandate under these deplorable conditions. It's worse now that we are not sure of changeover and leaves have been cancelled (Interview with Police Officer B21, 12<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Baure).

In the same interview, Police Officer B22 said that:

We don't have adequate equipment to decisively deal with the terrorists. The government bought a few APCs for us. We thought that we would be safe inside them. They have turned out to be death traps. Just two weeks after they were brought, one was blown on the road to Kiunga by an IED ripping it apart and killing all the personnel on board. Many have since been damaged in a similar manner. We have requested the government to bring us anti – IED, but nothing has been forthcoming. It's better to patrol on foot and die alone than to board these useless APCs and die en masse (Interview with a Police Officer B22, 12<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Baure).

These sentiments show the extent of disillusionment in the National Police Service. With demoralised officers, even performance is negatively affected. Morale is important for several reasons, but most importantly "... it builds efficiency, it creates discipline that is voluntary and enthusiastic rather than enforced". In addition, morale "... aims to stimulate and assist the weak, direct the strong, correct

the erring, educate the uninformed, and further encourage the successful. It brings enjoyment to work and pride in accomplishment” (Gocke, 1945, p. 216, para. 2).

When morale is high, there is a buy-in to the goals and the overall mission of the department. High morale helps officers cope with the day-to-day demands, the ups and downs of the job, and with issues and discouragement that often coincide with police work. We know what low morale produces, but high morale is not only necessary for a healthy department, but also for healthy members. Supervisors should get to know the officers they are in charge of, have a real interest in them and their families. This can help the supervisor begin to better understand the officers and may see issues they are facing because of the time taken to care.

As supported by Justice Theory, individuals evaluate the rewards given to them for performance based on various aspects. These include differential needs, values, goals and sources of motivation. On the basis of valence the motivations to accomplish different tasks also vary (Burgoon, 1993; Kroth, 2007). Thus, while deciding to perform in a particular way, individuals give importance to the variable that has the greatest motivational force, without which the morale remains low.


According to studies, there is a positive correlation between organizational justice and high morale. In other words better the employee perception of an organization, the higher the morale of that employee. Organizational justice is also positively correlated to motivation, implying that where justice is observed, a general positive attitude emerges by itself (Çelik & Saritürk, 2012). Allameh & Rostami (2014) studied the relationship between organizational justice and Organizational Citizenship Behaviour (OCB). In the study authors found strong relationship between the two. Similarly, study by (Wan and Morgan, 2016) shows that



citizenship behaviour are employee behaviours that go beyond the call of duty. There is a positive association between organizational justice and citizenship behaviour. Similarly, organizations need to ensure the practice of organizational justice so that it can create confidence and loyalty among the employees. This will influence employee's organizational citizenship behaviour, hence a rise in morale.

#### 6.4 Challenges in Implementing Counterterrorism Strategies in Lamu County

The study sought to know the challenges faced by the National Police Service in implementing counterterrorism strategies in Lamu County. The findings were as presented in Figure 6.4.



**Figure 6.4: Challenges in Implementing Counterterrorism Strategies in Lamu County**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

From Figure 6.4, challenges identified were corruption at 73.2% (230), inadequate community involvement at 49.7% (156), poor interagency coordination at 69.1% (217), low morale among officers at 86.0% (270), inadequate institutional framework at 62.4% (196), poor working condition and welfare of officers at 83.4% (262), porous Kenya-Somalia border, radicalisation at 60.0% (188), poor police-public relationship at 89.2% (280), lack of resources and training at 76.4% (240), poor infrastructure at 78.7% (247), socio-economic and political injustices at 44.6% (140), ethnic and religious animosity at 63.7% (200), and weak justice system at 67.5% (212).

As the findings suggest, poor police-public relationship (89.2%) is the major challenge in implementing counterterrorism strategies in Lamu County. From the interview, respondents indicated that poor relationship has hindered counterterrorism as the locals don't trust the police. They don't cooperate, share information on security matters or general intelligence. The locals blame the police for torturing them, arresting them arbitrarily, disrespecting their religion, taking their land and extra judicial killings. During Focus Group Discussion, Elder D7 stated that:

When they (the police) arrived here, they imposed a curfew on us causing a lot of inconvenience. They burnt traditional night wedding and night fishing thereby killing our livelihood. They are now carrying out abusive operation targeting Muslims and locals for arrest, detention and extra judicial killings (FGD with Council of Elders, 18<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu Town).

Yet in another Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader D6 pointed out that:

Check points and roadblocks have been mounted almost everywhere. The need to carry National Identification wherever we go is causing frustrations. Once you are a Muslim, you are stereotyped as terror suspects. People just disappear and the government does not respond. They just say it is a security issue

hence classified. How then do you expect us to cooperate with such people (FGD with Religious Leaders, 17<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Hindi).

Statements like these show that the police have much to do in order to win the confidence of residents. They need to change tact in the way counterterrorism is carried if there is to be some degree of success. By engaging the locals, the police have the opportunity to have a greater reach in Lamu, and avoid being seen as outsiders that disregards faith that so many locals hold dear, but that has been politicised and used as a pawn for terrorists to garner support for their cause (Saferworld, 2016). Indeed *Al-Shabaab* has used grievances of the locals to garner support as stated by Elder C5 during Focus Group Discussion:

People have sympathy for *Al-Shabaab* and fear the police. Even for me, if asked to pick, I would go for *Al-Shabaab* (FGD with Council of Elders, 15<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

Other people see poor security provision as economically motivated. Others stated that the police and other security agencies are grabbing land in Lamu. They are using the operation as a business opportunity. They believe that the security agencies and the government have come to take their land and not provide security. It is evident that developing a framework for cooperation with the locals is key (Saferworld, 2016). Security must therefore develop a coordinated approach in enhancing good relationship to enable them share information; decision making on potential risk situations, and also better enable them integrate the necessary mechanisms for counterterrorism.

Low morale among officers (86.0%), poor working condition and welfare (83.4%) and lack of resources and training (76.4%) were also cited as major challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies. From the interview, respondents indicated that police are demoralised because of several factors including lack of

specialised equipment and weapons to deal effectively with terrorism. Police also have poor welfare and pay, including delay in payment of allowances and poor working conditions. Due to rapid changes in technology, police need specialised training in counterterrorism and other technological and modern equipment for their use. During an interview, Police Officer B55 noted that:

For us to deal decisively with terrorists, we need proper weapons and equipment that can outsmart them. Currently, the APCs that were bought the government for our use are death traps. They are being blown by IEDs planted by the terrorists on our roads, thus hampering patrols. Besides, we need better equipment to manoeuvre the dense Boni forest where most terrorists are hiding. Drones that have been deployed for surveillance are also not helping at all. They rarely detect terrorist movements. We need modern drones that conform to current technology (Interview with Police Officer B55, 10<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Basuba).

In another interview, Police Officer B42 complained about the skewed training in the National Police Service. He stated that:

We are sent here to battle *Al-Shabaab* yet we are not adequately trained on counterterrorism. When it comes to counterterrorism training, only ATPU officers are given priority, yet they hardly go on combat (Interview with Police Officer B42, 12<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Baure).

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that capacity building is much needed for all cadres of officers for a successful counterterrorism. Bossong (2008) asserts that developing a successful capacity to tackle terrorism requires a focus on three main areas of counterterrorism activity: first, to overcome vulnerability to terrorism for example training security personnel and equipping them; second, to deny terrorists a safe haven and ensure that terrorists are prosecuted and/or extradited, to deny terrorists entry into a country and reinforcing law enforcement agencies; and third, to deny terrorists the means to commit terrorist acts for instance, preventing financing of terrorism, and denial of weapons. For sustainable peace and security

and economic progress of the world, it is important that all governments should enhance the capacity of security agencies.

On improved working condition and welfare of police officers, respondents emphasized pay and payment of allowances as key. They also indicated that changeovers and leaves should be regularised to allow officers recuperate. Their working conditions must also be improved. In another interview, Police Officer B109 indicated that:

Allowances meant for officers should be paid promptly. Currently, the morale is low because the little allowances are pocketed by senior officers. The meagre that remains comes three months late. It is difficult to discharge our mandate under these deplorable conditions. It's worse now that we are not sure of changeover and leaves have been cancelled (Interview with Police Officer B109, 21<sup>st</sup> November, 2018 in Pandanguo).

Despite these challenges, the National Police Service has to some extent detected and disrupted terrorist threats. While the Westgate attack showed glaring gaps in Kenyan command and control, and the unsuitability of conventional security forces to respond to a civilian incident such as the Westgate, the response by the Crisis Response Team of the elite General Service Unit Recce Company was more competent (START, 2016).

Economic, political and social injustices (44.6%) and ethnic and religious animosity (63.7%) were also cited as challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies. As with the other five coastal counties of Kenya, Lamu scores low on development indicators. Just like north-eastern region, also bordering Somalia and generally marginalised from development processes since independence, the coastal area of Kenya has the highest rate of poverty in the country. Its economy and broader socio-economic development is, nonetheless, undergoing a substantial rise with the

construction of a US\$ 5 billion 32-berth port, which will act as the gateway into East Africa's largest proposed infrastructure project, the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopian Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor.

Settlement of Kenyans from other parts of the country in Lamu, especially in Mpeketoni, Hindi, Moa and Mkunumbi is a major source of sour relationship and discord between the communities in Lamu County. This unending suspicion fuels resentment and is a catalyst for radicalisation and terrorism. Fear of land grabbing undermines investment opportunities due to resistance which arises from suspicion.

During Focus Group Discussion, Elder A8 stated that:

Indigenous Lamu residents do not have title deeds for their lands. The government has deliberately refused to issue us title deeds. We suffer a lot when big people come from Nairobi with title deeds and drive us from our land that we have farmed from our forefathers (FGD with Council of Elders, 2<sup>nd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

Although all Kenyan citizens are entitled to the same rights, including ownership of property, these perceived or real inequities in land ownership and tenure have created rift between local indigenous people and people from up country. Critically, these identity divides extend beyond ethnicity into religion: not all coastal people are Muslims, and not all newly-arrived settlers are Christians from up-country – indeed, some move from other parts of the coast – but the division between 'indigenous' and 'outsider' is all too easily presented and described as a Muslim-Christian one.

According to Saferworld (2016), the genesis of this can be traced back to 1970s, when the then-President Jomo Kenyatta allocated parcels of public land to 'up-country' settlers – from his own Kikuyu ethnic group. Kenya's largest ethnic group, the Kikuyus, have been in economic and political ascendance since independence.

They were awarded title deeds to land that historically belonged to ‘indigenous’ communities living in Lamu who include the Mijikenda, Bajuni, Sanye, Boni and Swahili.

Over decades, growing numbers of Kikuyus and other up-country ‘outsiders’ have moved to the area, buying up land and altering the county’s demographics. The bulk of Lamu County’s population is now in the mainland’s farming areas, away from its traditional centre, Lamu Island, and in mainland towns such as Mpeketoni which have large populations of ‘nonindigenous’ people. Lamu is now the only county in Kenya where nearly 50 per cent of the population is ‘non-indigenous’

The LAPPSET project also risks fuelling other forms of economic disparity. While the government has sought to provide training to local youths so that they can benefit from broader development in the area, some still say that better educated people from upcountry get the jobs in the big projects and in the hotels. Huge land speculation by investors – who are often non-local, politically-connected Nairobi based elites and referred to as land grabbers – has driven the value of land up, especially in areas of close proximity to the Port (Saferworld, 2016).

Ethnicity and injustices has also assumed political and social dimension. With devolution, there are winners and losers. Many people interviewed noted the common narrative among indigenous people. In a Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader D9 indicated that:

First, the Kikuyu people arrived, then they took the land, then they took the jobs, and then they took the political posts. They want it all (FGD with Religious Leaders, 17<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu Town).

Indeed by virtue of constituency boundaries, solidarity and block voting across the settlers population, currently the Kikuyu community have the position of deputy

governor, one of the County's two MPs, and disproportionate share of seats in the County Assembly of Lamu (Saferworld, 2016).

Weak justice system (67.5%) is another challenge in implementing counterterrorism strategies in Lamu County. Members cited weak laws on counterterrorism as the reasons why most suspects are arrested almost immediately.

During an interview, Police Officer A3 stated that:

We have arrested several key suspects but approximately 90% have been released by the court. This has made our work difficult. We are demoralised. Most officers are no longer interested in carrying out these arrests (Interview with Police Officer A3, 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

This sentiment is supported by Mogire and Agade (2011) who states that flawed terrorism laws in Kenya have caused grave problems and even with improved legislation over the last few years, success has been minimal. For one, the definition of terrorism is vague and thus, able to be contested by many opponents. The Kenyan government defines terrorism as “anti-state violent activities undertaken by non-state entities which are motivated by religious goals.”

In agreement Prestholdt (2011) points out that lack of comprehensive legislation puts Kenyan law enforcement officials in positions where they perform questionable means and violate human rights of many in the Muslim community. Intelligence officials have been accused numerous times of unlawfully detaining suspected terrorists for lengthy periods of time and torturing suspects in attempts to gain confessions and further intelligence.

In other instances, terror suspects have been left free in Kenyan courts due to lack of substantive charges to convict them. This has made the work of law enforcement difficult. It is therefore imperative that a transformation in the judiciary and judicial laws, especially those touching on terrorism and counterterrorism is necessary for



sustenance of cases and timely prosecution of offenders. Once this is done, it will serve as a great deterrence to those planning to engage in radicalization, terrorism or terror acts.

Poor infrastructure (78.7%) and porous Kenya-Somalia border (79.6%) are also some of the challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies in Lamu County. Respondents pointed poor infrastructure to be one of the reason for continued terror attack in Lamu County. The county is a home to thick and expansive Boni forest that stretches to Somalia. It is in this forest that *Al-Shabaab* has established their cells and uses to launch attacks. The forest also aids their movement to and from Somalia. In an interview, Police Officer A7 stated that:

Boni forest has hindered this operation. The forest is thick and impassable. It is difficult to patrol in there. Even air surveillance has achieved less because of the huge canopy, acting as cover for terrorists. Getting in there is like getting into a slaughter house. They (terrorists) will definitely kill you since they are well versed with the forest (Interview with Police Officer A7, 3rd October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

The same sentiments were supported by Chief 21 during an interview.

The police are afraid to go into the forest. Whenever there is an attack, they pursue suspects up to the edge of the forest. Once the criminals get into the forest, that's the end of it (Interview with Chief 21, 17<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

Indeed, the assertions are supported by Saferworld (2016) which indicates that security operation in Boni forest has been hampered by the dense vegetation that are used by terrorists as hiding ground and points for launching attacks. Security personnel have given forested area a wide berth. According to Lamu CIDP (2013-2017), Lamu county physical infrastructure has remained underdeveloped with only 6 Km of the 688.6 Km total road network in bitumen standard. This makes most of the roads impassable during rainy season, including Mpeketoni –Lamu road in Plate 6.2. The main road is Garsen - Mokowe – Kiunga road.



**Plate 6.2: Researcher next to Mpeketoni-Lamu bound bus. There is inadequate transport service in Lamu County as only 6km of 688.6km road network currently tarmacked.**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

The porous Kenya-Somalia border (79.6%) was also cited as a challenge. Respondents indicated that terrorist use the border to cross into Kenya from Somalia and back to launch attacks. This has made counterterrorism operation difficult. Mogire & Agade (2011) are in agreement when they state that with a porous border and a confirmed presence of Islamic fundamentalists, Somalia poses a threat to Kenya and the rest of the world. In a joint press conference with Kenya and the United States in 2003, President Bush declared that “stabilizing Somalia is

essential in sustaining the war against terrorism”. In an interview, Chief 10 stated that:

Kenya – Somali border is not only large to be effectively managed, but the underlying issues, some of which are historical and deeply rooted cannot allow it to be manned effectively (Interview with Chief 10, 17<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

As stated by the respondent, controlling Kenya-Somali border is faced by a myriad of challenges. This is explained by Chumba *et al.* (2016a) that despite Kenya’s centrality, different geographical areas require different standards of security. There can be no horizontal stratification for accessing the standard of border security. On a specific segment of the border, one has to go through many factors and not just geographically threat perception. Other trigger elements are; strategic importance of the area, population pattern and incidence of trans-border crime. At border guarding level, reduction of tension among the neighbouring countries is of utmost importance. Different proportions of the extensive border have a variety of problems specific to them which have to be properly addressed. These problems have become aggravated in recent times with Kenya’s policy of cross border terrorism along with its intensely hostile *Al-Shabaab* propaganda designed to mislead and sway the loyalties of the border population is a growing trend. The intensification of cross border terrorism targeted to destabilise Kenya has thrown up new challenges for border management (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a). In another interview, Police Officer B2 claimed that:

The major problem is the homogeneity of the Kenya-Somalia border population. It is difficult to tell whether one is a Kenyan or not since they resemble, have similar way of life, speak the same language and are all Muslims. This has made us sometimes arrest wrong suspects (Interview with Police Officer B2, 19<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu Town).

This complexity is supported by Chumba *et al.* (2016b) when he reiterates that Somali population bordering Kenya and Somalia look alike, speak the same language, wear the same dresses and have similar set of culture and traditions, thus making it difficult to identify a foreign national in the absence of identity card. Connivance of locals with intruders makes the task of detection difficult. Population explosion has also worsened the situation with migration across the borders.

Many Somalis have also crossed into Kenya as refugees and to escape war in the country. This migration has increased overtime that it has led to influx of refugees in Kenya. Many of these crossing points are not demarcated and manned. This has enabled terrorists take advantage and cross into Kenya disguised as refugees. In fact, most of the attacks in Kenya are planned in refugee camps.

Without a proper government that can take control of the country, Somalia will continue to play a direct role in the security deficiencies of Kenya. This is because Somalia's geographic location gives it the longest coastline in Africa and makes it the closest African country to the Middle East. This allows Somalia to act as a transit hub in smuggling illicit goods and arms into Kenya. Most notably, the perpetrators of the 2002 Mombasa attacks transited from Somalia and smuggled weapons into Kenya through the shared border (Mogire & Agade, 2011).

Poor interagency coordination (69.1%) was also cited as a challenge in implementing counterterrorism strategies. Interagency coordination in the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. Erwin (2013) asserts that lack of cooperation between agencies due to organizational structure, technical incompatibilities or competing interests, along

with the absence of a central mechanism for coordinating among agencies can lead to operational failures. Indeed these observations motivate a systematic examination of law enforcement structure and capabilities of state.

Pooling all available resources and drawing together multiple strands of expertise can remove the barriers to effective interagency cooperation so the dots can be connected more accurately (Erwin, 2013). This argument resonates with response from an interview where Police Officer B25 indicated that:

Terrorist threat in Lamu can be brought to an end if only there was collective responsibility. However, mistrust and interests limits cooperation (Interview with Police Officer B25, 21<sup>st</sup> October, 2018 in Faza).

This view suggests that interagency coordination and cooperation in the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. A conducive environment for cooperation is therefore of paramount importance in ensuring successful operation. While not all agencies might want to share the baggage, it is in their best interests to help their neighbour on overlying and corresponding issues (Saferworld, 2016). Various interviewees stressed the importance of contacts in counterterrorism operation.

Despite these efforts by the government, Agbiboa (2013a) maintains that Kenya's counterterrorism operational effectiveness is hampered by poor intra-agency and interagency coordination, a lack of command and control of some terrorist incidents, and the politicisation of terrorist incidents. A number of the security lapses that have occurred in Kenya can be attributed to a lack of effective collaboration, coordination and cooperation between the different national security organs. The APS and KPS, as agencies of the NPS, conduct their operations almost independently of each other and not as anticipated by the Constitution.

Consequently, the NPS is unable to work in a coherent and coordinated manner, hence creating serious shortcomings that pose a challenge to the country's security. The lack of collaboration, coordination and cooperation also extends to the KDF and the NIS.

As Mwangi (2017) narrates "The lack of a coordinated and joint approach to security by the requisite security organs also adversely affects intelligence information-sharing, often resulting in blame-shifting and finger pointing among the security agencies. The Mpeketoni and Garissa University terrorist attacks of June 2014 and April 2015 in Lamu and Garissa counties, respectively, and their consequent counterterrorism security operations demonstrate some of the interagency shortcomings that the security agencies experience in the course of their efforts. Mpeketoni town was attacked by 20 to 30 insurgents at approximately 8:45 p.m. on Sunday 15<sup>th</sup> June, 2014. Simultaneous attacks occurred on the APS Divisional Headquarters in Mpeketoni and in Mpeketoni town centre. Shortly afterwards, the gunmen attacked the Mpeketoni police station. Victims were shot at close range, 26 buildings were burnt and 44 vehicles were torched. The attack, which ended between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., resulted in the deaths of 49 people. The attackers thereafter proceeded towards Kibaoni, resulting in an exchange of fire between unconfirmed parties."

Mwangi (2017) further explains that "On Monday 16<sup>th</sup> June 2014, another attack took place further inland in Kijijoni village, Kaisari, where 9 people were killed and 1 house was torched. Two days later, police recovered 2 bodies from Pangani. A total of 60 people were killed in both incidents, for which *Al-Shabaab* quickly claimed responsibility. The subsequent Mpeketoni counterterrorism operations were uncoordinated. Neither a full time command post nor operations centre was

established to coordinate the operation. The APS rapid deployment unit (RDU) left its Mkunumbi base about 16 km from Mpeketoni at around 9:08 p.m. and arrived in Mpeketoni at around midnight but remained out of sight until 4:45 a.m. The GSU officers were the first to venture into the town at about 3:30 a.m., after the firing had stopped. The RDU was sighted later at 5:00 a.m.”

The Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) team identified the involvement of NPS headquarters as well as the lack of a centralised command structure, as the key factors which contributed to the slow and uncoordinated response by the NPS because they distracted from the effective and efficient planning of the counterterrorism operations. At one point, the operation was taken over by senior commanders from the regional and national headquarters, and the local operational commanders were left with no functional role. KPS commanders complain that they cannot directly issue operational orders to officers from the APS and specialised units such as the GSU. These units have to obtain approval from their national headquarters before embarking on any operation. For instance, when the KPS County Commander ordered the GSU commander to respond to the attacks, the latter alleged that the Deputy Commissioner of Police had given orders that the GSU should not deploy at night to Mpeketoni. Prompt response failed because of conflicting orders and the lack of a centralised command structure at the county level that could coordinate all the NPS resources in the region (Mwangi, 2017)

What this episode indicates is that lack of coordination and cooperation between security agencies impedes their ability to provide fast and efficient services. The necessity of coordination boils down to the fact that similar issues confront security

agencies and one agency will be limited to deal with them single handedly. This is what informs adoption of an integrated approach in counterterrorism.

Even though the government of Kenya has divided counterterrorism functions among security operatives, operational effectiveness is still impeded by poor interagency coordination among and within the police, intelligence and military forces; limited resources; insufficient training; endemic corruption; and an unclear command and control of, and politicization of some terrorist incidents. In order to improve operational effectiveness, the government made significant leadership changes to enhance effective coordination and cooperation as witnessed during Dusit D2 terror attack on 15<sup>th</sup> January, 2019.

Corruption (73.2%) was also suggested by respondents as a challenge in implementing counterterrorism strategies. Elder A3 quoted during Focus Group Discussion said that:

It is the police and government officials who receive bribes to allow free movement of contraband goods like sugar, weapons and allow free access for criminal and terror elements to enter Kenya from Somalia and roam freely. If only the government can eradicate corruption from government officers, then the terror attacks in Lamu and the rest of the country will be a thing of the past (FGD with Council of Elders, 2<sup>nd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that a number of terror activities in Lamu and the rest of Kenya have been blamed on corruption involving government officials. Corruption and terrorism have been cited to go coexist. Corruption acts have facilitated influx of terror groups and thriving of terrorism in Kenya as supported by Chumba *et al.* (2016a) who observes that poor governance creates a favourable environment for thriving of terrorism and terror activities by facilitating their ability to attack and organize.



Kenyan Government inability to implement existing laws, ethics and anticorruption measures have also enabled corruption to thrive and water down efforts geared towards counterterrorism efforts, especially along the borders. This has demoralised efforts by other committed personnel to scale up the fight against terrorism and related extremist activities. In addition, lack of integrity among border and custom officials has created a formidable challenge in the fight against terrorism perpetrated along the Kenyan borders. This has put into question the commitment of the government in enhancing security in Kenya to an extent of drawing both local and international criticism.

In line with the results of a past study by Chumba *et al.* (2016a), the high incidences of corruption among security agents and other staff has been linked to greed for money and feeling of vulnerability to criminal threats. In addition, use of repressive methods in fighting terrorism has prompted those feeling discriminated against and oppressed to seek out criminal and shadow structures instead of appealing to government agencies and law enforcement support. Such individuals provide the support the terror groups require to succeed through corruption and unethical practices as a way of revenging and sympathising. As such, terrorism is facilitated through well formulated and executed architecture of colluding cartels within the same institutions mandated to prevent such deals.

A major dissatisfaction to security personnel is their low remuneration and lack of incentives to boost their morale. This partly explains why most of them act unprofessionally. During an interview, Police Officer B20 retorted that:

The reason why National Police Service lead in Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranking every year is because of meagre salary and incentives. As long as this matrix is not changed, the

story will be the same next year (Interview with Police Officer B20, 11<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Dide Waride).

This sentiment implies that bribery and corruption has become part and parcel of the work culture of the institution. Increase in salaries, allowances and incentives may change this picture. At the moment, officers who refuse to follow the practice are lone rangers.

Inadequate institutional framework (62.4%) and radicalisation (60.0%) are also a challenge. From the respondents, there is no framework of cooperation between different agencies/levels of government. There is suspicion between the County Government and the National Government organs, and this undermines cooperation in counterterrorism. The County Assembly and County Executive are also working at cross purpose. Worse still, the constitutional County Policing Authority has not been established and structures that would foster cooperation between different levels of government in counterterrorism/security are not in place.

There is also a rising problem of gang and drug addiction in Lamu. This has been exploited to further the aims of terrorists. Radicalisers are targeting such vulnerable groups. Social media platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp groups have become potent avenues for radicalisation and recruitment. This is in tandem with observations made by Dandurand (2013) who states that even though many youth live at the margins of society, they are nevertheless inundated with information made available by new technologies. Cell phones and internet access have revolutionised the ways in which youth communicate and stay informed. Information and communication technology is shaping youth culture and methods used consume music, film and art. Furthermore, informal nature of *madrasa* education leaves loopholes that may be exploited by radicalisers.

In order to combat radicalisation, we need a choreographed strategy; *madrasas* and mosques are an important feature of the Muslim community and can reinforce community cohesion and integration. *Madrasas* are an important feature of the Muslim community, they can be, and have been pivotal in engendering mutual respect, tolerance and integration. Most *madrasas* focus on nurturing the identity of the children as young Muslims; though in some cases things could be better. There are some *madrasas* on the fringes which allow corporal punishment, and certainly have pedagogical issues which needs to be addressed. However, because of lack of surveillance, some *madrasas* have been turned into centres of radicalisation when youth are indoctrinated with wrong teachings that glorify violence and extremism (Bergen and Swati, 2006).

In regulating *madrasa*, governments need to undertake a major effort to reorient their system (initiate curriculum reform) so that education in the Muslim world focuses less on reproducing repressive religious ideologies and more on teaching the skills needed to develop and globalize their economies; think critically and act independently; and exercise freedom of initiative. In an interview, Police Officer B39 pointed out that:

There is need to regulate *madrasa* system, the same way Ministry of Education regulates schools and syllabus. Those who teach *madrasas* should also register with the Teachers Service Commission (TSC). At the moment, we have information that radicalisation goes in there (Interview with a Police Officer B39, 7<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kizingitini).

In another interview, Chief 4 stated that:

There is a general lack of awareness in the public and even among government officials about radicalisation. The subject is not discussed openly in public and when discussed, the community view themselves more from a victim's perspective. Moreover, those who have dared to openly confront radicalisation and

extremism have suffered. A senior chief had to relocate from Kiunga when he was targeted for elimination (Interview with Chief 4, 11<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Katsakairo).

Drawing from the foregoing responses, it is evident that the challenges in Lamu may compound any radicalization measure. For instance, *madrasa* system needs to be modified (International Crisis Group, 2012) but there has been insufficient will to draft the strategy. Realistically, *madrasa* reform can only be part of a wider reform with government and the local community support as well as a well defined program.


It is important that the governments, County and National, adopt a strategic approach to engage with specific groups including the youth, NGOs, women, civil society, media, community policing, schools, churches, religious leaders, business community etc. to enhance collaboration as a strategy to counter radicalisation and violent extremism.

### **6.5 Possible Ways of Addressing Challenges in Implementing Counterterrorism Strategies in Lamu County**

The study further sought to establish possible ways of addressing the challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies in Lamu County. The findings were as presented in Figure 6.5.

From Figure 6.5, a number of way of addressing challenges were identified and they include improving police welfare and working condition at 95.2% (298), eradicating corruption at 88.2% (276), enhancing interagency coordination 86.3% (270), training security personnel at 83.1% (260), improving infrastructure at 78.6% (246), improving police public relationship at 68.7% (215), community engagement

at 67.7% (212), addressing injustices at 67.1% (210), securing Kenya-Somalia Border at 63.9% (200), regulating *madrassa* operations at 61.3% (192), addressing religious/ethnic animosity at 57.5% (180) and strengthening judicial system at 55.0% (172).



**Figure 6.5: Possible Ways of Addressing Challenges in Implementing Counterterrorism Strategies in Lamu County**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

Improving police welfare and working condition (95.2%) was suggested as one of the major ways of addressing the challenges in implementing counterterrorism

strategies. Findings revealed that morale of police officers are low due to poor welfare and working conditions. For the challenges to be addressed, respondents suggested key areas as; increasing pay and allowances, giving food rations regularly, giving off days, allowing officers to proceed on leave promptly, and fully catering for officers injured or killed during operation. Welfare remains keys as was reiterated by Police Officer B155 during interview:

We are required to put our lives on line fighting terrorists yet when one dies the family is left desolate. My detail was killed in an IED attack in 2016. Up to now, the family are still chasing compensation without hope of getting any since they have been tossed from office to office. Why risk your life and loose in the long run (Interview with Police Officer B155, 7<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Pate).

During the same interview, Police Officer B156 indicated that:

If the government want us to commit to Operation *Linda Boni*, let them increase our salary and introduce special allowance for officers actively involved in counterterrorism. At the moment all of us view this operation as a punishment (Interview with Police Officer B156, 7<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Pate).

The foregoing assertions are a pointer to how far the NPS should go in enhancing security not only in Lamu but in Kenya as a whole. As postulated by Kroth (2007), individuals are motivated to perform works that would provide greater rewards after successful accomplishment. However, when the reward for a number of Organizational performances is same or low, motivation to perform different kinds of work declines. It is therefore imperative that the NPS should look into ways of improving the welfare and working condition of officers for them to fully commit to counterterrorism.

Eradicating corruption (88.2%) was also cited as a key method of addressing the challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies. With entrenched corruption

in the government, officers in charge of the systems are compromised with bribes for personal gain. They then allow contrabands and weapons to freely enter the country, especially through the border. They benefit from money laundering done by the terror groups. These are the same weapons that are used to carry out terror activities. Elder C5 quoted during Focus Group Discussion said the following:

The problem is the corrupt border officials and police officers who allow terrorists to conduct money laundering and weapons to pass through our borders and roadblocks after being bribed. What they don't know is that the same weapons are used to kill their colleagues and citizens. With such endemic corruption, we are not safe (FGD with Council of Elders, 15<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

Indeed, financial support has been important for many terrorist groups. Some financial aid has been through direct avenues and in other cases it has been channelled through institutions. Money can come from foreign governments, but it can also come from private sources. Osama bin Laden's wealth and support from other Muslim contributors helped mould *Al-Qaeda* (Comras, 2005).

The same sentiments are supported by Schultz and Vogt (2002) who maintains that money has been important for either maintaining the dissident groups or making them more perilous. When the financial sources of these groups are curtailed their ability to mount attacks is reduced even if not eliminated, and groups become less effective, less active and less dangerous.

It is important to note that the initial efforts of either intelligence operatives to find or track the funding sources for terror groups have not been fully successful. *Al-Qaeda*, for instance, has apparently been able to move some of its financial resources into commodities like precious stones and gold, hence making it more difficult to trace, including their source.

A study by Hunsicker (2006) reveals that same money laundering can lead to financial terrorism and many well-known financial institutions have either intentionally or unintentionally been involved in movement of funds in and out of offshore banks. An alternative to that would be the so-called Hawala (remittance) system, also known as “Hundi”, an ancient system originating in South Asia. Today it is used around the world to conduct legitimate but untraceable remittances. Like any other remittance system Hawala plays an extremely vital role in money laundering.

There is therefore need for more robust mechanism to tackle corruption. In the foremost, tackling terrorist financing and depriving terrorists of the means by which they can infiltrate the country through our borders and launder money should be made a priority. It is then that the war on terrorism can be won.

From the findings, 86.3% cited enhancing interagency coordination. Inter-agency coordination remains the way to go in ensuring successful counterterrorism operation. It is through counterterrorism operation that different security agencies are able to pool up resources, both human and material, thus benefiting from others strength. This makes operation easy.

One of the success stories of the integrated approach to counter terrorism and the incorporation of local law enforcement can be learnt from US. As explained by Chalk & Rosenau (2003), prior to 9/11, efforts to counter terrorism were considered ‘FBI-centric and that the Bureau remained dismissive of terrorism-related information supplied by state and local law enforcement agencies’. However, post-2001, there has been a shift in the mind-set of the US government in its efforts to curb terrorism. The US recognises that the integration of law enforcement into



national counter terrorism responses is imperative, given that it is usually at that level that indications of impending attacks first occur or decisive breaks in on-going cases eventuate.

Interagency coordination is also achieved through strengthening and sustaining the international effort to fight terrorism. International agreements achieved through diplomacy are an additional possibility to complement efforts in dealing with terrorism. Cooperation among nations in terms of dealing with terrorism has increased the performance of nations in tackling terrorism. Through this, nations benefit from the technology of stronger partners not only through weaponry, but also critical intelligence. Police Officer B166 quoted during interview said that:

The US Forces in Manda Base has greatly aided our work. Through their powerful satellites, they are able to detect the movement of *Al-Shabaab* both in ocean and land and share with us such intelligence. Sometimes Kenya Air Force act swiftly and strike. I just wish the same was structured (Interview with Police Officer B166, 21<sup>st</sup> October, 2018 in Shella).

However, Dartnell (2000) pours a cold water over cooperation when he state that international conventions and diplomatic approaches will be constrained by the failure of the international community to arrive at a common definition of terrorism and the failure to guarantee that persons identified as terrorists are prosecuted. This may however not be absolutely true given that after September 2001 New York attack, member states have been more united than ever in the fight against terrorism.

On the international front, partners are taking advantage of partnership mechanisms for dialogue and practical cooperation relevant to counter-terrorism, including defence capacity building. Interested partners are encouraged to include a section on counter-terrorism in their individual cooperation agreements. Allies place

particular emphasis on shared awareness, capacity building, civil emergency planning and crisis management to enable partners to identify and protect vulnerabilities and to prepare to fight terrorism more effectively.

Another strategy is training security personnel (83.1%). Apart from conventional areas of training such as skill at arms, drill, field craft and musketry, one key area that security should be trained on is intelligence. Modern warfare and security management dictates that one must be ahead of his adversary in intelligence. Any group that have greater intelligence power maintains an upper hand in combat. This was reiterated by Police Officer B112 during an interview thus:

Terrorists continue to hit us because they have advanced intelligence mechanism and network. That is why they will know when we are leaving for a specific route and plant an IED on our path or lay an ambush (Interview with Police Officer B112, 19<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu Town).

As reiterated in the foregoing, prevention through intelligence gathering and infiltration of dissident groups is one of the most viable measures in the battle against terrorism. The role of counter terrorism intelligence is to retrieve timely and credible information on details of a terrorist attack and prevent such attacks. Intelligence, which identifies terrorist targets, the securing of these targets, preventing of the terrorist attack and or locating and prosecuting of perpetrators, is extremely valued. Such details have proven to be central in disrupting terrorist attacks. Intelligence that disrupts successive terrorist cells and terrorists is regarded as the most fruitful counter terrorism exercise. Intelligence obtained regarding a target of terrorism can ensure that the target is secured. As explained by Pillar (2004), disrupting a terror cell is considered fundamentally more effective in countering terrorism. However, obtaining intelligence to achieve these objectives remains the most difficult part.

It is important for trainers of law enforcement officers and officers themselves to know that the major components of intelligence are collection, analysis, and dissemination to relevant parties. Intelligence can be collected in diverse ways, from old-fashioned legwork to sophisticated electronic voice and data capture. In addition to the gathering of intelligence, effective intelligence analysis provides either a warning of terrorist attacks or an assessment of terrorists. The assessments of terrorism by analysis may be either of a strategic or tactical nature. The tactical assessment considers the collection of information and trying to establish the identity of terrorists. The process also guides further collection of intelligence to fill gaps in the assessment. As put by Hunsicker (2006), intelligence analysis may determine the intentions, capabilities and the threat of terrorist organizations.

Counter intelligence information can also be utilised to plot possible future actions of terrorists. Information is obtained and possible scenarios of terror implications are considered. This will provide early warning and possible target areas, which can be secured. Pillar (2004) points that to be able to accurately, predict future terrorist acts is dependent on the need to obtain 'plot specific information'. This assertion is true to the extent that building the capacity of law enforcement agencies is made a priority.

Improving infrastructure (78.6%) is another strategy in addressing challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategy. Improved infrastructure is a precursor for ease of movement and mobility. Lamu is has poor road network and several islands which are not easily accessible. Transport is mostly by boats, donkeys and motorbikes. The county has a large and expansive Boni forest that stretches all the way to Somalia. It is in this forest that terrorist hide in and uses to launch terror attacks. Generally, Lamu county is flat lying between altitude Zero and fifty metres

above sea level. The low altitude exposes some parts of the county to flooding during rainy seasons for instance areas around Lake Kenyatta, along Tana River delta such as Chalaluma in Witu and areas on the coastal line that experience flooding during high tides. This was captured during an interview where Police Officer B17 stated that:

Movement in flooded plains and in water has slowed our progress. Whereas most of terror gangs are bred here and are used to the terrain, most of us are from up country and dread entering any water body beyond a trough. (Interview with Police Officer B17, 9<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Witu).

Poor road network has also hampered movement of security personnel given that no single road in Lamu is tarmacked, although the road is currently being upgraded for tarmacking (Lamu CIDP, 2013-2017). The terrain and demographic composition of the border area make it conducive for terrorist groups to sneak into Kenya and also get assimilated into the local populace. Improving infrastructure will limit the advantage terror groups are taking while improving the efficiency of security personnel.

Another strategy is improving police – public relation (68.7%). Through good relationship with the locals, the police have the opportunity to have a greater reach, and avoid being seen as outsiders that disregards faith that so many locals hold dear, but that has been politicised and used as a pawn for terrorists to garner support for their cause (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a). This was brought out during Focus Group Discussion when Religious Leader F1 stated that:

The police are biased against the Muslim community. That is why there is a strain in relationship (FGD with Religious Leaders, 11<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Kiunga).

Saferworld (2016) reaffirms this notion and suggests that continued exclusion of groups and repeated efforts to highlight separateness are dangerous to peace and

security. As Prestholdt (2011) puts it, make it a priority to include Muslims in politics, the economy, and everyday life. This inclusivity has been an important strategy of the Global War on Terror, “winning the hearts and minds of target populations,” In view of the foregoing, a key step then calls for considering religious leaders and religious differences as part of the solution rather than part of the problem, thus inclusivity.

Community engagement (67.7%) is another major strategy. The NPS and government can engage different segment of the community in countering challenges in countering terrorism, including the youth, women, civil society, NGOs and the media. From the interviews, it was clear that gaps relating to strategic approaches in engaging with the youth to enhance partnership in addressing challenges in counterterrorism exist. In one Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader C7 was quoted as follows:

The NPS and the County Government of Lamu is trying to engage the youth but the process is not all inclusive. A clear framework supporting the development and implementation of interventions to eradicate recruitment of youths into terrorism and radicalisation should be developed (FGD with Religious Leaders, 21<sup>st</sup> October, 2018 in Shella).

Although the foregoing statement gives a pointer to where things should be, as at now, most youth are left in a state of disillusionment and are left at the mercy of numerous factors that may dissuade them to join bad groups. Furthermore, enhancing cross sectoral trust is especially important when engaging youth at the margins of the society. Rural to urban migration, the disintegration of traditional and community structures, and lack of formal employment have pushed a large number of youth into evil from where they interact at cross-purposes with state institutions. Such youth are vulnerable to terrorist recruitment.

According to Dandurand (2013), although many youths live at the brink, they are nevertheless inundated with information made available by new technologies. Cell phones and, to a larger extent, internet have revolutionized the way youth communicate and stay informed. Information communication technology is shaping youth culture and the methods used by young people to operate. Nevertheless, respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the efforts of the government in monitoring and potentially engaging youth which they say is not satisfactory.

For women, engaging them in counterterrorism offers a big step in inclusivity and democratisation. In practice, engaging women is always a complex and challenging. During Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader A3 stated that:

Women have been neglected in counterterrorism programs. After all the role of women in such programs is always limited. Only men are normally involved (FGD with Religious Leaders, 1<sup>st</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

In view of the foregoing, it appears that most communities are patriarchal, a phenomenon that has also been copied by the government and its agencies. Sadly, it is important to point out that studies have uncovered an alarming trend where women are target by terrorist for recruitment. In most regions of the world, women are being recruited into a very austere and intolerant doctrine and terrorism. Therefore the government should retrace her steps and consider possible ways in which women can be engaged and enlightened on terrorism, dangers of terrorism and indoctrination so as to avert such free recruitment into terrorism.

According to a recent report by OSCE Secretariat on women and countering violent extremism, women have perpetuated enough attacks and are being continually recruited for further attacks. Some of the key reasons advanced for such acts by women include both social and individual factors such as unmet needs, unresolved

grievances, avenging the death of a close relative, poverty and drugs. In the recent past, a woman, Samantha Lewthwaite, the “White Widow” was one of the mastermind of Westgate attack (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a). In another incident, Violet Kemunto and Mariam Abdi who were key masterminds of Dusit D2 terror attack in Nairobi on 15<sup>th</sup> January, 2019 that claimed over 21 lives. According to police report, a mysterious woman known as Mariam Abdi played a key role in delivering weapons that were used in the Dusit D2 attack from Somalia. Anti- Terror Police Unit (ATPU) failed to find her in Eldoret, where she was thought to be after failing to nab her in Mombasa. A separate team was dispatched to Malindi to hunt her down (Achuka, 2019). This susceptibility of women to terror demonstrates importance of engaging them in counterterrorism programs. Although it is known that women face many hurdles in attaining education as well as conservative cultural norms, inadequate facilities and support, these can be corrected through a concerted effort by the government and stakeholders.

The role of civil society in countering terrorism is important. Civil society can help to prevent terrorism by tackling the underlying economic, social and political drivers. Government plays an important role in this regard by setting policy framework, providing funding and addressing structural issues. Through their effort and partnering with other organizations, they engage local community at the grassroots through capacity building to prevent them from terrorism. Although they are known to engage women and youth in peace education, the government has always not been at ease with them to the point of being branded ‘evil society’. In one Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader D2 stated that:

In Lamu, the government consider civil society an impediment to their work. Many have had their operations halted at some point due to suspicion that they are colluding with terrorists and

financing terrorism. In cases where there is some form of partnership, it is usual unbalanced and one sided with the government taking the driver's seat. This has led to many civil society groups withdrawing their support (FGD with Religious Leaders, 19<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu Town).

From the argument, it is clear that the government do not appreciate the important role played by the civil society in determining the mind-set of the society. Chumba *et al.* (2016b), further reiterates that by creating safe spaces for dissent and by providing a forum where experiences can be shared on a personal level, civil society institutions may contribute to healing community rifts and tensions. Civil society may engage in outreach activities and take proactive steps to address root causes of terrorism. Activities that strengthen human rights and the rule of law in particular, promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law contribute to building strong democratic societies in which citizens are free to participate in governance.

Although the government took some steps to increase engagement with the civil society on issues of countering violent extremism and counterterrorism, little has been achieved. In the First National Conference on Security and Countering Violent Extremism in 2015 in which a Violent Extremism Advocacy and Accountability Charter was developed and adopted, civil society and religious leaders participated alongside government officials. However, up to date, little achievements on this front have been realised.

Civil society can also help identify areas of vulnerability and develop programs to help protect one from regressing to terrorism through good parenting, neighbourhood watch, and capacity building. Most community plays a leading role in de-radicalisation by themselves, through experts or volunteers who were once victims themselves. Police Officer B23 noted that:



Without fear of contradiction, I can authoritatively say that it is the civil society that is close to the common man on the ground and knows what ails the society, hence can recommend remedy. To me, any government effort without civil society is a mirage (Interview with Police Officer B23, 3<sup>rd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

Indeed, the assertion shows that civil society and the government are not working in unison despite civil society's in depth understanding of the community and their problem. Erwin (2013) asserts that indeed it is true that the government has always been on a collision course with the civil society. In particular, human rights issues often create tension between the society and government. This narrative should be addressed and changed completely so that we have civil society and government working together or complementing each other.

Another important entity that should be engaged in the fight against terrorism is NGOs. Government engagement with NGOs, like other similar entities, is limited. In most instances, the government view NGOs with suspicion hence leave them in the periphery and out of their plan of counterterrorism. However NGOs has helped in coming up with counterterrorism measures in societies affected by terror. They have also come up with economic empowerment programs to help youths who have been de radicalised. In the fight against terrorism, such measures are necessary and should be a norm in all societies affected or at risk of terrorism.

Chumba *et al.* (2016b) tends to support this notion through his assertion that terrorism prevention initiatives are now underway in a variety of places including prisons, detention centres, youths and sporting clubs, schools and universities, and churches and mosques. This brings counterterrorism agents into contact with a range of actors. This therefore means that current terrorism prevention is a significant departure from the pre 9/11 era. The current one mobilises new

implementing groups across the board, engages a new range of non-traditional interlocutors outside the government, and extends counterterrorism to a series of policy domains that were not previously impacted by considerations of national security. During an interview, Chief 2 stated that:

As administrators who are abreast with happenings on the ground, we have advised the central government to engage NGOs in counterterrorism. Most of these NGOs, for instance MUHURI is trusted by locals. The locals are therefore likely to take their counterterrorism message seriously, unlike when the police do the same in isolation (Interview with Chief 2, 10<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Dide Waride).

In support of the same, Graaf (2011) reiterates that the processes by which the threat of and response to terrorism are communicated to the public and the messaging process implies that their action are closely linked to the levels of violence and terror acts. This in essence implies that the role of NGOs is critical in filling this gap.

Media, when used well, is a powerful tool in countering terrorism. Media disseminates information to large group of people making it a key player in changing the mind-set of the masses. The use of the social media and its ability to give a voice to a range of actors makes it the most sought after platform for generating change. Media, as a two edged sword, can on one hand be used to counteract terrorism, and on the other hand to spread terrorism, propaganda and radicalisation. During an interview, Chief 1 stated that:

The power of social media in counterterrorism cannot be underestimated. It has been used in many places to promote terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization. It has also been used to spread peace messages. When used well and in time, media can form a major part of the solution to terrorism. The problem is that terrorist in most instances have beat the government in use of social media for propaganda and to advance their cause (Interview with Chief 1, 9<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Witu).

This statement serves to reinforce the argument that media is important in counterterrorism. Bassong (2008) further points out that despite many researchers agreeing that media and communication are important arsenals in counterterrorism; few seem to truly understand the reality of digital age communication environment where such need to be used. In the new era of terrorism, there has been a lot of debate on the role of media and technology in sustaining or subjugating terrorism. There have also been many debates about the role of the media in fostering radicalisation or peace in the globe.

After the 9/11 attack, it has dawned on governments and actors more than any other time in history that media and technology has become an integral part in counterterrorism. The major problem is the assumption that technology is linear and friendly to any government in place. During Focus Group Discussion, Elder D2 stated that:

In this digital age, counterterrorism cannot be won by police or military operation only. We must engage the media in the campaign since it now clear that large number of terrorists are actually recruited through social media (FGD with Council of Elders, 18<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu Town).

This argument is a pointer to why the government is at times frustrated by the media to the point of shutting down certain media houses and some instances, bringing down the internet. This has happened following terrorist attacks in Kenya where the media has been ‘biased reporting’ and ‘advancing the cause of terrorists’. Surprising too is how various media forms are incapable of countering terror recruitment messages and propaganda. It is therefore right to conclude that media and terrorism are joined in the hip – terrorism needs media and vice versa. Nacos (2002) underscores this by reiterating that citizen’s trust in counterterrorism measures put in place by the government will only be useful by the government’s

ability embrace the media and outdo terror groups in the use of social media to advance their cause.

Another strategy cited by respondents was addressing injustices (67.1%). Lamu is faced with many forms of socio-economic and political injustices including education and land. These injustices have made the locals feel isolated and marginalised by the government. The environment is thus anti-government. Lamu scores low on development indicators. Just like north-eastern region, also bordering Somalia and generally marginalised from development processes since independence, the coastal area of Kenya has the highest rate of poverty in the country (Saferworld, 2016).

The state of Education in Lamu over the years has been characterized by underperformance. Many students in Lamu fail to transition beyond Form Four. According to the Lamu CIDP (2013 - 2017), projections for population of Early Childhood Development Education (ECDE) pupils stood at 10,614. There are 150 ECDE centres, 323 teachers with teacher pupil ratio standing at 1:24. The 2012 projections for primary school population were 23,580. During an interview, Chief 6 stated that:

It is not that our young ones do not embrace school. It's because schools are few and our children has to walk several kilometres to get to school. To make the matter worse, few schools that are available are also understaffed. Many teachers do not want to teach in Lamu County because of the hardship. When terrorist started attacking the county, over half of the teachers transferred to up county schools leaving Lamu with no teachers. Some schools are now closed as people flee terror attacks. We are tired of reminding the government to addressing these inequalities (Interview with Chief 6, 4<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

As indicated by the respondent, the locals feel that the government has done, and is doing little to help them. The ugly part of all these is that poor performance and

limited opportunities for vocational skills in Lamu County has fuelled a large pool of young people with no skills to successfully engage in the labour market. Such idle labour pool provides easy opportunities for recruiting agencies into terrorism.

In the political front, residents of Lamu feel that people from upcountry are taking over from them. At the moment, one of the two MPs and the Deputy Governor are immigrants. This has been brought about by the fact that Lamu is the only county in Kenya with half of its population being immigrants (Saferworld, 2016). Furthermore, wrangles within the county government have presented severe operational challenges. In addition, the devolved Government is still in the process of forming its structures and this hampers many activities in the County. This state of confusion is what fuels violent extremism and terrorism.

Land injustice is a major issue in Lamu County. As Saferworld (2016) puts it, serious attempts must be made to address historical injustices pertaining to land and to promote continuous but honest dialogue between all the people of Lamu. Large swathes of land are owned by immigrants who have taken to farming unlike local inhabitants who are majorly fisherman and traders. In one of the Focus Group Discussions, Elder A8 indicated that:

We will not rest until non-locals give us back our land. We cannot beg for our land. However long it will take, we must reclaim our land from occupation (FGD with Council of Elders, 2<sup>nd</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

This sentiment explains how deeply rooted the issue of land is in Lamu County. Saferworld (2016) explains that in the 1970s, the then-President Jomo Kenyatta allocated parcels of public land to ‘up-country’ settlers – from his own Kikuyu ethnic group. Kenya’s largest ethnic group, the Kikuyus, have been in economic and political ascendance since independence. They were awarded title deeds to land

that historically belonged to ‘indigenous’ communities – including the Mijikenda, Bajuni, Sanye, Boni and Swahili. Over decades, growing numbers of Kikuyus and other up-country ‘outsiders’ have moved to the area, buying up land and altering the county’s demographics. The bulk of Lamu County’s population is now in the mainland’s farming areas, away from its traditional centre, Lamu Island, and in mainland towns such as Mpeketoni which have large populations of nonindigenous people. Lamu is now the only county in Kenya where nearly 50 per cent of the population is non-indigenous.

Even though all Kenyan citizens are entitled to the same rights, including over property, these perceived inequities in land ownership and tenure have deepened notions of a difference between ‘outsiders’, ‘settlers’ or ‘up-country people’ and ‘indigenous’, ‘local’ or ‘coastal’ people in the area. This has been worsened by discrimination in issuing title deeds and identification cards. In another Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader D3 explained that:

The process of acquiring national identity has been made impossible. The authorities, who are mainly from upcountry, consider us to be Arabs or Somalis. They therefore deny us national identity card, while people from up country are readily issued with them. We cannot therefore not get title deed for our land. I recently lost an ancestral land in Kibaoni when a Kikuyu came with a title deed for my land from Nairobi. This is what is breeding resentment (FGD with Religious Leaders, 17<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Hindi).

This assertion underscores an argument by Chumba *et al.* (2016a) that land is an important factor of production. This explains why not having a title deed is suicidal. This therefore means that the government must step up its mandate to the citizens by addressing these injustices that are likely to breed resentment. Especially vital is the issuance of identification documents for residents of Lamu without undue delays and bureaucracy.

Another strategy in addressing challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies is securing Kenya-Somalia border (63.9%). Usually borders serve as the transit point for goods and services. People arriving and transiting out of the country are also screened and cleared through border crossing points. After 9/11 terrorist attack, there have been renewed calls for intensification of surveillance and monitoring of peoples movement globally. This is intended to enable security measures be taken in the event of threat to people or property. In Lamu County, surveillance is also carried out in the vast Indian Ocean waters along the border with Somalia using patrol boats such as MV Lamu shown in Plate 6.3 to detect and deter any suspicious activity that may threaten security in the region.



**Plate 6.3: Marne Police Unit (MPU) Patrol Boat docked at Lamu Jetty. This is one of the boats employed by the National Police Service in surveillance.**

**Source: Field Data, 2018**

When the government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, it created a lawless society where crime and radical ideologies flourished. Lacking state capacity since that time has allowed unrestricted movement of people and goods into and out of

Somalia (Mogire and Agade, 2011). While many of these people were refugees seeking a better life in Kenya, the number of terrorists should not be underestimated. With a porous border and a confirmed presence of Islamic fundamentalists, Somalia poses a threat to Kenya and the rest of the world.

Porous borders present a major challenge in securing territorial integrity of nations. The presence of security personnel in border areas is inadequate pointing to the general inability of the governments to ensure law and order within their territories (Renade, 2011). This is because the border is very wide and expansive. This allows for unrestricted movement of goods and people. This is particularly true in the case of Kenya-Somali border which has allowed for influx of refugees and terrorists into Kenya. In one of the interviews, Chief 20 indicated that:

Most terrorists have taken advantage of the refugee situation to enter Kenya. Many have come in disguised as refugees. In fact, many attacks are planned in refugee camps. It is from these refugee camps that terrorists move to their locations (Interview with Chief 20, 17<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

This argument may bring a debate on whether it is right for a country to bar refugees on grounds of national security. Bures (2006) clarifies that the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy reflects a clear affirmation on members state that effective counterterrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting, but rather complementary and mutually reinforcing, and that human rights and rule of law constitute the fundamental basis of the global counterterrorism effort. In adopting the Global Strategy and its Plan of Action, Member states resolved to recognise that international cooperation and any measures that they undertake to prevent and combat terrorism must comply with obligations under international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and



relevant international conventions and protocols, in particular Human Rights Law and Refugee Law.

In 2016, following relentless attack by terrorist coupled by complexities of controlling the porous Kenya – Somalia border, the government of Kenya decided to take a radical step by initiating the construction of 700 kilometres border wall from Kiunga to the south to Mandera in the north to prevent illegal entry, mostly terrorists, into Kenya. Although the project is one of the ambitious counterterror strategy in Africa, it is not a new phenomenon in the world. Other countries have in the past constructed similar walls to deter their neighbours, illegal migrants or protect them from cross border attacks. For instance, Israel constructed its wall to separate it from Palestine. Saudi Arabia constructed a wall to separate her from Yemen. Spain constructed a fence to keep off illegal African immigrants. US constructed the same to deter Mexican immigrants (Chumba *et al.*, 2016a). There has been a debate and mixed reaction on the decision by Kenya to build this wall. Whether this wall will be the solution Kenya has been looking for remains to be seen.

Although Kenya has put some measures in securing its border with Somalia, a lot still need to be done in securing Kenya – Somalia border. According to Harns (2005), border security should focus on: establishing or strengthening border systems, including data systems used at checkpoints and central management points, improving business management at the border, and, assisting countries in moving towards more integrated border management approaches; improvement of travel documents and their issuance systems, primarily passports and visas; building administrative and management structures related to migration and

security; improving policy and legal base for border management; strengthening training and human resource development systems that support all features of migration management; and enabling intergovernmental technical cooperation and dialogue on migration management matters, including migration, immigration and general security and safety.

Regulating *madrasa* operation (61.3%) was also cited as another strategy of addressing challenges in implementing counterterrorism. *Madrasa* was cited as one of the places where radicalization takes place. This was attributed to the fact that most of its activities are never regulated. It was also clear that vetting of *madrasa* teachers is never done. Radical, violent Islamists understand the significance of education as a fulcrum in the war. They organize lines of operation under the assumption that long-term control of society depends on what the rising generations of Muslim youth are taught to believe—educating Muslim youth is vital to achieving the Islamists’ long-term goals.

Graaf (2011) explains that although some *madrasas* teach secular subjects, in general *madrasas* offer a religious-based curriculum, focusing on the Quran and Islamic texts. Beyond instruction in basic religious tenets, a small group of radicalized *madrasas* promote a militant form of Islam and teach their Muslim students to fight nonbelievers and stand against what they see as the moral depravity of the West. During an interview, Police Officer B 118 indicated that:

Our intelligence sources have indicated that most of the youths are radicalised at a young age in the *madrasas*. It is in the *madrasas* that radical Muslims preachers hide and disguise themselves as *madrasa* teachers. Although we have continually asked for their vetting, Muslim leaders have rejected this and maintained that we are trying to interfere with their religion (Interview with Police Officer B118, 21<sup>st</sup> November, 2018 in Pandanguo).

This sentiment explicitly shows how effort in controlling *madrasa* is resisted. Despite such resistance from Muslim leaders, efforts should focus on intelligence gathering on radical *madrasas* that repeatedly produce terrorists. By focusing on a select group of radical *madrasas*, anti-terrorism efforts may be able to disrupt networks that form the basis for future attacks. This includes neutralizing the hard-core group who are most often part of terror network. As explained by Harns (2005), this is a realistic mission for two reasons. First, the number of radical *madrasas* that preach radical ideology is quite small. Second, within the small pool of radical *madrasas*, it should be possible to focus specifically on those that have direct ties to *Al-Shabaab* as these are the schools that have funnelled recruits to terrorist operations. By focusing government aid and intelligence gathering on a small group of radical *madrasas*, lives and interests could be saved, with little if any effect on the network of moderate *madrasas* that provide masses of people with needed education.

Defenders of the *madrasa* system view its traditional pedagogical approach as a way to preserve an authentic Islamic heritage. Because most *madrasa* graduates have access only to a limited type of education, they commonly are employed in the religious sector as prayer leaders and Islamic scholars. Authorities in various countries are considering proposals for introducing improved science and math content into *madrasas*' curricula, while preserving the religious character of *madrasa* education. In one Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader D3 supported this by saying that:

*Madrasas* are an important issue in education and development in the Muslim world; they are not and should not be considered a threat to peace and security (FGD with Religious Leaders, 17<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Lamu Town).

In an extension of this argument Bergen & Swati (2006) points out that we must eliminate the “assumption that *madrasas* produce terrorists capable of carrying out major attacks” in order to “shape more effective policies to ensure national security. *Madrasas* offer a free education, room, and board to their students, and thus they appeal to impoverished families and individuals. On the whole, these religious schools are supported by private donations from Muslim believers through a process of alms-giving known in Arabic as zakat. The practice of zakat — one of the five pillars of the Islamic faith — prescribes that a fixed proportion of one’s income be given to specified charitable causes, and traditionally a portion of zakat has endowed religious education. It is however this zakat that has been viewed suspiciously by the government. During an interview, Chief 3 stated that:

The reasons why we cannot decisively deal with terrorist is the unlimited funding they get from their brother across the continent. These fundings are sent to *madrasas* and used to radicalise our youths (Interview with Chief 3, 11<sup>th</sup> October, 2018 in Katsakairo).

This sentiment is true in the sense that indeed Kenyan government have in the recent past frozen accounts of several Muslim organizations and those connected to them. Several Muslims bodies and organizations have also been outlawed following accusations that they are funding terror activities. Most scholars argue that a differentiation should be made between funding to support charitable projects, such as *madrasa*-building, and funding that has been channelled, overtly or implicitly, to support extremist teachings in these *madrasas*. Anzar (2003) further clarifies that several states have strengthened controls on the activities of charities engaged in overseas activities, including *madrasa* building and administration. Despite the controls, several Islamic charitable organizations continue to provide assistance to educational projects across the Muslim world, and channels of responsibility

between donors and recipients for curricular development and educational control are often unresolved or unclear.

In regulating *madrasa*, governments need to undertake a major effort to reorient their system (initiate curriculum reform) so that education in the Muslim world focuses less on reproducing repressive religious ideologies and more on teaching the skills needed to develop and globalize their economies; think critically and act independently; and exercise freedom of initiative. *Madrasa* teachers need to be vetted and registered with the government, just like other teachers do. The government should also streamline and facilitate the *madrasa* registration process by announcing registration requirements as well as nominating a single body with whom *madrasas* should be registered and further build trust with *madrasas* through financial and technical support. In the end, victory will depend on how effectively we persuade Muslim leaders that *madrasa* reform is in the best interests of their societies and the Islamic faith.

Addressing religious and ethnic animosity (57.5%) is also a strategy in dealing with the challenges in counterterrorism. Muslims in Lamu and at the coast have historically felt marginalised from a predominantly Christian country. In Lamu, there is a huge immigrant population who are mainly Christians. This phenomenon has caused tension and suspicion between the two groups. The indigenous population who are mainly Muslims feel that the immigrant population have grabbed their land. Terrorist have taken advantage of these grievances and animosity to win converts and sympathizers. During Mpeketoni attack in 2015, the Kikuyus and other immigrant communities were targeted killed. This animosity is deeply seated as explained by Elder C1 in a Focus Group Discussion:

These *kafiris* came here and took our land. There will only be peace when they return our ancestors land (FGD with Council of Elders, 15<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kiunga).

The foregoing sentiment show than land issues are fuelling ethnic and religious animosity in Lamu County. *Kafiri* is a Swahili word for non-believer in reference to Christians by Muslims. This us versus them mentality creates hostility immigrant population. As Kresse (2009) puts it, access to resources is meant to be open to all members on an equitable basis depending on their varying needs. When bias and discrimination in the distribution of such resources sets in, conflict may emerge. It is also dangerous for group stability when ethnic profiling and ethnocentrism become rampant, its unity and harmony is compromised. In such a case, divisions may arise that breed the ground for conflict.

Strengthening judicial system was cited by 55.0% of the respondents. Mogire & Agade (2011) argues that flawed terrorism laws in Kenya have caused grave problems and even with improved legislation over the last few years, success has been minimal. For one, the definition of terrorism is vague and thus, able to be contested by many opponents. The Kenyan government defines terrorism as “anti-state violent activities undertaken by non-state entities which are motivated by religious goals”. This definition neglects terrorism based on political, ideological, and criminal rationales and thus, places an unfair target on the minority religion in Kenya (Islam). In one Focus Group Discussion, Religious Leader A6 explained that:

Because most terrorist attacks have been carried by Muslims, the government believe that all Muslims are terrorists. That is why they are creating laws to persecute Muslims. This is very sad (FGD with Religious Leaders, 1<sup>st</sup> October, 2018 in Mpeketoni).

This belief has created animosity and tension as Muslims feels they are target by the terror laws. Furthermore the 2003 Suppression of Terrorism Bill did not make it

into law after a public outcry over unconstitutionality, international human rights violations, and overt discrimination against Muslims. Two years later, the Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2006 was again brought before Parliament. This bill contained many of the same issues as its predecessor and was, therefore, not passed into law. Certain crimes committed by terrorists (such as murder) can be prosecuted in Kenyan courts; however, there has yet to exist a comprehensive anti-terrorism law insofar as one exists in other Western democracies (Prestholt, 2011).

The lack of this comprehensive legislation puts Kenyan law enforcement officials in positions where they perform questionable means and violate the human rights of many in the Muslim community. Intelligence officials have been accused numerous times of unlawfully detaining suspected terrorists for lengthy periods of time and torturing suspects in attempts to gain confessions and further intelligence (Prestholt, 2011). This was expounded by Police Officer B99 during an interview when he stated that:

It is demoralising to work under weak laws. Most instances when we arrest terror suspects and take them to court, they are usually released. This has emboldened their resolve while compromising our work. Sometimes it forces us to detain terror suspects arbitrarily (Interview with Police Officer B99, 7<sup>th</sup> November, 2018 in Kizingitini).

The foregoing sentiment points to some of the challenges law enforcement are faced with. Now that proper prosecutorial infrastructure is hardly in place, Kenyan authorities frequently hand-off terrorism suspects to neighbouring countries or the United States. In one instance after the 2010 bombing in Kampala, Uganda the Government of Kenya transferred 13 Kenyan citizens suspected of taking part in the attacks to Uganda. The Minister of Justice declared that the rendition was illegal (Mogire and Agade, 2011), although there was no possibility of reversing the action that had already occurred.

There are also several Kenyan nationals currently detained at Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay. One such subject, Mohamed Abdulmalik, was informally suspected of participating in the 2002 Mombasa attacks. He was never charged with a crime and no evidence was ever recovered after extensive interrogations and searches. Nevertheless, he was handed over to the American government because Kenya did not have the means to further investigate or prosecute the case. This is not to say that Mohamed Abdulmalik is innocent. Rather, the untrained law enforcement personnel and lack of proper legislation in Kenya make the amount of counterterrorism aid flowing into the country largely irrelevant (Mogire and Agade, 2011). It is therefore imperative that the government tighten its anti-terror laws since it is likely that terrorist menace is not likely to die soon.

## **6.6 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has evaluated the challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies by the National Police Service in Lamu County. The challenges remain key impediment in eradication of violent extremism and terrorism in Lamu County and coastal region at large. Findings revealed that the National Police Service has been back footed by the terrorists and are making little progress in the fight against terrorism in Lamu County. This has been worsened by the poor police-public relationship that is strained by among other reasons, detention of locals, disappearance and extrajudicial killings. Mutual suspicion has made cooperation a daunting undertaking as indigenous residents feel estranged from the security machinery. Worse still, the morale of police officers is also low occasioned by the prevailing counterterrorism operation circumstances and situation such as delay in payment/embezzlement of allowances, poor pay, poor working condition and



welfare, unpredictable transfers and changeover, inadequate equipment and training. This is against the Justice Theory that espouses that organizational justice is positively correlated to motivation, implying that where justice is observed, a general positive attitude emerges by itself

Findings further revealed that challenges in implementing counterterrorism are corruption (73.2%), inadequate community involvement (49.7%), poor interagency coordination (69.1%), low morale among officers (86.0%), inadequate institutional framework (62.4%), poor working condition and welfare (83.4%), porous Kenya-Somalia border (79.6%), radicalisation (60.0%), poor police-public relationship (89.2%), lack of resources and training (76.4%), poor infrastructure (78.7%), economic, social and political injustices (44.6%), ethnic and religious animosity (63.7%), and weak justice system (67.5%).

Findings also explored and revealed possible ways of addressing challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategy as improving welfare and working condition of officers (95.2%), eradicating corruption (88.2%), enhancing interagency coordination (86.3%), training security personnel (83.1%), improving infrastructure (78.6%), police – public relations (68.7%), community engagement (67.7%), addressing injustices (67.1%), securing Kenya – Somalia border (63.9%), regulating *madrassa* operations (61.3%), addressing religious/ethnic animosity (57.5%), and strengthening judicial system (55.0%). This chapter summary leads to the next chapter that constitutes summary, conclusion and recommendations.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This chapter presents a summary of key findings of the study, conclusions, recommendations and suggestions for further research. They are presented on the basis of the specific objectives and the corresponding research questions which were posed in pursuit of realizing the general objective of investigating counterterrorism strategies employed by the National Police Service in managing terrorism in Lamu County, Kenya.

#### **7.1 Summary of Findings**

The general objective of the study was to investigate counterterrorism strategies employed by the NPS and their performance in managing terrorism in Lamu County, Kenya. The summary of the study was informed by the objectives below:

- i. Evaluate counterterrorism strategies employed by National Police Service in Lamu County.
- ii. Assess efficacy of Policing Approaches utilised in counterterrorism by the National Police Service in Lamu County.
- iii. Examine challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies by the National Police Service in Lamu County.

##### **7.1.1 Counterterrorism Strategies Employed by the National Police Service in Lamu County**

In relation to the first objective of the study, findings revealed that terrorist attacks in Lamu County still happens hence pose a threat to peace and security. Although majority of police officers and other stakeholders are in agreement that counterterrorism strategies exist in the service, they were hardly involved in

developing these strategies, a situation that has made them not embrace these strategies fully. It is also revealed that they are not sufficiently inducted on these strategies, a situation that paints a grave picture on their preparedness to manage terrorism. Furthermore, findings also reveal that most of them perceive counterterrorism strategies as ineffective, and counterterrorism operation as being poorly conducted. Empirical findings show that the National Police Service has not fully involved its rank and file as well as other stakeholders in counterterrorism, a situation that has seen resentment and dissatisfaction with the operation as terror attacks still happens.

Among the strategies influencing performance of the National Police Service in Lamu County, protecting vulnerable targets (84.6%), joint operations (82.6%) and surveillance (69.7%) were cited as most effective. Other strategies mentioned were patrols (54.7%), erecting physical barriers (52.2%), ambush (37.8%), and intelligence gathering (23.0%) in order of effectiveness. Prosecution (17.4%) and raids (14.9%) were cited as the least effective strategies. This was mainly because of the existence of weak laws on terrorism that hardly convict terror suspects in courts, as well as raids that do not bear fruits but instead breed resentment.

On strategies influencing performance of the National Police Service, measures to address police welfare (92.6%), for example police pay, allowances, housing, transfers etc. is poorly addressed. Other areas that are poorly addressed in the strategy are measures in addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism (53.4%), measures to ensure respect for human rights and rule of law (46.0%), and measures to build police capacity including training and weapons (44.4%). Although measures to enhance intelligence gathering, detection and prevention

(52.9%) and measures to enhance cooperation with local organization and other partners (50.8%) are well addressed in the strategy, they are not effective on the ground given that findings have revealed that there is mistrust between the police and the public and non-cooperation of members of the public with security agencies making intelligence sharing virtually impossible.

Findings also revealed a number of other strategies that can be employed to achieve effective police performance in managing terrorism. Equipping and training officers (93.3%), improving working condition and welfare of officers (89.5%), and improving police public relations (83.7%) were cited as key strategies. These strategies should be adopted urgently to remedy terrorist menace in Lamu County. Equipping and training officers as well as welfare should be given prominence now that they rank high among strategies that can be employed to achieve effective police performance in Lamu County. Other strategies include: securing Kenya – Somalia border (82.8%); improving infrastructure (81.7%); solving youth unemployment/education standard (80.0%); addressing historical injustices (79.2%); addressing ethnic/religious animosity (73.5%); eradicating corruption (69.6%); improving interagency coordination (67.1%); strengthening judicial systems (61.0%); creating awareness on radicalisation (59.1%) and; addressing drug and substance abuse (46.0%).

It was established that the fight against terrorism must be all encompassing. Everyone must be involved in the fight against terrorism. Leaving anyone out at any stage will simply jeopardise counterterrorism leading to failure of strategies. Justice Theory's idea that human resource (welfare, remuneration and training) is key in performance management is also supported.

### **7.1.2 Efficacy of Policing Approaches Utilised in Counterterrorism by the National Police Service**

In respect to the second objective of the study, findings revealed that policing approaches are often applied by the police in counterterrorism in Lamu County, and that they are popular. The approaches also influence the performance of police officers to a great extent.

On particular policing approaches applied in counterterrorism in Lamu County, findings revealed that integrated policing approach (28.7%) is the most used. Other strategies are paramilitary (21.6%), intelligence led policing (18.5%), community policing (15.3%), criminal justice (6.4%), others (hot spot policing, predictive policing and problem oriented policing) at (5.0%) and military (4.5%). Intergrated policing is ideal since it encompasses the use of several strategies, as well as a combination of other players in ensuring peace and security. Military is not popular since the police seldomly has military hardware and prowess given that Kenya has “civilian police”. Furthermore, it is resented by civillians.

Findings also revealed that National Police Service (NPS) engagement with various groups in the community is a critical component of effective policing initiative, particularly one aimed at preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism. Findings revealed that groups that can be engaged were: religious leaders and elders (30.1%); youths (26.5%); civil society organizations (18.6%); media (14.2%); and women (10.6%). For effective counterterrorism, police should engage these stakeholders since they are key in providing information and intelligence that the police direly needs. They are also useful in helping police carry out their duty to the maximum through their cooperation.

Efficacy of policing approaches was considered and results indicated that integrated policing approach (51.0%) is the most effective followed by paramilitary (44.6%). The rest are intelligence led policing (38.2%), others (hot spot policing, predictive policing and problem oriented policing) at (33.8%), military (28.7%), community policing (19.1%) and criminal justice (14.1%). As espoused in Expectancy Theory, approaches that have a greater performance (effective) should be emphasized, and those with lower performance outcome reviewed. In this regard, approaches such as intergrated policing that is effective should be stressed, while community policing and criminal justice reviewed. Greater performance among officers should also be rewarded, for instance, by way of promotion.

### **7.1.3 Challenges in Implementing Counterterrorism Strategies by the National Police Service in Lamu County**

Challenges remain key impediment in eradication of violent extremism and terrorism in the Coastal Region and North Eastern Kenya at large. Findings revealed that the National Police Service has been back footed by the terrorists and are not making considerable achievements in the fight against terrorism in Lamu County. This has been worsened by the poor police-public relationship that is strained by among other reasons, detention of locals, disappearances of suspects and extrajudicial killings. Mutual suspicion has made cooperation a daunting undertaking as indigenous residents feel estranged from the security machinery. Worse still, the morale of police officers is also low occasioned by the prevailing counterterrorism operation circumstances and situation such as delay in payment/embezzlement of allowances, poor pay, poor working condition and welfare, unpredictable transfers and changeover and, inadequate equipment and training.

Findings further revealed that challenges in implementing counterterrorism are poor police-public relationship (89.2%), low morale among officers (86.0%), poor working condition and welfare (83.4%), porous Kenya-Somalia border (79.6%), poor infrastructure (78.7%), lack of resources and training (76.4%), corruption (73.2%), poor interagency coordination (69.1%), weak justice system (67.5%), ethnic and religious animosity (63.7%), inadequate institutional framework (62.4%), radicalisation (60.0%), inadequate community involvement (49.7%), and economic, social and political injustices (44.6%). These challenges should be addressed squarely so as to ensure meaningful and effective implementation of counterterrorism strategies. This will ensure that terrorists are defeated in Lamu County and the rest of Kenya.

The study considered possible ways of addressing challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategy and findings revealed that improving welfare and working condition of officers (95.2%) was a key strategy. Other possible strategies were eradicating corruption (88.2%), enhancing interagency coordination (86.3%), training security personnel (83.1%), improving infrastructure (78.6%), enhancing police – public relations (68.7%), community engagement (67.7%), addressing injustices (67.1%), securing Kenya – Somalia border (63.9%), regulating *madrasa* operations (61.3%), addressing religious/ethnic animosity (57.5%), and strengthening judicial system (55.0%).

In order to deal effectively with these challenges, the NPS should put in place control mechanisms while executing counterterrorism operation. As reinforced by Control Theory, when control mechanisms are put in place, commanders and other leaders tasked with counterterrorism are able to control performance of police officers and other stakeholders (by identifying the challenges promptly) since

control mechanisms such as Standard Operating Procedures and Standing Orders generates faster, better and timely output by regularly monitoring feedback and effecting desired corrections.

## **7.2 Conclusions**

The study confirmed theoretical notion that counterterrorism strategies are as varied as organizations, and a strategy that works for one organization/situation may not work for another. Further complicating the security landscape is the fact that there are several factors on the actual ground that greatly influences the strategies. Based on the summary of the findings, and in line with the study's specific objectives and research questions, the following conclusions were made:

First, counterterrorism strategies employed by the police in Lamu County are ineffective and counterterrorism operations are poorly handled. The fight against terrorism must involve all stakeholders for acceptability and ownership. Counterterrorism strategies must also take into account and address the prevailing circumstances and conditions on the ground such as marginalization and socio-economic factors for them to succeed.

Secondly, policing approaches utilised by the police in Lamu County are generally effective and acceptable. The approaches are popular with the police since they positively influence their performance to a great extent. They are also more familiar with them hence not difficult to apply. Again, for successful application of the approaches, the police need to engage stakeholders in the community such as non-governmental organizations, youths, religious leaders and women.

Thirdly, the results reveal that the challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies are numerous and varied. Whereas some are social, others are economic



and political. Therefore, the key to effective counterterrorism lies on first addressing these challenges that have remained key impediment in implementing counterterrorism strategies.

The overall conclusion is that as terrorism and terror acts evolve, so must counterterrorism strategies evolve too, taking into account the prevailing circumstances and dynamics on the ground such as socio – economic and political factors, technology, propaganda and general environment. It is then that the war on terrorism will be practically won.

### **7.3 Recommendations**

Recommendations being made were derived from the conclusions about the study findings. They are presented as follows:

First, commanders of the National Police Service should ensure that they involve all their rank and file in developing counterterrorism strategies, as well as properly inducting them on the same to enhance their capacity and preparedness in managing terrorism. Consequently, all stakeholders, including elders, religious leaders, civil society organizations, youths, women and the community at large should be involved in counterterrorism in order to realise sense of ownership. Furthermore, the strategies should address key underlying issues both within and without the service such as training, pay, transfers, equipment, police-public relationship, corruption, human rights and injustices, socio-economic and political factors for the strategies to be acceptable and effective.

Acts of terrorism and massive loss emanating from terror attacks requires more renewed interest in border security translating into rapid demands for advances in technology. It is recommended that security-based technologies commonly used by

the developed world to monitor insurgents at the border be procured and deployed by the two states such as cameras and sensors which have the capability to record video images transmit any suspected movements at the border to a command and control center controlled by security agents miles away, from the border. There is need to employ superior technological systems with instant access to GPS and GIS information along the borders to allow security agents have a wireless access to location to information. Possible Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), often referred to as drones, should be employed to enhance surveillance across the Kenya Somalia. This will require Kenya and Somalia governments to collaborate on providing additional resources and more funding to border security agencies.

Secondly, there should be a synergy between policing approaches and counterterrorism strategies. Policing approaches should be incorporated or married with counterterrorism strategies so as to enhance performance and efficacy given the findings have revealed that the approaches are more effective and acceptable than counterterrorism strategies.

Without community participation, intelligence-sharing is subject to fail. Thus, the community is an important element in a programme's failures or successes. Therefore, Kenya intelligence community should come up with a framework for engaging citizens in helping the intelligence community to identify possible terrorist threats and infrastructure vulnerabilities. Strategic intelligence measures that link the community intelligence and policy makers should be enhanced to produce timely and accurate intelligence that will ensure effective counterterrorism measures. One strategy would be for Kenya government to encourage intergrated policing program that is effective in the fight against terrorism. For counterterrorism and broader information sharing to be more effective, each entity

and level of government must clearly know its role. The Kenyan government should designate and delineate the responsibilities of the national and County Governments based on their available resources and ensure that information sharing occurs at all levels.

Thirdly, challenges such as socio-economic and political imbalances remain key impediment in management of terrorism and performance of NPS. For effective and efficient counterterrorism operation and performance, the government, the National Police Service and other relevant organs should endeavour to address these challenges satisfactorily.

Kenyan Coastal and Muslim community has always been brisk as a political unit in a persistent struggle against a perceived marginalization. This perceived political and socio-economic deprivation and their religious inclination only serves to create an environment for nurturing radicalization and pro-terrorism attitudes. Kenya should engage lobby groups and the international community to take a leading role in ensuring marginalized groups are protected in the new framework. Kenyan government should develop political goodwill to address the heightened religious and political difference.

From the study, socio-economic and political marginalization of locals and ethnic discrimination against Muslim communities came out strongly as grievances of local communities. The government should ensure local perspectives are taken into account when considering counterterrorism strategies. Specifically, the strategies need to address the root causes of underdevelopment leading to marginalization of the coastal region. Another strategy should be to develop a multi-sectoral policy framework that will foster economic development in Lamu and provide a robust

monitoring framework that will develop and track the achievement of key indicators and milestones of integrated economic development. Such a framework should include all sectors such as infrastructure development meant to construct road and rail network, ports and building educational institutions.

#### **7.4 Suggestions for Further Research**

Based on the findings, conclusions and recommendations, it is evident that there is need for further research in line with the following study's specific objectives and research questions:

- i. Further study on counterterrorism strategies and performance of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) in managing terrorism in Lamu County.
- ii. A study on the policing approaches utilized in counterterrorism in other counties prone to terror attacks.
- iii. A study on the challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies in the rest of Kenya.

First, the on-going counterterrorism Operation *Linda Boni* is a multiagency operation with key players being the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and the National Police Service (NPS). Given the fact that the two security apparatuses operate side by side in achieving a similar goal, further study should explore counterterrorism strategies and the performance of Kenya Defence Forces.

Secondly, the study has revealed that policing approaches are effective in counterterrorism operation. It is, therefore, important to know if the same is experienced in other regions. A study should, therefore, be replicated in other terror prone counties in Kenya.

Thirdly, challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies as revealed by this study remain key impediment to management of terrorism. For effective and efficient counterterrorism operation and performance to be realized, the government, the National Police Service and other relevant organs should endeavour to address these challenges satisfactorily. As such, further study should be conducted on challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies in the rest of Kenya.

Beyond the objectives listed herein, a study should be conducted on the role of the international community in counterterrorism. Counterterrorism strategies are effective when all stakeholders are involved. Building resilience against terror begins at the local level and proceeds up to the international level. A number of research findings account for effective counterterrorism strategies through cooperation, engagement and empowerment. Further studies should explore the role of international community in counterterrorism.

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## **APPENDICES**

### **APPENDIX I**

#### **INTRODUCTION LETTER FOR QUESTIONNAIRE**

**MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY**

**DEPARTMENT OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES**

**Dear Respondent,**

My name is Fredrick O. Otieno, a PhD student at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST). I am undertaking a study on **“Counterterrorism Strategies Influencing Performance of National Police Service in Managing Terrorism in Lamu County, Kenya”**. I have identified a list of individuals who play a prominent role in the fight against terrorism in the region, and you are one of them. For this reason, I request your permission to administer you questionnaire. Your participation will be of great help to this study. The data will be analyzed to help us gain better understanding of the impact of counterterrorism strategies and police performance.

Findings will be used in policy formulation and to guide future research in this area so that stakeholders concerned with the fight against terrorism will be appropriately guided. Kindly, answer the questions freely. The information you provide will be treated with utmost confidentiality and will be used for research purposes only. Do not indicate your name anywhere in this form. If you have any questions regarding your right as a participant, please feel free to contact me.

Thank you.

**Fredrick Okoth Otieno**  
**PhD Candidate.**



## APPENDIX II

### QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEMBERS OF INSPECTORATE & OTHER

#### RANKS

##### SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. Please tick as appropriate

a) What is your gender?

Male	<input type="checkbox"/>	Female	<input type="checkbox"/>
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b) What is your current rank in the National Police Service?

Rank	Tick
Chief Inspector of Police (CI)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Inspector of Police (IP)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Senior Sergeant (SSGT)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sergeant (SGT)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Corporal (CPL)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Constable	<input type="checkbox"/>

c) Length of Service?

	Duration	Tick
1.	Less than 1 year	<input type="checkbox"/>
2.	2 – 5 years	<input type="checkbox"/>

3.	6 – 10 years	
4.	11 – 15 years	
5.	16 – 20 years	
6.	21 – 25 years	
7.	26 – 30 years	
8.	Above 30 years	

d) Age bracket?

	<b>Age</b>	<b>Tick</b>
1.	18 – 23 years	
2.	24 – 29 years	
3.	30 – 34 years	
4.	35 – 39 years	
5.	40 – 44 years	
6.	45 – 49 years	
7.	50 – 54 years	
8.	55 – 60 years	
9.	Above 60 years	

e) Level of Education?

	<b>Level</b>	<b>Tick</b>
1.	CPE/KCPE/BELOW	
2.	KJSE	

3.	KCE/EAEC/KCSE	
4.	KACE	
5.	Diploma	
6.	Bachelor Degree	
7.	Master Degree	
8.	PhD	

f) State your work station:

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**SECTION B: OBJECTIVES**

**PART I: EVALUATING COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES  
INFLUENCING PERFORMANCE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE  
SERVICE IN LAMU COUNTY**

1. How frequent are terror attacks in Lamu County?

Very frequent	
Frequent	
Moderate	
Less frequent	
Not at all	

Explain your answer above:

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2. To what extent do terrorists pose a threat to peace and security in Lamu County?

Very great extent	
Great extent	
Neutral	
Less extent	
Not at all	

Explain your answer above:

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3. Kenyan security apparatus have adopted various counterterrorism strategies in managing terrorism. Do you agree that these strategies exist in your organization?

Strongly agree	
Agree	
Indifferent	
Disagree	
Strongly disagree	

Give reasons for your answer above:

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4. What does counterterrorism strategies in your organization entail? Explain.

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5. How are the strategies covered under the following frameworks? Tick as appropriate.

	<b>Framework</b>	<b>Well</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>Poor</b>
1.	Measures in addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.			
2.	Measures to build police capacity including training and weapons to combat terrorism.			

3.	Measures to enhance cooperation with local organizations, partner countries and international bodies.			
4.	Measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law.			
5.	Measures to enhance intelligence gathering, detection and prevention (counterterrorism intelligence).			
6.	Measures to enact security laws and legislations on terrorism.			
7.	Measures to protect citizens and infrastructure, and reduction of vulnerability to attack.			
8.	Measures to enhance cooperation between police, judicial authorities, residents (locals) and creating awareness.			
9.	Measures to address police welfare e.g. police pay, allowances, housing, transfers, communication infrastructure etc.			
10.	Measures to ensure preparedness to deal and respond effectively in combating terrorist i.e. establishment of special counterterrorism units.			

6. To what extent have you been involved in developing counterterrorism strategies for your organization?

Very great extent	
Great extent	
Moderate extent	
Less extent	
Not at all	

Explain your answer above:

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7. How sufficient have you been inducted on counterterrorism strategies?

Very sufficient	
Sufficient	
Moderate	
Insufficient	
Very insufficient	

Explain your answer:

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8. How do you perceive application of counterterrorism strategies in the fight against terrorism?

Very effective	
Effective	
Moderate	
Ineffective	
Very ineffective	

Explain your answer:

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9. How do you perceive counterterrorism operation?

Very good	
Good	
Fair	
Poor	
Very poor	



Explain your answer:

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10. To what extent are you involved in counterterrorism operation?

Very great extent	
Great extent	
Neutral	
Less extent	
Not at all	

Explain your answer:

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11. Are you satisfied with counterterrorism strategies?

Very satisfied	
Satisfied	
Neutral	
Dissatisfied	
Very dissatisfied	

Explain your answer:

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12. How are counterterrorism strategies influencing your performance in the management of terrorism in Lamu County?

Very positively	
Positively	
Neutral	
Negatively	
Very negatively	

13. In your own estimation, which counterterrorism strategies effectively influences your daily counterterrorism operation? Explain.

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14. Suggest other strategies and measures you consider can be best put in place to solve terrorism menace in Lamu County? Explain.

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**PART II: ASSESSING EFFICACY OF POLICING APPROACHES UTILISED IN COUNTERTERRORISM BY THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN LAMU COUNTY**

15. Which policing approach is most applied in counterterrorism in Lamu County?

<b>Policing Approaches</b>	<b>Tick</b>
Military	
Para military	
Criminal Justice	
Community Policing	
Intelligence Led Policing	
Integrated Policing Approach	
Others	

Explain your answer:

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16. How often do you apply policing approaches in the fight against terrorism?

Very often	
Often	
Moderately	
Rarely	
Very rarely	

Explain your answer:

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17. To what extent does the application of policing approaches positively influence your performance in counterterrorism?

Very great extent	
Great extent	
Moderate extent	

Less extent	
Not at all	

Explain your answer:

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18. How effective are the following policing approaches as utilized in managing terrorism in Lamu County?

<b>Policing Approaches</b>	<b>Effective</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Ineffective</b>
Military			
Para military			
Criminal Justice			
Community Policing			
Intelligence Led policing			
Integrated Policing Approach			
Others			

Explain your answer:

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19. a. Which groups in the community can police engage in implementing policing approaches in countering terrorism?

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b. How should police engage such groups effectively?

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c. Which approaches are desirable in engaging such groups?

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**PART III: EXAMINING CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES BY THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN LAMU COUNTY**

20. Since Operation *Linda Boni* began over 3 years ago, terrorists have continued to carry out attacks in Lamu County. Do you agree that the police are not making major achievements in the fight against terrorism in Lamu County?

Strongly agree	
Agree	
Neutral	
Disagree	
Strongly disagree	

Explain your answer:

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21. Since counterterrorism operation began in Lamu County, how has been the police- public relationship?

Extremely good	
Good	
Neutral	
Bad	
Extremely bad	

Explain your answer:

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22. How do you rate the morale of police officers in Lamu County?

Very High	
High	
Moderate	
Low	
Very low	

Explain your answer:

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19. What are the challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies in Lamu County?

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20. In your opinion, what do you think should be done to address these challenges?

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*End*

*Thank you for your contribution*

### **APPENDIX III**

**MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY**

**DEPARTMENT OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES**

**INTRODUCTION LETTER FOR INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR  
GAZETTED OFFICERS**

**Dear Respondent,**

My name is Fredrick O. Otieno, a student undertaking PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST). I am conducting research on “**Counterterrorism Strategies Influencing Performance of National Police Service in Managing Terrorism in Lamu County**” as a requirement for partial fulfillment of my degree.

The interview would be conducted face to face at a time and location convenient to you. Should you agree to be interviewed, I would be willing to deliver the interview schedule to you in advance. Your decision to participate in this project is entirely out of free will, informed and voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time if you choose to. If you volunteer to participate in this study, please contact me via my phone at +254 720 338 177 or email at [cso@maseno.ac.ke](mailto:cso@maseno.ac.ke). Details of the study and your commitment are on the attached information sheet.

Your involvement in this project would be greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

**Fredrick Okoth Otieno  
PhD Candidate.**

## APPENDIX IV

### INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

This schedule has two sections. Section one is composed of demographic information. Section two will consist of questions the respondent will be asked in line with the objectives.

#### SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. Please tick as appropriate

a) What is your gender?

Male	<input type="checkbox"/>	Female	<input type="checkbox"/>
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b) What is your current rank in the National Police Service?

Rank	Tick
Inspector General (IG)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Senior Assistant Inspector General (SAIG)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Assistant Inspector General	<input type="checkbox"/>
Commissioner of Police (CP)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Superintendent of Police (SP)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP)	<input type="checkbox"/>

c) Length of Service?

	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Tick</b>
1.	Less than 1 year	
2.	2 – 5 years	
3.	6 – 10 years	
4.	11 – 15 years	
5.	16 – 20 years	
6.	21 – 25 years	
7.	26 – 30 years	
8.	Above 30 years	

d) Age bracket?

	<b>Age</b>	<b>Tick</b>
1.	18 – 23 years	
2.	24 – 29 years	
3.	30 – 34 years	
4.	35 – 39 years	
5.	40 – 44 years	
6.	45 – 49 years	
7.	50 – 54 years	
8.	55 – 60 years	
9.	Above 60 years	

e) Level of Education?

	<b>Level</b>	<b>Tick</b>
1.	CPE/KCPE/BELOW	
2.	KJSE	
3.	KCE/EAEC/KCSE	
4.	KACE	
5.	Diploma	
6.	Bachelor Degree	
7.	Master Degree	
8.	PhD	

f) State your work station:

.....

**SECTION B: OBJECTIVES**

**PART I: EVALUATING COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES  
INFLUENCING PERFORMANCE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE  
SERVICE IN MANAGING TERRORISM IN LAMU COUNTY**

1. To what extent do terrorists pose a threat to peace and security in Lamu County?

Explain.

2. How frequent are terror attacks in Lamu County? Explain.

3. Kenyan security apparatus have adopted various counterterrorism strategies in managing terrorism. Do you agree that these strategies exist in the NPS?

Explain.

4. What are the counterterrorism strategies employed by the NPS in management of terrorism in Lamu County? Explain.

5. How are the strategies covered under the following frameworks? Tick as appropriate.

	<b>Framework</b>	<b>Well</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>Poor</b>
1.	Measures in addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.			
2.	Measures to build police capacity including training and weapons to combat terrorism.			
3.	Measures to enhance cooperation with local organizations, partner countries and international bodies.			
4.	Measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law.			
5.	Measures to enhance intelligence gathering, detection and prevention (counterterrorism intelligence).			
6.	Measures to enact security laws and legislations on terrorism.			
7.	Measures to protect citizens and infrastructure, and reduction of vulnerability to attack.			
8.	Measures to enhance cooperation			

	between police, judicial authorities, residents (locals) and creating awareness.			
9.	Measures to address police welfare e.g. police pay, allowances, housing, transfers, communication infrastructure etc.			
10.	Measures to ensure preparedness to deal and respond effectively in combating terrorist i.e. establishment of special counterterrorism units.			

6. To what extent have you been involved in developing counterterrorism strategies for your organization? Explain.

7. How sufficient have you been inducted on counterterrorism strategies? Explain.

8. How do you perceive application of counterterrorism strategies in the fight against terrorism? Explain.

9. How do you perceive counterterrorism operation in Lamu County? Explain.

10. To what extent are you involved in counterterrorism operation? Explain.

11. To what extent are you satisfied with counterterrorism strategies? Explain.

12. How are counterterrorism strategies influencing your performance in the management of terrorism in Lamu County? Explain.

13. In your own estimation, which counterterrorism strategies effectively influences your performance in counterterrorism operation? Explain.

14. Suggest other strategies and measures you consider can be best put in place to solve terrorism menace in Lamu County? Explain.

**PART II: ASSESSING EFFICACY OF POLICING APPROACHES UTILISED IN COUNTERTERRORISM BY THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN LAMU COUNTY**

15. Which policing approach is most applied in counterterrorism in Lamu County?

<b>Policing Approaches</b>	<b>Tick</b>
Military	
Para military	
Criminal Justice	
Community Policing	
Intelligence Led Policing	
Integrated Policing Approach	
Others	

16. How often do you apply policing approaches in the fight against terrorism? Explain.



17. To what extent does the application of policing approaches positively influence your performance in counterterrorism? Explain.

18. How effective are the following policing approaches as utilized in managing terrorism in Lamu County?

<b>Policing Approaches</b>	<b>Effective</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Ineffective</b>
Military			
Para military			
Criminal Justice			
Community Policing			
Intelligence Led Policing			
Integrated Policing Approach			
Others			

19. a. Which groups in the community can police engage in implementing policing approaches in countering terrorism?

b. How should police engage such groups effectively? Explain.

c. Which approaches are desirable in engaging such groups? Explain.

**PART III: EXAMINING CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES BY THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN LAMU COUNTY**

20. Since Operation *Linda Boni* began over 3 years ago, terrorists have continued to carry out attacks in Lamu County. Do you agree that the police are not making major achievements in the fight against terrorism in Lamu County? Explain.

21. Since counterterrorism operation began in Lamu County, how has been the police- public relationship? Explain.

22. How do you rate the morale of police officers in Lamu County? Explain.

23. What are the challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies in Lamu County? Explain.

24. In your opinion, what do you think should be done to address these challenges? Explain.

*End*

*Thank you for your contribution*

**APPENDIX V**  
**INTRODUCTION LETTER FOR INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CHIEFS**  
**AND COUNTY COMMISSIONER**

**Dear Respondent,**

My name is Fredrick Okoth Otieno, I am a student undertaking a PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology. I am conducting research on “**Counterterrorism Strategies Influencing Performance of National Police Service in Managing Terrorism in Lamu County**” as a requirement for partial fulfillment of my degree. The study will also be useful for other in research and policy formulation.

I am seeking 40 minutes with you in order to discuss counterterrorism strategies influencing performance of the NPS in managing terrorism in Lamu County. The interview would be conducted face to face at a time and location convenient to you. Should you agree to be interviewed, I would be willing to deliver the interview schedule to you in advance.

Your decision to participate in this project is entirely out of free will, informed and voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time. If you choose to, you may also remain anonymous. If you volunteer to participate in this study, please contact me via my phone at +254 720 338 177 or email at [cso@maseno.ac.ke](mailto:cso@maseno.ac.ke). Details of the study and your commitment are on the attached information sheet.

Your involvement in this project would be greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

**Fredrick Okoth Otieno**  
**PhD Candidate**

**APPENDIX VI**

**INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CHIEFS & COUNTY COMMISSIONER**

This in schedule has two sections. Section one is composed of demographic information. Section two will consist of questions the respondent will be asked in line with the objectives.

**SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION**

1. Please tick as appropriate

a) What is your religious affiliation?

Muslim	
Christian	
Traditionalist	
Others (Indicate)	

d) What is your highest level of education?

Primary	
Secondary	
Diploma	
Bachelor's Degree	
Masters	
PhD	

e) What is your designation?

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**SECTION B: OBJECTIVES**

**PART I: EVALUATING COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES  
INFLUENCING PERFORMANCE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE  
SERVICE IN MANAGING TERRORISM IN LAMU COUNTY.**

1. To what extent do terrorists pose a threat to peace and security in Lamu County? Explain.
2. How frequent are terror attacks in Lamu County? Explain.
3. Kenyan security apparatus have adopted various counterterrorism strategies in managing terrorism in Lamu County. Do you agree that these strategies exist in the NPS? Explain.
4. What are the counterterrorism strategies employed by the NPS in management of terrorism in Lamu County? Explain.
5. How are the strategies covered under the following frameworks?

	<b>Framework</b>	<b>Well</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>Poor</b>
1.	Measures in addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.			
2.	Measures to build police capacity including training and weapons to combat terrorism.			
3.	Measures to enhance cooperation with local organizations, partner countries and international bodies.			
4.	Measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law.			

5.	Measures to enhance intelligence gathering, detection and prevention (counterterrorism intelligence).			
6.	Measures to enact security laws and legislations on terrorism.			
7.	Measures to protect citizens and infrastructure, and reduction of vulnerability to attack.			
8.	Measures to enhance cooperation between police, judicial authorities, residents (locals) and creating awareness.			
9.	Measures to address police welfare e.g. police pay, allowances, housing, transfers, communication infrastructure etc.			
10.	Measures to ensure preparedness to deal and respond effectively in combating terrorist i.e. establishment of special counterterrorism units.			

6. To what extent have you been involved in developing counterterrorism strategies for the NPS? Explain.

7. How sufficient have you been inducted on counterterrorism strategies? Explain.

8. How do you perceive application of counterterrorism strategies in the fight against terrorism? Explain.

9. How do you perceive counterterrorism operation in Lamu County? Explain.

10. To what extent are you involved in counterterrorism operation? Explain.

11. To what extent are you satisfied with counterterrorism strategies? Explain.

12. How are counterterrorism strategies influencing performance of NPS in the management of terrorism in Lamu County? Explain.

13. In your own estimation, which counterterrorism strategies effectively influence the performance of NPS in counterterrorism operation?

14. Suggest other strategies and measures you consider can be best put in place to solve terrorism menace in Lamu County?

**PART II: ASSESSING EFFICACY OF POLICING APPROACHES UTILISED IN COUNTERTERRORISM BY THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN LAMU COUNTY**

15. Which policing approach is most applied by the NPS in counterterrorism in Lamu County?

<b>Policing Approaches</b>	<b>Tick</b>
Military	
Para military	

Criminal Justice	
Community Policing	
Intelligence Led Policing	
Integrated Policing Approach	
Others	

16. How often are policing approaches applied in the fight against terrorism?

Explain.

17. To what extent does the application of policing approaches positively influence the performance of NPS?

18. How effective are the following policing approaches as utilized in managing terrorism in Lamu County?

<b>Policing Approaches</b>	<b>Effective</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Ineffective</b>
Military			
Para military			
Criminal Justice			
Community Policing			
Intelligence Led Policing			
Integrated Policing Approach			
Others			

19. a. Which groups in the community can police engage in implementing policing approaches in countering terrorism?

b. How should police engage such groups effectively? Explain.

c. Which approaches are desirable in engaging such groups? Explain.



**PART III: EXAMINING CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING  
COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES BY NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE  
IN LAMU COUNTY**

20. Since Operation *Linda Boni* began over 3 years ago, terrorists have continued to carry out attacks in Lamu County. Do you agree that the police are not making major achievements in the fight against terrorism in Lamu County? Explain.

21. Since counterterrorism operation began in Lamu County, how has been the police- public relationship? Explain.

22. How do you rate the morale of police officers in Lamu County? Explain.

23. What are the challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies in Lamu County? Explain.

24. In your opinion, what do you think should be done to address these challenges? Explain.

*End*

*Thank you for your contribution*

## APPENDIX VII

### GUIDING QUESTIONS FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION FOR RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND COUNCIL OF ELDERS

My name is Fredrick O. Otieno, a PhD student at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST). I am undertaking a study on **“Counterterrorism Strategies Influencing Performance of National Police Service in Managing Terrorism in Lamu County, Kenya”**. I have identified a list of individuals who play a prominent role in the fight against terrorism in the region, and you are one of them. For this reason, I request your permission to administer you questionnaire. Your participation will be of great help to this study. The data will be analyzed to help us gain better understanding of the impact of counterterrorism strategies and police performance.

This FGD has two sections. Section one is composed of demographic information. Section two will consist of questions the respondent will be asked in line with the objectives.

#### SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

1. a) Number of participants in terms of gender?

Male		Female	
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b) Ward of residence?

Shella	
Mkomani	
Hindi	

Mkunumbi	
Hongwe	
Bahari	
Witu	
Faza	
Basuba	
Kiunga	

c) Religious affiliation?

Muslim	
Christian	
Traditionalist	
Others (Indicate)	

d) Highest level of education?

Primary	
Secondary	
Diploma	
Bachelor's Degree	
Masters	
PhD	

e) Your designation?

Religious leader	
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Elder	
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**SECTION B: OBJECTIVES**

**PART I: EVALUATING COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES INFLUENCING PERFORMANCE OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN MANAGING TERRORISM IN LAMU COUNTY.**

1. To what extent do terrorists pose a threat to peace and security in Lamu County? Explain.
2. How frequent are terror attacks in Lamu County? Explain.
3. Kenyan security apparatus have adopted various counterterrorism strategies in managing terrorism in Lamu County. Do you agree that these strategies exist in the NPS? Explain.
4. What are the counterterrorism strategies employed by the NPS in management of terrorism in Lamu County? Explain.
5. How are the strategies covered under the following frameworks?

	<b>Framework</b>	<b>Well</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>Poor</b>
1.	Measures in addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.			
2.	Measures to build police capacity including training and weapons to combat terrorism.			
3.	Measures to enhance cooperation with local organizations, partner countries and international bodies.			

4.	Measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law.			
5.	Measures to enhance intelligence gathering, detection and prevention (counterterrorism intelligence).			
6.	Measures to enact security laws and legislations on terrorism.			
7.	Measures to protect citizens and infrastructure, and reduction of vulnerability to attack.			
8.	Measures to enhance cooperation between police, judicial authorities, residents (locals) and creating awareness.			
9.	Measures to address police welfare e.g. police pay, allowances, housing, transfers, communication infrastructure etc.			
10.	Measures to ensure preparedness to deal and respond effectively in combating terrorist i.e. establishment of special counterterrorism units.			

6. To what extent have you been involved in developing counterterrorism strategies for the NPS? Explain.

7. How sufficient have you been inducted on counterterrorism strategies? Explain.
8. How do you perceive application of counterterrorism strategies in the fight against terrorism? Explain.
9. How do you perceive counterterrorism operation in Lamu County? Explain.
10. To what extent are you involved in counterterrorism operation? Explain.
11. To what extent are you satisfied with counterterrorism strategies? Explain.
12. How are counterterrorism strategies influencing performance of NPS in the management of terrorism in Lamu County? Explain.
13. In your own estimation, which counterterrorism strategies effectively influence the performance of NPS in counterterrorism operation? Explain.
14. Suggest other strategies and measures you consider can be best put in place to solve terrorism menace in Lamu County?

**PART II: ASSESSING EFFICACY OF POLICING APPROACHES UTILISED IN COUNTERTERRORISM BY THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN LAMU COUNTY**

15. Which policing approach is most applied by the NPS in counterterrorism in Lamu County?

Policing Approaches	Tick
Military	

Para military	
Criminal Justice	
Community Policing	
Intelligence Led Policing	
Integrated Policing Approach	
Others	

16. How often are policing approaches applied in the fight against terrorism?

Explain.

17. To what extent does the application of policing approaches positively influence the performance of NPS? Explain.

18. How effective are the following policing approaches as utilized in managing terrorism in Lamu County?

<b>Policing Approaches</b>	<b>Effective</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Ineffective</b>
Military			
Para military			
Criminal Justice			
Community Policing			
Intelligence Led Policing			
Integrated Policing Approach			
Others			

19. a. Which groups in the community can police engage in implementing policing approaches in countering terrorism?

b. How should police engage such groups effectively? Explain.

c. Which approaches are desirable in engaging such groups? Explain.

**PART III: EXAMINING CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING  
COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES BY THE NATIONAL POLICE  
SERVICE IN LAMU COUNTY**

20. Since Operation *Linda Boni* began over 3 years ago, terrorists have continued to carry out attacks in Lamu County. Do you agree that the police are not making major achievements in the fight against terrorism in Lamu County? Explain.

21. Since counterterrorism operation began in Lamu County, how has been the police- public relationship? Explain.

22. How do you rate the morale of police officers in Lamu County? Explain.

23. What are the challenges in implementing counterterrorism strategies in Lamu County? Explain.

24. In your opinion, what do you think should be done to address these challenges? Explain.

*End*

*Thank you for your contribution*



## APPENDIX VIII

### (AMBATISHO I)

#### BARUA YA KUJITAMBULISHA KWA AJILI YA MAHOJIANO CHUO KIKUU CHA SAYANSI NA TEKNOLOJIA CHA MASINDE MULIRO

#### IDARA YA MASOMO YA AMANI NA MIGOGORO

**Kwa mhojiwa,**

Naitwa Fredrick O. Otieno. Mimi ni mwanafunzi wa Digrii ya Uzamilifu kwa masomo ya Amani na Migogoro katika Chuo Kikuu cha Masinde Muliro.

Nafanya utafiti kuhusu “**Mikakati za Kukabiliana na Ugaidi Zinazoathiri Utendakazi wa Polisi wa Kitaifa Katika Kudhibiti Ugaidi Katika Gatuzi la Lamu**” kama sehemu ya masomo ya digrii yangu. Utafiti huu pia utakuwa wenye manufaa kwa utafiti zijazo pamoja na kutungwa kwa sera za kipolisi.

Naomba dakika 40 za muda wako ili tujadili mikakati za kukabiliana na ugaidi zinazoathiri utendakazi wa polisi katika kupambana na ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu.

Mahojiano yatakuwa ya ana kwa ana kwa wakati na mahali patakapokufaa. Iwapo utakubali kuhojiwa nitakupa ratiba ya mahojiano mbeleni. Uamuzi wa kushiriki mradi huu ni wako kwa kujitolea na kwa hiari yako. Iwapo utachagua kushiriki pia unaweza kukosa kujitambulisha.

Ukijitolea kushiriki, tafadhali wasiliana nami kupitia simu +254 720 338 177 ama kwa barua pepe [cs@maseno.co.ke](mailto:cs@maseno.co.ke). Habari zaidi za utafiti huu zinapatikana katika kurasa zilizoambatanishwa.

Uhusika wako kwenye mradi huu utakuwa wenye manufaa sana.

Wako mtiifu,

**Fredrick Okoth Otieno**

**(Mwanafunzi wa Digrii ya Uzamilifu)**

(AMBATISHO II)

**RATIBA YA MAHOJIANO KWA MA-INSPEKTA WA POLISI NA POLISI  
WA CHEO CHA CHINI**

Ratiba hii ina sehemu mbili. Sehemu ya kwanza inahusu habari kuhusu idadi ya watu. Sehemu ya pili ni ya maswali ambayo mhojiwa ataulizwa kulingana na malengo.

**SEHEMU A: HABARI KUHUSU IDADI YA WATU**

Tafadhali onyesha kwa alama (✓) panapofaa

a. Jinsia yako?

<b>Kiume</b>		<b>Kike</b>	

b. Unashikilia wadhifa gani katika idara ya polisi wa kitaifa?

<b>Wadhifa</b>	<b>Onyesha kwa alama ✓</b>
Inspekta Mkuu	
Inspekta	
Sajenti Mkuu	
Sajenti	
Koprol	
Konstebo	

c. Muda wa kuhudumu?

<b>Muda</b>	<b>Onyesha kwa alama ✓</b>
Chini ya mwaka mmoja	
Miaka 2 - 5	
Miaka 6 - 10	
Miaka 11 - 15	
Miaka 16 – 20	
Miaka 21 – 25	
Miaka 26 – 30	
Zaidi ya miaka 30	

d. Umri?

Miaka	Onyesha kwa alama ✓
18 – 23	
24 – 29	
30 – 34	
35 – 39	
40 – 44	
45 – 49	
50 – 54	
55 - 60	
Zaidi ya 60	

e) Kiwango cha elimu?

Elimu ya msingi	
Sekondari	
Stashahada	
Shahada	
Shahada ya Uzamili	
Shahada ya Uzamilifu	

f) Stesheni ya kazi .....

## **SEHEMU B: MALENGO**

**SEHEMU I: KUTATHMINI MIKAKATI YA KUPAMBANA NA UGAIDI INAYOATHIRI UTENDAJI WA POLISI WA KITAIFA KATIKA KUDHIBITI UGAIDI KATIKA GATUZI LA LAMU.**

1. Magaidi husababisha tisho kwa amani na usalama kwa kiwango gani katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.

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2. Tathmini mazoea ya kutokea kwa mashambulizi ya kigaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.

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3. Vifaa vya usalama nchini Kenya vinatumia mikakati mbalimbali ya kukabiliana na ugaidi ili kudhibiti ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu. Je unakubali kwamba mikakati hii inatumika na kikosi cha polisi? Eleza.

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4. Ni mikakati gani ya kukabiliana na ugaidi inayotumiwa na kikosi cha polisi wa kitaifa katika kudhibiti ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.

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5. Mikakati hiyo imeshughulikiwa vipi chini ya mifumo ifuatayo?

<b>Mfumo</b>	<b>Vyema</b>	<b>Wastani</b>	<b>Vibaya</b>
1. Hatua za kushughulikia maswala yanayosababisha kuenea kwa ugaidi.			
2. Hatua za kushughulikia kujenga wanapolisi kupitia mafunzo na vifaa vya kutumiwa katika kukabiliana na ugaidi.			
3. Hatua za kuimarisha ushirikiano na mashiriki ya ndani, nchi – shiriki na nchi za kimataifa.			
4. Hatua za kuhakikisha haki za kibinadamu na sheria zimeheshimiwa.			
5. Hatua za kuimarisha mikutano ya kutambua ugaida, kugundua na kuzuia ugaidi.			
6. Hatua za kutunga sheria za usalama na sheria kuhusu ugaidi.			
7. Hatua za kulinda raia na miundombinu na kupunguza			

hatari ya mashambulizi.			
8. Hatua za kuimarisha ushirikioano kati ya polisi, idara ya mahakama, wakaazi wa mitaa na kuhamasisha.			
9. Hatua za kushughulikia ustawi wa polisi kupitia malipo, marupurupu, nyumba, uhamisho, miudombinu ya mawasiliano, n.k.			
10. Hatua ya kuimarisha maandilizi ya kukabiliana kikamilifu na mapambano dhidi ya magaidi kwa mfano kuanzishwa kwa vitengo maalum vya kukabiliana na ugaidi.			

6. Umehusika kwa kiwango gani katika kuendeleza mikakati ya polisi wa kitaifa ya kukabiliana na ugaidi? Eleza.

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7. Ni kwa jinsi gani umetayarishwa katika kupambana na ugaidi? Eleza.

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8. Waonaje ufaafu wa mikakati ya kukabiliana na ugaidi katika mapambano dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.

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9. Waonaje oparesheni ya kukabiliana na ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.

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10. Unahusika kwa kiwango gani katika oparesheni ya kukabiliana na ugaidi? Eleza.

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11. Je umeridhilika na makabiliano dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.

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12. Mikakati ya kukabiliana na ugaidi inaathiri kwa kiwango gani utendakazi wa polisi wa kitaifa katika kudhibiti ugaidi katika Gatuuzi la Lamu? Eleza.

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13. Kwa makadirio yako, ni mikakati gani ya kukabiliana na ugaidi inayoathiri ufanisi wa utendakazi wa polisi wa kitaifa katika oparesheni yao dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.

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14. Pendekeza mbinu zingine na hatua unazofikiri zinaweza kuwekwa ili kutatua tatizo la ugaidi katika Gatuuzi la Lamu?

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**SEHEMU II: KUTATHMINI UFANISI WA SERA ZINAZOTUMIKA NA  
POLISI WA KITAIFA KATIKA GATUZI LA LAMU KUKABILIANA NA  
UGAIDI**



15. Mara nyingi polisi wa kitaifa wanatumia mbinu gani katika kukabiliana na ugaidi katika Gatuza la Lamu?

Mbinu zinazotumiwa na polisi	Onyesha kwa alama (✓)
Kijeshi	
Nusu – jeshi	
Makosoa ya jinai	
Sera za kijamii	
Sera zinazoongozwa na hekima	
Mbinu za kipolisi zilizojumuishwa	
Mengine	

16. Ni mara ngapi mbinu ya kipolisi zimetumika dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.

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17. Matumizi ya mbinu za kipolisi zimeathiri vipi ufanisi wa utenda kazi wa polisi wa kitaifa? Eleza.

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18. Mbinu zifuatazo zinatumiwa na polisi wa kitaifa katika Gatuza la Lamu kudhibiti ugaidi zina ufanifu gani?

<b>Mbinu ya kipolisi</b>	<b>Imefaa</b>	<b>Wastani</b>	<b>Haijafaa</b>
Kijeshi			
Nusu – jeshi			
Makosa ya jinai			
Sera za kijamii			
Sera zinazoongozwa na hekima			
Mbinu za kipolisi zilizojumuishwa			
Mengine			

19. Polisi wanaweza kushirikisha makundi gani katika jamii katika kutekeleza sera za kipolisi za kukabiliana na ugaidi? Eleza.

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b. Polisi wanafaa kushirikisha makundi haya vipi ili kuhakikisha kuwa kuna ufanisi? Eleza.

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c. Ni mikakati gani inayofaa kutumika katika kushirikisha makundi haya? Eleza.

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**SEHEMU III: KUTATHMINI CHANGAMOTO ZINAZOKUMBA IDARA  
YA POLISI WA KITAIFA KATIKA KUTEKELEZA MIKAKATI YA  
KUKABILIANA NA UGAIDI KATIKA GATUZI LA LAMU**

20. Magaidi wameendelea kushambulia Gatuzi la Lamu tangu ‘Oparesheni Linda Boni’ kuanza miaka mitatu iliyopita. Je, unakubali kwamba polisi hawajafanikiwa katika mapambano yao dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.

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21. Mahusiano baina ya polisi na jamii yamekuaje tangu makabiliano dhidi ya ugaidi kuanza katika Gatuzi la Lamu?

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22. Kulingana na wewe nini kiwango cha motisha ya polisi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.

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23. Ni zipi changamoto katika utekelezwaji wa mikakati ya kukabiliana na ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu?

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24. Kwa maoni yako, ni nini yapasa kufanywa ili kushughulikia changamoto hizi? Eleza.

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**“Mwisho”**

**Asante kwa mchango wako**

**(AMBATISHO III)**

**CHUO KIKUU CHA SAYANSI NA TEKNOLOJIA CHA MASINDE MULIRO**

**IDARA YA MASOMO YA AMANI NA MIGOGORO**

**BARUA YA KUJITAMBULISHA KWA AJILI YA RATIBA YA**

**MAHOJIANO KWA MAAFISA WALIONUKULIWA**

**Kwa mhojiwa,**

Naitwa Fredrick O. Otieno, mwanafunzi wa Digrii ya Uzamilifu kwa masomo ya amani na migogoro katika Chuo Kikuu cha Masinde Muliro. Nafanya utafiti kuhusu **“Mikakati za Kukabiliana na Ugaidi Zinazoathiri Utendakazi wa Idara ya Polisi wa Kitaifa Katika Kudhibiti Ugaidi Katika Gatuzi la Lamu”** kama sehemu ya digrii yangu.

Mahojiano yatakuwa ya ana kwa ana kwa wakati na mahali patakapokufaa. Iwapo utakubali kuhojiwa nitakupa ratiba ya mahojiano mbeleni. Uamuzi wa kushiriki mradi huu ni wako kwa kujitolea na kwa hiari. Unaweza kukataa au kujiondoa kutoka utafiti huu wakati wowote ule. Ukijitolea kushiriki katika utafiti huu, tafadhali wasiliana nami kupitia kwa simu +254 720 338 177 ama kwa barua pepe [cso@maseno.ac.ke](mailto:cso@maseno.ac.ke)

Habari zaidi kuhusu utafiti huu zinapatikana katika kurasa zilizoambatishwa.

Uhusika wako kwenye mradi huu utakuwa wenye manufaa sana.

Wako mtiifu,

**Fredrick Okoth Otieno**

**(Mwanafunzi wa Digrii ya Uzamilifu)**

(AMBATISHO IV)

**RATIBA YA MAHOJIANO**

Ratiba hii ina sehemu mbili. Sehemu ya kwanza inahusu habari kuhusu idadi ya watu. Sehemu ya pili ni ya maswali ambayo mhojiwa ataulizwa kulingana na malengo.

**SEHEMU A: HABARI KUHUSU IDADI YA WATU**

Tafadhali onyesha kwa alama (✓) panapofaa

a. Jinsia yako?

<b>Kiume</b>		<b>Kike</b>	

b. Unashikilia wadhifa gani katika idara ya polisi wa kitaifa?

<b>Wadhifa</b>	<b>Onyesha kwa alama ✓</b>
Inspekta Jenerali	
Naibu Inspekta Jenerali wa Polisi	
Msaidizi Mkuu wa Inspekta Jenerali	
Kamisheni wa Polisi	
Afisa Mkuu wa Polisi	
Mkuu wa Polisi	
Msaidizi wa Mkuu wa Polisi	

c. Muda wa kuhudumu?

<b>Muda</b>	<b>Onyesha kwa alama ✓</b>
Chini ya mwaka mmoja	
Miaka 2 - 5	
Miaka 6 - 10	
Miaka 11 - 15	
Miaka 16 - 20	
Miaka 21 - 25	
Miaka 26 - 30	
Zaidi ya miaka 30	

d. Umri?

Miaka	Onyesha kwa alama ✓
18 – 23	
24 – 29	
30 – 34	
35 – 39	
40 – 44	
45 – 49	
50 – 54	
55 - 60	
Zaidi ya 60	

e) Kiwango cha elimu?

Elimu ya msingi	
Sekondari	
Stashahada	
Shahada	
Shahada ya Uzamili	
Shahada ya Uzamilifu	

f) Wajibu wako.....

## **SEHEMU B: MALENGO**

**SEHEMU I: KUTATHMINI MIKAKATI YA KUPAMBANA NA UGAIDI INAYOATHIRI UTENDAJI WA POLISI WA KITAIFA KATIKA KUDHIBITI UGAIDI KATIKA GATUZI LA LAMU.**

1. Magaidi husababisha tisho kwa amani na usalama kwa kiwango gani katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.

2. Tathmini mazoea ya kutokea kwa mashambulizi ya kigaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
3. Vifaa vya usalama nchini Kenya vinatumia mikakati mbalimbali ya kukabiliana na ugaidi ili kudhibiti ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu. Je unakubali kwamba mikakati hii inatumika na kikosi cha polisi? Eleza.
4. Ni mikakati gani ya kukabiliana na ugaidi inayotumiwa na kikosi cha polisi wa kitaifa katika kudhibiti ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
5. Mikakati hiyo imeshughulikiwa vipi chini ya mifumo ifuatayo?

<b>Mfumo</b>	<b>Vyema</b>	<b>Wastani</b>	<b>Vibaya</b>
1. Hatua za kushughulikia maswala yanayosababisha kuenea kwa ugaidi.			
2. Hatua za kushughulikia kujenga wanapolisi kupitia mafunzo na vifaa vya kutumiwa katika kukabiliana na ugaidi.			
3. Hatua za kuimarisha ushirikiano na mashiriki ya ndani, nchi – shiriki na nchi za kimataifa.			
4. Hatua za kuhakikisha haki za kibinadamu na sheria zimeheshimiwa.			
5. Hatua za kuimarisha mikutano ya kutambua ugaida, kugundua na			



kuzuia ugaidi.			
6. Hatua za kutunga sheria za usalama na sheria kuhusu ugaidi.			
7. Hatua za kulinda raia na miundombinu na kupunguza hatari ya mashambulizi.			
8. Hatua za kuimarisha ushirikiano kati ya polisi, idara ya mahakama, wakaazi wa mitaa na kuhamasisha.			
9. Hatua za kushughulikia ustawi wa polisi kupitia malipo, marupurupu, nyumba, uhamisho, miudombinu ya mawasiliano, n.k.			
10. Hatua ya kuimarisha maandilizi ya kukabiliana kikamilifu na mapambano dhidi ya magaidi kwa mfano kuanzishwa kwa vitengo maalum vya kukabiliana na ugaidi.			

6. Umehusika kwa kiwango gani katika kuendeleza mikakati ya polisi wa kitaifa ya kukabiliana na ugaidi? Eleza.
7. Ni kwa jinsi gani umetayarishwa katika kupambana na ugaidi? Eleza.
8. Waonaje ufaafu wa mikakati ya kukabiliana na ugaidi katika mapambano dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.
9. Waonaje oparesheni ya kukabiliana na ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.

10. Unahusika kwa kiwango gani katika oparesheni ya kukabiliana na ugaidi?  
Eleza.
11. Je umeridhika na makabiliano dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.
12. Mikakati ya kukabiliana na ugaidi inaathiri kwa kiwango gani utendakazi wa polisi wa kitaifa katika kudhibiti ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
13. Kwa makadirio yako, ni mikakati gani ya kukabiliana na ugaidi inayoathiri ufanisi wa utendakazi wa polisi wa kitaifa katika oparesheni yao dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.
14. Pendekeza mbinu zingine na hatua unazofikiri zinaweza kuwekwa ili kutatua tatizo la ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu?

**SEHEMU II: KUTATHMINI UFANISI WA SERA ZINAZOTUMIKA NA POLISI WA KITAIFA KATIKA GATUZI LA LAMU KUKABILIANA NA UGAIDI**

15. Mara nyingi polisi wa kitaifa wanatumia mbinu gani katika kukabiliana na ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu?

<b>Mbinu zinazotumiwa na polisi</b>	<b>Onyesha kwa alama (√)</b>
Kijeshi	
Nusu – jeshi	
Makosa ya jinai	
Sera za kijamii	
Sera zinazoongozwa na hekima	
Mbinu za kipolisi zilizojumuishwa	
Mengine	

16. Ni mara ngapi mbinu ya kipolisi zimetumika dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.
17. Matumizi ya mbinu za kipolisi zimeathiri vipi ufanisi wa utenda kazi wa polisi wa kitaifa? Eleza.
18. Mbinu zifuatazo zinatumika na polisi wa kitaifa katika Gatuza la Lamu kudhibiti ugaidi zina ufanifu gani?

<b>Mbinu ya kipolisi</b>	<b>Imefaa</b>	<b>Wastani</b>	<b>Haijafaa</b>
Kijeshi			
Nusu – jeshi			
Makosa ya jinai			
Sera za kijamii			
Sera zinazoongozwa na hekima			
Mbinu za kipolisi zilizojumuishwa			
Mengine			

19. Polisi wanaweza kushirikisha makundi gani katika jamii katika kutekeleza sera za kipolisi za kukabiliana na ugaidi? Eleza.
- b. Polisi wanafaa kushirikisha makundi haya vipi ili kuhakikisha kuwa kuna ufanisi? Eleza.
- c. Ni mikakati gani inayofaa kutumika katika kushirikisha makundi haya? Eleza.

**SEHEMU III: KUTATHMINI CHANGAMOTO ZINAZOKUMBA IDARA  
YA POLISI WA KITAIFA KATIKA KUTEKELEZA MIKAKATI YA  
KUKABILIANA NA UGAIDI KATIKA GATUZI LA LAMU**

20. Magaidi wameendelea kushambulia Gatuzi la Lamu tangu ‘Opareseni Linda Boni’ kuanza miaka mitatu iliyopita. Je, unakubali kwamba polisi hawajafanikiwa katika mapambano yao dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.
21. Mahusiano baina ya polisi na jamii yamekuaje tangu makabiliano dhidi ya ugaidi kuanza katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
22. Kulingana na wewe nini kiwango cha motisha ya polisi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
23. Ni zipi changamoto katika utekelezwaji wa mikakati ya kukabiliana na ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
24. Kwa maoni yako, ni nini yapasa kufanywa ili kushughulikia changamoto hizi? Eleza.

**“Mwisho”**

**Asante kwa mchango wako**

(AMBATISHO V)

**BARUA YA KUJITAMBULISHA KWA AJILI YA MAHOJIANO NA  
MACHIFU PAMOJA NA KAMISHENI WA GATUZI LA LAMU**

**Kwa mhojiwa,**

Naitwa Fredrick O. Otieno, mimi ni mwanafunzi wa Digrii ya Uzamilifu kwa masomo ya Amani na Migogoro katika Chuo Kikuu cha Masinde Muliro.

Nafanya utafiti kuhusu “**Mikakati za Kukabiliana na Ugaidi Zinazoathiri Utendakazi wa Polisi wa Kitaifa Katika Kudhibiti Ugaidi Katika Gatuzi la Lamu**” kama sehemu ya masomo ya digrii yangu. Utafiti huu pia utakuwa wenye manufaa kwa utafiti zijazo pamoja na kutungwa kwa sera za kipolisi.

Naomba dakika 40 za muda wako ili tujadili mikakati za kukabiliana na ugaidi zinazoathiri utendakazi wa polisi katika kupambana na ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu.

Mahojiano yatakuwa ya ana kwa ana kwa wakati na mahali patakapokufaa. Iwapo utakubali kuhojiwa nitakupa ratiba ya mahojiano mbeleni. Uamuzi wa kushiriki mradi huu ni wako kwa kujitolea na kwa hiari yako. Iwapo utachagua kushiriki pia unaweza kukosa kujitambulisha.

Ukijitolea kushiriki, tafadhali wasiliana nami kupitia simu +254 720 338 177 ama kwa barua pepe [cs@maseno.co.ke](mailto:cs@maseno.co.ke). Habari zaidi za utafiti huu zinapatikana katika kurasa zilizoambatanishwa.

Uhusika wako kwenye mradi huu utakuwa wenye manufaa sana.

Wako mtiifu,

**Fredrick Okoth Otieno**

**(Mwanafunzi wa Digrii ya Uzamilifu)**

(AMBATISHO VI)

**RATIBA YA MAHOJIANO YA MACHIFU NA KAMISHENI WA GATUZI  
LA LAMU**

Ratiba hii ina sehemu mbili. Sehemu ya kwanza inahusu habari ya idadi ya watu. Sehemu ya pili itajumuisha maswali ambayo mhojiwa ataulizwa kuzingatia malengo.

**SEHEMU A: HABARI KUHUSU IDADI YA WATU**

1. Tafadhali onyesha kwa alama (✓) panapofaa  
a) Onyesha imani yako ya kidini?

Uislamu	
Ukristo	
Mtamaduni	
Mengine (onyesha)	

- b) Kiwango cha elimu?

Elimu ya msingi	
Sekondari	
Stashahada	
Shahada	
Shahada ya Uzamili	
Shahada ya Uzamilifu	

- c) Wajibu wako.....

## SEHEMU B: MALENGO

### SEHEMU I: KUTATHMINI MIKAKATI YA KUPAMBANA NA UGAIDI INAYOATHIRI UTENDAJI WA POLISI WA KITAIFA KATIKA KUDHIBITI UGAIDI KATIKA GATUZI LA LAMU.

1. Magaidi husababisha tisho kwa amani na usalama kwa kiwango gani katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
2. Tathmini mazoea ya kutokea kwa mashambulizi ya kigaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
3. Vifaa vya usalama nchini Kenya vinatumia mikakati mbalimbali ya kukabiliana na ugaidi ili kudhibiti ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu. Je unakubali kwamba mikakati hii inatumika na kikosi cha polisi? Eleza.
4. Ni mikakati gani ya kukabiliana na ugaidi inayotumiwa na kikosi cha polisi wa kitaifa katika kudhibiti ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
5. Mikakati hiyo imeshughulikiwa vipi chini ya mifumo ifuatayo?

Mfumo	Vyema	Wastani	Vibaya
1. Hatua za kushughulikia maswala yanayosababisha kuenea kwa ugaidi.			
2. Hatua za kushughulikia kujenga wanapolisi kupitia mafunzo na vifaa vya kutumiwa katika kukabiliana na ugaidi.			
3. Hatua za kuimarisha ushirikiano			

na mashiriki ya ndani, nchi – shiriki na nchi za kimataifa.			
4. Hatua za kuhakikisha haki za kibinadamu na sheria zimeheshimiwa.			
5. Hatua za kuimarisha mikutano ya kutambua ugaida, kugundua na kuzuia ugaidi.			
6. Hatua za kutunga sheria za usalama na sheria kuhusu ugaidi.			
7. Hatua za kulinda raia na miundombinu na kupunguza hatari ya mashambulizi.			
8. Hatua za kuimarisha ushirikiano kati ya polisi, idara ya mahakama, wakaazi wa mitaa na kuhamasisha.			
9. Hatua za kushughulikia ustawi wa polisi kupitia malipo, marupurupu, nyumba, uhamisho, miudombinu ya mawasiliano, n.k.			
10. Hatua ya kuimarisha maandilizi ya kukabiliana kikamilifu na mapambano dhidi ya magaidi kwa mfano kuanzishwa kwa vitengo maalum vya kukabiliana na ugaidi.			



6. Umehusika kwa kiwango gani katika kuendeleza mikakati ya polisi wa kitaifa ya kukabiliana na ugaidi? Eleza.
7. Ni kwa jinsi gani umetayarishwa katika kupambana na ugaidi? Eleza.
8. Waonaje ufaafu wa mikakati ya kukabiliana na ugaidi katika mapambano dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.
9. Waonaje oparesheni ya kukabiliana na ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
10. Unahusika kwa kiwango gani katika oparesheni ya kukabiliana na ugaidi? Eleza.
11. Je umeridhika na makabiliano dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.
12. Mikakati ya kukabiliana na ugaidi inaathiri kwa kiwango gani utendakazi wa polisi wa kitaifa katika kudhibiti ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
13. Kwa makadirio yako, ni mikakati gani ya kukabiliana na ugaidi inayoathiri ufanisi wa utendakazi wa polisi wa kitaifa katika oparesheni yao dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.
14. Pendekeza mbinu zingine na hatua unazofikiri zinaweza kuwekwa ili kutatua tatizo la ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu?

**SEHEMU II: KUTATHMINI UFANISI WA SERA ZINAZOTUMIKA NA POLISI WA KITAIFA KATIKA GATUZI LA LAMU KUKABILIANA NA UGAIDI**

15. Mara nyingi polisi wa kitaifa wanatumia mbinu gani katika kukabiliana na ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu?

<b>Mbinu zinazotumiwa na polisi</b>	<b>Onyesha kwa alama (√)</b>
-------------------------------------	------------------------------

Kijeshi	
Nusu – jeshi	
Makosa ya jinai	
Sera za kijamii	
Sera zinazoongozwa na hekima	
Mbinu za kipolisi zilizojumuishwa	
Mengine	

16. Ni mara ngapi mbinu ya kipolisi zimetumika dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.
17. Matumizi ya mbinu za kipolisi zimeathiri vipi ufanisi wa utenda kazi wa polisi wa kitaifa? Eleza.
18. Mbinu zifuatazo zinatumika na polisi wa kitaifa katika Gatuzi la Lamu kudhibiti ugaidi zina ufanifu gani?

<b>Mbinu ya kipolisi</b>	<b>Imefaa</b>	<b>Wastani</b>	<b>Haijafaa</b>
Kijeshi			
Nusu – jeshi			
Makosa ya jinai			
Sera za kijamii			
Sera zinazoongozwa na hekima			
Mbinu za kipolisi zilizojumuishwa			
Mengine			

19. Polisi wanaweza kushirikisha makundi gani katika jamii katika kutekeleza sera za kipolisi za kukabiliana na ugaidi? Eleza.
- b. Polisi wanafaa kushirikisha makundi haya vipi ili kuhakikisha kuwa kuna ufanisi? Eleza.
- c. Ni mikakati gani inayofaa kutumika katika kushirikisha makundi haya? Eleza.

**SEHEMU III: KUTATHMINI CHANGAMOTO ZINAZOKUMBA IDARA YA POLISI WA KITAIFA KATIKA KUTEKELEZA MIKAKATI YA KUKABILIANA NA UGAIDI KATIKA GATUZI LA LAMU**

20. Magaidi wameendelea kushambulia Gatuzi la Lamu tangu ‘Opareseni Linda Boni’ kuanza miaka mitatu iliyopita. Je, unakubali kwamba polisi hawajafanikiwa katika mapambano yao dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.
21. Mahusiano baina ya polisi na jamii yamekuaje tangu makabiliano dhidi ya ugaidi kuanza katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
22. Kulingana na wewe nini kiwango cha motisha ya polisi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
23. Ni zipi changamoto katika utekelezwaji wa mikakati ya kukabiliana na ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
24. Kwa maoni yako, ni nini yapasa kufanywa ili kushughulikia changamoto hizi? Eleza.

**“Mwisho”**

**Asante kwa mchango wako**

(AMBATISHO VII)

**MASWALI ELEKEZI YA KUJADILIWA NA MAKUNDI LENGWA YA  
VIONGOZI WA KIDINI NA BARAZA LA WAZEE**

Kwa majina naitwa Fredrick O. Otieno, mimi ni mwanafunzi wa Digrii ya Uzamilifu kwa masomo ya Amani na Migogoro katika Chuo Kikuu cha Masinde Muliro. Nafanya utafiti kuhusu, **“Mikakati ya Kukabiliana na Ugaidi Zinazoathiri Utendakazi wa Idara ya Polisi wa Kitaifa Katika Kudhibiti Ugaidi Katika Gatuzi la Lamu, Kenya”**

Nimeteua orodha ya watu ambao wana jukumu muhimu katika vita dhidi ya ugaidi katika sehemu hiyo nawe ni mmoja wao. Kwa sababu hii naomba ruhusa yako ili unijazie hojaji. Uhusika wako utakuwa wenye manufaa sana katika utafiti huu.

Data itachambuliwa ili kutusaidia kuelewa matokeo ya mikakati ya kukabiliana na ugaidi na utendaji wa polisi.

Mjadala ya makundi lengwa ina sehemu mbili. Sehemu ya kwanza inajumuisha habari kuhusu idadi ya watu.

Sehemu ya pili itajumuisha maswali ambayo mhojiwa ataulizwa kuzingatia malengo.

**SEHEMU A: HABARI KUHUSU IDADI YA WATU**

1a. Idadi ya wahusika kutegemea jinsia?

Waume		Wake	
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b. Eneo la makazi (wadi)?

Shella	
Mkomani	
Hindi	
Mkunumbi	
Hongwe	
Bahari	

Witu	
Faza	
Basuba	
Kiunga	

c. Dini?

Uislamu	
Ukristo	
Mtamaduni	
Mengine (onyesha)	

d. Kiwango cha elimu?

Elimu ya msingi	
Sekondari	
Stashahada	
Shahada	
Shahada ya Uzamili	
Shahada ya Uzamilifu	

a. Wajibu?

Kiongozi wa kidini	
Mzee wa baraza	

## SEHEMU B: MALENGO

### SEHEMU I: KUTATHMINI MIKAKATI YA KUPAMBANA NA UGAIDI INAYOATHIRI UTENDAJI WA POLISI WA KITAIFA KATIKA KUDHIBITI UGAIDI KATIKA GATUZI LA LAMU.

1. Magaidi husababisha tisho kwa amani na usalama kwa kiwango gani katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
2. Tathmini mazoea ya kutokea kwa mashambulizi ya kigaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
3. Vifaa vya usalama nchini Kenya vinatumia mikakati mbalimbali ya kukabiliana na ugaidi ili kudhibiti ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu. Je unakubali kwamba mikakati hii inatumika na kikosi cha polisi? Eleza.
4. Ni mikakati gani ya kukabiliana na ugaidi inayotumiwa na kikosi cha polisi wa kitaifa katika kudhibiti ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
5. Mikakati hiyo imeshughulikiwa vipi chini ya mifumo ifuatayo?

Mfumo	Vyema	Wastani	Vibaya
1. Hatua za kushughulikia maswala yanayosababisha kuenea kwa ugaidi.			
2. Hatua za kushughulikia kujenga wanapolisi kupitia mafunzo na vifaa vya kutumiwa katika kukabiliana na ugaidi.			
3. Hatua za kuimarisha ushirikiano na mashiriki ya ndani, nchi –			

shiriki na nchi za kimataifa.			
4. Hatua za kuhakikisha haki za kibinadamu na sheria zimeheshimiwa.			
5. Hatua za kuimarisha mikutano ya kutambua ugaida, kugundua na kuzuia ugaidi.			
6. Hatua za kutunga sheria za usalama na sheria kuhusu ugaidi.			
7. Hatua za kulinda raia na miundombinu na kupunguza hatari ya mashambulizi.			
8. Hatua za kuimarisha ushirikiano kati ya polisi, idara ya mahakama, wakaazi wa mitaa na kuhamasisha.			
9. Hatua za kushughulikia ustawi wa polisi kupitia malipo, marupurupu, nyumba, uhamisho, miudombinu ya mawasiliano, n.k.			
10. Hatua ya kuimarisha maandilizi ya kukabiliana kikamilifu na mapambano dhidi ya magaidi kwa mfano kuanzishwa kwa vitengo maalum vya kukabiliana na ugaidi.			

6. Umehusika kwa kiwango gani katika kuendeleza mikakati ya polisi wa kitaifa ya kukabiliana na ugaidi? Eleza.
7. Ni kwa jinsi gani umetayarishwa katika kupambana na ugaidi? Eleza.
8. Waonaje ufaafu wa mikakati ya kukabiliana na ugaidi katika mapambano dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.
9. Waonaje oparesheni ya kukabiliana na ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
10. Unahusika kwa kiwango gani katika oparesheni ya kukabiliana na ugaidi? Eleza.
11. Je umeridhika na makabiliano dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.
12. Mikakati ya kukabiliana na ugaidi inaathiri kwa kiwango gani utendakazi wa polisi wa kitaifa katika kudhibiti ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.
13. Kwa makadirio yako, ni mikakati gani ya kukabiliana na ugaidi inayoathiri ufanisi wa utendakazi wa polisi wa kitaifa katika oparesheni yao dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.
14. Pendekeza mbinu zingine na hatua unazofikiri zinaweza kuwekwa ili kutatua tatizo la ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu?

**SEHEMU II: KUTATHMINI UFANISI WA SERA ZINAZOTUMIKA NA POLISI WA KITAIFA KATIKA GATUZI LA LAMU KUKABILIANA NA UGAIDI**

15. Mara nyingi polisi wa kitaifa wanatumia mbinu gani katika kukabiliana na ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu?

<b>Mbinu zinazotumiwa na polisi</b>	<b>Onyesha kwa alama (√)</b>
Kijeshi	
Nusu – jeshi	



Makosa ya jinai	
Sera za kijamii	
Sera zinazoongozwa na hekima	
Mbinu za kipolisi zilizojumuishwa	
Mengine	

16. Ni mara ngapi mbinu ya kipolisi zimetumika dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.
17. Matumizi ya mbinu za kipolisi zimeathiri vipi ufanisi wa utenda kazi wa polisi wa kitaifa? Eleza.
18. Mbinu zifuatazo zinatumika na polisi wa kitaifa katika Gatuji la Lamu kudhibiti ugaidi zina ufanifu gani?

<b>Mbinu ya kipolisi</b>	<b>Imefaa</b>	<b>Wastani</b>	<b>Haijafaa</b>
Kijeshi			
Nusu – jeshi			
Makosa ya jinai			
Sera za kijamii			
Sera zinazoongozwa na hekima			
Mbinu za kipolisi zilizojumuishwa			
Mengine			

19. Polisi wanaweza kushirikisha makundi gani katika jamii katika kutekeleza sera za kipolisi za kukabiliana na ugaidi? Eleza.

b. Polisi wanafaa kushirikisha makundi haya vipi ili kuhakikisha kuwa kuna ufanisi? Eleza.

c. Ni mikakati gani inayofaa kutumika katika kushirikisha makundi haya? Eleza.

**SEHEMU III: KUTATHMINI CHANGAMOTO ZINAZOKUMBA IDARA YA POLISI WA KITAIFA KATIKA KUTEKELEZA MIKAKATI YA KUKABILIANA NA UGAIDI KATIKA GATUZI LA LAMU**

20. Magaidi wameendelea kushambulia Gatuzi la Lamu tangu ‘Oparesheni Linda Boni’ kuanza miaka mitatu iliyopita. Je, unakubali kwamba polisi hawajafanikiwa katika mapambano yao dhidi ya ugaidi? Eleza.

21. Mahusiano baina ya polisi na jamii yamekuaje tangu makabiliano dhidi ya ugaidi kuanza katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.

22. Kulingana na wewe nini kiwango cha motisha ya polisi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.

23. Ni zipi changamoto katika utekelezwaji wa mikakati ya kukabiliana na ugaidi katika Gatuzi la Lamu? Eleza.

24. Kwa maoni yako, ni nini yapasa kufanywa ili kushughulikia changamoto hizi? Eleza.

**“Mwisho”**

**Asante kwa mchango wako**

## APPENDIX XI

### CHRONOLOGY OF TERROR ACTIVITIES IN LAMU COUNTY

(MAY, 2017 – DECEMBER, 2018)

**An Extract from, The Elephant : A Timeline of Terror Attacks in Kenya since 1975 by Juliet Atella & Yvonne Masinde (20<sup>th</sup> January 2019).**

**8<sup>th</sup> December, 2018:** Three civilians were injured when their lorry was hit by an IED near Sankuri (Lamu County). The device was suspected to have been planted by *A-Shabaab*.

**12<sup>th</sup> November, 2018:** At least one police officer was killed and two others injured when the vehicle in which they were travelling ran over an improvised explosive device (IED) in the coastal Lamu County on Sunday evening.

**3<sup>rd</sup> November, 2018:** The KDF engaged *Al-Shabaab* fighters in Bodhei.

**16<sup>th</sup> October, 2018:** *Al-Shabaab* militants alleged that they had destroyed two Kenyan military vehicles with an IED, killing and injuring an unspecified number of soldiers. The alleged incident took place between Mangai and Basuba. Subsequent reports indicate that the IED exploded before the military vehicles were in range, resulting in no casualties or fatalities.

**12<sup>th</sup> October, 2018:** Police officers engaged in a shoot-out with *Al-Shabaab* after a landmine went off and injured civilians in Nyongoro.

**11<sup>th</sup> October, 2018:** Two Administration Police officers have died while three others have been injured after suspected *Al-Shabaab* militants ambushed an escort vehicle they were travelling in at Lango La Simba in Nyongoro, along Lamu-Malindi road.

**2<sup>nd</sup> October, 2018:** *Al-Shabaab* forces shelled a Kenyan military base in Mararani (Lamu County). No casualties mentioned (unknown death or injuries coded as zero fatalities).

**25<sup>th</sup> September, 2018:** *Al-Shabaab* forces reportedly killed a Kenyan soldier in Kiunga, Kiwayu.

**24<sup>th</sup> September, 2018:** *Al-Shabaab* militants claim to have overrun a Kenyan military base in Taksile area north of Pandaguo, Lamu County, killing ten KDF soldiers and admitting three deaths among their own ranks. Kenyan military sources also reported the clashes, although they claimed that ten *Al-Shabaab* fighters had been killed. Fatalities coded at the most conservative estimate.

**29<sup>th</sup> August, 2018:** Five Kenyan soldiers were killed and ten wounded when their vehicle hit a landmine on the road between Kiunga and Sankuri. It was not clear who had planted the device, though a pro *Al-Shabaab* radio station in Somalia subsequently claimed that *Al-Shabaab* had killed at least twenty Kenyan soldiers in an (unverified) attack in the area of Lamu, which was reported to be an ambush. Until further information comes to light, this has been coded as a single event of remote violence by an unknown group, killing five.

**24<sup>th</sup> August, 2018:** It is reported that *Al-Shabaab* destroyed power stations in Lamu town and Tana River town. There has been no confirmation of this claim in other sources.

**8<sup>th</sup> August, 2018:** Five KDF soldiers were killed and six others wounded when their vehicle was blown up by an IED near the town of Bodhei. *Al-Shabaab* claimed responsibility for the attack.

**5<sup>th</sup> July, 2018:** Two people were injured after the vehicle they were travelling in ran over a landmine at Nyongoro along the Garsen-Lamu road.

**15<sup>th</sup> June, 2018:** The police have launched air strikes in Boni Forest to attack *Al-Shabaab* fighters.

**12<sup>th</sup> May, 2018:** An explosive device aimed at a military lorry went off between Kiunga and Ishakani. It exploded early and there were no casualties.

**9<sup>th</sup> April, 2018:** Non-violent activity: Suspected *Al-Shabaab* attack a Lamu bound bus in Nyangoro. Four shots were reportedly fired, though no one was reported injured.

**3<sup>rd</sup> March, 2018:** *Al-Shabaab* attacks and kills two people and further steals a vehicle at Basuba location, Lamu East Sub County. Security forces later launched a security sweep of the area.

**11<sup>th</sup> February, 2018:** Between ten and fifteen suspected *Al-Shabaab* assailants attack Maleli in Witu. A witness said that the attackers shot their victims first, made sure they bled, before tying them up and making them lie on the ground facing down. They then proceeded to hack them. The attackers are said to have vowed that they were not going to leave until they eliminate all non-believers from the area. At least eleven are left dead. As a result of the attacks, many of the residents have fled the area.

**16<sup>th</sup> January, 2018:** In Ishakani village in Lamu East, more than hundred heavily armed insurgents took over the area and preached radical teachings to the residents. They hoisted their flag at a deserted local police station before going back to their hideouts. Sources revealed that the attackers have also been conducting daily prayers at mosques in the area at will.

**15<sup>th</sup> January, 2018:** Armed groups killed a woman and injured five police officers at Nyongoro along Lamu-Malindi road.

**13<sup>th</sup> January, 2018:** Kenyan officials said a civilian was killed and several policemen wounded when suspected members of the Somalia-based group *Al-Shabaab* attacked a convoy of vehicles near Witu.

**28<sup>th</sup> December, 2017:** Reports indicate that a deadly attack was carried out in Lamu. The attack was a well-planned ambush targeting a vehicle carrying "Kenyan crusaders" travelling on the road that connects Witu and Gamba villages in Lamu County. *Al-Shabaab* forces, who are waging jihad in Lamu, captured the vehicle and two Kenyan infidels, who are among those settled in the Muslim land of Lamu.

**28<sup>th</sup> November, 2017:** Two Administration Police officers have died while three others have been injured after suspected *Al-Shabaab* militants ambushed an escort vehicle they were travelling in at Lango La Simba in Nyongoro, along the Lamu-Malindi road.

**20<sup>th</sup> October, 2017:** Five people are nursing multiple gunshot wounds after their vehicle was shot at by suspected *Al-Shabaab* militants

**10<sup>th</sup> September, 2018:** At least one police officer was killed and two others injured when the vehicle in which they were travelling ran over an improvised explosive device (IED) in the coastal Lamu County on Sunday evening.

**6<sup>th</sup> September, 2017:** Four people were killed by suspected *Al-Shabaab* militia in Lamu County. Police have launched an investigation.

**30<sup>th</sup> August, 2017:** *Al-Shabaab* militants ambushed a vehicle travelling from Garsen to Lamu. The vehicle drove over an IED and was then shot at by the militants. Two people were killed 50 metres away, a few hours later, the same *Al-Shabaab* militants fired at a truck, killing one person. They also destroyed a nearby electricity pylon.

**20<sup>th</sup> August, 2017:** The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) on Sunday (20<sup>th</sup> August) resumed bombing Boni Forest which *Al-Shabaab* has used as a base to launch attacks.

**18<sup>th</sup> August, 2017:** At least three people were killed on Friday by *Al-Shabaab* militants in Witu Lamu County. The Star newspaper reports four dead.

**17<sup>th</sup> August, 2017:** *Al-Shabaab* militants attacked Maleli village, near Witu town. They burned down houses and killed four people.

**7<sup>th</sup> August, 2017:** Two people were injured after the vehicle they were travelling in ran over a landmine at Nyongoro along the Garsen-Lamu road.

**7<sup>th</sup> August, 2017:** *Al-Shabaab* militants destroyed an electricity pylon near Gamba, causing a blackout across Lamu County.

**2<sup>nd</sup> August, 2017:** Three people were killed and four injured after a passenger bus was ambushed by *Al-Shabaab* near Nyongoro.

**20<sup>th</sup> July, 2017:** *Al-Shabaab* attack Mararani area killing two civilians.

**13<sup>th</sup> July, 2017:** Three people were killed and several were injured including Public Works Principal Secretary Mariam El Maawy, during an ambush by *Al-Shabaab* in Lamu West.

**8<sup>th</sup> July, 2017:** At least nine people were killed in Lamu County on Saturday morning in an attack by *Al-Shabaab*. The attack occurred at Jima and Pandaguo villages near the border with Somalia. At Jima, *Al-Shabaab* beheaded four men (coded in other event).

**5<sup>th</sup> July, 2017:** At least three police officers and one *Al-Shabaab* member were killed after *Al-Shabaab* raided Pandanguo Police Camp in Lamu. *Al-Shabaab* engaged in a gun battle with the police that lasted for hours. One police officer was unaccounted for. *Al-Shabaab* planted IEDs while raiding the station. Government troops were later deployed to Lamu to look for *Al-Shabaab*. The Kenya Standard claims two police dead in the attack.

**29<sup>th</sup> June, 2017:** The Kenyan security forces rescued two of the four pupils kidnapped during *Al-Shabaab* attack in Kiunga in the past two days. No clashes reported.

**27<sup>th</sup> June, 2017:** Eight people including four school children and four police officers were killed in a roadside bomb attack planted by suspected *Al-Shabaab* fighters that occurred in Kiunga, Lamu on Tuesday. The police officers were escorting the school children to Kiunga from Mararani, when the lorry was hit by an IED. Following the blast, *Al-Shabaab* opened fire on the victims.

**11<sup>th</sup> June, 2017:** Detonation: The IED planted by *Al-Shabaab*, and targeting Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) along the Milimani-Baure's supply route detonated without any casualties or injuries on the side of KDF.

**31<sup>st</sup> May, 2017:** An explosive device aimed at a military lorry went off between Kiunga and Ishakani. It exploded early and there were no casualties.

**31<sup>st</sup> May, 2017:** Seven police officers and a civilian were killed when an armoured vehicle drove over a roadside bomb in South Eastern Kenya. *Al-Shabaab* claimed responsibility.

**31<sup>st</sup> May, 2017:** Two soldiers from Kenya Defence forces were killed, and another wounded in an IED explosion. *Al-Shabaab* claimed responsibility of the attack. Another IED exploded in the same area on the same day before a Kenyan vehicle passed, leaving the passengers unharmed.