

**EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACE-BUILDING STRATEGIES IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL GENERAL ELECTORAL
CONFLICTS IN TRANS-NZOIA COUNTY, KENYA**

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**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Conferment of
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies of Masinde Muliro
University of Science and Technology**

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work prepared with no other than the indicated sources, support, and has not been presented elsewhere for a degree or any other award.

Signature

Date

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CPC/H/01-53800/2019

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned certify that they have read and hereby recommend for acceptance of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology a proposal titled “**Effectiveness of Peace-building Strategies in the Management of National General Electoral Conflicts in Trans-Nzoia County, Kenya**”.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my late mother Sussy Ikapolok Akisa Ekwenye. How I wish you were alive to witness your son conferred as a doctor. You were a good mother who valued academics continue resting in peace mum.

Also, I dedicate this thesis to my late sister Mrs. Catherine Onyango Ekwenye and to the victims of post-election violence of 2007/2008 general election.

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ABSTRACT

Figuring out the best strategies for promoting peace requires an understanding of the factors that encourage electoral strife. A combination of both technical approaches attitude-transformation strategies are central to easing of electoral conflict. The past post-election and election-related conflicts in Kenya call for sustainable peace-building interventions. Thus, this study sought to evaluate the effectiveness of peace-building strategies in the management of electoral conflicts in Trans-Nzoia County, Kenya. The study sought to establish specifically the nature of electoral conflicts and the peace-building strategies used to manage these conflicts in Trans Nzoia County, Kenya; assess the effectiveness of peace-building strategies used in the management of electoral conflict and examine the challenges and opportunities of peace-building strategies used in the management of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County, Kenya. The study was led by a conceptual framework that tried to explain how peace-building techniques were helpful in managing election tensions. The study is anchored on Peace-building Theory and Conflict Transformation Theory. The study employed descriptive and evaluation research design because of its ability to explain the problem the way it is. The target population for this study comprised selected household heads, village elders and religious leaders. The sample size for the study consisted of 203 participants. Purposive sampling, stratified sampling and systematic sampling techniques were used to select the various categories of participants. Primary data was collected from the respondents using structured questionnaires, interview schedules was used to collect data from key informant and FGD was used to collaborate information collected from selected discussants. SPSS Statistics Version 25.0 was used to analyze quantitative data to provide descriptive statistics, particularly frequencies and percentages and the results were presented in tables and figures. Qualitative data were analyzed using thematic narratives and presented thematically in verbatim quotations. The study findings indicate that the major causes of electoral conflicts in the county include unresolved and long standing grievances (100%), Poor electoral management and administration (95.27%), political elite patronage (91.42%), stiff competition (61.37%) and lack of legal and institutional framework (52.79%). Results also show that peace-building strategies such as sensitization programmes (93.6%), use of grassroots peace advocacy and peace messaging (92.3%), dialogue and mediation (88.8%), training and institution-building activities (60.1%), the adoption of early warning (43.7%) and use of attitude-transformation programs and systems (41.6%) are effective in reducing tensions and preventing violence during and after elections. Overall conclusion is that the most effective peace-building strategy to manage electoral conflicts within Trans Nzoia County is dialogue and mediation. Although the peace-building strategies are affected by some challenges such as mistrust, suspicion, mismanagement of elections, and ethnicity they can improved through utilization of available opportunities such as formulation of relevant policies, use of early warning and response system, collaboration between the police and the political actors, peace advocacy activities, use of local dispute resolution mechanisms and building confidence of electoral actors. The study recommends that the Government of Kenya puts in place measures to address the pre-existing conflict, develop a framework to guide peace-building activities and then strengthen them through training and facilitation and employ programmes aimed at improving citizen trust in public institutions should be enhanced especially through civic education and public participation.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

- CGWTF:** Citizens' Goodwill Task Force
- CIAV:** International Support and Verification Commission
- CSO:** Civil Society Organizations
- DMCs:** code of conduct monitoring committees
- ECK:** Electoral Commission of Kenya
- EMB:** Electoral Management Body
- EVER:** Electoral Violence Education and Resolution Program
- GNU:** Government of National Unity
- ICEP:** Initial Coverage Election Period
- IDASA:** Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa
- IDP:** Internally Displaced People
- IEBC:** Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
- IPPP:** Institute of Philosophy and Public Policy
- KANU:** Kenya African National Union
- KNHRC:** Kenya National Human Rights Commission
- LPC:** Liberal Party of Canada
- MMUST:** Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology
- MP:** Member of Parliament
- NARC:** National Rainbow Coalition
- NCCK:** National Council of Churches of Kenya
- NGO:** Non-Governmental Organization
- NMC:** National Code of Conduct Monitoring Committee

ODM: Orange Democratic Movement

OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

PETAS: Pre-Election Technical Assessments

PNCR: People's National Congress Reform

PPPC: People's Progress Party Civic

PPRC: Political Parties Registration Commission

RPC: Regional peace committees

RUF: Revolutionary United Front

SPLA: Sudan People's Liberation Army

SPSS: South Sudan Police Service

TNA: The National Alliance

UML: United Marxist-Leninist

UN: United Nations

UNICEF: United Nations International Children Emergency Fund

UNIOSIL: United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNMIK: United Nations Mission in Kosovo

UNO: Unión Nacional Opositora

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF KEY CONCEPTS

Attitude Transformation: This refers to creating and moulding attitudes, perceptions of people about a certain process to achieve expected results.

Awareness Creation: This refers to conveying of knowledge to contribute to alleviation of conflicts

Conflict: describes a heated dispute or altercation about something

Conflict Management: refers to using the proper tactics to stop and resolve any potential sources of conflict.

Conflict Resolution: Means to resolve conflict and ensure perpetual peace

Conflict Analysis: Refers to structured, systematic presentation of facts in order to develop the best conflict management tools.

Dialogue: Refers to conversation between two or more people to resolve a problem

Democracy: Refers to a form of government in which all citizens or legal residents of a state have a say in policymaking through elected officials.

Electoral Process: the process by which political leaders are elected to office

Electoral Conflict: Refers to acts or threats of coercion, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arise in the context of electoral competition.

Grassroots Peace Advocacy: These are strategies employed by organizations to build peace and intercommunity cohesion.

Identity Politics: Refers to the conversation of and lobbying around issues relating to one's ethnic identity or religion.

Mediation: Refers to an alternative dispute resolution aimed at attaining perpetual peace

Nature of Electoral Conflicts: In the context of this study, it refers to the characteristics, causes, and dynamics of the disputes or disagreements that arise during an election process. It includes an understanding of the underlying factors that contribute to such conflicts, as well as the different forms that they may take, such as long-standing land conflicts or disputes over election results

Opportunities: This refers to available means of solving electoral conflicts

Peace: Refers to the absence of war and conflict. Peace in this thesis shall refer to positive peace

Peace-building: Refers to a process of strengthening a society's capacity to manage conflict in non-violent ways

Peace building Strategies: refer to measures and interventions employed by various actors such as religious leaders, non-governmental organizations and community-based organizations, peace advocacy groups to prevent electoral related conflict.

Peace Committees: An association of persons who support peace in a situation of conflict.

Power-sharing: Dividing high-government seats between warring political parties

Power struggle: Refers to the scuffles and fights that come during elective seasons

Post-conflict: Refers to the period after the conflict has occurred

Political truce: Refers to an end to political disagreements

Positive peace: Refers to the absence of physical violence and peaceful social and cultural beliefs, norms, the presence of justice at all levels, and the shared use of power.

Pre-Existing Conflict Factors: This alludes to the fact that, even after formal institutions have been changed, the dynamics of political rivalry may still be influenced by the underlying historical patterns of leaders' contact and political mobilization under authoritarian leadership.

Unresolved long-standing grievances: These are issues that arise from colonial creation of farming schemes in Trans Nzoia that alienated the original occupants therefore always arising during election circles.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Prevalence of election-related conflicts can be devastating; however, experience has shown that they can be prevented (Alihodžić, 2012). Peace building strategies for averting electoral conflict such as early warning and prevention are crucial towards ensuring there is no bloodshed and loss of property. Peace building strategies for electoral conflict refer to the establishment of sustainable electoral-related conflict interventions through capacity building and peace advocacy across political players and ethnic groups as well as across racial boundaries (Tschirgi, 2015). Peace building approaches can include conflict prevention; conflict management; conflict resolution and transformation and post-conflict reconciliation.

Höglund (2010) avers that understanding the causes of electoral conflicts and their impacts on conflict resolution and democracy is crucial for finding lasting peace building approaches. Understanding the triggering factors or enablers of electoral conflict for instance the nature of politics, nature of competitive elections and the incentives for political positions helps determine the best approaches for peace building. The success of peace building interventions for electoral conflict depends in part on the political decisions of those involved (national and local governments and communities) in part on effective leadership (by both the national and county governments) and on resources like human capital (Birch & Muchlinski, 2018).

The most effective way for preventing electoral disputes from escalating into conflict is by supporting strong national institutions (electoral, legal and political systems) and the ability of local leaders and civil society to address community grievances through nonviolent means such as capacity building (Khadigala, 2010). In support, (Bado and Scholar 2015) assert that supporting democratic civic education activities before, during and after elections helps considerably alleviate electoral conflict and as a result promote democracy. Embracing voter-focused strategies through capacity building such as through voter education and holding public debates to create awareness on the some of the most common electoral issues can help prevent tensions from building up. This can foster peaceful atmosphere for elections and reinforce a culture of democratic values and practices thus leading to resolving of ongoing election-related disputes.

Strengthening of electoral institutions is very important towards achieving transparent and democratic election results (Annan, Zedillo, Ahtisaari, Albright, Arbour, Helgesen & Wirajuda, 2012). To prevent misconduct or the use of other violent or illegal measures to influence the election, it is important to improve the ability of all parties involved to work together peacefully toward consensus and compromise on critical subjects. The norms of the democratic game, including the parties' adherence to principles of equality, mutual respect, the rule of law, and other sociopolitical rights, are crucial to the success of an election and its capacity to reduce political strife. The promotion of democratic principles and democratic rule of law, which is aided by strengthening and supporting institutional capacity, is essential for peace building (Mross, 2019).

Campbell (2015) indicates that the best way to alleviate election-related conflict is by addressing the grievances such as divisive issues and policies of the stakeholders involved

though public discourses. This is because, if left unaddressed, the grievances can surge to the fore during the electoral process. This is especially true in multicultural societies where tribal or racial identities play a significant role in determining the election outcomes (Kelly, 2016). Indeed, seriously taking into account the divisive issues and grievances of the community members in the electoral process can result in a peaceful socio-political order.

The United Nations Department of Political Affairs (2016) indicates that to achieve a lasting electoral related peace, holistic peace-building approaches must be adopted. That is, a combination of both technical, resource and logistical support as well as conflict transformation approaches are essential to peace building. In support, USAID (2013) points out that a combination of both technical and political approaches can help reduce electoral conflict. Simply put, a combination of both the technical approaches such as capacity building (training and institution-building activities) and attitude-transformation strategies aimed at shaping the preferences of relevant factors such as voters and political stakeholders can be very crucial in ensuring credible elections are held.

The primary purpose for capacity building of the voters, electoral actors, security and the electoral management institutions is to equip them with the capacity to deliver a credible and transparent election recognized by all, (Alihodžić & Asplund, 2018). Peace-building capacity interventions for averting electoral conflict include peace-messaging, codes of conduct and grassroots peace advocacy by civil society groups for both the voters and stakeholders (Opitz, Christian, Hanne & Höglund, 2013). To underscore the peace building strategies adopted in Trans-Nzoia County in managing electoral conflict, this study will assess the impact of Capacity building, grassroots peace advocacy, adoption of local dispute resolution and mediation processes and Early Warning Early Response.

During election cycles, ethnic tensions get worse because almost all political parties are formed along ethnic lines (Linke, 2020). Kenya and in particular, Trans-Nzoia County has no pluralist, cross-ethnic party with majority of the voters identifying themselves with the tribal political outfit. That's due in large part to the to the political strategy of divide and rule which entails pitting one tribe against another and only allowing political parties to be formed along ethnic lines. In 2007, these factors were all at play exacerbated mainly by the land question, patronage and identity politics as well as close competition, (Arusei, Ogowora & Were, 2019). Failure by the security agencies, leadership and the electoral institution to curb these vices led to the spiraling of the voters' reaction into conflict.

The aftermath of the 2007 post-election conflict in Trans-Nzoia County led to the forcible displacement of more than 34000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from their homes. Trans-Nzoia County was among the most affected counties during the 2007-2008 election conflict with Noigam and Endebess in Trans-Nzoia East being the hardest hit (13755 & 6867 respectively) (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2008). In some areas such as Chebyuk, the electoral conflict between the Sabaot community and Bukusu was fueled in part by the existing land issues. Specifically in areas such as Kimabole and Cheptais at least 11 people were killed with four others killed within Endebess and Salama areas (Namunyu, 2019). Endebess area (near Chepkitale) hosted over 8081 Internally Displaced Persons in a camp while places such as Lwahaha area hosted more 313 IDPs. Given the diverse ethnic groupings that reside in trans-Nzoia County, there is need for establishment of long-term peace building strategies to mitigate electoral related conflict in future.

The highly contested elections of 2017 also saw a lot of tension especially in areas such as Endebes in Trans Nzoia County where chaos erupted and police tortured and injured civilians (KNHCR, 2017). The 2017 electioneering period was relatively calm unlike the 2007/2008 elections. However, the intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic competition for both resources and political representation fueled by the contested elections between NASA and Jubilee Parties escalated the contest for 2017 elections between the communities' risked renewal of local unrest and conflict.

In Nigeria Orji (2017) prudent preventive actions adopted by the electoral commission, civil society groups and development partners before the highly charged and contested 2015 elections proved very effective. These preventive actions include innovations in election administration in order to enhance the transparency and credibility of electoral process, adoption of early warning and peace messaging and embracing of preventive diplomacy among the political opponents. These preventive initiatives were instrumental in avoiding electoral conflict in Nigeria. Simply put, the adoption of prevention strategies is fundamental in averting electoral conflict particularly in nations with higher risks of electoral conflict.

In Zimbabwe Hove (2013) avers that embracing of early warning system are key towards avoiding and preventing electoral conflict. A conflict can be avoided through the use of a set of contingency plans and responses that are informed by monitoring early warning system indicators such as politically motivated arrests, denial of political rights, political persecution, unwarranted banning of political rallies, unrestricted freedoms of expression, movement, and assembly, and high levels of social and economic corruption.

Many post-conflict countries are typically split and struggling .In spite of the fact that "the conflict has been deemed by international bodies as resolved, the people on the ground are still reeling from conflict that is not temporal, but is generational, historical, and cultural in some cases" (The Carter Center, 2018). As Horowitz puts it, ethnicity “embodies an element of emotional intensity that can be readily aroused when the group's interests are thought to be at stake” (Blagojevic, 2010; Rameez, 2015). As a result, ethnically diverse cultures have varying degrees of conflict potential. The “peace-building process necessitates new attitudes and practices: those that are flexible, consultative, and collaborative, and that operate from a contextual understanding of the root causes of conflict”. Majority rule is risky for split communities in addition to being undemocratic (Reynolds, 2006). Majoritarian institutions can sustain the marginalization of minority groups and the distribution of power, even if democracy often leads to majoritarian domination.

Power-sharing was employed in Kosovo in 2001 to keep the country from devolving into instability. A provisional government led by an elected President, a prime minister and cabinet chosen through a proportional party system, and a power-sharing arrangement set by UNMIK to guarantee participation by the main political parties in the Kosovo Assembly were the results of the elections “for an elected Kosovo Assembly” (UNDP, 2017). With the Democratic Party of Kosovo and Alliance for the Future of Kosovo parties also participating, the LDK led the government with 46% of the vote. By sharing parliamentary seats, the nation was able to hold onto the precarious calm it had recently achieved.

The idea of “peace-building” is highly relevant to Zimbabwe because, during the GNU era, a number of organizations were established with the goal of bringing about local and

national peace processes. What is intriguing is the fact that the conversations held by the political adversaries resulted in institution building” (UNDP, 2017:13). The institutions encountered numerous difficulties throughout the changeover, even though they were made up of people from both political groups. The first step toward ensuring democracy and peace prevail in the bitterly divided nation was the establishment of institutions (UNDP, 2017). In the Zimbabwean scenario, political parties ultimately decided to cooperate despite divergent philosophies and values for the first time since 2000 following the 2008 elections, which were characterized by high levels of violence. In order to bring about peace in a divided society, the Government of National Unity that was established as a result in 2008 then played a significant role in bringing together many opponents (UNDP, 2017).

The electoral process in Nigeria in 2007 was deeply divisive, with conflict in the run-up focusing on two major sets of issues: the struggle for power in Nigeria's central government, and the long-simmering struggle in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, where rebel violence has limited the electoral administrators and where there was limited ability to send out significant international election observers due to the security situation (Collier & Vicente, 2014). There were fights between the two major parties' supporters, threats were made against opposition leaders, and violence was directed towards monitors and observers. While election-related violence remained a problem in 2007, it was less so than in the previous election, in 2003 (Collier & Vicente, 2014).

The 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone, which was recovering from a ten-year civil war, prolonged instability, and unrest, "represented both a milestone and a giant leap forward in the consolidation of the peace process and of democracy in a

country" (UNDP, 2017:17). The peaceful elections were made possible by a well-managed and well-designed support structure, in which all involved parties made sure that holding peaceful elections was a top priority. For the 2007 elections, the coherent approach of important electoral players in their integrated electoral assistance service was crucial. The United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) and UNDP integrated assistance, along with the work of the NEC and broad international support, made it possible for the 2007 elections to be more credible and legitimate than any other and to represent a step forward for Sierra Leone's electoral administration (UNDP, 2017). The major accomplishments of the 2007 elections were: "an unprecedentedly open and sustained political dialogue; the first alternation of power achieved through democratic means; a significant reduction of political and election-related violence" (UNDP, 2017:18). Additionally, the Sierra Leone Police performed more impartially and professionally.

Ever since Kenya embraced multi-party politics in 1991, there has been far too much electoral violence, which is frequently driven by racial tensions. Violence in the days leading up to the 1992 elections between supporters of the ruling Kalenjin-dominated Kenya African National Union (KANU) and members of 'pro-opposition' ethnic groups killed 789 people and displaced over 60,000. Before the 1997 elections, supporters of the KANU in Coast Province also attacked 'foreign' ethnic communities. Following the elections, they clashed with armed Kikuyu groups in the Rift Valley, resulting in over 200 deaths and over 100,000 displaced persons. Political violence was relatively low during the 2002 elections, even though it was KANU's first time being ousted from power. However, scholars attribute this phenomena to a range of political factors rather than a fundamental alteration in the workings of the ongoing conflict. The National Alliance of Kenya (NAK),

which is led by Kikuyu, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which is dominated by Luo, had previously disagreed and only endorsed Mwai Kibaki as their presidential candidate (Elder, Stigant, & Claes, 2014). Despite the fact that the two front-runners in the presidential race were both Kikuyu, their unity made the ethnic gap in the race less noticeable.

Kenya had historic and peaceful presidential, legislative, and local elections on December 27, 2007. President Kibaki received 4,578,034 votes, whereas Raila Odinga received 4,352,860, according to the (disputed) figures declared by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) - a discrepancy of almost 225,000 votes, or 2.5 percent of the total votes cast (The Carter Centre, 2018:9). The voting process was orderly, but confusion and a delay in declaring the outcome led to discontent and ultimately violence. The Electoral Commission's pronouncement that President Kibaki had been duly elected to the presidency was disputed by the ODM, who refused to recognize the results. This led to a political upheaval. Violence erupted in Kenya and persisted for nearly a month. It was clear that latent tensions had been triggered to surface by the electoral controversy (The Carter Centre, 2018). Following the election, there were three main, occasionally simultaneous types of violence: retaliatory, organized, and spontaneous.

Kofi Annan met with Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga alone on January 24, 2008, in an attempt to start a peace process. He informed the two principals that Kenyans were the ones suffering the most as the violence in the election persisted (European Union, 2013). He also urged sincere communication and compromise as a means of resolving the twisted issues and the impasse in politics. The aforementioned conversation was intended to address long-term election disputes and violence in addition to the current crisis.

Additionally, Kenya was emphasized to the two leaders as the bigger brother when it came to regional security. Anan restated that in order to guarantee Kenya's advancement, Raila and Kibaki needed to work together.

When the two leaders decided to share power and establish a grand coalition government, peace was finally attained. In a situation like this, leaders typically rule in unison in an effort to reach a compromise (The Carter Centre, 2018). "Important and serious questions should be solved with near-unanimity," as Rousseau had proposed (European Union, 2013). Almost every topic brought up in the legislature will have an effect on how the peace process plays out in a post-conflict or severely divided country.

Kenyans overwhelmingly voted in favor of a new constitution in August 2010. The new constitution established new devolutionary structures, namely county governments, as well as more checks and balances on executive power. The role of Deputy President was also established (European Union, 2013). The 2013 and 2017 elections were conducted by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), which was established in the new document along with the elimination of the Prime Minister office (The Carter Centre, 2018).

In essence, the Orange Democratic Movement's Raila Odinga and the National Alliance's Uhuru Kenyatta contested for the presidency (ODM). The Carter Center (2017) reports that in an extremely close contest, Kenyatta prevailed against Odinga, surpassing the constitutional requirement of 50 percent plus one to avoid a rerun by just 63,115 (assuming only genuine votes were cast) (European Union, 2013). Odinga filed a legal challenge to the election results, claiming fraud. Kenyatta's victory was upheld by the Supreme Court.

A number of issues were raised during the 2013 election, including doubts regarding the authenticity of the voter registration, technological malfunctions during the transmission of results, and several delays in the electoral calendar's implementation. In preparation for the 2017 elections, electoral stakeholders thoroughly examined these issues of electoral administration, despite the low level of violence in 2013.

A campaign called "Mkenya Daima" or "my Kenya forever," was supported by the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KPSA) prior to the elections. According to Paffenholz and Spurk (2006), in collaboration with several civil society organizations, engaged in several types of peace messaging throughout the country." This includes distributing peace messages via stakeholder roundtables, church services, and print media. This effort, in a sense, was crucial in encouraging harmony and peace among Kenyans and deterring them from retaliating violently.

Six elections have taken place since the multi-party system was introduced in 1991; the most recent being the 2017 general elections (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2018). Kenya "has a history of violent election-related incidents, contested presidential election results, and sharp ethno-political divisions." Due to the creation of new municipal political venues and the rerun of four newly created elective offices, devolution has significantly changed the election dynamics. Voting in Kenya has always been mostly done along ethnic lines, with little discernible thematic variation between political parties (The Carter Centre, 2018:18). Since there isn't a single dominating ethnic group, formal and informal ethno-regional coalitions have been formed to form coalition administrations. Since 2013, Kikuyu and Kalenjin, the two major ethnic groups accountable for the violence that followed the 2007 election, have collaborated.

Kenya's democratic functioning was degraded and lives were lost during the drawn-out and destructive presidential race that characterized the country's 2017 general elections. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) suffered after the Supreme Court's historic annulment of the presidential result on August 8, but in the end, the results procedure for the new presidential election was enhanced and had greater levels of transparency (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2018:4). But polarization, ethnic divisions, and violence all rose, making the political environment worse. This resulted in an opposition boycott and even violent election-related resistance. Civil society, the judiciary, and the IEBC all came under attack, and the use of excessive force by the police sometimes resulted in fatalities and heightened tensions (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2018:5).

Political truce attempts were required to reduce the violence and tension that were observed following the 2017 elections. For instance, in the post-election violence that followed the 2007 elections, a team lead by Koffi Annan mediated a political ceasefire that led to the establishment of a coalition government between Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki, the two rival politicians (Karongo, 2018). In an effort to start a conversation, President Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga, the head of Kenya's opposition, met on March 9, 2018. It's known as "the Golden Handshake." The two leaders stated that the nation was seeing a continuous decline in the connections between ethnic communities and political parties. The top issues on the table were ethnic hostility and competition as well as a lack of a national ethos (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018:6). They "were of the view that bad politics were to blame for the country's negative perception by the international

community." They concurred that even with all of the nation's advantages, its national ethos needed to be defined and promoted (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018:6). In light of this, the study examined the effectiveness of peace-building techniques in resolving electoral disputes in Trans-Nzoia County, Kenya.

In Kenya, a study by Fatima and Yalim (2015) revealed some of the measures of preventing post-election conflict such as the use of wide-ranging civic and voter education, expanding political presence beyond the capital cities, advocating for the advancement of the reform agenda and holding the Government of Kenya accountable.

Nderitu (2010) portends that adoption of early warning system such as deploying peace monitors throughout the country and running use of free texting (messaging platform) to report tensions and incidents are very instrumental in averting violent incidents and reducing tensions. Such monitoring initiatives includes tracking radio messages aimed at specific communities can help avert and stop intra- and interethnic conflicts before they turn violent. The effectiveness of such early warning systems is demonstrated by the EU early warning system dubbed *Uwiano initiative* between pre and post 2007-08 Kenyan election which was built on national and local capabilities to identify own security issues. Using national and local capabilities to identify own security issues allowed for effective monitoring of indicators hence prevention of escalation of conflicts through mediation (Babaud & Ndung'u, 2012).

In Trans Nzoia during the time leading to August, 2022 election, tension between different ethnic groups had developed. The movement of people was restricted and voices of people were suppressed. Those other tribes that used to lease farms in Saboti, Kwanza, and

Endebess constituencies could not move in to harvest their produce. The situation became worse with delay in announcement of presidential vote. Vigilantes became common from the political divide and use of informers along tribal lines was known fact. In Saboti constituency, people from outside the Saboti and Sebei tribes moved out of the area following hate speech that was spreading in the sub county. Those who had planted maize, potatoes and onions lost them to the locals. Those who had leased farms suffered untold suffering. In Cherangany and Endebes the trend was the same, luos and other people from outside Bukusu and Kalenjin left the area for fear of retaliation. The politicians were in forefront for spreading the hate speech. The issue of son of the soil and daughter of the soil rent the air. The long-standing ancestral land issue was reignited and few farms were invaded by so called squatters. The atmosphere became tense and violence became inevitably.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Kenya lost 1300 lives and over 2 million people were displaced during the electoral conflicts and violence during 2007/2008 general elections. Since Kenya adopted multi-party politics in 1992, election-related violence has become commonplace. The post-election violence in 2007 and 2008, which pitted Kalenjin warrior groups against Kikuyu villages, was concentrated in Trans-Nzoia County and was fueled not only by political injustices and power struggles, but also by economic disparities and emotions of ethnic animosity.

Even though 2013 elections were relatively peaceful owing to the concerted efforts of civil society, religious organizations and the private sector, tensions was still high in Trans-Nzoia County. The political tension in 2013 was largely due to the failure and

unwillingness of the government and other state authorities to address the root causes of conflict that left the people who committed those crimes free to commit them again with the affected longing for an opportunity to revenge.

Despite various peace building strategies being put in place to manage the electoral conflicts, Trans-Nzoia County still experiences a number of electoral conflicts. It is upon this background that the study sought to evaluate the effectiveness of peace-building strategies in the management of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County, Kenya.

1.3 Study Objectives

1.3.1 General Objective

The general objective of the study was to evaluate effectiveness of peace-building strategies in the management of electoral conflict in Trans-Nzoia County, Kenya.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study were to:

- i. Examine the nature of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County, Kenya
- ii. Evaluate the effectiveness of peace building strategies used in the management of electoral conflict in Trans-Nzoia County, Kenya.
- iii. Assess the challenges and opportunities in the management of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County, Kenya

1.4 Research Questions

The research aimed at answering the following questions:

- i. What is the nature of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County, Kenya?
- ii. How effective are peace-building strategies that have been adopted in Trans Nzoia County in management of electoral conflict?
- iii. What are the challenges and opportunities in the management of electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County in Kenya?

1.5 Justification of the Study

Despite concerted peace building efforts by the national Government, County Governments, religious leaders and non-governmental agencies in Kenya to curb the endemic recurrent electoral conflict, understanding of the effectual and specific peace building strategies is not clear. Given the rampant nature of post-election conflict and lingering issues such as the land question and political patronage across trans-Nzoia County owing to the diverse ethnic groupings, it was imperative to explore the impact of the current peace building strategies in order to identify lasting interventions. Thus, this study was timely in such a time as in general elections in 2022, and as a means to fill the existing knowledge gaps in the previous studies on the same topic.

1.5.1 Policy Justification

The findings of the study can be of benefit to the relevant policy makers in the formulation of policies or improvement of the existing peace building strategies, which can be implemented effectively for better and sustainable coexistence among the Kenyan communities especially in every election cycle. The findings will be useful to the both the national government, the electoral management body (Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission) of Kenya, National Cohesion and Integration Commission, religious leaders

and non-governmental agencies in the determination of whether to develop more peace building strategies or improvement of the existing ones so as to achieve lasting peace. Additionally, a review of the influence of peace building strategies in Trans Nzoia County will unbundle electoral conflict into particular dimensions and hence help policy makers and stakeholders understand more underlying causative factors and identify the most appropriate policy solutions. This is because the causative factors of electoral conflict vary from one region to another with electoral conflict in some areas fueled by pre-existing social factors while in some areas it is driven by intense political rivalry and incitement.

1.5.2 Academic Justification

A review of the existing literature studies on peace building approaches for managing electoral conflict in Kenya revealed most studies had focused on the weaknesses of EMBs, influence of pre-existing social conflicts such as land conflicts, political patronage and clientelism. Moreover, the review of the existing studies showed inconclusive findings on the effectiveness of peace building strategies in managing electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County. Most notably the reviewed studies demonstrated that there existed contextual and conceptual knowledge gaps. For instance, a study by Nebe (2012) investigated civil conflict management of the post-election conflict 2007/2008 in Kenya. Another study by Arusei, Ogwora and Were (2019) looked at the structural context contributing to 2007 post-election conflict in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia Counties in Kenya. In addition, Höglund and Jarstad (2010), Fatima, and Yalim (2015) investigated the strategies to prevent and manage electoral conflict in Kenya. The studies however, focused on the wider perspective (Kenya as a whole) of peace building strategies for managing election conflict. This study

sought to evaluate the effectiveness of peace building strategies in the management of electoral conflicts in Trans-Nzoia County.

Additionally, the existing literature focused widely on known hot spot areas such as Nakuru, Uasin Gishu, Molo and Naivasha. Most notably, very little research currently existed on the effectiveness of peace building approaches in mitigating electoral related conflict beyond the common findings and recommendations for strengthening EMBs and conducting peace advocacy campaigns to reduce the likelihood of conflict in electoral cycles. Therefore, this study is expected to make clear the impact of peace building approaches in managing electoral conflict particularly in Trans Nzoia County. The findings of the study add to the existing body of knowledge especially in peace and conflict studies on the impact of peace building strategies in managing electoral related conflict. Moreover, the gaps that resulted from this study are expected to form an avenue for future research.

1.5.3 Philosophical Justification

Kenya has experienced electoral conflicts after every electoral period. Even during mlolongo elections in eighties, the country was not spared of these conflicts. This electoral conflict has always opened historical wounds. Electoral complains have been used scapegoats towards settling of these historical wounds, especially land claims. For this reason, therefore, long lasting peace cannot be arrived at offering short term solutions alone, which only result in negative peace every time. Short term solutions might only help to end electoral conflict especially violence in current timeline. Therefore, it was necessary to look at peace-building strategies that achieve long lasting peace. Peace-building strategies employed in Trans Nzoia County and by extension to Kenya cannot manage

electoral conflicts unless historical wounds are first healed. This study adopted interpretivism research philosophy in order to interpret the social world (factors / causes of electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County) in a subjective manner. The use of these approaches enabled the research to make a causal prediction and explanation of the relationship between peace-building strategies and electoral conflict. This also helped to improve the existing theoretical approaches for peace building and electoral conflict. Therefore, this study is essential for it targeted evaluating peace-building strategies that can be used to achieve both short term and long-term peace.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The conceptual scope of the study was to evaluate effectiveness of peace-building strategies influencing management of electoral conflict in Trans-Nzoia County in Kenya. The study specifically concentrated on identifying the peacebuilding techniques utilized in the management of electoral violence, as well as the opportunities and difficulties associated with doing so in Kenya's Trans-Nzoia County. This helped to understand the triggers of electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia as well as determine the peace building strategies adopted. The study covered period of 1992-2022 electoral circles.

1.7 Chapter Summary

In conclusion, coordinated post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives can result in the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of peace. Post-conflict peace-building, which gained momentum in 1992 after former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's seminal report, *An Agenda for Peace*, entailed mediating a peace accord between previously at odds parties and seeing that agreement through to completion. Conflicts in nations like Sierra

Leone, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Kosovo have needed to be resolved using various peacebuilding techniques. Kenya is also going through post-election violence in a similar way, and in each case, there have been coordinated measures to promote calm. It's unclear, though, if the tactics being used are successful or not. In light of this, the study aimed to assess the effectiveness of peace-building tactics in the handling of electoral disputes in Kenya. This research will contribute to the body of information regarding peace-building tactics and aid in the development of policies aimed at averting electoral violence in Kenya. The literature review is covered in the following chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

There are various security challenges in the modern world, but one of the most pressing is election violence, which is unfortunately becoming routine in many African countries (Goldsmith, 2015). Any polity's political and policy changes are ultimately shaped by democratic elections, which continue to be essential to maintaining peace and security (International Peace Institute, 2011). Flawed elections “have proved to be detrimental to democracy and development. This is the case because "flawed elections" typically foster a climate of violence, conflict, civic indifference, fatalities, and insecurity among people (Kodjo, 2015). The study reviewed literature on peace building strategies and electoral conflict. This helped in identifying the theoretical relationship between the variables under study. Empirical studies conducted on the topics were to be reviewed globally, regionally and locally to get and compare findings, which existed and helped shape up the study research gaps.

2.2 Nature of Electoral Conflicts

Nature of Electoral Conflicts refers to the characteristics, causes, and dynamics of the disputes or disagreements that arise during an election process. Elections are instruments through which the power balance in societies can be changed. Alihodžić and Uribe Burcher (2018b), postulates that the nature of power change (either peaceful or violent) in every democracy is determined by two dynamics namely; the context in which elections take place and quality of the electoral process. Electoral conflict is also a form of strategy used

by political elite to influence the course and outcome of electoral contests. Toha (2017) argues that political elite instigate electoral conflicts purposefully to influence the process and outcome of elections.

In countries such as Kenya with multicultural ethnicities, electoral conflict is exacerbated by unresolved and long-standing grievances such as land injustices and the quality of the electoral process. According to Alihodžić and Asplund (2018a), the underlying factors of electoral conflict are election-specific and do not exist outside of the electoral context. Simply put, electoral conflict are intertwined to the risks surrounding electoral actors, events, practices and materials across the electoral cycle. To accentuate fully the causes of electoral conflict, the study categorize the causal factors of electoral conflict as pre-existing conflict factors, political patronage and identity politics and electoral organizations and administration.

2.2.1 Pre-Existing Conflict Factors

Pre-existing conflict factors refers to underlying historical patterns of leaders' interaction and political mobilization under authoritarian rule that may put in place informal institutions that influence the dynamics of political competition even when the formal institutions are reformed, (Onguny & Gillies, 2019). Politicians cognizant of the ethnic divides due pre-existing conflict issues have always evoked or exploited it for their own selfish interests, (Nieto-Matiz, 2019). Ongoing conflicts over land or other issues resources often go unresolved. While this relationship can have several explanations, one appears to be the tendency for politicians to adopt the grievances of conflicting factions into their campaigns.

The existence of long-standing land grievances in Kenya has continued to underpin the electoral rivalry in a number of ways since independence. According to Boone (2014), the land grievances in Kenya especially in the rural areas were contributed in part by the uneven land distribution due to the land ownership patterns adopted during colonial era. These historical land grievances followed by land fragmentations and developments over the years played a big role in shaping the electoral conflict and the penchant to conflict particularly in the Rift Valley (Shilaho, 2017). Boone (2011) affirms that the historical land grievances played immense role in the conflict witnessed during 1992 elections as was seen in parts of Rift Valley occupied by Kikuyu migrants in 1991. The understanding of the underlying causes of electoral conflict and the influence of ethnic mobilization and historical grievances (either real or perceived) helps fully put into perspective the susceptibility of communities to conflict in every election cycle in Kenya.

While the political elite are directly/indirectly involved with electoral conflict, the underlying and unresolved land issues by the respective governments is the leading cause of communal conflicts (Hassan, 2017). In support, Klaus (2017) avers that the prevalence of electoral conflict in Kenya is associated with the identity politics and issues of land tenure. Greiner (2013) and Boone (2011) also allude that the electoral conflict in Kenya are centered on political dynamics, that is, the political elites politicize land-related grievances during electoral periods so as to embolden their ethnic groupings and ensure support. Equally, Boone and Kriger (2012) affirm that land access issues have been cited as one of the core-contributing factor for election conflict among particular ethnic groups in Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire. In concurrence, Taylor, Pevehouse and Straus (2017) affirms that presence of pre-existing conflicts escalates the likelihoods of election conflict

owing to the political elites' tendency to rally voters around pre-existing economic and political grievances.

The political elite are cognizant of the sensitivity of the land question in Kenya and thus, are very keen to use it to galvanize and mobilize the community to back a candidate from own ethnic group (Klaus & Mitchell, 2015). The perception around this is that getting one of their 'own' to control the state machinery will enable them influence or control the unresolved land issues (Keller, 2014). This view is corroborated by the actions of the first president of Kenya who used the former settler-land as means to build his political alliances and solidify support through political patronage (Kasara, 2014). This partly, elucidates why the politics around land rights and ownership dominates the political scene around every electoral cycle in Kenya with some political elite using land grievances to mobilize for support while promising to address historically rooted grievances (Mwita, 2017). Simply put, some community members believe that having one of their 'own' occupy the top political seat will enable them gain authority to resolve perceived historical land injustices such as land allocations and/or acquisitions.

Undeniably, the role of pre-existing factors and politicization of such factors as unresolved land grievances played out during the most volatile 2007/2008 electoral conflict ever witnessed in Kenya particularly in areas such as Rift Valley, which saw mass evictions of people. Even though the last electoral conflict in Kenya are attributed to contested election results, politicization of unresolved historical land issues such as land ownership and acquisition by the political elites are reported to fuel it (Oucho, 2010). Indeed, the Akiwumi Report findings on the causes of *tribal clashes* in Kenya indicated pre-existing historical land injustices as the key driver. Similarly, the Ndungu Report noted that throughout the

1980s and 1990s public land was allocated illegally and irregularly due to political patronage, and as a reward to “*politically correct individuals*”.

Owing to the political unwillingness from the successive governments in Kenya to implement reports such as Ndungu land report which if implemented could solve some of the thorny land issues, it has led to the increased sense of frustration among the affected Kenyans in their effort to deal with land tenure disputes. The fact that institutions, which could have been used to resolve land disputes, have not been impartial has encouraged individuals to take matters into their own hands and to use conflict to resolve them. Furthermore, as land is an emotive issue, politicians have capitalized on issues surrounding it, including encouraging conflict during elections. Even though the prevailing historical land injustices is often cited as a causal factor of electoral conflict, it is the political elites’ desire for political power and their politicization of land issues that lead to balkanization of the people (Onguny, 2019).

Even with the proclamation of a new Constitution of Kenya in 2010, which offers the platform for the implementation of the National Land Policy through the National Land Commission, the politicization, lobbying and contestation of the appointees of these institutions implies that decisions rendered by the office holders of such institutions are subject to politics. Despite the recent glaring consequences of post-election conflict (2007/08) witnessed in Kenya on the dangers of politicization of emotive issues as land ownership and acquisition, the political elite are yet to tone down their rhetoric as seen during the 2013-2017 elections. Going by the behaviour of the political elite, the intricate nature of historical injustices (resources, lands) and the political stakes at hand, much needs

to be done to solve the historical injustices in Kenya if the recurrent electoral conflict in every election cycle are to be averted.

2.2.2 Political Patronage and Identity Politics

Political patronage is a common phenomenon in the world of politics. According to Dawson (2014), political patronage refers to the use of state resources to reward individuals for their electoral support. Identity politics on the other hand refers to the conversation of and lobbying around issues relating to one's ethnic identity or religion, (Mukand & Rodrik, 2018). Political patronage stems from the ethnic patronage systems established in Kenya during the pre-colonial days by the British in their attempt establish governance systems to control their territories. During the pre-colonial period in Kenya, the British established contacts with tribal leaders through resource allocation in exchange for loyalty. This explains why colonial leaders / chiefs amassed resources in terms of large swaths of land.

British reward system for loyalty promoted patronage as the key means through which one can access government resources and benefits. Given that the British patronage politics were typically regional, it meant that the beneficiaries were tribal leaders and their members (Njagi, 2018). The agitation for access to economic opportunities and land redistribution followed and ethnic tensions emerged after the independence. These ethnic tensions especially in the larger parts of Rift Valley were because of agitations for redistribution of fertile land (Klaus & Mitchell, 2015). Historically, the Kalenjin and Maasai being the predominant inhabitants of the Rift Valley were forced from the land by British farmers during the pre-colonial period and in turn resettled community members

from Kisii, Luhya and Luo ethnic groups in the Rift Valley who served as cheap source of labor (Gachanga, 2012).

During the independence, numerous ethnic groups had substantial claims to white settler lands in the Rift Valley. Similarly, during the Kenyatta's presidency, patronage politics were predominant with political loyalists disproportionately getting government rewards in terms of appointments and access to benefits such as good roads, schools and health facilities in comparison to other ethnic groups (Marx, Stoker & Suri, 2014). Such trends of favoritism from the British colonialists and Kenyatta government fortified the patronage politics seen presently in Kenya. Ethnic patronage politics were further entrenched during the Moi's presidency, which saw Kalenjin state gain favors than other ethnic groups in the form of government appointments and infrastructure development. The 2007/2008 electoral conflict in Kenya were fueled largely by ethnic patronage with Kalenjin and Luo leaders mobilizing their communities to mass conflict following Kibaki re-election. The political leaders especially from the Luo and Kalenjin incited their communities that if Kibaki continued to lead they Kikuyus would carry on benefiting at their expense with some leaders indicating that Kibaki would redistribute their fertile land in Rift Valley to the Kikuyu (Ranta, 2017).

Identity politics and ethnic patronage plays an important role in political mobilization in Kenya, as it is strongly tied to the way in which political elite build their political vehicles. According to Fjelde and Höglund (2018), ethnic affiliation is major mainstay / source of patronage and continues to influence the voting patterns in present-day politics. Even though ethnic identification is diverse and politically salient globally, Kenya's ethnic politics are founded largely on exclusion and victimization. This explains why conflict is

a common phenomenon in every electoral cycle in Kenya (Shilaho, 2017; Osome, 2018). The nature of the formulation of ethnic identity politics in Kenya has been shaped by authoritarianism, exclusionary development and conflict thereby leading to ethnic groups developing a sense of victimization and injustice (Udogu, 2018). In the recent/contemporary political developments in Kenya, the political elite have increasingly embraced the use of exclusionary ethnic identity formations and narrow interethnic elite coalition to establish political vehicles to ascend to power (Kramon & Posner, 2016).

Kasara (2014) aver that violent redistricting (exclusionary ethnic identity) is a tactic that political elite use often in order to influence electoral outcome. Specifically, electorally pivotal areas with predominant ethnic groupings and ‘migrants’ are more likely to experience politics of exclusionary ethnic identity and conflict. In support, a survey carried out by Eifert, Miguel and Posner (2010) on the influence of identity politics on electoral conflict in African States found that ethnic self-identify has a considerable influence on electoral conflict. This is due to the tendency among the political elite to influence voters around ethnic identities.

2.2.3 Electoral Management and Administration

Electoral management and administration in this study refers to the way in which electoral processes are conducted. Electoral management refers to the means or governance practices and mechanisms employed in implementing elections while electoral administration implies the administrative processes used for casting votes and compiling the electoral register (James, 2019). Simply put, electoral processes should be handled with integrity, fairness and transparency to all the parties involved (James, Garnett, Loeber &

Van Ham, 2019). Quality electoral management and administration is fundamental towards realization of democratic and fair electoral results. According to Penar, Aiko, Bentley and Han (2016), poor electoral management and administration can lead to election fraud, skewed election outcomes / vote manipulation, political hostility, public mistrust, protest and conflict.

McCormick (2020) asserts that integrity of electoral process is key in ensuring confidence in the accuracy of election outcomes. Ensuring confidence to the public and the political players presents a challenge for election managers and administrators. Failure to assure the public and the political players of integrity of the electoral process can lead to rejection of election outcome and eventually protests and conflict (Norris, 2015). Electoral management bodies / commissions play a very critical role in embedding integrity and shaping public perception on the quality of electoral processes. Poor electoral management may give room for flawed election (result manipulations), public mistrust, protest, and conflict (Opitz, Fjelde & Höglund, 2013). In support Omotola (2010) affirms that weak institutionalization of crucial organizations such as electoral management bodies in democratic politics can influence electoral conflict.

Establishment of robust election management and administration processes can ensure integrity of election outcome and attainment of quality of electoral process (Changrien, Toprayoon, Assavasukee & Tan, 2019). Thus, it is imperative to ensure that electoral management and administration processes are followed during election cycle (pre-election and post-election). Safeguarding the election integrity / quality entails establishing appropriate policy frameworks and procedures prior, during and after elections. This includes establishing applicable legal frameworks, planning and programing, training and

education, voter registration, the electoral campaign, voting procedures during Election Day, verification, tabulation and publishing of election results. However, it should not be mistaken that good quality electoral processes cannot yield contestable election outcome; whereas in some cases, technically poor electoral practices may produce results that are satisfactory / acceptable to the political players.

Poor election management and administration can stoke mistrust in the electoral management bodies (Norris, 2014; Abuya, 2009). For instance, in Kenya, people lost trust in the electoral bodies following previous incidences of election results bungling as witnessed during the 2007 election results when Kivuitu who was the then ECK chairman announced Kibaki as the winner. This lack of trust in the electoral management body in Kenya is what led to the electoral reforms and establishment of the current IEBC. The mistrust in the then ECK stemmed from the mismanagement of elections which led the people and the stakeholders to loose trust. When voters and stakeholders perceive the electoral process as skewed and lacking a level playing field, they can lead to violent protest and ultimate rejection of election outcome (von Borzyskowski, 2019; Norris, Frank & Coma, 2014).

Mistrust in the management and administration of election can arise due to lack of proper legal and institutional framework pertaining to the selection and composition of the electoral management body, the rules defining voters and or political candidates' eligibility, processes for the declaration of electoral results and nature of the existing electoral dispute resolution mechanisms (Otaola, 2017). In support, Ferree, Gibson and Long (2014) affirms that the credibility of the electoral process has a considerable influence on the voting behavior of the electorate. Further, Opitz, Fjelde and Höglund (2013) in

agreement asserts that an all-encompassing electoral management body is vital towards addressing issues of mistrust of electoral politics. This view is also echoed by Seifu (2012) who avers that absence of independent electoral management body can have a negative consequence on the integrity and acceptability of the electoral outcome.

Poor electoral management and administration can have adverse consequences on the democracy and peace of a country. For instance, failure by the National Electoral Commission of Mozambique to uphold electoral transparency during the 1999 general elections led to the rejection of election process and results termed as fraudulent. This led to extensive violent protests, which resulted in over 100 deaths, (Sayed, 2022). Similarly, in Djibouti, failure by the electoral agency to manage the electoral process transparently in 2013 led to extensive accusations of fraud and rejection of declared results (Norris, Frank & Martinez, 2014). Equally, in Kenya, claims of election mismanagement and fraud by the then ECK in 2007 general election triggered massive election-related conflict that led to more than 1100 deaths (Kriegler Commission Report, 2008).

During the 2007 election cycle in Nigeria, "IDASA tracked election-related conflict and violence." An early warning system is provided by the system, known as an Information Communication Hub (I-C Hub) (Collier & Vicente, 2014:13). Among the more important elements of the dossier, which is the first product of the I-C Hub, are the following: "thematic chapters that address particular issues and also serve as resource materials for those advocating change or improvement; diagrams illustrating the problems; GIS maps that plot the gravity of the problem across the country; analysis of the data" (Collier & Vicente, 2014:15). Carefully chosen and trained in conflict tracking and verification techniques, the network of NGOs involved. Currently, IDASA trains about 170

organizations, and at any given time, it collaborates with a core group of about 20 groups. Throughout the election cycle, this approach of action-oriented information gathering on conflict and violence associated to elections has yielded positive results, particularly in terms of the techniques of disseminating the information. In order to prevent violence, lessen violent conflict, or lessen the impact that the conflict has on the public, the system employs a variety of communication and action strategies in addition to the conflict-tracking dossier (Collier & Vicente, 2014:15). The I-C Hub system fosters confidence, mobilizes communities, restrains political parties, and improves security forces' response to the needs of the populace. Even though the 2007 election was widely viewed as having many flaws, the degree of engagement and statement of interest to lower levels of conflict and bloodshed was impressive (Collier & Vicente, 2014:17).

Following the severe violence in 2007, Kenya had recurrent electoral violence in 2013 and 2017, albeit to a lesser extent, due to inadequate or inefficient conflict analysis techniques. Following the contentious election in 2007, Kenya experienced one of the longest deadlocks in its history. Although the Kofi Anan-led team launched a conversation that led to a grand-coalition/power sharing government, the measure was not adequate to achieve long-lasting peace (Muthoni & Iteyo, 2020). Similar to what happened in 2007, the main source of political conflict in Kenya in 2013 and 2017 was rivalry for political power and its advantages, mostly among various political elites. Competition led to outgroups hatching schemes to gain political power and in groups obsessed with holding onto power. To accomplish political goals in this conflict, ethnic identity mobilization was essential. There was also some degree of violence and tension in 2013 and 2017 as a result of these historical patterns in political campaigns and the pursuit of power ((UNDP, 2017: 13).

The most malleable kind of identity was ethnicity since "ethnic emotions are rooted in historical memories of grievances and based on a deeply ingrained pattern of social inequality and exclusion" (UNDP, 2017:13). According to UNDP (2017), this also refers to the systematic exclusion from public welfare programs, political involvement, and even the nation as a collective social and cultural construct, in addition to the problem of pervasive poverty. The country's regions' marginalization and imbalances, which are readily discernible through conflict analysis tools, are among the main causes of the raging discord.

It is a truth that the use of peace-building strategies in the management of electoral conflicts triggers the need to provide a means of preventing electoral conflicts, as evidenced by the work that institutions, neighborhood organizations, and EMBs conduct in this regard. Nonetheless, challenges persist in methodically putting documented practices into practice (Adebisi, 2019). Notably, the emphasis on collaboration, credibility, and training programs—all of which are crucial for preventing conflict—is real and truthful. EMB treasures most credibility just like any other larger organization since to completely execute conflict prevention it will considerably have an impact on what UNDP has called as the capability of electoral processes to uphold shudders to the system (Saati, 2015).

Election-related disagreements can arise from a variety of variables, but political factions' level of trust in EMB continues to be one of the most important ones. Even in the face of a crisis and anomalies, EMB's transparency and integrity can guarantee a calm election (Ugoh, 2022). In Bangladesh, there was a serious issue involving political leaders back in 2006 and 2007. The EVER team program revealed that some political figures from different constituencies encouraged their supporters to use violence or engage in other

violent acts rather than wanting to be "caught" using violence (Kloos, 2014). There is a chance that the local intervention could take advantage of the gains made by the EVER team.

In addition to other technological issues, there were other anomalies in the official polling procedure in South Africa early in 1994, which resulted in long lines for voters (Norris, 2015). However, EMB's trust in its electoral process is extraordinarily high. There was a strong political desire to see the process through, even if the outcome was unexpected (Birch & David, 2018). There was no violence as a result of the problems or anomalies. Nonetheless, there are comparable problems that could have caused disputes in different settings. This is similar to an instance that happened in Ghana in 2008 when elections were delayed in some regions, leading to the announcement of the national results which were then fiercely contested until the following year (Amankwaah, 2013; Birch & David, 2018). Regardless of the anguish as a result of the argument, the political parties and the public waited patiently for the electoral commission to follow its procedure and come to terms with the decisions reached.

On the other hand, one may experience the effects of poor faith in EMB and state institutions in Kenya. Voting in the 2007 election was part of the electoral process, but it also served as a stage for purported and actual anomalies, and poor communication tactics contributed to an increase in violence. Due to the accusations made and the conflicting findings that were released, there were many rumours that circulated following the elections about various irregularities. Rather of confronting the issue head-on, the EMB subtly revealed the obvious outcomes. It was revealed that pressure was applied to release the results, which could have worsened the issue (Elklit & Svensson, 1997). The electoral

procedure was questioned by the opposition and public groups, leading to a state of confusion that inflamed the resentment of the opposition's followers. A number of incidents, such as the media blackout, sparked violence and terror.

Partners engage in a variety of mitigating efforts when electoral violence breaks out, and management responds differently depending on where the election cycle is in progress. Numerous basic procedures could be improved by ICEP and a number of additional techniques could be added to the menu of implementable reactions (James, Garnett, Loeber & Van Ham, 2019). Exemption for advocates of electoral violence is a feature that many countries with sporadic constituent crimes essentially have in common. Additionally, because it crosses the boundaries of electoral domain, security, and equality, it is one of those setbacks that most demands cooperation (Burchard, 2015). Most of the electoral conflicts can be avoided through exercises highlighted in this literature section. Electoral violence reactions can be actualized as official endorses or activities by authority organizations (law implementation, the EMB or the legislature), from security/military channels (exceptional police units, military or private security) and from casual or non-military personnel endeavours (intercession between ideological groups, or activities by network pioneers or exchange boards of trustees) (Tonkin, 2011).

Techniques for handling conflicts that are appropriate include thorough and well-coordinated channels by all parties involved. For all parties concerned, responding to election disputes can be one of the more challenging tasks (Burchard, 2015). Goals, prevention, and conflict analysis are crucial components of any technique used because of this. Cross-division data exchange, open promotion of harmony, and a satisfactory EMB specialist for clearly defined trustworthiness and implementation tools are all necessary for

successful, feasible, and pragmatic conflict moderation (Omeje, 2018). Requirement and respectability components, frequently comprising authority channels, might guarantee that parties comply with sets of principles, political account rules and different guidelines and strategies (Burchard, 2015). Perceived bias, a lack of authority, or a lack of relative approvals can impede their sufficiency in any scenario. Institutional limit working during the inter-race time can lessen these problems. Taking into account the fact that those who are guilty bear a smaller perception of being exempt, which can lead to a general lack of expectation and make brutality a more tempting means of resolving political disputes or influencing appointment processes (Burchard, 2015).

Within the security domain, several approaches may include incident assessment; apprehending offenders; material and office security; patrols by crusade escorts and mobilizers; and military operations to eliminate areas of open conflict. Strategists for peace and reconciliatory building should see their main role as organizing responses to conflicts (Oberschall, 2007). Therefore, a thorough and all-encompassing security plan ought to outline commitment standards, guide organizations and various conventions that include preventive measures in addition to moderation and dispute resolution procedures. Post-struggle nations or those experiencing outfitted disputes would, undoubtedly, necessitate totally different reactions than progressively stable conditions (Kiplagat, 2019). Planning should be done ahead of time (as part of dispute investigation and counteractive action) and should highlight preparation programs, for both EMB staff and included security powers, in order to ensure satisfactory use of security measures.

However, not every conflict that arises may be anticipated by preparing. Great connection and coordination crosswise over segments will guarantee convenience and adaptability in

responses whenever conflict upsurges (Burchard, 2015). According to Coleman, Deutsch and Marcus (2014), the legal system should always be ready to respond to electoral violations, violations that might be covered by criminal or common law, and the specific procedures needed to resolve disputes recorded under the appointive protests instrument. The capacity to arraign, indict and condemn offenders of viciousness is crucial, considering the dimension of exemption which commonly goes with discretionary brutality. In many countries, such as Guatemala, investigations and arraignments pertaining to constituent brutality are handled by a special team (Phillips, 2015). Challenges associated with this include the ability to discriminate between electoral violence and the overall level of trust among the populace, the organization, and ideological factions. The important thing is to identify the weaknesses in the current structure and take the appropriate action to fix them in the national context, in between decisions, before violence breaks out.

Multi-partner groups, such as those shown above, are included in the locally-based and informal responses, as is the intervention of party and network leaders, among others. Civil society organizations can engage in advocacy, peacefulness promotion, early warning, and system evaluation (Gerring, 2023). Even Nevertheless, it is important to pursue relationships with governmental, discretionary, and security sectors to ensure that the information may be used for a timely response. Elischer (2013) suggests that the local government authorities possess non-formal tools to carry out a thorough reaction to potential disputes. Conflicts can also be avoided by providing correct information on risk factors and training political parties, election officials, observers, and the electoral candidate on how to behave in all of their correspondence and how to exchange information in a non-incendiary manner (Mutemi Onkware & Assistance, 2020). Careful media

reporting can also assist prevent feuds from escalating by providing factual information to counteract evolving misinformation and reject political violence (Elischer, 2013).

Kenya's conflicts during the 1990s were perceived from a political perspective. Leaders in government, mainly KANU veterans, including the President, blamed the riots on multiparty politics. Conflicts were viewed as an effort to preserve the state at a deeper level (Musau, 2015:41). This perspective states that "the state's political agenda took two forms." Initially, conflicts served as a means to actualize President Moi's prophecy that ethnic bloodshed would erupt in Kenya upon the country's return to a multiparty system. Changing the results of the 1992 and 1997 multiparty elections was the second item on the agenda. The pursuit of peace has to originate from these two stances and be conceptualized in the context of high politics. Rather than taking part in these projects, impacted communities became their beneficiaries (Richmond, 2016). This "upside-down view of peace turned out to be the worst flaw in the official reaction. Under this structure, initiatives continued to be ad hoc, unsuccessful, and lacked community support. The government's calls for peace were greeted with mistrust and skepticism. Most victims and commentators saw government authorities as biased, incapable of controlling the war, and unwilling or unable to address its aftermath. People perceived measures to promote peace as an attempt to maintain the status quo (Chabikwa, 2021). The administration maintained that the conflicts had been sparked and continued by the opposition MPs' reckless remarks and their intention to generate chaos prior to the polls (Mushonga, 2011).

Following the confrontations in 1992, "the President ordered an end to the violence, made an appeal for calm, and toured the affected areas." He proclaimed the hardest-hit districts of Elburgon, Molo, Londiani, and Burnt Forest security operation zones and invoked the

Preservation of Public Security Act in the most insecure areas (Njoroge, 2012). This act established curfews, made it illegal to own firearms, and made it illegal to enter these regions. One young guy clarified, saying, "The fighting stopped when the President came to Mt. Elgon and told people to stop" (UNDP, 2008). Although the President's tour served as a model for peacebuilding initiatives, these communities were segregated by the designation of security zones. Certain NGOs' work was hampered by the prohibitions on accessing or operating in the zones, and certain people were not allowed to visit them. Aurelia Brazeal, the US ambassador to Kenya, and a group of British and Danish members of parliament were among those who blocked the way. Additional government officials visited the impacted communities. Increasing security and supervising the repatriation of displaced individuals were their initial responsibilities (Njoroge, 2012). Molo, "one of the hardest hit sites," was given fifteen more police and district officers. The government personnel' presence, some of whom were excited to get started on their tasks, stabilized the community and gave peace efforts a foundation. The majority of the places where conflicts occur still have unsolved issues since these attempts to punish violent offenders did not go far enough (Njoroge, 2012). The impacted communities were not very motivated to participate in these government-led initiatives. These groups mostly continued to be wary of the government and hesitant to pursue significant involvement.

Conflicts in Kenya have been researched by several academics. For example Daweti (2014) states that inter-ethnic confrontations in Kenya are driven by the negative repercussions of colonialism, such ethnicity, land alienation and the formation of artificial boundaries. Opportunism, unequal distribution of economic resources and political power along ethnic lines are some factors that contribute to interethnic conflict. These investigations provide

light on the reasons for the interethnic disputes between the Kipsigis of Sigowet and the Luo of Upper Nyakach. Oucho (2010) asserts that a variety of variables, including but not limited to politics, ethnicity, and cattle rustling, have contributed to interethnic violence in Kenya. At the height of political engineering, ethnic violence erupted, ushering in Kenya's multi-party democratic era. "Land and ethnicity were used as scapegoats in this conflict, which appears not to be a historical accident" (Oucho, 2010, p. 24). The results of this investigation further showed that the ethnic conflicts were organized and financed by Rift Valley province leaders. Ouch does not, however, address the role that women play in Rift Valley conflicts. Other researchers' examination of Luo and Kipsigis Women's involvement in conflict management helped to close this gap.

Similarly, Saruni (2018) argues that the outbreak of inter-ethnic clashes in various parts of the Rift Valley and Nyanza provinces in 1992 was caused by inter-ethnic tensions. He goes on to say that myths, interethnic differences, and ethnic bias stemmed from the lack of a robust interethnic structure. This publication was pertinent to the study since it identified the factors that led to the interethnic conflicts in Kenya in 1992. Nonetheless, it made no mention of women's participation in the same. Through its discussion of women's involvement in peacebuilding and reconciliation following the ethnic conflicts of 1992, this study has closed that knowledge gap. Nyacurn (2012), writing about ethnic conflict in Kenya, states that "the government's willing buyer willing seller policy, which it adopted shortly after independence, was the major problem, in his view, despite the fact that many scholars have largely blamed colonialism for the rise in land clashes in the Rift Valley." He contends that a large number of people from the central province purchased land in the Rift Valley under the Kenyatta administration, particularly in the most productive regions

like Nakuru, Uasin Gishu, Nandi, Trans Nzoia, and Narok. Traditionally, the land in the aforementioned districts belonged to the Maasai and Kalenjin, and it inhibited the Samburu and other communities.

The Gusii, Luo, and Luhya were among the newcomers "in the post-independence period," who settled in and acquired land that bordered these areas. The indigenous ethnic groups of the Rift Valley opposed this new settlement, yet it persisted (Nyacurn, 2012). Thus, "land disputes progressively raised tensions in the Rift Valley, culminating in the 1992 land conflicts, which were instigated by Rift Valley politicians." The relationship between land disputes and interethnic wars has been better understood because to Nyacurn's examination of the causes of conflicts in the Rift Valley, which is pertinent to this study. The historical battles between the Luo and the Kipsigis are partially caused by border disputes. The three major causes of conflict in Nyanza and the Rift Valley are cattle rustling, land, and politics" (Akinyi et al., 2011). For example, "among the Kipsigis and Luo. The primary cause of conflict, which predates colonization, is cattle rustling (Ojalah, 2021). Environmental deterioration and conflict are likewise intertwined" (Waikenda, 2017).

Concerns in the three provinces include the drying up of rivers, the disappearance of forests and trees, the "changing climate, the shortage of land, and ultimately the shortage of good food harvests." Resources scarcity frequently results in violent outcomes. For example, as rivers and other conventional water supplies dry up, pastoral communities must now rely on wells, which, due to their reduced size, cause increased conflicts between groups fighting for water" (Schilling, Opiyo & Scheffran, 2012).

Some academics disagree, even though it is true that wars are somewhat caused by the depletion of natural resources. "Such analysis fails to clarify why the clashes that erupted in 1991 followed a pattern of taking place in ethnically diverse regions," (Alao, 2007). More importantly, it does not address why the government was not prepared to deal with aggressors in a consistent and strong manner. Furthermore, "some security analysts often base their arguments on the state's role in democratization and the opening of the political sphere in the 1990s, especially after Section 2(a) of the Constitution was repealed in 1982, making Kenya a one-party state de jure." The Kenya African National Union (KANU), whose authority was starting to decline, was challenged by other political parties and articulations thanks to repeal. The possibility of losing the second multiparty election since independence worried the KANU ruling elite. They established zones of support that mirrored ethnic combinations in order to guarantee victory (Douglas, 2013). The ethnic "zones were intended to keep out people who backed the opposition parties." These ethnically defined societies were seen by the state as hostile groups with dubious loyalties, whose political activity would be challenging to regulate (Aluoka, 2016).

This political dynamic has been a major contributing factor to the inciting of violence around elections since the 1990s, when multi-party politics first emerged (Mwagiru, 1998). Crucially, despite the identification of numerous top politicians in subsequent inquiries, "there has been a failure to hold accountable those responsible for past human rights abuses, including the ethnic clashes of the 1990s, abuses under the Kibaki presidency, and land grabbing and economic crimes." Given these conditions, politicians' belief that they could get away with attempting to rig elections or provoke violence was reasonable (Mwagiru, 1998:13). While Mwagiru's research identified politics as a primary factor contributing to

conflicts within communities, this study has looked at the role that women have in conflict resolution. Since Kenya gained independence, the politicization of ethnicity has emerged as the country's most persistent issue (Hornsby, 2013).

This was exemplified by the "manipulation of ethnic ideology for political survival with the advent of Multi-Partysm as experienced in the Rift Valley 16 region during the run up to the 1992 multi-party elections; the Mombasa clashes on the eve of the 1997 general elections; the constitutional referendum of 2005 and which exploded with the post-election violence following the bungled 2007 elections" (MYWO, 2011, p. 14). The study on the causes of ethnic conflict by MYWO was relevant to this study since it guided the assessment of the causes of conflicts between Luo of Upper Nyakach and Kipsigis of Sigowet. "Land was communally owned and traditional rights and obligations ensured direct access to all" during pre-colonial times. These bonds were shattered by colonialism. Colonial authorities believed that all land was ownerless if private ownership could not be proven by documentation (Shanguhya, 2022). According to Boone (2011), the colonial authority "parcelled out more than 7 million acres of land, including some of the most fertile land in Kenya, and earmarked them for cultivation by Europeans." The White Highlands became the name given to these regions. Indigenous "ethnic communities who had occupied these areas were relegated to marginal reserves and all land not in their occupation was declared crown land" (Muchiri, 2015).

This resulted in "overpopulation in the reserves and, as a result, significant numbers of Luo, Gusii, Luhya, and Kikuyu migrated to the Rift Valley province as squatters and to provide labour on settler farms. White colonists limited the potential for claiming property rights. Thus, the first task after Kenya gained its independence was to resolve concerns

around investment and private property, particularly land rights, which were taken over by a conservative segment of the country's rural populace. Who would receive reversionary interest in the highlands gave rise to bitter disputes (Towah, 2019). Political leaders instigate conflict based on community, clan, and personality cleavages by enacting policies that disenfranchise perceived 'enemy' supporters during electioneering or when necessary (Kamau, 2013). Nonetheless, it is evident from the research that politicians have a dual role in shaping the dynamics of disputes. A sizable portion of Kenyans perceive them as crucial players in conflict resolution, even though they are recognized as having influence in defining (discordant) inter-group relations (Akinyi et al., 2011:48). This demonstrates that political leaders play a crucial role in determining whether there is violence or peace in a region.

Young people are particularly vulnerable to political manipulation (Brandon, 2009). They "are the source of support for the majority of politicians." They also make up the majority of organized gangs and party youth wingers, whose assistance in political violence is always needed. In order to stop young people being used as props for politically motivated mayhem, a thorough youth empowerment program is necessary (MYWO, 2011:15). The GOK/NSC analysis (2011) classifies the reasons behind conflicts into six categories: political, security, economic, socio-cultural, legal, and environmental. The foundation for analyzing the reasons for the disputes between the Kipsigis of Sigowet and the Luo of Upper Nyakach was this type of conflict conceptualization. Nevertheless, the study by Akinyi et al. (2011:87) discovered that "there were no specific causes of the conflicts." Instead, every battle was unique to its setting, multi-dimensional, and multi-causal, arising

from a confluence of elements such as politics, ethnicity, livestock thievery, and boundary conflicts.

High levels of violence and displacement were already being experienced in a number of Rift Valley hotspots prior to the election, including Mt. Elgon and Kuresoi. "Overall, the amount of hate speech was concerning." The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNHRC) discovered that politicians from both main parties—the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), led by Raila Odinga, and the Party for National Unity (PNU), led by President Mwai Kibaki were the source of hate speech during campaign rallies and incitement. Seventy-seven peace monitors were connected to a text message centers that examined the constant stream of data flowing in from mobile phones by the Peace and Development Network (PeaceNet), a national umbrella organization for all NGOs and individuals working on peace-building (Elfverson, 2013:43). However, none of these monitors "tapped directly into IDP networks in the regions where violence was already occurring or where there was a high level of hate speech and mobilization suggesting violence was imminent." Furthermore, there was no real, organized effort to push for punishment or to stop the violence as a result of the monitoring. Anticipating challenges, donors pooled financing inside the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for peace-building and violence prevention initiatives" (Njoroge, 2012).

The most well-known, "Chagua Amani Zuia Noma" (Follow Peace and Avoid Chaos), was led by Partnership for Peace, a network of religious organizations, the media, the private sector, and civil society. Just three months before the election, on September 21, 2007, the plan was formally introduced (Njoroge, 2012). Although it created a media campaign that featured the distribution of peace songs and movies and denounced violence at Mt. Elgon,

Kuresoi, and other locations, "it appears to have relied on exhortation through media and workshops to a general public, or to specific groups such as youth and women." Additionally, middle-class and urban Kenyans found it far more appealing than rural youth, whom politicians were already recruiting with the use of regional languages and customary organizational structures (Njoroge, 2012). Moreover, it failed to address the different local political discourses that incite hostility by presenting stories of historical grievance. Fear of powerful politicians also contributed to the failure to act boldly to counter hate speech and ongoing violent mobilizations; additionally, Kenyan civil society organizations were politically polarized and failed to speak with one voice about local-level violence and disputes in rural areas" (Njoroge, 2012).

With the exception of a few organizations, "such as the Kenya Human Rights Commission (distinct from the KNHRC), the Centre against Torture (Eldoret), the Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Eldoret), and some local offices of the NCCCK and other churches, most have failed to address the growing problems of internal displacement caused by the violence." Instead, in a trend that is not specific to Kenya, the majority of the work done by the KNHRC, international organizations, the media, civil society, and even PeaceNet was devoted to keeping an eye on the election and overt forms of campaign fraud, like the misappropriation of public funds or the manipulation of voter registration or party nomination procedures. Elfversson (2013) notes that "the less scrutinized informal organization of violence prior to the election contributed to the creation of the framework for widespread violence when the election went wrong."

During the crisis, peace-building networks that already existed, like Concerned Citizens for Peace, PeaceNet, and Partnership for Peace, were essential. PeaceNet's election

observation network swiftly turned its attention to documenting violent incidents and emerged as a crucial information resource (Njoroge, 2012). By December 30, "it was setting up meetings with its members to talk about interventions, like assembling a team to mediate disputes." The core of the Concerned Citizens for Peace initiative, which merged with PeaceNet, was formed by January 1st by five well-known Kenyans who were active in maintaining and advancing peace in Kenya and the surrounding region: Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, General Daniel Opande (retired), General Lazaro Sumbeiywo (retired), Ms. Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, and George Wachira. Three days later, they were having frequent meetings at the Nairobi Serena Hotel to plan, report happenings to the global community, and take in information from the media, writers, academics, activists, and private sector players who had devised ways to get involved (Njoroge, 2012). The role of civil society in fostering a conducive atmosphere for negotiations was crucial during the ensuing negotiations that resulted in the national accord, involving the Panel of Eminent African Personalities of the African Union. Nevertheless, most IDP networks received no invitation to take part. As part of agenda one of the accord, the two major political figures, Kibaki and Odinga, along with their respective parties, decided on February 1, 2008, to take action to put an end to the bloodshed and restore rights and liberties. At least in Nairobi, the violence quickly decreased and semblance of normalcy returned, indicating the political nature of most, if not all, of the violence and its involvement in a power-sharing negotiation process (Njoroge, 2012).

Demobilization presents difficulties because some of the organized militia groups are informal and have political affiliations; additionally, these groups could be readily revived. There is proof that these militia organizations are becoming more independent and that

they are accumulating weapons in preparation for 2012 (Ojelabi, Akinwale & Uyieh, 2021). As the KNDR monitoring project's most recent report observes with alarm, some groups have benefited from political patronage and acquired some autonomy, but in doing so, they have forced some politicians to provide funding for them. Threats, kidnapping, and forced vows are among the coerced recruitment techniques employed by unlawful groups in certain areas. These organizations have occasionally intimidated security personnel and are yet free to carry out their operations. Concerns were raised by a senior administrative police officer that future mobilization periods would be significantly shorter if these organizations are not dealt with. The establishment of peace as well as the relocation and reintegration of the displaced are seriously hampered by these groups (Elfversson, 2013:45).

There are a few major issues with Kenya's present peacekeeping efforts. First off, there is ample evidence that many police and provincial administration employees participated in the violence, but at the local level, "the government response to displacement remains largely within the pre-election security paradigm, entailing the construction of more police posts and involving the security apparatus in resettlement" (UNDP, 2008:53). In the second place, peace-building organizations, "with notable exceptions, remain urban and Nairobi-centric, emphasizing youth exchanges, workshops, and sporadic small projects instead of forming rural-urban coalitions to push for necessary local structural changes, including the establishment of institutions around property restitution and other historical grievances" (UNDP, 2008:54). Third, "there is no systematic and ongoing monitoring of hot spots; it usually occurs only prior to the election, when there is insufficient time and strategy to manage the violence" (UNDP, 2008:54).

Fourth, peace-building efforts, including monitoring, rarely tap into informal or formal networks of local people and institutions, "such as IDP networks or schools and colleges, which are already trying to manage frayed local relations through their own creative mediations and interactions" (UNDP, 2008:55). Fifth, cultural practices and narratives that can exacerbate tensions and interethnic relations are frequently ignored by peace-building efforts. Sixth, although some initiatives try to use development aid and economic reconstruction to strengthen interethnic ties and collaboration, peacebuilding is still seen as a distinct endeavor from development and is therefore continuously sponsored and carried out as such. Lastly, it seems that not much evaluation of previous initiatives is done, despite the fact that doing so would promote greater strategic learning and increase accountability in peace-building initiatives. Donors pooled funds within the United Nations Development Program in anticipation of issues (UNDP, 2008:55).

Donors pooled funds for peace-building and violence prevention programs within the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Kenya in anticipation of potential issues. The most well-known, Chagua Amani Zuia Noma (Follow Peace and Avoid Chaos), was led by the Partnership for Peace, a network of religious, media, civil society, and commercial organizations (Elfverson, 2013:46). September 21, 2007, was the official launch date of the initiative—just three months before the election. It seems to have depended on media and workshops to exhort the general public or particular groups like youth and women, even though it denounced violence in Mt. Elgon, Kuresoi, and other locations and created a media campaign that included disseminating peace songs and movies. Furthermore, middle-class and urban Kenyans found it far more appealing than rural youth, whom politicians were already rallying with the use of regional languages and

customary organizational structures (Njoroge, 2012). Moreover, it made no attempt to address the many local political discourses that feed into the resentment by means of historical grievance narratives.

Concern about "powerful politicians also played into the failure to act boldly to counter hate speech and ongoing violent mobilizations; also, Kenyan civil society organizations were politically polarized and failed to speak in one voice about local-level violence and disputes in rural areas" (Elfverson, 2013, p. 32). With a few notable exceptions, most organizations did not address the increasing issues of internal displacement brought on by the violence, including the Kenya Human Rights Commission (which is not to be confused with the KNHRC), the Center against Torture (Eldoret), and the Center for Human Rights and Democracy (Eldoret), and certain local offices of the NCKK and other churches. Instead, in a pattern that is not specific to Kenya, the majority of the work done by the KNHRC, international organizations, media, civil society, and even PeaceNet was devoted to keeping an eye on the election and overt forms of campaign fraud, like the misappropriation of public funds, the manipulation of voter registration or party nomination processes, or the misuse of public funds (Human Security Report, 2012:14). Meanwhile, "the less-scrutinized informal organizing of violence before the election helped produce the infrastructure for mass violence when the election went awry" (Njoroge, 2012).

2.3 Effectiveness of Peace building Strategies for Managing Electoral Conflicts

According to Njoroge (2011), peace building methods are interventions that strive to support structures that strengthen concord through the development of norms and the

establishment of institutional frameworks in electoral systems. According to Birch and Muchlinski (2018), peace building tactics are interventions and measures used by a range of actors, including religious leaders, community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations, and peace advocacy groups, to avert conflict associated to elections. Adoption of early warning systems and mapping of electoral conflict hotspot areas, civic education, peace advocacy programs, and the creation of commissions like the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) to help end ethnic discrimination across Kenyan economic, social, and political institutions are some of the peace-building strategies that have had a significant impact on the management of electoral conflict.

Peace building is one of the few international initiatives that "possess such significant promise for improving the quality of life in post conflict areas." Its origins can be seen in peacekeeping, which was the United Nations' attempt to prevent hostilities between nations although peacekeeping's original purpose was to keep the peace between warring governments, it has since expanded to cover civil disputes. But as the socioeconomic costs and intricacies of civil wars became clear, peacekeeping's responsibilities expanded. The term "peace building" came into widespread usage to describe these "more comprehensive missions to install peace and forestall a return to violence." Peace-building missions became more common in the post-cold war period of the 1990s, when multiple civil wars raged around the world, accounting for 94% of all armed conflicts during this period" (Olonisakin, 2015). "Roland Paris notes, an estimated 90 percent of those killed in armed conflicts were civilians" (Omaamaka & Ogbonna (2015) speaks to the civilian death toll during this time period. With the creation of implementation frameworks, peace building centers, and the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the field of

peace building underwent significant growth and development during these early trial missions (Cole, 2012).

Even after nearly two decades since the inception of peace building missions, modern efforts to promote peace are still seen as experimental because of their propensity to fail (Miali, 2004). several missions were more complicated and featured fewer common tasks, although "some operations still resembled traditional peacekeeping missions (with tasks that included verifying cease-fires and troop movements)" For instance, "the United Nations' first post-conflict peace building mission in Namibia (1989) consisted of tasks not traditionally performed by the United Nations, such as disarming former fighters and preparing the country for its first democratic election" (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005). For the first time, the "United Nations included supervising democratic elections, assisting in the preparation of new national constitutions, providing human rights training and in one case (Cambodia) temporarily taking over the administration of an entire country" (Miali, 2004:12).

Paris adds, "The UN has to collaborate with other international entities to help countries rebuild post-conflict due to the complexity of these peace building efforts. The United Nations Development Program, the Organization of American States, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international non-governmental organizations are just a few of these organizations. According to Nathan (1999:34), the United Nations' peacebuilding efforts have typically been launched following the formal signing of peace accords or agreements in which opposing parties surrender their weapons, agree to a truce, and devise a plan for future power sharing, which typically entails the creation of political parties and

election contests. These peace treaties often signify the formal conclusion of hostilities and the involvement of parties involved in political processes. But as Anderson (2004) notes, "peace agreements do not simply mark the end of an old conflict, and sometimes they contain the seeds of their own destruction," therefore Woodhouse cautions that they may not always satisfy all parties. Therefore, there have been instances where peace building missions have been permitted to function both before and during peace accord negotiations, depending on the specific setting.

Austin, Fischer, & Wils (2003) put it simply: "peace building includes post-conflict initiatives to rebuild societies and forestall a return to violence and conflict situations." But as a holistic concept, peace building "embraces, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships," and it is fraught with complications. It "seeks to change the structural conditions that generate conflict and to enhance relationships between parties simultaneously" (Kalvvas, 2006). Thus, the word refers to a broad variety of actions and purposes that both come before and after official peace agreements. The different problems that these missions need to take into account while designing themselves represent the complexity that come with peace building. Security, governance, relief, and development are the four primary, interconnected areas that peace building missions often concentrate on (Kalvvas, 2006:14).

According to Igbuzor (2011), "the presence of several important African cultural values is the only manure on which African society's peace can germinate and flourish." These principles; patience, tolerance, honesty, and respect for elders, communality and mutuality, compassion, regard for due discretion, gentleness, modesty, self-control, moderation,

flexibility, and open-mindedness are key to fostering lasting peace. Accordingly, Mohamed noted from his research in Somalia that: "Somali customary law encourages people to uphold the following principles listed below, which constitute the basic pillars underpinning the culture of peace in order to strengthen peace." Tolerance, respect, regard for neighbours and inviolability, respect for human rights, and equality are among the values at issue. The Somali proverb "everyone has a father" serves as evidence for "the importance given to the last two values." The following three traditional Somali customary principles, which specify that women and children cannot be slain, are added to the aforementioned values. Furthermore, there is a proverb among the Somali that says, "Whoever commits this sin is considered a coward and is ostracized." Mohamed cites this saying. Killing women and children leads to never-ending disputes. The refugees are the following set of crowned heads. The sick and old are the others (Njoroge, 2012). It was also disclosed that civilians and non-combatants are covered by the culture of peace that forms the basis of Somali customary law.

Like every other country in Africa, Kenya has experienced interethnic strife on occasion before, during, and after colonialism. Numerous academics have investigated these kinds of disputes. Mwiandi (2014) delves into the "many reasons behind inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya." She demonstrates how interethnic obstacles and isolation caused communities to become ethnic cocoons as a result of colonialism.

Oucho (2010) takes a look at "the inter-ethnic conflict that engulfed Kenya's Rift Valley Province at the turn of the nineties when multi-party politics was being re-introduced in the country, bred a number of issues among them ethnocentrism." Saruni (2018) views the 1992 outbreak of interethnic conflicts in the Rift Valley and Nyanza as an example of the

negative aspects of interethnic interactions. He contends that interethnic discrepancies, misconceptions, and biases stemmed from the lack of a robust interethnic structure. According to Akinyi et al. (2011), "the failure of independent African governments to implement the necessary measures to counter the growing ethnic tensions among divided communities" is the reason for this. Tensions were also made worse by the formation of new states. According to Sone (2017), "one major factor contributing to conflict among African states is the unsatisfactory nature of inter-state borders." The majority of these borders were determined in Europe using subpar maps and with little regard for Africans during the colonial era. They were the result of discussions and treaties between colonial powers.

In summary, all forms of conflict, no matter what their origins, "are inevitable so long as human society exists. All conflicts require solutions, and in the recent past, the emphasis has been on peace building and reconciliation in which the international community and others engage. It is one of the international concerns among scholars, politicians, administrators, and institutions" (Donais, 2012).

Johan Galtung is frequently credited with coining the phrase "peace-building," meaning "peacekeeping, peace-making, and peace-building" (Bukae, 2012). In addition to peacekeeping and peace-making, Galtung contended, "structures that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur" must be found. As stated by Kajtez, Starčević and Ružičić (2018), "this serves as the foundation for the modern concept of peace-building, which is the endeavour to establish a state of stable (or occasionally referred to as durable) peace." Kenneth Boulding first defined peace in 1978

as a circumstance in which the likelihood of war is so remote that it really does not factor into any party's calculations.

Peace-building strives to convert society into stable peace by addressing core causes of conflict and “promoting indigenous capacities to deal with societal problems in peaceful ways” (Verheij, 2010). The idea “was around in scholarly debates for over a decade, but it only became widely used after Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General at the time, published the Agenda for Peace in 1992.” Paffenholz explains that the definition of peace-building in the 1992 report was quite narrow since it focussed on post-conflict peace-building to prevent a return to physical violence” (Paffenholz, 2010). In *Building Peace - Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, published in 1997, Lederach presented “his notion of peace-building and sustainable peace, with a focus on social relations and reconciliation as means to attain sustainable peace in war-torn societies.” He promotes an all-encompassing, long-term viewpoint and helped shift the focus of peacebuilding from external to internal actors.

His contributions established the groundwork for a more comprehensive and inclusive view of peacebuilding. However, as Barnett, Kim, O’Donnell and Sitea (2007) point out in *Peace-building: What is in a Name?* “Different actors still approach and interpret peace-building in different ways.” “Peace-building focuses of intergovernmental bodies and donor governments are examined by Barnett et al. (2007), who point out that some prioritize security and military operations like demining and demobilization, while others prioritize socio-economic development, and still others prioritize the political dimension of increased democratization, institution building, and respect for human rights, etc.” (23). What emerges is that “various peace-building actors have different strategies and practices

resulting from the contested concept of peace-building” (Schneckener, 2016). As per Dan and Pkalya (2006), Knightl characterizes peace-building as an intricate and multifaceted endeavor that involves a range of tasks, from disarming warring sides to reconstructing political, economic, judicial, and civil society institutions.

Thus, the goal of peace-building is "to prevent, reduce, transform, and assist people in recovering from violence in all its manifestations; it also gives people the ability to cultivate relationships at all levels that support both themselves and their surroundings." "Peace-building differs fundamentally from traditional conflict resolution strategies such as peace making and peacekeeping" (Akinmoladun & Ottuh, 2015). Ending violent conflict by diplomatic measures meant to encourage nonviolent discourse and, eventually, a peace agreement is the goal of peace-making. Conventional peacekeeping operations typically entail the use of force by a third party to mediate conflicts and support non-violent measures (Adan & Pkalya, 2006:20).

Beyond these "methods of problem solving, mediation, and conflict management, peace-building addresses the fundamental issues that give rise to conflict, often referred to as the root causes" (Fetherston, 2013). Building peace is predicated on the idea that "changing the way society functions and the patterns of interaction of the involved parties is necessary to go from an unstable peace to a durable peace." If there has been battle because of relationships between social groupings, it seems naive to assume that when the crisis is almost over and the bloodshed has stopped, mutual trust will immediately return. The odds are much higher that when a violent war ends, the opponents and society will be more divided than they were earlier (Balcells, 2010).

Peace-building, according to Galtung, is "strategies designed to promote a secure and stable lasting peace in which the population's basic human needs are met and violent conflicts do not recur" (Annie, 2009:45). Galtung also takes into account the objectives of positive peace, which is the absence of structural violence, and negative peace, which is the absence of physical violence. Abubakar (2019) state that "peace-building includes those activities and processes that: recognize the specifics of each post-conflict situation; encourage and support the participation of indigenous resources in the design, implementation and sustainment of activities and processes; and promote processes that will endure after the initial emergency recovery phase has passed." These activities and processes also support the rebuilding and rehabilitation of all sectors of the war-torn society. They also encourage and support interaction between all sectors of society in order to repair damaged relations and begin the process of restoring dignity and trust.

There are still many fragmented and impoverished post-conflict nations. International agencies may have declared the conflict "resolved," but the people affected by it are still suffering from generational, historical, and, in certain cases, cultural conflicts (Ashutosh, 2003; Arusha Accord, 1993). So, the conflict is not only temporal. Horowitz conjectures that ethnicity "embodies an element of emotional intensity that can be readily aroused when the group's interests are thought to be at stake."

Ethnically varied cultures therefore have varying degrees of potential for conflict. De Coning (2018) states that "new attitudes and practices are needed for the peace-building process: they must be adaptable, consultative, and collaborative, and they must be based on a contextual understanding of the origins of conflict. Lijphart argues that majority rule is not just risky but also undemocratic in split communities. Majoritarian institutions can

result in minorities being consistently excluded from power and subjected to discrimination, even though majoritarian control is frequently a by-product of democracy (Bøhler, 2013). Even while "peace-building initiatives aimed at strengthening civil society and justice and reconciliation commissions have increased dramatically," a comprehensive research agenda has not kept pace with these initiatives. As a result, little is understood about the role that civil society plays in fostering peace in a divided community and the efficacy of justice and reconciliation, including their capacity to lower violence, put an end to armed conflict, and establish a lasting peace (Boone, 2012).

The types of conflicts that peace workers face and the difficulties they face influence peace building. As Anthony Richmond observes, "ethnic conflicts take various forms, sometimes combining different elements" He classifies conflicts into six categories, including "conflicts that pit the state against a community." Systematic exploitation and dominance by the state, usually directed towards minorities, can ultimately result in the eradication of a people or their relegation to the periphery of society both geographically and socially. Conflicts for liberation in which marginalized groups, with or without outside assistance, fight for the right to reclaim land and exercise their human rights. Disputes involving issues of irredentism, religion, and language (Bekoe & Stephanie, 2010).

State-to-state conflict is "caused by ideological disagreements that can't be settled through other channels, political power struggles, rivalries between different ethnic groups, and competition for limited resources." Under these circumstances, sectarian bloodshed, intergroup strife, civil wars, and independence movements may manifest. Conflicts resulting from both previous and current migrations: Richmond's categories have certain elements that apply to Kenya (Conflict Mapping, 2011:1). Certain communities have been

marginalized by government policies. Conflicts in Kenya have been shaped by competition "for scarce resources, political struggles, ethnic nationalism, and migrations" (Conflict Mapping, 2011).

Conflict is defined as "a situation in which at least two identifiable groups are actively opposing each other while pursuing incompatible goals." These groups could be political, socioeconomic, linguistic, cultural, religious, or of an ethnic nature (Mac Ginty, 2013). "A struggle over values and claims to scarce resources, power, and status" underpins all conflicts. The opponents want to neutralize, damage, or destroy their competitors. Both intrastate and interstate conflicts can occur (within states). For a long time, there has been worry about interstate conflict. Mechanisms to resolve conflict and restore peace and order, defined in security terms by the United Nations Charter, have traditionally addressed interstate conflict" (Nyangasi, 2021).

Mediation and reconciliation attempts on a diplomatic level constitute a key component of these procedures. These endeavours enlist external parties that are deemed unbiased mediators as they are not impacted by the dispute (Ondiso, 2011). There are "more internal conflicts in the world, and approaches that concentrate on interstate conflicts are growing less successful in resolving disputes and less appropriate for fostering peace." This is mostly because the presumptions of traditional methods are called into question by the complexity of newly emergent conflicts. First, rather than being clearly motivated by an ideological predisposition, the majority of intrastate conflicts are motivated by intercommunal, ethnic, and religious conflicts rather than rivalries over scarce resources (Bereketeab, 2013). Secondly, they exhibit extreme brutality and a disdain for the conventions of warfare. At last, the lines separating fighters and civilians are blurring.

Kenya has embraced aggressive peacebuilding initiatives and programs after the post-election violence in 2007–2008. Religious institutions, government agencies, and civil society organizations are leading these peace-building efforts (Angoma and Gebremichael, 2016). Kenya saw few instances of electoral conflict in 2017 as a result of these actions. With the use of the *Uwiano* platform and the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management, NCIC was able to greatly reduce conflict in 2017 by implementing peace sensitization programs in areas identified as having a higher risk of electoral conflict. Because to the cooperation of the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management, prominent elders, local government representatives, and CSO leaders, *Uwiano* was a successful peace effort. Local peace committees played a crucial role in locating conflict hotspots and acting as early warning system observers when conflicts broke out. Peace committees support the harmonious coexistence of various ethnic groups in the County by mediating disputes and serving as forums for discussion, peacebuilding, arbitration, and mediation.

Peace building is one of the few international initiatives that "possess such significant promise for improving the quality of life in post conflict areas." Its origins can be seen in peacekeeping, which was the United Nations' attempt to prevent hostilities between nations (Githigaro, 2012). Although peacekeeping's original purpose was to keep the peace between warring governments, it has since expanded to cover civil disputes. But as the socioeconomic costs and intricacies of civil wars became clear, peacekeeping's responsibilities expanded. The term "peace building" came into widespread usage to describe these "more comprehensive missions to install peace and forestall a return to violence." In the post-cold war period of the 1990s peace building missions gained

predominance as multiple civil wars raged around the globe accounting for 94 per cent of all armed conflicts during this decade” (Wiberg & Scherrer, 2018). "Roland Paris notes, an estimated 90 percent of those killed in armed conflicts were civilians" (Serneels & Verpoorten, 2015) speaks to the civilian death toll during this time period. With the creation of implementation frameworks, peace building centers, and the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the field of peace building underwent significant growth and development during these early trial missions (Golicha, 2017).

Even after nearly two decades since the inception of peace building missions, modern efforts to promote peace are still seen as experimental because of their propensity to fail (Miali, 2004). several missions were more complicated and featured fewer common tasks, although "some operations still resembled traditional peacekeeping missions (with tasks that included verifying cease-fires and troop movements)" For instance, "the United Nations' first post-conflict peace building mission in Namibia (1989) consisted of tasks not traditionally performed by the United Nations, such as disarming former fighters and preparing the country for its first democratic election" (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005). According to Miali (2004:12), the United Nations undertook new tasks such as monitoring democratic elections, aiding in the drafting of national constitutions, offering training on human rights, and temporarily assuming control of an entire nation in the case of Cambodia.

Paris adds, "The UN has to collaborate with other international entities to help countries rebuild post-conflict due to the complexity of these peace building efforts. The United Nations Development Program, the Organization of American States, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the World Bank, the International

Monetary Fund, and other international non-governmental organizations are just a few of these organizations. According to Nathan (1999:34), the United Nations' peacebuilding efforts have typically been launched following the formal signing of peace accords or agreements in which opposing parties surrender their weapons, agree to a truce, and devise a plan for future power sharing, which typically entails the creation of political parties and election contests. These peace treaties often signify the formal conclusion of hostilities and the involvement of parties involved in political processes. But as Anderson (2004) notes, "peace agreements do not simply mark the end of an old conflict, and sometimes they contain the seeds of their own destruction," therefore Woodhouse cautions that they may not always satisfy all parties. Therefore, there have been instances where peace building missions have been permitted to function both before and during peace accord negotiations, depending on the specific setting.

Austin, Fischer, & Wils (2003) put it simply: "peace building includes post-conflict initiatives to rebuild societies and forestall a return to violence and conflict situations." Nonetheless, there are many "complexities and as a comprehensive concept it: encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships" in the peacebuilding process. It "seeks to change the structural conditions that generate conflict and to enhance relationships between parties simultaneously" (Kalvvas, 2006). Thus, the word refers to a broad variety of actions and purposes that both come before and after official peace agreements. The different problems that these missions need to take into account while designing themselves represent the complexity that come with peace

building. Security, governance, relief, and development are the four primary, interconnected areas that peace building missions often concentrate on.

African cultural values are essential for the development of peace in African society, since they give the manure necessary for it to germinate and bloom. The following qualities are among them: gentleness, modesty, self-control, moderation, flexibility, open-mindedness, patience, tolerance, honesty, respect for elders, communality and mutuality, compassion, and concern for due discretion (Igbuzor, 2011). Accordingly, Mohamud noted from his research in Somalia that: "Somali customary law encourages people to uphold the following principles listed below, which constitute the basic pillars underpinning the culture of peace in order to strengthen peace" (Mohamud, 2021). The contested ideals include equality, tolerance, respect, inviolability and neighbourly courtesy, as well as equality and human rights." The Somali proverb "everyone has a father" serves as evidence for "the importance given to the last two values." The following three traditional Somali customary principles, which specify that women and children cannot be slain, are added to the aforementioned values. Furthermore, there is a proverb among the Somali that says, "Whoever commits this sin is considered a coward and is ostracized." Mohamed cites this saying. Killing women and children leads to never-ending disputes. The refugees are the following set of crowned heads. The sick and old are the others (Njoroge, 2012). It was also disclosed that civilians and non-combatants are covered by the culture of peace that forms the basis of Somali customary law.

Additionally, while collaborating closely with the local peace committees, civil society organizations that promote peace, like PeaceNet-Kenya, were crucial to the implementation of peace initiatives in 2017. In the impacted communities, PeaceNet held

multiple sessions for discussion on conflict issues in collaboration with local peace committees. In addition, PeaceNet provided support for outreach initiatives aimed at educating and raising community members' awareness of the methods already in place for resolving disputes. The 2017 Kenyan election-related violence was significantly reduced thanks in large part to the efforts of PeaceNet and local peace committees (Githaiga, 2017).

Additionally, the church has played a leading role in promoting peace and reconciliation in regions that are thought to be hotspots for electoral conflict. This role has been strengthened by the fact that the social and political challenges facing the society are linked to their religion, which has contributed to the development of peace among the communities (Githigaro, 2012). In support, Darnolf and Cyllah (2014) state that religious leaders have a major impact on fostering peace, rapprochement, and—above all—the advocacy of peaceful elections via inclusive and nonviolent discourse. Through outreach initiatives and sermons, religious organizations spread messages of peace and support free and fair elections. Additionally, religious institutions play a critical role in educating the public and inspiring a wider range of people to support initiatives toward peace and reconciliation. Gathogo (2011) asserts that religious institutions, through programs like religious umbrella organizations (NCCK), which frequently include both intra- and interfaith organizations, can advance peace message and sensitization campaigns.

Following the fiercely disputed elections in 2007 and 2008, religious organizations in Kenya have taken the lead in promoting peace and spearheading efforts towards reconciliation. In other words, religious organizations have a critical role in fostering better relations, raising public awareness of election procedures, and preventing electoral strife. Religious organizations are crucial to the process of fostering reconciliation and peace.

This is evidenced by the contributions made by the NCKK following the 2007–2008 Kenyan election conflict, which included roles in humanitarian relief and peacebuilding, the provision of psychosocial support in response to fatalities and injuries to the body and mind, and the distribution of food and nonfood items (Tenaw, 2018). Furthermore, NCKK organized forums aimed at enhancing the mediation and peacebuilding abilities of religious leaders.

Religious leaders may have varying degrees of interest in politics and promoting peace. For instance, leaders of the more recent African reformist churches are less likely than those of the more established churches to participate in political discourse and take up peace efforts (Cooke, 2015). The role that religious players play in promoting political reform and democracy can be determined by their specific objectives. According to a study on Nigeria, geographical considerations can also be important. Religious leaders were more likely to promote religious tolerance in environments that are religiously varied and integrated than in environments that are religiously homogeneous (Dowd, 2014).

The capacity of religious leaders to effectively intervene in nonviolent conflict resolution also varies. According to De Juan, Pierskalla, and Vüllers (2015), people who work in environments with strong horizontal networks common religious beliefs, symbols, and activities and strong vertical networks connections between religious leaders and believers are better informed and have the capacity to coordinate efforts toward resolving conflicts.

Additionally, a religion's organizational structure affects the impact of its leaders. Congregational religious leaders are more likely to be able to mobilize people along religious lines than leaders whose roles are more limited (Chhibber and Sekhon, 2016).

Religious leaders can work to promote peace and reduce political and electoral violence in a number of ways. Individual leaders or more cooperative intra- or interreligious initiatives can be involved in these efforts: First, by promoting peace messaging and free and fair elections: religious leaders can promote nonviolent, inclusive speech as a means of promoting peaceful elections (Darnolf and Cyllah, 2014). These messages can be expressed via media, pamphlets, or, more frequently, sermons delivered in churches. Second, through candidate debates (including broadcast public debates), election monitoring, and civic education: Religious leaders have also contributed to these activities, frequently through bigger groupings. Thirdly, by creating codes of conduct, all parties involved can publicly commit to nonviolence, which can help keep tensions from rising to the point of violent conflict (UNDP, 2009). Such agreements have been developed voluntarily by umbrella religious organizations in an effort to promote peaceful elections. Finally, through interfaith initiatives and intra- and inter-religious dialogue: religious leaders have participated in these efforts through development groups, non-governmental organizations, and religious umbrella organizations in an effort to strengthen ties, disseminate information about election procedures, and avert electoral violence.

According to the United States Agency for International Development Report 2013, peace building initiatives such as special electoral training programs, particularly youth-focused sensitization programs on democratic values and processes, have a positive influence on fostering political tolerance (USAID, 2013). Examples of electoral training programs and

efforts include political parties hosting conferences to foster communication between rival political parties and educating the public and political parties about the benefits of and best practices for nonviolent campaigning. It also entails working with populations at risk of electoral conflict or those displaced, building civic reconciliation processes, and highlighting the role that media participation plays in defusing or escalating election-related conflict. According to the report, civic education and sensitization campaigns plays a very imperative role in enhance intolerance for political conflict and against women.

Over the past ten years, a number of coordinated initiatives have been formed to promote peace within different communities who have experienced past election confrontations. Even if they have a significant impact on preventing electoral war in many regions, these peacebuilding initiatives have not been able to stop conflict associated to elections. In a case study on using electoral education to prevent electoral conflict, Rao (2014) states that it would be incorrect to think that a voter education effort will prevent electoral conflict. Rao asserts that electoral education has a critical role in mitigating voter-related conflict to some degree. Therefore, the likelihood of an electoral conflict typically depends on variables outside the purview of peace advocacy groups. Among other things, the ability to access electoral justice determines how pacifying such efforts are in achieving electoral peace.

According to Höglund and Jarstad (2010), there are five approaches to managing and averting electoral conflict. Using election monitors is the first peace-building tactic. Election observers and monitors play a critical role in averting electoral unrest by identifying and denouncing electoral malpractice mechanisms and raising awareness of mounting tensions. The second strategy for managing electoral conflicts is to support

efforts at peace advocacy and mediation in order to reduce tension and calm election-related issues. The third approach to managing electoral conflicts focuses on creating an appropriate legal and institutional framework to prevent institutional factors that lead to electoral impunity and provide a foundation for deterring conflict. Voter-focused initiatives constitute the fourth electoral conflict management strategy. Voter-focused electoral conflict interventions highlight how important it is to avert electoral conflicts by encouraging the growth of democratic norms and community tolerance.

According to Rao (2014), election-related security and security sector reform, election monitoring such as the employment of independent electoral monitors media monitoring and reporting, voter education and public awareness through capacity building (training), and campaigning for peace through civil society and religious organizations are some of the management initiatives for preventing and addressing electoral conflict. Furthermore, legal framework reforms: These entail amending constitutions, peace treaties, and laws to create an electoral and legislative structure that is less supportive of armed conflict. Implementing institutional reforms, such as creating election management bodies and suitable legislative frameworks and dispute resolution procedures, is one of the electoral conflict management strategies.

Birch and Muchlinski (2018) found that technical assistance focused programs significantly improve the capacity of electoral actors in a cross-national study to ascertain the influence of UNDP programs focusing on election technical assistance and attitude transformation as electoral conflict management strategies. Election management bodies, CSOs, stakeholders, voters, and security agencies are examples of such electoral players. Providing electoral actors with programs that are centered on technical support aims to

increase their capacity through skill acquisition to conduct a fair and honest election. Furthermore, the goal of offering technical support programs is to close any gaps in the electoral processes that are typically brought about by inadequate logistical planning and a lack of expertise. This might lessen the likelihood that political players would contest the results and spark conflict by enhancing the credibility of electoral processes and, consequently, acceptance of election outcomes. Furthermore, the outcomes demonstrated that initiatives centered on attitude development are highly effective in averting electoral strife. Birch and Muchlinski (2018) claim that grassroots-based attitude reform strategies try to reduce election conflict by altering societal norms. Programs for changing attitudes include conversation, mediation, and peace advocacy/messaging. The goal of attitude modification strategies is to alter how society views the use of conflict as a political tool.

Collier and Vicente (2014b) looked into the impact of anti-conflict initiatives by Nigerian civic society. The anti-conflict campaign was carried out before the elections of 2007. Town meetings were conducted by the research in 24 randomly chosen communities across six states in Nigeria, in collaboration with regional NGOs. "No to political conflict!" and "Vote against violent politicians" were the catchphrases used in the anti-election conflict campaign. In order to boost the efficacy of the antiviolence efforts, 'No to political violence!' pamphlets, stickers, posters, T-shirts, caps, and hijabs were also dispersed. The results showed that local empowerment to oppose and resolve election dispute was enhanced by exposure to the anti-violence campaign. In the sampled communities, the therapy also decreased the number of real election-related conflicts. In a similar vein, Fafchamps and Vicente (2013) found that peace advocacy campaigns have a dual effect on election conflict—they can positively reinforce it and diffuse it—in their investigation of

how social networks affect political conflict in Nigeria. According to the study, family networks and other social networks support anti-conflict awareness programs, increasing their efficacy in averting and minimizing electoral conflict. According to the study, voter education initiatives lessen the perception and propensity of communities to participate in political strife.

Asunka, Brierley, Golden, Kramon, and Ofori (2019) looked into how domestic election observers affected electoral fraud and violence in Ghana in 2012. A randomized saturation experimental design was used in the investigation. The Ashanti, Central, Volta, and Western areas were the focus of the study. A sample of twenty-three constituencies with competitive elections was taken. The study's conclusions demonstrated that having monitors at the polling places under observation decreased instances of electoral fraud, voter intimidation, and conflict. The study did point out that there have been reports of election fraud and unrest in voting places without election observers. This suggests that election monitoring, particularly in high-stakes voting districts, significantly reduces confrontation on Election Day. To the contrary, Oduro (2012) asserts that CSO reporting and observation of Election Day activities, such as instances of voter intimidation, contributes to a decrease in electoral violence.

According to Weidmann and Callen (2013), election observers diminish electoral fraud and conflict by influencing the incentives and capacity of party volunteers and electoral officials to engage in unlawful actions. Election fraud and conflict are much more likely to be detected when observers and monitors are present. Furthermore, Weghorst and Lindberg (2013) claim that observers reduce the likelihood of election fraud incidents such as ballot

stuffing by raising the possible costs of electoral fraud, such as harm to a political party's reputation and the invalidation of election results.

Lynch, Cheeseman, and Willis (2019) discovered that peace campaigns have a positive link with low levels of election-related conflict in their investigation of the influence of peace campaigns on electoral conflict in Kenya, Uganda, and Ghana. Gorr and Lee's (2015) study provides evidence that the implementation of early warning systems and mapping of hotspot locations is crucial in crime prevention. The study aimed to assess the impact of early warning systems on transient crime hot spots. In a similar vein, Eze and Frimpong (2021) confirm that early warning systems work well to promote harmony and avert hostilities.

Furthermore, Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis (2014) contend that constitutional amendments are essential for managing conflict because they address historical grievances and promote interethnic cooperation, particularly in governments that frequently face electoral and ethnically based conflict. The Kenyan constitutional revisions that were implemented in the wake of the expensive 2007 election war and enshrined in the 2010 constitution serve as evidence of this. The reform process has helped decentralize the political stakes to the county level, which has helped lessen election conflict even though the results are still unclear and its full influence has not yet been realized due to a lack of political will. Angerbrandt (2011) asserts, in agreement, that the transfer of political power and resource control from the federal level to the county level has helped resolve election-related disputes.

With the help of the Electoral Violence and Resolution Program (EVER), Kyrgyzstan developed a system in 2005 that would guarantee the reporting and prevention of violence stemming from electoral processes. The controversial and contentious presidential and legislative elections in July 2005 and February 2005, which caused political unrest throughout the nation, prompted the creation of the program (Institute for Democracy and Elections Assistance, 2005). Owing to the evident political unrest in the nation, IFES teamed up with other local businesses to work with election officials, security personnel, members of civil society, and international businesses like international observers for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Together, these businesses monitored, coordinated, and reported on the changing priorities and crucial responses to political violence and security that occurred during the election period.

Some of the activities which took place include development of a series of training programs that would help in sensitizing the locals on conflict analysis and reporting, adaptation of the methods to Kyrgyzstan's context together with Foundation for Utilizing the EVER program methodology, Tolerance International monitored, tracked, and evaluated incidents of violence related to the electoral process. Constant monitoring was carried out during the election period, including the day of the election, the election itself, and the winner announcement. Through the local elections of last year, the monitoring and report-writing continued (Institute for Democracy and Elections Assistance, 2005).

The international community introduced and the disputing parties accepted as a suitable solution a primary peace-building strategy in Macedonia that involved establishing local democracy through power decentralization (Muthoni & Iteyo, 2020). The Ohrid Framework Agreement is a peace plan that was signed on August 13, 2001, to ease tensions

between the restless Albanians who were devolved from the central government in Skopje and the ethnic Macedonians (Slavic), who had dominated the country since its independence in 1990 after the Yugoslav federation broke up. The agreement's primary components included redrawing the country's territorial boundaries and reforming municipalities by removing their authority from the federal government. A convention was agreed as a result of US mediation in the middle of 2001, significant EU involvement, NATO's execution of security provisions, and OSCE involvement (CUPAC, 2016).

The June 2005 election in Guinea-Bissau was devoid of overt election-related violence after a number of potentially explosive situations were defused, mostly with the assistance of the citizen-goodwill taskforce (UNDP, 2017). Prior to Guinea-Bissau's elections, the international peace prosperity initiative concentrated on implementing measures to prevent political violence and state failure in order to avert a repeat of the state's collapse in 2004. Through cooperation, facilitation, and other means, the IPPP implemented a unique procedural project that reinforces and stimulates (UNDP, 2017). In addition to planning and carrying out communications both before and after elections, IPPP was instrumental in developing a support campaign that was led and motivated by Guinea-Bissau's population to reduce violence following elections. Early in April 2005, the IPPP called a conference with a wide range of stakeholders to discuss the need for teamwork in bolstering existing drive for national reconciliation. The meeting's attendees subsequently decided to create a new organization called the Citizens' Goodwill Task Force (CGWTF) (UNDP, 2017).

Small funding was made possible by the IPPP to establish the CGWTF in order to support the sudden and unanticipated development. One of the topics that the recently established

task committee addressed was the legalization of the transitional charter, which has valid ramifications for a few of the contentious presidential contenders (UNDP, 2017). After consulting with several international attorneys, the CGWTF proposed that the legitimacy of the charter be recognized by a high court case. As the court deemed the situation delicate allowing the candidates to run for their respective seats the CGWTF turned to the IPPP for assistance in creating an electoral code of conduct (UNDP, 2017). The CGWTF received several codes from the IPPP after a thorough survey. After the task force produced a final version of the codes, which were translated into Arabic and French and distributed outside of metropolitan areas, the CGWTF then collected the signatures of one presidential contender (UNDP, 2017). The CGWTF chairperson met with candidates and their supporters on a regular basis and also sent out a broadcast urging them to follow and show respect for the codes. A wonderful illustration of both low finance and exceptional results from the development of similar projects is the task force in Guinea-Bissau. Finding and assisting local leadership is advised (Abreu, 2012). It is possible to find capable and influential leaders in nations that are viewed as "failed." When organized and given the necessary tools, these potentially influential local leaders can inspire a sizable portion of the populace. Since lower level activities have a bigger impact on higher levels of society, it is also significant for lower level projects (Inglehart & Welzel, 2010). Because both sides are personally invested and influenced by both activities, working together is more successful. Tension reduction can help prevent the escalation of election-related violence, with the exception of Guinea-Bissau, where the use of mixed tactics is likely the most important lesson in managing pre- and post-election violence (Koko, 2013).

The establishment of peace commissions in Nicaragua was prompted by the 1987 Esquipulas Peace Accords, a regional endeavor that united presidents of Central America to put an end to civil hostilities in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua (Child, 1992:36). 31,000 Nicaraguans lost their lives in a 10-year conflict between the Sandinista government and contra insurgents supported by the United States, which began in 1980 (Lincoln & Sereseres, 2000). "There was no single conclusive peace agreement" at the end of the war. Thus, on matters like combatant disarmament, amnesty, and reintegration, local and regional peace commissions assisted in facilitating communication between the Sandinista Government and various Contra army factions (Kauffman, 1994:67). "Organizations based in churches and religious leaders participated in conflict resolution, enhancing the influence of peace commissions by keeping an eye on armed factions and fostering communication with them throughout and following the conflict" (UNDP, 2017:34). Later in the post-war era, Nicaraguan-led peace commissioners were established to assist in coordinating local conflict mediation and human rights protection in the most highly-conflicted areas, with assistance from an OAS-led verification mission.

In Nicaragua, disputes on governing authority led to a civil war. In a bloody revolution that concluded in 1979, the leftist "Sandinista National Liberation Front overthrew the regime of Anastasio Somoza" (UNDP, 2017:32). With 67 percent of the vote, the Sandinistas were elected democratically to the presidency in 1984, having previously held power "during the outbreak of the contra war." They oversaw a nation marked by extreme environmental deterioration, a faltering economy, and pervasive poverty. US-funded contra forces began attacking the Sandinista government in 1980 with the goal of establishing "real democracy" and defending the interests of US and Nicaraguan economic leaders. While the US

government provided the contras with weapons, training, and support, Cuba and the Soviet Union provided financial and military support to the Sandinistas (UNDP, 2017:32).

Additionally, the former national guardsmen who were part of the overthrown Somoza administration and were exiled in Honduras and Costa Rica provided the contras with "major support." Nicaraguans endured starvation, poverty, and an economy devastated by natural disasters and political violence starting in the early 1970s, all amid a civil conflict characterized by tensions stoked by the Cold War (UNDP, 2017:31).

"Efforts to conclude the war" were defined as a sequence of regional and national accords and negotiations. The rearming of formerly demobilized combatants—the Contras and soldiers from the Sandinista army—caused many communities to eventually collapse. The president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, oversaw the negotiations that resulted in the Esquipulas Peace Accords of 1987. Leaders in Central America devised a set of practical measures known as the Esquipulas process that might result in the demobilization and ceasefires in conflicts across the region (UNDP, 2017:32). By 1988, the "Sandinista Government faced declining prospects of international support for its antiimperialist revolution against the United States and huge economic costs of war." It began to negotiate the conclusion of the conflict as a result. Reluctantly accepting a ceasefire and the ensuing demobilization, the contras suffered sharp internal divides and reductions in US military backing (UNDP, 2017:36).

Peace talks were centered on getting Nicaragua to commit to "demobilizing" its troops, not on examining the reasons behind the conflict or the grievances of the other side. The US government subsequently pushed the contras to join forces with Violeta Chamorro's Unión

Nacional Opositora (UNO) party, hoping to defeat the Sandinistas in the post-war election. After that, the contras were assimilated into the political system. Because of this political structure, the two parties to the conflict never looked into their motivations for fighting during peace talks (UNDP, 2017:38). Polarization and animosity therefore "persisted during and after the transition from conflict." Both parties agreed to a truce and the contras' withdrawal into their own zones in March 1988. In the end, 23 autonomous development zones (20 percent of the nation) were established by the Sandinistas and contra rebels so that the latter could reside and maintain their own police. In the meantime, with assistance from the presidents of Central America, the OAS established the International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) in 1989 in order to implement the Tela Accord (UNDP, 2017:37).

The Memorandum of Understanding "gave the CIAV-OAS mission a mandate to support and oversee demobilization, repatriation and voluntary resettlement of contras and their families, while ensuring their fundamental rights" (UNDP, 2017:36). The regional leaders also decided to forbid unauthorized forces from entering their areas. This decision forced the contras to halt hostilities since they had relied on being granted shelter in Costa Rica and Honduras during the war. Initial peace talks put an official stop to the war in early 1990, but the demobilization effort failed swiftly, and by 1991, the majority of soldiers had taken up arms again. The UNO-contra partnership failed to withstand the political realities of the transition, and the contras were split among themselves. Although the Chamorro government was elected in 1990, it did not carry out many of the agreements made in the Peace Accord. According to some commentators, increased international supervision of the peace process would have led to a higher level of organization and accountability

during the disarmament and peace-building stages (UNDP, 2017:39). The "Chamorro government negotiated agreements with specific contra factions that ultimately led to a more complete disarmament" as the peace talks got underway again in 1990. But Nicaragua continued to be a deeply divided country with a severely underdeveloped legal system and a high level of citizen insecurity (UNDP, 2017:37).

The Esquipulas Agreement established "Nicaragua's National Reconciliation Commission," whose primary duty was to keep an eye on and confirm the ceasefire that had been announced in three different zones of the country. These ceasefires, according to President Daniel Ortega, are a step toward an official national cessation of hostilities (UNDP, 2017). The National Reconciliation Commission was subsequently tasked by the Nicaraguan government with creating "...a more extensive internal structure that included region-specific commissions and an extensive network of local commissions," going above and beyond the demands of Esquipulas. These local peace commissions have varying effects and characteristics on the region. "Local peace commissions' histories and features varied from those of the central and northern regions, especially in the south." Throughout Nicaragua's conflict and transition, the two peace commission systems evolved separately in response to internal and external factors. Their leadership styles and modes of operation also differed greatly (UNDP, 2017:38).

During the height of the conflict, religious leaders in the south, especially Catholic priests and evangelical pastors, collaborated to establish conflict-free zones by assembling small groups of locals to attempt to promote community-level communication between the Sandinista Government and contra rebels (UNDP, 2017). The original mandate of the commissions included "opportunities for victim advocacy, information sharing with

authorities, and documentation and investigation of human rights violations." Peasants were able to continue growing crops during the conflict because the peace commissions reduced the level of violence in the area. There were 28 commissions in the southern region of Nueva Guinea by 1987, and by the time the war ended in 1990, there were 60 (UNDP, 2017:38).

An evangelical pastor, a Catholic delegate, a representative of the Nicaraguan Red Cross, a member of the opposition party, and a government representative made up the majority of peace commissions' five members. Local commissions were supervised and arranged by zone-based commissions. After the war, further local work was added to their already extensive scope to address crime, land problems, and intracommunity disputes. Peace commissioners served as channels of communication and arbitrators. They moreover bolstered the endeavors of spiritual authorities to start and foster conversations between the Sandinistas and leaders of opposing rebel groups at both local and upper echelons (UNDP, 2017:40).

The religious nature of the "groups complemented and enabled the impartiality of the commissions." These commissions enhanced the personal networks that already existed, facilitating information sharing and ongoing communication between the government and the contras (UNDP, 2017:40). The selection of commission members was based on their honesty, expertise, and relationships with parties involved in the conflict, which allowed them to act as the "trusted insider partial third party" that emerges from within the conflict. Through their attempts to negotiate a final ceasefire with the contra rebels after the UNO government's unsuccessful disarmament and amnesty program, the commissions had an impact at the national level. In exchange for the disarmament of 20,000 members, the

Chamorro Government had given land, several amnesties, and, in certain cases, government posts to contra leaders. A few months after the end of the conflict, the contras resurrected violence across the country, especially in rural regions, by retrieving weapons from secret stockpiles. Members of the peace commission engaged the rearmed contras in conversation and took protective measures for several months in the highlands during this renewed fighting (UNDP, 2017:40).

Work on the CIAV-OAS mission began in 1990. The initial responsibility assigned to it was overseeing the "demobilization of over 22,000 contra combatants in the country's northern and western regions, and to coordinate the resettlement of the contras and their relatives." During the conflict, there was most violence and refugee flight in Central and Northern Nicaragua (UNDP, 2017:41). The civil war "had a direct impact on almost 20 percent of the country's total population of 3.5 million – about 600,000 people" by the time it ended in 1990. More than 500,000 people, including 400,000 internally displaced people, have fled their own countries. Over 22,000 disarmed fighters, over 63,000 family members, and about 24,000 returned individuals connected to the contras were under the care and protection of the CIAV. People who had been displaced by the war attempted to go back to where they had lived in the late 1970s or early 1980s (UNDP, 2017:42).

Consequently, in order to complete its last purpose of resettling the contras and their families, the CIAV concentrated on these regions (UNDP, 2017). Through human rights verification and mediation, the CIAV "helped fill an institutional vacuum and mitigate local conflicts in the most violent areas" in its early years. The majority of this work was completed by CIAV-OAS employees. The CIAV helped demobilize 20,000 rearmed soldiers and secured 30 agreements by the time the contras started to rearm at the end of

1990. Personnel under contract, initially hired for a two-month period, comprised the CIAV staff (UNDP, 2017:43).

The CIAV employed specialists from Latin America as well as indigenous Nicaraguans, among whom were 31 demobilized contra fighters (McSherry & Raul, 1999). In order to establish relationships with residents in possible conflict areas, the mission "relied on Nicaragua communication and travel among over a dozen field offices in northern and central regions, as well as on efforts to develop school classrooms and undertake other community focused programs" (UNDP, 2017). The CIAV-OAS operation and coordination attempts in Nicaragua, however, have drawn criticism from two directions. Initially, a few observers referred to the operation as a tool of the US government. The US international development organization USAID provided the funding for both humanitarian aid and the return of the contras. It provided \$42.1 million, or 97%, of the CIAV-OAS budget for the period of April 1990 to June 1993 (UNDP, 2017:44). The mission was viewed as, at best, being caught between the bureaucratic processes of the OAS and the objectives of its backer, and at worst, not being politically neutral. Many felt that the CIAV-OAS excluded other groups while placing a specific priority on shielding the contras from reprisals and violations of their human rights (UNDP, 2017:44).

Later on, "the mission became more neutral and looked into abuses against Sandinistas." Furthermore, unfavourable sentiments were stoked by the prominence of Argentine officials in the CIAV-OAS mission (UNDP, 2017). Misleadingly, a lot of Sandinistas thought these officials were connected to Argentine military and intelligence personnel who initially supplied and trained the contras in 1980–81. Whatever the case, this "created a lasting negative perception." Nearing its conclusion in 1994, the CIAV mission aimed to

guarantee that domestic peace organizations would carry on their human rights and peace-building efforts once they departed the nation (UNDP, 2017:46).

Since there were no governmental institutions or non-governmental organizations to take up conflict mediation and resolution, its initial goal was to establish peace commissioners in the most violently divided regions. There were no reputable public channels to settle disputes and administer criminal penalties due to the general absence of governmental presence (UNDP, 2017:46). "Local commissions to defend human rights, promote peace, and assume verification tasks, conflict resolution, and mediation when it leaves," was what the CIAV sought. It is unclear how closely organizations that functioned in the truce zones throughout the conflict were associated with the peace commissions that the CIAV supported, either formally or informally. The northern peace commissions were headed by peasants, in contrast to those in the south (UNDP, 2017:47).

By 1995, the CIAV had backed the establishment of peace commissions that engaged in four primary functions: community project facilitation, human rights promotion, verification of respect of human rights, and mediation as important facets of the peace architecture include the commissions' ownership and leadership (UNDP, 2017). The variations in local commission leadership styles among the various regions offer much to be learned. In the southern region, "religious leaders were prominent and helped create local organizations by training community members as volunteer intermediaries between the Government and the Sandinista and contra combatants. This swiftly bolstered negotiation procedures as church leaders and members developed durable local structures for intra-community conflict resolution" (UNDP, 2017).

In the latter years of the Contra war, the Evangelical Council of Churches (CEPAD) "was among the first organizations to work on dispute mediation in Nicaragua's conflict zones" (UNDP, 2017). Numerous "evangelical pastors and parishioners represented by CEPAD received deferments from the draft for religious reasons, enabling them to establish credibility with community members and become relatively neutral mediators." Regular workshops on human rights and nonviolent conflict resolution were conducted by their ecumenical commissions, and practitioners disseminated this information in their local communities. The creation of legitimate, respected leaders and community institutions through peace commissions in the south allowed the bodies to function as local government, especially in rural areas where the state and police were absent. To put it another way, local peace commissions in the south relied primarily on churches to promote peace, which was strengthened when an official National Commission for Peace was established to "deepen and strengthen their efforts. In the central and northern region, the CIAVOAS supported peasant-led organizations to encourage local ownership. Its aim was to create a network of peace commissions, particularly in conflict-prone areas" (UNDP, 2017:49). Although local churches were seen as powerful representatives of Nicaraguan civil society, the CIAV attempted to "develop peace commissions through them, but they could not work in harmony." The CIAV-OAS mission should have ended far sooner than 1997, according to some analysts, and Nicaraguans should have taken over its responsibilities. The northern strategy, in contrast to the southern one, involved a substantial intervention by an external actor with an international mandate but insufficient support from the grassroots (UNDP, 2017:48).

Local ownership and sustainability did not take hold as they did in the south because of the absence of local support, which was "probably due to the fact that local peace commission development began late, or because the CIAV-OAS did not have the same credibility as the churches" (UNDP, 2017:49). Coordination In the meanwhile, peace commissions functioning in the north and south "had little national or regional coordination." One may argue that the gradual end of the civil war, the inadequate peace agreement, and the hazy post-war transition were the reasons behind the lack of a singular formula or procedure for creating peace commissioners (UNDP, 2017:50).

The formation of local peace commissions was negatively impacted by the contras', Sandinistas', and UNO government's uneven actions during the transition period and the lack of coordinated planning and execution (UNDP, 2017). The various local peace-building strategies may be further explained by contextual variations "between the different regions." Political violence in the north started to produce patterns of intra- and inter-familial conflict in the early 1970s. The northern and central regions were more vulnerable to rebel activities as a result of the intensification of ideological polarization (UNDP, 2017:51). Tension with the government grew as northern coastal "communities" demanded autonomy. In the meantime, large tracts of land were given to demobilizing contra fighters in the south, and local peace commissioners were quite active. This could be the reason why there was an earlier and easier peace. Nonetheless, the UNP (2017) notes that "the temptation to make facile comparisons between regions should be resisted." Local peace commissioners were not the sole factor contributing to the south's peace and stability.

One important aspect is that the national struggle between the Contras and Sandinistas took specific, localized forms at the local level (UNDP, 2017). For instance, Lederach said that

conflicts on the east coast were mainly handled by local peace committees involving indigenous groups and the Sandinista government. There, the problem was not Cold War ideological tensions but rather the needs and demands of indigenous groups. Nicaragua's experience with peace commissions highlights a crucial point: unique peace-building strategies tailored to specific local circumstances and capacities may be necessary in a war-torn nation due to regional historical and cultural distinctions (UNDP, 2017:53).

"The CIAV-OAS did little to promote developing local conflict resolution institutions in the early years," the report states. While making significant progress in demobilization, opposing resettlement, and human rights verifications, the CIAV-OAS was unable to sufficiently build up local capacity (UNDP, 2017:54). The limited effectiveness of the "CIAV-OAS NICARAGUA mission highlights the necessary conditions for external agents or regional organizations to effectively engage in local peace-building. The success of a regional political organization is contingent upon its perceived impartiality and fairness, its independence from the policies of external funders, and its non-participation in wartime alliances (UNDP, 2017:55).

Nicaragua serves as a prime example of the significant influence that Catholic and evangelical churches, together with their associated organizations, have in granting legitimacy to peace commission positions. In order to monitor the ceasefire and communicate with armed groups, the government relied on peace commissioners, therefore this support was essential (UNDP, 2017). Religious "support frequently guaranteed that the commissioners were viewed as impartial participants rather than representatives of the government. The church's moral authority was the primary source of the credibility that the organization established over many years. By collaborating with peace commissioners

early on, when peace was still elusive, the church also garnered legitimacy. Peace commissioners eventually acquired further institutional and capacity-building support, allowing them to become more adept at their work and ensure some uniformity of procedure." (UNDP, 2017:56).

In Nigeria, Vicente and Collier collaborated with ActionAid, a non-governmental organization, on a field study in 2014 with the goal of encouraging nonviolent campaigns prior to the 2007 election (Fafchamps & Pedro, 2013). "Political violence must end! The campaign's main catchphrase, "Vote against violent politicians," was used throughout town hall meetings and popular theatre performances in randomly chosen towns across six states in Nigeria (Collier & Vicente, 2014). Additionally, the slogan was written on pamphlets, stickers, posters, T-shirts, caps, and hijabs. Town hall gatherings were created in an effort to lessen the issue of collective action, which impedes the reduction of conflict at the local level. Popular theatres relied on a single, state-wide script that featured both good and bad politicians, with the bad politician encouraging violence. The script was intended to target youths, who are typically the target of violent political activities, as well as other groups like women who were not drawn to town meetings (Collier and Vicente, 2012). The authors claim that the exposure to the anti-violence campaign made the locals extremely sensitive to the need to avoid election violence and focus peacekeeping efforts. The decrease in election-related violence as a result of the therapy in the treatment communities was also covered by local journalists. The anti-violence initiatives have the dual effects of positive reinforcing and diffusion effects. The diffusion was ascertained by keeping an eye on the people who interacted with those who were directly targeted by the advertisements but were not directly targeted themselves. Additionally, among the people who were initially

untargeted, there were indications of positive empowerment with reference to the elections (Fafchamps & Vicente, 2013).

Local peace committees that political parties voluntarily established in Sierra Leone have been crucial in maintaining peaceful elections (Smillie, 2008). The pre-conflict African nation of Sierra Leone was described as "a fragmented, exploited, and deeply insecure country" in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Report (Wyrod, 2008:67). During that period, "the colony's British administration created separate and unequal development for the inland protectorate of the country's original peoples and descendants of liberated slaves." Additionally, it weakened and exploited the chieftain system, preparing the way for a major "disconnect" to emerge between the rulers and the ruled. After British authority ended, the colony quickly turned into a predatory one-party dictatorship where the political elite amassed enormous money and power at the expense of the general populace (WARN, 2007:9).

A huge failure of leadership at all levels of public life was evident during the pre-conflict and conflict periods, according to the TRC. According to the Commonwealth Expert Team (2008), the political elites of all post-colonial administrations, especially President Siaka Stevens' (1969–1985) administration, were directly accountable for fostering the climate of violence. Political elites are mostly to blame for the war, which has been defined as "endemic greed, corruption, and nepotism that reduced most people to a state of poverty and deprived the nation of its dignity" (par. 13). By the end of the 1980s, "state failure had rendered notions of citizenship and patriotism meaningless concepts." Whether or not a community or individual could effectively enter the patronage system determined their chances of surviving (Government of Sierra Leone, 2005:2). The Revolutionary United

Front (RUF) started the civil war in 1991 (allegedly in collaboration with Charles Taylor's NPFL).

At first, the conflict was presented as a people's revolution against the opportunistic and corrupt elite, but it quickly became apparent that there was no overarching revolutionary theory or shared goal. The militia was described by the TRC as having "astonishing factional fluidity" (Nyathi, 2008), switching sides and causes frequently. The nation descended into an orgy of self-destruction, and the dominant emotions were raw rage, greed, and violence. A great deal of violence initially aimed at the elite, but soon there was no discernible reason for it other than the fact that the breakdown of law and order created job opportunities for those with firearms. According to some commentators, economic factors were the true cause of the violence (Nyathi, 2008:97). They contend that the civil war was sparked by the illicit diamond trade. One important aspect of this case study is the effects of the state breakdown on the districts. District participants claimed to have felt deeply abandoned and cut off from the nation's central authorities during the pre-conflict phase. The TRC report includes seven case studies of districts that describe how they were neglected" (Commonwealth Expert Team, 2008:113).

The studies unequivocally demonstrate that the RUF discovered willing "collaborators motivated by specific grievances and unresolved disputes" when they entered districts. Political rivalry, chieftain issues, personalities, patterns, and levels of exclusion were among the many distinct political, economic, and ethnic elements that each district had to deal with (Relief Web, 2009:14). The violence in Sierra Leone may have originated from particular local tensions and situations, as suggested by the district alienation issues. The fight exacerbated already-existing local conflict rather than being "nationally imposed on

peaceful districts." Also, the violence destroyed the social fabric of the town. Those battling actively violated social taboos by raping mothers and sisters, molesting children, abusing seniors, and, in some cases, engaging in cannibalism. Brutal violence was committed against the fundamental norms and ideals that united communities in every hamlet and region. Not alone did strangers commit violent crimes, but neighbors and even family members often committed terrible crimes. In this framework, peace-building required to take place at both the local and national levels" (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2007:21). This is the context in which the DMCs of Sierra Leone ought to be evaluated. The democratic elections of 2002 marked the end of the violent cycle in Sierra Leone, according to the country's code of conduct monitoring committees.

According to the European Union Election Observation Mission (2007), the nation made two more significant advancements in 2007 when it successfully held "the next round of Presidential and Parliamentary elections, and by peacefully transferring power to the opposition party." These were really important accomplishments. They were an uncommon success in Africa, "and should also be viewed in the context of nearly half of all post-war countries returning to war within the first five years of peace." Additionally, the elections in 2007 were the first time that post-conflict elections had been fully overseen by institutions in Sierra Leone (the UN had overseen the elections in 2002). However, a positive result was never guaranteed. Tensions rose because the incumbent president did not run, and different fractures and worries within the major political parties complicated matters" (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2007:42). Violence broke out in both the capital city and its surrounding areas. The West Africa Network for Peace-building (WANEP) published an early warning study in July 2007 that struck a dire note⁹⁶, stating

that a return to anarchy was a conceivable but not inevitable scenario. The elections were successful for a number of reasons. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) handled them with professionalism and earned recognition, which was the main reason (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2007:44).

Improved input from the civil society and excellent technical assistance "obtained from UNIOSIL and the diplomatic community" were further factors. But the Political Parties Registration Commission's (PPRC) contribution is the main topic of this case study. Although it was mentioned in the 1991 Constitution, the PPRC was never really established. Despite the passage of the Political Parties Act in 2002, the PPRC's establishment was postponed until December 2005, when NEC restructuring mandated that it put an end to complaints regarding the NEC's neutrality and effectiveness (IFES Feature Story, 2007). In addition to registering political parties, the PPRC's duty also includes "monitoring party affairs and conduct to ensure they comply with the constitution; promoting pluralism and the spirit of constitutionalism; and mediating conflict and disputes between political parties or leaders" (Awareness Times, 2009:21). Significant financial and technical support was given to the PPRC by the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), "the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)" (Ace Project, 2007:14). All provided committed, seasoned technical consultants to the Commission, greatly assisting in its empowerment (IFES Feature Story, 2007).

Even basic infrastructure, such as telephones and furniture, were unavailable to the Commission in 2006. More crucially, the advisors "bolstered the PPCR so it could comprehend and carry out its role, in addition to helping address these practical matters."

According to the Constitution, the chairperson of the PPRC must be a senior judge or someone with comparable qualifications (Kambale, 2011). "One from the legal profession, the Chairperson of the NEC, and a trade union representative were to be the remaining three members. The Commission's duty to enforce the law and levy penalties for misbehaviour was logically assumed given its makeup" (Fall, Hounkpe, Jinadu & Kambale, 2011). This was indeed the Commission's first assumption. But the PPRC had to confront the judiciary's involvement in the state's previous failures (TRC 2004). The opposition, however, "was charging that the ruling party was mishandling the peace and going back to its traditional practices. It would have been extremely challenging to impose legal punitive measures on political parties that broke the law. If these consequences are widely accepted and there are ways to enforce them, they may be effective. Neither of these circumstances applied. Nyathi further emphasized that political parties might contact the courts directly through the election law, bypassing the PPRC" (IFES Feature Story, 2007:17).

This raised the issue of what benefit the PPRC would provide. According to Nyathi, "the PPRC should use mediation as its primary strategy and needed to establish a relationship built on trust between it and the political parties" (Nyathi, 2008:56). Legal action should only be taken if "that failed." After the Commission came to terms with this interpretation of its mandate, its members went on to further their mediation training through courses. By doing this, the PPRC was able to help all registered political parties negotiate a voluntary Code of Conduct, and it did so with remarkable success. After a rigorous procedure, the Code of Conduct was officially signed in November 2006 at a grand event held at Parliament (Nyathi, 2008:57). According to Nyathi (2008), the parties "made a voluntary

and public commitment to the Code of Conduct, and a National Code of Conduct Monitoring Committee (NMC) was established with one representative from each of the registered political parties, one from the NEC, two from civil society, one from the police, one from the Inter-Religious Council, and one from the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights." The Committee became a useful forum for communication and problem-solving amongst political parties during the election season, choosing its chairperson from among "its non-political members." Replicating the framework at the district and regional levels was one of its initial considerations. District code of conduct monitoring committees (DMCs) were subsequently formed by the PPRC in each district (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2007:19).

These committees were crucial in guaranteeing that the elections were largely peaceful. According to Ohman, the DMCs had three purposes. They first demonstrated to voters that members of various political parties could cooperate to hold nonviolent elections. Tensions were lowered as a result (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2007). The perception was reinforced by the significant cooperation between DMCs and the district radio stations of the Independent Radio Network, where Committee members took part in biweekly radio programs. Second, they were able to recognize possible conflict hotspots and take action to stop them from getting worse thanks to their local expertise. Third, in the event that disputes arose, the DMCs were in a good position to mediate between the various players" (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2007:21). Ohman provided a list of 46 instances from 2007 and 2008 in which DMCs mediated or brokered violent disputes.

While there have been various civil society-based efforts to promote peace locally, "the DMCs benefited from a formal mandate established by all political parties on the NMC and enshrined in the National Code of Conduct" (Relief Web, 2009:8). Accordingly, "DMCs had the clout to bring on board all political parties, the NEC, the police, and civil society at the district level." The fact that there were no other reliable and effective institutions to control district conflict because all other mechanisms had been destroyed contributed to the success of DMC (IFES Feature Story, 2007). The DMCs "provided them with a chance to begin again." In addition to being far less "political," the environment in which DMCs worked was far less complex than that of the national level. The local system performed better than the national body, which had to deal with more intense political tensions, simply because of the necessity to avoid a return to violence (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2007:24). "The technical and political support the committees received was a key aspect of DMC work." This includes training, having access to the PPRC for nationwide support, and having continuing help from technical consultants. Occasionally, the entire Commission has gone to certain districts to provide support. On other occasions, the European Union Election Observation Mission (2007) states that the PPRC has urged national political party leaders to assist particular DMCs in resolving matters involving their parties' local structures.

DMC makeup was the same as that of the national organization. There was no "flexibility to specifically include women or youth, or to allow for local variations of demography or other identity issues. Despite having significant influence in the districts, local chiefs were also not represented" (Nyathi, 2008). The network established to connect the committees with one another and to link the national and local levels (NMC, PPRC, and DMCs) was

another crucial component of DMC operations. Frequent gatherings of DMCs improved collaboration and explored potential points of contention. Furthermore, committee arrangements fostered connections between civil society, statutory authorities, political parties, and security agencies (Awareness Times, 2009:13). Their joint contribution to peacebuilding was widened and deepened as a result of the discourse and interaction that was made possible. Ultimately, election observers acknowledged the success of DMC.

The July 2008 municipal elections served as the subsequent litmus test for Sierra Leone's advancements in peacekeeping. Once more, "the overall result was favourable; observers deemed the elections credible, but they pointed out that the foundation of peace in this nation remains precarious." During the election, there were a few violent events and claims of intimidation, particularly directed towards independent candidates. During this time, DMCs maintained their work. Following February 2008, they had a reorganization in composition, and the PPRC assigned them the responsibility of overseeing the Code of Campaign Ethics, a NEC document that encompassed independent candidates (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2007). The DMCs "received conflict prevention training twice in 2008 with support from IFES." Moreover, they were busier in 2008 than they were in 2007. Before their activity was essentially terminated at the end of September 2008, evaluation meetings were held with all DMCs (Relief Web, 2009:34). Positive overtones were present in some events, though. One was held in the north to be ready for a party-to-party debate about particular complaints. According to the narrative, "the regional minister and the acting PPRC Regional Commissioner organized a joint 'feast' between the three major political parties" (Relief Web, 2009).

The three groups proceeded from "one office to the next to share in the feast and build peace," with each party preparing meals in its own space. Comparing these instances to the violent ones shows that organizations like DMCs can effectively maintain democratic pluralism and peace during the interim between elections (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2007). DMCs were neighbourhood "peace-building organizations" whose main duty was to make sure elections went smoothly. They were without authority during the interim between elections. After the 2007 and 2008 elections, the nation continued to see periodic acts of violence connected to political tolerance. A number of incidents happened in the diamond-rich Kono district in 2009: a lady was gang-raped, an opposition party office was covered in human excrement, and a demonstration the following day was interrupted (Relief Web, 2009:36).

Midway through 2005, the international community began to rebuild Liberia, and it quickly ramped up efforts to finance reintegration programs, reconstruct clinics and community schools, finance training programs, or provide supplies, seeds, and tools for beginning farmers (Cook, 2010). Communities received direct assistance from the international community in the form of infrastructure and essential services that facilitated agricultural productivity at the household and community levels. A fair distribution of these essential services, tailored to each resident's requirements, was guaranteed to the duly elected and supported community and village councils (Jimoh, 2019). The National Transitional Government of Liberia established the Governance Reform Commission in 2004. The commission held regular and well-attended public hearings throughout 2005, demonstrating growing public support for extending the democratic franchise to lower national levels. Proposals for decentralization and sharing of public funds and foreign aid

through direct elections of county delegates and town city mayors were among the main conclusions drawn from the hearings (Clarke, 2019).

According to Boone (2011), the primary causes of election-related violence and conflicts in Kenya include male dominance, ethnic party politics, personalities, and money. The violence that broke out following the elections was successfully put down in 2007 thanks to the power-sharing agreement. The establishment of the Grand Coalition government proved to be an effective peace-building tactic in re-establishing harmony (Branch, 2011). The new constitution was ratified in 2010 with the intention of averting violence during the 2013 election and future ones. A number of sectors launched initiatives to promote a calm electoral process during the 2013 elections. The Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KPSA) launched a program called "Mkenya Daima," which translates to "my Kenya Forever." In this initiative, the KPSA collaborated with other civil society to promote nonviolence and conducted nationwide campaigns of a similar nature (Taylor, 2018). Stakeholder gatherings, church services, and print media sources were used to accomplish this. Aiming to promote peace throughout the election process, the CSO "sisi ni Amani" received 50 million text messages from Safaricom, one of the biggest mobile phone providers in Kenya (Ajao, 2017). Comparably, the 2017 Golden Handshake between Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta normalized social, political, and economic interactions.

2.4 Challenges and Opportunities for Managing Electoral Conflicts

2.4.1 Challenges for Managing Electoral Conflicts

For the effective management of electorally linked issues, the electoral frameworks' ability to mitigate conflicts must be successful (Magasu, Banda & Muleya, 2020). Some of the

approaches that are key in managing electoral conflicts includes use of election monitors, voter focused approaches such as education, legal frameworks. Such approaches are vital in nurturing democratic norms and tolerance towards prevention of electoral conflicts. In Kenya, some of the challenges influencing the management of electoral conflicts include slow pace in justice delivery. For instance, cases pertaining election malpractices or perpetrators of electoral conflicts take long to heard and determined in the courts.

Even as Kenya gears up for the 2022 general elections, legal framework for ensuring accountability during elections are yet to be established. For instance, the prosecution of election offences such as Baby Pendo Case committed in 2017 by the law enforcement officers is still pending in court 5 years down the line. Another challenge is the late enactment / amendment of electoral laws too close to elections. Moreover, institutional challenges replacement of the four IEBC commissioners who resigned barely a year left to the general elections in 2022. This undermines planning and implementation of electoral activities within the set electoral timelines. It is also contrary to the international best practice (also noted by the Kriegler Commission), which recommends ceasing of enactment of electoral laws at least two years to a general election.

Equally, there is a challenge of police brutality and the political interference in every election cycle in Kenya. For instance, cases of police brutality and the political interference were evident in the recently concluded by-elections in Juja, Bonchari, London ward, Kabuchai and Matungu. If such cases of police brutality and interference are not addressed, it may hamper the management of electoral conflicts and/or cause electoral conflicts in the forthcoming general elections in 2022.

Moreover, the Electoral Management Bodies such as IEBC and National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management fail to institute timely capacity-building workshops and conflict mapping practices to sensitize the voters and stakeholders on their role in averting electoral conflicts. According to Magasu, Banda and Muleya (2020), the quality of capacity building trainings are key in eradicating perilous election bottlenecks, which may contribute to conflicts during the election. Today, capacity-building programs conducted by the EMBs are characteristically low with only a year left to the general elections.

The challenge of lack of adequate financing as cited by IEBC hampers smooth execution of operations. The high cost of elections in Kenya are attributed to electoral technology prescribed by statutory laws, rising number of polling stations, use of satellite technology (results transmission); high number of security features on ballot papers as well as high cost of transport and logistics. Funding challenges are exacerbated by IEBC's reliance on the National Treasury to allocate budget and release exchequer yearly hence risking exposing the Commission to undue influence from the executive and other electoral actors. Lack of adequate funding constrains the activities of IEBC such as regular maintenance of election technology, continuous voter registration, voter education and staff capacity building (Mutemi & Onkware, 2020).

2.4.2 Opportunities for Managing Electoral Conflicts

There exist a number of opportunities that governments, both local and national can adopt to prevent and manage electoral conflicts. These includes establishment of national early warning system, establishment of reliable and timely complaints mechanisms, training of

security personnel on the management of elections and fast tracking of election related cases in judicial system.

2.4.2.1 Establishment of National Early Warning System

Early warning system (EWS) represents the set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organizations threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss (Willan, 2021). The author further observed that to be effective and complete, an early warning system needs to comprise four interacting elements namely: (i) risk knowledge, (ii) monitoring and warning services, (iii) dissemination and communication and (iv) response capability.

According to Aketch (2020), the Kenyan Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) mechanism is adopted from the IGAD CEWARN. The system conducts conflict monitoring by receiving and analyzing information from its peace actors (local peace structures) that operate across the counties and in conjunction with the media. The author noted that establishment of the Conflict Early Warning and Response mechanism must be enhanced through training and facilitation of local peace committee members. That most LC have members who are volunteers and lack of training and facilitation makes most of them not to be active in the course of their duties.

According to Mac Ginty. (2014), the biggest challenge facing indigenous and conventional early warning conflict indicators is that they have a short lag time before conflict outbreaks occur. This means responses are mostly reactive instead of preventive. In addition, early warning conflict indicators are not always accurate hence it

is hard to persuade political leaders, state and non-state actors to mount an early action response. It is recommended that timely and appropriate prevention initiatives should be undertaken during the dormant stages of violent conflicts. The author further observed that the conflict early warning indicators generated are disseminated to different actors for possible action. This means that there is no one institution at county level charged with the coordination and response of CEWARN information. This results in delay in responses and undermining of existing indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms

Hegre et al., (2019) revealed that to address this challenge, the government has had a paradigm shift by focusing less on conflict early warning and focusing more on 'Peace early warning'. Peace early warning mechanisms involves the monitoring and analysis (for a given conflict) factors that sustain peace. The community is then involved in monitoring when these peace indicators stop prevailing hence forecast an impending conflict. Indigenous knowledge is still intact amongst the Pokot Community in West Pokot County. The communities have a vast body of knowledge on early warning conflict indicators and resolution mechanisms that are part of a well-structured, time-proven social system inclined towards reconciliation, maintenance and improvement of social relationships. The methods, processes and regulations are deeply rooted in the customs and beliefs of the people.

The Pokot community has been able to prevent a number of conflicts through proper utilization of the early warning information generated from their indigenous knowledge system. The community elders are a crucial component of peace building initiatives

renowned athletes like Tegla Lorupe has also initiated conflict prevention strategies through the sports for peace race that empowers reformed warriors by giving them resources such as financial support or cattle once they surrender their guns. This aids them to engage in more peaceful livelihoods. However these indigenous early warning indicators and peace building institutions have not been integrated with the conventional Conflict Early Warning and Early Response mechanisms (Wachira, 2014).

The purpose of early warning systems is mitigating the risk produced by disasters, but these risks are compounded by the socio-economic vulnerability of the population exposed to the hazards. In this context, early warning systems must be inclusive and sensitive to the different sources of vulnerability. As indicated by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), these systems must be people-centred, end-to-end, and multi-hazard. Early warning systems play a significant role in the world of work. By disseminating timely and accurate information regarding disaster risk, they enable preparedness action as well as a rapid response from workers, employers, and national or local authorities, and can therefore prevent human and economic losses in the workplace. For instance, farmers, pastoralists, fishers, and foresters are among the most-at-risk communities to disasters. Moreover, early warning systems can also play a crucial role in decent work, as part of the occupational health and safety standards in disaster-prone countries. Early warning systems are essential to prepare and respond effectively in the short term, corresponding to the first stages of disaster management. Moreover, the implementation of such systems can also contribute to building resilience, as enhancing preparedness strengthens the capacity to recover rapidly, and reduces vulnerability. This

matches ILO's view on disaster risk reduction, promoting employment and decent work at the nexus between humanitarian and development needs (UNICEF, 2022).

2.4.2.2 Establishment of Reliable and Timely Complaints Mechanisms

Procedures exist to allow problems to be dealt with in a fair, consistent and speedy manner. It is standard practice to have such procedures in any organization. The applications of Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms such as mediation, negotiation and arbitration have been widely used in the world today to solve conflicts (Toha, 2017).

The elections of 27 December 2007 were the fourth electoral exercise in Kenya since the inauguration of the multiparty era in the early 990s. They were momentous because of the large voter turnout, reflecting a yearning to achieve a better future through the ballot box. They also symbolized a learning process through which, after three elections of varying competitiveness and openness, the electorate had begun to be acclimatized to the perception that it could make a decisive difference through the vote, whether in local, parliamentary, or presidential elections.

In previous years multiple efforts by civic organizations had endowed Kenyans with an adroit sense of agitation and education that resulted in the electoral triumph of 2002, when the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) managed to mobilize across ethnic and class lines to put an end to the sloth and decay the government of Daniel arap Moi had visited on the nation for 2 years. Civic education began to create an engaged and informed citizenry that stood firm when the elected government of Mwai Kibaki procrastinated about instituting genuine constitutional reforms and lapsed into corruption and ethnic provincialism. In

the 2005 constitutional referendum the government was soundly defeated when it supported a constitutional draft that fell short of national expectations. After the constitutional referendum disenchanted members of NARC who had fallen out with the Kibaki government formed the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), a multi-ethnic alliance of mainly the Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin, and Coastal groups under the leadership of Raila Odinga. Remnants of NARC and a collection of other parties constituted under the Party of National Unity (PNU), led by Kibaki, drew support among the majority Kikuyu and their ethnic allies in Central Kenya.

An ODM splinter group, ODM-Kenya, led by Kalonzo Musyoka, was exclusively composed of the Kamba ethnic group. Although these tripartite blocks seemed to present a picture of ethnic polarization in reality they dovetailed more or less with the ethnic balance of forces across the country. Given the history of ethnic mobilization political parties in the multiparty era tried to forge alliances with some semblance of a national outlook, even though their primary organizational base remained solidly ethnic and regional. Since the successful multi-ethnic alliance that had produced the NARC victory in 2002 the major challenge facing Kenya was whether such alliances would translate into predictable and principled organizations or whether they would remain momentary instruments for electoral contestations. The latter proved to be the case when, barely a year into the Kibaki administration, the NARC alliance unraveled and elites retreated back into ethnic cocoons. In addition to the salience of ethnicity, the lead-up to the December 2007 elections was characterized by profound disenchantment with the Kibaki

administration. With the government's defeat in the constitutional referendum the ODM coalesced around a reform agenda of constitutional change, anti-corruption, and anti-cronyism. Rightly or wrongly, the Kibaki administration was perceived throughout the campaign period as the major impediment to constitutional reforms that would decentralize power away from the imperial presidency.

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Locked in zero-sum mentalities the PNU and ODM faced a grinding stalemate that was exacerbated by the escalating violence. With the parties short of concrete ideas about how to extricate themselves the door was opened for

external mediators. Deepening the stalemate was the attempt by both parties to lay claims to legitimacy: the PNU claimed from the outset that it had won the election while the ODM claimed the PNU had robbed it of its rightful victory. Confident that it had won the PNU asked the ODM to launch a legal challenge in the courts. The government's hardline position was underlined by its deployment of police and security forces in major venues in Nairobi to prevent ODM-led mass protests and threats to install a parallel government. Stalemates partly explain the necessity for external intervention but they do not explain why particular mediators intervene. African conflicts are notable for the number of mediators who converge on them. Given the competition among multiple parties it is always critical to delineate who should mediate (Pitsoane, 2014).

In the Kenyan context the entry of mediators was complicated by a legacy of national pride that had accumulated in the years of relative political stability. Kenya had often associated mediation enterprises with failed states. When, therefore, various mediators began to propose intervention to resolve the conflict most of the country's leaders, particularly those in government, were reluctant to countenance the intrusion of outsiders. Yet despite invocation of sovereignty the traumatic violence after the elections and the potential descent into state failure made the country a genuine candidate for external mediation.

The parties agreed to work together with a panel of eminent African personalities headed by Mr. Kofi Annan ... towards resolving their differences and all other outstanding issues including constitutional and electoral reforms. Both sides agreed there should be an end to the violence and they also agreed there should be dialogue. (Al Jazeera, January, 2008)

I will stay as long as it takes to get the issue of a political settlement to an irreversible point. I will not be frustrated or provoked to leave. It is in the interest of the men and women of Kenya, the region, Africa and the international community to have a new government. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (Daily Nation 6 February)

2.4.2.3 Training of Security Personnel on the Management of Elections

Educating security personnel on the value of applying little to no force when dealing with protestors is part of the training process. Demonstrations have long been seen in Kenya as a means of pursuing justice, particularly in the run-up to elections. The researcher wanted to determine if educating security forces could assist prevent electoral strife and promote peace in Kenya and if yes, how best to do this. The results showed that 18.4% of the respondents disagreed with this statement significantly, 17.1% disagreed in some way, and 15% disagreed. However, 16.8% of the participants agreed, 16.2% agreed in some way, and 9.7% strongly agreed.

According to table 6.1, a total of 50.5% of respondents disagreed that peacebuilding and electoral conflict prevention can be achieved by security force training. Nonetheless, 42.7% of the participants believed that peacebuilding and election conflict avoidance might be achieved by security forces training. In Kenya, police frequently employ excessive force to disperse crowds, particularly protestors. This is a further instance of violence that needs to be stopped, and the only way to do it is for the security personnel to become more adept at managing crowds without resorting to violence. Several academics classified police brutality as an element of electoral violence based on their analysis of earlier studies. For instance, Williams (2011) discovered that inadequate training for security forces is another issue impeding efforts to promote peace during elections. Domestic police services are

responsible for daily election security, with the exception of some post-conflict or ongoing conflict contexts (Bekoe & Burchard, 2021).

The police force in many transitional nations already confronts significant obstacles in terms of resources and capabilities, and it might not be trusted by the general public, specific neighbourhoods, or political groupings. In the limited time often available for training security forces in advance of elections, deficits in competence and trustworthiness cannot be rectified (Collier & Vicente, 2014). But greater collaboration with EMBs could be a better way to handle these issues. Election Day coordination and problem-solving would be enhanced by involving the EMB in security training preparation (to guarantee that the election process is taught effectively) and holding joint sessions (Collier & Vicente, 2014).

It would be beneficial if EMBs or electoral specialists could provide guidance on election procedures to security forces at high-level joint meetings or training for the troops. In terms of rules of engagement for handling security challenges in the lead-up to, during, and after Election Day, this will also assist guarantee that all stakeholders are in agreement (Birch & David, 2018). It can be challenging for people outside the security industry to locate training materials for security forces both locally and online. However, for effective and peaceful elections, security officers must be knowledgeable about electoral procedures and have the interpersonal skills necessary to collaborate with community poll workers and the upper echelons of the EMB leadership (Birch & David, 2018).

Another illustration of the previously noted sector-specific focus is this discrepancy in training collaboration. In other words, individuals who engage in the security sector as

fundlers or implementing partners frequently have poor connections to those who work in other sectors of development (Birch & David, 2018). Election-focused joint programs and donor coordination meetings are not often attended by the distinct group of experts and donors that concentrates on security reform and training. Even in situations where there is a high degree of coordination between training and field operations, it frequently starts at the last minute (Birch & David, 2018).

According to a research by Burchard (2015), a lot of UN and civilian help was focused on the election process in South Sudan before to the 2010 polls, which made coordination challenging. Due to the gradual progress of security sector reform after 2005, there were numerous issues related to election security. After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), one of the main combatants in the long-running civil war, engaged in numerous power struggles with poorly trained police, leaving the newly established South Sudan Police Service (SPSS) (Burchard, 2015). There were numerous instances of the SPLA and the people disobeying SPSS authority prior to the polls in April 2010. However, election security coordination and training did not start until six months later. An election security group was established once the problem was given priority, and it was subsequently reproduced at the state level in South Sudan.

It was not until late January 2007 in Northern Ireland that Sinn Fein's general membership chose to endorse policing reforms. Consequently, "Sinn Fein has become a member of the DPPs and the Policing Board. As a result, the infrastructure designed to enable police reform could assert to have the backing of all major players nearly ten years after the Good Friday Accord was signed" (Jarman, 2016). Developments in police reform between 2003

and 2008: "Numerous polls were carried out to ascertain the public's opinions and views of law enforcement in general, and the DPPs specifically. The results of the survey corroborate the opinion stated in 2008 by Sir Hugh Orde, the Chief Constable of the PSNI, as the police were now officially known. He claimed that "massive changes" had been made to policing, with fruitful outcomes (Rusk, 2008:213). According to a 2008 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency study, 33% of Catholics and 30% of Protestants, respectively, expressed satisfaction with district policing. Protestant dissatisfaction actually decreased by a noteworthy 4 percent from 2006, primarily as a result of their perception that the legal system was too forgiving. A quarter of the respondents were dissatisfied with the police, whereas the majority held neutral sentiments about them. However, it is surprising how attitudes regarding the police have normalized" (Bell, 2017). Catholics' unfavorable opinion of police has mostly been dispelled.

In both groups, about 80% of respondents think that people are willing to interact with the police. According to this, "reactions regarding why people would be unwilling to engage with the police reflect the lingering impact of the troubles." 45 percent of Catholics and two thirds of Protestants said that the legal system was too forgiving (Ankerberg & Weldon, 2012). Protestants were less likely than Catholics to cite fear or dislike of the police as an influence. "Political opinions were important to both groups, but the history of the difficulties was more important to Protestants than Catholics. Comparatively speaking, only 8% of Protestants and 19% of Catholics said that the police did not represent their group. The extent of the animosity among minorities who continue to harbor mistrust for the police is not well reflected in the data. Sinn Fein's decision to back the PSNI has resulted in significant defections from the party" (McGlynn, Tonge, & McAuley, 2014).

The Sunday Times revealed in December 2007 that throughout the preceding months, there had been indications of unease among grassroots Republicans in significant regions regarding Sinn Fein's endorsement of law enforcement (Rusk, 2008). In Strabane, a town where dissidents were looking for members," two Sinn Fein council members declined to accept their posts on a DPP; the DUP was given the slots instead. Sinn Fein could not hide widespread dissatisfaction, even when it pointed out that 55 of its council members had joined DPPs. The more frightening threat of using violence again came from dissent. Dissident organization the Irish Republican Liberation Army threatened to assassinate Sinn Fein members occupying District Policing Partnership seats in a statement released in December 2007. It further said that information provided to the PSNI by residents of Republican communities would be treated as informants. Death is the penalty for that. Nevertheless, Sinn Fein's determination to back PSNI remained unwavering despite the threats and defections" (Mitchell & Mitchell, 2011).

There were approximately 1800 documented gunshots and attacks in Northern Ireland between 1998 and 2005, many of which had paramilitary implications. In his assessment of Community Restorative Justice Ireland and Northern Ireland Alternatives' activities, Mika found that their restorative justice initiatives had a significant and measurable influence. The Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (2008) discovered that there was a notable decline in paramilitary sentences in the regions where these programs were instituted. Established in neighborhoods where there is a prevalent perception of a lack of genuine policing and where "statutory bodies appear to be indifferent to victims who reside in working class areas..." (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 2008), several activities were carried out. The efforts focused on forgiveness and reparation

over retaliation in order to increase trust, and they actively sought out and collaborated with former paramilitary leaders. Restorative justice measures, however, ran counter to efforts to rebuild the trust of the police and the greater legal system. Reconciliation and reparations were typically performed informally in restorative justice programs. They avoided the existing legal system at a time when revitalizing it was the nation's primary priority (Archick, 2019).

In situations when state institutions are weak or compromised, civil society peace-building initiatives can support justice, even though they may conflict with the larger state-building attempt, as demonstrated elsewhere (e.g., Kenya) (Githaiga, 2017). This does not mean that we should stop sponsoring community projects; rather, it means that we must identify and resolve the underlying inconsistency. Consider the following statement from John Braithwaite, the 2005 recipient of the Stockholm Prize in Criminology: Compared to other countries I know of, Northern Ireland has a more advanced debate of restorative justice concepts and procedures. This is most likely because official and civil society interpretations of restorative justice in Northern Ireland have been the subject of a more intense discussion than elsewhere. In situations this heated, there is the greatest chance of disasters in the court system. In addition, these are the environments in which a restorative justice model is most likely to overcome political barriers (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 2008). The Good Friday Agreement effectively chose a consociation dispensation, which needs to be considered when assessing the impact of the DPP.

2.4.2.4 Fast Tracking of Election Related Cases

Ordinarily, timelines are dealt with under subsidiary legislation that deals with the procedure for enforcing substantive law. As the timelines are found in subsidiary legislation, they, together with other forms of procedural law, are secondary to substantive law. This is why as far back as **Githere v Kimungu (1976-1985) E.A 101**, it was held that procedural rules are a handmaiden rather than a mistress and that courts should not be too tied by the rules to the extent of doing an injustice. This position was buttressed following the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, which introduced the now infamous Article 159 (2) (d).

The Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, serve as the primary guide in civil matters. They provide for timelines for doing things, but these timelines can be extended and the failure to adhere to them is rarely, if ever, fatal. By way of example Order 21 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules requires courts to pronounce judgments within 60 days of the conclusion of the hearing. It, however, provides that where judgment is not pronounced within 60 days, the judge is simply required to give reasons. The failure to adhere to the timeline is not fatal. Practically, judgments are rarely delivered within this timeline and judges rarely give reasons. Even where the timelines are set out under the Civil Procedure Act, Section 95 provides that these timelines can be extended and therefore failure to adhere to the timelines is not fatal.

This is not the case in election matters. Election matters are governed by the Elections Act and the Rules which represent a complete code that governs, the filing, prosecution, and determination of election petitions. The Civil Procedure Act and the Civil Procedure Rules,

2010 do not apply. In this code the timelines for filing, hearing and determination of election petitions and their appeals are a question of substantive law (the Constitution and the Elections Act) as opposed to procedural law and are therefore given an added significance. This was recognised by the Court of Appeal in **Ferdinand Ndung'u Waititu v Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission [IEBC] & 8 others [2013] eKLR** which held that:

"These timelines set by the Constitution and the Elections Act are neither negotiable nor can they be extended by any court for whatever reason. It is indeed the tyranny of time, if we may call it so. "

A practical example of the dichotomy of approaches between election matters and ordinary litigation is the treatment of late of filing of an appeal. Under Rule 82 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2010, although a record of appeal ought to be filed within 60 days of filing the notice of appeal, the time required for the preparation and delivery of proceedings is excluded from the computation of the 60 days. An appeal can, as a result, be filed much later. No such leeway is given in election appeals, an election appeal must be filed strictly within the timeline set out under the Elections Act. The Court of Appeal in **John Munuve Mati v Returning Officer Mwingi North Constituency, Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & Paul Musyimi Nzengu [2018] eKLR** explained:

"The 2010 rules regulates the filing of all appeals in this Court. In general appeals, there is no serious time constraint. Parties have as many as 14 days to file a notice of appeal and 60 days thereafter to file the record of appeal. Where a party has applied for proceedings and complied with **rule 82**, the record of appeal can be filed even three or five years later so long as there is a certificate of delay. That luxury is not available in an election petition appeal. By dint of section 85A of the Elections Act, an election petition appeal must be filed within 30 days from the date of the judgment of the High Court and heard and determined within 6 months from the date it was filed."

Whereas the timelines for filing, hearing, and determining election petitions and their appeals are set out under the Constitution and the Elections Act and cannot be extended. Other timelines are provided under relevant subsidiary legislation or may be imposed by the court and may be extended. By way of example in **Mary Emaase Otucho v Geoffrey Omuse & another [2017] eKLR** Rule 19 of the Elections (Parliamentary and County Elections) Petitions Rules, 2017 was applied to extend the time for a respondent to file a response to the election petition which is set out under the Rules. The court was however clear that when considering an application to extend time an election court must always consider the impact of the extension of time on the timely determination of the election petition as the timeline for determining an election petition cannot be extended.

Kenya has made tremendous step in meeting timeliness in resolving election related matters. In the Constitution (2010) presidential dispute petition should be determined within 14 days from date of filing. Other election petitions are to be determined within 6 months from time of filing. According to Gitonga (2019), the presidential petition guidelines assist in instilling trust in political actors and avoiding suspicion.

2.4.2.5 Establishment of Local Peace Committees

In several nations, democratic administrations have emerged as a result of elections. "South Africa, Benin, Senegal, Cape Verde, Ghana, and Mali" are a few of these nations. Autocratic administrations in nations like Niger, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have also led to the emergence of more stable societies (Gabrial, 2002). As stated by Hart (2006) and the European Union (2012), "election results have been altered in favor of legitimate autocratic regime or the succession dynasty systems" in certain instances. At about 20 to

25 percent of African elections, violence is still a significant factor. At least 4,000 people have died as a result of election-related violence in recent years in nations including Cote D'Ivoire (2010-2011), Kenya (2007-2008), and Zimbabwe (2000-2008), forcing hundreds of inhabitants to flee their homes (Kinyeki, 2017; Cook, 2011). Election-related violence has the potential to cause people to lose faith in democratic processes. Furthermore, as saw in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, there is a good likelihood that nations that have experienced election-related violence will see it again during future elections. Building public trust, inadequate training for security personnel, and misinterpreting elections are a few of the difficulties in handling electoral disputes. Nonetheless, these difficulties present chances to enhance electoral disputes since countries may draw lessons from them, increase public confidence, develop their security forces, and inform the public about what elections entail (Munga, Mwabu & Kiplagat, 2014).

Local initiatives to promote peace grew out of desperation and frustration with violence. First "reactions were dominated largely by international actors and were based on the relief model" (Njoroge, 2012). Food aid usually comes first, then the reunification of displaced communities, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. Rehabilitation includes the pursuit of peace and reconciliation. Nonetheless, ongoing displacement issues resulted in outside actors burning out. Moreover, the UNP (2008) states that "donor fatigue was depleting resources and escalating dissatisfaction with the government." Despite the void left by the departure of foreign actors, "it did leave local actors with the space to reassert their role and engage in a wide range of activities related to returning, rehabilitation, and reconstruction." (Njoroge, 2012).

For the majority of local actors, establishing peace presented unique difficulties. It needed particular "skills and institutional support, which were hard to come by in the country and locally." Reductions in funding for local actors assisting displaced persons resulted from the removal of foreign actors (Njoroge, 2012). A number of difficulties were "created at the grassroots level, where the majority of displaced individuals started exhibiting indicators of fatigue with aid initiatives and a strong desire to go back home." This put tremendous pressure on actors to consider problems other than relief, which was a difficult task requiring large sums of money and long-term commitments (UNDP, 2008:68). Local actors were compelled to use local resources due to a lack of government assistance, resources, and experience. They "looked for opportunities, skills, and capacities among members of the communities they worked with. Conflict transformation started with the initiation of peace actions through rigorous collaboration and teamwork. To put it briefly, local peacebuilders gained knowledge while promoting peace" (Oluoch, 2015).

"Public trust and understanding of the results process and how the results translate into seats or winners is crucial. In other words, it's critical to inform voters ahead of time on the process, including the minimum number of votes required, seat distribution, and run-off procedures" (Fischer, 2012:43). For example, in 2007 tensions quickly increased in "East Timor when coalition building resulted from the use of a convoluted mechanism for seat allocation, which did not appear to fairly reward the party with the most votes. Though these post-election day activities don't always succeed, IFES and its allies' massive education campaign played a crucial role in lowering tensions. Local and international groups working on non-election issues should keep a close eye out for signs of growing conflict and tension during the election process, especially during the waiting period for

results, in order to improve work using the ICEP lens" (Fischer, 2012:44). It is recommended that warning indicators be "reported to the appropriate authorities or via reliable networks." This communication loop might be created by adding conflict-related information sharing to already-existing, coordinated efforts or by using an ICEP working group in a different capacity." (UNDP, 2017:45).

Avoiding post-election confrontations, which frequently revolve around results announcements, requires preparation and training. To ensure that all stakeholders have the necessary confidence in the results process, it is imperative to provide "a transparent electoral results system; pay extra attention to explaining how results aggregation and tabulation will actually work; and sharing timelines and results, by polling station level, at all steps of the process" (Fischer, 2012:47). The procedure is essential, as are methods for sharing information, cooperating with the media, making public announcements, and creating backup plans in case of disagreements or controversy. Building confidence between the EMB and parties prior to results being released by having these procedures and preparations in place is crucial to minimizing negative reactions at the first indication of issues" (Fischer et al., 2015:48).

Watchdog and monitoring programs can offer accurate, ongoing information on current/increasing tensions, electoral violence, or election breaches, regardless of whether they are started by civil society organizations or state authorities (Fjelde & Kristine, 2016:81). Because they "address impunity, secrecy, and gossip — factors that commonly generate electoral conflict in transitional democracies, they can boost the success of conflict prevention. Conflict is less likely when there are monitoring and watchdog measures in place to help restrict the area and opportunities for fraud and corruption. These methods include the electoral dispute resolution (EDR) case monitoring system, the transparency measures the EMB introduces, political financing regulations, conflict monitoring, early warning systems, election observation, and many more" (Fjelde & Kristine, 2016:82). Conflict is avoided in large part through the work done by EMBs in

developing best practices and legal requirements to maintain the integrity of an election process.

This has been one way to curb violence in Jamaica, "where the link between corruption and electoral violence is well known." 2011 saw the local alliance Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE) launch the Corruption Hurts campaign in support of the Election Commission's efforts to enact broad reforms aimed at curbing corruption. Political parties, local groups, and the media are examples of non-governmental actors who might be better known for encouraging and carrying out advocacy and monitoring initiatives (Fjelde & Kristine, 2016:83). Early warning "mechanisms for preventing electoral violence as well as educational initiatives and campaigns that promote peaceful campaigning and legal ways to settle disputes, assist in defining the rights and obligations of individuals in a democracy, and define what constitutes and does not constitute legitimate debate and disagreement" are among the strategies for preventing electoral violence" (Fjelde & Kristine, 2016:84).

2.2.4.6 Conducting Voter Awareness Campaigns

A voter awareness campaign entails steps taken towards educating the voters on their civic and democratic rights (Boone, 2011). , A 2015 Commonwealth report states that civic and voter education contributes to giving voters the information and self-assurance they need to cast an informed ballot. Peaceful elections allow citizens to choose leaders who they believe will best handle their concerns. It's important to include young people outside of the educational setting in order to prevent politicians from abusing their influence. Politicians, as can be seen from the previous statement, care more about their personal agendas than they do about the needs of young people. The study came to the conclusion

that combating the recurrent electoral violence requires civic education. According to one respondent, "There should also be a lot of civic education done not by politicians but by religious groups, civil society, etc. Inform people on the value of voting and what to do in the event that their candidate loses. A great deal of preparation in civics is required."

2.5 Knowledge Gaps

Even though various peace-building approaches for electoral conflict have been explored globally, regionally and locally, there is ideally little evidence on the effectiveness of peace building approaches in mitigating electoral related conflict beyond the common findings and recommendations such as strengthening of EMBs and conducting peace advocacy campaigns to reduce the likelihood of conflict in every electoral cycles. This is because the causative factors for electoral conflicts in Kenya vary in scope from one region to another. For instance, the causative factors of electoral in areas such as Naivasha, Molo, Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia slightly vary from those in urban slums areas such as Kariobangi, Dandora, Kayole, Kiambiu, Githogoro, Kibera, Mathare Mukuru slums and Korogocho. This study reports the investigation of the influence of peace-building strategies for managing electoral conflict in Trans-Nzoia County. The study also reports the causative factors of electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County in order to identify the appropriate peace building approaches and solutions.

Reviewed literature works such as by Angoma and Gebremichael (2016) recognized the role of African peace building centered solutions for controlling economic, social and political conflicts such as electoral conflict. However, the study provides sweeping regional peace building approaches for combating conflicts in Africa such as in South Sudan's

conflict with limited practical solutions such as the perennial electoral conflicts witnessed in countries such as Burundi, DRC and Kenya. The purpose of this study is to identify lasting peace building approaches for managing recurrent electoral conflict particularly in Trans Nzoia County in Kenya.

A risk assessment of the potential influence of pre-existing factors such as long-standing land grievances; political patronage, identity politics and political management and administration on electoral conflict require critical information on the would-be exposure and its role in electoral conflicts. This study seeks to evaluate the influence of exposure to politics of identity (tribal politics), emotive land grievances and electoral management by the relevant authorities in order to identify appropriate peace building approaches for combating electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County.

Further, a review of the influence of electoral conflict management initiatives revealed inclusive findings on combating electoral conflict. For instance, works by Collier and Vicente (2014b), Asunka, Brierley, Golden, Kramon and Ofori (2019) and Lynch, Cheeseman and Willis (2019) revealed that adoption of electoral management initiatives such as attitude transformation approaches and election monitoring have positive correlation with low levels of election-related conflict. However, the studies provide a generalized view of electoral management initiatives on mitigating electoral conflict. This study seeks to identify and determine the influence of peace building approaches adopted in Trans Nzoia County in mitigating electoral related conflict and conflicts.

2.6 Theoretical Framework

Theoretical review aids the researcher in making assumptions about the existing relationship between the study variables, which are essential for formulating the research questions that will guide the investigation. A theoretical framework, according to Grant and Osanloo (2016), is an intellectual foundation for a research project based on an existing theory in a field of study that is connected to and/or reflects the study's hypothesis. This research relies heavily on the theoretical frameworks of conflict transformation.

2.6.1 Theory of Peace-building

Building peace is the process of making peace happen. Approaches, breadth of operations, and time frames for peace building vary widely depending on one's conception of peace. It should come as no surprise, then, that the phrase and concept of peace building are utilized with varied understandings and definitions in contemporary study and practice. Bertram (2022) argues that the study of peace building is still in its infancy. As a result, it should come as no surprise that the concept of peace building is open to a wide range of interpretations. What's really fascinating, though, is how different researchers have come to define peace building as a 'process' including a wide variety of actions and stakeholders.

What Kofi Annan calls "the various concurrent and integrated actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation" Peace-building, in Lederach's definition, is an effort to deal with the structural, social, and cultural factors that contribute to the emergence of violence in the first place. Both of these descriptions of the process of creating peace are accurate and useful. Annan also incorporates reconciliatory practices of altering attitudes and resolving the sources of the

conflict. Annan's plan assumes that the process will begin after hostilities cease, but what if that doesn't happen? Lederach includes all the steps and methods that are necessary to move from conflict to lasting peace. Consequently, peace building is an all-encompassing process that must incorporate the following: post-conflict reconstruction; enhancing and establishing social interactions; providing aid assistance; reconciling differences; and making fundamental changes to social and structural systems.

Throughout history, civilizations have used various councils of elders, religious leaders, and other organized venues to foster a culture of peace. It wasn't until the late 19th century that peace-building as an institution in international law began to take shape. The United Nations was established after World War II with the primary goal of maintaining international stability through the provision of mediation, facilitation, good offices, and arbitration between member states. This chain of events began with The Hague Peace Conference in 1898 and continued with the formation of the League of Nations. Before Johan Galtung (1969), the term "peace building" had never been used before. He identified it as one of three strategies for achieving world peace, together with establishing peace and maintaining it. Galtung distinguishes between negative peace (the absence of violence) and positive peace (a harmonious society) as the foundation for his approach to peacemaking. The absence of physical violence can be maintained by peacekeeping, but only through peacemaking and peace building can the absence of structural violence be achieved. The goal of peacemaking in conflict resolution is to reduce hostility between warring groups so that underlying causes of violence can be addressed. When the underlying causes of conflict are addressed and prevented from escalating into violence, peace building

transforms into positive peace through the establishment of peace structures and institutions based on justice, equity, and cooperation.

The positive and negative peace presented by Johan Galtung are reflected in most modern definitions and conceptions of peace-building. The phrase "peace building" was given new life in the United Nations Secretary General's Report "An Agenda for Peace" in 1992, which led to a rapid increase in its use. It was in response to the increased number of UN-led peacekeeping missions aimed at stabilizing countries following war that the Agenda was proposed. When viewed through this lens, efforts to restore calm after a conflict are referred to as "post-conflict peace building." In its original form, "An Agenda for Peace" presents a narrow definition of peace building, one that focuses on preventing the recurrence of violence in the aftermath of armed conflicts and assisting a country in establishing the ground rules for beginning the journey towards positive peace. Building peace can be understood in two ways, each of which corresponds to one of Galtung's two poles: Liberal peacemaking and long-term stability in peacemaking

The term "Preconflict peace-building" was coined by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1995. This was due to his usage of the term "peace-building" in 1995, when he meant only post-conflict military and civilian support for promoting durable peace and post-war reconstruction in order to avert further eruptions. Activities such as (de)militarization, control of small arms, institutional reform, enhanced police and judicial systems, monitoring of human rights, electoral reform, and social and economic growth are all examples of what Bertrand calls "pre-conflict peace-building" (Bertrand, 1997). So, to ensure long-term stability and fairness, peace builders implement initiatives that target the root causes of conflict and historical grievances. Therefore, it is possible to view

peacemaking and conflict resolution as two sides of the same coin. Peace building includes resolving conflicts, but it takes a longer time and more ongoing effort to achieve lasting peace.

Interaction between people of diverse backgrounds, as proposed by the "contact hypothesis" of peace-building theory, is thought to lessen prejudice and hostility between communities. Trade, business, trade unions, professional gatherings, sports, and other similar activities can all serve as avenues for interaction. However, studies have shown that contact only has a positive effect on attitudes when it is close, pleasant, between equals, well-supported, and aimed at achieving a common purpose. Unless such prerequisites are met, more interaction may incite antagonism. Many academics have cast doubt on the effectiveness of interpersonal communication in resolving intergroup conflicts. Even if interaction leads to a shift in perspective, returning to one's home community might be difficult for those who have undergone a transformation. Their newfound tolerance for the enemy will undoubtedly be met with skepticism by their friends and neighbors. Therefore, friendship cannot be established solely through communication.

According to the literature on peace-building, an Early Warning System (EWS) is a structured system for keeping tabs on the onset and development of violence in a society. Early Warning Systems are defined by Diller (1997) as mechanisms or sets of procedures that detect, process, and disseminate signals of possible or impending hazard to enable early counter-measures to prevent or lessen negative impact. According to Diller, early warning is the act of keeping tabs on a conflict's development and then disseminating that data in order to facilitate interventions that can prevent or lessen its negative effects.

Dorn (1997) defines Early Warning as the act of notifying a recognized authority (e.g., the United Nations Security Council) to the potential of a new (or renewed) armed conflict at an early enough stage for that authority to take preventive action. The foundation of preventative diplomacy is early warning. The process begins with the recognition of existing tensions and the emergence of possible crises that could lead to armed conflict. With this kind of foreknowledge, the people may exert pressure on the contending parties from all over the world. As part of early warning, it may be necessary to keep an eye on ongoing social strife and use any opportunities that occur to help end it.

2.6.2 Conflict Transformation Theory

John Paul Lederach proposed the theory in 1997. The major concept behind conflict transformation theory is that, a sustainable way for managing conflicts such as those of elections is through the transformation of structures, root causes or systems, which contribute to conflicts and prejudice. The theory indicates that addressing the causal structures, cultures and foundations that enthrone political intolerance and societal conflicts (Montambeault, Dembinska & Papillon, 2019). Conflict transformation is a holistic and multidimensional approach for dealing with violent conflict in all its phases, (Lederach, 1997). According to the theory, managing conflicts such as those related to elections is a continuing process of change from negative to positive associations, attitudes behaviour and structures (Miall, 2004). The theory considers peace as centered and entrenched in the quality of relations such as societal interactions and the ways in which the society structure its social, political, economic and cultural relationships, (Marc, 2012).

Modern conflicts, according to proponents of the conflict transformation theory, call for more than just a rethinking of perspectives and a search for common ground. It's possible that the underlying structure of the parties and their connections is entangled in a web of tense interactions that goes beyond the immediate scene of the conflict. Therefore, conflict transformation is the process of actively interacting with and changing the relationships, interests, discourses, and, if necessary, the fundamental constitution of society that allows for the perpetuation of violent conflict. People view healthy disagreement as a crucial change agent or catalyst. There are a variety of complimentary roles that can be played in the long-term process of peace-building, from those within the conflict parties themselves to those within the afflicted society or region to those from the outside with relevant human and material resources. This points to a broad and inclusive strategy, with an emphasis on aiding conflicted parties within a society rather than relying on outside mediators. Additionally, it acknowledges that conflicts are modified gradually, through a series of minor or greater modifications and particular processes, in which a variety of individuals may play significant roles. In the words of Lederach:

Conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we do not primarily, see 'the setting and the people in it as the ,problem' and the outsider as the ,answer'. Rather, we understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and building on people and resources within the setting (Lederach 1995).

However, states may opt for accommodation and communal groups may opt for political forms of confrontation provided there is adequate capacity in governance and society, if politics are not overly militarized, and if the international context is favorable. By fostering legitimate decision-making capacity, strengthening autonomous growth, and maintaining civil rather than military politics, this can lead to a pattern of constructive conflict. All of

these things help people get the necessities they need. The model suggests how conflict patterns interact with the fulfillment of human needs, the adequacy of political and economic institutions, and the decisions made by political actors, going beyond basic structural or behavioral explanations. It also shows how alternative paths might cause either positive or negative escalations in the dispute. Vayrynen argues in favor of a theory of conflict focused on transformation rather than settlement, with a focus on the necessity of understanding the dynamic transformation of conflicts. The vast majority of conflict theory assumes the status quo in terms of issues, people, and interests, and then seeks ways to reduce or do away with friction between them. However, as a result of the social, economic, and political dynamics of societies, the issues, actors, and interests shift with time (Vayrynen 1991, 4). His method is largely analytic and theoretical, but it also makes suggestions for how peacemakers could intervene. (See Vayrynen 1991):

1. actor transformations – internal changes in parties, or the appearance of new parties;
2. issue transformations – altering the agenda of conflict issues;
3. rule transformations – changes in the norms or rules governing a conflict;
4. Structural transformations – the entire structure of relationships and power distribution in the conflict is transformed.

One of the most thorough formulations of conflict transformation thinking for practitioners is Lederach's (1997). Inspired by a search for the principles of peace and justice, truth and kindness, he sees peace-building as the gradual transition from a war system to a peace system. Changes in conflict's key dimensions—including those at the individual, structural, relational, and cultural levels—occur across varying time scales and at varying levels of the system. As such, peace-building is understood to be a structured process. Strategic time

frames (such as focusing on mid-term steps to build a peace constituency while simultaneously embracing a vision of the desired future and an awareness of the current crisis) are linked to appropriate strategies (such as networking between mid-level leaders with links to parties across the conflict). Lederach proposes the pyramid model of leadership, which places powerful people at the top, followed by religious and communal figures in the middle, and ordinary citizens at the bottom. All of these overlapping spheres of influence need to be addressed in tandem by any serious peace movement.

According to Mitchell and Hancock (2012), minimizing conflict, developing perceptions of justice, and strengthening peaceful ties between multi-ethnic groups all need an understanding of the dynamics that lead to electoral conflict. Effective solutions for reducing interethnic tensions and preventing conflict in multiethnic communities can be derived from the Conflict Transformation Theory's three pillars of analysis: factors, actions, and impacts (tools for conflict evaluation). According to the theory, resolving disputes in the long run requires tackling social justice concerns like identity politics, land inequities, and political power inequality. Managing recurrent election conflicts requires building the skills necessary to actively participate in change processes at the individual, group, and societal levels (Conteh-Morgan, 2004). Among these abilities is the ability to engage in conversation and public education initiatives. For instance, in order to maintain peace in Trans Nzoia County after the recent election, all residents, regardless of party allegiance, will need to work together to address the root causes of the unrest.

According to Conflict Transformation Theory, the first process of transformation is attitudes the transformation. This involves changing and pacifying negative perceptions. The second process of transformation is behaviour transformation. The third process of

transformation is the transformation of the conflict itself. Conflict transformation entails seeking to ascertain the root causes of electoral conflicts and eliminating the source of discordancy among the political actors. The process of transformation entails identifying and acknowledging the dialectic nature of electoral conflicts and changing them. As such, sustainable solutions should be employed to ease ethnic and political intolerance among the diverse communities in Trans Nzoia County. This is because the process of transformation begins with unmasking violence and uncovering hidden conflict in order to make their consequences visible to victims and communities.


The change and improvement necessary to transform the attitude of the community members towards each other that are at the basis for electoral conflict and which; the political elite often exploit. Conflict Transformation theory is relevant to the study as it provides deeper understanding on the impact of peace building strategies such as grassroots / local peace advocacy and capacity building through mass education and training as it helps put emphasis on individual thoughts, emotions and decisions, as well as social norms and practices that play a role in ending ethno-political conflicts.

Micro to macro issues, local to global levels, grassroots to elite actors, and rapid to slow timescales are all addressed in a conflict transformation approach. Rather than focusing on facilitating outcomes or delivering settlements, this approach strives to build capacity and support structural transformation. It aims to address not just the immediate aftermath of violent conflict but also the underlying causes and systemic factors that contribute to it.

2.7 Conceptual Model of the Study

A conceptual model denotes the researcher’s synthesis of the previous related studies to explain and resolve the study problem, (Regoniel, 2015). A conceptual model showing the relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable is presented diagrammatically in Figure 2.1. The conceptual model guided the study in solving the research problem.

Figure 2.1 Conceptual model showing interaction of variables



Source: Researcher (2023)

The study conceptual model is supported by the tenets of the theory of peace-building that emphasized that electoral conflicts are human caused phenomenon and therefore needs human based approaches and strategies to solve them. The electoral conflict causal factors such as long standing historical conflicts over land claims, forced migrations, violence during electoral circle, conflicts over resource allocation and distribution can only be managed through well designed peace-building strategies such as establishment of peace committees, application of election technical approaches, grassroots peace advocacy, attitude transformation, awareness creation, peace-building approaches and also through holding of dialogue and mediation sessions. Intervening variables that would moderate the phenomenon included government policy frameworks, political will, intervention by NGOs and FBOs, Sub County Peace Committees, resolution of dispute mechanisms and lack of good electoral laws.

The conceptual framework also entails the principles outlined in conflict transformation theory. The theory deduces the causes of conflict including micro to macro issues running from local to global levels, grassroots to elite actors, and rapid to slow timescales. Rather than focusing on facilitating outcomes or delivering settlements, this approach strives to build capacity and support structural transformation. It aims to address not just the immediate aftermath of violent conflict but also the underlying causes and systemic factors that contribute to it. This is what this conceptual model of the study stands for.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a review of the research methodology; the chapter discusses the methods and procedures that were used in the research. These include, research design, the study area, target population, the sampling strategy, data collection methods and procedures, pilot test, data analysis, the limitations and ethical considerations that were followed during the study.

3.2 Research Design

The study adopted descriptive and evaluation research design because it utilizes mixed methods techniques and provides the researcher with rigorous approach to utilize both qualitative and quantitative data (Almalki, 2016). Descriptive research design was employed to measure participants' perception about the nature of electoral conflicts, challenges and opportunities in the management of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County. Evaluation research design was used to measure the effectiveness of peace-building strategies used in the management of electoral conflict in Trans-Nzoia County, Kenya. In agreement, Aramo-Immonen (2011) affirms that descriptive research design allows the integration of both qualitative and quantitative data hence providing the researcher with a rigorous approach to answering research questions. Given that the researcher sought to analyze holistically causative factors of electoral related conflict, identify and determine the influence of peace building approaches adopted in Trans Nzoia County in Kenya, descriptive research approach was appropriate for the study.

3.3 Study Area

Trans Nzoia County is located within Kenya's former Rift Valley Province 380 km North West of Nairobi. It situated within on area of 2,495.5 km² surrounded by the Republic of Uganda to the North West, Bungoma to the West and South West, Kakamega and Uasin Gishu to the South East, Elgeyo Markwet to the East and West Pokot to the North. According to the Kenya National Bureau of statistics 2019 census, the County has a population of 990341 with a population density of 396.9/km². This region lies between Mt. Elgon and Cherangany Hills approximately between latitudes 00° 52' and 10° 18' north of the equator and longitudes 340° 38' and 350° 23' east of the great Meridian. Kitale town is the largest commercial city and the administrative capital of the County. Other major towns include Kiminini, Sibanga, Maili Saba, Endebess and Saboti.

The Sabaot people initially inhabited Trans Nzoia County; however, after independence individuals from other ethnic groups in Kenya bought most of the vacated white settler farms, (Médard, 2010). Today the contrasts in the size of landholdings and population densities within the County remain uneven due to the internal migrations and land subdivisions in the former White Highlands. Luhya community now predominantly inhabits Kitale, which is currently a capital town of Trans Nzoia County, with other tribes occupying comprising less than 1% of the population.

According to the County Government of Trans Nzoia (2018), agriculture is the primary economic activity in the county. The majority of farmers in Trans Nzoia County practice wheat and maize cultivation in addition to dairy farming on both large and small scales. Due to the County's location on the mountain slopes, its climate is typically mild and

temperate, with average annual temperatures between 10 and 27 degrees Celsius. The County receives between 1000 and 1200 millimetres of precipitation annually, with the wettest months occurring between April and October. Tea, coffee, horticulture, and commercial enterprises are also extremely important to the economy of the county. There are dairy farms and a thriving tourism industry due to the abundance of touring sites and tourist attractions in the county. Numerous companies and government institutions, including Kenya Seed Company, Elgon Tea Factory, Western Seed Company and K.C.C employ a large number of urban residents.

Currently, the County politics is dominated either by the Luhya community (initially dominated by Kalenjin community). Majority of the Luhya community residing in the county originate from Kakamega, Bungoma and Busia; while most of the Kalenjin community residing in the county originates from Pokot, Uasin Gishu and Elgeyo Marakwet. A minority of the population of the County are from the Kikuyu and Kisii communities. This study area is considered appropriate for this study owing to the recurrent elections conflict during every election cycle as witnessed in 2007 which led to the displacement of people in Kiboroo in Trans Nzoia West Sub-County; Salama, Balale and parts of Chepchoina in Kwana Sub County.

Majority of people living in Trans Nzoia County are Christians. Prominent churches in the county include Anglican (ACK), Roman Catholic, Friends (Quakers), Seven-Day Adventist (SDA), and Presbyterians. There are numerous evangelical churches among them the Deliverance, African Inland Church (AIC), Africa Gospel Church (AGC), the Redeemed Church, PEFA, Full Gospel and Kenya Assemblies of God (KAG). Other faiths

such as Islam and Hinduism are also professed especially in major towns (County Government of Trans Nzoia, 2018).

Oshwal adherents in Kitale, the administrative center of Trans Nzoia, also embrace Jainism, a faith that encourages non-violence toward all living things while placing a strong emphasis on spiritual independence and equality. Mount Elgon is home to the indigenous Sabaot people, who are a subtribe of the Kalenjin. They are fiercely protective of their unique heritage. They have a long history of working as shepherds. They once thought that God resided on the peak of Mount Elgon or in the clouds, both of which were out of their reach. Formerly pastoralists, today's residents of Trans Nzoia County are major players in the agricultural sector thanks to the widespread adoption of Christianity, widespread literacy, and widespread intermarriage.

One County Referral Hospital, four Sub-county Hospitals, and thirty-three Dispensaries add up to around seventy-eight healthcare facilities in Trans Nzoia County. Seven hospitals, twenty-eight medical offices, and six or so nursing homes may be found throughout the county. Kitale Referral Hospital, Kapsara sub-county Hospital, Cherangani Sub-county Hospital, Endebess Sub-county Hospital, Mt.Elgon Private Hospital, and Cherangani Nursing Home are just a few of the excellent medical facilities available. Over 470 elementary schools and 120 secondary institutions can be found in Trans Nzoia right now. There are more than 20 colleges and universities in Trans Nzoia alone, including a university campus, nursing and teaching colleges, a farmers' institute, a youth polytechnic, and a variety of business schools (County Government of Trans Nzoia, 2018).

Most outstanding places of interest include Mount Elgon National Park, Saiwa Swamp National Park and Kitale Nature Conservancy. Mt. Elgon National Park is located approximately 11 kilometers from Kitale town. Some of the wild animals found here include elephants, buffalos, black and white colobus, giant forest hog and over 420 bird species. From Nairobi, Trans Nzoia is accessible by road via Nakuru-Eldoret, a 380 km journey that normally takes 5–6 hours. Trans Nzoia can also be accessed by air through Kitale's small airport located about 7 kilometers from Kitale town. The road from Nairobi to Kitale is tarmacked and smooth (County Government of Trans Nzoia, 2018).




Figure 3.1 Showing the Map of Trans Nzoia County, Kenya

Source: GIS, 2019

3.4 Study Population

According to Cooper and Schindler (2011), a study population refers to a group that the research focuses on. Target population refers to a specific population from which information is obtained. This target population comprised of household heads (223808), village elders (234) and religious leaders (110). The study population included chiefs (36),

MCAAs (24), Deputy County Commissioners (5), County Commissioners (1), Sub County Commander (5) and NGOs/CSOs (5). The target population of the study were drawn from all the five sub-counties comprising Kwana, Endebess, Saboti, Kiminini and Cherangany Counties.

The study targeted members of NGOs/CSOs specifically from Rural Women Peace Link, Mercy Corps, UNDP, Child Rescue, Kenya and Kenya National Commission of Human Rights, Kitale Regional Office because they were key ones directly involved in peace-building initiatives across the Trans Nzoia County, especially during occurrence of electoral conflicts. Local peace actors such as household heads, village elders, religious leaders and local administrators (area chiefs and MCAs) were targeted since they facilitate joint, all-encompassing grassroots level peace-making and peace-building processes in their own jurisdictions and they have a direct access to the conflicting parties, especially the locals. This is because they are in a position to give views regarding the peace building processes for pacifying electoral conflicts. Similarly, County Administrators comprising County Commissioners and Sub-County Administrators they were targeted since they mediate conflict scenarios. Overall, the targeted population was chosen because they provided understanding on the various peace building processes including causative factors of conflicts as well as challenges affecting implementation of peace building initiatives in the Trans Nzoia County.

Ordinary citizens were represented in the study by selected household heads from Trans Nzoia County because they are the ones who are most affected whenever election conflicts arise. It is the ordinary citizens who take part in the election conflicts and suffers most from its consequences.

3.5 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size

3.5.1 Sampling Techniques

The sampling plan details the study's sample size, as well as its sampling unit, sampling frame, and sampling techniques. The sampling frame defines the universe of possible sample selections from the population (Rai & Campbell, 2006).

3.5.1.1 Sampling of Household Heads

The targeted population of household heads in Trans Nzoia County was 223808 and the study employed the Slovin's formula to determine the sample size (n) given the population size (N) and margin of error (e). The study thereafter employed simple random sampling technique to determine the sample size of the participants in the study

3.5.1.2 Sampling of Village Elders

The total number of village elders in Trans Nzoia County was 234, and the researcher employed a simple random sampling technique because of its simplicity and lack of biasness. The researcher also used it to make generalizations about the population. The researcher choose simple random sampling because the total population size was known. 30 percent of the village leaders were selected as participants in the study.

3.5.1.3 Sampling Religious Leaders

The researcher employed a simple random sampling technique to determine the sample size of religious leaders from target population of 110. 30 percent of the religious leaders were included in the study.

3.5.1.4 Sampling of Key Informants

The study adopted purposive sampling to draw a sample of 34 Key Informants. This is because purposive sampling allowed the researcher to use a predetermined criterion of importance in identifying and selecting participants. According to Patton (2015) and Palinkas, Horwitz, Green, Wisdom, Duan, and Hoagwood (2015), purposive sampling allowed the researcher to select participants who yielded 'information rich' on the subject under study. The study purposively selected 11 Chiefs from target population of 36 which amounted to 30% of them, 7 MCAs from target population of 24 (30%), further, for the NGOs/CSOs in Trans Nzoia County, the study also purposively selected 5 NGO/CSOs members out of 50 (10%). The study purposively using 2019 census records selected all Deputy County Commissioners, County Commissioner and Sub County Commanders because of the key role they play in management of electoral conflicts in their areas of jurisdictions.

3.5.2 Sample Size

Based on sampling techniques and sample determinants, the study had a sample size of 203 comprising of 100 household heads from target population of 223808, 70 village elders from 234, and 33 religious leaders from a target of 110. The study had also a sample size of 34 key informants comprising of 11 chiefs (12) from target population of 36, 7 MCAs from a target of 24, Deputy County Commissioners (5) out of a target of 5, 1 County Commissioner (1), 5 members of NGO/CSOs out of 50, and 5 Sub County Commander out of 5 as a sample size of key informants. In total, the study has 203 sample size respondents and 36 key informants.

3.6 Data Collection Methods and Instruments

This study utilized both primary and secondary data.

3.6.1 Primary Data

Data collection in research refers to the precise and methodical gathering of raw data (Abawi, 2013). This study employed a mixed-method approach during data collection involving the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitative approach was used to capture data with the help of structured questionnaires with a set of predetermined questions. Qualitative approach on the other hand entailed the use of interview schedules and Focus Group Discussions to capture participants' views and opinions regarding peace building strategies and electoral conflict in form of an in-depth discussion. Interviews and Focus Group Discussions involved selection of Key Informants (Chiefs, Village Elders, Household heads, Religious Leaders, Members of NGOs/CSOs and County Administrators) across the selected sample of the study.

3.6.1.1 Questionnaires

The study employed structured Likert Scale-questionnaires (Appendix II) to collect quantitative data from Household heads, religious leaders and village elders. Likert-scaled structured questionnaires were appropriate because they ensured there is consistency in the questions asked and data that was to be generated is easy to analyze. In agreement, Cummings, Kohn and Hulley (2013) affirm that structured questionnaires are easy to administer and takes less time for the respondents to answer. Likert scale is a nominal interval scale that is classified into five segments to quantify the level of agreement or disagreement with a given statement.

The questionnaire was divided into 2 sections namely; Section A and B. Section A was intended to capture data regarding participants' Gender, Age, and Level of Education. Section B on the other hand contained subsections with Likert-scaled questions formulated according to each research objective/question. Likert scale is an interval scale that explicitly uses five anchors ranging between 1 and 5. A Likert scale questionnaire is preferred as it makes it easy to code the participant's responses into quantitative format for data analysis. The five-point Likert scale questions enables the participants to state their degree of agreement / disagreement with each of the questionnaire items where each item contains five reaction classifications, that is, *Strongly Disagree*, *Moderately Agree*, *Agree* and *Strongly Agree*. Questionnaire was responded to by household heads

3.6.1.2 Interview

An interview schedule refers to a list containing a set of structured and predetermined questions to act as a guide to the researcher during the interviewer (Longhurst, 2003). The integration of in-depth interview schedules allows the researcher to probe further as regards to the causes of endemic electoral conflicts as well as establish the influence of peace building strategies in Trans Nzoia County. According to Pickard (2013), the use of key informants' interview allows the researcher to document various perspectives of reality and understanding of why people think and act in the different ways that they do. Thus, the study employed structured interviews with open-ended queries to obtain further information concerning underlying causes of electoral conflict and explore the influence of peace building approaches adopted in Trans Nzoia County. The study purposively interviewed 34 Key Informants comprising of Chiefs, MCAs, , NGO/CSOs members, Deputy County Commissioner, County Commissioner and Sub- County Police

Commander. The interview schedule is as indicated in Appendix III and was responded to by KIs comprising NGOs, FBOs, CCs, and Chiefs,

3.6.1.3 Focus Group Discussion

Focus group discussion allows the researcher to gain an in depth understanding of social issues, (Nyumba, Wilson, Derrick & Mukherjee, 2018). Focus Group Discussion allows one to assess attitudes, beliefs, desire and reaction to the concepts, (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2013). Focus Group Discussions normally involves a small group of respondents. From the focus group discussions, the researcher can easily observe and interpret participant's reactions and thoughts on peace building strategies and their influence on electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County and was responded to by village elders.

According to Guest, Namey and McKenna (2017), the appropriate the number of participants for a focus group discussion varies, however, between six and eight participants are sufficient. Similarly, Carlsen and Glenton (2011) indicated that the point of saturation (minimum and maximum) for focus group discussion is between 4 and 15 participants. Equally, Hennink, Kaiser and Weber (2019) indicate that the ideal group size for a focus group is typically 6-10 participants. This study purposively conducted four (5) units of Focus Group Discussions (one FGD in every Sub County) comprising of 6-10 participants. When selecting a group of individuals for FGDs, the researcher ensured factors such as participants' age, gender and leadership hierarchy were taken into consideration to ensure everyone involved was comfortable to express himself or herself without feeling intimidated. In this study, the first Focus Group Discussion comprised of a

pool of local administrators (Chiefs/Sub-Chiefs) while the second pool of FGD comprised of Household Heads. The third pool of FGD participants consisted of village elders while the fourth pool of FGD group consisted of religious leaders. Finally, the fifth pool of FGD participants comprised of NGO/CSOs Members.

In order to ensure representative participants were selected to partake in the FGD, the study took into consideration various factors including the inclusion criteria. The study selected and categorized the participants based on their occupation, gender and age in order to ensure the participants are comfortable and easy to engage in a discussion without fear of intimidation. The first step included definition of the research question. Before constructing a focus group, the study defined the research question that the group focused in order to help to determine the appropriate participants and structure for the focus group. Secondly, the study determined the ideal group size for a focus group, (6-10 participants) in order to allow for a diverse range of opinions and perspectives to be heard. Thirdly, the study identified the target participants. The participants of the focus group were selected based on specific criteria such as age, gender, occupation, geographic location and hierarchy. Fourthly, the study developed a discussion guide with a list of open-ended questions organized based on the topics (objectives) which served as a guide during discussion with the focus group.

Additionally, the fifth step entailed selection of the FGD venue. The study considered proximity, neutrality and convenience of the venues in order to ensure the participants are comfortable. As such, the study used public meeting rooms (halls), community centers and other public spaces considered accessible to all participants. Most importantly, the study scheduled the FGDs by asking and confirming from the participants the appropriate time

that is convenient for all participants. This was done to ensure the participants engaged in the discussion long enough to allow for a meaningful conversation. To ensure that no researcher bias or prejudice occurs, the study used trained moderators to guide the conversation and ensure that all participants have an opportunity to share their perspectives. The use of a moderator during focus group discussion helped eliminate researchers' bias.

The focal point of FGD discussion was on structured topical issues generated based on the research questions. For instance, what are the types and causes of electoral conflict experienced in Trans Nzoia County? What are the strategic options of enhancing management of electoral conflict? What are some of the peace building approaches that have been implemented in Trans Nzoia County? How has peace building strategies adopted in Trans Nzoia County helped mitigate electoral conflict? Among others as indicated in the Focus Group Discussion Guide in Appendix IV.

3.6.1.4 Observation

The study used the observation checklist in Appendix V as a guide during data collection. Observation checklist in research helped researcher to determine specific outcomes to observe and assess. For instance, in this study, observation checklist contained peace-building strategies for managing electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County, which helped guide the researcher to evaluate the approaches adopted.

3.6.2 Secondary Data

The study reviewed publications such as the Kenya Human Rights Commission Election Observation Report 2007/2008, 2013 & 2017) to establish the trend and prevalence of electoral conflicts and nature of the peace building approaches adopted in Trans Nzoia

County. The study also reviewed relevant publications to determine the peace building approaches adopted for managing electoral conflicts in the last five electoral cycles.

3.6.2.1 Document Analysis

Document analysis is a critical examination of recorded information related to the issue under study. It is used to obtain unobtrusive data at the pleasure of the researcher (Karppinen & Moe, 2012). Therefore, census records, KNBS records, list of electoral victims, county religious records, records of chiefs and Village elders and list of NGOs and FBOs in the county and how they are associated with electoral conflicts.

The information required for this study was obtained from the Deputy County Commissioner. This required formal application and request for access to the information. This application was accompanied by a commitment that all necessary steps would be taken to conceal the identity of the persons whom the information pertains. The analysis of the participant documents assisted the researcher to collect in depth information on the background of the background of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia; peace-building strategies and management of electoral conflicts.

In order to ensure objectivity in document analysis, a document analysis schedule was applied. The information sought from the documents which were analyzed included the type of document, procedures and instruments used to collect data, procedure for data analysis, findings in the document and validity of conclusions and recommendations.

Table 3.1 Summary of Population, Sampling and Data Collection

Population Category	Population Size	Sample Size Determinant	Sampling Techniques	Sample Size	Data Collection
Household Heads	223808	Slovin's formula	Simple Random Sampling	100	Questionnaire FGD
Village Elders	234	30% of the Population	Simple Random Sampling	70	Questionnaire FGD
Religious Leaders	110	30% of the Population	Simple Random Sampling	33	Questionnaire FGD
Chiefs	36	30% of the appointed chiefs	Purposive Sampling	11	Interview FGD
MCA	24	30% of elected MCAs	Purposive Sampling	7	Interview
Deputy County Commissioners	5	Census	Purposive Sampling	5	Interview
County Commissioner	1	Census	Purposive Sampling	1	Interview
NGO/CSOs Members	50	10% of NGO/CSOs members	Purposive Sampling	5	Interview FGD
Sub County Police Commanders	5	Census	Purposive Sampling	5	Interview

Source: Field Data (2023)

3.7 Pilot Study

The purpose of carrying out pilot test was to identify the existing weaknesses in the questionnaire such as validity and reliability. Preliminary analysis using the pilot test data was undertaken to ensure that the data collected are a true reflection of the research questions (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012). Cooper and Schindler (2006) provide supporting evidence by stating that the goals of a pilot test are to identify design and implementation flaws and to offer an alternative to chance sampling for data collection. According to Bougie and Sekaran (2019), a pilot test is essential for determining the

validity of a study and the dependability of its instruments. After the questionnaire has been pilot tested and revised, data will be gathered using the questionnaire in accordance with the guidelines provided by Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2012). While time, money, and practicality all play a role, Whitehead, Julious, Cooper and Campbell (2016) state that a good rule of thumb for a pilot study's sample size is between 5 and 10 percent of the total. Cooper and Schindler (2006) state that while determining the validity and reliability of instruments, it is not necessary to have a statistically significant number of respondents in a pilot test. Five percent of the sample population was used for a pilot study in the Saboti and Cherangany constituencies. It was taken care of so that they wouldn't be counted in the final tally of responses. This helped the researcher adjust the questionnaire for greater objectivity and efficiency. In pilot tests, the questionnaire was expected to take participants around 15 minutes to finish.

3.8 Validity and Reliability of Research Instruments

Singh (2014) describes validity and reliability of the research instrument as a process for increasing transparency and decreasing opportunities for researcher bias. Validity and reliability of the researcher instrument will be determined prior to the actual field data collection. The purpose of validity is to ensure that the instrument is truthful whereas reliability is to ensure the findings of the instrument are stable and consistent.

3.8.1 Validity

The term "validity" is used to describe how well a research instrument assesses its target variables (Thatcher, 2010). Validity concerns what an instrument measure and how well it does so, (Mohajan, 2017). Shenton (2004) posit that the validity of a research instrument

is carried out to ensure that reasonable trustworthy responses are obtained and ensure that the instrument is clear, devoid of typos and unambiguous. Validity of the research instrument was established by subjecting it to the university supervisors to check for the validity of the constructs before carrying out the actual data collection. Moreover, the study used content validity to check whether the content of items of the instrument really measures the concept being measured in the study. Content validity allowed the study to determine whether the key issues captured by the research objectives are correctly covered. Additionally, content validity allowed the study to evaluate the design of the research instrument such as readability, in-text typos, clarity of instructions and the correct usage of language, (Muijs, 2010).

3.8.2 Reliability

Reliability refers to the extent to which test scores of instruments are free from measurement error, (Mohajan, 2017). According to Blumberg, Cooper, and Schindler (2014), reliability is defined as the degree to which a research instrument yields same results time after time. According to Chakrabarty (2013), reliability of the research instrument is the capacity of the tool to measure consistently, accurately, frequently, and be able to produce the same results. The general reliability of the research equipment was analyzed for internal consistency in this study. Internal consistency was determined by calculating the value of Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach, 2010). The level of internal consistency was determined by calculating the correlations between test items and observing whether or not items designed to assess the same basic construct yield comparable 0–1 scores. A cutoff of 0.7 for internal consistency was utilized for the analysis in this paper.

3.9 Data Collection Procedure

Creswell (2011) refers to data collection procedure as a process of collecting raw data that can be treated into more telling information, following the scientific process of data analysis. The researcher sought for permission from the relevant authorities including National Council for Science and Innovation (NACOSTI) and School of Post Graduate Studies of Masinde Muliro University before commencing. This included the acquisition of an introductory letter and permission from the school of graduate studies at the University. Copies of authorization letters research were availed to the respective participants including County Commissioner, Sub County Administrators, Chiefs, Village Elders, Household Heads, MCAs and respective NGOs/CSOs.

The researcher obtained the services of two research assistants to help in the administration of questionnaires. The research assistants also helped in providing interpretation to the respondents such as village elders or household heads who might have a challenge in understanding the questionnaire items. To ensure that the percentage response is high, the research ethics were carefully upheld. The participants were asked to tick/mark their responses in specific boxes representing their answer or fill a blank space for open-ended questions. The questionnaires were distributed using drop and pick-later technique to the selected participants within the County.

In addition, with help of interview schedule with open-ended questions based on the research objectives, the researcher had face-to-face interview with selected Key Informants. The open-ended questions contained in the interview schedule helped the researcher to draw out Key Informants' views and opinions as regards to peace building

strategies, types of electoral conflict experienced as well as innovations and solutions to stem electoral related conflict in Trans Nzoia County. Finally, focused group discussions were organized by first identifying the discussion individuals and the venue points within the five Sub Counties. During the discussion, the moderator encouraged the individuals to not only express their own opinions but also respond to the views / statements of other group members while answering the questions.

3.10 Data Analysis and Presentation

Data analysis denotes a methodical treatment, processing, assortment and grouping of data to generate significant information. Dully field questionnaires collected from the household heads, village elders, chiefs, religious leaders, MCAs, members of NGOs/CSOs, Sub-County Administrators and County Commissioner were edited to ensure they are complete and labeled using Microsoft Excel before they are finally coded using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 22). Coding refers to a nominal process where symbols, which are usually figures, are assigned to the raw data to transform it into a simply tabulated and counted format (Leech, Barrett & Morgan, 2014). Quantitative data were collected using the questionnaires were analyzed using descriptive statistics. The findings of quantitative data (descriptive statistics results) were presented using tables, charts and figures.

Descriptive analysis entails the use of frequencies and percentages in their absolute and relative structure. Standard deviations and mean will be used as measures of central tendencies and dispersion respectively. The study used content analysis techniques to analyze qualitative data obtained from the interview and FGDs. Content analysis of the

findings of interview and FGDs was organized and analyzed thematically. Content analysis included the use of 'participant' narratives to describe the themes or concepts.

3.11 Limitations of the Study

Given the nature and the impacts of the electoral conflict on the life of the residents of Trans Nzoia County, the researcher explained to the study participants the importance of the study and the way it was to improve their future coexistence. Anonymity was emphasized and the respondents were not required to indicate their names on the questionnaires. Another limitation experienced by the study was the unavailability of some respondents due to their busy schedule as some of them included administrators. However, to mitigate this problem, the study used drop and pick method which gave them ample time to duly fill the questionnaires.

The study faced time constraints owing to the magnitude of the target respondents and the data collection methodologies employed and vastness of Trans Nzoia County. A reconnaissance visit to the area was carried out to identify and establish the contacts of respondents such as NGOs/CSOs, MCAs, Chiefs, religious leaders and village elders. Additionally, the study employed the help of research assistants from Trans Nzoia County owing to their knowhow of the geographical scope of the County.

3.12 Ethical Considerations

Before carrying out the actual data collection, the study sought for authority letter from Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology School of Postgraduate Studies, and National Commission for Science and Technology copies were availed to the Trans Nzoia County Director of Education. The purpose of sharing the research permits with the

County Education Director was to obtain authorization to conduct the research in the County. The study upheld high research ethics concerning participants' right to privacy, disclosure understanding (openness), informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity. The study also exercised due consideration to ensure researcher's own feelings or emotions and biases does not affect the reporting of research findings, conclusions and recommendations.

The researcher was upfront and honest with the participants about the research's processes, benefits, hazards, and the fact that their participation was entirely voluntary. Each participant voluntarily provided informed consent by completing the questionnaire. Participants' willingness to fill out the questionnaire was used to gain their informed permission. The researcher did not include a space for participants' names on the questionnaire to protect their privacy. The researcher also guaranteed the participants' confidentiality throughout the report's dissemination. Respondents' personal details were held in the strictest confidence. The researcher also informed the participants that the study's sole objective was academic (without disclosing the study's central research issue).

3.13 Chapter Summary

This chapter has highlighted the methodological approach that was used in this study. It has also emphasized the importance of data collection techniques that were used in this study. The process of drawing accurate and meaningful conclusions has also been explained. The chapter also highlights the procedure of data collection by stating the channels that were pursued in collecting data. Limitations of the study and how they were overcome have also been covered.

The next chapter four presents the findings on the nature of electoral conflicts experienced in Trans Nzoia County, Kenya.

CHAPTER FOUR

NATURE OF ELECTORAL CONFLICTS IN TRANS NZOIA COUNTY, KENYA

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter was to analyze, present, interpret and discuss data in order to answer the research questions. Section 4.2 presents findings of questionnaire response rate, followed by section 4.3 presents the findings on distribution of respondents' demographic information such as respondents' area of residence (4.3.1), gender (4.3.2), ethnicity (4.3.3), age (4.3.4) and level of education (4.3.5). Section 4.4 of this chapter is presented under the following parameters: 4.4.1 Types of electoral conflicts experienced in Trans Nzoia County; 4.4.2 Causative factors of electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County; 4.4.3 causes of electoral violence and 4.4.4 the impact of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County.

4.2 Questionnaire Response Rate

The researcher distributed questionnaires to 233 respondents which represented 100%. Out of this 233 (100%) returned. This impressive rate was achieved due to the rigorous engagement of the respondents by use of qualified research assistants and by extending data collection period to reach those that had busy schedules. The study findings, therefore, can be considered valid and reliable because of the high response rate. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the respondents who participated in the study.

Table 4.1 Questionnaire Actual Response Rate from the Target Population

	Respondents	Responded	Response Rate	Not Responded
Questionnaires	233	233	100%	
Interview Schedules	80	77	96.25%	3.75%
FGDs	5	5	100%	

Source: Field Data (2023)

Table 4.1 shows that 100% of the respondents out of a possible 233 provided responses. This posted a high response rate, which guarantees reliability of the data gathered.

4.3 Demographic Information

Demographic information was captured to determine the sub-county of origin, gender, education level, ethnicity and age of the respondents. This was very fundamental in enhancing the reliability of the study findings by providing a larger spectrum of understanding the demographic characteristics of the respondents who participated in the study.

The constituencies the comprised area of study included Cherangany, Kiminini, Saboti, Endebes, Kimilili, with representation of 54, 53, 46, 40 and 40 respondents respectively. The slight variation in target population was due to variations in constituency population as per 2019 KNBS Census.

On gender of respondents, the study had 109 male, 110 female and intersex were 14. Male and female being the dominant sexes they are well represented

On the variable of age of the respondents, the study looked to get valid data from the target population that have at least participated in demographic process of elections. These age brackets included 18-27 years, 28-37 years, 38-47 years and over 48 years. The respondents who fall in these age brackets provided information from right hand experience.

To ensure that all people with from all levels of education were included in the study, the researcher included respondents from all levels of education that is: primary level, secondary level, polytechnic, undergraduate and postgraduate

The inclusion of the above demographics will ensure that data generated is a reflection of the entire population and it can be generalized to apply to it.

4.3.1 Constituency of Residence of the Respondent

Findings in Figure 4.2 shows that the research has nearly equal representation across the constituencies despite the small numerical differences occasioned by Kenya Bureau of Statistics 2019 Census statistics and areas that experienced more election violence got slightly more representation. This was done to ensure that findings gotten would reflect the real situation of the phenomenon on the ground. Cherangany had sample of 54 (23.2%), Kiminini 53 (22.7%), Saboti 46 (19.7%), Endebes and Kwanza both had 40 (17.2%) representation.




Figure 4.1 Respondent's by Constituency

Source: Field Data (2023)

4.3.2 Gender of the Respondents

Male and female participants were used in this study in almost equal proportions. As depicted in Table 4.2, 46.8% (109) of the respondents were male while 47.2% (110) comprised female participants. This implies that the views of both genders were well represented in the study. According to Creswell (2014), a gender balance in the target population assists to minimize gender bias, which makes the findings valid, reliable and generalizable. This is further supported by the findings of a study by Mugenda and Mugenda (2013) which revealed that balancing gender in the sample size increases the credibility of the research process and results. Therefore, the findings in the current study were based on balanced opinions, feelings, and reactions from both the male and female participants in Trans-Nzoia County, which means that the findings can now be generalized

across similar counties in Kenya experiencing similar election related challenges (Creswell, 2014).

Taking into consideration or recognizing the separate roles and opinions of men and women have in peace building in the community is vital because men and women often have different experiences, perspectives, and needs when it comes to issues of conflict and peace (O'Reilly, 2015). In support Jacobson and Carlman (2005) aver that it is imperative to recognize the opinions of both men and women because they have different abilities and resources to contribute to peace building efforts. Including the perspectives and participation of both men and women in peace building can lead to more effective and sustainable solutions. Hudson (2009) also upholds that involving both men and women in peace building can help to challenge and change gender norms and stereotypes that can perpetuate violence and conflict.

Table 4.2 Gender of the Respondents

Gender	Frequency	Percent
Male	109	46.8
Female	110	47.2
Intersex	14	6
Total	233	100

Source: Field Data (2023)

Whereas the study incorporated both male and female respondents, their proportions have large disparity. The large disparity between men and women respondents in this study is attributed to the fact in some households' men were unavailable as most of them were at

work or away from home. Although the reason for the unavailability of male respondents is plausible, studies such as Cerrato and Cifre (2018) indicate that in some communities or cultures, women are more likely to be at home during the day or are more accessible to researchers. In support, May, Wachs and Hannak (2019) affirms that women are more likely to participate in research studies than men, which could also contribute to a higher representation of women in the sample. Similarly, Galea and Tracy (2007) upholds that men are more likely to decline participation in research studies than women, which could also contribute to a higher representation of women in the sample.

4.3.3 Age of the Respondents

The respondents were sectionalized into four age categories. Figure 4.1 shows the age of the respondents.




Figure 4.2 Distribution of the Respondents by Age

Source: Field Data (2023)

As indicated in Figure 4.1, some (44.2%) of the sampled respondents were aged between 28 and 37 years. Results also shows that 28.8% of the respondents were aged between 38

and 47 years while 18.5% of them were aged over 48 years. The results indicate that only 8.6% of the sampled respondents were aged between 18 and 27 years. The age distribution of the respondents is varied which implies that the study was well balanced in terms of age of participants. Overall, results show that most of the sampled respondents are youth (52.8%), which implies that the youths who take an active role in both civic and democratic activities in Kenya and in Trans Nzoia County in particular. Previous studies such as The Carter Centre (2018) and Elder *et al* (2014) reveal that in most conflict situations, youth are normally at the forefront in perpetrating heinous electoral activities. Birch and David (2018), who observed that the youth play a huge role in determining the sustenance of peace and stability during electoral circle, also echo the same sentiments. Therefore, to understand the peace-building strategies to mitigate electoral conflicts, it is important to understand the views and perceptions of the young adults.

4.3.4 Educational Level of Respondents

This section sought to show the educational level of respondents. Table 4.3 shows the distribution of educational levels attained by respondents as categorized into six.

Table 4.3 Respondents' Educational Qualification

Education Level	Frequency	Percent
Primary level	70	30.04
Secondary level	87	37.3
Polytechnic	34	14.6
Undergraduate	36	15.5
Postgraduate	6	2.6
Total	233	100

Source: Field Data (2023)

Table 4.3 indicates that out of 203 sample of respondents, 87(37.3%) of the respondents had secondary level educational qualification, 70(30.04%) had primary level education while 36(15.5%) had undergraduate level education and 6(2.6 %) of the sampled respondents had postgraduate level education. The finding reveals that the distribution of the respondents in terms of their educational qualifications was well balanced as all categories of education were well represented. The researcher's ability to portray the actual picture of the occurrence on the ground was aided by the variety of perspectives, emotions, and sentiments that were expressed by the individuals in the study region. As per Creswell's (2014) assertion, the process of choosing a study sample that possesses diverse social and demographic attributes aids in uncovering the fundamental causes of a certain phenomenon. Despite the fact that the respondents' educational backgrounds were fairly balanced in the current study, the bulk of them only had a secondary education. In Kenya, an individual with a secondary education is literate enough to rationally comprehend many complicated situations. Given that the World Bank (2011) reports that 67.64% of Kenyans have completed secondary education, the study's findings can thus be considered representative of the majority of Kenyans. The study conducted by Adan and Pkalya (2006) further shown that representative conclusions may be drawn from a sample that was well-balanced in terms of sociodemographic parameters. The results corroborate the findings of KNBS survey report (KNBS, 2014) which found that 21% of Trans Nzoia County inhabitants have secondary level of education or above. The report also indicated that majority (59%) of Trans Nzoia County residents have a primary level of education only with 20% having no formal education.

4.4 Nature of Electoral Conflicts in Trans Nzoia County, Kenya

This Section presents study findings under the following parameters: 4.4.1 Types of electoral conflicts experienced in Trans Nzoia County; 4.4.2 Causative factors of electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County; 4.4.3 causes of electoral violence and 4.4.4: the impact of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County.

4.4.1 Types of Electoral Conflicts in Trans-Nzoia County

Election-related conflicts can arise at any time, including during the registration period, the nomination of candidates, and the campaign itself, election results on the day of voting. Although literature on election-related conflict is limited, it does explore possible causes and strategies for preventing and resolving such violence. In Trans Nzoia County, the study demonstrated a number of electoral conflicts experienced during electoral circle. This included identity conflicts, campaign conflicts, balloting conflicts, representation conflicts and voter motivated conflicts (Onyango, 2020).

According to research findings, 178 out of 203 of the respondents' experiences campaign conflicts which occurred when the rival politicians sought to disrupt the opponents' campaigns, intimidate voters and candidates, and use threats and violence to influence participation in the voting. This is emphasized by on chief 3 during FGD session in Kiminini constituency:

Kiminini was a hot spot. The camps of two frontrunners, Hon. Natembeya and Wamalwa have formed vigilant groups and political gangs. In one of the campaigns moments at Kiminini town, there was serious fighting between the members from each camp which resulted into violence, destruction of property and one death. Being Hon. Chris Wamalwa political base, presumed supporters of Hon. Natembeya were marked and some were forced to denounce their candidate to save their lives and businesses. (16/11/2022, Kiminini Town)

Long standing land grievances especially from squatters has never been left out of electoral campaigns. Fighting of land that is presumed by others to be grabbed by senior citizens and powerful individuals has continued to be an electoral conflict by itself. Pre-election period politicians incite their supporters to take over pieces of land that previously are presumed to have belonged to their ancestors. Trans Nzoia being in Highland's area with rich soils has attracted migration of people from different parts of the country, however, during electioneering, people from outside are forced to support certain candidate or face forced migration. During 2007/2008 post-election violence many non-indigenous people lost their property including land to locals. Many Kikuyus and Kisiis bore the brunt of electoral violence.

This is supported by head of household 7 who commented as follows during FGD:

Land issue is motive here in Trans Nzoia especially in Saboti, Endebes and Cherangany. Many people lost their land during 2007/2008 post-election violence. Others have never recovered their land to date. Saboti was seriously affected. The Bukusu who used to live and farm in Saboti were murdered while others migrated leaving their farms. In Cherangany many people's houses were burnt, while livestock was stolen. I had never experienced a neighbour kill a neighbour or chase him from his land, but it happened here in Trans Nzoia. During 2022 general elections, the same issue had started to come up, but many locals feared the power of Hon. Natembeya as a senior police officer. Many people retreated although some people migrated for their own safety.

1/11/2022

Makutano

Many people from Saboti and Endebes constituencies were denied registration as voters. They were treated as aliens and people from neighbouring countries. The sebei were mostly discriminated and suffered a lot of identity conflict during electioneering period. They could not establish and reestablish their officially recognized identities. This was supported by statement by one religious' leader from Saboti constituency through FGD:

We the Sebei people are treated like Ugandans, as Karamoja to be specific. Most of us do not have national identity documents. Some of us own land but we cannot access land title deeds due to identity conflicts. Therefore, we can also vote or choose our leaders.

3/11/2022

Waitaluk

During voting day there is balloting conflict when violence is meted on opposing camps at the polling stations. Many supporters of rivalry camps are assaulted, others murdered while property of others are destroyed. Out of the respondents sampled in the study, 165 out of 203 observed that in Trans Nzoia, during balloting many voters are turned away from voting by rivalry supporters while others fear going out to vote because of the likely assault by opposing supporters. Most of the victims of electoral violence are youths between the ages of 18-27 years. Most of the respondents that experienced electoral conflict were from Saboti (34), Cherangany (44), Endebe (30), Kwanza (26) and Kiminini (27).

Elections in most African countries are conducted peaceful. However, during tallying results conflict occurs. Disputes over election results or the inability of judicial mechanisms to resolve disputes in a fair, timely and transparent manner are common. This happened in Kenya in 2007 and 2013 general elections where election results were announced at night or after a long wait. This creates suspicion and mistrust among election actors. The mistrust and suspicion that something is being cooked results into both sporadic and organized violence, rebellion and organized crime.

In most African countries representative conflict has been a major source of conflict. This occurs when elections are organized as zero-sum events and losers are left out of participation in governance. In Kenya since 2002 general election, the losing side have

always been left out of the government structure. Most Kalenjin were replaced from government positions as they were thought to have led for enough time. In 2007 general election, most luhyas, Kisiis, Kalenjin and Luos again lost their positions in government as most senior positions went to pro government tribes. This led to massive discontent, violence and destruction of property.

Most of the time, it seems like the State is more eager and prepared to start a fight with voters than the voters are to start a fight with the State. The electoral dispute resolution systems may be skewed toward state interests if the State plays such a large role. Also, political rivalry is the leading cause of electoral violence. However, efforts at mediation, political party formation, and conflict settlement may have the greatest impact on this particular dispute. Additionally, the election calendar appears most prone to conflict throughout the campaign, voting, and outcomes phases. The study also found that there is a propensity for violence to repeat if there is a history of electoral dispute.

A diagnosis of electoral conflict could be valuable for practitioners if researchers and planners used a unified paradigm. Promising measures to avoid, contain, and resolve election violence may result from a deeper understanding of the origins and flashpoints of conflict.

4.4.2 Causal Factors of Electoral Conflicts in Trans Nzoia County

The study examines the causes of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County as interpreted in the study. The study sought to establish the nature of the factors that cause electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County. The respondent's degree of acceptability on various

probable causes of electoral conflicts was determined. Table 4.4 presents the findings, which establish the major causes of electoral conflicts in the county.

Table 4.4 Causes of Electoral Conflicts

Respondents Perception about Causes of Election Conflicts	Strongly Agree		Agree		Not Sure		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		Rank SA+A
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	
Poor electoral management and administration	152	65.24	70	30.04	5	2.15	3	1.29	3	1.29	95.27 (2)
Political elite patronage	115	49.36	98	42.06	6	2.58	10	4.29	4	1.72	91.42 (3)
Unresolved and long standing grievances	178	76.39	55	23.61	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	100.00 (1)
Lack of legal and institutional framework	73	31.33	50	21.46	23	9.87	77	33.05	10	4.29	52.79 (5)
Stiff competition	73	31.33	70	30.04	0	0.00	55	23.61	35	15.02	61.37 (4)

Source: Field Data (2023)

4.4.3 Poor Electoral Management and Administration

The study findings in Table 4.4 about whether poor electoral management and administration results into electoral conflict indicate that 152(65.24%) of the respondents strongly agreed that, the above factor is a major contributory factor to conflicts during electoral circle. Further 70(30.04%) agreed, 5(2.15%) were not sure while 3(1.29%)

respectively did not agree and strongly disagreed. This was supported by research by Center for Strategic International Studies (2009) that revealed that carrying out electoral reforms including introducing best practices in administration and management of elections, preventing corruption in electoral process will go a long way in reducing electoral conflict. According to Akfor (2020), African countries apply some of the best electoral management systems ever developed which makes elections in the continent to be among the most expensive in the world. The author further noted that despite elections in Kenya being the most expensive in the continent, there has been electoral conflict in nearly all her elections. In conclusion the author observed that the selection of electoral officials had been skewed towards the governance system. Most electoral officials are employed with a purpose to achieve for their masters. One Sub County Police Commander in support stated that:

The issue of electoral violence during every election circle has made many people not to participate in elections. People wake up early to vote and votes are counted to their satisfaction. The only problem is on the management of counting of presidential elections. There is always untold delay and at the tail end the whole process is mismanaged and the winner is pronounced in unclear circumstances. This happened in 2007 general election and the winner was announced at night. This had serious consequences for people of Kenya as whole. In Molo where I was stationed by then, even my police station was burnt to ashes. Many people lost their lives and property destroyed.

24/11/2022

Kitale Town

4.4.4 Political Patronage and Electoral Conflict

Comparably to poor electoral management and administration, political patronage had slightly similar data returns. Those who strongly agreed that political patronage was a major cause of electoral conflict stood at 115(49.36%), 98(42.06%) agreed while 6(2.58%), 10(4.29%) and 4(1.72%) were not sure, disagreed and strongly disagreed. This study

finding was in consistent with those of International Republican Institute (2022) showed that political elites capitalize on ethnically motivated incitements and intimidations; and dire economic reality affecting the youths therefore generating significant concerns for the resurfacing of electoral violence each electoral circle.

4.4.5 Unresolved and Long-Standing Grievances and Electoral Conflict

As indicated in Table 4.4 above unresolved and long-standing grievances had the highest number of respondents who strongly agreed that is one of the factors leading to electoral conflict. Out of the sample size of 203 participants, 178(76.39%) strongly agreed that grievances that have gone on for long time without being resolved causes electoral conflict. Further 55(23.61%) also agreed as per the reflection of the conceptual framework. The findings are also consistent with the UNDP (2014) further noted that long standing issues especially historical land issues and inequalities, lack of accountability; and constitutional and institutional reforms are recipe for future electoral violence. This was supported by research by Center for Strategic International Studies (2009) that revealed that addressing historic grievances around land ownership will be critical stage in combating electoral conflicts and violence to a more stable and democratic polity. The author further observes that carrying out electoral reforms including introducing best practices in administration and management of elections, preventing corruption in electoral process will go a long way in reducing electoral conflict.

One of the main goals of the Constitution adopted in 2010 was to correct regional marginalization and inequitable growth by devolving power and resources to lower the stakes of past all-or-nothing electoral struggles for the presidency. Forty-seven (47) new

counties were established, each with its own governor and a multimillion-dollar budget under his or her direct authority. While devolution has brought services closer to residents, it has also exacerbated racial and cultural divides within counties and encouraged communities to elect members from within their own group to the many open positions at the county level. One of the most sought-after jobs is that of governor. This has led to an increase in territorial claims, such as communities trying to restore land they believe they lost unfairly or expand their borders. A major source of local friction is the fact that many candidates for governor and other posts, such as senator, are campaigning on a platform of protecting or developing communal interests.

Another police commander from one of the sub counties had this to say:

Land claims is rampant in the former rift valley province. Since colonial time there has been claims of ancestral land and former colonial farmland. Politicians have been on the forefront in instigating the motive land claims issue. Prior to elections, politicians in Trans Nzoia incite the locals and promise them to lead them to their ancestral land. There have been many cases where during elections locals invade other peoples land and forceful occupy. Many people have been injured and others lost their lives over land claim issues. ADC land in Trans Nzoia has been under threat from the locals for years, but situation worsen during electioneering. Non locals are threatened with dire consequences if they do not vote in certain way or otherwise, they lose their land.

1/12/2022

Endebes

4.4.6 Lack of Legal and Institutional Frame work, and Electoral Conflict

Absence of legal and institutional framework had the highest disapproval rate among the causal factors. 77(33.05%) of the respondents disagreed that lack of it leads to electoral conflict as compared to 73(31.33%) who strongly agreed, 50(21.46%) who agreed that it causes electoral conflict and 23(9.87%), 10(4.29%) who represented those that were not

sure and those strongly disagreed respectively. The findings are also consistent with the UNDP (2014) which indicated impunity as the main cause of electoral conflicts in African continent, which is not confined to police abuse alone. The continued failure to act on the findings and recommendations of various state commissioned inquiries and studies have distanced the citizens from state institutions. Most perpetrators of electoral conflicts and human rights violations are never prosecuted and therefore they can act in total impunity.

4.4.7 Stiff Electoral Competition and Electoral Conflict

The study findings in Table 4.4 revealed that stiff competition among electoral actors was a moderate factor in causing electoral conflicts. Out of 203 participants, 73(31.33%), 70(30.04%) strongly agreed and agreed that it results to conflicts during elections. Further 55(23.61%) and 35(15.02%) disagreed and strongly disagreed. Study by Njoroge (2011) revealed that during 2007 General Election in Kenya, stiff competition between the then president His Excellency Mwai Kibaki and Opposition leader Raila Odinga and the slogan of 42 tribes against one resulted into electoral violence that had never been witnessed before. There was mayhem in every corner of the Republic of Kenya, massive destruction of property, death of thousands of Kenyans, massive forced migration of population, theft, burglary and arson.

In general, therefore, findings in Table 4.4 indicate that (178) 76.4% of the respondents strongly agreed that long-standing historical land grievances were a major cause of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County followed by poor electoral management and administration practices at 152 (62.2%). An equally significant factor of electoral conflicts was established to be political elite patronage at 115 (49.4%). Lack of legal and

institutional framework 77 (33%) and stiff competition at 55 (23.6%) were the factors that respondents disagreed to be contributing to electoral violence.

To establish the causative factors of electoral conflicts, the study asked the respondents to indicate what they perceive to ignite electoral conflict if not handled not only in Trans Nzoia County but countrywide. The results of the study are as shown in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5 Respondent’s Perception on the Causes of Electoral Violence

Statements	Mean	Std.	Rank
Whipping communities’ emotions around land injustices during electoral seasons	4.37	0.75	5
Existence of long-standing historical land grievances	4.54	0.62	1
Political patronage disenfranchises other ethnic communities	4.46	0.54	2
Politics of ethnic identity leads to exclusionary development	4.32	0.60	6
Vote rigging/vote fraud leads other political Rejection of Election outcomes	4.44	0.63	3
Poor electoral management and administration can lead to public mistrust, objection and conflict	4.44	0.65	3


Source: Field Data (2023)

Results in Table 4.5 shows that the mean of existence of long-standing historical land grievance was highest at 4.65 with a standard deviation of 0.622 negatively. Political patronage had mean of 4.46 and standard deviation of 0.541; Vote rigging/ fraud had a mean of 4.32 with a standard deviation of 0.604. Politics of ethnic identity had the least mean of 4.29 with a standard deviation of 0.555 negatively skewed at 0.008. Whipping communities’ emotions around land injustices had mean of 4.37 with standard deviation of 0.750; and poor electoral management and administration had mean of 4.44 and standard

deviation of 0.648. Although existence of long-standing historical land grievances had highest mean, it has a higher deviation from the mean as compared to political patronage and politics of ethnic identity which had smaller means because it had more cases of respondents who strongly disagreed, disagreed and not sure.

The study also sought to establish the impact of whipping communities' emotions around land injustices on electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County. Results of the study are as indicated in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3 Respondents' perception on the impact of whipping communities' emotions around land injustices



Source: Field Data (2023)

Most of the respondents agreed 113 (48.5%) and strongly agreed 109(46.8%) that whipping any communities emotions around land injustices during elections season is likely to lead to political tensions and conflicts. This research finding can be interpreted to mean that land injustice is significantly related to electoral tension, conflict and violence. As pointed

out by Karbo (2008), peace-building aims to transform society into stable peace by addressing root causes of conflict and promoting indigenous capacities to deal with societal problems in peaceful ways ensuring restoration of peace and harmony. In support, Njoroge (2011) observed that in Timboroa, Burnt Forest, Jua Kali and Turbo areas of Uasin Gishu County; Saboti Constituency in Trans Nzoia County both from former Rift Valley Province experienced serious cases of post-election violence after the 2007 general election mainly due to whipping of communities' emotions around historical land issues. During this time, thousands of people belonging to Kikuyu, Luhya, Kisii and Kamba lost their lives and property including legally acquired parcels of land. In contrast, Njoroge (2011) observed that poor management and administration of elections especially rigging and fraud led to dissatisfaction among residents' towns and cities. That poor management of results especially tallying and transmission of results led to suspicion, mistrust among electoral actors leading to violence and destruction of property of losers.

From the FGDs and interviews conducted, most respondents opined that peace-building initiatives were crucial in ensuring a harmonious coexistence. Indeed, one respondent stated that,

Peace-building seeks the restoration of peace and harmony in the communities and prevention of relapse to conflict. There has been a lot of animosity between the Saboti and the Bukusu; and the Bukusu and the Kalenjin over historical land injustices. The historical land injustices issues have been whipped every electoral circle by politicians from both tribal lines with an aim of reclaiming grabbed land when they win. This creates a lot of emotions and animosity resulting into clashes and violence.

14/12/2022

Kitalale


In another FGD, one participant noted that;

Bringing together opposing political groupings to guarantee that the historical injustices that typically spark violence before elections are rectified is one method the government can resolve land injustices that have occurred in the past. For instance, having representatives from regions where there are land and boundary disputes in the government will make it easier for them to convey the suffering of their people to the appropriate government officials. (15/12/2022, Kolongolo)

According to a previous study, one of the main reasons of conflict in Kenya is land conflicts, which typically flare up during election season (Ouchow (2010)). Kenya is less likely to have election-related instability when these problems can be resolved through participatory governance.

The study also asked the respondents whether existence of long-standing historical land grievances have continued to underpin the electoral rivalry in Trans Nzoia County. Results of the study are as shown in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.4 Long Standing Land Grievances and Electoral Rivalry



Source: Field Data (2023)

Findings in Figure 4.5 revealed that existence of long-standing historical land grievances has always acted as a catalyst for electoral rivalry among various candidates and communities. In the current study 137 (58.8%) of the participants strongly agreed that

historical land issues have effect on elections tension, conflict and violence. Further, 89 (58.8%) agreed that unresolved land problems are a hot subject during electioneering period as most candidates' base on it to gain votes.

According to study finding by Toha (2017), historical land problems caused partly by colonialism and then by preceding administration have continued to be a key issue during elections. This historical problem has continued to be an electoral campaign issue for decades and especially in former Rift Valley province. This problem is intertwined with ethnicity and economic exclusion issues. The author further observed that Kikuyu ethnicity group have suffered year in year out since early 1990s to date. In support of the above, Njoroge (2011), revealed that during 2007/2008 post-election violence period, Kikuyus, Luo, Maasai, Luhya were among the major ethnic group that experienced worst forms of discrimination, torture, loss of property and thousands of deaths. Land problem is still a serious election hot issue up today.

Haki Africa (2019) in its annual report noted that historical land problem has continued to be used by politicians and political party manifestos to win over votes in coastal region. Many families lack land title deeds to put claim on the lands they occupy. Few title deeds are issued during electioneering period to win political favour. This historical has resulted to serious squatter problem at the cost resulting to politicians inciting locals to go ahead and occupy other people's lands because they are not locals. However, Hassan (2017) maintained that historical land issues in Africa are not a core election issue, which results in electoral tension, violence, and conflict, but rather are a catalyst that comes into play when one party loses the election. Therefore, they cling to historical land issues to express

their anger and frustration, but they are swept under the rug when they form the government.

The findings are also emphasized by the observation of one of the key informants who is a Chief in Saboti Constituency who stated that;

Land issue in Saboti and entire Mt. Elgon has been having been thorn for years. The Saboti people has been at loggerheads with the Bukusu people for invading their community land through land scheme subdivision. Senior government officers also acquired large tracks of land through these schemes. This land problem gave rise to Saboti Land Defence Force militia group. Although the government thwarted the activities of this militia group, still there are remnants who still incite local people. This incitement becomes active and open during elections. Many Bukusu people were forced to move from their farms and they cannot dare return back because of these politicians and militia groups.

15/12/2022

Saboti

In support, Boone (2012) argues that presence of long-standing land grievances and electoral rivalry intersect exacerbates the situation as the rivalries may be fueled by the land disputes, and as political elites may use the land disputes as a tool to gain political power. This can lead to even more intense competition and tension, and an increased risk of violence. According to Klaus and Mitchell (2015), the political actors may exploit the existing long-standing land grievances as a campaign issue by promising to the voters or community members that they will address them if elected. This can lead to increased competition and tension between candidates and their supporters, as well as potential violence if the grievances are not resolved.

According to Mohamed (2015), existence of electoral rivalry can heighten the stakes leading to aggressive or inflammatory rhetoric, or unethical or illegal behavior by political actors in an effort to gain an advantage over their rivals. This can also lead to increased

competition and tension between candidates and their supporters, as well as potential violence if the rivalry becomes particularly intense. Horowitz and Klaus (2020) affirms that presence of unresolved land disputes can create a sense of injustice and frustration among the affected communities, who may turn to violence as a means of seeking redress. Besides the presence of historical grievances, Wambua (2017) maintains that political parties and candidates may use their ethnic communities as pawns in their electoral strategies, further fueling the electoral conflicts as witnessed in the past elections in Kenya such as in 2007, 2013 and 2017.




Figure 4.5 Political Patronage and Development

Source: Field Data (2023)

Findings on Figure 4.3 shows that over a half of the sampled respondents 118 (50.6%) agreed that political patronage disadvantages other ethnic communities especially in the areas of resource allocation and distribution and accessibility to available job opportunities leading to political tension during electioneering period due to rivalry arising from its negativity. Moreover, 112 (48.1 %) of the participants strongly agreed that negative effect


of political patronage especially discrimination related to resource allocation, distribution and job opportunities acts as a catalyst to political rivalry, tension, conflict and violence. This result can be interpreted to mean that political patronage is a key contributor to election conflict. According to Robinson and Verdier (2013), political patronage is an election issue worldwide. Voters have ever continued to associate close to government with easy access to development, resources and employment opportunities. For business people close to political elite is sure way of accessing government tenders and other corrupt deals. The author further echoed that, political patronage is closely associated with electoral gangs, hooliganism, violence and conflict. They will do anything to get close to power and resources to be specific. These political elites control resource accumulation and distribution channels.

Geraldine (2010) observed that political elites contribute billions of shillings to campaign kits of certain presidential or governor candidates with a promise of favours, which includes tenders, jobs and economic deals. The author adds that because of their heavy investment in elections, their candidates remain puppets when they occupy office as these political elites hold them hostage. In support, Dube (2018) observed that even when these political elites commit electoral offences such as incitements, forced human population migrations, violence, destruction of property and even economic crimes they are never prosecuted because of protection they enjoy from those in power.

Oucho (2010) revealed that alienation of other communities by those in power from government services, resource allocation and employment opportunities leads to rivalry, clashes and destruction of property. The author gave examples of Kibera slums which have during every election circle have participated in political demonstrations, violence and

destruction of property due to the fact that despite being in the capital city, they lack basic facilities such as good schools, hospitals, piped water, good housing despite the fact that many of them have gone to school and possess relevant employable skills. The same is echoed by Kamau (2017) who found out that the former Nyanza province had experienced the blunt of political patronage, as political elites near power has always made sure that the region is discriminated when it comes to national cake distribution. This political and economic alienation has always resulted to discrimination in form of development and resource allocations leading to rivalry, unhealthy opposition and hatred towards other ethnic groups.

Figure 4.6 Ethnic Identity and Exclusionary Development



Source: Field Data (2023)

As indicated in Figure 4.4, politics of ethnicity were found to have profound effect on victimization and injustices during elections period because it results in creation of ethnicity identity, gang creation and criminal groups. This finding was supported by 131

(56.2%) and 89 (38.2%) of the respondents who agreed and strongly agreed with it respectively. This finding can be interpreted to mean that they are these created ethnic identity groups and slogans that politicians use to incite their supporters against those of his opponent with an aim of creating an edge over them. The political ante tones also include promise of development projects, resources and jobs at the expense of the other groups whenever they win elections. This exclusionary development leads to suspicion, tensions, ethnic rivalry and violence. That at the heart of ethnic discrimination is prejudice based on the concepts of identity and the need to identify with a certain group of people. That this political discrimination leads to division, hatred and even dehumanization of other ethnic group because of their different identity.

According to Awino (2010), after every election and in situations where there is change of guard, the incoming administration tends to exclude officers from the previous administration from main administration lines. Most workers are discriminated against, others are fired, forced to resign or forced to work under difficult environment. According to the author, this trend was experienced when the late president Mwai Kibaki assumed power most of the government employees who worked close to the former president were forced out. Moreover, there were many people who belonged to opposing political function that were evicted from their houses by landlords because of their political affiliations. Many who qualified for various jobs could not access them because of their names portraying their ethnic identity.

Sunday (2020) used the study's conclusions to argue that a lack of public participation in government is one of Kenya's most pressing problems. The author elaborated by saying that many people, especially members of minority groups, believe that participation in state

affairs is limited to those who are wealthy or have close ties to those in political power. In addition, Oucho (2010) research found that entire parts of the country are often excluded from the benefits of state-sanctioned growth, and that entire groups are often targeted for discrimination. Many people feel most safe and at home inside the context of the ethnic networks to which they belong rather than within the framework of the state as a whole. Furthermore, the author argues that indigenous peoples and other minorities in the country continue to bear the brunt of this process of marginalization. Although voting is only the first step in a long process of incorporating communities' voices and enhancing their capacities, it is a crucial one.

Ayugi (2012) found that state policy was indifferent towards minorities before to the Constitution's ratification in 2010. While effectively hiding the ethnic privileging of particular elements of the society, the state pursued what looked to be an ethnically blind strategy, justified based on national unity. According to research conducted by Shilaho (2017), the Bajuni of Lamu are an agro-fishing group that makes up a sizable portion of the county's population, but whose low income prevents them from being adequately represented. Because the Bajuni do not have economic clout in the county, their elected representatives serve the interests of the Arabs, Asians, and Barawas, according to research by Mwalimu Baadi of the Lamu Environmental Protection Action Committee (LEPAC, 2020). This is due to the fact that winning an election needs substantial financial backing, and any Bajuni candidate would have to seek it from the economically dominating mercantile factions.

Displacements can be located on a map in a generic sense. Agricultural workers in Naivasha, Nakuru, and Thika, located on the western borders of the Rift Valley, Uasin Gishu, and Nandi districts, are the primary source of internal displacement. People from Central Province and the eastern Rift Valley who had lived there for one or two generations, including Kikuyu and Kamba farmers and sometimes Kisii farmers, as well as agricultural workers and junior Luo or Luhya civil servants, were uprooted. The majority of the Kikuyu who held title deeds were adamant about returning to the area they now regarded their own, while those from western Kenya swore they would never return. A type of "Kikuyunisation" of the junior workers in the horticulture farms in the Naivasha area and Central Province as a result of this circumstance. Migrants from the Luo, Luhya, and Kalenjin tribes were replaced by Kikuyu who had been forced off Maasai land, particularly in the southern Narok District (Muli, 2008).

According to Karanja (2012), landlords in Nairobi's densely populated Kibera, Eastleigh, Mathare, Kangemi, and Kawangware neighborhoods evicted tenants who did not share the same ethnic identity or subscribe to the ideals of a political party favorable to the landlords in the weeks following the election riots of 2007/2008. Tenants and landlords at houses and residential estates in metropolitan areas came to an ethnic and regional understanding through social contact. Areas for Kikuyu or those from Central Province and neighboring Kamba land and areas for the Luo or those from western Kenya have emerged as a result of gang polarization in the slums with a mixed population, such as some parts of Mathare (The Standard (Nairobi), 10 January 2008).

Nelson (2019) observed that places populated by ethnic minorities, especially pastoralists, have a higher rate of violent conflict. Most of these wars stem from rivalry over limited

resources, but elections give political players a chance to reframe any outstanding issues as matters of identity in order to rally support from their own tribes and clans. The author rightly pointed out that Baringo, Tana River, Mandera, and Samburu have all experienced sporadic incidences of cattle rustling, revenge killings, and displacements in the lead-up to the 2013 elections.




Figure 4.7 Poor Electoral Management and Administration and Electoral Conflict

Source: Field Data (2023)

Election administration choices have the potential to influence voter turnout and involvement. Unfair allocation of election resources due to policy decisions could affect vote counts. Election administration has the potential to significantly affect results in low and middle-income nations where electoral capacity and resources are limited and decision-making is centralized. A statutory criterion was found to determine the ability of polling centers to quickly serve voters on Election Day in Kenya in August 2017. As a result of the congestion, voter turnout is 2.4% lower in precincts just below the barrier

compared to precincts above the threshold. The chosen threshold helps the sitting president more than alternative hypothetical thresholds because more polling resources are allocated to places where the incumbent is popular than to areas where the opposition is. This suggests that the distribution of electoral resources affects political conduct and the results of elections (Harris, 2022).

Election fraud, skewed election outcomes and vote manipulation have been found in various studies to result in election rivalry, conflict and violence (Ezra, 2020, Toha, 2017). In the current study, findings show that nearly a half of the respondents 116 (49.8%) strongly believed that poor electoral management and administration results into election fraud, skewed outcomes and vote and voter manipulations' leading to conflict and violence during and after elections. Further 109 (46.8%) of the participants also agreed that lack of best practices in management and administration of elections leads to public mistrust, objection of results and conflict.

According to Bor's (2009) research, the burden of these costs can vary widely across the population, making it difficult to register all eligible voters or avoid long lines on Election Day if well-intentioned election administration policies create an uneven electoral playing field.

Agrippina (2020) found that election administration can effect election outcomes and can be politically volatile, lending credence to the study's findings. Several contentious modifications to Kenya's election law in December 2016 caused a stir in the country's National Assembly. A simple amendment, limiting each voting site to 700 voters, passed with little fanfare in those and earlier debates. As a result of this shift, election expenditures

skyrocketed from \$240 million in 2013 to over \$500 million in 2017, with the majority of that money going toward polling place personnel and infrastructure. This statute had distributive effects, dictating which regions got more voting resources. Individuals' length of time in line to vote was also influenced by the law. Typically, 700 voters would wait in line outside of a single classroom at a school where ballot boxes, finger ink, and election officials were set up. Approximately 350 voters were assigned to each classroom and assisted by a separate team of election officials at a polling station with 701 registered voters (Mutambo Langat, 2016; Wanzala, 2016; IEBC, 2018).

Toha (2017) found that international observers claimed that the national Electoral Commission in Mozambique did not adhere to international standards relating to electoral transparency or release official results in a timely manner during the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections. When it finally released the results, the opposition Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) rejected them as fake. Roughly one hundred individuals were killed in the subsequent riots. The author pointed out problems such a lack of resources (both financial and human), bias in the media, and a lack of effort put into informing voters.

The findings are supported by the findings of FGD. For instance, during the Focused Group Discussion one of the participants stated that:

Elections in Trans Nzoia are always conducted well; there is normally no violence or conflict before or during voting. The problem normally is on Presidential election transmission and tallying. There is normally serious delay in tallying of presidential election. This builds tension and pressure in people. Many social media incitements start with this delay. Allegations of rigging crop in and even forged documents start appearing on social media. This delay has always been a hot political issue here in Trans Nzoia. You will see people start migrating and moving to potential safer grounds. (16/12/2022, Sirende)

Much of the violence that occurred in Kenya's parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007 was due to irregularities that happened after Election Day, as noted in the final report by the IGAD Observer Group (2008). An independent review commission discovered evidence of a substandard tallying procedure by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) after evaluating data from 18 randomly selected constituencies. More than 1,100 people were killed in election-related violence, with allegations of incompetence and fraud following the release of the results playing a role. The security forces came under fire as well for their alleged role in or inability to stop these killings. This was because of discrimination against women, brutality against women, the presence of non-state armed groups, and bleak economic conditions.

Freedom in the World (2014) corroborated the aforementioned finding by reporting that tensions were high during the February 2014 parliamentary elections in Djibouti, the first in which the opposition had participated since 2003. The opposition did not recognize the official results because they suspected extensive fraud. Polling place totals were not made public after a formal objection was dismissed due to a technicality in the law. Protests on a massive scale ensued, leading to a wave of arrests. For months, opposition lawmakers refused to sit in the legislature until they could strike a deal with the government, which finally happened in December 2014. The opposition figures in the 2016 elections faced the same difficulties, challenges, and scandals.




Figure 4.8 Voter Rigging/Fraud and Electoral Conflict

Source: Field Data (2023)

As indicated in Figure 4.6, majority of the respondents perceived voter rigging and fraud as significantly leading to rejection of election outcomes and therefore leading to electoral conflicts. 116 (49.8) of the respondents strongly agreed that voter rigging makes the pronounced loser to reject the results and therefore forcing his supporters to demonstrate on the streets leading to violence, destruction of property and even death. Further, 107 (45.9%) of the participants agreed that electoral conflicts is due to voter rigging and fraud.

Musungu (2010) in his study deduced that during the Kenya’s 2007 general election there was reported massive rigging especially of presidential election. The first three were conducted largely outside of Nairobi and impacted outcomes at the county level, while the fourth was held in Nairobi at the Kenyatta International Conference Centre (KICC). This latter factor swayed the national vote for president. First, the author discovered

irregularities in the voter registration process that led to as many as 15% of the rolls including information for people who had already passed away.

The second sort of election fraud occurred in districts with a high concentration of people from the same ethnic group. Voter turnout estimates were inflated to be greater than 100%. ODM poll agents were suspected of being corrupted by government agents, and widespread reports of vote buying surfaced, particularly in areas with low literacy levels and on the outside of "arable Kenya" (the Coast and Northeastern provinces, Maasailand, and the North Rift). Finally, during transfer from polling places to the national counting center and collation at KICC, some results were manipulated, sometimes inadvertently. The outcome of the presidential election was most affected by these anomalies. On 30 December 2007, all 44 constituencies were agreed upon by ODM and PNU observers at KICC as being affected by the anomalies. The attached map reveals that the abnormalities were concentrated in the country's most populous areas. The difference between Kibaki and Odinga, which gave Kibaki the victory, was at least 232,000 votes, which is comparable to 2.3% of the votes cast, therefore it is possible that all the irregularities influenced 3% of the vote.

According to the author, the delay in calculating the votes and mounting rumors of cheating sparked an increase of violence at the end of December 2007. The Western media reported on these happenings as the New Year began. Official numbers claim that two months after these events, there were 1,000 fatalities and 300,000 displaced people. When the various stages of the violence's development between the end of December 2007 and the end of February 2008 are examined in isolation, the same logic that underlies both may be discerned in the mapping of the violence.

According to Angela (2008), post-election discontent manifested itself in riots between the end of December and the middle of January in opposition-won constituencies: Luoland, particularly the capital Kisumu, Mombasa and parts of Nairobi inhabited by the Luo, beginning with slums in Kibera, Kawangware, and Mathare, and a few pockets in the east of Nairobi inhabited by the Luo. In the rural districts of the Eldoret-Nakuru-Kericho triangle, the violence assumed the guise of a peasant rebellion, which was clearly planned stage managed by local politicians and influential personalities between Nakuru and Eldoret, especially near Turbo and Timboroa. The Kikuyu minority was the first to be attacked, followed by the Kisii minority. In Kisumu, however, entire streets were destroyed by unplanned rioting with no casualties (the violent deaths were caused by a disproportionate reaction by the security forces in clashes that lacked the ethnic dimension). For example, in Eldoret, thirty people perished in a church fire in the Kiambaa neighborhood.

The findings of the interview also corroborate the influence of Voter rigging and fraud on electoral conflict. For instance, one informant, who is a Member of the County Assembly, stated that:

Rigging of election results has been there since 2007 elections. All election violence that has taken place in Trans Nzoia has been due to claims of rigging of elections and especially Presidential election. However, at lower-level elections, rigging is rampant during party primaries. There are no nomination elections that are credible. There is a lot of hooliganism, bribery and intimidation. Tallying is mere a formality. Therefore, tension is carried away from party nominations to general elections. Therefore, any indicator of mismanagement of general election especially presidential election will be received with full anger, bitterness and violence.

20/12/2022

Sikhendu

4.4.8 Impact of Electoral Conflict in Trans Nzoia County

Many countries have faced dire consequences as a result of conflicts arising from electoral disputes during electoral timelines. Some of the countries have disintegrated while others have fallen into coup crusaders (Johannes, 2020).

“There is evidence that at least some LPCs have achieved positive interventions such as preventing violence and mediating agreements,” despite widespread uncertainty and a lack of support. For instance, the Chitwan LPC demonstrated remarkable outcomes in its two months of operation and had proven successful in a setting of state illegitimacy and incapacity, according to a case study report published in June 2008 by the Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative (Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative, 2008:18). The LPC Chairperson was cited in the article as stating, "We're living in a virtual stateless situation here." Too many instances for the police and administration to handle. As a result, whenever there is a significant issue, people contact us (Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative, 2008). When LPCs have been successful, it has been because of the initiative and dedication of those who seized the chance that committee formation offered. Notably, "the LPC concept was overwhelmingly supported by those interviewed for the report." Another important consideration is the makeup of LPCs. Political parties (11 out of 23) have one more representation from civil society than do the committees. This balance is good; most representatives of civil society do have definite political inclinations, but LPCs offer the only forum for dialogue and constructive cooperation between politicians and civil society. Additionally, LPC composition makes it possible to employ society's ability for conflict transformation more profitably (Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative, 2008:19).

The highly contested election and the postponed announcement of the presidential elections in Kenya during the 2007 general election both contributed to unplanned violence. With the exception of Central Kenya, almost the whole nation saw post-election violence. There was massive loss of property whether business related or domestic. Buildings were torched, businesses were broken into and goods stolen (Owuor, 2014). In Trans Nzoia the effect of 2007/2008 post-election violence was felt near and far. There was massive forced migration of Kikuyus from Cherangany, Kiminini and Endebes. Many of ruling party supporters were killed and their houses burnt down.

This was supported by one religious' leader in Endebes Sub County during FGD session:

During 2007 general election I lost many of my friends whom we used to worship together with. Some of the people I know turned against their neighbour took their cattle and chased them from their farms. Others torched their neighbors' houses with an aim of occupying their land. However, some of us who rescued some of target neighbour and assisted them to reach police stations were subjected to humiliation. I know of a friend after assisting a Kikuyu neighbour escape to safety was cut with machetes until he died.

21/12/2022

Endebes

Another chief had this to say about the impact of electoral conflict in Trans-Nzoia County:

Because many businesses were destroyed as a result of electoral violence in Cherangany Constituency, many young people lost their sources of livelihoods. Many employment opportunities vanished within no minute. Young men who dependent on manual work in neighborhood could not access those farms due to insecurity and suspicion that existed.

In support of the above statements, Awino (2010) observed that election dispute of 2007 general election and subsequent violence in Mumias town that led to many deaths and destruction of property, the two became marginalized as major business people were forced out of the town or killed leaving it a shell of itself. Most people who had invested in rental houses no longer have occupants.

The killings and genocide in Rwanda are unlike anything else that has ever happened. One thing that jumps out, however, is that the constant dominance and marginalization of one group by another is what people really hate (Barbet, 1998). Overthrowing the Tutsi from their centuries-long position of supremacy was the root cause of the terrible internal instability in which Rwanda found itself. The Tutsi people of Rwanda have a rich and illustrious history as cultural elites, set apart from the rest of the population by their strong ties to the country's colonial masters. Time and again throughout the 1950s, Belgians favored the persecuted Hutu majority and openly supported the newly emerging Hutu political movement. Hutu intellectuals, many of whom had previously worked in the church, issued a manifesto in 1957 criticizing the Tutsi's hold on power (Hallet, 1980).

In spite of widespread bloodshed, looting, and destruction of property, the Belgians managed to stage municipal elections in 1956. Hutu burgomasters were overwhelmingly elected in communal elections, displacing Tutsi chiefs. Hutu burgomasters, exercising their authority, forced all Tutsi to resign from positions of power in their territories. In 1961, with the support and organizing of the colonial masters, a convention of Hutu burgomasters and local councilors deposed the monarchy and proclaimed a republic by popular acclamation, marking a revolution that saw the Hutu firmly established and the Tutsi rule brought to an end. Under the leadership of Hutu Gregoire Kayibanda, Rwanda gained its independence in July 1962 (Hallet, 1980).

Power in Rwanda was transferred from the traditional Tutsi royalty to the previously submissive Hutu in a series of communal and parliamentary elections held between 1960 and 1962. The Tutsi, unwilling to conform to the new order, resorted to violence. Tutsi fled to Uganda, Tanganyika, and Congo for protection as the country descended into chaos

following a Hutu insurrection in 1959 and the violence that followed community and legislature elections. The Hutu-dominated government was overthrown by exiled Tutsi who launched invasions from abroad. There were at least nine incursions by Tutsi refugees between 1962 and 1966. As a result, Tutsis remaining living in the country were targets of vengeance assaults. A brutal revenge carried out by the Hutu population resulted in the deaths of around 10,000 Tutsi men, women, and children who were cut to death (Hallet 1980: 609). As a result, more Tutsis were forced to flee to neighboring nations in search of safety.

Zimbabwe's post-election violence continues to be a problem for the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The biggest opposition party, MDC T, has rejected the results of the contentious presidential elections and has decided not to take part in the run-off elections. Since March 2008, an untold number of people have been killed, hundreds have been displaced, and countless buildings have been destroyed as a result of the violence (New Africa, May 2008). Most Zimbabweans who fled the post-election violence ended up in neighboring South Africa, where they have strained relations with the country's natives by competing for jobs and other resources. After being attacked by people from other African countries, South Africans retaliated by attacking local immigrants, leading to fatalities, mass displacement, and widespread destruction. The bloodshed in Zimbabwe after the election had echoes here. Challenges of multi-party democracy can be traced back to its roots in the domestic sources of post-election violence in Zimbabwe. Most African heads of state were able to be hesitant to give up control. Since the country's independence in 1980, Robert Mugabe has served as its leader, and even now, 28 years later, he shows no signs of stepping down.

The economic situation in Zimbabwe may have had a role in the outbreak of violence following the election. After years of economic sanctions imposed by Britain and its allies and claimed sabotage by multinational corporations operating within the country, the economy is on the verge of collapse. Unemployment is at 80% and inflation is over 150,000%. Many Zimbabweans who were unhappy with the opposition's politics saw the 2008 elections as a chance to make a difference and get rid of the regime that was being blamed, at least by international media outlets, for the country's problems (New African, May 2008).

4.5 Chapter Summary

This section discussed the nature of electoral conflicts experienced in Trans Nzoia County. From the findings, the major causes of electoral conflicts in the county include poor electoral management and administration, political elite patronage, unresolved and long-standing grievances, lack of legal and institutional framework and stiff competition. The findings also indicate that the existence of long-standing historical land grievances, poor electoral management and administration practices and political elite patronage as some of the major contributing factors of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County. Additionally, the study indicated those whipping communities' emotions around land injustices during electoral seasons, political patronage disenfranchises other ethnic communities, identity politics and vote rigging/vote fraud leads other political rejection of election outcomes which ultimately exacerbate dispute and conflict during elections.

Overall, existence of electoral rivalry can heighten the stakes leading to aggressive or inflammatory rhetoric, or unethical or illegal behavior by political actors in an effort to

gain an advantage over their rivals. This can also lead to increased competition and tension between candidates and their supporters, as well as potential violence if the rivalry becomes particularly intense. Other factors such as political patronage disadvantages other ethnic communities especially in the areas of resource allocation and distribution and accessibility to available job opportunities leading to political tension during electioneering period due to rivalry arising from its negativity. The next chapter discusses the effectiveness of peace-building strategies for managing election conflicts.

The next chapter five presents' findings on the effectiveness of peace building strategies used in the management of electoral conflict in Trans-Nzoia County, Kenya

CHAPTER FIVE

PEACE BUILDING STRATEGIES USED TO MANAGE ELECTORAL CONFLICT IN TRANS-NZOIA COUNTY, KENYA

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the results and discussions on the objective two about effectiveness of peace-building strategies used to manage electoral conflict in Trans-Nzoia County, Kenya. Section 5.2 of this chapter provides results and discussion of the nature of peace-building strategies in Trans Nzoia County followed by section 5.3, which provides the approaches for managing electoral conflict and finally the chapter summary in the last section 5.5, which presents a summary of the findings of the effectiveness of peace-building strategies for managing electoral conflict.

5.2 Peace-building strategies used to Manage Electoral Conflict in Trans Nzoia County

This section examines effectiveness of various strategies of peace-building in mitigating electoral conflicts and violence in Trans Nzoia County through assessing respondent's perceptions about each one of them. Table 5.1 provides the details of various indicators of different strategies for managing electoral conflicts as perceived by the respondents.

Table 5.1 Respondents Perception about Types of Peace-building Strategies for Curbing Electoral Conflict

Respondents Perception about peace building	Strongly Agree	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Rank
Strategies applied to curb electoral conflict	F (%)	F (%)	F (%)	F (%)	F (%)	SA+A
Use of grassroots peace advocacy / peace messaging	145 (62.3)	70 (30)	2 (0.9)	13 (5.6)	3 (1.3)	(92.3) 2
Training and institution-building activities	120 (51.5)	20 (8.6)	33 (14.2)	40 (17.2)	20 (8.6)	(60.1) 4
Adoption of early warning systems	46 (19.7)	56 (24)	43 (18.5)	40 (17.2)	48 (10.6)	(43.7) 5
Dialogue and mediation	164 (70.3)	43 (18.5)	6 (2.6)	12 (5.2)	8 (3.4)	(88.8) 3
Use of attitude-transformation programs	46 (19.7)	51 (21.9)	50 (21.5)	77 (33)	9 (3.9)	(41.6) 6
Sensitization programs	153 (65.7)	65 (27.9)	0	14 (6)	1 (0.4)	(93.6) 1

Source: Field Data (2023)

5.2.1 Use of Grass root Peace Advocacy/Peace Messaging to Electoral Conflict

Table 5.1 shows findings from the respondent's perception about various peace building strategies that can assist to curb electoral conflict. On the use of grassroots peace advocacy and peace messaging methods as peace-building strategy to prevent electoral conflict, 145 (62.3%) strongly agreed that it leads to conflicts during elections followed by 70(30%)

who agreed that it causes. In contrast 2(0.9%), 13(5.6%) and 3(1.3%) were not sure, disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively.

5.2.2 Training and Institutional Building Activities, and Electoral Conflict

The study findings revealed that out of 203 sample size of respondents selected for the study, 120(51.5%) participants strongly agreed that training and capacity building institutions involved in electoral process will assist in preventing electoral conflict. Another 20(8.6%) agreed that it do cause electoral conflict. In contrast, 33(14.2%), 40(17.2%), and 20(8.6%) were not sure, disagreed and strongly disagreed consecutively.

5.2.3 Adoption of Early Warning System and Electoral Conflict

The respondents in the study also gave their perceptions as to whether application of early warning system can assist to prevent electoral conflict. 46(19.7%) strongly agreed that when employed it has capacity to prevent electoral conflict, 56(24%) agreed that it prevents, 43(18.5%) were not sure, 40(17.2%) disagreed while 48(10.6%) strongly disagreed.

5.2.4 Use of Dialogue and Mediation and Electoral Conflict

Respondents had the highest preference on the use of dialogue and mediation to among other peace-building strategies with 164(70.3%) of them strongly supporting, 43(18.5%) agreeing while 6(2.6%) were not sure. 12 (5.2 %) and 8(3.4%) disagreed and strongly disagreed.

5.2.5 Use of Attitude Transformation Programs and Electoral Conflict

Most respondents had negative perceptions on the use of attitude transformation programs to prevent electoral conflict. Out of 203 sampled participants for the study, 77(33%) disagreed on the use of the programmes, 50(21.5%) were not use on how these programmes could impact on electoral conflict while 9(3.9%) strongly disagreed. On the other hand 46(19.7%) strongly agreed that it assists in preventing electoral conflict while 51(21.9%) agreed that it assists.

5.2.6 Use of Sensitization Programmes and Electoral Conflict

Sensitization programmes on the negative effect of electoral conflicts on the lives of citizens can assist to prevent potential offenders from participating in them. Most respondents 153(65.7%) strongly agreed that these programmes have capacity to prevent electoral conflicts, 65(27.9%) agreed to the finding. However, 14(6%) and 1(0.4%) disagreed and strongly disagreed.

In summary therefore, Table 5.1 above indicates that in Trans Nzoia use of dialogue and mediation is the strategy that is commonly used to solve election disputes and conflicts in the county. Dialogue and mediation method is strongly supported by majority of the respondents with representation of 164 (70.3%) for mitigating problems emanating from election disputes and conflicts. This was closely followed by use of sensitization programs at 153 (65.7%). The finding further revealed that when those who strongly agree and agree that dialogue and mediation is best suited to solve conflicts arising from election period, more than 207 (88.8%) of the respondents are in support. Moreover, for sensitization programs, those who strongly support and agree, they add up to 218 (93.6%). This finding

therefore revealed that dialogue, mediation and use of sensitization programs are the chosen strategies to combat electoral conflict. In contrast, use of attitude transformation programs was the strategy that received the least approval with only 46(19.7%) strongly agreeing and 51(21.9%) in support.

Only when peace-building tactics take into account the requirements of the populace will they be successful there. Nagle and Clancy (2010) contend that rather than being implemented without question, peace-building techniques ought to be put to the test to see whether they can be adapted to suit the requirements, wants, and comprehension of the populace. According to the study's conclusions, effective peace-building techniques are deeply ingrained in research and training. Research on the reasons behind election violence is necessary, as is making sure that the public is informed on how to steer clear of violence and instead adopt techniques for fostering peace. These results also support the claim made by Bumsumtwi-Sam (2010) that previous research should serve as the foundation for any successful peace-building initiatives.

The study's findings support earlier research. Nathna (1999:12), for instance, discovered that, in most cases, "united nations peace-building missions were deployed after the signing of formal peace accords or agreements that have warring factions laying down their arms and agreeing to some form of a truce and a strategy for future power sharing, usually the formation of political parties and the contesting of elections." These peace accords usually signify the official conclusion of a conflict and the involvement of parties involved in political discourse. But as Woodhouse warns, peace agreements don't always make everyone happy, they don't always mean the end of an old conflict, and they can sometimes even contain the seeds of their own destruction (Anderson, 2004). Therefore, peace-

building missions have sometimes been authorized to work prior to and during peace accord negotiations, depending on the circumstances.

One respondent during FGD noted that;

Peace building should encompass post-conflict initiatives to rebuild societies and forestall a return to violence and conflict situations.

23/12/2022 Chepchoina

The aforementioned findings, which highlight the significance of reparation and restoration, are consistent with those of Lacayo (2004). Most victims of violence have some sort of symptomatic reaction, and widespread violence has the potential to drive a wedge between communities and their families. Neglecting to deal with victimization and justice issues can lead to the growth of resentment and the revival of old animosities. Reconciliation also lessens prejudice and desensitizes people to the unacceptableness of violent acts against others. Accordingly, many post-conflict reconstruction studies see reconciliation and mending of interpersonal relationships as crucial to avoiding a recurrence of violence (Lars, 2009).

Healing wounded societies is a function and nature of peace-building, and it calls for a deeper comprehension of the underlying causes of conflict and the strategies for integrating people in a way that prevents painful memories from being rekindled. In light of this, Akinmoladun and Ottuh (2015) propose that peace-building works to avoid, lessen, transform, and assist individuals in their recovery from all types of violence. It also gives people the capacity to cultivate relationships at all levels that support both themselves and their surroundings.

The study also sought to determine the various electoral strategies that can prevent electoral conflict in Tran Nzoia County. The respondents were asked to indicate whether they agree electoral strategies that can prevent electoral conflict in Tran Nzoia. The results are as shown in Figure 4.10.




Figure 5.1 Early Warning System and Electoral Conflict Prevention

Source: Field Data (2023)

Figure 5.1 indicate that majority of respondents 118 (50.6%) strongly support adoption of early warning systems to assist in keeping track of conflicts before they occur through implementing of preventive measures. Further 110 (47.2%) of the respondents were in support of the strategy. This finding therefore revealed that adoption of Early Warning System would bring about the desired change in management of electoral conflicts, as it is a preventive measure and not a reactive one. Most preventive measures reduces both loss of property and humanity.

Post-election violence (PEV) in Kenya in late 2007 and early 2008 threw a pall over the country and heightened the need for a standardized conflict early warning system, according to research findings published in a paper by Oluoch (2010). To help integrate and coordinate Kenya's different peace processes, UNDP-Kenya supported the formation of the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management. The establishment of an Early Warning mechanism to enable Early Response in order to prevent potential conflict within the country was one of the primary charters in the committee's establishment.

Despite the generally peaceful nature of the elections in August 2022, Njuguna's (2022) research indicated that 21 occurrences were picked up by the early warning and fast reaction mechanisms. Ten of them were able to receive prompt attention thanks to the project, while the others are still being monitored. For instance, on August 6th, fighting broke out between two Somali clans, the Garre and the Degodia, in the town of Konton, located on the boundary of Wajir and Mandera counties, resulting in one death and five injuries. There were concerns that the impending elections might lead to an increase in violence between the two communities because of the close nature of the gubernatorial campaigns in both counties and the history of conflict between them. However, with the help of the initiative, the local peace infrastructures that had been developed in the preceding phase were able to mediate the conflict. At first, everyone put their disputes on hold until election-related tensions subsided. The peace infrastructure then mediated an accord that included formal apologies and monetary reparations to start the healing process.

The author also noted that training sessions for election monitors, who kept an eye out for political violence, were held to prepare the community for the polls. A conflict early

warning and response system was established through the county Ceasefire Monitoring Committees (CMCs) during the campaign time. Multiple actors have stressed the significance of local peace-building infrastructures, both during and after the elections.

In the months leading up to the elections, the NCIC reportedly held sensitization workshops, distributed branded peace materials to local communities, organized peace caravans, and lobbied for political candidates to sign peace charters. All of this work was done with the end goal of fostering a culture of peaceful elections at every societal level. Trainings were held in Mandera and Wajir counties for a wide range of stakeholders, including local media outlets and young people, on topics such as conflict-sensitive reporting, hate speech management, and Electoral Alternative Dispute Resolution (EADR) mechanisms. Similarly, a peace roadshow was arranged in Kapenguria and West Pokot with the slogan "Elections Bila Noma" after 'boda boda' (motorbike) operators incited violence in metropolitan centers in prior years. In support, one of the key informants who is an administrator underscored that;

“Peace is a very vital organ in our community. Like the heart organ in the body, peace is the kernel of our existence. Without it, all the other aspects of our lives are doomed! We must work extra hard during this electioneering period to make sure our communities will have peaceful elections and smooth transition of power to the new administrations.”

In support, another informant who is a Chief observed that;

“We talk of addressing development in our communities, yet we overlook peace and its importance. What kind of development can we achieve without peace? I would suggest we focus all our energies and resources on building peace structures like CMCs and making them a fully functional peace-building body of their own, rather than investing resources in other unimportant development projects by our government. Peace should be prioritized above all. Once consensus is established, and its structures are in place, we can only discuss development. (11/11/2022; Matumbei”)

Hamisi (2022) concluded that paying special attention to adolescents, women, and underrepresented groups was crucial to the long-term success of an early warning system and swift reaction. Women were the focus of several forms of training and participation designed to reduce the likelihood of escalation and increase the likelihood of successful prevention, mitigation, and management of electoral violence and conflicts. They were frequently asked to give their expert opinions on a wide variety of radio programs.




Figure 5.2 Grassroots Peace Advocacy by Civil Society Organizations

Source: Field Data (2023)

The use of grassroots peace advocacy by civil society received immense support from the research participants. Figure 5.2 shows that 130 (55.8%) and 88 (37.8%) of the respondents strongly agreed and supported the use of grassroots peace advocacy methods by the civil society including faith-based organizations to entrench tolerance in people and therefore avoid conflict during electioneering period.

Moses (2019) claims that in order to be effective, informational interventions must inform relevant actors of a process and the repercussions of either supporting or breaching the process. Informational interventions are the foundation of many policies and programs because of the belief that if people have access to new information, they will acquire new habits. The author also discovered that participants who received informative interventions reported feeling more confident in their ability to reject electoral violence. Even in crisis zones and in countries without a firm democratic foundation, election education led by unbiased facilitators can reduce the likelihood of violence.

People in areas where election education has taken place are less likely to engage in electoral violence, as shown by the findings of Isaac (2021). This could be because they have learned about non-violent alternatives to resolving what may seem like intractable disagreements, or because they have become more resistant to disinformation from actors encouraging violence through peace messaging aimed at changing social norms. Because of these differences, programs that aim to reduce violence through information dissemination should develop targeted message techniques.

Isaac (2021) advocated for early response mechanisms that alter societal norms to reduce violence on Election Day. These interventions are most successful, the author argues, when they target those who are most likely to pursue violent behavior, but their effects can spread to those who are not directly exposed to them. The process entails systematically collecting evidence on the effects of peace messaging on election violence.

Hussein (2020) found that the Afghan Women's Network, which is made up of over 125 civil society organizations, has enough clout as a whole to be invited to important national

events and to address the UN Security Council. It was able to use its political and social clout to advocate for gender quotas and the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law, as well as to collaborate with foreign groups to promote initiatives to boost women's representation in government. As a result, networks can drive the agenda. Disagreements and conflict inside a network or coalition might weaken its effectiveness.

Cox, Osborn, and Sisk (2015) found, on the other hand, that religious institutions and groups can be used to promote segregation. Religious leaders have been complicit in both inciting and then supporting electoral and political violence. After being silent for over a year, religious leaders and institutions finally spoke out against violence and in favor of justice and human rights in 2012. The debate between political parties that led to the unity government had the backing of the Catholic bishops as well (Throup, 2015).

However, churches played a significant role in peace demonstrations and peace caravans leading up to the 2013 general elections.

In many instances, religious leaders have been complicit in electoral and political violence. Christian and Muslim religious leaders in Nigeria, for instance, have both sought to garner followers and sway by stating they are efficient at curbing the societal and political power of the other religion (Dowd, 2014). Such rivalry has seeped into the political arena. General Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim, is running for president, and Christian religious leaders in Rivers State have been accused of collecting payments and campaigning against him by spreading a document that incites fear of an Islamization of the country. According to research (Afolabi and Avasiloae, 2015), these kinds of activities ratchet up tensions. By not condemning vote rigging and allowing politicians who won fraudulent elections to

engage in 'thanksgiving' in churches and mosques to acknowledge God's sovereignty and faithfulness, religious leaders in Nigeria have been accused of undermining free and fair elections (Familusi, 2012).

An umbrella body representing Uganda's Christian denominations, the Ugandan Christian Council (UJCC) has participated in civic education and election monitoring (Downie, 2015a). To mitigate the possibility of election-related violence, DREP (a non-governmental organization created in 2013 by Christian religious leaders and co-chaired by Christian and Muslim leaders as an inter-faith effort) in Nigeria conducted civic education seminars in 2015. The number of illegitimate ballots cast was reduced as a result. DREP also conducted voter education initiatives, urging young people to register with the Independent National Electoral Commission and cast ballots (Afolabi and Avasiloae, 2015).

Afolabi and Avasiloae (2015) and Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart (2010) found that religious leaders and religious institutions in several states in Nigeria (including Kaduna state and Lagos state) organized and facilitated televised public debates throughout recent election cycles. Residents of Lagos state who were interviewed by Afolabi and Avasiloae (2015) said they felt the televised event hosted by the Dioceses of the Anglican Church of Nigeria helped to decrease the use of hate speech and inflammatory rhetoric and provided voters with a better opportunity to learn about and evaluate candidates' platforms. Some Christian and Muslim leaders in Rivers state kept tabs on the situation on the ground via local networks, and even banned parties from campaigning in potentially volatile areas in an effort to quell violent clashes. Afolabi and Avasiloae (2015) state that "community

reporters and key community influencers were trained to gather information on incidents and to mobilize public opinion toward nonviolence."

But such actions might also spark debate. Candidates for Tanzania's ruling party in the 2010 national elections were unimpressed by the Catholic Church's efforts to promote civic engagement and education. The candidates mistook the severe language on corruption in the civic education letter for an implicit criticism of their record in service and therefore a hostile interference, despite the fact that the letter's main message was simply to encourage readers to make educated political choices based on candidates' suitability for office. As a result, President-elect Jakaya Kikwete criticized such materials (Downie, 2015b), arguing that they would lead to Tanzanians voting in accordance with religious directions.




Figure 5.3 Dialogue and Mediation Approach

Source: Field Data (2023)

Figure 5.3 indicates that majority of the participants 137 (58.8%) strongly observed that use of dialogue and mediation approaches to mitigate conflicts between political opponents and between warring communities will solve electoral rivalry and mistrust amongst themselves. Further 94 (40.3%) of the respondents agreed that use dialogue and mediation approaches is a strategy that if applied will solve both political conflict and confrontation between different communities especially during elections.

It was also observed that moderated talks between political party leaders could lead to increased cooperation, which in turn could open channels of communication and help reduce violent incidents. Addressing violence may be facilitated by a multi-party liaison committee's inclusive involvement with election management organizations or another consultative group. Interpersonal prejudice may be mitigated by persistent, meaningful interaction in the context of shared, purposeful projects. Burundian youth are commonly mobilized by political players during episodes of political violence in Burundi; the USAID project known as Bumbatira Amahoro, supervised by a local CSO, aimed to deter them from engaging in electoral violence (Karanja, 2016).

During the politically fraught years of 2008-2009 in Zimbabwe, a group of church leaders from various Christian denominations got together to discuss how their churches could help ease tensions. In order to facilitate local peace discussions and outreach, religious and community leaders from all over the country were enlisted through the Ecumenical Church Leaders Forum (ECLF). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Zimbabwe began working with the Evangelical Church Leadership Forum (ECLF) in 2009 to train local religious leaders in conflict prevention, management, resolution, and change (UNDP, 2014). Community conversations for peace and social cohesion are brought

together between traditional leaders, political parties, police, and local council officials thanks to ECLF's capacity building efforts. By bringing together ECLF and national stakeholders like the Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation, and Integration, UNDP helped Zimbabwe's peace and reconciliation efforts become more organized (UNDP, 2014).

As part of its peace-building efforts, the NCKK has promoted communication across different faiths and ethnic groups on a local and national scale, educating citizens about the workings of government. Supported trips to Rwanda have been organized to help leaders of different ethnic groups understand the effects of identity-violence (Cox & Ndung'u, 2014), and this is just one example of the organization's efforts to expose communities to conflict zones.




Figure 5.4 Attitude Transformation Programs

Source: Field Data (2023)

Figure 5.4 shows that despite attitude transformation through outreach programs and faith-based organizations being the least used electoral conflict resolution strategy in Trans Nzoia, majority of the participants 127 (54.5%) agreed that it's one of the best initiatives that when applied will assist to sensitize people against engaging in conflict during electioneering period. Another 97 (41.6%) of the respondents also strongly supported the above research finding.

The Inter-faith Forum International (IFI), which was established in Lagos state to encourage Christians and Muslims to live together in peace, was found to have facilitated cooperation between religious authorities of the two religions. Religious leaders from all religions attended special interfaith prayer activities arranged by IFI to promote peace during the election season. Afolabi and Avasiloae (2015) argued that the decrease in violence across the state could be attributed in part to religious leaders' efforts to promote harmony. Christian and Muslim officials in Ibadan state have frequently issued united statements and collaborated to sponsor events with the goal of preventing divisive language and acts of interfaith violence. There is less political tension and fewer avoidable clashes because to these outreach efforts (Dowd, 2014).

It was discovered that Sri Lankans made an attempt to involve religious leaders in inter-religious activity to foster peace and reconciliation, paying special attention to the establishment of horizontal relationships across different communities. Prayer services, talks, and workshops (Cox, Osborn, & Sisk, 2015) centered on the shared values and pacifist teachings of the world's major religions.

Kenya's religious leaders and institutions have long been catalysts for positive social transformation and integration. African Independent Churches (AICs) were instrumental in the fight against colonialism and in the subsequent independence movement. However, they were structured similarly to political parties of the time in that they were divided along ethnic lines (Cox and Ndung'u, 2014). In the postcolonial era, religious leaders and inter-denominational Christian associations were very vocal in their demands for multiparty elections, which were finally realized in 1992 (Kilonzo, 2009). This included clergy from mainline Protestant denominations under the umbrella body of the National Council of Churches of Kenya and the senior most leadership of the Catholic Church through the Kenya Conference of Catholic Bishops. In contrast, Pentecostals in Kenya during the 1980s and 1990s supported the dictatorship despite opposition from civil society and mainstream churches, aligning themselves closely with the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and President Moi (Throup, 2015). After the Kibaki and Coalition governments came to power, prominent religious leaders remained silent regarding democratic violations (Cox and Ndung'u, 2014).

Religious leaders and interfaith institutions were once again polarized along ethnic lines during the most recent post-election violence in 2007-2008 (Throup, 2015). Furthermore, many looked to have 'played ethnic politics' themselves in the lead up to the violence, which contributed to further erosion of authority among religious leaders to speak out against state abuses and ethnic politics and in support of societal cohesion. After the 2007-2008 electoral violence, however, religious players took significant control of peace-building and inter-group reconciliation efforts, making room for them and lending their support. Support for peace dialogues, interventions like peace marches or "peace

caravans," local peace education programs, and peace messaging via SMS systems were all funded by the international community (Cox & Ndung'u, 2014), and this was just the beginning of the international community's investment in peace-building.

A civic education program in Kibera, a huge and densely populated slum, is an example of an earlier effort. A Catholic parish's human rights ministry ran a civic education curriculum in Kibera between 2002 and 2005. After completing the program, parishioners showed significant improvement in their democratic values and behavior at the localized level within their own parish groups. The program focused on nation building, constitution making, democracy and good governance, and integrated Christian ethics, beliefs, and values. Participants grasped the significance of selecting leaders who honestly and fairly represent their views. Approximately 75% of the leaders of tiny Christian communities were voted out of office in 2004. Tolerance, respect for differing opinions, and the combating of prejudice were also bolstered as a result of the training (Bodewes, 2010).




Figure 5.5 Targeted Peace Building Activities for the Youths

Source: Field Data (2023)

Figure 5.5 shows that the use of targeted peace building initiatives especially those aiming at the youths to reduce electoral conflict received overwhelming support from the respondents as 123 (52.8%) supported the strategy in addition to 107 (45.9%) who strongly agreed it. This finding can be interpreted that most respondents supported it because it aims at youths who are mostly used by the politicians to cause violence and destruction of property. Therefore, involving youth themselves in the conflict management and resolution activities is in itself a solution.

This lends credence to the claim that Kenya has the sixth-largest population in Africa (after Nigeria, South Africa, and Ethiopia) due to its 49.7 million people, as stated in the UNDP (2017) report. Furthermore, it is smack in the heart of a youth bulge, with 40% of its population being comprised of people aged 0-14, 33% of its population being comprised of people aged 10-24, and 57% of its population being comprised of people aged 15-64. Kenya's population is expected to continue its 'toughening' trend in the near to medium

future, with a fertility rate of 3.8 births per woman and an annual population increase of 2.6%.

The results of this study are consistent with those of Yatok (2020), who found that young people play many roles in inter-communal violence. These roles include being perpetrators of violence, victims of violence, and peacemakers. The author also discovered that the prevalence of 'Moranism' in certain regions of Northern Kenya makes it more acceptable for young males to resort to violence in pursuit of personal glory or in self-defense. Pastoralist communities in the North Rift rely heavily on age groups as a social and political factor. You can find them in the Kalenjin, Turkana, and Samburu communities. There are several age groups of men in these cultures, and these groups repeat themselves periodically. One of the most significant groups is the warrior set, which consists of young men in their late teens to early twenties. All-male warrior groups, known as 'Morans' among the Maasai and Samburu, have historically played pivotal roles in the political, economic, and military life of North Rift tribes. fighter organizations continue to protect their communities even in modern times; "warrior militias represent the entire community, its stakes and the socio-cultural continuity." They are responsible for restocking and maintaining the honor of a specific generation or ethnic group, as well as defending villages from retaliatory attacks and engaging in livestock raids to amass cash.

The author's research also showed that the role of youth is gendered, with young women being particularly vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence during conflicts and when they are abducted. There is a case to be made that the same discourse that gives Moranism its sense of ethno-communal pride and its willingness to defend the community

is also fundamentally masculinist, elevating the prestige of young male warriors above all others and unintentionally devaluing the value, worth, and bodies of young women.

In spite of this, the author deduces that many young people are engaged as peace players in a wide range of projects, such as peace brigades, Youth for Peace, Tuelewane, and the Tecla Laroupe foundation. It is difficult to deny the agency of the young people who take part in that intricate network of inter-communal violence. Many young people's motivations and interests are tied to their individual and communal socio-economic, cultural, civic, and ideological agendas, which explains why they can be both perpetrators and victims of violence as well as arrowheads of peace and reconciliation. Even in the context of structural determinants like 'Moranism,' young people's involvement in inter-communal violence is often tied to their awareness of their own socio-economic and political marginalization and vulnerabilities, with violence often seen as a means to ends like social recognition, social advancement, material gain, and a voice in community decision-making.

In contrast, Oucho (2010) made another overarching conclusion regarding the state and opposition parties' use of young militias and violence to "build electoral influence." Throughout Moi's administration, youth organizations and political party youth wings were co-opted and utilized to silence critics and suppress opposition. For instance, it has been said that the KANU youth wing, which enjoys the protection of the government, has utilized and mastered the culture of political intimidation and extortion. Several youth militias formed as a result, giving young people in Kenya an option for a 'violent' line of work. Mungiki Sect, which was founded as a counter-youth group with other ethnic-oriented vigilante groups, is one prominent example of this phenomenon. The rise of youth

militias and vigilante organizations has made it so that the Kenyan government is no longer the only source of violence or the only group of young people who can be seen actively participating in politics and elections.

To paraphrase Kariuki (2010), "youths were mobilized and instrumentalized for goals that transcend political power" during the election violence in Kenya. Most of the young Kenyans who were involved saw it as a means to an end a means to defend their social, economic, and material gains as well as those of their families and communities. This goes against the trend of weak state critical institutions, which is commonly exemplified by the inability to ensure fair and honest elections. Protests, especially violent ones, become an acceptable substitute for peaceful political competition under these conditions. Political elite, ethnic communities, and perhaps young people in Kenya place a high value on the president and political power because of the seemingly endless supply of patronage and the belief that it can open doors to better economic opportunities for themselves and their communities. Due to the competitive nature of elections and politics in general, the political arena and elections in particular have become the primary venue for the promotion of individual and collective needs and the preservation of rights and interests.

Kimunguni (2021) discovered that secondary school students have utilised existing options in their syllabus to engage politically and for peace-building in his analysis of the role of youth in peace keeping activities. The Kenya National Schools and Colleges Drama Festival (KNSCDF) is one such venue. The KNSCDF was first introduced in the 1950s as an extracurricular activity for Kenyan youth by the colonial government, and it has since grown to become a major place for discussing socioeconomic and political concerns in Kenya's varied setting. Students in elementary and secondary school, with the help of their

teachers, are encouraged to produce plays that are authentic to their experience. The festivals serve a double purpose of "enabling observers to use each annual festival to gauge grassroots opinion on the most volatile issues of the day" and "getting these young minds to reflect on their contexts."

The author also pointed out that the festival's growing popularity was evident in 2013 when the organizers banned a play by the Butere Girls called Shackles of Doom due to its tribal themes and its discussion of truth, justice, and equal distribution in light of the recently discovered oil in Turkana. While this certainly isn't representative of all young people their age, it does illustrate that many have taken advantage of the tools at their disposal to promote peace in whichever way they see fit. However, since most official locations are managed by the government, they prove to be restrictive for discussing delicate matters, which might vary greatly depending on the current administration. These situations call for the use of more casual areas.




Figure 5.6 Training of Election Actors and Institutional Capacity Building

Source: Field Data (2023)

Figure 5.6 shows that majority 115 (49.4%) of the respondents agreed that institutional capacity building and training of election actors such as training EMB staff, sensitization of voters as well as political actors, and training of security actors can reduce incidences of electoral conflicts. In addition, the study shows that 48.1 (112) of the participants strongly agreed institutional capacity building and training of election actors have a positive impact on reducing electoral conflicts. Although training and institution building activities of voters, electoral actors, security and electoral management institutions was not widely used in Trans Nzoia County, most respondents indicated that when applied well it can assist in delivering credible and transparent elections.

Electoral systems also have an impact on the ability to govern because of the legitimacy they provide. A well-trained electoral system and institutions with plenty of experience running electoral procedures are crucial to the legitimacy of any elected government. When people have faith in their election system, they are more likely to want to see it continue to function democratically, which makes the system more administrable.

5.3 Approaches for Management of Electoral Conflict

In the study, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with various statements in relation to management of electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County.




Figure 5.7 Collaboration between Security Forces and Political Parties

Source: Field Data (2023)

As indicated in Figure 5.7 majority of the respondents 121 (51.9%) agreed and 110 (47.2%) strongly agreed that collaborative activities between the security agencies and political parties can assist in building confidence in the agencies involved in election management during the electioneering period. This finding can be interpreted to mean that the existing animosity between these agencies affects planning and management of the elections, voting patterns and even outcome of the elections. Because the main purpose of electoral body is to deliver credible, verifiable and transparent election results, involvement of security agencies as partners/stakeholders will build confidence in the operations of the elections agency and therefore the elections outcome.




Figure 5.8 Electoral Policy and Strategies for Security of Election Actors

Source: Field Data (2023)

Findings in Figure 5.8 reveals most of the respondents hold the view that adoption of relevant policy and strategies will assist in addressing security therefore allowing party representatives and observers to actively participate in electoral process and therefore enhancing credibility of the electoral process. The representation of 132 (56.7%) of respondents strongly agree with the findings as indicated as well as 98 (42.1%) of those who supported the facts. Therefore out of 233 respondents who were sampled for the study 230 (98.8%) agreed that enactment and application of relevant electoral policies and strategies will improve the process of elections and its credibility.

Towah (2019) stressed that formulation and adoption of relevant policies and regulations is not enough to hold credible and reliable general elections. According to the author, these policies need to be followed to the letter by the body mandated with election management and administration. Further, the author noted that other election actors need to be made

aware about these policies through training and participation. For these policies to function, the electoral management body needs to be financed well through the whole process.

Ngugi (2014) on the other hand deduced that the problem is not about formulation of good electoral policies, regulations or laws but is all about the government interference in the electoral process either through intimidation of electoral body officials, providing inadequate funds or by use of security apparatus to intimidate voters and opposition figures with an intention of retaining power.

Page and Pitts (2009) argues that there are things that the Electoral Management Body must conform to despite having the policies in order to show high level of professionalism, internal administration and accountability. Adopting and publishing a strategic vision, adopting and publishing a code of conduct for the EMB and its staff, and establishing a core cadre of permanent election officials; creating and implementing training and education programs for election officials, such as professional ethics, institutionalizing a culture of learning and self-reflection, and maintaining institutional memory; creating and implementing training and education programs for election officials, such as professional ethics; and institutionalizing a culture of ethical behavior, including internal discipline methods, by e.g. The study also suggested implementing a system for randomly assigning poll workers to polling places, placing poll workers in stations outside of their districts, standardizing EMB processes and electoral procedures to ensure uniform treatment, particularly for polling and counting, and developing an anti-fraud strategy that addresses deterrence, detection, and resolution while balancing this with the significance of maximizing enfranchisement.




Figure 5.9 Confidence building among Election Actors

Source: Field Data (2023)

Findings in Figure 5.9 reveal that building confidence among key electoral stakeholders including politicians, political parties and voters reduces political conflict. Out of the sample of 233 respondents, 134 (57.5%) agreed that building confidence among electoral stakeholders assists in reducing electoral conflict. Further, 90 (38.6%) of the respondents observed that confidence building among political stakeholders significantly reduces political, electoral conflict and mistrust.

The role of Electoral Commission on building confidence among stakeholders on its preparedness to deliver credible, verifiable and transparent elections is key to prevention of electoral conflict. Regular meetings with stakeholders, relaying of information through mass media channels, and holding meeting with stakeholders especially political parties, aspirants and inviting observers to come and verify the process of electioneering, in itself ensures trust (Ogola, 2009).

In support, interview findings indicated that

“The root of electoral integrity is a political problem. Electoral integrity depends on public confidence in electoral and political processes. It is not enough to reform institutions; citizens need to be convinced that changes are real and deserve their confidence. Inclusiveness, transparency and accountability are all fundamental to developing that confidence.

The basis for public trust is shaped by the broader political context in which elections take place, not just by the quality of the electoral process itself.

Elections are not an end in themselves. Their purpose, as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is to ascertain the will of the people regarding their government. They are processes to confer legitimacy to govern, and to resolve peacefully political competition. A genuine election is ultimately one in which the outcome reflects the freely expressed choices of the people.

Electoral competition is winner-take-all games in which winners gain wide-ranging political and economic benefits and losers face the threat of persecution and even violence. For elections to have integrity, they must avoid this winner take all situation and instead create a political system in which even losers have an incentive to participate.

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Legal protections for minority cultural, linguistic, and educational heritage, as well as promises to invest public resources, may be key factors of confidence for groups that do not represent a majority. As a temporary solution, veto rights for groups on issues affecting their status have been agreed upon in several post-conflict circumstances.

Regardless of who is in power, the opposition and their supporters would feel more secure if electoral and political rights were guaranteed by constitutional and other legal provisions and their amendment was subject to consultative processes and qualified decision-making. Strong institutions that can function separately from the executive branch, whichever party controls it, are also necessary for a rule of law to exist. Although it's a broad topic in and

of itself, improving public faith in the judicial system and law enforcement authorities is an important part of this.

Campion and Jega (2023) in their study maintains that any election commission must reassure election actors that it is prepared and capable of producing acceptable results by maintaining open lines of communication with political actors, civil society, and the media and instituting liaison mechanisms for consulting with stakeholders on major decisions. Furthermore, by adopting rules for provision of open access to electoral information, encouraging, and facilitating the presence of party agents at all polling stations and other electoral locations, EMB can inspire confidence to the election stakeholders. This is because increasing trust in elections and the legitimacy of all electoral operations can be facilitated by providing party agents with more opportunities to participate. By actively educating and informing voters and residents, as well as offering them with complete and accurate information, EMB can increase confidence and trust in its procedures among all parties involved. Furthermore, EMBs can aid in fostering trust among constituents by facilitating widespread channels of communication with voters via traditional and emerging media platforms such as newspapers, television, and radio. Results integrity can also be improved by posting results at each polling station, providing copies of result sheets to party agents, and publishing results for each polling station widely, including on its websites; setting reasonable timelines for the release of results; adhering to those timelines; and providing clear explanations if the timeline cannot be met.

Fischer (2012) suggested that it is crucial for the public to have faith in and comprehension of the results process and how the results convert into seats or winners, and the current findings confirm these claims. Voters should be informed ahead of time about things like

the number of votes required to win, how seats will be distributed, and whether or not a runoff election would be necessary. When a convoluted mechanism for allocating seats in the East Timorese parliament led to coalition building that did not appear to fairly reward the party that received the most votes, tensions quickly escalated in that country in 2007. Although post-Election Day education programs are not always effective, a large-scale campaign planned by IFES and other partners proved crucial in calming tensions. Using the ICEP lens, non-election oriented organizations on the ground should keep a close eye out for signs of rising conflict and tension during the whole election process, but especially during the wait for results (Fischer, 2012). It is important to report any red flags to the proper authorities or through reliable channels. UNDP (2017) suggests using an ICEP working group for this purpose, or including information sharing pertaining to conflicts into ongoing coordinated initiatives.

Post-election confrontations, which typically revolve around the announcement of results, can be avoided with proper training and planning, as Fischer (2012) demonstrated. The necessary confidence in the results process by all stakeholders can only be achieved by ensuring a transparent electoral results system, paying special attention to explaining how results aggregation and tabulation will actually work, and sharing timelines and results, down to the polling station level, at all stages of the process. The procedure, together with tactics for informing the public, collaborating with the press, making public pronouncements, and preparing for any conflicts or controversies, is essential. Trust between the EMB and the parties will be established before the results are released, which is crucial for mitigating negative reactions at the first indication of trouble.

Whether started by the state or by civil society, watchdog and monitoring initiatives can provide timely, reliable data on the presence or growth of tensions, electoral violence, or electoral breaches (Fjelde & Kristine, 2016). Because they tackle impunity, secrecy, and rumors all of which contribute to electoral conflict in transitional democracies they have the potential to boost the success of conflict prevention efforts. The possibility for conflict is mitigated by the presence of monitoring and watchdog measures, which reduce the room and opportunity for fraud and corruption. These include, but are not limited to, election dispute resolution (EDR) case monitoring, election observation, and election transparency procedures introduced by the Election Management Board (EMB) (Fjelde & Kristine, 2016). Election Management Bodies' efforts to develop best practices and regulatory provisions to ensure electoral process integrity are crucial in maintaining peace.




Figure 5.10 Civil Society Peace Advocacy Campaigns

Source: Field Data (2023)

Findings in Figure 5.10 indicate that the role played by civil society organizations especially the non-governmental organizations, faith-based organization and community-based organizations in building awareness among community members is very important in reducing electoral conflicts. This observation is reflected in the responses of 108 (46.4%) and 120 (51.5%) of respondents who strongly agreed and agreed to the assertion. This finding can be interpreted to mean that awareness activities enable the participants including the community members, minority groups, and other agencies involved in electoral process to ask questions and be assured of a credible process with public participation. This awareness session reduces suspicions, mistrust and feeling of exclusion. It enables everyone to feel appreciated and take himself to be part of the process.

The role international and local organizations play in peace advocacy campaigns at national and local level prior and during both political and electoral circles cannot be underrated. ECOWAS, IGAD, AU and Human Rights Watch play significant role in issuing warning of impending conflict, providing funds for local campaign activities and by sending personnel to assist the victims of the conflict (Kathryn, 2018). According to Maigari (2022), awareness campaigns funded by nongovernmental organizations, faith-based organizations and community-based organizations ensures that potential conflict is prevented by assisting many countries to diffuse tension, instill confidence in people about the process and makes different communities living together to respect one another for the sake of peace and harmonious coexistence.

Before the elections, NCIC, NEPCOH Trust, and Inter-peace worked together to host sensitization workshops, distribute branded peace materials in neighborhoods, organize

peace caravans, and lobby candidates to sign peace charters. All of this work was done with the end goal of fostering a culture of peaceful elections at every societal level.

Local media outlets and young people were among the many stakeholders in Mandera and Wajir counties who received training on topics such as conflict-sensitive reporting, hate speech management, and electoral alternative dispute resolution (EADR) mechanisms.

An election-themed peace roadshow was held in Kapenguria and West Pokot after 'boda boda' (motorbike) drivers incited violence in cities in previous years. During a road show in Mandera, Hussein Yussuf, chief officer for the Department of Conflict Management, Cohesion, and Integration, spoke on the importance of maintaining calm during the next election.

Candidates for office, county commissioners, and representatives of peace stakeholders all signed peace charters in an effort to hold leaders accountable for their conduct in the run-up to the November general election. Chief Abey, a member of the CMC in Banisa, commented on the necessity of collaborative peace-building efforts by saying that electioneering seasons always bode death for their people, particularly along the Mandera North-Banisa corridor, because of the memories of the past that are unearthed during the elections. The chief stated that the elections have cost those lives, property, and their means of subsistence due to the ongoing clan wars between the Garre and the Degodia who reside in this area.

Interpeace has traditionally focused its efforts in Kenya on community-level peace-building in the country's northeast (Mandera and Wajir Counties) and, more recently, in the North Rift Region. To ensure peace in Kenya following the elections, the government

is working to increase social cohesion among communities with long-standing and ongoing grievances, strengthen trust and cooperation between security actors and Kenya's public, and pave the way for the creation of new opportunities.

According to Izueke, Okolo, Ugwuanyi and Ugwuibe (2022), election management bodies (EMBs) should seek foreign donor support to aid electoral commissions and civil society in creating long-term observation methods. The research also found that improving the infrastructure of national and regional observation groups, creating and investing in citizen monitoring groups that include mechanisms to track and report incidents of violence, and establishing crowd-sourcing mechanisms can all contribute to fewer disagreements being voiced during elections. The study also revealed that hotlines, mapping tools, civil society participation in civic and voter education efforts, and the creation of media monitoring programs to enhance media accountability all contribute to the reduction of disagreements and conflicts. The research also found that forming peace committees at the national and local levels, with the participation of political actors, can assist increase trust in elections and promote the acceptance of their outcomes.

Okutta (2023) discovered through his research that confidence in the election process must include the availability of legal remedy and the reliability of the systems for adjudicating disputes. The author argues that providing a viable remedy for the alleged rights infringement is the most important factor here. Voters and candidates will have more faith in the results of an election (or other decision that directly affects them) if there is a mechanism in place for them to challenge those results, ideally one that is external to the government and the election commission and is quick, easy to understand, and accessible to the public. The research found that teaching benchmarking on election laws' procedures,

operations, and offenses is necessary, as is the appointment of judges who will decide electoral dispute cases through a non-partisan system. The research also showed that if voters, candidates, and agents have an efficient way to challenge the actions of the Elections Management Body, it helps create an environment where citizens can voice concerns when they arise and polling officials can resolve them to the best of their abilities. According to the findings, increasing public trust in elections and acceptance of results materials can be achieved through the establishment and dissemination of dispute settlement processes as part of voter education and public awareness campaigns. Finally, the report recommended that time limitations be set for appeals and decisions, that decisions be published quickly after they are made, that electoral offenses and deterrent punishments be legislated, and that they be rigorously enforced, including the possibility of holding violators internationally accountable.




Figure 5.11 Early Warning System/Response Strategies

Source: Field Data (2023)

Results in Figure 5.11 indicate that from the sample of 233 respondents who participated in the study 126 (54.1%) and 99 (42.5%) strongly agreed and agreed respectively that early warning system is a good electoral conflict management strategy as it assists to avert and stop intra and interethnic conflicts before they turn violent. This can be interpreted to mean that early warning system especially of tracking of radio messages is very important because when someone is aware that he is being monitored then he avoids to engage in electoral conflict because he thinks he is being followed and observed.

Use of early warning system in management of conflicts around the world especially in horn of Africa, in United States in states where hurricanes are common and in many developing countries prior to elections is common. Many countries including Kenya use this system to predict drought, floods, hunger and even conflict during elections (Njuguna, 2018). Effective peace building strategy must encompass early warning system it is planning for detection of early signs of conflict, violence or any activity that will put the credibility of electoral process and results (Wafula, 2019). From the finding, the management approach that received significant endorsement by the respondents is the use of early warning system to predict and prevent electoral violence and conflict in the society.

Clare (2022) notes that in the months leading up to the general election in August 2022, NCIC held sensitization workshops, distributed branded peace materials to local communities, organized peace caravans, and lobbied for political candidates to sign peace charters. All of this work was done with the end goal of fostering a culture of peaceful elections at every societal level. Local media outlets and young people were among the many stakeholders in Mandera and Wajir counties who received training on conflict-

sensitive reporting, hate speech management, and electoral alternative dispute resolution (EADR) mechanisms.

According to Linet (2019), IGAD set up regional early warning system for the Horn of Africa Region. This system relays information on locust invasion, famine, hunger, migration, wars and ethnic conflicts and early signs of conflicts in regional elections. IGAD also deploys observers when elections are held in the member states and zeros on areas with prior signs of conflicts. Aggrey (2022) revealed that the early warning system and response mechanisms put in place especially through formulation of local peace committees, monitoring of messaging on social media enabled the government to make necessary interventions including use of NGOs, and FBOs to reach identified hot spots and reduce impending tension and conflict. Further, necessary deployment of well-briefed security officers in advance cooled down the tempers and tensions that were building up.

Hassan (2017) in his analysis of early warning systems found out that putting in place of the system alone cannot deal with electoral conflict and violence in particular. According to the author, early warning system work hand in hand with other strategies for managing conflicts such as proper training of electoral actors, dialogue and mediation, use of NGOs and FBOs to reduce ethnic tensions and conflicts and proper management and administration of elections.




Figure 5.12 Local Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

Source: Field Data (2023)

Results in Figure 5.12 shows that 118 (50.6%) and 107 (45.9%) of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed respectively that use of local peace committees is a good conflict management strategy as it diffuses tension and conflict arising out of elections. Adoption of local dispute resolution in conflict management is very important for maintaining peace and harmony for any meaningful development of any society. According to Onyango (2019), an effective peace-building and conflict management strategy should be aimed at attaining positive peace. It is only when there is reconciliation and healing during reintegration process that people can co-exist in harmony. From the findings, it was found that the adoption of local dispute resolution mechanisms especially use of peace committees assists in reducing conflicting and diffusing tensions. The main purpose of use of local peace committees is to restore peace and harmony in the society and especially before and after elections.

The findings of the study are accentuated by the results of the FGD. For instance, one participant in the FGD remarked that;

We have locational peace committees, which comprise of the police, member of religious organization, non-governmental organization, members of the public, opinion leaders, assistant chiefs and I. These committees have assisted us in Trans Nzoia as through them we come to those who want to cause chaos before, during and after elections. We summon such people and we discourage them from participating in those evil activities. Such people eventually become good friends to the committee and provide vital information whenever they get. (6/12/2022; Kapomboi)

The study found that local peace committees ensure that peace and harmony are restored in the society. The study found out that respondents observed that local peace committees are crucial in ensuring a harmonious coexistence among members of the society.

Promoting peace and working in situations where communities are at risk of conflict are the primary responsibilities of local peace committees. They attract a wide variety of people with the goal of having productive conversations and increasing mutual understanding. The goal is to foster a climate of trust and cooperation so that people can work together to address issues and prevent violence (Joseph, 2012). In addition, the author disclosed that local peace committees in Kenya emerged as a result of widespread dissatisfaction with the government's efforts to end the war in the country's north. The fact that they combine elements of both informal dispute resolution and more official arbitration systems is what makes them so effective.

Francis and Hirshi (2010) discovered that the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) was founded in 1995, marking an early point in the evolution of Kenyan Local Peace Committees. In the late 1990s, similar initiatives took shape in the North Eastern,

Upper Eastern, Coastal, and North Rift regions. According to the National Steering Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Management, district committees' responsibilities span numerous aspects of peace-building, such as providing early warning of conflicts, monitoring the implementation of peace agreements, disposing of weapons, keeping records of peace processes, and coordinating with other organizations. With the addition of a fast reaction framework and conflict analysis and mapping, the ability of these district peace committees has increased significantly. Election-related mistrust, violence, and conflict are just some of the numerous problems that the approach has helped communities address. This idea was adopted in Trans Nzoia County beginning in 2007/2008.

McCombes (2016) bolster this claim by noting that in May 2012, when fighting broke out in Muhoroni-Chemelil on the border between the Rift Valley and Nyanza provinces, the Rift Valley Local Empowerment for Peace Project was able to intervene through the Nandi North DPC. The Committee enlisted the help of the Nandi Council of Elders so that it might lead peace talks with the Luo Council of Elders. The Wareng Youth Initiative for Peace also helped facilitate communication by organizing youth bungenes (youth parliaments) along the border.

While analyzing problems faced by local peace committees, Issifu (2016) discovered that its members receive no compensation because fostering peace is seen as a charitable endeavor. However, financial limitations often show up. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and even the government have been criticized in the past for allegedly encouraging a culture of receiving a "sitting allowance." These ideas have spread throughout the LPC community, with some participants expecting an allowance because some non-

governmental organizations offer it. Because of this, peace committees have been corrupted by opportunists and have failed to effectively handle conflicts. There have also been some very frightening allegations that people on peace committees intentionally instigate fights so that they can be paid to end them.

Ndalira (2023) found that peace committees established by communities themselves had much longer and more sustainable lifespans than those established with the assistance of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which become so reliant on external funding and facilitation that they can no longer function without it. In order to secure financial backing from outside sources, local peace committees like the Wajir committee have had to reorganize. In cosmopolitan locations, where some groups seek to utilize their numerical superiority to marginalize others, the author echoes the sentiment that local peace committees face a social problem of ethnicity. Some peace committees have instituted quotas for members of a certain ethnic group as a means of mitigating this issue. The people of Samburu, Tana River, Marsabit, and Marakwet have all found this to be helpful.

While the official Arusha Peace Process ended a decade-long civil war in Burundi, Seifu, (2012) noted that in the mid-1990s, local peace committees formed as informal means for conversation, conflict management, reconciliation, and social rehabilitation. The Kibimba Peace Committee, the first of its kind, was established in 1994 and played an instrumental role in reestablishing trust between rival Hutu and Tutsi and rebuilding the social fabric of a community decimated by inter-ethnic atrocities during the civil war, inspiring the formation of LPCs across Burundi.

South Africa is experiencing a similar pattern, with xenophobic prejudice toward migrants from other African countries contributing to escalating violence and social upheaval in the country's poor townships and informal urban settlements. The Action Support Centre (ASC), a Johannesburg-based NGO, launched an initiative in 2010 to capitalize on the positive legacy of local peace committees that had been established during South Africa's transition but had since become defunct in response to the widespread xenophobic violence that killed more than 60 people in major urban areas across the country in 2008. In slums and poor suburbs of Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Durban, the ASC has sought to revitalize local peace committees (Mukand et al, 2018).

Many local accords in Nicaragua were facilitated by peace committees. All other attempts to deal with the contra guerrillas who rearmed after the ceasefire agreement had failed, but these groups have been successful in engaging them, encouraging conflict management, and easing their re-integration into society (Boone, 2012).

Nebe (2012) expands on this topic by analyzing the indirect public institutions tasked with ensuring peace in the context of public accountability. He argues that the presence of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution (CIC), the Commission on Administrative Justice (CAJ), and the Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC), among nine others, exemplifies the strategic legacy of Kenya's founding fathers.

Mark (2000) criticizes the Peace Committees for being infiltrated by political interests, economic overtures from significant corporate persons, and so on, which maintain rather than eradicate a given conflict. Mark argues that the Peace Committees have been

corrupted by ethnic and sub-ethnic interests, turning them into vehicles that support hegemonic tendencies and, in turn, some of the pillars that uphold wars.

Whether or not the Peace Committees have been successful is a question that IRIN (2007) attempts to answer. While it's encouraging that conflicts have been resolved, it's also worth noting that Local Peace Committees have failed in other situations.

An article published on December 17th, 2007 (IRIN 2007) discusses the post-election violence in Kenya and how "inefficient peace committees frustrate reconciliation in clash areas." Mount Elgon, in Kenya, was the location of the conflict between the two groups. The report states that the composition of peace committees and whether or not they were functional prior to the war have been questioned by community, civic, religious, and local authority leaders.

However, they did not advocate for the dissolution of Local Peace Committees; rather, they advocated for their revitalization and reorganization, saying that such bodies "could play a pivotal role in pacifying the warring groups" (Aganah PhD, 2023).

Peace committees helps to lessen crime and make neighborhoods safer (Van Tongeren, 2013). The death of South Africa's prominent and popular liberation movement leader Chris Hani in April 1993 is perhaps the most striking illustration of the importance of Local Peace Committees in this context. The episode had the nation on the brink of chaos. Little provocation was needed to spin the country into a spiral of bloodshed. All around the country, people are grateful to the Local Peace Committees for their work in averting that disaster. They achieved this by organizing meetings with local organizers of separate protests and memorial services to come to consensus on how each should be carried out.

Frequently, it featured a reaffirmation of the National Peace Accord's Code of Conduct. In addition, it required realistic arrangements for watching. The fact that these plans were developed in tandem with liberation movement institutions, municipal authorities, and police forces ensured their success. While there was some violence at Hani's funeral and at numerous protests across the country, it was minimal.

Chivasa (2017) asserts that the foundation of most, if not all, Peace Committees' activity is discussion. But it's also a goal in and of itself. One goal of the District Policing Partnerships in Northern Ireland was to give citizens and their elected officials a forum to air their grievances over policing, an issue that had come to symbolize the country's deep divisions (Northern Ireland Policing Board, 2007). There were quarterly meetings of the People's Forums in Sri Lanka where locals discussed issues of mutual interest (AED 2006; AED 2007; Anti-War Front, Foundation for Co-existence et al., 2007). Surprisingly, these Local Peace Committees came into action in the wake of the tsunami and helped facilitate a wide range of spectacular rehabilitation efforts. Local South African Committees for Peace According to Ball (1998:26, 30), Local Peace Committees promoted communication where it had been lacking or improbable. People were able to bring up controversial topics without fear of retaliation in Local Peace Committees. Local Peace Committees facilitated communication between warring factions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia.

Most of the discourse that Local Peace Committees encouraged took place during procedures to solve specific problems, as observed by Palihapitiya, (2013) in his contextualization of the contributions made by Local Peace Committees in Malawi.

Improved communication and "cordiality" among political parties on the municipal level are welcome side effects. Malawi's Political Party Coalitions

Some of the most encouraging stories regarding the impact of Local Peace Committees tend to come from communities that have been devastated by violence, which is why Bor (2009) praises peace committees as crucial in Problem-solving and community development. The situation in Kibimba, Burundi, is particularly striking. Most LPC participants were moved to action by the following question: "How can communities that have consistently engaged in violent conflict live together again?" This issue is one that the work of the Local Peace Committees helps to answer.

In the South Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, LPC used football matches between former vigilantes of the so-called Mai-Mai and local kids to push their peace-building mission. In the midst of total anarchy, it depicted a hopeful scene of normalcy being restored and community life being made possible once more.

From the above, it is clear that Local Peace Committees play a vital role in resolving various societal problems, such as local land disputes, intercommunal conflict, and electoral dispute resolution. Peace committees employ a wide range of methods, from mediation to facilitation to conferencing to the deployment of early warning and reaction systems, in order to achieve their goals.

Table 5.2 Approaches for Management of Electoral Conflicts

Statements	Mean	Std. Dev.	Rank
Adoption relevant policy and strategies to address electoral security	4.55	0.54	1
Adopting early warning and early response strategies	4.5	0.60	2
Collaboration between security forces/local and political Actors	4.46	0.52	3
Adoption of peace advocacy campaigns by NGOs and SCOs	4.44	0.54	4
Adoption of local dispute resolution Mechanisms	4.42	0.58	5
Confidence building among the political stakeholders	4.34	0.57	6

Source: Field Data (2023)

It can be deduced from Table 5.2 that on average a larger portion of the respondents were in agreement with the statements on various approaches to management of electoral conflict. For instance, majority of the respondents strongly agreed that the adoption of relevant policy and strategies to address electoral insecurity enhances credibility of election outcomes is the most effective approach for management of electoral conflicts as shown by a Mean=4.55. Results also revealed that adopting early warning and early response strategies such as tracking radio messages helps avert intra and inter-ethnic conflicts is the second most effective approach for management of electoral conflicts (Mean= 4.50, S.D=0.60); Collaboration between security forces and political actors (Mean= 4.46, S.D = 0.52).

5.4 Chapter Summary

This section has discussed the effectiveness of peace-building strategies for managing electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County. From the findings, peace-building strategies such as dialogue and mediation, training and institution-building activities, use of grassroots peace advocacy / peace messaging, sensitization programs, use of attitude-transformation programs and the adoption of early warning systems can be effective in reducing tensions and preventing violence during and after elections. The study indicated that promotion of dialogue and communication between the different political parties and their supporters can help to build trust and understanding, and can serve as a platform for negotiations and mediation efforts. Additionally, the study found that promote civic education and voter education because it helps to increase voter participation, reduce the risk of fraud and manipulation, and ensure that voters are informed about the issues and can make informed decisions.

Additionally, the use of monitoring and observation of electoral process can be an effective way of preventing electoral fraud, manipulation and violence. The study also found that involving civil society organizations and other actors such as international observers as well as local communities in peace-building efforts can also be effective. Such organizations and communities can act as intermediaries between the different parties and can help to promote reconciliation and healing after elections. The next chapter discusses the challenges in managing electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County.

5.5 Findings

Results indicate that majority of the participants agreed that the establishment of peace platforms such as the formation of local peace committees for the elections, promotion of tolerance among the communities or promotion of intercommunity dialogue helps in preventing electoral conflicts. Results also showed that resolution of prevalent conflicts such as resource conflicts, use of peace messaging during campaign such as establishment of youth peace programs and training and hate speech monitoring play a significant role in preventing electoral conflicts. Findings also revealed that conducting civic education, participation of political actors in peace initiatives such as Uwiano, establishment of acceptable code of conduct for political actors/parties during elections and championing for peace among the political players/actors are instrumental towards fostering peace during elections. Additionally, results showed that provision of capacity building such as of political actors/parties during elections to focus on issue-based campaigning and development, strengthening the independence of IEBC / Reforming /reviewing of electoral laws, establishing electoral dispute resolution mechanisms and oversight of the electoral management body helps in reducing electoral violence.

The next chapter six presents' findings on the challenges and opportunities of peace building strategies in the management of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County, Kenya.

CHAPTER SIX

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN MANAGING ELECTORAL CONFLICTS IN TRANS NZOIA COUNTY, KENYA

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses challenges for managing electoral conflicts experienced in Trans Nzoia County during in the previous electoral cycles such as 2007, 2013 and 2017. Some of the challenges indicated by the Key informants during the interview and the FGD includes mistrust, mismanagement of elections, lack of legal framework for ensuring accountability, slow pace in justice delivery, untimely enactment/amendment of electoral laws (too close to elections), police brutality or bias during elections and political interference during elections. Lack of timely capacity-building workshops to sensitize both the voters and stakeholders on their role in averting electoral conflicts.

6.2 Challenges in Managing Electoral Conflicts


The respondents were asked to state their perception on the main challenges faced during management of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia. The study found out that mistrust, suspicion, and ethnicity, unemployment of youths and mismanagement of elections as the main challenges.

6.2.1 Mistrust

Trans Nzoia County consists of three major ethnic groups that are always at loggerheads over leadership positions and land issues (Mukoya, 2015); Edwin, 2021). The prospect of one occupying the governor position is one man take it all scenario and therefore it's do or

die activity between the Luhya and the Kalenjin who are the two major tribes. The other circle of mistrust is over land ownership. The Sabaot are always in conflict with the Bukusu over land ownership in the larger Mt. Elgon area.

Figure 6.1: Respondent's Perception on Whether Mistrust among Electoral Actors leads to Electoral Conflict



Source: Field Data (2023)

Research finding in Figure 6.1 shows that 170(83.74%) of the respondents' belief that mistrust among electoral actors leads to electoral conflict while 33(16.26%) do not perceive so.

The results of this study corroborate those of Hallet (1980) regarding post-election violence in Nigeria. The author argues that a variety of local issues contributed to the electoral violence that eventually sparked the civil war in Nigeria. The political unrest in Nigeria was expected and came as no surprise. The sheer size and diversity of the country's people, as well as the profound and often vicious conflicts that arose between opposing political

parties in the decade leading up to independence, were unmistakable warning signs of impending problems. Unlike the Congo, Nigeria was well-prepared for independence; the country's constitution had been hashed out after years of debate among political leaders, and it included a wide variety of protections meant to prevent illiberal behaviors. Northern Party for Constitutional Government (NPC) and National Convention of National Coalition (NCNC) and Action Group (AG) controlled the federal government after independence. Hallet (1980) cites growing antipathy and friction between the North and South as a cause of the unrest that followed the country's elections. Northerners had worried about the South's dominance in the 1950s. By the time the southerners felt the strain of "Northern domination," ten years later, the tables had turned and the NPC was the undisputed leader in Lagos's federal government. Fear, ignorance, and disdain were the building blocks of Southern perspectives of the North. The North, as described by Awolowo, was "a dead weight on the country as a whole, a gradual but sure break in the fast-moving South" (Hallet, 1980). The national census was taken in 1962 and released the following year, giving the North a numerical advantage of 10 million persons over the South. It became a political issue, and the resulting animosity between the NPC and the NCNC tore the coalition apart just as the country was getting ready for a federal general election at the end of 1964.

These findings are consistent with those of Hirsh (2010), who attributed the violence in Nigeria to racial and regional prejudice. Ethnic affiliations were continually used in post-independence Nigeria's fierce competition between regions for the highest share of revenue, industry site, and public office appointments. A majority of the public were left poor and humiliated as a result of the avaricious behavior of their elected officials as the

political scramble lasted for six years, frittering away the wealth and potential of the country. In the streets, Nigerian voters were disgusted and ready to fight. Only through the federal general elections in late 1964 and the allegedly rigged elections in the west could the underrepresented get their message across. The post-election violence in 1965, which broke out in the western portion of the country, spiraled out of control, leading to tragic events that ultimately drove the country into a civil war.

Research by Meredith (1984) suggests that politicians in Nigeria over-engaged in a power and profit grab with reckless abandon, leading to post-election violence and the eventual collapse of civilian governance.

Nigeria's political elite took full advantage of their positions of power to enrich themselves and their political parties with patronage and ill-gotten gains. He notes that the 1964 census figures were announced just as the country was preparing for federal general elections, further stoking tensions between North and South. Political violence erupted in the wake of the Western Region's sham elections, which both sides of the opposing political parties fought with ruthless and brutal tenacity, bribes, threats, assaults, arson, hired thugs, and murder.

According to one respondent:

Trans Nzoia is in former Rift Valley Province and it belongs to us Kalenjin. The position of the Governor belongs to us by right; however, other communities have combined against us and have twice occupied the position since its creation. We shall not relent until one of us occupies it.

Another respondent who is locational chief has this to say:

Election here in Trans Nzoia is ethnically based. Although, the Kalenjin see themselves as the majority, the Bukusu still commands many following in the area. The first Governor, H.E Khaemba was from Bukusu ethnic group as well as the current Governor H.E Natembeya. The Kalenjin group has been left with either women rep or senator position. This has caused a lot of mistrust between these two groups. There is a lot of under tones among members of the two ethnic groups. Sometimes tension among the groups boil up but by use of local mechanisms we reduce and manage them.

7/12/2022

Kwanza

In support of this report, Erick and Josephat (2021) found out that found that peace building process in Kenya was not easy to achieve because some political leaders did not believe in the dialogue and mediation process, neither did they have confidence in judicial in handling electoral disputes and in electoral bodies developed to handle election process. The losers always feel betrayed by the mediators as they think that the incumbents would take advantage of their powers to corrupt the system and the institutions even after signing reconciliation pacts. According to Lumumba (2012), the only future in the country in bringing an end to circle of electoral conflicts lay in the peoples hope in the aspirations of the new Constitution (2010). The new constitution was meant to solidify democracy, create independent institutions including procedures on how electoral disputes will be solved in future.

However, some of the respondents (K3, K4, K6, K8, K9, K10, K13, K15, K17, K18 & K20) stated that:

The country's only hope lay in the independent institutions created by the new constitution (2010). These institutions are Judiciary, IEBC, Office of the Director of Public Prosecution, Inspector General of Police and Parliament. However, due to state capture of these institutions, they all work with the executive. The IEBC is not independent as expected, the selection of its commissioners is biased towards the executive, the secretariat is not working, and the commissioner is divided. The constitution is not working for the people but for the executive. The

only institution that people still have some hope is the judiciary, but seeking justice in it is a mirage, as it takes long time.

8/12/2022

Kaplamai

As another respondent (K5) narrated,

Peace-building should not be forced affair; it should be embraced by both parties. The mistrust experienced during 2007 reconciliation by Kofi Annan was not good for the country. It gave bad precedent to future peace-building initiatives. The agreement signed between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga was not out of consensus and good will but coerced one. The pressure from foreign powers for the two to reconcile was temporary and has and did not last two years before cracks emerged in the coalition government. Mismanagement of that reconciliation process has continued to haunt us today. No one still believes that a peace-building agreement can be honoured. This is replicated in peace agreements between the Pokot and the Turkana, Marakwet and Turkana. Peace-building agreement should be allowed to take its course through confidence building and provision of support during reintegration process.

9/12/2022

Suwerwa

Underscoring a lack of trust as a challenge for managing electoral conflicts, one participant who is an MCA noted that:

We that live in Saboti areas have seen it all. The settlement of people in settlement schemes has caused a lot of agony to the people of Mt. Elgon. We have been living in harmony with our brothers Bukusu, until senior government officers including the District Commissioners, Ministers, Provincial Commissioners and those close to the presidency started illegal demarcation of community land allocating big chunks of land to them, relatives and even moved Bukusu from their ancestral land to the schemes. Most deserving local people were not considered. This caused a lot of tension and mistrust up to today. The settlement of people in those schemes has been done several times but to no conclusion. This mistrust in settling people in the gave rise to Saboti Land Defence Force a militia group that was agitating for the rights of the Saboti people. (15/12/2022; Kabonet).

6.2.2 Suspicion

In this study, the concept of suspicion is treated to means one group or both do not trust the process used for peace-building. This study found out that one of the major challenges facing peace-building was suspicion. That whenever certain measures and strategies are

put in place to restore peace and ensure that it holds for long time, some group of people will also be sceptical of it and treat it with suspicion not sure, if the whole process will work and take care of their inherent interests.

Regarding the challenges of peace-building strategies in the Trans Nzoia County, the key informants stated that;

We the Sabaot are minority in the county. The Luhya and the Kalenjin are more than us in population; however, we also deserve respect and recognition. During elections we make many peace agreements and arrangements about sharing of positions but at the end of the day it all benefits two communities. We have never produced Governor, Senator or County Woman Representative. Sabaot in Bungoma county at least are recognised and have been awarded with Deputy Governor position twice and other senior positions in executive and county assembly, but us here in Trans Nzoia we have gotten nothing. Here in Mt. Elgon also we have gotten in so many agreements with Bukusu over land problem. There are so many organizations that deal with reconciliation over land disputes, however, every time demarcation of land is done, the real people Sabaot beneficiaries are not considered. They are government officials, influential Sabaot senior people and Bukusu who benefit. This has caused a lot of conflict and especially during election time. The lasting peace shall only be achieved with application of the correct land settlement techniques where our people are also considered.

20/12/2022

Saboti

Closely similar to the current findings, Njoroge (2012) points out that peace building posed particular challenges for most local actors especially when it touched on land injustices and ancestral land acquisition. Such complex issues call for inclusion of specific skills and institutional support, both of which were scarce at the local and national levels. In support, Magut (2018) showed how motive land issues are accompanied by displacement of population, which require relief assistance, and at the same time, they are eager to return to their farms. This local peace committees and organizations might not have the capacity to provide therefore causing untold suffering to the displaced. Without provision of relief

to the affected there will be no healing of wounds incurred during conflict and therefore more suspicion of the whole process.

In support, Golan and Zahira (2005) in their study revealed that about half of all peace support operations including both peacekeeping and more expansive peace-building operations) fail after around five years. According to Hamre and Sullivan (2002), the low success rate reflects the inherent complexities that face the process of peace-building a process that is said to be diverse beyond comparison.

There have been many efforts as per respondents in the study of government, NGOs, FBOs and CBOs to try to manage conflicts in the county especially during elections and during clashes over land allocation in schemes. Major reconciliation efforts have been directed towards Saboti Constituency and the larger Mt. Elgon region. During one of the FGD in Saboti with religious leaders, it was pinpointed that religious leaders have been on the forefront of peace-building through mediation and reconciliation in the region. This was done through community outreach activities, which involved education programs, training programs, provision of seeds and fertilizers and solving of land disputes between inhabitants. It was noted also through this FGD that it was easier to reconcile dispute between Sabaot and another Sabaot or Kalenjin than Sabaot and Bukusu or Kisii. It was also noted that the Sabaot are normally violent and bitter during reconciliation meetings than other tribes. This left the decisions arrived at by religious leaders not acceptable to be both sides.

Indeed, during the FGD, one participant remarked that:

At least religious reconciliation is more acceptable than NGO or CBO directed one. This is because religious leaders seem more honest, have the power to prevent and mitigate violence by breaking down ethno-political prejudice, promoting inter-group dialogue, and empowering youth and broader citizens to participate actively and constructively (in non-violent ways) in election and governance and processes.

28/11/2022

Kibomet

6.2.3 Ethnicity

Belonging to a group that upholds similar national or cultural ideals is referred to as ethnicity (Chetail, 2009). According to the survey, the majority of respondents cited ethnicity as a significant obstacle to effective peacebuilding. Conflicts between different ethnic groups have historically caused problems, and not much has been done to stop them. Politicians that use the ethnicity issue for their own political advantage have made it worse.

One participant responded as follows when asked what causes, even after the new constitution was enacted, explain for Kenya's ongoing growth in the frequency and intensity of electoral conflict:

We are inclined on our ethnic identities. Am a Kalenjin and am happy to be so. We can run away from our culture as it dictates whom we are. Am a Kalenjin because i follow the norms, values and culture of the Kalenjin tribe. We also elect our leaders depending on our tribes. Am a chief because I come from the biggest clan, and it has been like that since colonial time. This ethnicity has brought problems especially on the election of the Trans Nzoia Governor; we have never gotten it because Bukusu combine with other ethnic groups to defeat us. The aspirants brainwash people with ethnic rhetoric, incitement and threats of eviction to win electoral seats. Unless there is civic education by non-governmental and faith-based organizations before elections for people to understand the rule of law and their rights as electorates there shall always be conflict.

29/11/2022

Cherangany

Njoroge (2012) found that ethnicity was a crucial factor in determining whether or not there was peace in Kenya. Kenya is home to an estimated 42 distinct ethnic groups, yet only a

handful regularly clash with one another over a variety of issues. It is difficult to unite warring ethnic groups under a common vision for peace because of their historical animosities and cultural disparities.

Tribal divisions are just one of the many local issues that Lowe (2005) says contributed to the unrest in Nigeria before and after elections in the 1960s. It was the colonialists, he says, who united the various tribes in the country. After Europeans withdrew support, however, people once again sided with their tribes rather than their countries.

Second, he emphasizes how federal general elections in 1964 coincided with a period of economic crisis and underdevelopment in Nigeria. Basic commodity prices increased by 15 percent in 1964, when unemployment was also on the rise. A new class of wealthy politicians and public service elites emerged as these events unfolded.

Reader (1998) claims that ethnic and regional nationalism in Nigeria were to blame for the country's bloodshed. Ethnic affiliations were continually used in post-independence Nigeria's fierce competition between regions for the highest share of revenue, industry sites, and public office appointments. A majority of the public were left poor and humiliated as a result of the avaricious behavior of their elected officials as the political scramble lasted for six years, frittering away the wealth and potential of the country. The average Nigerian voter was appalled and ready for a brawl. A voice for the voiceless was heard during the federal general elections in late 1964 and the allegedly rigged elections in the west. The post-election violence of 1965, which began in the western portion of the country, spilled out of control, leading to catastrophic events that ultimately drove the country into a civil war.

6.2.4 Lack of Facilitation and Training of Local Peace Committees

Despite the huge responsibility that local peace committees have in restoring peace by quick and organized response to the impending conflict, most of the members of these peace committees work on voluntary basis without any facilitation and training. Local peace committees require assistance and training to engage in networking activities, public relations campaigns, expert training, electoral observation and monitoring, conflict prevention and reconciliation programming. They may also require assistance with planning, implementing and monitoring large-scale projects involving elections, resettlements and activities of militia groups.

One the chief who is the chair of locational peace committee who said that supports this:

Locational peace committee has assisted me and my area of jurisdiction to respond to early warning to conflict especially prior and during elections. Whenever we get reliable information about a situation that endangers peace, we quickly summon the person or persons responsible and talk to them. In most cases, these people end up being our informers and always brief us on any person planning to cause conflict in the community. In other cases, some of members of peace communities we visit bursar bars and talk to people. This creates a good rapport between the committee and members of the public. However, expect myself; other members of the local peace committees have never undergone any form of training. There is also no framework on the works of local peace committees. Furthermore, there is no facilitation even for provision of tea of transport reimbursements during the LPC meetings despite some of the members are forced to travel long distances to the meeting venue.

30/11/2022

Meru Farm

Another chief lamented that:

Locational peace committees were a good and noble idea at its inception. However, there is serious infiltration by politicians. There are locational peace committees that have cronies of the politicians as members. There is no way we could reject persons referred by area member of parliament who come as his representatives. There are cases where some of the members of local peace committees have been found to participate directly in conflict therefore making our work difficulty. Then lack of

facilitation makes our response to conflict difficult. At least we chiefs we have motor circles but other members have to use their vehicles or use boda boda. With current economic situation, therefore there is serious delay in response.

25/11/2022

Nai Farm

6.2.5 Unemployment among the Youth

Unemployment refers to the state of joblessness. From the current study, rampant unemployment is a major factor that impedes peace-building efforts. With a good percentage of youths jobless, it is easy to manipulate them, especially during electioneering period.

Underscoring the challenge of youth unemployment and peace-building challenges, one of the key informants remarked that:

Job creation should be the core responsibility of any government through training citizens to be job creators and not job seekers. The market for the traditional courses is full. Even graduates from teacher training colleges and universities have to stay out for nearly ten years before they are absorbed. Thousands of graduates are leaving colleges and institutions of higher learning. Many end their journey of education at form four therefore engaging themselves with working in other people's farms, hawking groundnuts, bananas, sweets and biscuits. To worsen the situation even these small businesses have been taken up by foreigners. There are many Ugandans and Congolese who hawk goods in Kitale town making lives of our youths even more miserable. These youths now are at the mercy of politicians and criminal gangs for handouts and as accomplices for criminal jobs. Government must create jobs for its youth otherwise worst is yet to happen.

22/12/2022

ADC Area

6.2.6 Mismanagement of Elections

This was one of the main challenges highlighted by the respondents. This is what one of the respondents said:

The issue of election conflict has been since early eighties. During mlolongo election style that was managed by district officers, the winner was known before elections.

Electioneering was a formality. Any negative reaction to the outcome was met with serious repercussions from the security squad known as special branch as well as from KANU young wing that acted with impunity. Later on during 2007 general election, citizens were subjected to heinous police brutality. Many people lost lives following this police intervention. The presence of the law enforcement officers tended to increase the violence that was going on. It was like rioters became more aggressive whenever police confronted them. The way live bullets were used has never been seen before. Whenever, there was serious election mismanagement there serious security brutality on the citizens.

4/11/2022

Kerita

6.2.7 Lack of legal framework for ensuring accountability

The respondents noted that lack of legal framework for ensuring criminal culpability following electoral malpractice and conduct impedes efforts for managing electoral conflicts. As underscored by the key informants and FGD participants, a lack of legal framework for ensuring accountability can hinder electoral peace-building in several ways.

For instance, one participant observed that:

Without a legal framework in place, it can be difficult to hold individuals or groups accountable for their actions. This can create a sense of impunity and may encourage the use of violence and other forms of misconduct during elections.

Without a legal framework for regulating political advertising and campaign materials, it can be difficult to prevent the spread of misinformation and propaganda. This can lead to increased polarization and mistrust between different groups, and can fuel tensions and violence during elections.

Without a legal framework in place to protect the rights of voters, it can be difficult to prevent voter intimidation and other forms of misconduct. This can lead to a lack of trust in the electoral process and may discourage voter participation.

A lack of legal framework for ensuring transparency in the electoral process can make it difficult to detect and prevent electoral fraud and manipulation. This can lead to a lack of trust in the electoral process and can fuel tensions and violence.

Without a legal framework for holding people accountable for election-related violence or misconduct, it can be difficult for people to seek justice or receive compensation for the harm that they have suffered. (11/11/2022, Kitale)

Emphasizing the vital role of legal framework in ensuring accountability, Burchard and Simati (2019) argue that legal framework plays an essential aspect of electoral peace-building. Equally, Höglund and Jarstad (2010) maintains that presence of legal frameworks can help to prevent violence and misconduct during elections, promote transparency and trust in the electoral process, and ensure that people are held accountable for their actions.

6.2.8 Slow Pace in Justice Delivery

A slow pace in justice delivery can hinder electoral peace-building in several ways. For instance, a slow justice delivery system can lead to lack of deterrence, closure; accountability, reparations and it can also discourage voters from participating in elections. In support, the findings of the interview and FGDs underscore the vital role of an effective justice system. For instance, some participants noted that:

When justice is not delivered quickly or effectively, it can create a perception that there are no consequences for engaging in electoral misconduct or violence. This can lead to an increase in such actions, thereby hindering electoral peace-building efforts. When victims of electoral violence or misconduct do not see justice being served, they may not feel that their grievances have been addressed. This can lead to feelings of injustice and resentment, which can fuel further tensions and conflicts. A slow pace in justice delivery can make it difficult to hold individuals and groups accountable for their actions, which can lead to a lack of trust in the electoral process and the justice system. When citizens see that justice is not being served, they may lose faith in the electoral process and may be less likely to participate in future elections, which can undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process and the democratic process. A slow pace in justice delivery can also make it difficult for victims of electoral violence or misconduct to receive reparations or compensation for their losses. This can make it harder for them to recover from the harms that they have suffered, which can further fuel tensions and conflicts. (29/12/2022, Malik)

Newman (2011) in accentuating the importance of a fast and effective justice delivery system argues that it plays an important aspect of electoral peace-building. In support, Akhaabi (2018), maintains that a fast and effective justice delivery system can help to deter

misconduct and violence during elections, promote accountability and trust in the electoral process, and ensure that victims receive justice and reparations.

6.2.9 Challenges faced by Religious Leaders in playing their Roles

The religious and inter religious organizations involved in peace initiatives before, during and after the elections are faced with myriad of challenges in the course of their missions. These includes: Tension between Christian and Muslim groups over the topic of Kadhis (Islamic courts) has weakened interfaith engagement at the national level. A mismatch in the internal bureaucracies of certain religions is an organizational obstacle to efficient inter-religious institutions (Cox and Ndung'u, 2014). Second, there are trust issues because of accusations of bias against religious leaders, who have been working to repair their reputations. However, many Kenyans continue to doubt the objectivity of religious authorities (Cox and Ndung'u, 2014). The widespread peace messaging advocated by religious leaders and other actors has had the unintended consequence of silencing dissenting voices and preventing the airing of grievances, which brings us to our third and last point (Elder, Stigant, & Claes, 2014; Deacon & Lynch, 2013). Finally, when donor priorities change, peace-building programs that involve religious players are generally the first to be cut due to lack of resources.

Religion and relationships between religious groups are not intrinsically violent, but they can be used by religious-political entrepreneurs. Thus, even if a debate has nothing to do with religion or theology, an identity conflict may take on religious overtones. Half of all wars, according to some research (see Basedou and Koos, 2015) may have religious motivations. However, as De Juan, Pierskalla, and Vüllers (2015) point out, while religion

is often a contributing factor to violence, religiously motivated wars make up just a small fraction of all armed conflicts.

In many places of the world, religious leaders have played a role in mobilizing religious identities (for more, see Chhibber and Sekhon, 2016). Studies of actual events show that religious leaders can incite violence as well. For instance, a study of Jewish and Muslim political violence in Israel finds that people will only support violence if religious leaders present an inflammatory interpretation of their economic and political hardships (Canetti et al., 2015, cited in Basedou and Koos, 2015).

According to a literature analysis by Basedou and Koos (2015), religious leaders initiate and then promote violence when they feel threatened by rivals and want to protect and increase their influence among believers or political leaders. In addition, the review stresses the relevance of setting when assessing whether or not religious leaders endorse violence. Personal convictions opposed to secularism and tolerance of other faiths; existing group inequalities and forms of marginalization; and close ties between political and religious leaders are all factors that increase the likelihood of calls for violence (see Basedou and Koos, 2015).

Religious leaders have been linked to electoral and political unrest and violence on multiple occasions. Christian and Muslim religious leaders in Nigeria, for instance, have both sought to garner followers and sway by stating they are efficient at curbing the societal and political power of the other religion (Dowd, 2014). Such rivalry has seeped into the political arena. General Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim, is running for president, and Christian religious leaders in Rivers State have been accused of collecting payments and

campaigning against him by spreading a document that incites fear of an Islamization of the country. According to research (Afolabi and Avasiloae, 2015), these kinds of activities ratchet up tensions. By not condemning vote rigging and allowing politicians who won fraudulent elections to engage in 'thanksgiving' in churches and mosques to acknowledge God's sovereignty and faithfulness, religious leaders in Nigeria have been accused of undermining free and fair elections (Familusi, 2012).

Political violence has become a reoccurring issue in Kenyan presidential elections (for further information, see Cox and Ndung'u, 2014). Depending on the context, religion in the country can either bring people together or drive them apart. According to a large body of research on social cohesion, religious institutions tend to cause social fragmentation and inter-group mistrust at the national level, despite the fact that they often bring people of different ethnic backgrounds together at the local level through shared religious practices and experiences and through service provision. Church leaders and elders in Kenya were complicit in inciting violence based on ethnicity during the 1992 and 2007 general elections, according to a report published by the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) of Kenya (see Cox and Ndung'u, 2014). Churches' silence on corruption has fueled discontent, damaged their reputation, and made it harder for them to promote national unity in Kenya (Cox and Ndung'u, 2014).

6.3 Opportunities

While there are a number of challenges facing the management of electoral conflicts, they can be overcome through a number of opportunities. These opportunities are discussed in the section that follows.

6.3.1 Training Security Personnel

Training security forces entails an exercise carried out to enlighten the security on the importance of using no or minimum force in handling demonstrators. In the Kenyan context, demonstrations have always been regarded as a way of fighting for justice, especially during the electioneering period. The study's goal was to determine whether or not peace can be built in Kenya through the prevention of electoral strife through the training of security forces. According to the results, 18.4% of people responded with a strong disagreement, 17.1% responded with some disagreement, and 15% responded with a disagreement. However, 16.8% of those polled agreed, 16.2% agreed somewhat, and 9.7% agreed strongly.

Table 6.1 Training Security Forces

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Agree	80	34.4	34.4	34.4
Agree	92	45.3	45.3	79.7
Not Sure	6	2.9	2.9	82.6
Disagree	20	9.8	9.8	92.4
Strongly Disagree	15	7.1	7.6	100.0
Total	203	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Data (2023)

Table 6.1 shows that an overwhelming majority of respondents (79.7%) think that training security forces can aid in preventing electoral conflict and constructing peace. Twenty-three percent of those polled, though, thought that training security forces wouldn't do

anything to cut down on election turmoil or establish stable peace. Especially when dealing with demonstrations, police in Kenya frequently resort to the use of excessive force. This is yet another sort of violence that needs to be avoided, and it will not be until the security forces adopt nonviolent strategies for dealing with crowds. Police brutality has been linked to electoral violence by several previous studies. According to Bekoe and Stephanie's (2010) research, for instance, insufficient training for security forces is another obstacle to peace-building during elections. Domestic police forces are responsible for election security on a daily basis, with the exception of post-conflict and ongoing conflict zones (Arriola, Dow, Matanock & Mattes, 2021).

Many countries in transition have police forces that are underfunded, overworked, and not trusted by the general public or by certain communities or political factions. Insufficient time for training security forces before elections typically results in gaps in competence and credibility (Collier & Vicente, 2014). However, greater collaboration with EMBs could help solve these issues more effectively. Election Day coordination and problem resolution can be enhanced by including the EMB in security training preparation (to ensure the electoral process is communicated effectively) and by initiating joint sessions (Collier & Vicente, 2014).

Training for security personnel could include input from EMBs or electoral specialists, or high-level joint sessions should be held to ensure security forces understand electoral procedures. The norms of engagement for addressing security threats before, during, and after the election will be clearer to all parties involved if this is done (Birch & David, 2018). It can be challenging for persons outside of the security industry to access training materials for security forces, both online and in physical libraries. But for effective and peaceful

elections, security officials must understand electoral processes and be able to collaborate with poll workers at both the local and regional levels (Birch & David, 2018).

The narrower focus on specialized industries is indicative of this training partnership gap. Funders and implementing partners in the security sector, for instance, are frequently cut off from their counterparts in other development sectors (Birch & David, 2018). Donors and experts working on security reform and training are occasionally left out of donor coordination meetings and other collaborative efforts centred on elections. Although it usually starts at the last minute, coordination for field operations and training can be quite effective (Birch & David, 2018).

According to Blanchard (2016), coordination was challenging even though significant UN and civilian assistance was directed at South Sudan's election process in the run-up to the 2010 elections in April. The delayed pace of security sector change since 2005 created a number of challenges for ensuring a secure election. Despite the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), internal power conflicts remain inside the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), one of the principal combatants in the protracted civil war (Kuol, 2010). This has left the newly formed South Sudan Police Service (SPSS) with large numbers of marginally trained police. There were numerous instances of SPSS authority being disregarded by the SPLA and the people prior to the April 2010 elections. However, preparations for election security coordination and training only started six months in advance. When this became a top priority, an election security group was formed, and it was later copied at the state level (Young, 2015).

One of the sub county commanders had this to say:

Training of police officers has undergone tremendous steps; training period has been extended to 15 months. The previous physical training has been extended to course work and demonstration. However, the curriculum covers general areas. Specific areas like election management are not adequately covered. Furthermore, we lack experts in electoral management and training. Many police officers only serve to secure electoral material and staff. Furthermore, due to huge shortage of security personnel, sometimes the government deploys recruits from training schools to assist in offering security during elections. Most of these recruits do not have skills and experience to assist in elections especially where there are disputes during campaigns, voting and counting. (30/12/2022, Sirende)

6.3.2 Conducting Civic Education

Measures intended to inform voters of their civic and democratic rights are known as voter awareness campaigns (Boone, 2011). These actions also propagate messages of peace, imploring voters to refrain from using violence of any kind, regardless of their grievances. The purpose of the study was to ascertain whether or not voter awareness campaigns could lessen electoral violence and support efforts to promote peace. The findings demonstrated that approximately half of the participants (48.4%) thought voter education programs could contribute to lessening election-related violence and fostering peace. Raising voter awareness can help reduce election violence and promote a climate of trust in the democratic process, according to 92.2% of respondents overall. 4.9% of respondents, on the other hand, were undecided or strongly disapproved.

The respondents believed that in order to guarantee permanent peace, civic education was essential. According to one opinion,

Civic education is necessary. It's a crucial tactic. We must instill in our people the belief that elections should not be used as a means of deciding who will eat, but rather as a tool to assist us decide who will strive to serve the country. The general public must constantly be educated about civics, and in order to comprehend the idea of elections, we must begin in elementary and secondary education. People understand that anyone can be elected as long as they meet

the requirements to be president, so this can be utilized as a strategy to control election disputes. The nominations are the other crucial factor. You must fail the nomination process in order to be eligible to run for president or to be a member of parliament. If you are ineligible, Chapter 6 ought to halt you before you pass the nomination. When someone makes it past the nomination stage, it signifies they are eligible to run for president and ought to be welcomed by all. Consequently, those who make it past the nomination stage ought to be problem-free individuals.

24/10/2022

Bidii Area

Another respondent endorsed civic education, saying, "It can be used to ensure long lasting peace because people understand that there is no need to kill for and about anyone the moment they understand the meaning of elections."

Table 6.2 Conducting Voter Awareness Campaigns

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Agree	98	48.4	48.4	48.4
Agree	87	42.8	42.8	91.2
Not Sure	0	0.0	0.0	91.2
Disagree	10	4.9	4.9	96.1
Strongly Disagree	8	3.9	3.9	100.0
Total	203	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Data (2023)

Initiatives to raise voter awareness educate people about the importance of peace and the ripple effects of their actions, as seen in Table 6.2. Voter education is usually directed at young people in order to teach them the importance of having peaceful elections, according to prior studies. A report showing the beneficial impact of civic and voter education on

turnout and voters' comprehension of the voting process was released by The Commonwealth in 2015. Elections that are peaceful provide voters the chance to select leaders they think will best address their issues.

Some respondents particularly those from peace organizations thought that it was essential to provide young people the chance to learn the value of peace and to stop being manipulated by politicians. According to a respondent's account,

For instance, we are the first organization to create areas in high schools where students can develop original company concepts. These areas, known as LEAP hubs, are located at over 24 schools. The Global Peace Foundation founded a LEAP hub at Moi Forces Academy. We have those hubs at Kenya High School, Kariobangi Girls. We take such action because we must effectively address the issue of unemployment. The reason why young people were scurrying around with signs that read, "No Raila, no Peace," and featured politicians! No Raila, no Peace! They essentially do nothing. If they were as busy as I was, I wouldn't have had time to get there because I was watching what they were doing from my office.

25/10/2022

Centre Kwanza

Other young people should be included in other activities in addition to those in schools to make sure that politicians do not abuse them. According to a response from a FGD,

Then there are the young people going about their business; they are too busy making opportunities to fight or sling insults at politicians. We think that we need to address the underlying cause in order to accomplish that. If we can place young people in employment, give them a means of subsistence, and enable women to take care of their families, then the election of a president becomes irrelevant to them. Nobody seems to care if the government provides services; personally, I don't care as long as I can continue doing my business. I don't care as long as I can drive my car, build my business, and feed my kids. For instance, do you believe that every Kikuyu is content now that there is a Kikuyu president? I've traveled to locations like Gatundu, where the president is of Kikuyu origin, despite the fact that they suffer from jiggers. We will never be

able to resolve this issue if we continue to think that having a president of your ethnicity makes you happy. (27/10/2022, Swam)

The aforementioned statement makes clear that politicians do not truly care about the needs of young people; rather, they should be taught that young people are the objects of their own selfish interests.

The study concluded that civic education was essential to addressing the ongoing electoral violence. According to one reply, "Religious organizations, civil society, etc. should teach a lot of civics instead of politicians. Inform people on the value of voting and what to do in the event that their candidate loses. A great deal of preparation in civics is required."

6.3.3 Developing Citizen Trust

The study also looked at whether creating a culture of trust among citizens is a useful strategy for establishing lasting peace. According to the results, 143 people (or 70.4%) highly agreed, and 40 people (19.6%) agreed that fostering citizen trust is a good method to reduce tension and create enduring peace. Conversely, 3 (1.98%) were unsure, 7 (3.4%) strongly disagreed, and 10 (4.8%) disagreed that increasing public trust can lessen election strife. A total of 90.0% of the respondents said that fostering citizen trust is a useful strategy for establishing lasting peace.

Table 6.3 Developing Citizen Trust

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Agree	143	70.4	70.4	70.44
Agree	40	19.6	19.6	90.0
Not Sure	3	1.8	1.8	91.8
Disagree	10	4.8	4.8	96.6
Strongly Disagree	7	3.4	3.4	100.00
Total	203	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Data (2023)

Table 6.3 illustrates that the success of any peace-building initiative depends on the people having trust and faith in the current ruling institutions. If people are assured that the elections will be free and fair and that the electoral authority will be accountable and transparent, they are less likely to feel comfortable leaving their houses after the election. People are less inclined to plan violent acts ahead of time as a result of their growing trust in the impartiality and integrity of the democratic process.

Fischer (2012) suggested that it is crucial for the public to have faith in and comprehension of the results process and how the results convert into seats or winners, and the current findings confirm these claims. Voters should be informed ahead of time about things like the number of votes required to win, how seats will be distributed, and whether or not a runoff election would be necessary. When a convoluted mechanism for allocating seats in the East Timorese parliament led to coalition building that did not appear to fairly reward the party that received the most votes, tensions quickly escalated in 2007. Although post-

Election Day education programs are not always effective, a large-scale campaign planned by IFES and other partners proved crucial in calming tensions. Using the ICEP lens, non-election oriented organizations on the ground should keep a close eye out for signs of rising conflict and tension during the whole election process, but especially during the wait for results (Fischer, 2012). It is important to report any red flags to the proper authorities or through reliable channels. UNDP (2017) suggests using an ICEP working group for this purpose, or including information sharing pertaining to conflicts into ongoing coordinated initiatives.

Moreover, Fischer (2012) discovered that training and planning are critical for minimizing post-election tensions that often center on results announcements. The necessary confidence in the results process by all stakeholders can only be achieved by ensuring a transparent electoral results system, paying special attention to explaining how results aggregation and tabulation will actually work, and sharing timelines and results, down to the polling station level, at all stages of the process. The procedure, together with tactics for informing the public, collaborating with the press, making public pronouncements, and preparing for any conflicts or controversies, is essential. Trust between the EMB and the parties will be established before the results are released, which is crucial for mitigating negative reactions at the first indication of trouble.

Whether started by the state or by civil society, watchdog and monitoring initiatives can provide timely, reliable data on the presence or growth of tensions, electoral violence, or electoral breaches (Fjelde & Kristine, 2016). Because they tackle impunity, secrecy, and rumors — all of which contribute to electoral conflict in transitional democracies — they have the potential to boost the success of conflict prevention efforts. The existence of

monitoring and watchdog procedures, which limit the space and opportunity for fraud and corruption, lessens the likelihood of conflict. These comprise, but are not restricted to, election observation, electoral dispute resolution (EDR) case monitoring, and the transparency initiatives implemented by the EMB (Fjelde & Höglund, 2016). By establishing best practices and legal protections to guarantee the integrity of an electoral process, Election Management Bodies (EMBs) play a critical role in conflict avoidance.

6.3.4 The Building Bridges Initiative/Handshake

The handshake between Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta gave rise to the Building Bridges Initiative, also referred to as the "handshake." Although it is connected to the handshake as a recent peace initiative, it is a distinct initiative that requires time. The BBI can be a useful tool for promoting peace if used properly. As one interviewee described,

BBI was a unique peace-building strategy that surprised everyone. It was developed out of nothing. The country was becoming ungovernable. The country was divided at the middle between the supporters of Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. The coming up of the two through handshake was Godly send. Peace extended to every corner of the country from nowhere. Coexistence between people of different tribes evolved. The two powerful leaders put the country a head of everything and stability of the nation was key. I know there those were not pleased by coming together of the two leaders. But peace and economic stability improved in all corners of the country. The country regained its lost status as an island of peace.

28/10/2022

Kitale Town

However, some people felt that the handshake between the two leaders should be given more time to flourish to determine if it is effective in ensuring peace among Kenyans, as it is only a recent development. As narrated by one respondent:

Building Bridges Initiative is a new phenomenon worldwide. There has never been time the government and the opposition worked together in executive and legislative matters. This was a new idea and its outcome was good for the country

but there was no check for the same government that fell in bed with the opposition. A good number of the things articulated in the BBI document were progressive and needed just some fine tuning to benefit the country. The late president Moi tried the idea but it never came out well as under the current government. It should be noted that it also led to great divisions in the government and parliament. (31/10/2022; Hospital).

Table 6.4 Building Bridge Initiative

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Agree	95	46.7	46.7	46.7
Agree	93	45.8	45.8	92.5
Not Sure	3	1.8	1.8	94.3
Disagree	9	4.3	4.3	98.6
Strongly Disagree	3	1.7	1.7	100.00
Total	203	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Data (2023)

The study also sought to find out if building bridge initiative is an effective way of building long lasting peace. From the findings, 95(46.7%) strongly agreed, 93(45.8) agreed that building bridge initiative defuses tension and is an effective way of building long lasting peace. On the other hand, 9(4.3%) disagreed, 3(1.7%) strongly disagreed and 3(1.7%) were not sure about whether building citizens trust can reduce electoral conflict. Cumulatively, 92.5% of the respondents felt that application of building bridge initiative is an effective way of building long lasting peace.

6.3.5 Economic Development and Empowerment

Rapid economic development and especially decentralization of industries to counties will reduce urban migration and increase employment opportunities for many trained youth

who are unable to access formal employment or have stagnated career progression due to lack of job opportunities. Every year Universities and Colleges are graduating thousands of youths into job market; many are unable to get employment due to slow national economic development (Okutta, 2023). The author further observed that countries such as Rwanda, Botswana, India, Singapore and Taiwan had steady economic foundation that led to massive infrastructural and manufacturing investment resulting to excessive job opportunities and therefore attracting foreign workers importation. Such economies have thrived on steady democracies where Citizens have great say on who leads them. Electoral processes are digitized and trust in electoral institutions is at the heart of the citizens.

Table 6.5 Economic Development and Empowerment

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Agree	78	38.5	38.5	38.5
Agree	99	48.8	48.8	87.3
Not Sure	6	2.9	2.9	90.2
Disagree	7	3.4	3.4	93.6
Strongly Disagree	13	6.4	6.4	100.00
Total	203	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Data (2023)

The study also sought to find out if economic development and empowerment of people is an effective way of building long lasting peace. From the findings, 78(38.5%) strongly agreed, 99(48.8) agreed that economic development empowerment defuses tension and is an effective way of building long lasting peace. On the other hand, 7(3.4%) disagreed,

13(6.4%) strongly disagreed and 6(3.4%) were not sure about whether economic development and empowerment can reduce electoral conflict. Cumulatively, 87.3% of the respondents felt that economic development and empowerment is an effective way of building long lasting peace.

One church leader had this to say during interview session:

Many youths have retreated into drug and alcohol abuse due to lack of job opportunities. Life has become so difficulty that even coming across manual work for them is not easy. Even the farm jobs are not easily available. Many large-scale farmers have mechanized their farm activities. Planting and harvesting are now done with machines. Farmers today use herbicides instead of manual weeding. Many household incomes have reduced to nearly zero. With more youths engaging in drug and alcohol abuse, cases of criminality have gone up. Theft, assault, rape and defilement cases have increased. During elections, most of these youths become gangs on hire by politicians.

18/10/2022

Mali Nane

Another Chief had this to say during another interview session:

Unemployment has become a major problem in the country and especially in Trans-Nzoia. These days many trained youths are not migrating to major towns to search for employment as before, most organizations advertise their vacancies online and application is also done online. Therefore, most of these youths remain in the villages and informal settlements with little to do. Most people expected county governments to fill this gap by offering more employment opportunities, but in contrast employment opportunities are given according to the side one voted and according to the tribe. The National Government has not also assisted devolution to thrive. Counties stay for three to four months without any disbursement of funds from the National Treasury. Many workers have gone without salaries, health sector have collapsed due to lack of funds. Many suppliers have gone for years without payment of their bills.

18/10/22

Mali Saba

6.3.6 Enhancing Security, Trust and Electoral Integrity

The focus on election security goes beyond the minimization of risk or the suppression of violence. It's the state of having no barriers to the free and equal exercise of all political rights, as outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and other United Nations and international instruments.

The political realities on the ground mean that elections frequently take place in highly charged and potentially dangerous social and political environments. As a result, election management boards, political parties, candidates, security forces, media, civil society organizations, religious and community leaders, and judicial officials regularly face the formidable challenge of creating a climate in which citizens can exercise their right to vote or run for office without fear of physical reprisal. These groups will use a variety of methods to promote peaceful elections. Voter violence can be reduced greatly if people have faith in the Election Management Body. It has been noted that an Election Management Body's credibility is the most valuable asset it can have because it may greatly improve election security (Erich & Kerr, 2016).

As observed by one head of household in Kiminini Sub County:

Kenya has one of the progressive election laws as stipulated in the Constitution (2010). The election disputes especially the presidential one is handled within very few days after elections. The other disputes are handled within 6 months after elections. These regulations have improved peoples trust in the institution of Electoral Management. These has also

reduced occurrence of widespread violence like one experienced in 2007/2008. The remaining problem is the way elections are managed by those put in the office of the Electoral body, the Commissioners. Most of those put there are easily compromised leading to mistrust and violence.

6.4 Chapter Summary

The main obstacles to and prospects for using peace-building techniques in Trans-Nzoia County's election dispute handling have been covered in this section. Based on the research, the primary obstacles to Kenya's efforts to promote peace include mistrust, distrust, ethnicity, erroneous interpretations of the constitution, high rates of unemployment, and electoral body corruption. The management of electoral conflicts has a variety of obstacles, but these can be addressed by taking use of certain opportunities, such as civic education, establishing bridges, fostering citizen trust, and providing security officer training. The highlights, conclusions, and suggestions are covered in the next chapter.

The next chapter seven presents summary of the findings, conclusions and the recommendations.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents the summary of findings, conclusions, and recommendations the study drawn from the results of analysis. The chapter also outlines suggestions for further research.

7.1 Summary of Findings

The general objective of the study is to evaluate effectiveness of peace-building strategies influencing management of electoral conflict in Trans-Nzoia County, Kenya. Specifically, the study: established the nature of electoral conflicts experienced in Trans Nzoia County and the peace building strategies used to manage the conflict. The study also assessed the effectiveness of peace building strategies used in the management of electoral conflict in Trans-Nzoia County and examined the challenges and prospects of peace building strategies in the management of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County. The study adopted a conceptual framework underpinned by Galtung's theory of peace and the Theory of Change (TOC) in peace-building. The study used a descriptive research design. The study targeted heads of households, citizens. Church leaders, Chiefs, members of County Assembly and Deputy County Commissioners. Systematic random sampling was used to select household heads, citizens and church leaders while purposive sampling was used to select chiefs, MCAs and Deputy County Commissioners. There were 5 focus group discussions (FGDs) with 8-12 participants. Out of the 233 anticipated, the researcher was able to distribute 233 surveys. In addition, the researcher completed 77 interviews out of the anticipated 80 and 5 focus group discussions out of the anticipated 5. Focus group

discussions (FGDs), interview guides, and questionnaires were used to gather data. Version 22 of SPSS was used to analyze the quantitative data, while thematic organization, verbatim coding, and coding were used to analyze the qualitative data. 46.8% of the 233 responders were men and 47.29% were women. The respondents were split up into six age groups, spanning from 18–27 to 68–77. The results showed that the group with the largest number, 28–37, was 44.2%. This was followed by the groups with 28–47 and over 48, which had 28.5% and 18.5% of the total, respectively, and the 18–27 category, which had 8.6%. Five constituencies in Trans Nzoia County were the focus of the study: Kiminini, Kwanza, Cherangany, Endebes, and Saboti. Every study participant's ethnic background was evenly represented. All five sections included representation from five different ethnic groups. Luhya (24.5%) made up the majority of responders, followed by Kalenjin (21.9%), Kikuyu (21.5%), and Kisii (17.2%); other tribes made up 15.0%. Out of the 233 respondents, a majority of them, (37.3%), had acquired secondary education, undergraduate level (15.5%), polytechnic (14.6%), those who had acquired postgraduate level of education had representation of 2.6%, and those with primary level of education had 21.5% representation while (8.6%) had had below primary school level.

7.1.1 Nature of Electoral Conflict

The study found out that the nature of causes of electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County were unresolved and long-standing land grievances (76.4%); poor election management and administration (62.2%); political elite patronage (49.4%), and lack of legal and institutions framework (31.3%) in that order. On respondents' perception on the main causes of electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia and beyond: Existence of long standing history of land grievances had mean of 4.54; political patronage (4.46); voter rigging and fraud

(4.44); poor election management and administration (4.44); whipping community emotions around land injustices (4.37) and politics of ethnic identity (4.32).

7.1.2 Peace-building Strategies to Manage Electoral Conflicts

On the strategies employed to curb electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County: Dialogue and mediation led with 70.3%; sensitization programs (65.7%); use of grassroots peace advocacy and peace messaging mechanisms (62.3%); training and institution building activities (51.5%); use of attitude transformation programmes and adoption of early warning/response system had 19.7% each. On the perception of respondents on the best management approach to electoral conflict: adoption of relevant policy and strategies had mean of 4.55; adoption of early warning and response strategies (4.50); collaboration between security forces and political actors (4.46); adoption of peace advocacy and campaign by NGOs and SCOs (4.44); adoption of local dispute resolution mechanisms (4.42); and confidence building among the political stakeholders (4.34). As for the challenges,

7.1.4 Challenges and Opportunities in Electoral Conflict Management

The study found that the major challenges to the peace-building process include mistrust, suspicion, and ethnicity, Lack of facilitation and training of local peace committees, youth unemployment and mismanagement of election process. Among the opportunities that were found and would assist in managing electoral conflict included training of security officers, developing citizen trust, conducting civic education, economic development and empowerment, enhancing security, trust and election integrity and application of building bridges initiative.

7.2 Conclusion

Based on the key study findings the researcher arrived at the following conclusions based on each research objective and question.

7.2.1 Nature of Electoral Conflict

From the findings of objective one, the study concludes that unresolved and long-standing grievances were the major cause of electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County.

7.2.2 Peace-building Strategies in Management of Electoral Conflict

Based on the findings of objective two, the study concludes that the most effective peace-building strategy to curb electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County was application of dialogue and mediation mechanism among conflicting sides.

7.2.3 Challenges and Opportunities in Management of Electoral Conflict

Deduced from the findings of objective three that the major challenge to the peace-building process in Trans-Nzoia County is mistrust, while the major opportunity to manage electoral conflict was developing citizen trust. The study concluded that programmes aimed at improving citizen trust in public institutions should be enhanced especially through civic education and public participation.

7.2.4 Overall Conclusion

Overall, although electoral conflict has been a problem in Trans Nzoia County for years, peace-building strategies have been effective in reducing it as experienced during August 2022 general election.

7.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusion of objective one, the study concluded that unresolved and long-standing grievances were the major cause of electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County, it therefore recommends that the Government of Kenya to put in place measures to address the pre-existing conflict factors such as past land injustices to prevent perennial conflicts.

Based on the findings and conclusion of objective two that the main peace-building strategy to curb electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County was application of dialogue and mediation mechanism, the study recommends that the Government of Kenya to develop a framework to guide peace-building activities and then strengthen them through training and facilitation.

Based on the findings of the objective three, the study found out that the major challenge to the peace-building process include mistrust, while the main opportunity opportunities was developing citizen trust. The study recommends that programmes aimed at improving citizen trust in public institutions should be enhanced especially through civic education and public participation.

7.4 Suggestions for Further Research

The following suggestions are made for further research

Future studies may want to consider not just leaders but also grassroots community organizers as their subjects. Beyond high-level clergy, there are also laypeople working toward peace in religious communities. Rather than focusing exclusively on religious

leaders, this study highlights the importance of involving faith-based grassroots actors and entire indigenous communities. The research concludes that everyday clerics, rather than political or military leaders, have helped bring about peaceful resolutions to conflicts. However, their significance has not been adequately acknowledged by policymakers. Furthermore, as most organized religions are established along patriarchal lines, with male-dominated religious leadership, a concentration on leaders is likely to disregard the vital voice of women.

Future research should be done by use of longitudinal research design unlike descriptive research design employed here. This is because longitudinal research design involves studying a social phenomenon over a long period of time, and therefore, it can be used to study the effectiveness of the mentioned election conflict management strategies for example since the beginning of multi-party state to date. Researchers will then be able to measure how effective each strategy is.

Future studies ought to look into the connection between electoral fights and historical disputes. Future research should look into establishing the relationship between elections and historical disputes, such as land concerns, even if the current study notes that fighting communities may use elections as a scapegoat to settle these disputes. It will be simple to develop peace-building frameworks that achieve both positive and negative peace once a relationship has been established. Future studies should take into account peace-building techniques that are applied in different types of conflicts, not just election-related ones. Cattle rustling and border disputes have not always been seen as major conflicts in Kenya. Although the government always takes reactive action, significant preventive action has never been taken. Therefore, future scholars are challenged to think about examining

different types of conflict, which will then inform the formulation of appropriate peace-building tactics.

Subsequent research ought to be conducted to assess the ability of peace-building organizations to handle electoral disputes in Kenya. Even while some of these organizations receive significant funding from donors, they have little interest in settling election disputes in the way that is anticipated. Thus, it would be worthwhile for future studies to examine groups that claim to be involved in promoting peace in Kenya.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Introductory Letter



MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MMUST)

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27th July 2022

Otte Zebedee Ekwenye
CPC/H/01-53800/I9
P.O. Box 190-50100
KAKAMEGA

Dear Mr. Ekwenye,

RE: APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL

I am pleased to inform you that the Directorate of Postgraduate Studies has considered and approved your PhD proposal entitled: *“Efficacy of Peace Building Strategies in the Management of Electoral Conflicts in Trans-Nzoia County Kenya”* and appointed the following as supervisors:


1. Prof. Chrispinous Iteyo - SDMHA - MMUST
2. Dr. Ruth Simiyu - SDMHA - MMUST

You are required to submit through your supervisor(s) progress reports every three months to the Director of Postgraduate Studies. Such reports should be copied to the following: Chairman, School of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Graduate Studies Committee and Chairman, Department of Peace and Conflicts Studies. Kindly adhere to research ethics consideration in conducting research.

It is the policy and regulations of the University that you observe a deadline of two years from the date of registration to complete your PhD thesis. Do not hesitate to consult this office in case of any problem encountered in the course of your work.

We wish you the best in your research and hope the study will make original contribution to knowledge.

Yours Sincerely,



Prof. Stephen O. Odebero, PhD, FIEEP
DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

Appendix III: Questionnaire

Instructions

Kindly fill your response in the space provided or tick (✓) as appropriate. All information provided here will be handled with utmost confidentiality and the findings will be used for the purpose of this research ONLY.

Section A: General Information

1. Kindly indicate your constituency _____
2. Kindly indicate your Sex Male, Female Intersex
3. Kindly indicate your age bracket in years
 - a. Below 30 years
 - b. Between 30-40 years
 - c. Between 40-50 years
 - d. Over 50 Years
4. Please indicate your highest educational qualification
 - a. Primary level
 - b. Secondary level
 - c. Polytechnic
 - d. Undergraduate
 - e. Postgraduate

Section B: Nature of Electoral Conflict

Kindly indicate by ticking (✓) on the brackets based on the level of agreement or disagreement that best represents your view where **1 = Strongly Disagree**, **2 = Disagree**, **3 = Not Sure**, **4=Agree** and **5 = Strongly Agree** on the statements regarding the nature or causal factors electoral conflict and conflict in Trans Nzoia County.

5. Kindly indicate the main causes of electoral conflicts in trans Nzoia county
 - a. Poor election management and administration
 - b. Political elite (identity politics and patronage)

- c. Unresolved and long-standing grievances
 - d. Lack of proper legal and institutional framework for electoral process
 - e. Stiff competition
6. Whipping communities' emotions around land injustices during electoral seasons leads to political tensions and conflicts 1 2 3 4 5
 7. Existence of long-standing historical land grievances have continued to underpin the electoral rivalry 1 2 3 4 5
 8. Political patronage disenfranchises other ethnic communities in terms of resources and job opportunities hence leading to rivalry 1 2 3 4 5
 9. Politics of ethnic identity leads to exclusionary development thereby leading to ethnic groups developing a sense of victimization and injustice 1 2 3 4 5
 10. Vote rigging / vote fraud leads to other political opponents and their supporters to reject electoral outcome leading to conflicts 1 2 3 4 5
 11. Poor electoral management and administration can lead to election fraud, skewed election outcomes or vote manipulation hence resulting in public mistrust, objection and conflict 1 2 3 4 5

Section C: Effectiveness of Peace Building Strategies for Managing Electoral Conflicts

Kindly indicate by ticking (√) on the brackets based on the level of agreement or disagreement that best represents your view where **1 = Strongly Disagree**, **2 = Disagree**, **3 = Not Sure**, **4=Agree** and **5 = Strongly Agree** on the statements regarding electoral conflict management initiatives in Trans Nzoia County

12. Kindly indicate the types of electoral peace-building strategies that have been adopted in Trans Nzoia County

- a. Dialogue and mediation
 - b. Training and institution-building activities
 - c. Use of grassroots peace advocacy / peace messaging
 - d. Sensitization programs
 - e. Use of attitude-transformation programs
 - f. Adoption of early warning systems
13. Adoption of early warning systems can help track volatile areas hence allowing remedial measures to be put in place 1 2 3 4 5
14. The use grassroots peace advocacy by the both the civil society groups and faith/community-based organizations can help entrench tolerance during elections 1 2 3 4 5
15. The use of dialogue and mediation approaches between political opponents and between the dominant and minority ethnic groupings can reduce electoral conflict incidences 1 2 3 4 5
16. Attitude-transformation through outreach programs and religious sermons can help sensitize the people against engaging in conflict 1 2 3 4 5
17. The use of targeted peace building activities particularly those on youth have a positive impact in reducing electoral conflicts 1 2 3 4 5
18. Conducting peace building sensitization workshops such as public village barazas can help build the capacity of the people against electoral conflict 1 2 3 4 5
19. Training and institution-building activities of the voters, electoral actors, security and the electoral management institutions can help deliver a credible and transparent election recognized by all 1 2 3 4 5

Section D: Management of Electoral Conflict

Kindly indicate by ticking (√) on the brackets based on the level of agreement or disagreement that best represents your view where **1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Not Sure, 4=Agree** and **5 = Strongly Agree** on the statements regarding the approaches for the Management of Electoral Conflict in Trans Nzoia County

20. Collaboration between security forces/local and political parties can help build confidence of the participants and the public during election 1 2 3 4 5
21. Adopting relevant policy and strategies to address electoral security such as permitting party representatives and observers enhances credibility of election outcome 1 2 3 4 5
22. Confidence building among the political stakeholders (political opponents) and voters reduces political conflict 1 2 3 4 5
23. Adoption of peace advocacy campaigns by the NGOs and CSOs to build awareness among the community members reduces electoral conflict 1 2 3 4 5
24. Adopting early warning and early response strategies such as tracking radio messages can help avert and stop intra- and interethnic conflicts before they turn violent 1 2 3 4 5
25. Adoption of local dispute resolution such as active involvement of Location/Division or District Peace committees in the ground can help dissipate conflicts 1 2 3 4 5
26. Training of security personnel during electoral timeline can assist to prevent electoral conflict 1 2 3 4 5

27. Conducting civil education during election timeline assists to defuse electoral conflict 1 2 3 4 5
28. Developing citizen trust in public institutions including electoral management bodies defuses electoral conflict 1 2 3 4 5
29. Developing and employing Building Bridge Initiative assisted to defuse electoral conflict of 2013 General Election 1 2 3 4 5
30. Economic development and Empowerment of all regions will assist in preventing electoral conflict 1 2 3 4 5

Appendix IV: Interview Schedule for Key Informants

Dear Sir/Madam, My name is Otte Zebedee Ekwenye, a Doctor of Philosophy student in Peace and Conflict Studies of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology. I am conducting a study on the “*efficactivenesss of peace-building strategies influencing management of electoral conflict in Trans-Nzoia County in Kenya*”. The study seeks to understand the Nature / causative factors of electoral conflict as well as the implications of peace building strategies in mitigation electoral related conflicts and conflict in Trans-Nzoia County in Kenya. The study is estimated to take between 20-30 minutes. All Responses will be treated with utmost confidentiality and the results will only be used for research purposes. In case of any questions, please call Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology School of Graduate Studies on +254 (0) 702597360/1, 733120020/2, 057 2505222/3 or email on info@mmust.ac.ke. Please confirm your consent towards proceeding with the study. Please remember you are free to withdraw the consent at any stage of the interview. Thank you for your cooperation.

- a) In your view, what do you think is the underlying cause of the perennial electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County?
- b) In your opinion, when is the electoral conflicts witnessed in Trans Nzoia County, is it during or after elections?
- c) In your view, who are the main perpetrators of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County?
- d) Do you think the police play a role in the electoral conflicts?
- e) In your opinion, what was the key cause of the electoral conflict in 2007/2008, 2013 and 2017? Do you think the issues were resolved?
- f) If not how do you think the issues should be addressed?
- g) What can you say about distribution of development initiatives and job opportunities among the communities in Trans Nzoia County? Does this have any bearing towards electoral tension and conflicts?
- h) When conflicts occur in the society, how do you resolve?
- i) Have you ever been affected by electoral conflicts? If so, how?

- j) Are you aware about local peace committee? Are you a member?
- k) How does local peace committee help in addressing conflicts in your community?
And how important is it?
- l) What do you think should be done to the current peace building initiatives and programs in order to make them more effective?
- m) What is your view about the role of National Cohesion and Integration Commissions (NCIC) in reducing political incitement and intolerance?
- n) Do you think NCIC is instrumental in preventing electoral conflict in Trans Nzoia County? If not, why do you think so?
- o) Do you think the current electoral peace-building efforts have been effective?
- p) In your view, what do you think should be done to perpetrators of electoral conflict instigators?
- q) What are some of the challenges of managing electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County?
- r) Do you think these challenges have been handled? If so, how has it influenced the occurrence of electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia County?
- s) Do you think the challenges of managing electoral conflicts presents way forward for managing such conflicts?

Appendix V: Focused Group Discussion Guide

Facilitator's Welcome, Introduction and Instructions to Participants

Welcome and thank you for volunteering to take part in this focus group. You have been asked to participate, as your point of view is important. I appreciate you for taking your time to partake in this discussion.

Introduction: This focus group discussion is designed to assess your current thoughts and feelings regarding the nature of electoral conflicts experienced in Trans Nzoia County every election cycle; influence of such peace building efforts and the challenges and opportunities for managing electoral conflicts. The focus group discussion will take no more than two hours. I will record the discussion to facilitate the writing of the report.

Anonymity: Despite the recording, I would like to assure you that the discussion will be anonymous. The recordings will be kept safely in a locked facility until they are transcribed word for word, then they will be destroyed. The transcribed notes of the focus group will contain no information that would allow any individual to be linked to specific statements. You should try to answer and comment as accurately and truthfully as possible. I and the other focus group participants would appreciate it if you would refrain from discussing the comments of other group members outside the focus group. If there are any questions or discussions that you do not wish to answer or participate in, you do not have to do so; however please try to answer and be as involved as possible.

Ground rules

The most important rule is that only one person speaks at a time. Please note that each of your views is important. There are no right or wrong views and you do not have to agree with the views of other members in the group. You do not have to speak in any particular order. Please feel free to express your views in either English or Kiswahili. Does anyone have any questions? Well, let us begin.

Warm up

First, I would like everyone to introduce himself or herself. Can you tell us your name?

Introductory question

I am just going to give you a couple of minutes to think about your experience with the past electoral conflicts. Is anyone comfortable to discuss or share his or her experience?

Guiding questions

1. What are some of the factors that contribute to electoral conflicts in Trans Nzoia?
Who are the main perpetrators?
2. What role do the factors play? How do they fuel electoral conflicts?
3. In this area, what do you think influences voting decisions of the community?
4. Do you think there is a way to solve the issues?
5. What are some to peace building efforts that have been initiated in this area to mitigate electoral conflicts? Can you name them?
6. Have you ever participated in any of the peace building efforts?
7. Do you think the current peace building efforts are working?
8. What do you think are some of the challenges affecting the effectiveness of the current peace building efforts?
9. What do you think should be done to overcome the challenges?

Conclusion

- Thank you for participating. This has been a very successful discussion
- Your opinions will be a valuable asset to the study
- We hope you have found the discussion interesting
- If there is anything you are unhappy with or wish to complain about, please speak to me later
- I would like to remind you that any comments featuring in this report will be anonymous

Appendix VI: Observation Checklist

No.	Observation Area	Evidence/ Documentation
Nature /Causes of Electoral Conflicts		
1.	Unresolved and long-standing grievances such as land injustices	
2.	Identity politics / political patronage	
3.	Lack of electoral integrity, fairness and transparency	
Youth Involvement / Role in Electoral Conflicts		
4.		
5.		
6.		
Police Involvement / Role in Electoral Conflicts		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		
Peace building Strategies for Managing Electoral Conflicts (by respective Actors: Household Heads; Village Elders; Chiefs; MCAs; Religious Leaders; County Administrators & NGO/CSOs Members)		
11.	Establishment of peace platforms such as the formation of local peace committees for the elections	
12.	Promotion of tolerance among the communities / Promotion of intercommunity dialogue	
13.	Resolution of prevalent conflicts such as resource conflicts	
14.	Peace messaging during campaign such as establishment of youth peace programs and training	
15.	Hate speech monitoring / enforcement of hate speech laws	
16.	Carrying out civic education such as about voters' rights, laws, and regulations regarding elections	
17.	Sensitization of the public such as by NCIC on tolerable political discourse	
18.	Ensuring political actor's participation in peace initiatives such as Uwiano	
19.	Establishment of acceptable code of conduct for political actors/parties during elections	

20.	Championing for peace among the political players/actors	
21.	Providing training to political actors/parties during elections to focus on issue-based campaigning and development	
22.	Strengthening the independence of IEBC / Reforming /reviewing of electoral laws	
23.	Establishing election dispute resolution mechanisms	
24.	Independent local/international election oversight	
25.	Setting up early warning systems / Mapping of hotspot areas	
26.	Providing training to journalists such as on sensitive reporting (election violence)	
Effectiveness of peace-building strategies		
	Peace-building Strategy	Rank (Effectiveness)
27.	Adoption of early warning systems	
28.	Dialogue and mediation	
29.	Sensitization programs	
30.	Use of grassroots peace advocacy / peace messaging	
31.	Training and institution-building activities	
32.	Use of attitude-transformation programs	
Challenges for Managing Electoral Conflicts		
33.	Lack of legal framework for ensuring accountability	
34.	Slow pace in justice delivery	
35.	Untimely enactment / amendment of electoral laws (too close to elections)	
36.	Police brutality / bias during elections	
37.	Political interference during elections	
38.	Lack of timely capacity-building workshops to sensitize both the voters and stakeholders on their role in averting electoral conflicts	
Opportunities for Managing Electoral Conflicts		
39.		
40.		
41.		
42.		

Appendix VII: Research Work plan

Activity	Month 1				Month 2				Month 3				Month 4				Month 5			
	Week				Week				Week				Week				Week			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Topic selection & approval																				
Supervisor appointment																				
Submission of draft proposal																				
Incorporate supervisors reviews																				
Proposal ready for presentation 1																				
Incorporation of panel comments																				
Proposal ready for presentation 2																				
Preparation for field data collection																				
Pilot testing of questionnaire																				
Administration of questionnaires																				
Conducting FGD Discussions / Interviews																				
Data processing (cleaning/sorting/Coding/Transcription)																				
Data analysis and Interpretation																				
Compilation of the Research Findings																				
Review and Printing of Project Report																				
Submission of the project report to the supervisors																				
Incorporation of supervisors' views/comments																				
Presentation and Defense of the Final Project Report																				
Incorporation of the Defense Panelist's views/comments																				
Submission of the Final project Copies to the school of Graduate Studies																				
Publishing																				

Appendix VIII: Trans Nzoia County (Decentralized Units) Administration (2018)

NO	Name of Sub County	Name of Ward	Approx. Pop of Wards	No. Of Villages	Village Units	No. of Locations
1	Kwanza	Kapomboi	56,082	5	Kapomboi	Kapomboi Kwanza Namanjalala Bidii Kaisagat Kapsitwet
					Kobos	
					Namanjalala	
					Liyavo	
					Kapsitwet	
		Kwanza	55,647	7	Kwanza	Kapsitwet (6)
					Maili Saba	
					Lunyu	
					Kaisagat/Karaus	
					Amuka	
					Bwayi	
					Karaus	
		Keiyo	56,679	5	Keiyo	Keiyo Maliki Kolongolo Nasianda Kapkoi
					Maliki	
					Kolongolo	
					Nasianda	
Bidii	21,498	4	Bidii	Bidii Section Six Lessos Makunga		
			Section Six			
			Lessos			
			Makunga			
2	Endebess	Chepchoina	36,485	6	Kiptogot	Endebess Matumbei Kaibei (3)
					Kaptega	
					Twiga	
					Chepchoina	
					Upper Hill	
					Mito Mbili	
		Endebess	23,338	4	Endebess	Endebess Lukayi Koitobos Cheptenden
					Lukayi	
					Koitobos	
					Cheptenden	
		Matumbei	31,369	4	Chepkoilel	Chepkoilel Matumbei Kiboi Mwita Mumbere
					Matumbei	
					Kiboi	
Mwita						
3	Saboti	Kinyoro	39,645	5	Kinyoro	Matisi

					Kipyoymen	Municipality
					Teldet	Tuwani
					Kisawai	Bondeni
					Kitalale	Grassland
		Matisi	40,662	4	Kipsongo	Kinyoro
					Grassland	Kisawai
					Rafiki	Kiboroa
					Matisi	Saboti
		Tuwan	39,662	3	Tuwan	Machewa
					Bondeni	(10)
					Kaloleni	
		Saboti	34,988	6	Koykoy	
					Muroki	
					Sukwo	
					Sikinwa	
					Gitwamba	
					Chebosan	
		Machewa	19,990	5	Ngobolele	
					Chemichemi	
					Mwita	
					Olkesem	
					Lukhome	
4	Kiminini	Kiminini	33,764	4	Nakwangwa	Sikhendu
					Kiminini	Wehonia
					Matunda	Matunda
					Sikhendu	Kiminini
		Waitaluk	40,764	5	Kapkoi Sisal	Mabonde
					Mabonde	Waitaluk
					Kibagenge	Milimani
					Baraka	Nai farm
					Namwichuli	Kapkoi
		Sirende	23,677	3	Sirende	Sirende
					Toro	Baraton
					Bikeke	(11)
		Hospital	30,234	3	Naisambu	
					Kibomet	
					Milimani	
		Sikhendu	24,129	6	Sikhendu	
					Kikwameti	
					Weonia	
					Mucharage	
					Mukuyuni	
					Kabuyefwe	
5	Cherangany	Sinyerere	25890	5	Kipsaina	Kachibora
					Sinyerere	Kaplamai

				Makindu	Cherangani Motosiet Makutano Sitatunga (6)
				Michai	
				Munyaka	
	Makutano	18,362	4	Kapsara	
				Biribiriet	
				Kapolet	
				Amani	
	Kaplamai	25,257	4	Kimoson	
				Karara	
				Botwa	
				Yuya	
	Motosiet	33,185	5	Motosiet	
				Kipsingor	
				Mateket	
				Tunen	
				Noigam	
	Cherangany/ Suwerwa	48,719	5	Kaptumbo	
				Kapkarwa	
				Kapterit	
				Kachibora	
				Geta	
	Chepsiro/Kipt Oror	39,402	5	Kibuswa	
				Kapsigilai	
				Milimani	
				Top Suwerwa	
				Kiptoi	
	Sitatunga	26,364	4	Chemutas	
				Chemaluk	
				Sitatunga Central	
				Sitatunga East	

Appendix IX: List of Sampled Churches in Trans Nzoia County (2021)

No.	Church	Branches
1.	Africa Brotherhood Church	4
2.	African Christian Church	3
3.	African Church of the Holy Spirit	6
4.	African Inland Church	12
5.	African Interior Church	5
6.	African Nineveh Church	3
7.	Anglican Church of Kenya	10
8.	Church of Africa Sinai Mission	2
9.	Church of God in East Africa (Kenya) – Kima Mission	4
10.	Coptic Orthodox Church	2
11.	Episcopal Church of Africa	4
12.	Free Pentecostal Fellowship in Kenya	10
13.	Friends Church in Kenya	3
14.	Full Gospel Churches of Kenya	10
15.	Kenya Assemblies of God	2
16.	Lyahuka Church of East Africa	2
17.	Maranatha Faith Assemblies	1
18.	Methodist Church in Kenya	3
19.	Overcoming Faith Center Church of Kenya	1
20.	Pentecostal Evangelistic Fellowship of Africa	2
21.	Presbyterian Church of East Africa	5
22.	Reformed Church of East Africa	2
23.	Salvation Army	4
24.	Seven-Day Adventist	8
25.	Zion Harvest Mission	2

Appendix X: Interview Session with One of the Respondent's (Chief)



