EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-CUSTODIAL REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMES ON WELFARE OF RETURNEE TERRORIST FIGHTERS IN MOMBASA COUNTY, KENYA

Michael Osew Ngachra

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Conferment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this research thesis is entirely original to me, was created using only the references listed, and has not been submitted for academic credit or any other kind of recognition.

Signed……………………………… Date…………………………………

Michael Osew Ngachra Reg. No: CPC/H/04-54131/2019

CERTIFICATION

The thesis is recommended for acceptance by Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology by the undersigned, who attest that they have read it. The thesis is entitled **"*Effectiveness of Non-Custodial Reintegration Programmes on Welfare of Returnee Terrorist Fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya*".**

Prof. Kennedy Onkware (Ph.D.)

Department of Emergency Management Studies

Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

Signed……………………………… Date…………………………………

Dr. Susan Kimokoti (Ph.D.)

Department of Peace and Conflict Studies

Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

Signed……………………………… Date…………………………………

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DEDICATION

I give special dedication to officers and service members of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) for their courageous and heroic performance to protect our motherland, Kenya from the destruction of terrorism. To the gallant soldiers who have lost their lives in the line of duty, may God rest their souls in eternal peace.

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism is widely acknowledged as a threat to global stability, peace, and prosperity. Although the concept of returning terrorist fighters is not new in Kenya, the most efficient strategy to reduce their threat to national security and community peace-making is through non-custodial reintegration. In Kenya, this intervention is targeted to resolve problems that obstruct effective recovery and ultimate reintegration of the returnees into the community. Little research has examined the welfare of returned terrorist fighters in Kenya and the reintegration initiatives that meet their psycho-social and economic needs. This thesis contributes to the debate on the desirable non-custodial reintegration initiative and its efficacy on the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa, Kenya. The specific objectives of the study aimed to: Explore the nature of non-custodial reintegration programmes on returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa, evaluate the efficacy of the non-custodial reintegration programmes on the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters, and finally assess the challenges to the non-custodial reintegration programmes on the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa. The study was founded on three theories: Programme Theory, Relative Deprivation Theory and Desistance Theory. A sample size of 400 respondents was needed for the concentrated investigation. The study data relied on questionnaire and interviews with residents of the community, government representatives, returnees, academic experts, and civil society players. Data was collected using a mixed concurrent triangulation approach and a cross-sectional descriptive and evaluation research design. The study's target group was taken from Mombasa County, which was shown to have the highest rates of violent extremism and recidivism in Kenya. Pilot testing of the instruments contributed to the study's findings being more valid and reliable. Study participants were chosen by simple random selection, snow balling and purposive sampling. Quantitative data was gathered via questionnaires. Textual thematic analysis was used to collect qualitative data from focus group discussions and key informant interviews. The findings of the study are summarized, analyzed, and presented using descriptive statistics of frequencies, means, and standard deviations, as well as narrative form. From the findings, the study aims to add new knowledge to the existing body of research and academia, help review current policies to help develop new approaches and guidelines regarding the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters. In conclusion, the study found that non-custodial reintegration programmes of returnee terrorist fighters provide a perfect opportunity for enhancing community resilience in fighting radicalization leading to terrorism. The study noted challenges facing non-custodial reintegration programmes in addressing the welfare of the returnees, thereby limiting the programmes' ability and capacity to improve the returnees' welfare objectively and accurately. The study's overall conclusion is that the employment of a multisectoral and multi-agency approach together with participation and inclusion of community members in the non-custodial reintegration process is a key factor in ensuring sustainable and effective programmes that are impactful on the welfare of the returnee terrorist fighters. The study recommends the nesting of non-custodial reintegration programmes into large economic and social stability efforts at county governments to enhance structural plans in development, implementation, and evaluation.

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OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY TERMS

Civil Society Actors: Members of the community, particularly women, young people, and leaders in the religious and other sectors of the community who are in a position to make significant and lasting contributions to the welfare of the returnee terrorist fighters.

Community: Refer to the women, men, social groups, and organizations that are located in the same region and share interests with the returnee terrorist fighters in the sub-counties of Mombasa.

Desistance: Explains how returnee terrorist fighters who had previously engaged in persistent patterns of criminal offending have avoided crime for a long time.

Disengagement: Refers to a behavioural change targeted at returnee terrorist fighters in order to stop them from committing violent crimes in Mombasa County. Disengagement can be seen as the process whereby an individual experiences a change in role or function that is usually associated with a reduction of participation in violent acts.

Do no harm: Refers to actions taken during information sharing and news reporting about returnee terrorist fighters to avoid exposing them to additional risks through our action. "Do no harm" means taking a step back from the process of non-custodial intervention to look at the broader context and mitigate potential negative effects on the social fabric of the host community.

Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Kenyan nationals residing in Mombasa County who left Kenya to join terrorist organizations like Al-Shabaab and then returned back.

Gender perspective: Refers to the recognition and consideration of the unique needs, experiences, and status of women and men in Mombasa County in light of their socio-cultural context.

Lifers: Refer to convicted terrorist who was sentenced to imprisonment for life, but later given remission to go back to the society after going through rehabilitation and reform programs.

Media: Refers to communication channels through which news messages concerning terrorism and non-custodial reintegration programmes are disseminated. These includes and not limited to radio broadcast, newspapers and Television.

Mui Huwa Mwema: A proverb in Kiswahili language that portends that even the worst criminal can reform and be the most valuable person.

***Mungiki*:** This is a religious sect that is outlawed in Kenya. In Kikuyu language, the name denotes "a multitude or a united people." The secrecy of the religious sect, which is thought to have started in the late 1980s, is in resemblance to mystery religions.

***Non-custodial reintegration*:** The phrase refers to R&R programs that are provided outside of a prison setting, such as in local communities as part of alternative measures given to support offenders during their reintegration back into society after their surrender and return from terrorist fighting or after they have been released from custody.

Propaganda: Information, especially that which is biased or deceptive, used to disseminate or advance a particular cause or point of view.

Pwani si Kenya: Refers to the slogan used by a separatist movement, Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), to raise claims that Mombasa should secede from Kenya and become an independent state - Mombasa Republic. The proposed state that encompasses the Coast Province of Kenya.

Radicalization: The gradual acceptance of a belief system that is at odds with conventional wisdom by Kenyan youth in Mombasa County, which may socialize them to violent extremism and recruitment into terrorist organizations or campaigns.

Recidivism: The tendency of a returnee terrorist fighters to reoffend or commit violent acts of terrorism.

Rehabilitation: A planned intervention, which purposes to change characteristics of the terrorist fighters (attitudes, cognitive skills and processes, personality or mental health, and social, educational or vocational skills) that are believed to be the cause of the individual's criminal behaviour, with the intention to reduce the chance that the individual will re□offend. They include strategies, measures and programmes applied during incarceration of the returnee terrorist fighters in preparation for release.

Reintegration: The process of safely reintegrating returnee offenders into society, in which the terrorist fighters live a law-abiding life after being released and develops attitudes and behaviours that typically result in productive functioning in society.

Returnees: In the study returnees only refers to former terrorist fighters who have returned one their own volition.

Terrorist: An act or threat of action that uses violence against a person or puts the life of someone other than the person committing the action in danger is referred to as a terrorist act.

Violent extremism: Advocating, using, or encouraging violent acts with an ideological motivation in order to further social, economic, or political objectives.

Welfare: Refers to actions intended to directly influence the wellbeing of returnee terrorist fighters, including their living arrangements. The success of treatment initiatives and programs depends on the returnee's wellbeing and that it is meant to curb a return to terrorist activities.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAPs   County Action Plans

CBT   Cognitive Behavioural Therapy

CVE   Countering Violent Extremism

DDR   Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration

ISIS   Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

MCAP-PCVE   Mombasa County's Action Plan for the Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism

NCTC   National Counter Terrorism Centre

NGOs   Non-Governmental Organisation

NPS   National Police Service

NSCVE   National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism

P/CVERLT   Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism

PVE   Prevention of Violent Extremism

R&R   Rehabilitation and Reintegration

UN SMRNM   United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures

OSCE   Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is one of the most significant challenges to world order in the modern era, along with other factors such as peace and prosperity (Rapoport, 2011). It is also regarded as the greatest litmus test for the methods used to resolve conflicts today. While there has been a worldwide growth in terrorism, its intensity, and proliferation in recent decades, the variety of effects brought on by terror groups is also globalized. These include migration across international borders, increased levels of fear, and mortality (UNGA, 2015), with the number of deaths caused by terrorism reaching its highest point in the year 2014 (IEP, 2019).

In this chapter, you will gain knowledge about the background of the study, the problem statement, the research objectives, the research questions, the reason for the investigation, and the scope of the study.

1.1 Background to the study

There is no shadow of a doubt that the concept of foreign fighters extends back much further than the fight against the current war on Al-Shabaab and even other conflicts that have occurred in the twenty-first century. Certain aspects will never stop luring recruitment of foreign fighters and nations worldwide have a long history of being willing to hire foreign mercenaries to fight their battles on their behalf. Horgan, a researcher, notes that this phenomenon has intensified since the conclusion of the Cold War in light of the end of the bipolar struggle and the growing pace of globalization in the previous couple of decades. He also notes that globalization of this trend has been accelerating recently (Horgan, 2008).

The major ideological war of the 20th Century, which was supported by two superpowers and their different allies, ended during the Cold War's closing stages. At the same time, the state-centered policies that prevented possible future terrorist fighters from fighting for a cause in their nations also ended. Thanks to developments in communications, transportation, and technology, small groups with little to no beginning influence may now reach a global audience, make purchasing and transporting weapons easier, and make fundraising appeals more easily than ever before. These conditions have paved the way for the emergence of foreign terrorist fighters, which can be recruited from any part of the world, travel quickly, and are armed with frightening impact readily, cheaply, and frequently with little training required.

Local fighters from Iraq and Syria are generally compelled to fight for pressing and immediate reasons. These reasons may include persecution, discrimination, torture, historical grievances, terror, or the simple necessity of fighting. Terrorist fighters are often not immediately affected by the struggle, and as a result, they can make judgments under less time and pressure. Because of this, the grand narrative is more significant and fascinating to terrorist fighters on an ideological level. Some terrorists engage in violent activities for the sole purpose of accumulating wealth. This group of ideologically motivated soldiers who opted for hardship and maybe death has gained the most attention from the media, even though their objectives are generally overlooked or glossed over. According to reports, foreign terrorist fighters from Western nations comprise many of the most brutal members of the terrorist fighter groups affiliated with Al Qaeda (Haynes, 2012). The role that these fighters have played in the wars in Iraq and Syria makes it imperative that they receive attention on a global scale.

Foreign terrorist fighters who have returned home pose a significant threat to national security because of their prior experience in war, proficiency in using various weapons, and links to international terrorist networks. Desensitization to violence and post-traumatic stress disorders frequently emerge after the battle. The possibility that the foreign fighters participated in atrocities like those that Al-Shabaab proudly publicizes all contributes to the potential threat returnees pose. In addition, it is crucial to underline that not all returnee foreign fighters are the same regarding their potential desire to commit terrorist acts of violence in their home nations after their return. This understanding is important since it is essential to stress that returnee foreign fighters are not all the same. There is no doubt that there is a substantial possibility that some former foreign fighters who have now returned to their home countries may not seek to carry out terrorist activities.

When discussing the topic of returnee foreign fighters, it is essential to consider the variety of persons who fall into this category, both in terms of the potential threat they could pose and the most effective strategies for lowering the possibility that they will participate in further acts of terrorism in the future. It is a contentious topic of whether or not returnee terrorist offenders and violent extremists should be reintegrated back into society. This is especially true if the individuals in question have joined terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab. Public pressure may favour having them serve their sentences in prison. Still, the legal processes in international judicial systems have proven how difficult it can be to get convictions for crimes purportedly committed abroad, especially in a country torn apart by civil war (Schuurman & Heide, 2016). According to experience, most people found guilty of crimes related to terrorism eventually find themselves free. Promoting how

to improve the non-custodial reintegration of returned terrorist fighters to reduce the likelihood of returnee foreign fighters becoming involved in further violence is not just choosing a "soft" approach but also an attempt to respond pragmatically to a complex conflict prevention dilemma.

Inaccurate and debatable from a legal and academic standpoint, the term "foreign terrorist fighters" remains problematic in how it is used. Historically, it has been used to refer to citizens of a nation who travel to a foreign country to take part in a conflict there. Nevertheless, the definitions provided by modern scholars of international law are more complicated because they consider the group identity factor. International law refers to individuals who leave their country of origin or their country of habitual residence to join a side of warring parties in an armed conflict and are primarily motivated by ideology, religion, and/or kinship (De-Guttry, Capone, & Paulssen, 2016). This is an important distinction between mercenaries, whose primary aims are financial, and foreign fighters. However, this distinction is only helpful if it is thought that a foreign fighter is a genuine combatant, subject to the rules and customs of war established by other nations and entitled to the safeguards and rights stated in the Geneva Conventions. If it is assumed that a foreign fighter is not a legitimate combatant, then it is not meaningful to make this distinction.

Given that foreign fighters join terrorist organizations like Al-Shabaab and ISIS to such a big extent today, international humanitarian law offers a limited framework for determining what foreign fighters are (Kraehenmann, 2014). This contrast is highlighted specifically by other recent definitions of terrorist fighters, which likewise focus heavily on engagement in an insurgency or nonstate armed conflict (Malet D., 2013). The

international community came up with the term "foreign terrorist fighter" to address the limitations of the legal tools now available to deal with nonstate actors and terrorist organizations.

People who travel to or attempt to travel to a state other than their states of residence or nationality for the purpose of conducting, planning, preparing for, or participating in terrorist acts or providing or receiving terrorist training are foreign terrorist fighters according to the United Nations (UNSCR 2178, September 24, 2014). This conduct affords some legal distinction but also shows the combination of criminal justice and international conflict models, techniques, and vocabulary. This blending of criminal justice and international conflict paradigms, tactics, and language has come to characterize the international community's reaction to this severe transnational security concern. Because of this, foreign fighters are considered combatants while on the battlefield, but they are considered criminals once they come home. This makes it significantly more challenging for governments and civil society to attempt to rehabilitate and reintegrate the individuals.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2178 mandates that governments must incorporate new criminal laws into their existing criminal justice systems to fulfill their obligation under the resolution to prevent their nationals from leaving the country to engage in illegal activity. As a direct consequence of this criminality, it is now against the law in many countries, including Kenya, for individuals to take part in non-government led military operations during armed conflicts in other countries. Because of this, becoming a member of a militia organization is against the law in Kenya, regardless of whether or not the organization is engaging in terrorist activities.

This means it is illegal for Kenyan nationals to take part in armed conflict overseas on behalf of a non-governmental force, regardless of the militant outfit they may be fighting for. Terrorist fighters who have been recruited typically travel to hotspots of conflict to carry out their acts of terrorism. The persuasive use of propaganda by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) resulted in an unprecedented influx of international volunteers to live under the supervision of the terrorist organization. These individuals chose to live under the authority of the terrorist group. These recruits included men, single women, and women with their families. Since the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has lost control of the bulk of the land it formerly held in Iraq and Syria, many terrorist combatants have tried to return to their home countries, and some have even succeeded.

The United Nations Security Council enacted resolution 2178 in September 2014 due to growing concerns regarding the increasing trend of individuals traveling abroad to join terrorist organizations such as ISIL, al-Nusra Front, and organizations associated with Al-Qaida. The resolution responded to the growing pattern of people traveling abroad to join terrorist organizations. This resolution explicitly urged member states to improve their responses to terrorist fighters through the criminal justice system by establishing legislation to track down terrorist fighters, stop them, and make it illegal for terrorist fighters to travel and engage in activities related to terrorism (UNSC, 2014).

In December 2017, the Security Council of the United Nations overwhelmingly approved Resolution 2396 of the UNSC. The resolution addresses the concerns raised by the possibility of terrorist combatants fleeing or entering zones of active conflict. In addition, it urges member states to accelerate their efforts to stop the threat posed by returning and relocating terrorist fighters and their family members, especially women, and children, by

implementing steps to manage the borders, improve criminal justice, and share intelligence (UN Security Council, 2017). The phenomenon of recruitment to terrorist radicalization in Kenya has been being driven by several causes, some of which include the allure of gaining rapid wealth, high unemployment rates among youth in the Country, religious inspiration, and drug and substance abuse which is rampant in Mombasa County. Recruitment to terrorism in Kenya also take the form of other more stereotyped notions, such as those motivated by a person's socio-economic background, color, or religion.

The following are some of the reasons why foreign fighters and mercenaries are joining the conflict in Somalia, which the authorities in Kenya have offered by providing instances from other parts of Africa: intellectual, religious, racial, and racial insecurity, as well as insecurity, the endeavor to evade prosecution, and the pursuit of economic rent (ACCORD, 2012). Although the practice of a person's religion may be driven by sincerity for many people, for others, it is merely a technique of rallying support for a specific cause. In fact, when compared to prior generations of violent nonstate organizations like Al-Shabaab, the number of foreign fighters recruited by IS was significantly more than any other group. The overwhelming majority of foreign fighters point to their religious beliefs as the primary inspiration behind their decision to participate in armed conflict. Because of their religious background, most terrorist combatants are the inheritors of an old legacy of jihadism in the teaching of Islam. This causes them to become deluded escapist dreamers and fantasists. From this group of people who are losing all hope, some terrorist combatants have returned home; either they deserted Al-Shabaab of their own free decision, or security authorities captured them. Either way, the group is getting more and more despairing.

Organizations such as Al-Shabaab cherry-pick and condense some portions of the Quran to develop and promote an extremist and distorted view of Islam (Omar, 2016). It should come as no surprise that Ayat 194 and 217 from Sura 2, which explain a legal framework in which engaging in jihad war and killing may be justified. In defense against the present crusaders of "the West," are the most often utilized Koranic verses in Daqib (Omar, 2016). Furthermore, Daqib insists on several occasions that engaging in violent conflict with non-Muslims is not only permissible but also mandated by Islam and that all Muslims should do so. According to the findings of the analysis, the verses from primary Islamic texts left out by hardline Islamist recruiters to fight abroad discussed making peace or Allah's mercy. They limited themselves to only selecting the most controversial passages from the most radical verses. When propaganda such as Daqib is examined on its own, however, it becomes clear that the Islamic State's violent deeds are not only permissible but also ethically justified.

Emily Winterbotham and Elizabeth Pearson investigated the dynamics of gender in radicalization in a paper they wrote for the RUSI. In the paper, the authors looked into why women joined IS and the dynamics of gender in radicalization. They imply that although marriage or the prospect of marriage to IS fighters was a draw for many of these women, a variety of other factors also needed to be taken into account. These factors included a desire for adventure or thrills, a sense of loneliness in their communities, and a rejection of Western feminism and their way of life, which might conflict with some traditional Islamic values. IS assured these women that they would have the freedom to live however they wished and dress however they pleased and would have a fair chance of experiencing true status and empowerment (Winterbotham & Pearson, 2020). While

men were envisioned as idealized fighters, the role of women was to be that of stay-at-home mothers who contributed to the construction of a new Islamic utopia. Young women who are unhappy remaining at home all day may be enticed by the promise of being given a house, receiving financial support, and marrying a man with a prominent social position.

The world is currently experiencing several crises, including wars and conflicts, which can be linked to the expansion of terrorist activity. During these times of conflicts, two distinct migration routes come into existence: the first is paved by civilians and other non-combatants fleeing the conflict-affected area in quest for safety in relatively safer nations, and the second is paved by individuals who are recruited and enticed to fight in other territories as terrorist fighters.

It is not a new phenomenon for locals to travel to another country to participate in a war or fight in one. Terrorist warriors have participated in various wars throughout history, including the Spanish Civil War, the American Revolution, and the Greek War of Independence, to name just a few. At least four successive waves of foreign fighters have been drawn to fight to preserve Islam in the battles that have unfolded in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Iraq, Syria, and Iraq. These conflicts have all taken place in the Middle East. Those who supported liberation wars in the 1960s and 1970s shared many similarities with those who were mobilized to defend foreign democracies in the 1850s or to combat communism in the 1930s (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017).

The rise in the number of Muslim faithfuls serving in militaries overseas is a phenomenon that emerged relatively recently. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in the 1980s, several Islamic leaders underwent a theological shift that legitimized, encouraged, and sometimes mandated armed jihad. This shift brought about the first appearance of the

phenomenon. In addition to this, it propagated a narrative that depicted these conflicts as an existential danger to Islam (Thomas, 2010). The influx of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria is unprecedented because of the sheer number of them and the diverse range of their histories and places of origin. According to estimates, more than 40,000 fighters from more than 120 countries have entered Syria and Iraq since 2011 (Shtuni, 2017). According to the information presented by IEP (2016), just under seven thousand fighters originated from Western countries, even though about five thousand were citizens of European Union countries. The patterns observed in previous armed conflicts involving Muslim foreign combatants have been significantly disrupted by these data, which marks a dramatic shift. However, the Maghreb and the Middle East are the two regions from where the vast majority of foreign fighters and members of their families who have joined them in the battle zone originate. Particularly impacted are countries such as Tunisia, where around 6,500 nationals have travelled to the conflict zone, and another 15,000 citizens have been prohibited from leaving due to suspicions about their objectives (Trofimov, 2016).

Many countries, notably those in North Africa and the Balkans, continue to struggle with the issue of how to best manage the reintegration of their nationals who have served as combatants in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. As of the beginning of December 2016, at least 800 of the more than 6,000 Tunisians considered foreign fighters had fled the country. The same was true for more than 117 citizens who were originally from Kosova, 100 who were originally from Bosnia, and 86 more who were originally from Macedonia (The Soufan Group, 2015). According to government data (Malet, D, 2009), 800 residents of these three Balkan nations have travelled to Iraq and Syria since 2012. These trips were taken between the year 2012 and 2018. In some instances, these terrorist fighters who have

returned home may have deserted the movement they had joined and had been disillusioned and disappointed upon their arrival to the conflict area. Others have returned, but they maintain their commitment to violent behaviour and espouse extremist ideologies despite having returned.

The most recent trend on the consistently increasing number of men and women being arrested for terrorism related offences within the East African region continues to be a subject of concern for the governments of the region and the community at large, more generally. This information comes from a report compiled for the Prisons Policy Initiative 2019 (Wagner, 2019). Even though there are still relatively very few terrorist offenders in Africa, this tendency is of growing worry for both the governments of Africa and the local population as a whole. The condition stated in (Msath, 2013) may be blamed on the moral ideals held by Africans, particularly among the younger generation. Poverty, a lack of education, a poor family background, drug and substance abuse (Miriti & Kimani, 2017), media, culture, and technology (Kumar, 2010) continue to be drivers of terrorism. In addition, factors such as genetic predisposition to a difficult temperament, poor parenting, and residing in a violent neighbourhood are blamed for the moral decay and ideals promoting radicalization (Santrock, 2005). Consequently, it is of the utmost importance that society addresses the worry about moral degradation and that the criminal justice system explores efficient solutions to address difficulties related to an individual's criminal behaviour during the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters.

There has been an increase in the number of young people joining terrorist organizations, while at the same time, there have been reports of former terrorist combatants leaving the continent (Koehler D., 2016). As they make their way back to their home countries, disengaged terrorist

combatants are adding a third pathway to the migration flow (Marsden, Knott, & Lewis, 2017). The surrender of these terrorist combatants presents a substantial prospect in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), which is critically needed in addition to the other potential security dangers that must be resolved (RAN, 2017).

To be successful and long-lasting, non-custodial rehabilitation and reintegration programs include participation from a wide range of organizations and institutions in addition to professionals, specialists, and other types of consultants. This multifaceted group include a few specialists in sectors associated with VERLT and program supervisors and administrators who can cultivate an atmosphere in the workplace suitable for age and gender sensitive rehabilitation and reintegration endeavours. Instead of constructing new organizations that operate in parallel, governments prioritize using pre-existing institutional and other capacities whenever feasible, even if those capacities were not expressly developed to deal with P/CVERLT issues.

However, to develop and practice non-custodial reintegration programs, certain nations invest in specialist tools and training as well as a more general strengthening of essential institutional skills. Instruction on how to collaborate across agencies or with other multi-actor groups on particular cases, how to start and carry out difficult conversations that might help people leave VERLT, and how to evaluate the risk or needs of people who may have come into contact with terrorism or VERLT are all included in the first category. The latter includes the capacity of the police, prisons, probation services, mental health, social welfare, education, and any other relevant government agencies involved in this line of work or work related to it. Additionally, the latter includes the capacities of other applicable non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are community-based. These competencies are especially important given the difficulties

associated with providing specialized, targeted rehabilitations and other services connected to a holistic approach to R&R that does not involve confinement. CSOs and the civil society more generally should receive special attention to ensure they have the necessary legal and policy space, capacity, and resources to contribute. CSOs have multiple comparative advantages when working in communities on sensitive topics. This goes beyond merely ensuring that the requisite governmental capacities are in place at national and subnational levels.

People who live in the community that receive the returned terrorist fighters might be more willing to work with former offenders and assist with their reintegration into society if they can communicate with a dependable government partner who they know is ultimately responsible for the returnees (including carrying the risk) and who can offer guidance and support if it is required. Access to crucial components of a comprehensive reintegration strategy, such as social support, education, and work, can sometimes be restricted. To make a good contribution to the reintegration and disengagement processes of returned terrorist fighters, members of the community, particularly family members, may, on occasion, require psychosocial or other forms of help. Increasing knowledge, reducing stigmas and potential backlash, and addressing prejudices are all things that should be done to assist communities in getting ready to accept these people. To accomplish these objectives, government representatives - especially those operating at the local community level - need to tell the communities relevant to them about the guidelines of the R&R program, highlight the various participants, and emphasize that maintaining public safety is the utmost concern.

The Kenyan government acknowledges the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (UN SMRNM), often known as the Tokyo Rules of 1990 (UNSC, 2014). These principles argue for the effectiveness of non-custodial sentencing as an alternative to

incarceration by emphasizing the importance of treating all detainees with dignity and respect as human beings (Mykkänen, 2020). This technique is based on the widely held belief that petty and juvenile offenders should be assigned to community rehabilitation and reintegration programs that provide more efficient recovery through the utilization of community assistance services.

The rule of law and crime reduction are flagship projects that strengthen overall state-building, societal stability, and social order in Kenya's Vision 2030 roadmap (Dandurand, 2012). These goals can be met through comprehensive resettlement and offender reintegration programs highlighting community reintegration features and striving to prevent recidivism while fulfilling the terrorist offenders' welfare and socio-economic requirements. Kenya's Correction Service, formerly known as Kenya Prison, performs community counselling, reintegration and relocation of prisoners serving mandatory jail terms, and crime prevention promotion. The necessity for the successful reintegration of returned terrorist combatants in Kenya originates from global concerns about this community's growing population, which has been connected to higher levels of new criminality and high recidivism rates (ICJPR, 2018).

The method of non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Kenya is unique. It began in 2015 when the president launched an amnesty scheme for anyone who had travelled to join Al-Shabaab. President Uhuru Kenyatta established the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) in 2016, in addition to the more traditional counter-terrorism initiatives currently in place. Prevention and counter-radicalization were part of this effort. This approach assigns tasks to various county governments, civil society organizations, and communities. Before the NSCVE strategy, the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2012, the Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014, and the Proceeds of Crime and

Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act of 2017 laid the groundwork for measures to combat violent extremism (Ogada, 2017; Mogire & Mkutu, 2011). These laws prevent violent extremism through law enforcement, intelligence collection, and legal action. The NSCVE Strategy was introduced to supplement them and investigate gentler approaches to reducing community susceptibility to violent extremism.

The Kenyan government recognizes, as do governments worldwide that the threat of terrorism cannot be removed alone via force. New answers to the issues provided by returnee terrorist combatants are continually concentrated on community involvement to enhance interactions with the public and obtain information about terrorism, detect violent extremists, and prevent radicalization (Cherney, A; Hartley, J, 2017). The Kenyan government views non-custodial reintegration with the firm notion that terrorism threatens the country's security, and that terrorism must be dealt with through extreme methods. Surprisingly, this is a fight between allies and adversaries, with allies on one side and adversaries on the other.

In his speech to announce the 2016 NSCVE, President Uhuru Kenyatta forcefully pushed for an integrated and multi-dimensional response to counterterrorism, utilizing the "us" against "them" concept. He said;

> The majority of civil society, international partners, and international security agencies are opposed to them. Military units and police agencies are battling them across every region. As Kenyans, we must fight them to ensure our country remains safe from terror attacks.

- President Uhuru's speech on February 25, 2015.

The Kenyan government obliged Counties to develop County Action Plans (CAPs) to help local CVE initiatives (Shauri, 2017). The Mombasa County Action Plan is built on the NSCVE's nine pillars of training and capacity building, education, psychosocial support,

security, media and online, arts and culture, faith-based and ideological, legal, policy, and political, with two additional pillars on women and the economy (Mombasa County, 2017). By promoting disengagement, both methods recognize the essential role that an effective reintegration program can play in the battle against violent extremism. According to Bell (2015), disengagement is an approach that focuses entirely on behavioural changes, such as stopping to engage in violent activity and financially supporting terrorists. Disengaged people prefer nonviolent means of expressing themselves rather than undergoing a psychological transition and abandoning radical ideals (Reinares, 2011). Conversely, deradicalization is a shift away from or decline in support for extreme ideologies or opinions (Horgan, 2009)

Non-custodial rehabilitation and reintegration programs for ex-offenders are included in the Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MCAP-PCVE) (2017-2022), which was released in February 2017 and is linked to the NSCVE (MCG, 2017). Plans and strategies for official and informal techniques are used to improve non-custodial reintegration programs. According to the Mombasa County Action Plan's psychological pillar, few organized, communal psychosocial support programs for dealing with returnees are available. The Mombasa County Action Plan prioritizes stigma reduction for terrorist offenders and victims. The County's plan is structured into intervention stages, including those dealing with returnees throughout the disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration stages. The emphasis is on interventions that urge members to reevaluate their views and stop supporting violence, counselling and treatment to people who have left cults, and building communal normalcy and adherence to societal norms. Radicalization is widely recognized as a major security risk in Mombasa

County. Many locals, some Al-Shabaab defectors, know which Al-Shabaab foreign fighters are returning and remaining in the neighborhood.

While actively involved, returning terrorist offenders face numerous hurdles in remaining committed to rehabilitation and reintegration. Stigmatization, difficulty getting legal assistance, extrajudicial killing by security forces, harassment by other community members, revenge from erstwhile allies, and getting in contact with receiving communities where not everyone is sympathetic are among the problems. As a result, Mombasa County Action Plan provides an opportunity to analyze the returnee terrorist combatants' experience and commitment, as well as the problems they confront and how they overcome them. As a result, this study contributes to a growing yet unresolved debate in Kenya over effective reintegration strategies for returnee foreign terrorist fighters.

Like many other nations, Kenya is currently dealing with the difficulty of managing the return of its nationals who fought with Al-Shabaab or joined other terrorist groups to function in various roles. According to Cragin (2019), over 100 Kenyan fighters have travelled to fight in Iraq and Syria, demonstrating that Kenya is an important source of foreign fighters for Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State (Cragin, 2019). Many more people have returned to the country after fleeing Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

Terrorist fighters making a comeback is thus not a new phenomenon in the world (Marsden S. V., 2017). Terrorism has gained momentum in academic discourses worldwide due to progress in identifying, preventing, and prosecuting it and the limited effectiveness of offensive military operations that have resulted in combat losses or defeats of specific terrorist groups (RAN, 2017).

In one of its 2016 studies, the International Centre for Counter-terrorism believes that there

are between 4,294 foreign fighters from the European Union, the bulk of them from Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Koehler D., 2016). Several nations, particularly those in the Balkans and North Africa, are being burdened with the responsibility of reintegrating nationals who participated in the Iraq and Syria conflicts. In addition to over a hundred Bosnians, 117 Kosovars, and 86 Macedonians, at least 800 of the more than 6,000 Tunisian nationals classified as foreign fighters have fled the country as of early December 2016 (Trofimov Y., 2016). This unprecedented surge has been aided by contemporary communications, travel convenience, aggressive recruiting activities, and Western responses and interventions that have increased public awareness of a global, religiously motivated terrorist danger.

All acts of terrorism, as well as any connection with them, are banned in Kenya, according to the government. To encourage disengagement, the government gave amnesty to Kenyans who left the nation to fight as terrorist combatants in 2014 (Ombati, 2015; NCTC, 2016). After the amnesty was issued, the National Security Council (NSC) held a meeting to investigate the repercussions of the amnesty, which scholarly opinion generally observes to further only considered disengagement (Altier, 2014). According to the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE), hundreds of Kenyans have defected from Al-Shabaab since the amnesty was announced, with a major part of them returning to Mombasa and the surrounding Kwale County (NCTC, 2016).

Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MCAP-PCVE) (2017-2022), in line with the NSCVE, incorporates components of local recovery and non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters. Formal and informal techniques for better reintegration are developed and implemented (RoK, 2017).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The growing acceptance of non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters has heightened the demand for new strategic counterterrorism capabilities. The success of this strategy in the global war against terrorism will be determined by how host communities react to this transition and the shift from a whole-of-government, harsh approach to a whole-of-community, soft approach.

With the prospect that these trained radicalized individuals will carry out attacks or cause other sorts of harm once they return home, the return of foreign terrorist fighters to their home countries has become a major concern worldwide (Styszynski, 2015). These returned terrorist combatants threaten peace and security of the community and the home Country. In the face of this expanding threat, managing returnees demand extensive criminal justice measures, especially where a true security concern exists. However, not all countries have these resources and capabilities.

The rise of terrorism in the region has necessitated a strategic approach to the rehabilitation and reintegration of these individuals back into society, aiming to prevent recidivism and promote community stability. This research study aims to assess the effectiveness of existing non-custodial reintegration programs in Mombasa County with a focus on their impact on the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters.

Despite the implementation of various reintegration initiatives, there remains a lack of comprehensive understanding of their actual influence on the well-being and reintegration outcomes of these individuals. Moreover, the complex nature of terrorist activities and the specific challenges faced by returnees emphasize the urgency to examine the current support systems and identify any gaps or shortcomings in their implementation.

This research will delve into the various non-custodial reintegration programs currently operating in Mombasa County, investigating their structure, content, and delivery mechanisms. Additionally, the study will explore the psychological, social, and economic challenges faced by the returnees, along with the effectiveness of these programs in addressing these challenges. By assessing the overall impact on the welfare of the returnee terrorist fighters, the study aims to provide valuable insights for policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and community stakeholders, facilitating the development of more targeted and comprehensive intervention strategies to foster successful reintegration and long-term societal stability.

According to Shajkovci (2019), Kenyan youths account for 25% of the estimated 7,000 Al-Shabaab members, with actual and perceived socioeconomic and fundamentalist push factors driving them to join the armed group (RoK, 2017). The third migratory flow caused by returning foreign terrorists has resurfaced with renewed vigor since the deployment of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2011 to challenge the Islamic Court authority (Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O., and Woodhouse, T., 2016). The goals of the returnee terrorist combatants span from vengeance to continuous recruitment, concealment, and reintegration (RoK, 2017). It is still controversial whether former violent extremists, who may still have affinities for the organizations and people that support terrorism, should be reintegrated into mainstream society.

Although numerous potential interventions exist to address the threat posed by the return of former terrorist fighters, the aid provided should be proportional to the individual's risks, needs, and vulnerabilities. Over intervention in non-custodial reintegration of returnee

terrorist fighters may risk stigmatizing the returnees, closing the cognitive space required for rehabilitation, and unnecessarily inciting alarm in the relevant host community - whose cooperation and support is critical for successful re-entry of the ex-offenders back into the community.

In contrast to the concept of reintegration that takes place outside of a correctional setting, some countries have tried to institute rehabilitation programs within the jail system with different degrees of success. However, the prison environment in many countries reinforces a combatant's identity and dedication to the cause (Schulze, 2008). Because human rights violations within the judicial and penal systems currently do little to ensure that returnees abandon their commitment to violent activity and identities as combatants, this study evaluated the efficacy of non-custodial reintegration programs on the welfare of the returnee terrorist fighters. This was done as an alternative strategy. In addition, many jails and prisons are homes to hardened extremists who promote a group identity for the inmates rather than their rehabilitation or, at the absolute least, their continued criminality (UN, 2018).

As Horgan and Braddock (2010) point out, many concerns still need to be answered when examining the effectiveness of non-custodial reintegration for returning terrorist fighters. For instance, are those individuals who have returned from fighting for terrorist organizations in a suitable condition to be readmitted into society? How likely is it that they will get back together with everyone else? And the question of whether or not the communities hosting them will accept them is still being discussed. After they have been reintroduced back into the community, what kind of supervision do you have planned for them? They committed one crime, but will they commit another? Is it possible for these

individuals to be dissuaded from engaging in terrorist activity while they are incarcerated? Will the general population ever accept any rate of criminal reoffending as acceptable? (Horgan & Braddock, 2010).

There is a serious lack of support for efficient non-custodial rehabilitation programs in Kenya, which can assist returnees in ending their affiliation with violent extremist groups after being imprisoned or after receiving the government amnesty and ensuring their successful reintegration into society. Problematizing this argument is that even if there are various reintegration programs already in existence, there is still an increase in the number of incidents of returnee terrorist combatants going back to fight in foreign nations. Therefore, the question that arises as a result of this is whether or not these reintegration programs are effective. Because of this, there is a requirement for further research.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The overarching purpose of the study was to evaluate the efficacy of the non-custodial services offered by Mombasa County in terms of enhancing the quality of life for reintegrated terrorist combatants who had just returned from participating in combat operations in other countries.

The study's specific objectives were to:

   i.   Explore the nature of reintegration programs on the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya.

  ii.   Evaluate the effectiveness of the non-custodial reintegration programs on the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya.

 iii.   Assess the challenges non-custodial reintegration programs face on the welfare of returning terrorist fighters in Mombasa, Kenya.

1.4 Research Questions

The researcher sought to answer the following research questions to fulfil the study's objectives.

i.   What is the nature of existing non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa, Kenya?

ii.   How effective are the non-custodial reintegration programs on the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya?

iii. What are the challenges facing non-custodial reintegration programs on the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya?

1.5 Justification of the Study

Research on international terrorist fighters is hampered by the absence of distinguishing characteristics between those nationals who travel to support conflicts in capacities other than as formed combatants and those who arguably do not support them. This includes the wives, children, and other family members who may have been forced to travel. Jihadi brides and those who answered the call to contribute to the formation of the caliphate without resorting to violence are only two instances of individuals who have moved to war areas to support ISIS but do not engage in violent activity (Hoyle et al., 2015) Jihadi brides are also an example of those who have immigrated to conflict areas to assist ISIS but do not engage in violent activity.

There are already quite a few functioning reintegration programs for former terrorist offenders in Kenya, and Mombasa County is currently the site of the implementation of some brand-new programs. The vast majority of these community-based alternatives to incarceration involve participation in a wide range of activities, some of which are

education, counselling for mental health concerns, training for job-related skills, and recreational pursuits. Even though Kenya's government has attempted, with varying degrees of success, to implement custodial rehabilitation and reintegration programs within the prison system, the nation's criminal justice system is working to address the challenges that arise from this approach in order to enhance the local community's resilience to accept the ex-offenders after they have been released from prison confinement. This is done to enhance the local community's resilience to accept ex-offenders. A commitment to supporting efficient non-custodial reintegration programs that address the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters is of the utmost importance if one wishes to assist former combatants in severing their ties to violent extremist groups following their release from detention and ensure that they can successfully reintegrate back into society. This will ensure that former combatants can successfully reintegrate back into society.

1.5.1 Academic Justification

There is a lack of research and scholarly materials about the effectiveness of a non-custodial rehabilitation and reintegration program for returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County and Kenya, which is why this study is of academic value. Much research has been done on the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters. The majority of this research has been focused on the United States of America, Arab and Asian countries, and Europe; however, there has been very little attention paid to Africa.

In addition, in light of the previous research, most of the studies have focused on the rehabilitation and reintegration programs carried out within the boundaries of correctional facilities as a consequence of serving sentences of incarceration. Because of this, there is a gap in the academic knowledge of how rehabilitation and reintegration programs can be

effective in community settings that do not involve incarceration to reduce the likelihood of future criminal behaviour. As a result, this research's purpose was to contribute to the existing body of knowledge and shed light on the academic community by providing fresh information.

Various nations have made efforts to develop reintegration programs that are responsive to the vast numbers of terrorist fighters who travel back home after taking part in violent conflicts in other countries. These programs aim to lower the risk of further radicalization and prevent recidivism among returnee terrorist fighters. In addition, these efforts have been made to prevent recidivism. According to Holmer and Shtuni (2017), using non-custodial reintegration efforts can increase the community's general resilience to accept individuals who have returned from involvement in violent extremism. Sometimes, the terrorist fighters who have returned home are defectors from the violent movement they joined (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). These terrorist fighters typically come home after being either disillusioned or disappointed with the movement they joined. Notably, some of the people who fought for terrorist organizations have returned, but they have not abandoned their radical beliefs or their violent behaviour.

The authorities of the host governments must simultaneously identify, prioritize, and manage the potential threat posed by returning terrorist fighters to their home communities. While the host communities must make room for the successful rehabilitation of the returnees and their successful reintegration back into society, the host communities must also make room for the returnees. In the context of deradicalization and the rehabilitation of convicted criminals, cognitive disassociation from the identity and ideology of a violent group is a topic that is regularly brought up for discussion. For this reason, major parts of

non-custodial reintegration projects are thought to include re-establishing severed social, familial, and community links and offering returnees the opportunity to participate actively in society. Successful non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist combatants attempt to reduce radicalization among young people to avoid recidivism among returnees and to build community-level resistance to violent extremism, thereby boosting the general welfare of the returnees. These programs also aim to minimize radicalization among young people to prevent recidivism among returnees.

Reintegration is defined as the process by which former combatants become citizens and find steady jobs and income, as the United Nations (2014) described. On the other side, non-custodial reintegration is an open-ended social and economic mechanism that primarily takes place in neighborhoods at the local community level. This type of reintegration is in contrast to custodial reintegration. Returnees from the fight against terrorism have been a big concern worldwide, particularly given that these competent individuals may still carry out attacks or other serious crimes when they return to their home country (Styszynski, 2015). Returnees from the war on terrorism have become a major source of concern around the world. As a result of this danger, numerous questions have not been answered. As Horgan and Braddock (2010) point out, the various challenges that the returnees face, such as their position in society, their opportunities to participate in non-custodial reintegration programs, and the possibility that they will be accepted by the communities in which they are placed, he poses the following questions: "Where would they go? Who would be in charge of maintaining order and keeping them in check? Will they engage in further criminal activity? Is it feasible to get them to focus on something other than terrorism? (Horgan & Braddock, 2010).

In recent years, several countries, both inside and outside of Europe, have implemented a variety of programs with the intention of reintegrating (previously) political radicals or terrorists, returnee terrorist combatants, visitors to Syria, and members of gangs. These programs are designed to assist in the rehabilitation of these individuals. Even though research has already been conducted in this field, many aspects of these processes and initiatives must be adequately clarified. One reason is the lack of monitoring and evaluations to gain in-depth knowledge of what "actually occurs" in the various non-custodial reintegration programs. This suggests that there is also a paucity of knowledge based on empirical evidence concerning the many strategies that work or fail and the underlying causes of those outcomes.

Therefore, this topic provides more unanswered questions than insights and understanding of the circumstances and processes involved in non-custodial reintegration programs. Considering this fact, there is a paucity of knowledge supported by empirical evidence regarding the significance of non-custodial reintegration programs that focus on the well-being of returned travelers who have participated in terrorist wars or political radicals. This is further backed by the paucity of statistics on recurrences that can corroborate or disprove whether these groups are tougher to integrate back into society than typical criminals (Schuurman & Heide, 2016).

In recent years, particularly in Europe, there has been an increasing number of rehabilitation and reintegration programs designed for both in-prison and post-detention settings. This has been done to deal with the migration of fighters from Syria and Iraq. The programs have been made for both in-prison and post-detention settings. However, scant evidence suggests that the programs have any effect. The length of time required to assess

the results of a reintegration program and the challenges in gathering data over a long period are two of the most significant barriers to evaluating the degree to which such programs are successful. In addition, some challenges arise when attempting to define recidivism in the context of deradicalization programs. This is because merely refraining from violence does not indicate that an individual has given up their ideology (Taylor, 2012). Reintegration, on the other hand, is a vital component of any comprehensive plan to counter violent extremism (CVE), and it is essential to developing a more resilient community.

According to (Cragin, 2019), Kenya is a significant supplier of foreign fighters. In addition to the many Kenyans who have joined the Al-Shabaab militia group in Somalia and other Islamic States, approximately one hundred Kenyans have fought in Iraq and Syria, making Kenya a substantial source of foreign fighters. Many people who joined Al-Shabaab in Somalia later deserted the cause and returned to their home country of Kenya. The practice of reintegrating returnee terrorist fighters in Kenya is, however, still relatively poorly documented (Koehler D., 2016). This is because there is a dearth of empirical evidence on the success of the reintegration process from the perspective of the returnee terrorist fighters. This information gap exists due to academics' focus on developing theories and preventative methods for radicalization (Horgan, 2009). The case favoring the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters demands more empirical evidence. This proof can only be supplied by a study that captures the perspective of the well-being of returnee terrorist fighters and their continued commitment to reintegrating into society. This is quite the contrast compared to the radicalization theory (Marsden et al., 2017).

According to Koehler D. (2016), non-custodial reintegration programs should be examined critically, independently, and in real-time when ranking them for review. They can be evaluated according to the objectives they have set for themselves, the underlying assumptions they have made about achieving those objectives, the organizational execution plan they have developed, and the degree to which they have been successful. Consequently, the probability of recidivism among former terrorists who have returned to society will be decreased due to the development and execution of more efficient reintegration programs. This study contributes to the dearth of evidence-based literature on descriptions of experiences in the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters. It does so by assisting in creating future strategies in Mombasa and elsewhere and strengthening the political will to carry out its non-custodial reintegration initiatives (Mombasa County, 2017). In addition, the study's findings add to the preferred empirical method, which helps improve the theoretical accuracy and the Life Psychology framework of the non-custodial reintegration initiative, positing it as the best alternative to prison confinement for returnee terrorist offenders (Phan, 2017). This is important for addressing the welfare concerns of returnee terrorist fighters who have fought for terrorist organizations.

To bolster community resiliency in the struggle against terrorism, Holmer and Shtuni (2017) initially proposed researching non-custodial reintegration in their study titled "Returning Foreign Fighters and the Reintegration Imperative." This was done in the context of their study on "Returning Foreign Fighters and the Reintegration Imperative." This study helps policymakers and practitioners overcome the obstacles brought about by the threat posed by former foreign terrorist fighters who have returned from Somalia

(Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). It does so by supporting the establishment of successful non-custodial programs to reintegrate former foreign terrorist fighters who have returned from Somalia. Returnees need assistance shifting from religious militantism to a nonviolent and tolerant way of life for communities to become more resilient and secure in the long run (OSCE, 2020). Holistic and thorough non-custodial reintegration programs are vital for this transition since they provide this assistance.

This study fills a research gap by providing empirical data that is informed by the returnee terrorist fighters' experiences with and difficulties in the non-custodial reintegration process in Mombasa County, which is home to many Kenyans who joined Al-Shabaab and were granted amnesty upon returning to their home country. Specifically, this study focuses on the returnee terrorist fighters' experiences and difficulties in the process in Mombasa County.

1.5.2 Policy Justification

This study is also significant because it enables policymakers to develop strategies for ensuring clear regulatory guidelines on how security agencies, correctional services, and other national and international reintegration stakeholders can work together to combat recruitment to terrorist groups and promote national security. Terrorism and other forms of violent extremism challenge regional efforts to maintain peace and security.

Politicians, physicians, national governments, and international organizations are all giving the concept of rehabilitation and reintegration more consideration for various reasons. This is prompted by several factors, such as the rise in terrorism convictions, which has resulted in a rise in the number of people linked to violent extremism and radicalization who are serving prison sentences for acts related to terrorism, the majority of whom will eventually

be released back into the community while still at a young and productive age; the growing awareness of the vital role that different actors can play in reducing terrorism-related recidivism through the implementation of various programs (RAN, 2016).

According to the empirical data, the efficacy of rehabilitation and reintegration programs for offenders has been the subject of substantial debate over worldwide public policy during the past 20 years (Cullen & Gendreau, 2000). Some academic researchers believe that non-custodial reintegration and meaningful rehabilitation programs that cater to offenders' needs and fundamental welfare are required for successful reintegration into society (Morita, 2013). These researchers believe this to be the case because of the importance of attending to offenders' needs. Rather than only instructing the returnee terrorist combatants engaged in the reintegration programs on reducing their chance of re-offending and getting jailed, such non-custodial reintegration programs should give them the tools they require to live a better life (Ward & Stewart, 2003).

The fact that terrorist warriors and their families are returning home raises concerns among several governments across the globe. Ensuring these individuals, who may or may not be deserving of criminal prosecution and prison time, are allowed to reintegrate into society is critical to both human rights and national security. For governments to implement effective non-custodial reintegration programs and strategies that are effective and conform to human rights norms, they require sufficient resources to handle the problems provided by the efforts. It is necessary to implement comprehensive strategies for the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters as a top priority on the security agenda because of the anticipated increase in the number of terrorist fighters returning to their home nations after participating in conflicts against terrorist organizations such as ISIS,

Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab, among others (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017).

Non-custodial reintegration programs must be implemented to enhance community resistance to violent extremism, lower the risk of young radicalization, and prevent recidivism among returnee terrorist fighters (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). This study contributes to a developing but otherwise unresolved discussion about effective reintegration tactics for returnees who participated in fighting for foreign terrorist organizations. East African nations place a high premium on the ongoing struggle against Islamist terrorist organizations like ISIS and Al-Shabaab. On the other hand, due to the rehabilitation and reintegration of returning foreign terrorist fighters, there is an increased requirement to build more strategic counterterrorism capabilities.

Throughout the last few years, numerous programs aimed at the de-radicalization and rehabilitation of violent extremists have sprouted up in various parts of the world. According to Neumann (2010), countries such as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore, Colombia, and the United Kingdom (UK), to name but a few, have already implemented comprehensive reintegration programs. Each of these countries has devised its counterterrorism policy to dissuade citizens from participating in political violence. The analysis and comparison of these programs are made more difficult by the fact that they appear to generally include comparable interventions (such as educational and vocational training and psychological and religious counselling), but in reality; they have a wide variety of aims that are unique to each program (Neumann, 2010). This presents a challenge because the programs appear to include similar interventions.

Kenya has been thrown into chaos as a result of terrorist attacks. Kenya was placed 21st out of 163 countries in the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) (IEP, 2019). This index measures

the impact of terrorism on countries around the world. This is partly the result of Kenya's proximity to Somalia, which is home to al-Shabaab, a terrorist organization with ties to al-Qaida (Rapoport D., 2011). In Somalia, al-Shabaab has been working toward establishing an Islamic state. On Kenyan land, a range of tragic occurrences has taken place, including beheadings in public, hostage takings, hijackings, and massacres that targeted civilians, security personnel, and international targets working in health, educational, industrial, and other public facilities (Al-Jazeera, 2020). These atrocities have targeted civilians, security personnel, and international targets.

Like many other countries, Kenya faces the challenge of reintegrating its nationals who joined Al-Shabaab or were recruited by the organization to serve in various capacities. This is a problem that affects many countries. The returnee terrorist fighters are a heterogeneous population, and returnees do not necessarily reflect those still a part of the terrorist organization (Altier, 2014). Therefore, it is vital to have answers to the "why" and "how" they were recruited into the group. This is the argument that has been put up. The procedures for disengagement and reintegration of returnees will be easier to understand with the help of the answers to these questions. Kenya must undertake thorough reintegration programs as a response to the fact that hundreds of terrorist combatants are returning home. This would help reduce the risk of further radicalization and recidivism among returnees. According to Holmer and Shtuni (2017), such initiatives can potentially contribute to developing an entire community's resilience to violent extremism.

Policies and programs for rehabilitation and reintegration that respect human rights are essential for the short-term prevention of violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism and the long-term development of community-level resistance to these threats.

These policies and programs include those working with people outside the prison system. Therefore, to prevent and combat violent extremism and radicalization that can lead to recidivism and terrorism, as well as a part of a larger strategy, the definition of non-custodial reintegration should be incorporated into applicable regulatory and policy frameworks, including national policy recommendations. This should be done to prevent and combat violent extremism and radicalization that can lead to recidivism and terrorism. The applicable legal and regulatory frameworks should recognize that non-custodial reintegration into society is as vital as punitive measures for persons accused of criminal wrongdoing. This is because non-custodial reintegration into society is intended to help offenders become productive members.

The policy significance of this study is that it needs to inform the creation of new policy frameworks and legal guidelines, as well as the evaluation of current practices, to generate options for the non-custodial rehabilitation and reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters. This is important because Kenya is experiencing a new wave of ex-combatant returns. In order to carry out programs designed to reintegrate the former terrorist combatants in a way that does not enhance and promote recidivism, which would otherwise encourage the continued presence and thriving of terrorist groups, it is necessary to not only come up with the best practices, which the government can adopt and other correction actors, but also to encourage the enforcement, imparting, and observance of certain codes and ethical guidelines. This is necessary because coming up with the best practices can be adopted by the government and other correction actors. If these recommendations for improvement in practice and policies were implemented, it is anticipated that terrorist acts would be reduced to the barest essentials.

1.5.3 Philosophical Justification

The Kiswahili proverb *"Mui Huwa Mwema*," which promotes the concept that even the worst criminal can still transform and become a good person in the community, inspired this research project's philosophical underpinnings (Mazrui, 1981). As a sort of rehabilitative or restorative justice philosophy, this Kiswahili proverb's use of a humanistic approach to encourage non-custodial reintegration of returnee foreign terrorist combatants can be interpreted as a form of reintegration that does not involve imprisonment. This ideology emphasizes resolving the underlying causes of conflict, fostering accountability, and offering opportunities for offenders to make amends and reintegrate themselves into society as part of its core principles. The primary tenet of this philosophy is the notion that people are capable of self-improvement and that the imposition of sanctions alone may not be sufficient to deter future criminal behaviour. Applying the principles of rehabilitative and restorative justice, such as the employment of community-based rehabilitation programs, education and skills training, and counselling in the context of non-custodial reintegration of returnee foreign terrorist fighters, is consistent with the goals of these types of judicial systems.

This proverb may be construed as a philosophy that advocates giving individuals second chances and having faith in their capacity to improve. According to this ideology, individuals who have been radicalized and involved in violent extremist activities can be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society, which can be used as an argument to support the non-custodial reintegration of returnee foreign terrorist fighters. They can be helped to turn away from violent behaviour and become useful members of their communities by employing non-custodial methods such as community-based rehabilitation programs,

educational and skills training, and counselling rather than being sentenced to lengthy jail terms as a form of punishment.

This strategy acknowledges that individuals who have become involved in terrorist activities may have had a variety of complicated motivations and personal situations that led them down that path and that it is vital to treat these underlying issues to prevent future engagement in extremist activities. It also accepts that punitive measures on their own might not be successful in avoiding radicalization and that they might even fuel greater complaints and resentment in the process. Society can give a message of hope and reconciliation to returning foreign terrorist fighters by embracing the "*Mui Huwa Mwema*" ideology and fostering non-custodial reintegration initiatives. This would also promote long-term peace and stability in the region.

According to Veldhuis (2012), a large portion of the successful non-custodial reintegration program the returned terrorist combatants go through is responsible for the intended transformation. Since it has been observed that the environment of prisons can provide a pathway to re-radicalization (Veldhuis, 2012), in which convicted terrorists continue to become more hardened and increase their propensity to want to commit more dangerous attacks (UN, 2016), this study believes that the use of non-custodial reintegration of returnee ex-terrorist combatants is more effective in assisting them in refraining from violence and reform than forcing them to serve custodial jail terms. As long as non-custodial rehabilitation and reintegration strategies are improved and made responsive to the welfare of returnees, former combatants can change their mindset and shun the extremist ideologies that had compelled them to join the terror groups through non-

custodial reintegration programs. This is one of the reasons why they were driven to join the terror groups in the first place.

This line of thinking has much in common with Ivan Pavlov's Learning Theory (1927), published in 1927. The most important takeaway from the learning theory is that most of the radical and terrorist behaviours exhibited by offenders are learned behaviours. The theory proposes that every acquired behaviour can be unlearned, provided that the correct processes are followed, and the necessary rewards or penalties are delivered (Bandura A., 1965). In the view of behaviourists, learning can only be established by a change in behaviour that is shown to be stable over time.

According to Albert Bandura's theory of social learning, social learning, imitation, and behaviour modeling will occur in a person if they observe successful, desirable outcomes during rehabilitation and reintegration into the community (Bandura, 1986). This is the case if a person witnesses successful outcomes during rehabilitation and reintegration into the community. It is commonly held that social learning principles are unchanging throughout a person's lifetime. Anyone can acquire knowledge by observation, regardless of their age. If one is exposed to new powerful, influential models who have control over resources, there is always the possibility of gaining new knowledge through the modeling process. This is the case as long as one controls the relevant resources (Newman & Newman, 2007).

Consequently, models of social learning can also be utilized to instruct people on how to abstain from taking part in actions of terrorism. Numerous studies have found that when children observe violent or aggressive role models, they are more likely to behave in an analogous manner to those examples. According to this point of view, imitation and

observation affect a person's thoughts and actions toward morality. Consequently, moral judgments regarding what is right and wrong are a component of what we acquire, and one of how this occurs is through modeling. The social cognitive theory tries to provide an all-encompassing account of the socialization process. The idea details how good rehabilitation and reintegration are vital in changing the mindset, including the procedures by which former terrorist fighters who have returned to society can acquire acceptable ways of thinking and acting throughout this expansive agenda (Green & Piel, 2009).

The reintegration of former terrorist combatants has been considered, for a long time, to be the method that is most likely to be successful in the battle against terrorist activities (Horgan, 2008). Because of the growing number of returnee terrorist combatants, the community responsible for taking care of them would be directly and potentially at risk for security danger. This threat might also worsen violent extremism and recidivism (Jawaid, 2017). It has been hypothesized that if the correct questions are asked, terrorists returning from their missions will be eager to speak about their experiences. Therefore, the participation of returnees in the design of non-custodial reintegration programs is required to educate the practice involved in their reintegration process (Horgan, 2009). This is necessary in order to achieve a successful process. The most common goals in rehabilitation and reintegration programs in both non-custodial and custodial environments are disengagement programs, which aim to persuade beneficiaries to refrain from using aggression in the hopes of creating a behavioural change, and deradicalization programs, which aim to change the returnee's ideology or convictions in the hopes of creating a cognitive change. These goals can be found in programs like deradicalization and deradicalization programs.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), disengagement interventions typically involve various activities. These activities can include psychological counselling and support, cognitive-behavioural programs, social work interventions, and debate and dialogue based on religious principles. The goal of the reintegration program should be made crystal clear, and it should be specified if the goal is to alter the thinking or conduct of the individual who is being targeted. According to the research of Koehler D. (2016), numerous authorities believe that R&R programs that concentrate on modifying behaviour are more likely to be practicable, inexpensive, and successful than those that try to change attitudes. Others, on the other hand, argue that ideology and attitude have such a major impact on behaviour that disregarding beliefs could raise the chance of recidivism (UNODC, 2018). Another school of thought maintains that for reintegration programs to be successful, they need to combine both purposes.

The Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) of the European Commission recommends a deradicalization-only strategy for reintegration, missing the critical fact that separating oneself from extremist and terrorist groups is based on various factors beyond ideological set (OSCE, 2020). This approach to reintegration is problematic because it ignores the reality that distancing oneself from extremist and terrorist groups is based on these elements. One of these causes is disillusionment with the effectiveness of violence, disagreements with fellow countrymen, and the allures of a normal living. On the other hand, factors such as fear of retaliation from former allies and the influence of peers might be obstacles to the proper reintegration of former members of terrorist organizations or extremist groups who fought for those organizations overseas (RAN, 2016).

An effective non-custodial reintegration program should aim to change violent extremist views and behaviour while delivering a wide range of resources to make this feasible. This will allow for the successful return of former foreign fighters into society. This is because a successful re-entry into society in all aspects is necessary to prevent violent extremism and other types of criminal behaviour. Even if a returnee has changed their mind regarding the validity of extremist doctrine, they may still be drawn back into extremist activities due to psychological or societal concerns.

This research adhered to the notion that effective non-custodial programs for the reintegration of former terrorist fighters who had returned home should address the difficulties these individuals face within the context of human rights. Therefore, the clear purpose of these reintegration efforts should be to withdraw from terrorism or violence rather than the vaguer conceptions of deradicalization that seek to change ideologies or views. This philosophy receives support because everyone is guaranteed the freedom to adopt a belief and have opinions without interference by international human rights standards (United Nations, 1976). This ability to adopt a belief and hold opinions without interference serves as a support for this philosophy. A strategy to end violence aligns more with the OSCE's definition of VERLT. However, deradicalization that aims to change people's attitudes or beliefs is consequently laden with threats to their human rights.

Therefore, to effectively implement programs for non-custodial reintegration, it is important to understand how and why terrorist offenders initially became involved in violent extremism and radicalization (VERLT). This initial involvement can have a variety of causes that, in general, extend beyond the adoption of a particular ideology.

Consequently, these programs need to be flexible and particularly developed to take into account the distinct history and drivers behind each participant.

1.6 Scope of the Study

Returnee terrorist combatants in Kenya find committing to the ongoing reintegration process difficult because of stigmatization, legal challenges, extrajudicial killings, harassment, threats from former friends, and encounters with the receiving communities (ICG, 2014). Therefore, this study was restricted to examining the methods used in Kenya to rehabilitate and reintegrate foreign terrorist combatants who had previously left the nation to join militant organizations like Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The scope of the study covered the period from the year 2015 to 2022 when the high influx of returnee was reported after the government gave a ministerial amnesty for Kenyans who had join Al-Shabaab in Somalia to return home. Between May and December of 2022, the research investigation was carried out.

In order to theorize about the returnees' demonstrated commitment to the process of non-custodial rehabilitation and reintegration, as well as the challenges they encounter and how they overcome them, Mombasa County was chosen as the case study because it is home to a sizable number of returnee terrorist fighters in Kenya. Since Kenya actively entered the conflict against the Al-Shabaab organization in Somalia in 2011, the country has seen a rise in the number of terrorist militants returning home. This investigation focused on re-enlisted terrorist militants in Mombasa County at the time.

1.7 Chapter Summary

As people who travelled to fight in conflicts like those in Iraq and Syria return home, many

governments continue to struggle with how to react. As the terrorist combatants migrate back to their native nations, these uninterested recruits aid in developing a third route. The need for the implementation of comprehensive strategies for the non-custodial reintegration of terrorist fighters as a top priority on the security agenda arises from the rise in the number of terrorist fighters returning to their home countries as a result of the pressure being applied to terror organizations like Al-Shabaab and combined with the pressure created by other security forces by the African Union.

Given the number and scope of this wave of fighters and the nature of the conflict, there is a significant cause for concern regarding the possibility that some returning offenders will perpetrate acts of violence upon their return home. Effective non-custodial programs to reintegrate returning foreign fighters are crucial for averting violent acts, minimizing radicalization among the young population, and enhancing overall community resilience to violent extremism. These programs are also essential for returning foreign fighters to their home communities. The reappearance of terrorist fighters presents a sizeable opportunity for the rapidly developing yet critically important field of CVE (countering violent extremism).

Therefore, for the initiative aimed at the returnees' reintegration to be effective, the returnees are required to contribute information that will inform the development of the project. Returnee terrorist combatants in Kenya face several challenges in retaining their dedication to reintegration. These challenges include stigmatization, legal barriers, extrajudicial violence, harassment, revenge from former supporters, and encounters with the receiving communities.

In light of the goal of the study and the significance of the study that was highlighted, the

next chapter offers a comprehensive assessment of the previous research that has been conducted on the subject at hand, beginning with a global context and moving on to continental, then regional, and finally local settings.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This study aimed to evaluate the efficacy of non-custodial reintegration programs for formerly incarcerated individuals who were moving back to Kenya. These programs were designed to ensure the participants' physical and mental well-being by attending to their specific requirements. In this chapter, we explore the conceptual underpinnings of the study as well as empirical reviews relevant to the rehabilitation and reintegration of former terrorist fighters who have returned home.

The variables of the study, which include the specific psychological needs of returning terrorist fighters about their propensity for crime, programs that are available that are gender-responsive, and elements that influence how effectively non-custodial reintegration programs are conducted, form the basis for the literature review that is included in the study. The chapter's conclusion includes a summary of the previous research and a conceptual framework that illustrates how the study variables were related to one another.

2.1 Nature of Non-Custodial Reintegration Programmes for Returnee Terrorist Fighters

The implementation of an all-encompassing strategy to combat the dangers posed by terrorism and VERLT that strikes a balance between various P/CVERLT measures, such as policies and programs aimed at prevention, intervention, and reintegration, and traditional counter-terrorism measures, such as arrests, detentions, and movement restrictions, is becoming an increasingly important focus for countries all over the world.

In particular, national governments and county authorities, civil society and other nongovernmental actors, as well as multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, the Global Counter-terrorism Forum, the European Union, and the Council of Europe, are paying increased attention to the concept of non-custodial reintegration (OSCE, 2020).

Due to the growing acceptance and adoption of non-custodial reintegration strategies for returnee terrorist fighters in numerous countries, there is a growing understanding of the necessity for governmental and nongovernmental actors to contribute to developing and implementing non-custodial R&R programs. This understanding contributes to the growth of an understanding of the necessity for both governmental and nongovernmental actors to contribute to developing and implementing non-custodial R&R programs. In order to put this strategy into action, it is necessary to ensure that CSOs and other nongovernmental actors have the required legal and policy space and capacity to engage, acknowledge the relative advantages of government and nongovernmental stakeholders, and identify the appropriate division of labor between them in supporting any reintegration program. These steps are necessary in order to make this strategy a reality.

Because non-custodial R&R is a crucial component of the psychosocial, psychosocial process and requires the continued engagement and participation of local communities, families, and other supportive social networks, CSOs have a unique role to play in this aspect of R&R. CSOs commonly have access to VERT-affected individuals and communities, as well as the trust of those individuals and communities, in ways that government officials do not. This is in part because CSOs are not part of the government. This can make it easier to maintain contact with the individual and the larger society, which has been discovered to be an essential element of successful R&R work outside of a jail or

prison setting (OSCE, 2020).

As a result of the fact that CSOs already provide services to their communities, they may be the first members of their communities to engage in conversation with individuals who are being released from prison or returning from conflict zones, particularly women and children. The United Nations has recommended governments work with civil society organizations (CSOs) to create and execute R&R plans and initiatives. This is due to the UN's recognition of CSOs' comparative advantages in health, social welfare, and education, in addition to their familiarity with local communities and access to those populations (Ahmed, 2019).

CSOs can provide religious counselling, legal assistance, psychosocial, psychosocial support, vocational training, educational opportunities, and sensitization in the area of non-custodial R&R, which can help weary communities understand how the non-custodial R&R of returnee terrorist fighters benefits the larger community in the long run. This is one way that CSOs can help weary communities. CSOs are among the very few service providers who can participate in both the custodial and non-custodial stages of the P/CVERLT R&R process. Consequently, they can be placed in a certain way to guarantee a smooth transition between the phases (Bosley, 2019).

A strong and effective non-custodial reintegration process, working in close collaboration with civil society organizations and communities, will facilitate the transition back into society for former violent extremist offenders, demonstrating ongoing goodwill and providing an essential support structure for the former violent extremist prisoners. The UNODC has acknowledged the significant role that CSOs (and communities in general) play in this situation (UNODC, 2018).

It is also crucial for community service organizations (CSOs) that women lead to understand and address the gender components of R&R programs. These aspects include the effects of sexual and gender-based violence and the particular needs of returnee female terrorist fighters and other connected women and children. CSOs are actively working on R&R projects in a number of the countries that make up the OSCE region. In certain instances, they maintain a tight working relationship with the government and get money from that entity. This engagement does provide for a tight relationship, even though it has proven to be more of an anomaly than the norm. This has many different explanations, depending on the situation's specifics. CSOs have occasionally been cautious about engaging in this arena due to the potential for legal and security ramifications from dealing with a convicted terrorist, someone who has otherwise gotten radicalized to VERLT, or someone who has just returned from a conflict zone.

In other circumstances, CSOs could be unable to participate due to a lack of the P/CVERLT expertise or knowledge required. National governments, particularly those concerned with security and law enforcement, have occasionally shown reluctance to include nongovernmental players in circumstances that they regard as delicate, high-risk scenarios involving potentially dangerous people. This reluctance is especially prevalent when the national governments are directly involved. In other instances, national governments have failed to provide civil society organizations with legal clarity, political support, or financial aid to permit their participation. This has prevented CSOs from effectively advocating for change (McNeill F., 2012).

The success of the R&R program for non-incarcerated offenders may depend just as much on the type of actor, either government or non-government, that is most equipped to carry

out a particular intervention. The nation, the county, and the community that will be hosting those affected by this decision all need to be taken into context. When working with a cohort of potentially dangerous individuals who may be enrolled in non-custodial R&R programs, government employees may feel more at ease than nongovernmental actors because they may have more knowledge about the security risks posed by the individuals and better access to legal resources (including through participation in multi-agency platforms for information sharing around specific cases). This is because government employees may have access to more information about the individuals' security risks.

In addition, they may be less concerned than community based CSOs, for example, about the potential reputational problems that could result from their encounters with people who have some link to terrorism or VERLT. These interactions may not be as likely to result in such risks. In addition to this, they might be in a better position than nongovernmental actors to be open about the work that they do in order to align their interventions with government policies. This is especially true when nongovernmental actors are not involved in creating particular programs or policies or in situations where those programs and policies are unknown to the general public (Souris & Singh, 2018).

The returnee terrorist combatants, their families, and the greater community may view these persons as the "enemy" because they are state representatives. Cooperation, support, and active participation on their part are essential to the achievement of any goal, including demilitarization or reintegration. This is especially true if they are related to law enforcement or other security actors or are a part of either of those groups. On the other hand, CSOs and other nongovernmental organizations are frequently better positioned to establish trust more quickly and deeply with the target individual and the wider

community. They also have greater knowledge of the grievances and other motivations at work, particularly in situations in which the government does not fund them or does not have other close links with the government.

Moreover, compared to their government colleagues, CSOs are typically better positioned to communicate with individuals where state policies or actions are among the key factors contributing to VERLT. In addition, Community Service Organizations (CSOs) might have experience working with gangs, hate organizations, or adolescents in danger in the neighborhood, which they can draw on.

In many cases, governments have placed a higher priority on actions that are more practically oriented, such as assisting people in locating homes and receiving training for jobs or bringing together several stakeholders to discuss a particular scenario, such as local religious leaders, former extremists, family members, and local authorities. For their part, CSOs and other nongovernmental community partners have used their credibility and access to engage people privately on matters of ideology, religion, or extremism. These topics could cause legal or cultural issues if government actors lead that engagement. CSOs and other nongovernmental community partners have also done this through sporting, cultural, or artistic events (Souris & Singh, 2018). It is common for organizations whose major mission is to assist people in refraining from VERLT or other forms of violence to take the lead in this latter type of work. In several OSCE member states, exit programs and other efforts that assist individuals trying to quit violent extremist groups have a specific and concentrated focus on this activity area.

2.1.1 Nexus Between Custodial Sentence and Recidivism

The act of returning to criminal behaviour is known as recidivism, and it is measured in most cases by a formerly jailed person's subsequent conviction for a new crime while they are still serving their sentence. There are estimates that place Kenya's recidivism rate somewhere around two-thirds, meaning that approximately two-thirds of released prisoners will wind up back in jail (Oruta, 2016). Consequently, a sizeable amount of the crimes committed today and, in the future, will be carried out by returnee terrorist combatants who had been previously imprisoned and released from their sentences. Policymakers, criminologists, and those working in custodial corrections services are worried about the high risk of rearrest and re-incarceration due to the trend of the high prevalence of recidivism in Kenya, which has resulted in an astonishingly high number of people being imprisoned and eventually released back into the community.

This has led to a high risk of rearrest and re-incarceration due to the high prevalence of recidivism in Kenya. The expense of re-offender arrest, prosecution, and jail has a major influence on public safety, as does a high rate of recidivism, which harms public safety. High rates of recidivism among returned terrorist fighters entail catastrophic societal consequences for the communities and families of offenders, in addition to the personal costs that offenders themselves incur.

According to Maltz (1981), the term "recidivism" refers to "the return to criminal behaviour by a person who has already been found guilty of a prior offense, sentenced, and probably given the necessary guidance." This definition pertains to the criminal justice field, and it states that "recidivism" describes "the return to criminal behaviour by a person." A person's return to custody for any cause, including small offenses, is considered a form of

recidivism. Various definitions of recidivism exist (Verbrugge et al., 2002). Others view it as a new round of arrests, convictions, and incarcerations (Benda, 2005).

The problem of persistent criminal behaviour is referred to by the technical word "recidivism," which obscures the significance of the issue it implies when applied in a limited sense. According to Howard League (2008), the number of jailed adults in England and Wales is approximately 83,000, almost twice as high as the number that was incarcerated from 1991–1992 (Morgan & Liebling, 2007). According to the Fawcett Society's research from 2006, the number of female detainees in England and Wales climbed to approximately 4,500 in 2008. This compares to a 4% growth in male inmates in those countries in 2008.

According to LeBel et al. (2008), in 2002, 67 percent of male inmates who had been released from jail in England and Wales were rearrested within two years. Similarly, according to research published by the Fawcett Society in 2006, in England and Wales in 2004, 64 percent of female prisoners committed new offenses within two years of release. There is a multitude of variables that continue to contribute to the overpopulation that exists in correctional facilities all around the world. There is an increase in the number of criminals being locked up for violating the terms of their release and for less serious offenses.

The rate of recidivism among inmates in Nigerian prisons has reached an all-time high in recent years. These include male and female convicts and individuals currently detained in Nigerian correctional facilities. According to Soyombo (2009), the prevalence rate of criminal recidivism in Nigeria in 2005 was 37.3%. This information comes from the country's National Bureau of Statistics. According to Abrifor (2010), the recidivism rate in

Nigerian jails reached a staggering 52.4% in 2010. Since then, there hasn't been any evidence to suggest that the pattern has shifted. Research conducted in Nigeria revealed that 81% of male criminal convicts and 45% of female criminal inmates were rearrested within 36 months of being released from prison custody, according to Wilson (2009), who also said this statistic.

According to data collected on recidivism from around the world, the majority of former inmates who are released from prison are likely to be arrested again within three years of their release, and about 80% are likely to be arrested again within ten years of their previous release (Freeman, 2003). Studies worldwide have shown that rearresting is possible within the first year after a person is released from prison (Hassin, 1989). This is the case even if the released criminal can access reintegration support. A high percentage of recidivism leads to an increase in criminal activity, an increase in the number of victims, and an increased strain on the criminal justice system (Olwenyo & Ater, 2022).

According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, there were a total of 52,000 persons locked up as of February 2012. This figure includes those who were being held pending trial and those on remand. This violates the capacity of the jail system in Kenya, which is 22,000 people at a time. There is an alarming level of overcrowding in the 99 institutions established across the country to house inmates, with an occupancy level of 236.4% more than the stated capacity of the facilities. This information comes from the Ministry of the Interior and the Coordination of the National Government. A large number of inmates are currently being held due to the rise in the number of individuals serving multiple sentences for the same crime (Oruta, 2016).

According to Dennis Lumiti (2004), over 60 percent of the seven hundred and forty-four inmates freed due to the presidential amnesty had subsequently been rearrested. This very high recidivism rate is connected with huge costs, both in terms of the public's safety and the money required to discover, apprehend, and imprison repeat criminals. These expenses add up to a significant amount. As a result of the trend toward the high prevalence of recidivism in many countries worldwide, including Kenya, policymakers, criminologists, and those working in the corrections system are concerned about the alarmingly high number of imprisoned and eventually released back into the community. This is a direct result of the high prevalence of recidivism in many countries worldwide. This results in a major fraction of crimes committed in the present and in the future being perpetrated only by former convicts.

The threat to peace, the protection of people and property, and other considerations all play a role in determining the rate at which investments are made in social and economic growth and developmental processes. Consequently, it is of the utmost importance to research recidivism by investigating the socioeconomic and demographic factors that are known to be predictors of recidivism among convicts of the Kenyan Prisons Service, as well as the accompanying challenges that former inmates encounter after being released from prison.

Criminals released from jail in Kenya have a 50% probability of getting rearrested and a 75% likelihood of committing another offense during the next two years after their release (Gathu, 2012). There are not enough reintegration programs available in Kenya's prisons, and there are not enough resources available to support the reintegration programs either. These factors make it difficult for Kenyan citizens who have participated in terrorist fighting to escape falling back into criminal behaviour. This research, which is an essential

component of our society, was conducted to construct resilient and risk-free communities to enhance the quality of life for Kenyans who had previously participated in terrorist organizations overseas and had since returned home. Addressing the issues that impact former offenders and lead to recidivism is crucial because most terrorist offenders will eventually return to society. Recidivism is a big problem in the United States.

The construction of prisons can be considered a relatively recent development, given that they have existed for less than 300 years (Morris & Rothman, 1995). After having their beginnings in the northeastern part of the United States and Western Europe, incarceration facilities have gradually extended throughout the rest of the world in the wake of colonial expansion. Inmates awaiting trial were held in detention facilities either until the total fine or debt was paid off or until the court's decision was carried out, whichever came first. On the other hand, the use of prisons as a direct disposal of court sentences in any meaningful fashion can be dated back to a relatively recent period (Coyle, 2005).

In the ninth century, the first prisoners were imprisoned in jails while they awaited their trials. By the sixteenth century, a network of county goals had been established. They were privately held by neighborhood lords who generated money by charging inmates for shelter, food, and other amenities. Their primary source of income was the inmate population. They were tiny, similar to the size of their people, and they received little backing from the government. In medieval England, prisons were not considered a form of punishment in and of themselves; as a result, their primary function was not to punish inmates but rather to hold them in custody. Inmates were subjected to deplorable living circumstances and carried the risk of catching the disease in addition to the possibility of famine. The efficiency of a prison was measured by its capacity to confine convicts and

prevent escapes; this was used to justify the institution's usage as a form of punishment and as a deterrence (Muncie, 2001).

By the middle of the 19th century, several fundamental shifts had taken place, one of which was the shift away from an arbitrary engagement of the state in criminal law and toward a system that was rationalized, centralized, and managed by the state. This made it feasible to differentiate between criminal subgroups by classifying and categorizing prisons and inmates into distinct groups, such as male and female inmates, adults and juvenile criminals, remand and convicted inmates, and so on. These divisions required specialized support from qualified individuals or experts with appropriate licenses. As a result of implementing these policies, prisons have developed as the principal instrument for modifying unwanted behaviour and have subsequently become the favored means of punishment (Cohen, 1985).

The number of people incarcerated has grown significantly in various parts of the world. By 2007, the jail populations of seventy-three percent of the countries that topped the list of those with the world's largest prison populations had increased. The United States of America (2.19 million inmates), Russia (0.87 million inmates), Brazil (0.36 million inmates), India (0.33 million inmates), Mexico (0.21 million inmates), Thailand (0.16 million inmates), South Africa (0.15 million inmates), and Iran (0.15 million inmates) are the countries with the highest prison populations. China has the highest prison population, with 2.55 million inmates (Van D. J., 2007). If the construction of new prisons does not keep up with the need for more space, the existing prisons will likely become overcrowded as the jail population continues to rise. According to the United Nations Crime Survey

(UNODC, 2005), many regions, particularly South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America have extremely high occupancy rates.

According to a report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) titled "Addressing the Global Prison Crisis Strategy 2015-2017," North African countries such as Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia have seen large percentage increases in the number of people incarcerated in their respective prisons. The number of people locked up in South African prisons reached its highest point in 2004, when it stood at 188,000 and dropped to 158,000 by 2014. There has been an increase in inmates in a few East African republics, but not all. The number of people held in jail in Ethiopia climbed from 55,000 in 2000 to 93,000 in 2011, despite smaller percentage increases in Kenya and Uganda.

After witnessing a considerable spike as a result of the genocide, the number of people held in prisons in Rwanda has been steadily declining ever since 1998. According to Tanzania and Zimbabwe, fewer people are serving time in prison than fifteen years ago. There have been observations of increases in the countries of West and Central Africa; some of these increases are relatively insignificant, as in the case of Cameroon, while others are more pronounced, as in the case of Nigeria (UNODC, 2015).

Notably, correctional programs implemented in prison settings try to break the cycle of offending, lower the prison population to manageable levels, and provide inmates with the required life skills to lead a crime-free life following release from jail, amongst other goals. These are only some of the goals that correctional programs strive to achieve (Gendreau & Cullen, 2000). According to Gona et al. (2014), the efficiency of the correctional programs implemented in detention facilities is called into question due to the rising prison population and the fact that most of those convicted of crimes are not first-time offenders.

This is because the majority of those convicted of crimes are repeat offenders. There are many different schools of thought regarding whether prison-based rehabilitation programs are beneficial in reducing both crime and recidivism.

According to Esperian (2010), the importance of rehabilitation and reintegration programs cannot be overstated in reducing the recidivism rate among incarcerated individuals. He gives solid evidence to support the argument that sponsoring education programs for inmates makes states significantly more money: first, by significantly reducing the recidivism rate, and second, by removing the expenses of long-term warehousing when felons are educated. Both of these benefits are attributed to the fact that funding education programs for prisoners make states significantly more money (Esperian, 2010). Research of a similar nature was carried out over two years by the Ohio State Prison System on the influence of education and job training on the recidivism rate.

According to their study's findings, within two years, there is a recidivism rate of 28% among criminals who complete or attain any form of educational program. Within the first two years after their release, 30.4% of inmates who had not participated in educational programs were rearrested (Wilkinson & Stickrath, 1995). It is anticipated that giving returnee terrorist combatants access to and encouraging them to participate in the rehabilitation programs made available by prisons will have an impact on reducing the recidivism that these individuals cause.

The amount of time individuals who have returned from fighting for terrorist organizations spend imprisoned is another factor that influences recidivism. The most common conception of criminal activity is that it is a learned behaviour that is morally acceptable but committed in violation of the law as a reaction to several isolating social situations.

The primary focus of attempts to prevent recidivism among returned terrorist combatants should be altering the social circumstances in high-crime areas that foster adopting these behaviours. This should be the primary purpose of these efforts (Mauer, 1999). In addition to the impact of the returnee's traits, the jail's atmosphere affects convicts' misbehaviour, particularly in their violent interactions with one another (Bottoms, 1999).

Inmates can interact with one another in prison settings, which contributes to the jail's function as a significant factor in determining whether or not an individual would become a career criminal. In addition, the media often portrays jail as a claustrophobic environment in which criminals are confined for long periods with plenty to discuss, and there is no question that discussions regarding illegal activity and innovative criminal strategies will take place (Neminski, 2015).

According to Goodstein and Wright (1989), prison life has a negative impact on an inmate's views, values, social interaction styles, and self-concept, which makes it more difficult for them to succeed in successfully reintegrating back into society once they are released from jail (Goodstein & Wright, 1989). In contrast, Pritikin (2008) contends that the dangerous conditions that prevail within these prisons do not successfully reform offenders but lead to increased criminal behaviour once they are freed (Nyariki, Bor, & Onsarigo, 2019).

An economic assessment found that there are currently three times as many people serving time in prisons in Kenya as there were back in 2010. The number of people serving time behind bars rose from 88,631 in 2010 to 221,974 in 2015. Nevertheless, there has been a shift in the population, as evidenced by the number of convicts rising by 20,472 between 2013 and 2014. However, as of 2014, there were 109,629 persons serving time in prisons, and the number of inmates in each facility climbed by 6% on a daily average. The year

2015, on the other hand, showed a reduction of 10.6% in this. According to the findings of the poll, 111,055 individuals had a history of convictions that occurred between the years 2011 and 2015. According to the poll, 17,683 individuals were handed convictions in 2015 alone (KNBS, 2016).

As a result of the phenomena of prisoner reintegration, different challenges are faced by returnee terrorist fighters, members of their families, local communities, and the government. Because they frequently have very low employment rates, returnee terrorist combatants who have been incarcerated and then reintegrated into society have a very high risk of resorting to a life of crime after they are freed from jail and reintegrated into society. Because of this, and the stigma connected with their criminal conviction for terrorism, it can be challenging for individuals who have returned from fighting for terrorist organizations to obtain jobs and contribute positively to society (Van D. J., 2007).

The principal missions of correctional facilities in Kenya are the rehabilitative and corrective work they do with convicted criminals. The government has made significant efforts to accomplish the successful exit of convicts and, as a result, lower recidivism. These efforts include boosting budgetary support for prisons, hiring more skilled staff, expanding rehabilitation programs, and establishing a more compassionate environment. Stigmatization of former offenders in Kenya is an additional societal issue that may affect the country's high recidivism rate. According to Goffman (1963), a stigma is a mark that reduces an individual's credibility by ascribing unfavorable characteristics to that individual. One further approach to looking at stigma is as a label affixed to individuals or organizations, leading those individuals or groups to be undervalued due to negative characteristics (Link & Phelan, 2001).

In addition, it is believed that one's thoughts and behaviours and those of the general public can contribute to stigma formation. This type of stigma is known as self-stigma. When a group is stigmatized in the eyes of the general public, larger, more powerful groups, like the community or the government, are more likely to treat members of that group unfairly (Link & Phelan, 2001). When a minority group internalizes such ideas against themselves, a phenomenon known as self-stigma can emerge, as is the case with returnee terrorist combatants who are formerly incarcerated individuals (Mak & Cheung, 2010).

According to Kobayashi and Kerbo (2012), the stigma associated with getting arrested and obtaining a penalty can be translated into humiliation and embarrassment, which can be perceived as a disincentive to continue breaking the law. In other words, being arrested and receiving a penalty can deter further breaching the law. This view is rejected by many experts, who believe that labels indicating a previous conviction do not affect deterrence.

According to one of the researchers, Chen (2004), stigma harms returning ex-offenders. It can result in anger and resentment rather than sorrow and shame, which boosts the probability of future criminal behaviour (Chen, 2004). However, Winnick and Bodkin (2008) agree that once the negative label is internalized, the labeled individual returnee may alter his or her behaviour to fit into these new assessments. Furthermore, in the case of returnee terrorist fighters, such internalization justifies their returning to deviant behaviours (Winnick & Bodkin, 2008).

Braithwaite (1989) asserts that stigma is a sort of destructive shame that does not make any effort to rebuild bonds between a community and a returned terrorist offender. Braithwaite (2000) provides additional evidence that stigma has a negative impact on formerly incarcerated individuals. This theory proposes that stigma functions as a conduit that makes

it more appealing for criminal subcultures to grow and that the subcultures, in and of themselves, counteract the shame that would otherwise arise from breaking the law. Criminal subcultures themselves serve to offset the shame that would otherwise result from breaking the law (Braithwaite, 1989). According to Link and Phelan (2001), the stigma of being an ex-convict continues for a long time after the initial release from prison, and the stereotyping, labeling, discrimination, status loss, and alienation that ex-prisoners undergo are perceived as an invisible type of punishment.

After spending their time in a facility, former inmates are given access to social assistance, which is another social component that plays a role in determining whether or not they will return to criminal activity in the future. The gender of the returnee is a significant issue that should be taken into consideration while providing social support to former terrorist fighters who have been incarcerated and have since been released from their sentences. According to Benda's (2005) study of 300 female and 300 male militants who had participated in violent conflicts, there are considerable gender differences in the predictors of tenure in the community without criminal recidivism in a 5-year follow-up. These differences were found in the predictors of tenure in the community without criminal recidivism. Men were more likely to commit further crimes than women because of their associations with other criminals, their use of firearms, their abuse of alcohol, and their violent characteristics. Because of their more fulfilling jobs and higher levels of education, males tend to stay in a town longer than women. On the other hand, women tend to remain in a community longer because of their relationships and childbirth.

According to research that investigated gender disparities in recidivism rates, it has been found that female criminals have a much lower likelihood of committing crimes again

compared to male offenders. For instance, in a study conducted in 1989 by the United States Bureau of Justice Statistics, the recidivism rates of 108,580 convicts, 5.9% of whom were women, who had been released from prison in eleven States in 1983 were investigated. Women who were released from prison had a reduced reoffending rate compared to men who were released. Even though women have a lower risk of being incarcerated than males, the rate of female incarceration in the United States has been climbing considerably more rapidly than that of male incarceration.

Women make up around 24%, 12%, and 7% of those incarcerated in all of these different groups: probation, parole, and prison (Glaze & Bonczar, 2007). According to Heimer and De Coster's (1999) research, female detainees who have violated the law and gender standards can be considered double offenders. Women who have served time in jail are frequently thought of as having a less feminine demeanor because they were incarcerated.

The family is recognized as one of the strongest pillars of the support system in correctional facilities. Because the family provides mental and physical support for treating criminals, it should not be overlooked because of its significance in this system. According to Hairston (1991), the support of one's family is critical for individuals both while they are incarcerated and after they have been released, and it has a beneficial influence on such individuals. Hairston (2002) raises questions concerning incarceration's impact on children and families, as well as the extent to which families may be resources and assets rather than liabilities in fostering safer, more resourceful communities (Hairston, 2002).

Berg and Huebner (2011) believe that social support, particularly that which is generated through familial relationships, is a key component for imprisoned returnee terrorist combatants during the process of their reintegration into society after serving time in jail.

Specifically, this is the case for those individuals. The researchers looked into if there was a link between social contacts, employment, and subsequent criminal activity. Their research demonstrates that the significance of the family in the life of a criminal can be seen in the fact that family relationships have an effect not only on the likelihood of committing another crime but also on the likelihood of being successful in the workplace (Berg & Huebner, 2011).

In addition, Pritikin (2008) observed that incarceration causes the breakdown of relationships between imprisoned returnee terrorist fighters and their families. This makes it difficult for convicted individuals to reintegrate into society after being freed and prevents them from engaging in criminal behaviour (Pritikin, 2008). In light of this, this study aimed to assess the importance of the family's social support system for effective non-custodial reintegration of former offenders into society and, consequently, for minimizing recidivism among the group.

The returnee terrorist fighters' work possibilities are severely limited when they have a criminal record, and their pay is reduced even if they can find even the most menial of positions. Unemployment is a common factor that contributes to both recidivism and violations of parole or probation, and both of these are serious offenses (Holzer, Raphael, & Stoll, 2003). Mukamal (2000) found that of the people who had been previously incarcerated and had violated the terms of their probation or parole at the time of the violation, 89% of them were unemployed at the time of the violation in the employment statistics for the state of New York. Additional data suggests that as many as sixty percent of formerly incarcerated individuals cannot find work within a year after release (Nightingale & Watts, 1996). One of the factors that have been connected to successful

reintegration and criminal resistance among former terrorist fighters who have returned to their home countries is employment (Uggen, 2000).

After being released from prison and reintegrated back into society, an ex-convict's capacity to find a gainful job is one of the most important factors in determining whether or not they will engage in pro-social behaviour, establish new habits, conform to societal norms, and earn legal revenue. The ability to achieve value employment, particularly high-quality employment, is commonly cited as a primary element that promotes a drop in recidivism among this group. These characteristics are why the phrase "can get valuable employment" is frequently used (Uggen, 2000). High-quality employment can be defined in several ways, including the returnee's capacity to find purpose in their work and the job's ability to provide stability and financial reward (Laub & Sampson, 2003). Returnee terrorist combatants who successfully obtain meaningful employment often do it with the help of friends or family members shortly after their release from prison (Visher, Debus, & Yahner, 2008).

Reintegration programs that help terrorist fighters' workforce members who have returned to find jobs have had some success, but their capacity and geographical reach to employment prospects is confined. Reintegration programs have had some success helping terrorist fighters' workforce members who have returned to find employment (Solomon, Johnson, Travis, & Mcbride, 2004). Another area of worry is the problem of reintegration into the workforce for those terrorist combatants who have successfully found work after their return home. Because incarceration has a lowering effect on future earnings, it can make existing inequalities in the community that welcomes back former terrorist fighters

once they have completed their reintegration into society even worse (Western, Kling, & Weinman, 2001).

Those former terrorist combatants who have returned to their home countries and are now attempting to reintegrate into society face several serious hurdles. They often find that returning to the workforce is one of the most challenging conditions. Even though work possibilities for ex-offenders were often limited even before they were locked up, the employment rates of ex-offenders and their earnings are poor according to practically any criterion. It would appear that a tight connection exists between the low employment rates and the exceptionally high recidivism rates that are observed among people who have been released from jail (Holzer, Raphael, & Stoll, 2003).

It is vital to know employer views about hiring returnee terrorist fighters, as it has been identified as one of the most crucial parts of effective reintegration into society. Finding lawful employment after release from custody has been cited as one of the most crucial aspects of successful reintegration (La Vigne & Kachnowski, 2005). After being released from prison, over two-thirds of returnee terrorist fighters receive financial aid from family members, which adds to the countless challenges in seeking jobs (Shollenberger, 2009).

In addition, Holzer (1996) discovered that it could be challenging for returnee terrorist combatants to become financially independent. This is because most jobs today need a higher degree of qualification, specialized skills, or previous work experience. As it becomes harder for returnees to find lawful work, they face increasing pressure and temptation to try to make a living through unlawful methods. The inability of returnee terrorist combatants to obtain work of sufficient caliber is one of the most significant factors contributing to the likelihood of recidivism among former offenders. Even though

post-incarceration employment possibilities will vary widely depending on the nature of the conviction, the length of incarceration and other circumstances may lead to a fall in predicted lifetime earnings. This is the case even though the length of the sentence and other factors may contribute to a decrease in expected lifetime earnings (Pritikin, 2008).

2.1.2 Controversy in Non-Custodial Approach for Reintegrating Returnee Terrorist Fighters

Transitioning away from violent extremism requires a multi-step process anchored in psychological dynamics, identity notions, and pragmatic concerns. Many researchers in this field agree that disassociation from a radicalized group is typically followed by a cognitive change away from a commitment to violent extremism. However, deradicalization and disengagement are frequently distinguished in this field of study. This indicates that disengagement, even if it typically comes before deradicalization, does not necessarily ensure it (Horgan, 2009). For returnee terrorist fighters to be eligible for non-custodial rehabilitation and reintegration, they must radically modify their social relationships, personal circumstances, and attitudes about extreme views.

However, it is a fallacy to presume that a terrorist warrior who has returned home will immediately disengage from the movement once they get there. This is the case for two reasons: first, the individual frequently returns to the social networks and community in which he or she was radicalized in the first place, and second, allegiance is not restricted to formal group membership or being in a certain location. The second reason is likely the more important of the two. The complex psychosocial process of Radicalization is best understood by thinking of it as being driven by a blend of personal qualities and

circumstances, societal dynamics, and outside facilitating factors. This is the most effective way to understand how Radicalization occurs (Oluteyo, Were, & Simiyu, 2018).

Even though a person may have become disillusioned to participate in terrorist fighting, been let down, or even been traumatized by witnessing violence, many of the conditions that motivated their involvement and, perhaps more importantly, some of the connections that fueled their recruitment remain in place. This is especially true if the individual was recruited by others involved in the conflict. Involvement in a violent battle also has a profoundly altering influence on a person's identity as well as their perspective on the world. Research has shed light on the deeply embedded identity of a warrior, particularly the strong loyalty and dedication to fellow soldiers (Herman, 1992). Therefore, the path to non-custodial reintegration entails not only a change in one's attitude but also a modification of one's social network and personal circumstances. This is because non-custodial reintegration aims to help individuals become productive members.

This process is made more difficult by the risk that the community will refuse to accept the returnees, particularly those with a reputation for criminal activity. Some returnees suffer the additional risk of being penalized by the people they once considered allies. It is of the utmost importance to provide returning terrorist fighters with access to a social support system and a welcoming environment to facilitate genuine disengagement and the formation of a new identity (Garfinkel R., 2007). Researchers have identified several characteristics that contribute to the decision of foreign fighters to return to their native groups, including disillusionment; intergroup conflict; injury; burnout; a desire to reconcile with family; a want for greater stability; and a desire for more stability (Bjorgo, 2002).

Others believe that a traumatic experience during the individual's time in battle frequently causes them to return, generating a cognitive opening for change (Garfinkel R., 2007). Despite the presence of veteran foreign combatants, there is evidence that many young people who have travelled abroad to support the military clash in Iraq and Syria are unprepared for the rigors of battle and return with psychological and physical wounds. This is the case even though veteran foreign combatants are present (Horgan, 2008).

Because of these characteristics, the process of non-custodial reintegration for returnee terrorist fighters requires a continuous, coordinated effort that involves multiple players. Without these programs, juveniles released from prison or turned in to counterterrorism authorities are likelier to commit crimes. The mere fact that they identify as combatants might radicalize and inspire others, even if they do not engage in any further acts of violence in the future. Those individuals who can successfully construct a new, positive identity and social network within their communities have the potential to significantly impact the development of enhanced resilience among their local populations to the effects of violent extremism. Over the last few decades, many programs have been established to rehabilitate and reintegrate individuals who have participated in criminal organizations.

In recent years, notably in Europe, many programs have been devised for prisons and non-custodial settings to deal with the influx of combatants from Syria and Iraq. These programs are designed to help inmates adjust to life outside of jail. However, at this early point, there is little evidence to suggest that such programs have any significant influence. Measuring the efficacy of rehabilitation and reintegration programs is one of the most challenging tasks since it takes a long time to determine the effects of a program, and it might be difficult to collect data over an extended period. In addition, the notion of

recidivism in the context of deradicalization programs is problematic because just because an individual stops engaging in violent behaviour does not mean that they have given up their beliefs (Horgan & Taylor, 2012).

Those who become nonviolent radicals can radicalize others or advance the movement's goals even if they do not actively participate in the movement themselves. The political goodwill and public support necessary to promote non-custodial reintegration programs can be undermined by a few high-profile instances of violent recidivism, particularly in a deadly terrorist attack. This can be particularly devastating for these initiatives (Porges, 2011). However, non-custodial reintegration is crucial to building more resilient communities, and it is a key component of any comprehensive plan to combat violent extremism.

It is possible that the solutions to this issue can be found by applying the knowledge gained by addressing similar issues in the past. Even though the situations being studied are all extremely different and the Islamic State's (IS) ideology is separate from that of al Qaeda, neo-Nazism, and the dynamics of civil conflict, the assumption is that some of these lessons are transferrable. This is the case even though the circumstances being researched are all very different. However, the process of reintegration and persistent disengagement from a community and reinsertion into it, as well as the adoption of a new social position, is founded on specific cultural and contextual variables specific to that community. This is true for both reintegrating into the community and adopting a new social role. Several cognitive and psychological dynamics make it possible to reject or modify a previous identity and commitment to violent behaviour regardless of one's ideology or type of organization.

The capacities and motivations of various communities to facilitate non-custodial reintegration also vary from community to community. The cultural norms around concepts of salvation and the position of an individual within a community are typically clearly established in all communities. In this way, lessons from other contexts can support the goals and theory of change in community-level reintegration programs. On the other hand, the design and implementation of these non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters must consider that particular community's social dynamics and cultural norms.

People who have dealt with terrorism or VERLT but have not been charged with or found guilty of a crime or attempting to leave a violent extremist group are the focus of a third category of reintegration programs. These programs are designed to help these individuals transition back into society. In recent years, there has been a rise in demand for individualized R&R programs that emphasize the aforementioned concerns. Some programs focus on violent extremists already incarcerated, while others help those recently released from jail or prison. These initiatives are used more regularly to assist those migrating or returning from Iraq or Syria. However, they are not being prosecuted and are determined to need aid to reintegrate into their society. This assistance is being provided to people not considered a threat to national security.

The concept of the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters is receiving an increasing amount of attention from national governments and county authorities, civil society, and other non-governmental actors, as well as multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the European Union, and the Council of Europe. In Kenya, there has been an increase in the popularity of both VERLT

and tailored R&R efforts that try to tackle terrorism. Some of these programs are geared toward violent extremists already serving jail time. In contrast, others are designed to help individuals who are rejoining society after either being released from prison or turning themselves in due to an amnesty program offered by the government.

People who have dealt with terrorism or VERLT but have not yet been charged with a crime or found guilty but may be subject to administrative measures or those who desire to quit a violent extremist group of their own free choice are the focus of a third category of these initiatives. These initiatives are aimed at people who have interacted with terrorism or VERLT but who have not yet been charged with a crime or found guilty. Non-custodial reintegration programs are increasingly used to support those returning to the country after engaging in conflicts or fleeing Al-Shabaab in Somalia who is not prosecuted and are determined to get prerequisite support to re-enter their community. This trend began in 2015 when the government of Kenya granted amnesty to those who surrendered from the terrorist gang.

Recent years have seen significant reforms implemented across the board in Kenya's judicial system. Many of these reforms are associated with and affect the non-custodial punishment regime. The National Council on Administration of Justice (NCAJ) was established in 2011 to provide a coordinated approach to the administration of justice and enhance improvements in the existing justice system in Kenya (Kenya Law, 2010). In addition, one of the purposes of the Sentencing Policy Guidelines that were announced in 2016 is to encourage the use of punishments that do not involve incarceration whenever deemed suitable.

If these Guidelines were fully applied, the number of criminals now serving sentences that

do not involve confinement would increase while the number of inmates would drop. The Bail and Bond Policy Guidelines were also distributed to the public in 2015. The constitutional clauses that acknowledge the right to bail are reaffirmed in the recommendations, and the purpose of the guidelines is to limit pretrial detention to instances in which there are sufficient reasons to hold an accused person in jail. These two policy directives were developed as a response to the overpopulation of prisons in Kenya, partly attributed to the substantial number of people detained in pretrial detention and the excessive use of imprisonment (The Judiciary, 2016).

There is a growing trend in Kenya of convicts serving out their periods of imprisonment through community service rather than incarceration. In 2013, 38,585 male and female offenders received either a probation order or an order requiring them to perform community service. The number reached 51,604 in the year 2015 (Ibid). In 2015, 6,887 more women worked for Community Service Orders than in 2013. This is an increase over the previous year, 2013. (Ibid). Regardless of situation-specific variables such as recidivism, prisoners who fall into this group are eligible for sentences that do not involve time spent in a correctional facility, as provided in Section 3(1) of the Community Service Orders Act, 1998. The majority of these sentences are appropriate for them to use. The fact that the jail terms of some criminals were later changed to non-custodial ones shows that the offenders in question were ideal candidates for non-custodial sentences. In addition, some offenders' prison terms were later converted to non-custodial ones.

The non-custodial reintegration programs in Mombasa County each have different goals, components, intervention providers, and levels of participation, all of which are still voluntary. These differences may be seen in terms of the programs' targets. Still, others are

led by civil society organizations and other non-governmental players, and still more involve partnerships between the public and corporate sectors. There are several institutions of the government direct. The Shanzu Boys' Probation Hostel and Training Center in Bamburi, Mombasa County, is one example of an institution that provides non-custodial R&R programs for returnee terrorist fighters. This particular facility serves as an example.

Returned felons serving community sentences can benefit from the Center's rehabilitation programs and activities, designed to assist them in their journey toward full recovery. Treating the offending behaviour, enhancing the offender's capacity for a responsible lifestyle, and maintaining healthy relationships are the three primary goals of the rehabilitation program for returning terrorist offenders. As a result of this, there have been fewer instances of recidivism, and the community, the victim, and the specific offender can all continue to enjoy protection throughout the rehabilitation process.

The vast majority of these reintegration programs provide a wide range of services, including ideological and psychosocial counselling, support with job placement, training for particular occupations, assistance with housing, and access to cultural or recreational possibilities. It is quite doubtful that a single actor or organization could address all of the vulnerabilities and needs that the targeted returnees and their families will have, regardless of whether those requirements are ideological, psychological, or practical. Consequently, the County Government of Mombasa has regularly utilized non-custodial reintegration strategies, with variable degrees of success in each instance. These methods make it possible for a wide variety of practitioners and specialists to take part.

Terrorists and extremists who have formed alliances with other terrorist groups, such as

ISIS or Al-Shabaab, make it more difficult to reintegrate into society as productive members. Because of this conception, a technique known as "arrest-them-all" might be supported in response to pressure from the general population. It has been proved in court cases worldwide how difficult it can be to gain convictions for crimes purportedly committed overseas, particularly in a country in the midst of a civil war. In addition, there is an ongoing discussion on whether or not such a course of action is desirable (Miriti & Kimani, 2017). It should go without saying that the vast majority of persons who have been found guilty of crimes related to terrorism will, at some point in the future, be released from their sentences. Therefore, giving thought to how to manage the reintegration of former terrorist fighters in order to minimize the probability of recurrent violence is not selecting a "soft" strategy; rather, it is a practical response to a difficult situation that needs to be addressed.

Even while their primary objective is to facilitate deradicalization, the rehabilitation and reintegration programs already in place have components that focus on disengagement. The precise benefits and downsides of these programs cannot yet be highlighted definitively due to the continued uncertainty surrounding whether such efforts successfully reduce recidivism related to acts of terrorism. However, this does not preclude the possibility that, in the future, such initiatives will be able to do so. It is still impossible to offer useful guidance to people developing or implementing initiatives comparable to yours (Alexander, Lowenkamp, & Robinson, 2014).

Even though several governments that are members of the EU have adopted reintegration programs, which either prioritize deradicalization or disengagement, or both, the methods utilized by each state are very different. There are distinctions

amongst the reintegration programs regarding the population they are designed to assist. Some of these individuals may be returning foreign combatants, violent extremist criminals, persons susceptible to Radicalization, or all of the above. Additionally, there may be differences in the phases in which the programs are implemented (pre-prison, in-prison, and post-prison), the basis on which participants participate in the programs (voluntary or required), the party in charge of the program's execution, and the components of the programs themselves, which may include religious counselling, educational programs, and psychological counselling, amongst other things (Fink & Hearne, 2008).

Because there are still issues regarding their capability to minimize recidivism associated with acts of terrorism, the precise benefits and cons of non-custodial reintegration programs can't yet be underlined with certainty. This is because there are still unsolved questions about their ability to do so. It is still possible to assist those developing or putting into comparable action projects. Given the number of returns and the fact that these challenges can hinder ongoing reintegration efforts, addressing them should be prioritized at all levels of governance, including the local, national, and EU levels (Cherney, A; Hartley, J, 2017).

It is anticipated that correctional services will work on weaning violent extremists and other violent offenders away from further acts of violence and, by doing so, will prepare these individuals for their social readjustment and reintegration into society. This is in addition to providing humane, secure conditions by international standards. These international requirements include those specified in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Mandela Rules, 2015).

The international human rights standards place an obligation on states to ensure that the social and moral rehabilitation of incarcerated individuals is a priority within the criminal justice system. In addition, these criteria require that states take the necessary precautions to ensure that detainees are not subjected to torture or any other forms of cruel, brutal, or degrading punishments or treatments. This involves keeping individuals in solitary confinement for extended periods or permanently, which is still carried out in several countries, notably with terrorist criminals.

Inhumane incarceration methods not only raise the chances of recidivism but also undermine the effectiveness of rehabilitation and reintegration programs after an individual has been released from prison (UNODC, 2018). Offenders who are violent extremists should be treated properly and in line with the law, just like all other convicts. Furthermore, they should receive support to help them prepare for reintegration into society on all fronts, including socially, psychologically, and practically. Beginning with this step is where the process of reintegrating violent extremist criminals back into society should get underway. The planning for a criminal's post-release programs should begin while the criminal is still incarcerated, and the inmate should collaborate closely with the planners on developing these programs (Alexander, Lowenkamp, & Robinson, 2014).

In addition to maximizing opportunities for offenders to have their risks and needs accurately assessed and the most effective interventions identified, ideally by a multi-disciplinary team of experts, this approach recognizes the significance of maintaining continuity from custodial (in-prison) and non-custodial (out-of-prison) programs. Custodial programs are those that take place inside of prisons, while non-custodial

programs are those that take place outside of prisons. Practitioners should begin working with former inmates within the jail at least six months before the ex-offenders scheduled release date to develop a long-lasting, trustworthy connection and preserve stability. At the same time, practitioners should continue to carry out their counselling obligations outside of prison (EU RAN, 2018).

Both short-term violence prevention and long-term VERLT prevention need to establish general community resilience to VERLT, as well as R&R measures and programs that comply with human rights and that target people outside of the context of prisons. This is true for both short-term violence prevention and long-term VERLT prevention. As a result, the concept of R&R ought to be incorporated into relevant legal and policy frameworks, including national action plans for P/CVERLT, as suggested by the Global Counterterrorism Form (GCTF) and other international bodies, both as part of a criminal justice response to VERLT and as part of a broader approach to post-conflict recovery. In other words, R&R ought to be incorporated into relevant legal and policy frameworks, including national action plans for P/CVERLT (GCTF, 2016).

The appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks for those accused of criminal activity should embrace the idea that their rehabilitation and reintegration into society are equally as vital as punitive measures for those accused of criminal behaviour. These frameworks should be employed in contexts other than the criminal justice system. Additionally, they should include several components that would make it possible to establish and implement R&R programs and policies outside of that environment that is sensitive to age and gender, as well as appropriate and timely for those populations. These programs and policies should be non-custodial.

One of these components might be a qualified and objective assessment of the danger that each returning individual poses to society, in addition to an analysis of the individual's requirements and potential weaknesses. Recognizing the need for a "whole-of-society" approach to the problem, which encourages cooperation between and among a variety of national and local government actors, non-governmental actors such as CSOs, and the private sector, as well as their ability to contribute, ensuring the appropriate actions are taken to address the specific requirements of the women and children who are participating in the non-custodial reintegration programs. Last but not least, emphasizing the significance of ensuring that these non-custodial reintegration programs are subjected to appropriate oversight and are carried out in compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of these programs, and making these evaluations widely accessible to the public. In addition, ensuring that these programs are subjected to appropriate oversight and are carried out in compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law (ICCT, 2018).

In the context of preventing and combatting terrorism in light of the growing number of terrorist offenders, a variety of guidelines, frameworks, and good practice documents have been produced on these themes by multilateral agencies, governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These writings focus on the issues at hand. These policy frameworks raise awareness of how jails can act as incubators for violent and sexually transmitted diseases (VERLT), as well as the significance of providing a specific sector of the prison population with individualized R&R support, which should continue after the individual is released from prison (RAN, 2019) (GCTF, 2012).

In addition to ensuring that the concept of non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters is embedded in the relevant national legal frameworks and strategies, the government of Kenya has developed specific policies or guidelines to enhance the efficacy of any such R&R efforts. These policies or guidelines were developed in order to improve the effectiveness of any such R&R efforts. This is accomplished by making it very apparent who will be qualified to participate in R&R programs outside of the confines of a correctional facility. Provisions that identify the aim of the programs or intervention goals and the activities that must be followed to attain them are one of the policies or guidelines included in these rules or guidelines to encourage transparency. Describe the many different civil society and government stakeholders that are involved in R&R activities, along with the duties and responsibilities that each of them plays; Place a heavy emphasis on the requirement for a variety of interventions and services to address the different psychosocial, practical, and other needs and vulnerabilities of both men and women as well as children who may benefit from such programs; The importance of ensuring that prison conditions are in accordance with human rights should be emphasized for post-prison programs. This should be done while considering how a humane prison environment will likely contribute to beginning an effective disengagement intervention that can continue after release.

Additionally, they should make it clear under what conditions information concerning returnees enrolled in the non-custodial reintegration programs will be shared with the police, intelligence, or security services in order to avoid undermining the beneficiary's trust in the non-custodial reintegration actors. This is necessary to prevent the beneficiary's trust in the non-custodial reintegration actors from being undermined.

This will also make it possible for the government and non-governmental players involved in these initiatives to share information while at the same time respecting the beneficiaries' right to privacy and other fundamental human rights.

Concerning the issue of information sharing, the gathering and disclosure of personal information invariably constitutes a violation of the right to privacy and must thus be justified by law, be required, and be a reasonable trade-off for the risk. This is because gathering and disclosing personal information invariably violates the right to privacy.

It is the responsibility of the national government to ensure that there is a clear legal basis, with the implementation of policies and protocols as necessary, that clarifies what kinds of information can be shared, between whom, who has access to the information, when they have access, and what kinds of protections and safeguards apply. This responsibility includes implementing policies and protocols as necessary. Particularly sensitive information, such as about a person's health or discussions between a client and a lawyer, requires a higher level of protection.

Interventions in the fields of recreation and cultural support have also been employed within the context of non-custodial reintegration programs. It may involve activities in the performing arts, visual arts, musical performance, or athletics. It is impossible to exaggerate the significance of recreational and cultural possibilities in R&R programs that do not occur inside a custodial setting. This is also true of R&R programs within a prison setting and in community-focused P/CVERLT interactions. They provide individuals with avenues through which they may express themselves, enhancing their sense of self-worth, forming healthy bonds with one another, and hastening the healing process (GCTF, 2015). They also provide an alternative kind of support in

circumstances where traditional psychological support services are not available.

Although it is unlikely that this type of assistance will, on its own, convince someone to give up their support for terrorism or other forms of violent extremism, it does greatly aid in that process by providing appealing narratives that aren't the typical ones (Hedayah, 2015). Both athletics and the arts offer a useful forum for discussing diversity and difference while also drawing attention to the common histories, present circumstances, and potential of many individuals. The use of drama help to generate debate and critical thought about experiences shared by several people, which may cross political barriers. The world of athletics also possesses a potent capacity to bring people together. The development of constructive methods to comprehend and resolve conflicts and tensions, which could otherwise lead to support for violent extremism, can also be done by participating in athletics, the arts, and cultural activities.

Over the past decade, researchers have noticed how crucial it has been for sports treatments to aid those individuals who have become radicalized to the point where they support terrorist organizations (Richardson, Cameron, & Ber, 2018), in particular when intended at returnee terrorist combatants who are looking for a sense of identification inside the society as well as a sense of group affiliation (Marsden, Knott, & Lewis, 2017). In addition, who is providing the sports-based instance a way to connect with young people who are disengaged from their communities and schools; once these connections have been made may then present opportunities to engage with and eventually educate people who are radicalized to violence.

Art therapy workshops are included in many rehabilitation and reintegration (R&R) programs throughout Mombasa, where both professional counsellors, and influential

religious figures lead these workshops. One illustration of this trend is the growing number of groups that have been seen in the city performing gymnastics at various traffic lights. They use a variety of artistic forms, such as visual art, music, theatre, movement, and dance, to act as a soft entrée into discussions concerning the events that led to extreme violence. These discussions are the focus of the group. Art provides a clearer way to bring up these difficulties, which are frequently difficult to express in conversation due to the sensitive nature of the topics. Art therapy allows extremists to move outside the context of the current circumstance allows CVE practitioners to have the opportunity to have a beneficial influence on the reframe. This is accomplished by assisting extremists in acknowledging and reframing their life experiences. Art therapy enables extremists to express themselves freely (Shapiro, 2018).

Even though violent extremist offenders in some countries only have access to the same rehabilitation programs available to the general prison population, several other states have created specialized programs that are argued by many to be responsive to the particular needs of a person who has been classified as a terrorist. These programs have been created even though violent extremist offenders only have access to the rehabilitation programs available to the general prison population in some countries. In the past, these have typically included educating prison staff on how to assess the risks posed by violent extremist offenders, providing one-on-one counselling to offenders about religious or ideological issues, interacting with family and community leaders, and forming connections with community organizations to ensure that the offender continues to benefit from the program after release.

Such programs include those now being carried out in Austria, Belgium, Denmark,

Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom (EU RAN, 2018). The United Nations and other organizations have identified several extra stages that need to be considered in getting violent extremist offenders ready to return to their communities. These procedures need to be taken into consideration.

These actions, which may affect how post-release R&R measures are implemented, include the following: First, creating transition programs that promote close collaborations between families, CSOs, and other local actors in the community to which they will be returning, or entering for the first time, in the case of offenders who move to new locations. Those whose trust, engagement, and support will be crucial to any post-release non-custodial R&R initiatives for violent extremists.

Second, if there is a credible threat, ensuring the safety of the released prisoner, as well as his or her family and friends, while simultaneously conducting awareness-raising campaigns and other interactions with the receiving community to lessen the stigma and erode prejudices surrounding those who have already been labelled as "terrorists." In addition, it is essential to implement post-release restrictions that are fair in order to strike a balance between the need to protect the safety of the community and the opportunities for disengagement (UNODC, 2016).

Different programs for non-custodial reintegration have different goals, components, and intervention providers. They also vary in the degree to which participants are given the option to participate voluntarily. Governments are in charge of some of the programs, while CSOs and other non-governmental organizations are in charge of others, and public-private partnerships are involved in the administration of others of the programs. The vast majority of the programs provide participants with access to

various services, including but not limited to housing, educational possibilities, cultural or recreational activities, psychosocial or ideological counselling, job placement, vocational training, and job placement. It is highly improbable that a single actor or organization will be able to meet all of the vulnerabilities and needs of the people who are going to be targeted, as well as the needs of their families, which will include practical, psychosocial, and ideological requirements.

Non-custodial R&R is managed in several methods throughout the OSCE zone, one of which is by the Brussels Prevention Service in Belgium. The Brussels Advance Brussels Vooruit (BRAVVO) counter-radicalization team is comprised of five full-time personnel, one of whom has expertise in both the legal and political science fields (OSCE, 2020); It is linked to a sizable network of service providers located all across the city and employs professionals such as a clinical psychologist, a social worker, an expert on comparative religions, and a sociologist with experience in the field of education.

The goals of the unit are to handle the psychosocial and security concerns connected with individuals who participate in violent extremism and diminish such extremism's influence in particular neighbourhoods. It is active in the primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention spaces all at the same time. This can be achieved by informing people about the dangers of violent extremism and strengthening the safeguards for both children and their parents.

Its activities include educating communities about the Radicalization of people to violence, teaching professionals how to spot the warning signs of Radicalization and how to address those vulnerabilities, identifying personal vulnerabilities, and offering

"wrap around" services through its network of intervention providers to address those vulnerabilities. These activities are designed to combat the Radicalization of people to violence. The section appoints a team leader for each investigation and ensures that all team members have access to open lines of communication at all times.

In addition, the unit has clear regulations regarding when and how interventions are to take place, as well as clear protocols regarding the exchange of information, and it has the flexibility to allow resources to be distributed by the needs that have been recognized. Most cases in this area are referred to by the relevant security-focused local task forces established in every municipality throughout the nation by that Strategy. The reintegration program at BRAVVO has been carried out by Belgium's national counterterrorism strategy since 2005 (Liesbeth & Schuurman, 2019).

"Back on Track," which is a national-level program, is one of the programs that the Danish Prison and Probation Services offer to inmates who have been accused of or found guilty of crimes related to terrorism, inmates whose crimes were connected to hatred of another group, and inmates who are thought to be susceptible to Radicalization to violent extremism. "Back on Track" is one of the Danish Prison and Probation Services programs (Forsorgen, 2014). The purpose of the mentoring program is to assist incarcerated individuals in improving their capacity to deal with everyday challenges, disputes, and situations to reduce the likelihood that these individuals may engage in violent extremist behaviour in the future. Mentoring is meant to support and strengthen an inmate's resolve to live a life free from criminal activity and create new relationships with extremists who reject violence and crime as a means of expressing their beliefs.

An increasing number of international and regional organizations, such as the United Nations, the OSCE, the GCTF, and the European Union, are emphasizing the significance of ensuring that R&R strategies and programs, including those utilized in non-custodial settings, take into account gender and age sensitivities. This is one of the most important aspects of ensuring R&R strategies and programs (Plesch & Haxhiaj, 2019). For example, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396 emphasizes this concept and notes that women and children may have played a range of roles in terrorist acts, including those of sympathizers, enablers, and perpetrators. In light of this, particular attention must be paid to these demographics while formulating prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration strategies.

The Security Council stressed the significance of analysing the risks and requirements of each individual, taking into account characteristics such as age and gender and ensuring that women and children associated with terrorist fighters who might become terrorist targets receive the necessary support. This was done to prevent them from being targets of terrorist attacks. A large number of women and children who travelled to the conflict areas in Iraq and Syria, the growing understanding of the complicated dynamics surrounding their connection to terrorism and VERLT, and the specific needs and challenges they may encounter upon their return are just a few of the reasons for this emphasis. There are many more reasons, but these are just a few of the most important ones (European Commission, 2018).

The gendered nature of recruitment and Radicalization to extremist violence and terrorism has been brought to light by a growing body of research, highlighting the necessity for gender-responsive responses in all areas, including the development and

implementation of non-custodial R&R strategies outside of the context of prisons (Ndung'u & Shadung, 2017). The inclusion of a gender perspective in non-custodial R&R and wider P/CVERLT efforts is consistent with several recent Security Council resolutions and RAN recommendations (UNSCR-2396, 2017), as was mentioned earlier, and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) encourages this as a good practice. In addition, the GCTF notes that including a gender perspective in non-custodial R&R and wider P/CVERLT efforts is consistent with these.

The OSCE ministerial declaration on VERLT from 2015 calls on participating States to, among other things, take into account a gender perspective in their efforts to counter terrorism and prevent and counter VERLT, and the pertinent recommendations in the OSCE/ODIHR guidelines for addressing the challenges posed by terrorist fighters within a human rights framework, also reflect this. The OSCE ministerial declaration on VERLT from 2015 also calls on participating States to consider a gender perspective in their efforts to counter (OSCE, 2018).

Despite this improved understanding and political support at the international and regional levels, a recent study conducted by the United Nations Development Programme and the International Civil Society Action Network discovered that current (R&R) policies and programming tend to either ignore women and girls associated with violent extremist groups or oversimplify the issue. This was found even though R&R policies and programming tend to ignore women and girls associated with violent extremist groups. For example, all 32 of the 110 women who returned to Kosovo in April 2019 were regarded as suspects and held under house arrest upon their arrival (Begisholli, 2019).

The researcher found from this study that women and girls who participate in non-custodial R&R programs are frequently seen in binary terms as either victims or perpetrators of violence (Ibid). This is even though it is known how complex their involvement is and what is required to enable them to disengage from violence and reintegrate into their communities. The reality is that they frequently choose to link themselves with terrorist organizations like VERLT for several different reasons. They can be coerced, co-opted, enslaved, kidnapped, or subjugated inside their groups, and their hopes of belonging, having a purpose in life, having exciting adventures, and gaining empowerment may not be realized.

According to a report published by the United Nations, most nations that take in female terrorist combatants regard them largely as victims due to gendered stereotypes, which are frequently incorrect, about the limited agency they possess. This is the case despite the complexities and threats to national security posed by returning female terrorist fighters, who, like their male counterparts, may also pose (UNCTED, 2019). As a result, the treatment of most women does not occur within the criminal justice system. In addition, this United Nations investigation discovered that women frequently receive less assistance with rehabilitation and reintegration, which may place them at an elevated risk of recidivism and Radicalization and jeopardize their capacity to properly reintegrate into society (Ibid).

The aforementioned disparity underscores the importance of providing more attention to R&R activities that do not include confinement and are targeted at women (and girls). At each level of these programs, including the risk and needs assessment, the design of any interventions, and the execution of those interventions, gender sensitivities should

be taken into consideration.

When planning and putting these kinds of programs into action, the organizations and individuals involved in doing so should routinely take several gender dynamics into mind. Those who have, for example, been the victims of sexual assault have particular psychosocial and health needs that must be met, and they are also susceptible to additional stigma from the communities in which they live. They give birth to children regularly, some of whom may have been subjected to rape or forced marriage while young. As a result of having to take on the burden of running the home after the death of their husband on the battlefield, returning women may also encounter difficulties in terms of their financial situation.

Some women may return to highly politicized and continue to adhere to the ideology of ISIL-Daesh. In contrast, others may return having been disillusioned and eager to reintegrate themselves into normal life and raise their children. Because of societal and cultural standards that restrict the types of R&R opportunities available to women, women may face particular unique hurdles when trying to find such opportunities. They also have a greater risk of being mistreated by security force members (GCTF, 2019). In addition, women linked to terrorist organizations and VERLT are typically subjected to a greater degree of stigma than men, making it challenging for them to be accepted and reintegrated into their families and communities.

Children who are taking part in non-custodial reintegration programs have specific requirements, just as the requirements that women have. For example, their trauma during the war may have disrupted the natural progression of their social, moral, and emotional development. They may have been exposed to violence, may have been its

victims, or may have perpetrated violent actions, making the likelihood and degree of trauma particularly intense compared to other returnees or those who may be participants in the same R&R programs. They may have been its victims. They may have been its perpetrators.

The 2018 OSCE/ODIHR report on dealing with the challenges of returning terrorist fighters encourages states to create and carry out specialized reintegration programs for returning children. These programs should include allocating mentors and various support to enable returning children to return to their previous lives without the fear of being stigmatized or alienated (OSCE, 2018). This recommendation is in agreement with those of several other multilateral organizations, such as the United Nations and the GCTF, which have developed a set of principles for how to handle this category of cases (which is often further divided into age brackets), including when it comes to non-custodial R&R, acknowledging the special risks and protections, as well as the special needs, involved when dealing with minors. Specifically, this recommendation concurs with the United Nations and the GCTF (UNSC, 2018) (GCTF, 2018).

Some of the countries that make up the OSCE region have developed organized plans for managing the return of children from the zone of hostilities, and these plans include R&R activities that do not involve custodial care. For instance, in France, this method entails, among other things, a methodical referral to a juvenile judge for protective measures, an evaluation led by the youth judicial protection services, an evaluation of mental health and broader medical conditions, entry or reintegration into school as soon as is practical, and involvement of the local crime and radicalization and family support units (established under the 2018 National Plan to Prevent Radicalization) to ensure

sustained follow-up (EU RAN, 2018).

Kenya recognizes the Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures established by the United Nations in 1990, which are known as the Tokyo Rules. These regulations emphasize that all inmates should be treated with respect due to their inherent dignity and value as human beings and support the feasibility of non-custodial sentences as an alternative to incarceration. In addition, these regulations promote the viability of non-custodial sentences as an alternative to incarceration. In the roadmap for the country, Vision 2030, the concept of the rule of law and the prevention of crime are highlighted as flagship efforts that assist overall state-building, societal growth, and social order. The Department of Probation and Aftercare Service is responsible for administering programs that aid in the social rehabilitation and readjustment of convicted criminals. As a distinct branch of study within the realm of criminal justice, the Department enjoys a competitive edge in this field, bolstered by applicable legal mandates and an accommodating organizational structure.

The operations of the Department are directed by the Department's goals, which are as follows: the generation of information for courts and other penal institutions for the administration of criminal justice; the supervision and rehabilitation of offenders serving community sentences; the reintegration and resettlement of offenders serving statutory penal licenses; and the promotion of initiatives for the prevention of crime. All of these ideas stem from the fundamental belief that criminals are capable of making amends. Kenya's reintegration program is one of a kind worldwide. In particular, it began in 2015 when a program for amnesty was revealed as being available. In 2016, President Uhuru Kenyatta presented the National Strategy to Counter Violent

Extremism (NSCVE), an addition to the traditional counterterrorism strategies already in place.

This technique comprised both counter-radicalization and preventative measures. Within the framework of this approach, various county governments, civil society organizations, and communities are each given a role to play. Prior to the implementation of the NSCVE strategy, the basis for measures to combat violent extremism was laid by the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2012, the Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014, and the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act of 2017. These three pieces of legislation were passed in 2012, 2014, and 2017 respectively (Ogada, 2017). These policies make law enforcement, intelligence collection, and civil sanctions their points of focus in their fight against violent extremism.

The Strategy came into the picture as a supplement to them, looking at tactics and ways that were not as harsh as others to minimize communities' vulnerability to radical violent extremism. The government of Kenya, like the governments of other countries worldwide, is aware that using force to fight this threat is ineffective. New interventions continually focus on community engagement to enhance relations with citizens, help the police acquire information about terrorism, identify violent extremists, and stop Radicalization. This is done to stop Radicalization (Cherney, A; Hartley, J, 2017).

Kenya's acute awareness of the terrorist dangers is the source of the country's holistic Strategy, which was taken because of these risks. Terrorism poses an existential risk that calls for extraordinary measures to combat it. Unusually, people fighting against it are considered allies, while others fighting for it are considered enemies. This was made

very obvious in President Uhuru Kenyatta's speech at the 2016 NSCVE. In it, he advocated for a concerted anti-terrorism policy by casting the current predicament in terms of "us" vs. "them." The county governments in Kenya were given the authority to develop County Action Plans (CAPs) by the national government of Kenya to support local CVE initiatives at the national level. Kwale County is responsible for developing the first CVE plan focused on promoting restorative justice and combating violent extremism (Shauri, 2017).

A relatively short time after the Kwale Action Plan was presented, Mombasa County Governor Hassan Joho presented a similar plan. The foundation of the Action Plan is comprised of the nine pillars that make up the NSCVE, which are training and capacity building, education, psychosocial support, security, media and online, arts and culture, faith-based and ideological, legal, policy, and politics, in addition to two additional pillars that focus on women and the economy (Mombasa County, 2017). Both models recognize that an effective reintegration program is essential to stop people from being involved in violent extremism.

Because criminal behaviour can have individual and societal roots, communities need to play an active part in rehabilitating and reintegrating former terrorist fighters. Reporting a crime or offense to the appropriate authorities typically rests with the community or individual citizens. After going through the established legal procedure that the government has in place, the offender will eventually return to the community and require social help to effectively reintegrate and resettle themselves. The community comprises the offender's immediate family members, members of the general public, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based groups, and

community-based organizations (CBOs) that offer specific services for the treatment of offenders. Inside the halfway homes that have previously been set up in Mombasa County, there aren't a lot of non-governmental and religious groups working to assist former prisoners in Mombasa County with their reintegration into society (Mumma-Martinon & Ododa, 2019).

The community policing strategy is a novel approach to reducing criminal activity and improving the safety of residential areas. It is founded on the principles of public trust, citizen empowerment, and collaborative effort. This program is built on a greater relationship between the community and the police force in recognition that communities are aware of their surroundings and can identify social outcasts and suspicious activities occurring within their midst. As a result, this research will contribute to a discussion that is currently taking place in Mombasa County but has not yet concluded appropriate reintegration tactics for exiled foreign terrorist fighters.

2.1.3 The Process of Non-Custodial Reintegration

The issue of non-custodial R&R does not have a single, overarching solution, just as the question of P/CVERLT measures generally does not have a single, overarching solution. However, in the process of developing and implementing such programs, there are a great many considerations and issues that need to be taken into account. This section will walk you through the first six important steps of the process.

2.1.3.1 Mapping the Environment for Non-Custodial Reintegration Programme

A comprehensive mapping of the resources and capacities that are already accessible should be carried out as the first stage in order to fully grasp the ecosystem of all players that might be used to support the non-custodial R&R initiatives. This should be done

so that the non-custodial R&R initiatives may be supported. This mapping should specify, among other things: targets for non-custodial R&R programs, such as past violent extremist offenders or returnee terrorist fighters and family members who are not subject to the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system; The kind of professionals and community members (such as teachers, counsellors, mentors, clergymen, and family members) who are most suited for the job include those who are willing to participate in non-custodial R&R initiatives, as well as their knowledge of and established connections with the relevant people, families, and communities; in addition, these professionals and community members have established connections with the relevant people, families, and communities; if there are any programs that are already in place that could be changed for R&R purposes, such as those that deal with P/CVERLT or gang violence; what additional tools, skills, and training are required; if there are any programs that are already in place that could be modified for R&R purposes; levels of confidence between law enforcement and non-law enforcement professionals as well as between the police and the relevant communities, identifying any areas where confidence is low and needs to be improved; levels of confidence between law enforcement and the relevant communities; the policies and practices that are currently in place for preserving data and communicating pertinent information, as well as any regulatory holes in data protection that may need to be filled; as well as the attitudes held by society toward persons who have been found guilty of terrorist offenses or who have some relation to terrorism in terms of their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

2.1.3.2 Personalised Needs Assessment of the Returnee Terrorist Fighters

This step's purpose is to ensure that any non-custodial reintegration program either carries out or relies on in-depth, individual assessments of the risks and requirements posed by the program's beneficiaries. Several bodies, including the UN Security Council, the GCTF, the Council of Europe, and RAN, have stressed the significance of such evaluations. Evaluations of this kind can pave the way for the development of individualized answers that take into account the life stories, personalities, and intrinsic cognitive talents of the returnees (EU RAN, 2016), are appropriate to the risk, attend to the needs of the returnees, and prevent further radicalization of the people targeted, members of their family, or local populations (GCTF, 2018). The Global Contextualization Task Force (GCTF) has said that any contextualized assessment instrument should consider the participant's age, gender, mental health, and other relevant identifying indicators. The Global Contextualization Task Force (GCTF) understands the importance of developing contextualized evaluation instruments (Ibid). According to the Risk Assessment Network (RAN), the designers and implementers of non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist combatants can better grasp the returnees' needs, stories, and networks if they use specific risk assessment procedures for violent extremism. These techniques have been developed specifically for violent extremism (RAN, 2016). Some more particular topics that need to be investigated include the returnees' commitment to and motives for using violence, their level of adherence to a violent ideology, their capacity to use violence, their social context and aim, and their psychosocial and practical requirements. Before people return to war-torn countries like Somalia, Syria, or Iraq, we need to ensure we fully

understand the circumstances under which they fled such countries. However, they are likely to include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic experiences, anxiety, disillusionment, aggression, potential feelings of guilt or shame, a lack of job opportunities, stigma from the community and society, difficulties in resolving conflicts amicably, and contextual learning about religion and politics. The needs that must be met and the difficulties that must be overcome will differ according to the individual returnee.

Even though those who are developing non-custodial R&R programs for P/CVERLT may wish to make use of relevant, currently available tools, which frequently share a few indicators by which to gauge an individual's level of engagement in extremist acts, with the underlying approach ranging from structured professional judgment to self-questionnaires, they should ultimately rely on an approach to risk and needs assessment that is informed by, adapted to the local context, and most likely to be successful (OSCE, 2019). In order to accomplish this, it is essential to understand that inadequately conceived and administered risk assessment methods have the potential to unjustly profile and single out particular individuals, stigmatize and alienate beneficiaries, and undermine attempts to provide non-custodial R&R by alienating beneficiaries and community groups (Dean, Feve, & Kessel, 2018).

Given the variety of situations presented in just one category of returnees from Al-Shabaab in Somalia, it is essential to conduct personalized evaluations when developing non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County. These programs are intended to help returnees find a place in society after their time spent fighting for terrorist organizations overseas. Various experiences,

motivations, and histories are represented among the males, females, and young people who have returned. For example, relatives of the families of terrorist fighters could play the role of witnesses, victims, or all three simultaneously.

In recent years, much attention has been paid to how exactly women who travelled to combat zones and got married there were involved in terrorist activities. This question has received a lot of attention. Recently, a lot of focus has been placed on the part played by youngsters (Ex-Post Evaluation, 2018). In other words, individuals in this category have various requirements and dangers, which may require aid from the humanitarian and security communities.

2.1.3.3 Multiagency Information Sharing and Cooperation

It is vital to enable multiagency information exchange and cooperation to generate in-depth, individualized assessments and ensure the success of non-custodial R&R programs. In addition, this will help ensure that the initiatives will be successful. During assessing a situation, these data should be considered so that an appropriate intervention or support approach may be developed. However, there are a lot of obstacles to overcome when it comes to sharing information. Different professional and ethical frameworks and objectives might make it difficult to share information. This is true for those who provide psychological therapy and religious and other counsellors. In addition, some regulations must be followed regarding the collection and storage of data, and the right to privacy is safeguarded by human rights law (OSCE, 2017).

Personal information must be gathered and processed fairly and lawfully, maintained only for the precise and permitted purposes for which it was collected, and used only in a manner compatible with those goals to be protected against disclosure to parties

not authorized to view it. Particular precautions are required for extremely sensitive data, such as information about a person's health and the political and religious convictions of returnee terrorist fighters registered in the non-custodial reintegration programs.

In addition, actors involved in reintegration who do not generally have access to sensitive material, much alone classified information, may be reluctant or unable to accept information from law enforcement, security, or intelligence services. There is a possibility that members of the media and news reporters, together with civil society and human rights organizations, are included in this group. Suppose you have reliable, personal relationships or informal networks. In that case, overcoming this resistance or discovering other means to make the necessary information sharing on an as-needed basis possible is often possible. This can be done by finding creative solutions. Transparent guidelines or other frameworks - including, whenever possible, legislative ones - as well as oversight and independent review processes, should be put in place, even though there will inevitably be a change in personnel throughout a program. This is because of the necessity to protect personal information and adhere to privacy laws.

By making it easier for individuals involved in reintegration to share information, knowledge, and expertise and by protecting information from returnee terrorist fighters, these might make it easier for individuals involved in reintegration from various agencies, organizations, and professions to evaluate a particular case jointly and methodically. This would be beneficial for both parties (Hemmingsen, 2015). For example, in Denmark, the police, schools, and social service agency - the three pillars of the locally led P/CVERLT efforts - are permitted to share information about an

individual if it is required for cooperation in crime prevention or cooperation between the police, social services, and social psychiatry and mental health authorities in their efforts to assist socially vulnerable people. This is the case even if the information does not pertain to a crime being investigated. When criminal investigations are being carried out, the exchange of information is strictly forbidden.

In Belgium, there is a legislative framework in place that enables the horizontal and vertical sharing of sensitive information about individuals. However, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has questioned the legal justification for the collection of data from returnee terrorist fighters on surrender, the access for people, including children and their legal guardians to information that is held about them, the ability to challenge the accuracy of such data, and the legal justification for the sharing of such data within and between countries. In addition, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedom (UNSC, 2018).

The policy framework for information sharing in the execution of non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters should be clear to professionals and program beneficiaries regarding the information shared, when it is shared, with whom it is shared, and why it is shared. It should also be clear under what circumstances security agencies must be involved in the process (Koller, 2019). The German Council on Foreign Relations hosted a workshop on tertiary prevention in Berlin in March 2019. It concluded that to build trust between all parties involved; there needs to be transparency regarding the obligations and boundaries of information-sharing. This is especially important when a client is concerned about protecting the personal information they

disclose to a counsellor. Concerns and misconceptions surrounding data sharing can be addressed and dispelled by proactively notifying returnee terrorist fighters registered in non-custodial reintegration programs of the aforesaid requirements and limits (Ibid). This would allow for addressing and dispelling concerns and misunderstandings regarding data sharing.

When attempting to share information across the many reintegration experts who can be involved in tailored P/CVERLT treatments, there are several obstacles to overcome; however, three stand out in the context of the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters. These include: The EU RAN invites governments to consider establishing mechanisms allowing additional stakeholders to share information with one another and the original stakeholders (EU RAN, 2017).

The first challenge is requiring additional categories of professionals, such as probation or intelligence services. The second challenge is the increased reluctance of non-law enforcement professionals to become involved in such cases due to the increased security and other risks posed by returnee terrorist fighters upon their return. Both of these challenges are related to the fact that returnee terrorist fighters pose increased risks upon their return. Second, the refusal of law enforcement personnel to disclose information concerning cases that may have repercussions for national security as well as the responsibility for those cases with professionals working in fields unrelated to law enforcement, such as journalists working for the media and news reporters.

2.1.3.4 Non-Custodial Reintegration Strategy Informed by Empirical Evidence

The subsequent step in the process entails formulating an individualized strategy, which is guided by the evaluation results. This would be a strategy that is established in close

consultation with the intended beneficiaries, who are returnee terrorist combatants so that they would feel engaged in the outcome of the plan. In an ideal world, this would be the case. It is important for host community members, such as teachers, mentors, family members, counsellors, and any other community members, to get involved with returnees to the extent that they have a reliable relationship with the individual.

It is to be anticipated that potential returnees taking part in the non-custodial R&R program will demonstrate a variety of vulnerabilities, hazards, and requirements. These may include ideological, psychosocial, economic, religious, educational, and familial concerns. Others might still be radicalized, have already had military training, and present a threat to public safety that is significant enough to call for continued surveillance by law enforcement or some other kind of monitoring. Some of them might have had only a minimal amount of engagement or contact with terrorists or VERLT. Others may have been rejected or shunned by their communities. In contrast, still, others may have families that may be supporting violent extremism or, for other reasons, would not play constructive roles in the R&R process. Some communities may have even actively participated in the exclusion of these individuals.

It is possible that the communities and families of some terrorist fighters who have returned home are excited to make a constructive contribution to their reintegration process. Others may require specialist counselling or other P/CVERLT interventions, but others may merely require fundamental psychosocial support or other services available to the general public. Those who require the former are more likely to require P/CVERLT interventions. Because the requirements of individual returnees can vary widely, non-custodial R&R measures can include any combination of the following

types of programs and activities: Support for mental health issues, the development of skills, education up to the basic level, healthcare, employment assistance, legal assistance, economic support, social support, and engagement with local communities through dialogue and outreach programs (GCTF, 2018).

However, during the non-custodial reintegration process, the help and support provided to returnees must be proportionate with the needs and vulnerabilities of the individuals receiving it. Over intervening, or providing too much or too many different types of support, should be avoided because it comes with its own set of problems, including stigmatizing the person, making it harder to establish trust between government workers and the person and his or her family, limiting cognitive space for rehabilitation and disengagement, and unnecessarily raising concerns in the relevant community (where the community will feel the ex-offender is accorded preferent treatment). People in charge of non-custodial R&R programs should frequently monitor and analyze the potential for the program's ability to cause more harm than good, and the amount of intervention should be modified as and when it is thought appropriate. In addition, people in charge of the program should do regular risk assessments.

2.1.3.5 Identification of Non-Custodial Reintegration Programme Lead Actor

When numerous people are involved in the reintegration process of an individual returnee, it is extremely important to select a lead actor, also referred to as the "case owner." This individual will serve as the devoted point of contact for the person who is worried, their family, and the greater community. Additionally, this person will organize the numerous actors and activities involved in the case. Even though the police or other security actors will probably be involved in tertiary prevention cases,

particularly those involving returnee terrorist fighters and family members from conflict zones, they might not be the best candidates to take the lead. For example, having the police take the initiative as lead actors in the reintegration program runs the risk of undermining efforts to establish trust with community members, whose continued cooperation and engagement are necessary for the program's success.

Community members may be unwilling to participate with the police for several reasons, including the possibility that they view the police as being on a mission related to security and lacking the training and instruments necessary for community policing and engagement. Even more critically, It is probable that the returnees had a negative relationship with the police. As a result, they have low faith in the police and other state institutions due to that interaction. Suppose the non-custodial R&R attempt in these circumstances is not handled sensitively, for example, by hiring a social worker or CSO to initiate and lead the engagement. In that case, the necessary rebuilding of trust may be difficult to accomplish. This can be avoided by appointing a social worker or CSO to lead the engagement. This engagement could be initiated in cooperation with the police, depending on the level of risk involved, the harm posed to the returnee, and how comfortable community service officers and social workers are with being proactive.

2.1.3.6 Awareness Creation on Benefits of Non-Custodial Reintegration Programmes

Another crucial step in the process of non-custodial reintegration for returnee terrorist fighters is the effective communication of the goals and benefits of non-custodial R&R measures to a public that may view them as being too "soft" for dealing with terrorism, and, on the other hand, to the targeted people and host communities that may view them as potentially stigmatizing. This is important because the public may view these measures

as too "soft" for dealing with terrorism (Christensen & Bjørgo, 2018).

Additionally, depending on the interventions and other forms of support provided in a non-custodial R&R setting, as well as how widely these services are made available to the general public, non-custodial reintegration programs may cause people to feel resentful of the people they are trying to help. This is because they believe, and this may be true, that those who have ties to violent extremism or terrorism receive better care than those who don't. Because of this, it is of the utmost importance to devise and implement a strategy to deal with both categories of concerns.

The non-custodial reintegration plan should consider having all program participants actively explain their techniques and aims, providing feedback on the effectiveness and acceptance of their programs in the target group, and sharing successful instances of their efforts. Additionally, it should include information on the strategies it uses to reach audiences with strong objections or a contemptuous attitude while simultaneously outlining the limitations of its work.

It is also required to convince the public's skepticism that investing in non-custodial R&R programs for returnee terrorist fighters is an essential component of an all-encompassing anti-terrorism strategy. This can be accomplished by educating the public about the importance of these programs. It is a shrewd alternative to assisting "terrorists," since it works to reduce the likelihood of recidivism and collaborates with former terrorist offenders to prevent other people from committing acts of violence in the future (Morton & Silber, 2018) as well as to stop people from the affected areas from getting politicized and turning to violence. Given the growing number of terrorism-related offenses that carry relatively short sentences (in part because many are for non-violent crimes such as

providing material support) and the relatively young age of most released or returnee terrorist offenders, it would be, at best, shortsighted not to invest in interventions to support offenders' disengagement from violence and peaceful re-entry into society. This is especially true because many of these non-violent crimes include providing material support.

In light of the information presented thus far, it is of the utmost importance to devise a plan for reducing the stigma that is attached to released (former) extremists or returnee terrorist fighters, as well as the individuals who are expected to facilitate their reintegration into society. This is the case whether the extremists in question were terrorist fighters or not. It is important, for instance, how the program is presented to the individual and the larger community (for example, as a counterterrorism initiative, a criminal justice measure, a civil society, or a resilience-building program) because the terminology used to describe the initiative will have different implications for how the community views the particular returnee and, consequently, for how willing the community is to support the individual. For example, the program could be presented as a counterterrorism initiative, a criminal justice measure, civil society, or resilience (Veldhuis, 2012).

Community members may be hesitant to collaborate with government officials on the reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters and their families who are not charged upon their return for fear that doing so may increase the likelihood that a returning family member will face legal action and put them at risk of stigmatization. This is because returnee terrorist fighters and their families may not be charged upon their return. Stigma may also need to be addressed in the workplace to avoid prejudice, which could influence employment decisions and workplace safety and delay the reintegration of former terrorist

fighters who have returned from active duty (Invisible Women, 2019). One of the goals of the communications plan that was developed for the non-custodial reintegration programs is to increase the capabilities of families and community people who are accepting returning family members. This includes increasing their level of knowledge. This alleviates these concerns and bolsters the healing process, integration into society, and treating disorders associated with traumatic experiences.

Lastly, professionals who give R&R interventions in the community can face stigma or pressure from their peers or other community members. This is because they are made liable for the behaviour of their clients. Creating space for the self-reflection and professionalization of practitioners, as well as coming to an awareness of the roles and responsibilities of individuals involved in such interventions, can assist in lessening this danger (VPNRI, 2019).

In addition to the negative connotations associated with the topic, practical and safety concerns may need to be addressed. Fear of retaliation and social marginalization pose a considerable barrier to the social component of non-custodial reintegration, which is significantly impeded. In order to ensure the recipients of non-custodial R&R programs and their family's safety, they may need to take preventive measures when it becomes necessary to do so. Possible responses include taking precautions to protect witnesses or temporarily relocating them. The anonymity that comes with the relocation can help former terrorist offenders create a stable identity by helping them to avoid having to constantly address their history, including their ties with extremist organizations. This is one of the ways that anonymity can assist in the process of developing a stable identity.

The recipients of the R&R efforts should also be shielded from any unnecessary public attention in order to avoid putting the continuing non-custodial reintegration process of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County into jeopardy. This will ensure that the process does not become compromised. If done by the principle of "Do No Harm," media coverage of the program activities can bring attention to the unique challenges confronted by returning terrorist fighters and their families (as well as others who may have had some association with violent extremism), thereby fostering empathy and reducing stigma in communities (Bonis & Lucchi, 2018).

2.1.3.7 Monitoring and Evaluation of the Non-Custodial Reintegration Programmes

An essential stage in re-establishing the reintegration of former terrorist combatants who have returned home is ensuring that the non-custodial R&R intervention is correctly monitored and evaluated. This must be done while also recognizing the challenges in determining the degree to which such programs succeed. In non-custodial reintegration, as with a significant portion of the P/CVERLT sector, there is a paucity of evidence-based knowledge regarding what works and what does not. Because they lack a strong empirical basis, implementing these programs is typically done through trial and error (Veldhuis, 2012). There is a need for further information to determine what characteristics support effective outcomes and how progress could be monitored. As a result of the fact that there aren't as many publicly available evaluations of non-custodial reintegration initiatives as there should be, it is difficult to tell what supports self-restraint from violence or other good change on the returnee terrorist fighters. There are also problems with data collection, a lack of understanding of what occurs within the non-custodial reintegration initiatives, and challenges assessing success,

often related to a lack of understanding of what supports abstinence from violence or other positive change. These problems are sometimes linked to a lack of understanding of what supports abstinence from violence or other positive change (Heide & Schuurman, 2019).

Evaluation methods for non-custodial reintegration programs should be incorporated into the design of the intervention in order to contribute to the development of this body of evidence and to make it simpler to conduct periodic evaluations of the implementation and efficacy of the program. This should be done in order to: (a) make it possible to contribute to the development of this body of evidence and (b) make an evaluation of the effectiveness of the program easier to do. The evaluation results must also be made available to the public whenever and wherever it is practically viable to do so. Those in charge of developing non-custodial R&R programs have several responsibilities, the most important of which is to ensure that the design of each intervention (or larger program) is guided by a theory of change that explains how the suggested method relates to the intervention's goals and expected outcomes. This is the first and most important responsibility.

Theories of change, which should guide the program's objectives (such as attitudinal, motivational, and skills-related changes), assist in identifying how the program should be developed and whether or not it successfully achieves the desired results (Cherney, 2018). In addition to this, it makes it much simpler to monitor the program's development and success as it is carried out. A successful evaluation of the non-custodial reintegration programs is vital to obtaining continuous funding and public support for this effort, which depends on properly expressing what non-custodial R&R

programs intend to accomplish (OSCE, 2020).

It is also extremely important to make it feasible to analyze the progress being made on an ongoing basis in order to guarantee that the intervention will continue to cater to the ever-evolving requirements of the individual returnees. It is essential, while determining the efficacy of any therapy, to consider the possibly enormous societal, cultural, and other obstacles that individuals seeking to leave VERLT have to face (Gielen, 2018).

2.1.4 Forms of Terrorism in Kenya: Home-grown Verses International Terrorism

Kenya is now being affected by two different sorts or varieties of terrorism. Both globally inspired terrorism and domestic terrorism from within a country's borders can be classified as terrorism. Terrorism that occurs globally and is perpetrated by individuals from other nations is called international terrorism. Terrorists routinely travel across international borders to "export" their destructive operations. On the other side, domestic terrorism, also known as homegrown terrorism or local terrorism, is carried out by terrorist organizations located within a state's borders. Terrorism is considered to be local or homegrown when, for instance, terrorists who are Kenyan commit terrorist activities within the borders of Kenya. This meets the criteria for the term "local." When members of the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization from Somalia cross the border into Kenya to carry out terrorist attacks, this is an example of international terrorism.

There is continuing evidence that the terrorist organization known as Al-Shabaab is involved in internal and foreign acts of terrorism. Over the course of several years, this organization has been able to forge relationships with several other worldwide terrorist

organizations, including Al-Qaeda, ISIS/ISIL, Boko Haram, and other terrorist organizations (Darden, 2019). Since Kenyan troops joined other foreign forces in Somalia in 2011 to wedge a war to eradicate the terror group, the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization has made a series of reprisal strikes on Kenyan land. These assaults have been carried out in retaliation for Kenyan troops' participation in the battle. In 2019, Kenya was the target of the deadliest terrorist attack in its history, which Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for. The deployment of a suicide vest and intentionally targeting people were two notable strategies that Al-Shabaab employed during the conflict. In addition, terrorist assaults continued in the coastal region of Mombasa, particularly those that involved deploying improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambushes that targeted Kenyan security personnel and essential infrastructure. Several terrorist attacks took place in 2019, including the one in which members of Al-Shabaab assaulted the Dusit2D hotel complex in Nairobi on January 15. This attack resulted in the deaths of 21 people and injuries to 28 others. On February 16 (Al-Jazeera, 2019). It is believed that Al-Shabaab was responsible for the murder of three Christian teachers who were working at a primary school in the predominantly Muslim County of Wajir. According to claims published in the media on April 15, one police officer was killed in Mandera, and two Cuban doctors were taken captive there. An IED that Al-Shabaab planted in Wajir County on June 15 caused a police car to be destroyed, resulting in the deaths of 11 police officers and the injury of one officer. According to the claims coming from the government and the media, three policemen from the Kenya Police Reserve were also taken captive. On October 26, it was claimed by the media that 11 General Service Unit (GSU) officers had been killed in Garissa County as a result of

an IED that Al-Shabaab had detonated. According to reports from the media and the government, an attack by Al-Shabaab on a public bus in Wajir County on December 6 resulted in the deaths of eight people: six police officers and four civilians (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2019).

There have been multiple further terrorist attacks across the country, some of which took place in Lamu, Mombasa, and Wajir, in addition to the one that took place at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi (International Crisis Group, 2018). Another assault took place on the campus of Moi University in Garissa. These assaults may all be traced back to Al-Shabaab in one way or another. Mombasa County is believed to function as the planning headquarters for most of these attacks, or the attackers snuck across its porous border with Kenya to carry out most of them. Both of these hypotheses are based on the fact that the border between Kenya and Mombasa County is somewhat permeable. It is important to note that these are acts of international terrorism, which the Kenyan security authorities consider the most difficult category.

Despite this, Al-Shabaab has recently begun a vigorous drive to recruit young people from the coastal region, particularly Mombasa County. This occurs due to campaigns designed to radicalize individuals, some of which occur in worship houses. Several young people from Kenya have been implicated in the acts of terrorism that have taken place on Kenyan soil. Some of the assailants who attacked Garissa University and the attack on the DusitD2 Hotel were young people from Kenya (Wakube, Nyagah, Mwangi, & Attree, 2017).

2.1.4.1 Domestic Terrorism in Kenya

Kenya has recently seen the emergence of domestic terrorism, also known as

homegrown or indigenous kind of terrorism. The radicalization campaign that the Al-Shabaab group has begun to enlist the young people of Kenya in their terrorist cause is the root cause of this situation. It has come to the government attention that this terrorist group has recently begun to concentrate on the young people who make their homes in Kenya's coastal and Northeastern districts (Hellsten, 2016). This is most likely because they are predominantly Muslim affiliates, making them an easy audience to reach out to through Mosques. According to the findings of this investigation, the young people who carried out the attacks at Garissa University and the DisitD2 Restaurant were all Kenyans. This unequivocally demonstrates that domestic terrorism is rising, albeit at a rather primitive stage. This tendency can be stopped in its tracks if the national government of Kenya and the county governments work together and employ tried-and-true methods of fighting terrorism before things get out of hand.

Compared to countries bordering the Federal Republic of Somalia, such as Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea, Kenya has witnessed a far larger number of people join Al-Shabaab than any of these other countries. It is common knowledge that most foreign fighters for the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab come from Kenya. It is believed that between 20 and 25 percent of the approximately 7,000 fighters in Al-Shabaab who hail from Kenya are involved (Burridge, 2014).

According to the findings of Anderson and McKnight's inquiry into the role of Al-Shabaab in clan politics, it was discovered that Kenya is now a viable place for recruiting young people into the ranks of Al-Shabaab. This was revealed in their report on their investigation, which can be seen here (Anderson & McKnight, 2015). When soldiers from the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) marched into Somalia in October 2011,

this did not begin there; rather, it had begun significantly earlier. It is speculated that most of the recruits come from the counties of Isiolo and Garissa, both located in the northeastern part of Kenya. A similar thing happens along the coast of Kenya, particularly in the counties of Lamu and Mombasa, where most of the people who join the military come from. Regarding Nairobi County, the Eastleigh neighbourhood is where recruits are typically found. These new members are instructed by the recruiters on the best way to enter Somalia, and where to go once they are there (Anderson & McKnight, 2015). Analysis of the perpetrators of the attacks in Kenya revealed that Kenyan youths recruited into Al-Shabaab were directly involved in carrying out those assaults. This was determined by looking at the perpetrators of those attacks.

Botha (2014) observes that Kenyan-born terrorists in the ranks of Al-Shabaab are the ones who assist in organizing and carrying out attacks on Kenyan soil. This is because they have the advantage of having a comprehensive understanding of the geographical landscape of the country, in addition to the fact that they can disguise themselves more easily by speaking the native language and are less likely to be suspected. After receiving the necessary training in Somalia, they carried out these attacks. They can carry out the planning process in Somalia and Kenya due to the assistance they obtain from the dormant cells they awaken in Kenya. Because these terrorists have Kenyan citizenship, it is far simpler for them to enter Kenya than it would be for anyone else. Once they enter the country, they become untraceable since they blend in with the populace, making it difficult for the government to find and arrest them.

Al-Shabaab has built huge networks and sleeper cells in Kenya, where local youths who have been radicalized are participating in terrorist acts. This is in addition to the

significant number of recruits spotted in Kenya for Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has been successful in doing so. These domestic terrorists present a big problem to Kenya's security authorities since they are familiar with the locations where they plan to carry out their attacks. For instance, it was observed that four out of the five attackers at Garissa University were Kenyan nationals. These individuals carried out the attack.

Take the attack at Westgate Mall as another example to illustrate my thesis. It was later established that Kenyan authorities had previously housed people responsible for the planning and execution of the attack as Somali refugees. This information came to light when it was discovered that those responsible had been involved in the attack. The flood of Al-Shabaab returnees from Somalia who are either Al-Shabaab trainees or other members of the militant group is another indicator that Kenya has always been a prime place for Al-Shabaab recruitment and radicalization. These returns indicate that Kenya has always been a prime area for Al-Shabaab recruitment and radicalization. (Botha, 2014).

Returnees from Somalia who took part in the heinous murders of villagers in Kwale County, located in the coastal region of Kenya, are named on the list provided by Adow (2015). The list contains eight names. These vicious murderers used simple tools like hammers and knives to take the lives of three respected community members (Adow, 2015). It is evident from the goings-on in the country that Al-Shabaab has several homegrown fighters, a complex network of terror cells, and enough intelligence network which makes use of both returnees from Somalia as well as the Al-Shabaab sympathizers who live within the population (Onsarigo, 2016). This is the conclusion that Onsarigo (2016) comes to in his work.

The countless attempts that Al-Shabaab and other foreign terrorist groups are making to radicalize young people and the general populace must be brought to people's attention. This occurs occasionally under the auspices of mosques and other religious gatherings in the local area. It has been reported on multiple occasions that the militant group slips into Kenyan territory in the county of Mombasa and takes the stage, particularly at religious prayer services, to broadcast their ideas to radicalize the locals. These messages are intended to radicalize the locals.

The tone, framing, and angle that are utilized by the media while covering the news all play a part in contributing to the propagation of the radicalization agenda that terrorists are driving. For example, when reporting on the Mandera area, the media takes a negative tone and viewpoint because the area is seen as a fertile breeding ground for terrorist activity. This is one of how the media portrays Mandera County. In addition, the media present the county as having been ignored by the national government over the years, contributing to the locals' poor image of the government. This has resulted in several young people developing a disregard for the government's authority; some have even gone so far as to join terrorist organizations.

The government of Mombasa County, in collaboration with the government of Kenya as a whole, has convened a series of forums in recent months in order to address the issue of the terrorist threat that exists in the county, as well as to develop tactics that will prevent Al-Shabaab from radicalizing and recruiting residents of the county. The county administration has established a fully functional department of counter-radicalization and violent extremism tasked with combating radicalization and violent extremism inside the county (Daily Nation, 2019).

Since quite a few years ago, Mandera has had the reputation of being a "hotbed" of terrorist activity. The various acts of violence have resulted in many fatalities and injuries. The majority of these attacks started in the year 2011, and they reached their peak in the year 2014 when 64 individuals were slain in the span of ten days (Daily Nation, 2014). The situation worsens because terror sleeper cells operate in Mandera County. The presence of terrorist cells has negatively impacted the surrounding community, which has been subjected to the consequences of terrorist attacks and economic neglect. The various security agencies have not been excluded from this either. A great number of lives have been lost as a result of IED attacks on roadways (Daily Nation, 2014).

The Kenyan populace needs to be on guard against the warped and radicalized interpretations of Islamic doctrine that are being used by radicals to radicalize others. People who have been radicalized tend to avoid the company of other people; they prefer to be alone. The locals need to recognize the early warning signs of radicalization in how extremists approach the Islamic teachings in the county. Additionally, radicalization behaviour changes to watch for in identifying people who have been radicalized include the following: radicalized persons tend to avoid the company of other people. They also have the impression that their classmates do not accept them. The individual who has been radicalized is always looking for a new thrill or source of excitement, and most of the time, people who have been radicalized feel the need to go out and remedy some injustice that they perceive in the world.

In order to prevent radicalization in Mombasa County, which could lead to domestic and homegrown terrorism, the county government and, more generally, officials from

the national government need to develop an effective and proactive communication strategy to explain government policies. Developing an intercultural dialogue between the communities in the county is also important. This will dispel the doubts that the local population has about the government and their lack of knowledge, both of which contribute to the local population's perception that they have been ignored, making them more prone to radicalization. To win the hearts and minds of the local community and ultimately earn their support for the many security measures taking place in the county, the government needs to create employment opportunities for the youths and encourage the security agencies to adopt friendlier methods of interacting with the local populace. There has been an increase in the levels of radicalization in Mombasa County, which can be linked to various circumstances.

First, there is a significant amount of poverty among the local population in coastal areas that Muslims predominately control. The development that comes from the national government has not been efficiently trickling down to the areas that are considered marginalized. The local community's extreme poverty levels create an environment conducive to the growth of radical ideology. The populace here is receptive to perverted doctrines because they are led to believe that adhering to them will lead to improved living conditions. Therefore, the leaders of radical religious groups make the most of this opportunity to deliver their sermons to their audience without interference. The young people are comforted by these teachings, so they choose to become involved with radical organizations in the hope of leading a better life, as promised.

It is important to note that the countries in the region with a mainly Muslim population

have not been able to fully or completely handle their residents' socioeconomic difficulties. This creates the potential for their population to be receptive to radical views and makes them more likely to adopt them. The local population is sensitive to adopting the anger and hatred of some population members, which leads to their acceptance of their viewpoint and their susceptibility to joining extremist groups. The local population is prone to adopting the resentment and hatred of some population members. As a result of what they believe to be government marginalization and alienation, members of the coastal Mombasa community feel cut off from government programs, the development agenda, and mainstream politics. This disconnect makes them feel cut off from the community. When subjected to this form of marginalization, they are more likely to be radicalized and recruited by members of violent extremist groups.

One such element that contributes to the proliferation of terrorist acts is the approach taken by the government in its fight against violent extremism and terrorism. When the government resorts to unorthodox methods, this serves as kindling for the fire of terrorist activity. In certain situations, governments may decide to carry out extrajudicial killings (like the one that took place with Aboud Rogo), as well as claimed cases of forced disappearances orchestrated by security agents. Because of this, animosity is aroused against the government, and as a result, the local populace is forced to oppose government methods designed to combat terrorism.

Along the coast of Kenya and in the northeastern part of the country, radicalization has been largely successful. It is primarily because of the careful organization and implementation of their teachings and messages to attain the greatest possible impact

that those who sympathize with terrorists and recruit new members and radical preachers have been successful. The messages are crafted so that it is impossible to twist their meaning in any way. The terrorist recruiters have, over time, researched the people they are trying to persuade to join their cause. As a result, they have developed efficient methods of communicating their messages in order to ensure that their words are interpreted in the correct context. Most of the time, the generated messages are quite plain and easy for any person to comprehend. Their arguments are so alluring and captivating in addition to being convincing.

It is also believed that the process of radicalization was successful because those involved in the efforts to radicalize understood very well the cultural sensitivities of the particular communities, which made it easier for them to pass on those messages easily and win the trust of the locals. This was one of the factors that contributed to the success of the radicalization process. The fact that they came from a Muslim family was another factor that helped them win over the hearts of the people that make up their audience, who are all devout Muslims. The parents were confident that their children, who would later be recruited into Al-Shabaab, would participate in religiously motivated activism at the most appropriate venue. As a result of the preceding, the young people were persuaded to get recruited into terrorist organizations thanks to the meticulously crafted radicalizing teachings spread by radical preachers. The exceptional understanding displayed by these preachers, which allows them to bring about relevant scenarios to the local conditions to fit into their grand recruiting strategy, is a major advantage toward extending the tendrils of terrorism.

Technology, namely the internet, has played a role in the effectiveness of terrorist

organizations in recruiting younger people to join their ranks. The internet is frequently used to disseminate religiously conservative ideas and messages to the general public. The government has a difficult time regulating the space that is the internet. Messages are conveyed to the younger generation that criticizes the government and portrays it negatively, showing it as feeble and uninterested in bettering their life. Because of this, young people come to despise the government and any other approach associated with it.

It has been proved that the radical Islamic ideology is fast spreading into Kenya from Somalia. This migration is occurring from the direction of Somalia. As a result of the extreme ideology, Kenya's Muslim and Christian communities have seen some elevated levels of tension. Several neighbourhoods in Nairobi, including Eastleigh and Majengo, have become hotbeds of radicalization in Kenya. Other regions include the southern coast of Mombasa, the northeastern part of Kenya, and other areas of the eastern province of Kenya. The county of Mombasa, Kenya, is of particular relevance because of the frightening degree of radicalization that is taking place there. One of the themes being spread is that once Somalia is freed, they will move on to Kenya and beyond to deal with the injustices that Muslims are experiencing and eventually free the Muslims. This is one of the ideas that is being spread (Maclean, Khamis, & Ahmed, 2012).

According to the findings of a study that was carried out by Masese (2012), while some preachers disseminated their extremist ideas within mosques, others did it outside of mosques but in a more casual setting during social events. Young Kenyans under the age of 24 were the ones who were sought out and recruited for participation in terrorist activities. There is also recruitment for terrorist organizations at madrassas owned by

radical preachers. These radical preachers typically make use of the lack of supervision that exists in madrassas in order to spread their radical doctrines. Under the pretence of Islamic religious instruction, these extreme speakers can gain easy access to these locations.

According to the study's findings, there is an organized effort to target young people with a low level of education, specifically those whose highest level of education is a primary school, with a few high school dropouts also being targeted. In this kind of situation, it is easy to misrepresent the reality in order to convince these young people to join up with terrorist organizations. Due to these young people's poor education level, it is quite easy to manipulate and brainwash them (Dalia & Dilyah, 2017). This is because they are not typically sceptical and can be readily convinced on religion-related issues.

These young people are exposed to the errors and paradoxes of life as portrayed by knowledgeable and politicized preachers since these radical teachings are where they get their information from. Some of these preachers are so knowledgeable and well-informed that they can simply pass on their lessons to the young people to win their conviction. Some of these preachers claim that they were previously engineers or doctors but abandoned their careers to become involved in terrorist organizations to fight for the cause of Islam without regard to their education (Masese, 2012). Most of the sermons are centred on encouraging Muslims who have been victimized to seek vengeance against those who have discriminated against them, including governments and individuals.

By 2007, the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab had become a significant challenge for

the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG). Islamic extremist groups that had become radicalized had come together to establish an internal extremist group, which they called terrorism. The Taliban, who had control of the "warriors of God" who were stationed in Afghanistan and were known as the Mujahideen, had radicalized many young people in Somalia and recruited them to aid them in their fight against the government of Afghanistan. Eventually, throughout the war in Afghanistan that was led by the United States, the terrorist organization known as Al-Qaeda would make contact with other foreign militant groups in order to proceed with the pursuit of their terrorist aims. Around this time, Somalia, which was already a failed state, turned into a rich breeding ground for terrorists and a training ground for them as well. A sizeable number of Somalia's armed men travelled to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban, while others were recruited by Al Qaeda and joined that organization's various terrorist factions.

Al-Shabaab came into being during this period, and it was at this time that they made the decision to utilize terror as a means to exert their dominance over the then-Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and their allies, who at the time were primarily from Ethiopia and Kenya, in addition to the Western powers (Okoth, Matanga, & Onkware, 2018). Al-Shabaab has established itself as the preeminent military organization in Somalia. The serious potential of the Al-Shabaab militant group prompted the invasion of African Union soldiers in Somalia in 2007, led initially by Ethiopia and Uganda and later on by Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Kenya. This occurred in the year 2007 (Hansen & Gaas, 2012).

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) had the backing of the Intergovernmental

Authority on Development (IGAD) in its efforts to bring peace and stability to Somalia as part of the Somalia Peace Process. When terrorists attacked the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was at the forefront of calling for the African Union to intervene in Somalia. In the beginning, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution that made it impossible for the countries in the surrounding area to participate in the intervention. Following an increase in the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks in Somalia's neighbouring nations, the United Nations Security Council permitted the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to act in the country. In 2007, AMISOM went into operation. In 2011, Kenya became involved in the conflict in Somalia by participating in an operation that was given the code name "Operation Linda Nchi." After being present in Somalia for six months, Kenya was included in AMISOM (Okoth, Matanga, & Onkware, 2018).

As a result of the instability of Somalia's government, the Al-Shabaab group has been allowed to thrive in the country. Because of the amount of planning and preparation that goes into their training activities, this group has recently successfully carried out terrorist acts in Somalia and across borders. These successes can be attributed to the fact that they train extensively. Al-Shabaab has been mainly successful in carrying out severe asymmetric attacks in Somalia and in other countries that are neighbouring Somalia due, in large part, to the fact that it is amorphous, carefully plans its operations, and trains its members.

According to Okoth, Matanga, and Onkware (2018), the complex linkages between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda terrorist group and their training activities both in Sudan and

Somalia culminate in the illegal and sometimes forced recruitment into the terrorism of youths in Somalia and Kenya as well as other neighbouring countries in the horn of Africa. These youths are recruited into terrorism by Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. According to a top public administrator working for the Ministry of internal coordination of the national government, it has been reported that recruiters for Al-Shabaab have allegedly targeted street youngsters living in the cities of Nairobi and Mombasa. The youths are optimistic that unemployment, land alienation, poverty, and a lack of adequate curriculum, particularly in Madrassas, will be resolved due to their acceptance to be recruited and deal with the aforementioned injustices. The use of ethnic profiling against Somalis in Kenya has not only contributed to the radicalization of young people to the point where they adopt the ideology of extremist groups, but it has also been a catalyst for this process.

The Jubba region, located close to the Kenyan-Somali border, is home to the majority of the recruitment centres for the Al-Shabaab group. They employ foreign combatants from other countries as their instructors. These individuals are not allowed to reveal their identities publicly. Most originate from nations such as Chad, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Eritrea, Egypt, and Nigeria (Masese, 2012).

Because of the nature of the crimes they partake in, the Al-Shabaab outfit does not enjoy the entire support of the people of Somalia. They justify their actions by claiming they are defending Islam from its adversaries. They are currently engaged in the coercive collection of the Zakat tax. In addition to this, they are complicit in the kidnapping and bombing of the civilian population. In 2017, for instance, Al-Shabaab was responsible for a blast in Mogadishu that killed hundreds of civilians. Because of

these actions, they are disliked among the people of Somalia.

Using the media as a tool to aid international terrorist organizations is extremely important. International terrorists have been drawn to Somalia because of the media's habit of constantly exaggerating and almost celebrating the severity of terrorist incidents that occur in the region. These terrorists would not come to Somalia if they were unable to locate media outlets that were easily accessible to carry their agenda into the arena of international politics. It is not that the government ought to impose harsh regulations to smother or strangle the media. It is the responsibility of the media to uphold a high standard of ethical behaviour while carrying out their obligations of reporting on recent events (Omoera & Ake, 2016).

When reporting the news, especially stories about terrorism, the media should always maintain objectivity. Terrorists may be dissuaded from committing violent acts if they know their messages are less likely to be received by the audience they intend to communicate with. As a consequence of this, the influence that terrorists have over public opinion will decrease as a result. The media must ensure that a terrorist assault is not portrayed as a noble deed but rather assists the efforts of the government to combat terrorism by smearing terrorists' reputations and condemning their actions (Paletz & Schmid, 1992).

2.1.4.2 International Terrorism

Al-Shabaab continues to be one of the most important actors in the planning and carrying out of terrorist strikes in the Horn of Africa. According to Masese (2012), Somalia did not immediately become a haven for terrorists after its independence. Due in large part to the power vacuum that was created as a direct result of the collapse of

the government that Siad Barre led, terrorism was able to take the spotlight as the primary political issue in Somalia. As a result of the power vacuum, many clan-based groups rose to prominence and began to lobby for positions of authority. It all started with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which desired to implement Sharia rule in Somalia. Some clans were wronged, and due to these wrongs and frustrations in the political, social, and economic realms, a fertile ground was created for radical groups to establish themselves by employing terrorist acts to accomplish their goals. This was because of the grievances and frustrations in these areas.

The predicament became even more dire when 2005, a man named Abdullahi Yusuf was elected president and immediately formed a cabinet from which the warlords were excluded. Sheikh Hassan Dahir has proclaimed a holy war against the government of President Yusuf, which he deems to be anti-Islam and, as a result, illegitimate. Dahir invited international extremists and militants to participate in the conflict against the government of Somalia, and he offered those extremists and militants support in establishing themselves in the regions of Somalia so that they could seize control (Burridge, 2014).

Al-Shabaab has successfully radicalized young people to join their group to spread its warped militant ideology, thanks to the tools described above. They have established themselves as a formidable adversary by setting up training camps and safe havens for anybody interested in joining their ranks. These developed camps inside Somalia are used by al-Shabaab in order to plan and carry out terrorist acts both inside and outside of Somalia (Masese, 2012).

The Somali people place a high priority on their Islamic religion, clan system, and

culture. In Somalia's intricate clan system, conflicts for supremacy are fought regularly. Islam, as a religion, is a significant component that penetrates borders beyond clannism, and this has been leveraged by the Sheikhs and Mosque leaders, in general, to carry out unification messages across all clans. The dissemination of these teachings has reached a wide audience, and on occasion, they denigrate clannism by relegating it to the background and, as a result, strengthening religion. Religion has emerged as a powerful identifier for Somalis and plays a significant role in forming the identity of the people. Their morality and the facts of life are defined by their religion. As a result, the Islamic faith has successfully provided a distinct identity distinct from that offered by clannism (Last & Seaboyer, 2011). This aspect is considered the most important contributor to the radicalization and recruitment of Somalis into terrorist groups.

When it seemed in 2005 that the Western world was supporting operations against warlords who opposed President Yusuf's government, it became evident that the level of terrorism in Somalia was growing at an alarming rate. As a result, this notion attracted transnational terrorist groups allied with Al-Qaeda operatives and volunteer jihadists from other areas of the world who believed that the West had a larger secret objective of battling Islam. These individuals believed the West had a broader hidden agenda of attacking Islam. Terrorists from as far away as Afghanistan and Iraq entered Somalia to carry out their operations (Masese, 2012).

Domestic, indigenous terrorism in Somalia has always been a feature of the country, but it wasn't until Al-Shabaab that it made its way onto the international stage. The international community engaged in the fight against Al-Shabaab has contacted the Western world for aid in the ongoing war against Al-Shabaab. Many different actors

are involved in the battle in Somalia, each with their own set of objectives that they are pursuing by taking advantage of the power vacuum left behind by the terrorist group in Somalia. Because of the instability of the Federal Government and the incapacity of the Somalia National Army, there is a complete absence of powerful and reliable institutions capable of filling the power vacuum.

According to Masese (2012), the radicalization of young people in Somalia has reached an all-time high, and the local community estimates that it affects more than half of the country's young people. Since 2007, when the Ethiopian Defence Forces (ENDF) first entered Somalia to battle Al-Shabaab, this pattern has been on the rise, and it is expected to continue to do so. The terrorist organization's ideology is heavily influenced by the philosophy of Al-Qaeda, to the extent that it uses Al-Qaeda's literature and reference materials to radicalize young people.

The early rejection that the Somali people showed towards the ENDF was due to the conviction that the ENDF was going into Somalia to maintain the Western world's purpose of destroying Somalia. This view was the root of the Somali people's initial resistance toward the ENDF. Because of this, there was a significant increase in the number of young people recruited to fight against the Ethiopian army. Actually, the Somalis did state that they would postpone their internal battle to fight the external enemy, Ethiopia and that after they had defeated Ethiopia, they would go back to fighting among themselves. The Somali people were angry over the intervention of Ethiopian troops, and they did not want to have anything to do with them (Zeray, 2007). Al-Shabaab has successfully instilled the belief in the minds of its recruits that Somalia is incapable of resolving its internal crises without the assistance of the international

community. The Ethiopian invasion stoked the fires of nationalism among the Somali people, motivating them to battle the ENDF, which they had labeled *'Kafirs',* to force them to leave the country. Many living in the diaspora have contributed financial assistance to assist the warlords and Al-Shabaab in Somalia in their struggle against ENDF. The people of Somalia have adopted Al Qaeda's anti-Western mindset, which has caused tensions between the two countries. This can be primarily related to the kinds of writing they were made familiar with (Anderson & McKnight, 2015).

At this point, certain members of Al Qaeda made their way into Somalia to assist the local Somali population in their fight to defend "Islam." Because of the incursion by the ENDF, international terrorists and anybody else willing to buy into the idea that Somalis wanted to defend Islam were urged to join the battle in Somalia. Originally, there was no aim of asking international terrorists to join the conflict in Somalia. The teachings of Al-Qaeda were simple to understand when one considers the fact that Somalis are extremely religious and revere their Sheikhs as religious leaders. The radical religious leaders used this chance to radicalize the public, particularly the youth, into believing that the United States of America and the Western world, in general, are enemies of Islam (Omoera & Ake, 2016).

This background is essential to comprehend how this organization is "exporting" terrorism into Kenya using radicalization. It is vital to point out that most of Kenya's experience with terrorism has come from outside the country, whereas domestic terrorism has been more restricted. On the other hand, as time passes, we might witness the opposite, which is to say, we might see domestic terrorism take the lead. This is the case because the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab is responsible for a significant

amount of terrorism that occurs across borders.

Due to its proximity to the border between Kenya and Somalia, the county of Mombasa has endured a great deal of damage at the hands of acts of international terrorism. It is crucial to note that even while security services in Mombasa County and the Northeastern Region of Kenya, in general, have put their best foot forward in combatting terrorism, terrorists have nevertheless managed to infiltrate Kenya through its weak borders. The Somali clans extend into Kenya, and because of this, members of Al-Shabaab can enter Kenya under the guise of Kenyan citizens. The Somali people who live along the border between Kenya and Somalia all speak the same language and belong to the same clans. Because of this, it might be challenging to differentiate between people who are members of Al-Shabaab and those who are not. This issue is made worse when Somalis living on the Kenyan border, in the spirit of Islam brotherhood, harbour those coming into the Kenyan borders without understanding that some of those harbouring them have ill-intents and belong to Al-Shabaab. Somalis residing on the Kenyan border have made this scenario worse.

The vast majority of terrorist acts committed in Kenya have an international dimension. This is especially blamed on the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab, which has its headquarters in Somalia. It is impossible to discuss terrorism in Kenya without mentioning Al-Shabaab because they are the terrorist organization responsible for the acts of terror committed in Kenya and Mombasa County as a whole. This terrorist organization has established a presence in Kenya and other nations in the region, such as Uganda and Tanzania. It has been established that Saleh Nablan, along with Abu Godane, the head of Al-Shabaab at the time, organized the terrorist attack that took

place in Kampala, Uganda, in the year 2010, which resulted in the deaths of 76 people and the injuries of over 78 more (Bryden & Bahra, 2019).

Using Somalia as a location for planning and staging terrorist attacks in neighbouring countries has been a major concern for security professionals, who view Somalia as a significant factor in the growth of international terrorism in the region. There are a variety of factors, including the following, that contribute to the spread of international terrorism from Somalia to the nations that are neighbouring Somalia: porous borders between the countries in the region, illegal cross-border trade, a lack of cross-border counterterrorism strategy, a lack of strong cross-border collaboration amongst neighbouring states, a lack of robust information exchange, limited cross-border security collaboration, an absence of a legal framework to punish perpetrators, terrorist financing and money laundering across borders, a lack of effective cross-border security, a lack of intelligence sharing across borders; these are just some of the problems that plague the region (Nacos, 2007).

2.2 Effectiveness of Non-Custodial Reintegration of Returnee Terrorist Fighters

In the 21st century, terrorism has become a significant security challenge for governments worldwide. In the face of unchecked terrorist activity, states are fighting for their existence. The horrifying acts of terrorism that have been observed all over the world pose a threat to the well-being of humanity and global peace. Returnees from terrorism are today a huge source of fear for the entire world. This is made even more so by the possibility that these trained individuals may carry out attacks or other sorts of harm once they return to their country of origin. This makes the issue of returnees from terrorism an even more pressing concern (Koehler D., 2016).

Throughout the history of the American prison system, the concept that efforts should be made to reform convicts has remained a constant (Gendreau & Cullen, 2000). In the 1970s, a significant shift toward rehabilitation went in the wrong direction. The greater socioeconomic shifts that were taking place in American society at the time gave rise to a general criticism of the "state-run" criminal justice system. This criticism took the form of a generalization. Rehabilitation was seen as responsible by liberals for giving the state the ability to employ coercion against offenders. At the same time, conservatives held it responsible for allowing the state to show leniency toward offenders.

In both non-custodial and custodial settings, R&R programs typically have one or both of the following goals: disengagement (i.e., convincing program participants to abstain from using violence in order to affect behavioural change) or deradicalization (i.e., altering participants' ideologies or beliefs in order to affect cognitive change). Disengagement refers to the process of convincing program participants to abstain from using violence in order to affect behavioural change. Deradicalization refers to (Koehler D., 2016). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), disengagement-related interventions typically include various activities. These activities include psychological counselling and support, cognitive-behavioural programs, social work interventions, faith-based debate and dialogue, vocational training, family activity, and social, cultural, and recreational activities.

In contrast, deradicalization therapies usually rely substantially on religiously trained mentors, psychologists, psychiatrists, or other mental health practitioners who have received specific education in their religious traditions. R&R programs demand an understanding of how and why someone initially became engaged with VERLT, with the

motivations being diverse and often going beyond adopting a particular ideology. This information is necessary regardless of the goal of the program. Consequently, these programs must be flexible enough to be molded to each individual's specific history and objectives.

The need for rehabilitation and reintegration (R&R) programs that are both efficient and sustainable in the fight against violent extremism over the long term is underlined in the national plan developed by Canada to counteract the radicalization of violence. These programs can also support the work of security and law enforcement organizations in observing, investigating, and developing cases for criminal proceedings. This can be done in various ways (CNSCRV, 2018). Disengagement programs, intended for individuals who have directly participated in acts of violence driven by ideology, are yet another method that can be utilized to reduce the potential threat posed by these individuals. R&R is a field that states from around the OSCE region are focusing their increased and urgent attention on for several different reasons.

The first is the increase in the number of terrorist prosecutions. Since the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, the legislative framework for counterterrorism has progressively evolved, which has led to an increase in the number of terrorist offenders who are currently serving prison sentences (Marsden, 2017). Second, terrorist offenders in certain parts of the OSCE region face comparatively brief sentences in some of the region's prisons. Since 2015, in South-Eastern Europe, many persons have been found guilty of terrorist offenses and have either completed their jail sentences or are serving them. On the other hand, sentences for terrorism-related offenses in South-Eastern Europe are among the least lengthy found anywhere on the continent (Shtuni, 2017), given that most criminals

spend no more than seven years in jail or prison for their crimes.

Thirdly, and this is tied to the second point, a substantial percentage of people associated with terrorist activities will eventually be freed from prison, frequently when they are still pretty young, and they will re-enter society. Often, this will happen when they are relatively young. Assistance will be necessary for these formerly incarcerated individuals if they can reintegrate into society peacefully and productively. Under some conditions, it is prudent to consider uprooting one's life and relocating to a new town or city. Fourth, there is a growing awareness of the significant part that non-custodial R&R programs, which rely on the expertise and other contributions of a large number of organizations and actors hailing from a wide range of fields and fields of study, can play in lowering the rate of recidivism among people who have committed acts of terrorism (Azinovic V., 2018).

Fifthly, more people are returning home from war-torn countries like Somalia, Iraq, and Syria, who may have been radicalized to the point of violence but may not be sent to jail for various reasons. These people may have been exposed to terrorism while they were abroad. It can be challenging to collect witness testimony that confirms the existence and engagement of a returnee terrorist combatant in a conflict zone, for example. As a result, some terrorist criminals may not be convicted of their crimes. Several countries in the OSCE region, especially those in South-Eastern Europe and Africa, are currently grappling with this issue, even though it continues to be both a humanitarian and a security need for the successful Reintegration of these returnees into society.

The realization that many countries do not have programs set up to support R&R activities constitutes the final reason for the increased focus that is being devoted to R&R. At the institutional as well as the professional and practitioner levels, certain nations lack the

knowledge, assets, and other competencies essential to design, implement, and maintain such programs. These countries also struggle to keep these programs running. As an illustration, several countries in Africa and other regions of the OSCE region have institutions that suffer from chronically inadequate staffing levels, both in terms of the people numbers and the specialized knowledge, such as those that provide psychosocial care and corrections. In addition, those countries lack the trust among several actors and the culture of working together, which are typically necessary for developing a comprehensive R&R strategy (RCC, 2017).

People who have been associated with terrorism and VERLT but have not been found guilty of related crimes in custodial settings are likewise targeted by R&R programs that do not need participants to be incarcerated. This includes former terrorist offenders. R&R programs can be broadly divided into two groups: those that concentrate on the incarceration context, typically where those convicted of violent extremism or terrorism serve their sentences. The majority of attention that multilateral bodies and other organizations have paid to date has been focused on the environment of prisons. This has led to the development of several guidelines and frameworks, best practices, and training programs intended to support R&R initiatives aimed at terrorist offenders and people who may have become radicalized while incarcerated, as well as prevent prisons from becoming VERLT hotspots.

Through careful examination of the available research, several non-incarceration-based correctional treatment programs have been demonstrated to effectively lower recidivism rates. According to the meta-analysis method, the treatment group has an average recidivism rate of ten percentage points lower than the control group across all evaluation

studies. However, other studies have also suggested that while some correctional interventions, particularly those that emphasize punishment, do not influence the criminality of offenders, others dramatically reduce recidivism at a rate of approximately 25%. This is even though some correctional interventions have been shown to have no impact on offenders' criminality (Gendreau & Cullen, 2000).

Because of the wide range of outcomes achieved by different programs, it is now essential to search for the guiding principles that differentiate effective treatment interventions from those that are less so. The conclusion that cognitive-behavioural treatments established predictors of crime for change and predominantly focused on high-risk offenders are the characteristics of rehabilitation programs that produce the highest reductions in recidivism has theoretical and empirical support. These three factors are the characteristics of rehabilitation programs that significantly reduce recidivism. The multi-systemic treatment is a successful program that adheres to these criteria significantly and serves as a particular illustration of this notion. Going ahead, an "evidence-based" policy and practice for non-custodial correctional settings should be the norm. According to the research that is currently available, non-custodial rehabilitation programs that are informed by the principles of effective intervention have the potential to reduce recidivism and, as a result, contribute to the promotion of public safety. Those in positions of power who have this information would back this position.

To believe that a returnee has automatically disengaged from the movement simply because they have returned is, however, a false assumption. First, membership in a formal group or physical presence in a particular location are not prerequisites for affiliation. The individual frequently returns to the social networks and groups in which he or she was

initially radicalized. This is the second and possibly more crucial factor. Given the thousands of terrorist combatants traveling back home, countries need to develop efficient reintegration programs to limit the risk of further radicalization and avoid recidivism among returnees. With the assistance of such programs, the community as a whole may be better able to withstand the influence of violent extremism (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017).

The fight against Islamist terrorist organizations like ISIS and Al-Shabaab in East Africa is receiving much attention from governments worldwide. Developing strategic capacities to combat terrorism is more necessary than ever, particularly because an increasing number of overseas terrorist fighters are being treated and reintegrated into society. How do the communities hosting refugees feel about shifting from a whole-of-government, strict approach to a whole-community, relaxed one? This will be the determining factor in determining the effectiveness of the approach in the worldwide war against terrorism.

The use of discretion by members of Kenya's judiciary is the basis of the country's sentencing system. The criminal justice system in Kenya adopts an indeterminate sentencing technique, meaning that most of the sentence decisions are left to the judge's discretion. Except for offenses inherently punishable by death, such as murder and robbery with violence, the Kenyan Penal Code is organized in terms of maximum penalties for the bulk of the offenses introduced. The exceptions to this are crimes like murder and robbery with violence. The exceptions to this norm are the provisions of the Penal Code sections 89 and 308, which make it unlawful to possess firearms and, respectively, to possess dangerous or offensive weapons in anticipation of committing a crime. Both of these provisions are prohibited.

Any person who carries or has in his possession or control, without reasonable excuse, any firearm or other offensive weapon, or any ammunition, incendiary material, or explosive in circumstances that raise a reasonable presumption that the firearm, ammunition, offensive weapon, incendiary material, or explosive is intended to be used or has recently been used in a manner or for a purpose prejudicial to public order is guilty of an offense and subject to imprisonment.

Section 308 (1)

Any person who is found to be armed with any hazardous or offensive weapon under circumstances that indicate that he was so armed with the intent to commit any crime is guilty and is subject to imprisonment for a period that ranges from seven to fifteen years, depending on the severity of the crime.

-   *(Act No. 3 of 1969, s. 4, Act No. 22 of 1987, Sch.)*

In both instances, minimum and maximum possible penalties have been proposed. Kenya has no sentencing guidelines besides the limited material in the Bench Book for Magistrates in Criminal Proceedings. Guidelines for sentencing should be devised that emphasize the value of alternatives to incarceration to promote uniformity and certainty in the sentencing process and enhance public confidence in the sentencing procedure.

The Penal Law in Kenya governs the use of incarceration and non-custodial punishments, and ideal sentencing guidelines should be the foundation for such law applications. Even though Kenya does not yet have a sentencing policy, numerous government officials have underlined how important it is to develop one. A solid comprehension of the sentencing guidelines is necessary for arriving at conclusions regarding the purposes of criminal sanctions and how they are to be carried out. Kenya's updated sentencing guidelines should address when a prison sentence should be given

instead of a sentence that does not involve incarceration. In addition, this strategy should consider the constitutional mandate to use restorative justice, which is found in Article 159(2)(c).

Article 159 (2) (c) - Judicial authority

Subject to the provisions of section (3), the promotion of alternative methods of conflict resolution, such as reconciliation, mediation, arbitration, and more traditional dispute resolution processes, is required.

Clause (3)

Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms shall not be used in a way that-
(a) contravenes the Bill of Rights;
(b) is repugnant to justice and morality or results in outcomes that are repugnant to justice or morality; or
(c) is inconsistent with this Constitution or any written law

- Kenya Law (2010)

When calculating a sentence, the sentencing guidelines in various countries emphasize the importance of considering any potential aggravating or mitigating circumstances. These guidelines also repeat the concepts of equality and proportionality. A sentencing strategy that lists the improvement of offenders' lives and public safety as official aims and informs the courts on how to carry out these goals through the sentencing procedure is more useful. What is more beneficial is a sentencing policy that not only lists the improvement of offenders' lives and public safety as formal goals.

In the communities that run along the coasts of Kwale and Mombasa in Kenya, it is thought that there are at least a thousand people who have returned home (Ahmed, 2019). Demobilization, disarmament, and Reintegration abbreviated as "DDR," is a unique procedure that is part of the larger effort to deradicalize and reintegrate returning foreign fighters or those found guilty of terrorist offenses. It is, therefore, to everyone's advantage to learn from DDR programs established after conflicts. In particular, DDR

programming has emphasized the importance of specialized programs for women and children and community participation's role in Reintegration.

Researchers that have conducted studies on the topic of why foreign fighters come home have discovered several causes that contribute to this phenomenon, some of which include: disillusionment; intergroup conflict; injury; burnout; a desire to rejoin with family; and a need for more stability (Horgan J., 2008; Bjorgo, 2002). Many believe a traumatic occurrence sets off a return, creating a cognitive opening for transformation (Fink & Hearne, 2008). Therefore, it is stated that the only approach to address the risks that returning terrorist fighters may represent to public safety is to properly rehabilitate and reintegrate them into society (Clubb, 2016). These strategies aim to solve the issues that stand in the way of successful rehabilitation and, ultimately, the Reintegration of former terrorist fighters into society.

Nzomo et al. (2017), who focus on the reintegration experiences in Kenya and developing community resilience against radicalization, propose that governments employ such incentives sparingly and only when no other effective alternatives are available. This is because extremist groups can use such incentives. To encourage people to participate in reintegration programs, incentives like reduced prison sentences or financial aid are frequently offered. The response from the community would be reduced because they would not have the impression that the offenders were getting rewarded. Clubb and Tapley (2018) note that this is an issue faced by other reintegration programs, including in Nigeria; the demand to prioritize the resettlement of the millions of people the fighting has displaced constantly thwarts efforts to reintegrate former Boko Haram fighters. This is a challenge faced by other reintegration programs in Nigeria as well. Many people in the community

oppose Reintegration and question why the government prioritizes assisting individuals left behind to join extremist groups. Even if the state or national government must play a role, local communities are responsible for addressing problems that are the source of complaints and limit their capacity to thrive. These problems include poverty and a lack of skilled leadership and representation (Nzomo et al., 2017).

During the non-custodial rehabilitation and integration phase, the returning citizen undergoes an ongoing cognitive and behavioural process. This process lasts for the duration of the phase. This process risks being confronted and disrupted by internal and external environmental factors, which could result in a significant financial loss (Khalil, 2019). Programs designed for the rehabilitation and Reintegration of returnee terrorist combatants can help mitigate the risks associated with these situations by taking into account the real past experiences of the returnees (Horgan, 2009).

The theological or intellectual assistance provided to returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County as part of the non-custodial Reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters does not attempt to modify an individual's worldview. These activities are a part of the non-custodial Reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County. Depending on the national and local context, various contentious problems concerning the precise role of religion and ideology in P/CVERLT may become relevant (RAN, 2016). These issues included the extent to which the separation of church and state permits the government to sponsor activities with a religious component; tampering with people's legally protected religious or other viewpoints; and if there is any involvement, the role that religion or ideology plays in radicalization to VERLT.

Non-custodial reintegration programs are progressively adopting a diversified strategy, even though numerous theological or political interventions have been used in the past. These interventions can take many forms, such as counselling sessions with a single individual or a group of people. However, according to an individualized assessment, they should only be utilized when a particular returnee's mentality needs to be altered. This is the only time they should be used. It is inappropriate to make any effort to convince the returnee to modify their worldview or philosophy in any way. However, these treatments have only been recorded in relevant compendiums, manuals, and other frameworks largely focused on the prison (custodial) or probation setting. Even though they are vital to the non-custodial R&R context, these treatments have only been documented in a select number of relevant compendiums, manuals, and frameworks (UNICEF, 2016). RAN P&P Practitioners' Working Paper (2019) and GCCS, Compendium of Good Practices are two frameworks discussed here.

Even while it is unlikely that such interventions will persuade returnees to quit supporting violent extremism or terrorism on their own, they can nevertheless be utilized for a range of typically connected goals. They can, for example, broaden the returnees' worldview to take into account various viewpoints and interpretations; foster a cognitive opening to enable disengagement from violent extremists, groups, or causes; support the maintenance of a positive sense of self and the associated sense of purpose, meaning, self-worth, and belonging; and assist in developing a broader, more contextualized understanding of religion and challenge (ibid).

Family counselling is widely utilized as a primary component and an additional intervention within non-custodial reintegration programs for former terrorist fighters who

have returned home. Notably, family counselling often includes providing support from other family members. The provision of such support acknowledges the necessity of ensuring that non-custodial R&R efforts focus on individuals who may have been radicalized to VERLT or had some contact with terrorism, the unique role that family and peer networks can play in disengaging from violence and reintegrating into the community, and finally, how establishing or re-establishing meaningful relationships with family members or peers can contribute to effective non-custodial reintegrating into the community (Koehler, D, 2014).

Family counselling can be provided by a wide range of individuals and organizations, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social workers that concentrate on protecting children or other areas of social work, local police officers, or mental health specialists. Interaction with the relevant individual's parents, other relatives, or peers is typically required, and this can occur individually or with the family as a unit. It is often part of a bigger effort to study the individual's peer and family networks in order to determine which areas of the bonds need to be strengthened, which areas of the family have conflicts, and which relationships have the potential to be leveraged. When family and peer relationships are so important to VERLT radicalization, individuals must participate in non-custodial reintegration programs alongside their families and friends. Before taking any action, it is essential to do this analysis to evaluate whether the returnee's family and friends will likely have a positive or negative impact on their resocialization and to identify those family members and friends.

The ultimate goals of family counselling include aiding family members in the following areas: maintaining or developing a positive relationship with the individual; managing the

stigma, shame, and security dangers associated with continuing or renewing association with the person. When an ex-offender has recently been released from prison or has returned from a combat zone, the family needs counselling so that the individual can finally deal with any psychological challenges or mental illness they may be suffering (EU RAN, 2018).

Due to these factors, the reintegration process must involve an effort that is both persistent and well-coordinated in order to be successful. Without these kinds of programs, it is quite likely that young individuals who have committed violent acts will conduct those acts again. Even if they never engage in violent activity again, the fact that they identify as warriors could inspire others to engage in even more extreme behaviour. Those successfully readmitted into society eventually cultivate a new, more respectable persona. Their social network can dramatically alter the resilience of the receiving communities in the face of violent extremism.

It is still an issue on a global basis when returning terrorist fighters are not effectively reintegrated into their communities, and Kenya is not an exception. The action plans for Mombasa County comprise several facets of neighborhood initiatives designed to reintegrate former foreign combatants. The psychological pillar of the Mombasa County strategy recognizes that there are very few coordinated, collective psychosocial support services for dealing with returns. The Mombasa County strategy significantly emphasizes lowering the social stigma associated with terrorism victims. Reintegration efforts, in order to be successful, need to be paired with actions to improve the criminal justice system, generate greater societal and political resistance to violent extremism, and address the

environment and processes that encourage radicalization. Only then can reintegration efforts be considered successful (Githigaro, 2021).

The intervention steps for returnees are broken down into several categories within the Mombasa County plan. These categories include disengagement, Reintegration, and rehabilitation. The focus is on treatments that are aimed to convince people to re-evaluate their beliefs and stop supporting violence, give cult-departing counselling and therapy, and promote a sense of normalcy in the community and harmony with social norms.

2.2.1 DDR Effort Towards Reintegration of Returnee Terrorist Fighters.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) processes, which aim to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate combatants into society after the conclusion of hostilities, have come to be key components of peace processes over the past 20 years. These DDR processes aim to demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate fighters into society after the end of hostilities. In particular, the United Nations has launched several DDR projects as part of its peacekeeping operations in various post-conflict countries across Africa, as well as in Nepal, Kosovo, East Timor, and Colombia. These efforts seek to collect and destroy weapons, cut combatants off from their military ties, and assist former combatants in transitioning to civilian life by providing them with social and financial support as they move. A significant amount of information regarding the usefulness of the reintegration components of these programs has been accumulated over time. There are a lot of knowledgeable people who believe that this information needs to be applied to the current issue of returning foreign fighters. Nevertheless, this practice transfer is challenging due to several significant variables.

First, those who assist groups considered international terrorist organizations are dealt with according to the criminal justice system rules. This was mentioned earlier. Their activities are illegal, and they do not have the legitimacy that soldiers in other conflicts might have. This is the kind of circumstance that frequently serves as the basis for a dispute resolution process. The stigma associated with their function can be fundamentally distinct from those associated with former fighters, even though the breadth and nature of violent activities may be the same. Foreign fighters who support violent extremist organizations are typically seen as criminals rather than combatants, making it difficult for them to reintegrate into their home countries. To this end, the hybrid structure of many groups, the operational strategies combining elements of criminality and politics, further complicates the issue of legitimacy.

Second, resettlement is commonly included in DDR procedures, and it at least suggests that there will be a post-conflict environment in which former combatants could start a new life (Specker, 2008). This is because resettlement is frequently a component of DDR procedures. However, because they believe the struggle is over, foreign terrorist fighters are increasingly likely to return to the same environment and social network where they first became radicalized. This is because they believe that the conflict is still ongoing. It is especially challenging to rehabilitate and reintegrate them because the same structural problems, external pressures, and unresolved concerns that led to their engagement in terrorist groups are typically still there, along with active recruitment dynamics. This makes it exceptionally difficult for rehabilitation and reintegration efforts to be successful.

Third, economic and employment support has always been one of the primary focus of

DDR practice, and severance benefits are typically included as part of this category. Economic assistance to returnee terrorist fighters, especially those convicted of terrorist crimes, is a contentious issue because there is little public support for giving what is seen as a reward or benefit to former criminals. This is especially true in environments where jobs are scarce and many people fight for financial survival (Banholzer, 2013). However, reintegrating returnee terrorist fighters into society after captivity could benefit from a better knowledge of certain components of DDR practice. The implementers have strongly emphasized the significance of social networks and the value of re-establishing relationships with family and the community. Providing financial aid and assistance in the search for work takes up the bulk of post-conflict reintegration initiatives. It is common practice to frame this activity as part of a larger political and social rehabilitation initiative (United Nations, 2014). An empirical study on the social Reintegration of former FARC members in Colombia highlighted the importance of community involvement in reducing recidivism rates. The study found that former fighters were more likely to participate when more community members participated in the program (Kaplan & Nussio, 2015).

Analysis has also revealed that former fighters must be willing to participate in attempts to promote social reconciliation and reunion and that credible local interlocutors must support these efforts. Both requirements must be met before social reconciliation and reunification occur. This conclusion highlights the value of voluntary participation, the necessity for dependable facilitators, and a sense of the authenticity of the non-custodial programs (United Nations, 2010). If returnee terrorist fighters are to be reintegrated into society outside of a correctional institution, the roles of the government and those who

enforce the law must be carefully regulated. If threat management and information collecting are prioritized during the implementation of the DDR program, the likelihood of successful reintegration attempts is reduced.

Evaluations of DDR procedures have also shed light on the fact that there is a pressing requirement for specialized and targeted help to be provided to women and children. Whether they were victims, former combatants, or both, reintegrating them into society is fraught with unique challenges and challenges (United Nations, 2014). DDR activities have shed light not just on the prevalence of violence in the aftermath of a conflict but also on the manner in which the psychological and emotional wounds caused by war frequently impede social Reintegration. One example that is brought up very frequently is the fact that areas that have recently emerged from combat have some of the highest rates of domestic violence.

Women and children make up many of those who have travelled to Iraq and Syria, even though very few people have returned. (Tarras-Wahlberg, 2016). For example, around 20% of the European Union force, 14% of the contingent in Kosovo, and 18% of the contingent in Bosnia and Herzegovina are comprised of women. No accurate data is available for children from EU states; nevertheless, the rates are roughly 9% and 25% for Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Shtuni, 2017). Women in their adult years can access the same travel opportunities as men. On the other hand, their exposure to and experiences with violence are usually distinct, particularly when sexual crimes are committed or participation is forced (Azinovic & Jusic, 2015).

Given the conditions, it is abundantly evident how important it is to incorporate psychosocial therapy modalities into a comprehensive non-custodial reintegration

program for returnee terrorist fighters. Additionally, it is important to acknowledge the risk that untreated trauma may hamper Reintegration and increase the likelihood of recidivism. The most important lesson for efforts to reintegrate returning foreign soldiers may be the limitation of DDR programming in the absence of more extensive transformation. According to DDR professionals, Reintegration must occur at the same time as the rebuilding of society, the economy, and the political system. If this does not occur, the conditions that existed before the original outbreak of violence will not alter (United Nations, 2014). This lesson is especially pertinent to non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters in the context of violent extremism because of the information it contains. With activities aimed at reintegrating people back into society outside of prison, we need to undertake programs that aim at the social dynamics and structural elements contributing to radicalization. In this strategy, Reintegration is only useful when combined with CVE initiatives that are proven to be effective, and the two concepts should, at the very least, be considered concurrently.

Many of the countries that send fighters to these organizations and run the risk of attacks from both those who leave the country and those who return are now better protected as a result of the new law prohibiting support for violent extremist organizations such as IS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab. However, the availability of resources for the individualized programs that are necessary to rehabilitate and disengage recruits from violent extremist groups and the establishment of criminal justice systems that are accountable and competent are prerequisites for effective security measures. What should be done in countries where the criminal justice system cannot deal with the number of people who fight for terrorist organizations or can do so? Or those fragile

and newly established democracies that have a long way to go before they can achieve significant change in the field of criminal justice, and where mere contact with the criminal justice system has the potential to increase linkages to violent extremist groups or other criminal organizations? Even if only 20% of those who left Tunisia to fight in Iraq and Syria as foreign fighters later returned to Tunisia, the criminal justice system, and more specifically, the incarceration system, would be unable to handle the increased population. In many parts of the world where there is a high level of political violence, it is a well-known fact that prisons function more as breeding grounds for terrorists than as centres for the ex-offenders' reintegration into society. This is the case in many of the world's jails.

In addition, while working with such large numbers, it is essential to consider not just the VE groups' recruitment dynamics but also the push factors in the countries of origin that make so many individuals vulnerable to the attraction of these organizations. VE organizations, such as those operating in Mombasa County, can attract young people because they capitalize on perceived or genuine problems connected with bad governance, economic marginalization, and social isolation. Regarding recruiting, ideology is typically a secondary concern, but effective disengagement is tied to more substantial structural issues.

It is difficult to accurately predict the sustainability of non-custodial reintegration programs for returning terrorist fighters when operating on a large scale or in complex conditions. Under these conditions, a different strategy rooted in the practice of conflict management and considers the deradicalization process to be more along the lines of combatant demobilization and transition may be the most suitable. Assume for the sake

of argument that these efforts will, at the very least, be successful. In such a situation, there needs to be a significant investment in reforming the criminal justice system and, more generally, promoting social and political resilience growth.

It can be concluded that the process of rehabilitating returned terrorist offenders and foreign fighters who still have an ideological attachment to the cause will be significantly more challenging and complex than the process of rehabilitating returnees who have expressed contrition for their actions. The primary reason for this is that those individuals almost always fight back against being punished or receiving financial benefits, and they also refuse to recognize the validity of governmental and mainstream religious institutions. In cases where radical beliefs have been entrenched for a long time, it might be difficult to find interlocutors who are believable to the people who have returned and acceptable actors to the government. It is not acceptable to let the fact that certain returning terrorist fighters are not suitable participants in reintegration programs undermine the programs' general validity or their material usefulness. Instead, it should emphasize the significance of conducting a comprehensive and continuous examination of applicants after the surrender, during their time in jail, and after their release, focusing on those who look to have the most to gain from the programs.

The involvement of foreign state and non-state entities in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq has spawned a global flood of returning foreign fighters on a scale that has never been seen before. In the same vein, the dynamics of the ongoing conflict will, to some extent, affect the success of initiatives aimed at providing rehabilitation and reintegration services to returning militants. Returning, rehabilitating, and reintegrating into their

home nations would be fraught with additional tensions and challenges due to the nature of the situation. If peace is not achieved in Syria and Iraq, civilians will continue to lose their lives, and many people will be forced to flee their homes. Furthermore, as long as terrorist acts outside of the conflict zone will occur, the situation will not improve. The countries that are being impacted by the issue of foreign fighters need to enhance the amount of work and attention they are devoting to these critical activities. Ultimately, the welfare of returnees and the welfare of the entire society is addressed by holistic and complete reintegration efforts. These efforts are aimed at assisting those who have abandoned religious militancy in transitioning into a way of life that is peaceful and tolerant. These activities are necessary in order to build communities that are both more resilient and secure.

2.2.3 Media as Force Multiplier in Non-Custodial Reintegration

There are primarily two kinds of media employed in today's modern culture to distribute information to audiences. These include both print and electronic forms of media. Publications such as newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, posters, and flyers are examples of print media. On the other hand, electronic media includes broadcasts such as television and the Internet. The race to attract a larger number of readers or viewers has hastened the growth of the media. Mass communication refers to the ability of the media to reach an audience that is both big and diverse. In contrast, the word mass media refers to the channel employed. Using satellite technology for mass communication has allowed the general population to access information in real time from anywhere in the world. In its capacity as a means of mass communication, the media is present in every facet of contemporary society.

The purpose of the media in society is threefold: to inform, educate, and entertain. Because they are a part of society, the military and police are scrutinized by the media. While government agencies increasingly rely on the media to advance their security goals, the media are simultaneously maintaining their function as the watchdog of society. The state is no longer necessary to censor information before making it available to the general public because security operations against terrorism are no longer considered state secrets. Around the middle of the 19th century, tremendous media influence was exerted on popular opinion. The media was referred to as "The Fourth Estate" because of the advocacy role that it was said to play and the capability that it was implying it had to formulate political problems (Cooke, 2019). Because of their overt and covert roles as advocates for various causes, the press and other news media are sometimes collectively called the "fourth estate" or "fourth power." Even though it is not a part of the political system, it has a significant indirect influence on society, which can be used for either the benefit or the detriment of society.

The media in Kenya is a powerful tool for achieving societal and governmental goals, and this country recognizes its importance. Both state power and a free press are necessary components of every free society. They interact with one another as components of a complex social system by functioning in several ways that occasionally conflict with one another. This, in turn, affects how individuals perceive "the state" and "the media" as a whole. For instance, the operating levels of the military and the mainstream media are very different. The military system is currently closed, in contrast to the openness of the media. This element exists as a result of a philosophy that is aligned across the organization. Although the Constitution guarantees both

freedom of the press and the right of individuals to access information, there is a requirement that material passed from the military to the press be filtered and restricted. This freedom of the press is governed by security implications that can impact the nation from the backlash that could occur in the event of the spilling of sensitive material concerning counterterrorism strategies and actions.

Intelligence on political and economic matters and security can be gained in large measure through the study of the media and by interaction with reporters. It is possible to gain insightful information on your standing and friends' status by looking at the media (Allan, 2007). Because of this, questions regarding censorship and the reliability of media outlets that are run by the state have been raised. As a result of the unclear or doubtful situations produced by censorship, there may be a corruptive rivalry between the media and security players. This is because censorship causes these circumstances. The capacity to trick one's adversary has always been an important component of any successful security operation. Sometimes, a part of an operational cover strategy involves using one's media as a fake. (Latimer, 2001).

The concept of a free society has its foundations in the collective wisdom of its members. Amid all of the sincere efforts to educate the people, disseminate information, and advance civilization, there is a dark counterplay over how the split between personal, service, and national interest is regarded. The free expression of the media affects the effectiveness of the employment of state security personnel since it makes public information regarding security operations against terrorist groups. The question of how to best employ the society's armed forces in order to advance the society's political agenda is among the most pressing and difficult problems that a free

society needs to find a solution to. People's freedom in this society and the independence of its news media make it more difficult to employ security personnel in the fight against terrorism. When applying armed forces in a free society, the ties between the government, the military, and the media are intricately entwined. Each side has its own set of priorities, and whether or not they succeed in achieving their goals depends on how well they satisfy the requirements set forth by that all-important, ethereal, and hazy court of ultimate judgment known as public opinion.

As a result of its ability to affect the course of a conflict through psychological operations, the mass media's power can shape the thoughts of government security actors and the leaders of civic society during times of conflict. The nation's security agencies are currently adapting to the new world order that has been ushered in due to the proliferation of sophisticated democracies and the growth of the mass media industry.

In the context in which it operates, state security has been conducting all of its business only within the confines of the perimeter barrier. The situation is different now than it was yesterday. The sophisticated nature of the mass media systems, in conjunction with the high level of education of the security personnel, has affected the public's attention. As a result, the public is interested in learning more about the role that the police play in the process of nation-building. It is possible that the operational security of any security operation could be jeopardized, and the public's faith and trust in the security actors could only increase if they successfully develop a public affairs campaign before the beginning of any security operation.

The media play an ever-increasing role in influencing public opinion in favour of non-

custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters to affect security operations and act as a force multiplier. This is done to influence security operations and act as a force multiplier. Television news media significantly impact the decision-making process for news broadcasts, affecting what the general public sees on television. The media has a big role not only in selecting what kinds of information the public will see, hear, and not hear but also in deciding what information the public will see and hear. This gives the media great influence over viewers' actions in response to certain issues.

Tumber and Palmer (2004) found that the media's coverage of the Gulf War substantially impacted the public's response to a crisis and the formation of public opinion. This was discovered when they investigated the engagement of the media in the coverage of the war. For instance, the titles that television news organization decided to use for their broadcast were only sometimes recognized. The numerous broadcasting stations used the term in a variety of different ways. The operation was referred to by its official military code name, "Operation Iraqi Freedom," when discussed on Fox News. On the other hand, the BBC referred to it as "The Iraq War," CNN referred to it as "The War in Iraq," ITN referred to it as "The War on Saddam," Sky referred to it as "The War on Iraq," and CNN referred to it as "The War on Iraq." (Tumber & Palmer, 2004).

According to the book, more than 3,000 journalists were dispatched to Iraq; more than 500 were embedded with various military units. Consequently, they were the most essential components of the communication scenario during the Second Gulf War. The need for embedded journalists was first brought to light during the Second World War,

and it continued to grow during the Vietnam War and the Falkland Islands War. According to Tumber and Palmer, the role of propaganda during these wars was such that it could no longer be ignored during the battles. As a result, it became impossible to ignore the media. Journalists covering the Gulf War were given unique instructions regarding how they should conduct themselves. However, due to a lack of confidence, several organizations, such as the United States Department of Defence, have imposed "arbitrary and capricious" reporting periods because they are cautious of the media divulging tactical military strategies. These institutions are concerned that the media would reveal sensitive information (Tumber & Palmer, 2004).

Regardless of whether or not there is a war on terrorism, the government and the military can exercise control over the mainstream media to communicate information in a manner that is favourable to their goals. The Gulf War in 1991 was the war that received the most media attention of any conflict in history. According to Pearson (2018), there has never been a time when such a large number of journalists attempted to cover a conflict from competing viewpoints. During the Gulf War, all sides were aware of the importance of propaganda, dedicated a significant amount of their time and energy to its dissemination, and implemented it in various contexts and with various strategies.

Although the war against terrorism is fought physically on the ground (such as in the instance of the fight with Al-Shabaab in Somalia), it is also fought in the minds of those who support and promote the conflict through media-generated propaganda. This is the case even though the war against terrorism is fought physically on the battlefield. Misrepresentation, a lack of objectivity, inconsistencies, and even outright lies through

the media are all tactics that can be used by a nation in its fight against terrorism through the non-custodial Reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters to reduce recidivism. This is done to gain support and establish a sense of legitimacy. This tactic can affect the minds of the general public. Therefore, the media is a weapon with two sides, and the way they report the news will depend on how they engage with the various actors in the security sector.

According to Andersen (2006), the selection of media representation contributes to the justification of earlier conflicts and the preservation of existing conflicts. He explains how information management, commonly called censorship and propaganda, has altered to keep up with information technologies to the point that such tools are now being used as weapons in the battle against violent extremism. He says this is because information management has had to keep up with the breakthroughs in information technologies. Undoubtedly, the state aims to affect people's perceptions of civilians and the general public to have them perceive their operations in a positive light. This influence aims to have people view the state's activities in a more favourable light. The efforts become a very challenging endeavour, but it is not impossible in the age of rapidly advancing technology and widespread availability of information technology (Anderson A., 2009).

In times of peace and conflict, it is possible to examine the relationship in Kenya between the state and the mainstream media. Due to the reporting of Kenyan journalists, there is a climate of mistrust and suspicion among the media (Porch, 2002). The Kenyan security forces consider journalists to be unpatriotic spies. On the other hand, the state security forces are seen by the press as using the pretext of national security to censor

material, restricting the principles of freedom of information that are highly valued. Even though the Kenyan Constitution guarantees a free press and the media's right to report on whatever they see fit, the state's security agencies must censor material they provide to the media press regarding activities related to terrorism. The security implications of the sensitive nature of such material, which can have various impacts on the nation, control this.

However, to adapt to the new world order brought about by the growth of Kenyan democracy and the expansion of the mass media business, the Kenyan security forces are currently undergoing this process. The media in Kenya has continued to be very critical of security operations against returnee terrorist fighters. This is because they are the ones who are responsible for gathering information, interpreting that information, and disseminating it to audiences all over the world. Consequently, they hold a substantial degree of power to impact the success of reintegration efforts being made in Kenya for returnees who participated in terrorist fighting abroad. In the past, the state security forces would do all of their business solely within the confines of the perimeter fence when operating in this particular environment. The situation is different now due to the high level of education of the Kenyan security personnel, the sophistication of the mass media systems, and the public focus, which wants to know the role played by both state and non-state actors in the non-custodial Reintegration for the returnee terrorist fighters. Today, the scenario has changed because of these factors.

When looking at the ongoing battle in Somalia with the terrorist organization Al-Shabaab, the Somali civil war started and escalated owing to the Somalia Revolution, which began in 1986 as a deadly reaction to Said Barre's harsh regime. The struggle in

Somalia with Al-Shabaab is still going on today. After he was deposed in 1991, a movement to restore him to power began, and ever since then, the country has been torn apart by violent conflict (Migue, 2014). Some militia organizations in Somalia, most notably Al-Shabaab, which is the paramilitary branch of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), continue to be adamant about maintaining the insurgency despite the attempts made to end the violence in that country. The international world needs to take a closer look at the situation in Somalia and develop innovative solutions if they want to stop the violence in that region, which has been going on for ten years and is becoming more intense as it continues.

Both foreign and local media have continued to cover and give news reporting on the events of the fight against the militia Al-Shabaab organization. This group has been developing its military and financial power, making it a serious challenge to expel by force. The war has been going on for quite some time. This can be accomplished most effectively through the framing and baiting of news stories by mainstream media broadcasts. According to Brandwein (2011), news framing involves selecting certain aspects of an observed reality and making them more prominent in a communication text. This promotes problem description, causal interpretation, moral judgment, and treatment. The concept of "framing" is based on the assumption that the way an issue is presented in news broadcasts can significantly impact viewers' perceptions of that subject (Brandwein, 2011). He thinks that one of the most important aspects of media framing is using precise vocabulary and labelling different types of content. A news source can build a frame that conveys positive or negative indications about events and persons by consistently using a particular terminology throughout their reporting.

The focus placed by the media on certain aspects of the conflict relative to others shapes our understanding of the controversy. In a roundabout way, it infers a preference for one set of answers over another. When it is claimed that an internal dispute is an ethnic conflict, readers are frequently given the impression that there is a difference between the warring sides based on the identities of the people involved in the conflict. Because the intervention will not alter the underlying ethnic identities that led to the conflict, it is possible that doing so would be judged futile. To characterize the same conflict as either genocide or a humanitarian disaster, on the other hand, suggests that participation from the international community is morally essential to end the needless suffering of the innocent (Brandwein, 2011).

In August of 1990, Iraq launched an attack on Kuwait as part of Operation "Desert Cloud." (Gottschalk, 1992) reports that before the outbreak of hostilities, military and media planners at the Pentagon worked together for six months to devise techniques that would make the coverage of the Gulf War on television the most exhaustive wartime television news coverage in history. On the first night of the United States' invasion of Iraq, Peter Jennings, a TV anchor for the American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), gave a mispronunciation of the beginning of "Operation Desert Cloud" as "Operation Desert Storm" (Gottschalk, 1992). This may have been the result of a Freudian slip. As a result of the several spectacular claims made by the United States military during the Gulf War that has now been proved to be inaccurate, Jenning's slip-up in his proclamation of the war to be "Operation Desert Storm" appears to have been nothing at all. It wasn't simply that the Pentagon and the United States administration were misleading the media; the problem was that most of the media

accepted everything the military and government handed them without questioning it. They were instructed to do the duties of stenographers. When the truth began to slowly surface in the aftermath of the fight, it was too late to alter the prevailing picture of a war that was unavoidable, clean, and conducted with high-tech weapons. It was too late to modify these perceptions.

We need to acknowledge India's exceptional use of the media to recover from the effects of the Kargil battle in order to draw significant lessons from that fight, which has been labelled "A Watershed for Indian Media." In order to do so, we may acquire useful lessons from the Kargil conflict. Kargil was one of India's worst nightmares in recent history. It exposed the great deficiencies they possessed and resulted in many fatalities. We have no choice but to give the Indians credit for their dogged determination and the exceptionally successful diplomatic and media campaign they have put forth. How the Indian media responded to the crisis, mobilized its resources, and organized television programs, newspaper reports, analyses, discussions, features, the well-known "rogue army" posters, and a wide range of coverage convinced the world that Pakistan was in the wrong and that the Indians were the party who had been the victim of a wrong. By employing the tactics of lying and dishonesty, they successfully manipulated their own country's populace. It was decided to restrict Pakistani television and newspapers from accessing Indian cable networks and the Internet to enhance the lies they were spreading and protect the Indian populace from learning the truth. In addition, they were skilled Internet users, spreading their propaganda via the specialized website www.vijayinkargil.com.

During the period known as "Operation Restore Hope," the United States was actively

involved in Somalia and Iraq. This is proof of a more powerful media in the post-Cold War era (Robinson, 2002). Because of unfavourable press coverage, the United States' engagement in Somalia ended abruptly in 1993. An outrage was produced in American public opinion due to the photographs that depicted an American soldier being brutally murdered while tied to a wire rope and pulled along the street in Mogadishu. As a result of this outcry, the American public opinion wished to avoid anything that would remind them of another Vietnam. Because of the killing of 24 officers and the injuries sustained by many others, President Bill Clinton was forced to recall American soldiers from Somalia. As a result, "Operation Restore Hope" in Somalia failed to complete its mission (Robinson, 2002).

According to the findings of the research conducted by Jessica Brandwein, the New York Times (NYT) most commonly cited terrorism or al-Qaeda in articles concerning Somalia, which accounted for 45% of all mentions combined.

On the other hand, terrorism and al-Qaeda were only referenced in 16% of the articles from African sources about Somalia. Additionally, the battle was regularly portrayed by the New York Times as a humanitarian catastrophe, a civil war, or a mission to protect the peace. In his article titled "Global Media and Violence in Africa: The Instance of Somalia," Gewald (2004) asserts that the media presented a favourable picture of American engagement in Somalia during the crisis that occurred in 1992 by showing the American military protecting food assistance convoys and providing aid to the destitute and those who were in need. Gewald's argument is based on the media showing these things. This perception underwent a complete overhaul when wanted posters with Farah Aidid's likeness began to circulate throughout Mogadishu. This

resulted from an attack on a gathering of clan leaders who backed Aidid that was carried out by the United States, which resulted in the deaths of seventy people (Gewald, 2004). When word got out about the strike, local Somalis, including women and children, turned on international journalists and killed four of them when they arrived at the location (Purvis, 2002, cited in Gewald, 2004).

In her article titled "Impact of international media in Somalia," Brandwein (2011) observes that the media has mostly chosen to spotlight various aspects of the Somali situation. These aspects include civil war, international interventions, humanitarian crises, failed peace deals, piracy, and terrorism. In reaction to the article titled "Framing of the War in Somalia by International Media," the following is provided. The foreign media presented a variety of viewpoints on the conflict in Somalia, each of which affected how the rest of the world viewed the crisis and the alternative responses that international actors were contemplating.

Schraeder and Endless found that an average of 73% of the stories gave unfavourable images of African politics and society in their 1998 study of 1,168 sampled items from the New York Times between 1955 and 1995. The research was conducted in 1998 and sampled articles between 1955 and 1995. 1990 is the year that stands out as having the most positive depictions of Africa, as shown by a positive rating of 43%. They added that this was directly tied to the cheery expectations that came with the conclusion of the Cold War and the talks that resulted in Namibia's independence and a democratic South Africa. In other words, the end of the Cold War and the negotiations that led to a democratic South Africa led to optimistic expectations. The joy, however, did not last long because the percentage of negative media depictions of Africa reached 85% in

1995. According to the findings of Jesicca Brandwein (2011), the Western media frequently presents Somalia in terms of terrorism, a humanitarian crisis, or a civil war, with little emphasis placed on peace discussions, local human-interest stories, or actual local realities.

This was the conclusion that she reached after researching articles published in the New York Times (NYT) and across all Africa.com websites between 2000 and 2010. She argues that this media emphasis is congruent with the United States government's image of Somalia as a refuge for terrorists, which legitimizes United States policies of military engagement in Somalia while at the same time explaining the absence of real participation in the nation on peacebuilding problems. She goes on to say that although African media outlets are more likely to focus on peace negotiations, regional security initiatives, and local peace initiatives, both outlets reinforce biased portrayals of Al-Shabaab and leave little room for counterarguments that would support and legitimize local engagement with the insurgent group in pursuit of peace. She says this even though African media outlets are more likely to focus on peace negotiations, regional security, and local peace initiatives (Brandwein, 2011).

When Eribo (1994) conducted a content analysis of the coverage of Somalia in two Russian newspapers, Pravda and Izvestia, in December 1992, he noticed that most news items about Somalia and the former Yugoslavia were published in Russian media from the Russian perspective. This was the case for both countries (Eribo, 1994). The period covered was when the United States Marine Corps' "Operation Restore Hope" was the most talked about topic in news headlines worldwide. Malnourished victims of drought and ethnic strife in Somalia were given the command by President George W. Bush to

have the United States send the military to Mogadishu to help in the delivery of humanitarian food supplies to those victims. In his article titled "Russian Newspaper Coverage of Somalia and the Former Yugoslavia," Eribo asserts that it was to be anticipated that Pravda and Izvestia would place a greater emphasis on the former Yugoslavia than they did on Somalia. He makes this claim in his article. Izvestia's reportage on the events in Somalia and Yugoslavia was more knowledgeable and objective. However, Pravda's coverage appeared biased against the United States' participation in "Operation Restore Hope."

Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda are most often mentioned in connection with most of the Somalia articles published in Kenyan newspapers. This is how the news about the conflict in Somalia is typically presented in the Kenyan media. In the stories, phrases such as these and others, such as "Islamist militia," "Islamic militants," "Radical Islamist group," and "ragtag militia," were utilized. Syson (2012) defined al-Shabaab as Islamic fundamentalists, whereas Kiberenge (2012) referred to the organization as a "ruthless extremist group allied to al-Qaeda." Kiberenge (2012) also referred to al-Shabaab as Islamic fundamentalists.

To explain Al-Shabaab's involvement in kidnappings in Kenya, Aluanga (2011) cites David Kikaya, an international relations instructor, who asserts that the group's goal was to gain attention from the global community. He maintains, "Terrorism thrives on bad press," and I agree. Al-Shabaab has retreated to the outskirts of hotspots such as Mogadishu to escape prolonged combat with AMISOM. Examples of these hotspots include Mogadishu. The fact that there have been kidnappings recorded in Lamu shows the general public that this is still a concern.

After the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) entered Somalia to combat Al-Shabaab, a former Kenyan minister named Dr. Mukhisa Kituyi wrote a commentary titled "World must support Kenya in the war against Al-Shabaab." In their opinion, he linked the threats made by despots to the threats made by Al-Shabaab. He stated, "Their threats were coached in flowery language reminiscent of the final days of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi" (Kituyi, 2011). According to an editorial published in the Sunday Nation on October 16, 2011, which supported the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) war against Al-Shabaab in Somalia, there is no greater external threat to Kenya's stability than the Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is a loose confederation of radical extremists and rootless youth that Ugandan and Burundian troops drove from Mogadishu in the second week of August.

According to several studies, Somalia is a war-torn nation that has disintegrated. The nation was variously referred to as "War-ravaged country," "War-torn country," "Lawless country," "Failed State," "War-stricken country," and "War-weary Horn of Africa country." All of these descriptors were used regularly. Background information on the country typically included the claim that Somalia has not had a stable government since 1991 or even for 20 years, which furthered the perception that Somalia is a failed state.

By convincing someone to view an issue along a particular axis that supports the promoted point of view, news priming makes it easier to set the topic for a discussion. In order to affect how members of the public form ideas about politicians and political topics, the concept of news priming makes the premise that the media may make certain issues or components of issues more accessible and easily recalled. This is done to

influence how members of the public form opinions about politicians and political topics (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2001). As a result, the framing and priming in the media may cause individuals to comprehend and interpret information in a biased manner.

In addition to distributing information regarding the non-custodial Reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, the media also has the moral and ethical obligation to guarantee that its reporting is impartial (Rodman, 2019). rules and regulations govern the behaviour of information disseminators working in professional capacities for media outlets and are subject to scrutiny under these rules and regulations. However, ethical and moral obligations do not erase the biases that can be seen in reporting the many different actors involved in media operations. Owners and financiers of media outlets are responsible for ensuring that opposing viewpoints are minimized or ignored. Furthermore, reporters are afraid of offending their bosses. Being human means that reporters are also unable to avoid being subjective, and this trait is especially obvious in live TV reporting, when there are no gatekeepers and filtering is minimal.

The media has a significant responsibility whenever they report on a conflict. The general population frequently has little choice but to rely on the media's reporting since they have few other options to understand events frequently taking place in far-off locations about which they know very little. According to Frere (2011), the role of the media should ideally consist of monitoring, investigating, and objectively publishing its results. Even if it can be tough, reporting daily can be incredibly difficult amid an ongoing war. The modern media are under increasing amounts of pressure to deliver

news at a faster rate and more frequently. As a direct consequence, journalists frequently require additional time to investigate sources and verify material. They frequently require additional time to conduct an in-depth analysis of the events and place such analyses within a broader historical perspective. It is possible that this could result in a vicious cycle of oversimplification and oversimplification, which will leave very little room for progress toward a deeper comprehension of the underlying issues. According to Johan Galtung (2007), the majority of the attention that the media pays to conflict nowadays is concentrated on the military. He thinks that how wars are reported in the media frequently supports perceptions that, in effect, stoke the flames of violence. If the general public does not frequently hear about a fight or specific aspects, there is a good chance that their knowledge and comprehension of the fight or some aspects of the fight will be limited.

Television media has a large degree of power because of its audio-visual capability to broadcast the battle's events live. As a result, television media has the potential to shift dialogues and, to some extent, shape reality. The news on television and other media forms affects the criteria used to judge governments, the military, policies, and political candidates by emphasizing certain concerns while ignoring others. This has the effect of distorting the picture that viewers have of these institutions. A mass media operation is a specific kind of media activity that is carried out to ensure that the general public is informed in a reliable, current, correct, and effective manner. At the highest level, it is coordinated, and at lower levels, it is held to preserve a proactive position.

The purpose of the media operation is to assist the various actors in the fight against terrorism in achieving their operational goals by increasing public awareness and

gaining support from the general populace (Munteanu, 2014). In this information age, media operations have taken on an increasingly vital role in pursuing success. In the case of non-custodial reintegration programs, media news reporting offers the ability to monitor and facilitate a clear grasp of the program implementers' viewpoints, vision, and mission. This is an important step in ensuring that the projects are successful. It hopes to affect how community discourse can increase the viability of the non-custodial Reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters while remaining within the confines of morality and legality.

To supplement their other security-related activities and improve their effectiveness, state security services participate in media operations. The Kenyan state media functions by a comprehensive set of guidelines that can both ensure success and lessen the severity of any potential consequences. For something to be successful, it is imperative that the following five fundamental requirements be satisfied: regard for the truth, credibility, security safeguards, opportunity, and the planning idea (Karanja, 2000). The other four principles that need to be added to these five are continuity, acquiring and holding the initiative, and the principle of complementarities to avoid surprises and military activities. These should be included (Green, 2000).

The editorial viewpoints in newspapers add to the audience's overall comprehension of the events. Therefore, the only area in a newspaper where the opinion media house is directly represented is in the editorials. Editorials in the public domain, such as those published in newspapers, considerably impact how political discourse is shaped. Journalists attempt to either indirectly or directly impact politics by attempting to sway public opinion or directing their attention, especially to politicians (Fairhurst & Star,

1996).

Khan (2009) explains how a distorted image of Pakistan is being presented in international media and how significant Pakistan has grown as a result of the terrorist attack that was carried out against the United States on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, by the Islamic terrorist organization al-Qaeda. This is discussed in the context of examining the diplomatic ties between the United States and Pakistan. The coverage of Iran in the elitist American print media about terrorism increased in the years following Ayatollah Khomeini's rise to power in 1979 and the years following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's election in 2005, according to a content analysis of the reporting on Iran that took place in the New York Times and the Washington Post during that period. According to the findings, the year following Ahmadinejad's election saw more media coverage of Iran concerning terrorism than the year after Ayatollah Khomeini's rise to power in Iran (Kamal, 2010). He discusses why Pakistan is being portrayed inaccurately by foreign media outlets and how significant Pakistan has become due to the events of September 11.

Kenyan print media have provided extensive coverage of the ongoing conflict against Al-Shabaab. In a study titled "Is Peace Journalism Conceivable in the War against Terror in Somalia?" researchers investigated this question. One study, which was done by Fredrick Ogenga (2012), looked at the coverage of Kenyan media. The presentation of "Operation Linda Nchi" in the Kenyan Daily Nation and the Standard. His research, the purpose of which was to investigate the concept of peace journalism, concluded that the two magazines in question had sanitized and supported the military action and contributed to the general public's impression of it. He asserts that journalists chose a

pro-war attitude to advance national interests and that this was their motivation. Despite their assertions that they practice objective journalism, he believes Kenyan media outlets do not genuinely make an effort to be objective in their reporting. After looking at 26 prominent headlines in 26 newspaper editions of the newspapers between October 16 and November 21, 2011, addressing the coverage of the war on Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Ogenga (2012) believes that the local media employed bandwagon journalism, which is copied and pasted from the Western tradition. He came to this conclusion after examining the coverage of the war on Al-Shabaab in Somalia. If this is the case, it will be challenging for the media in Kenya to create a narrative distinct from the one being presented by the media in other countries. This disproves the notion that African media outlets can report on a distinct region while presenting a different story to their audiences (Ogega, 2012).

Ogenga (2012) blames the Kenyan media for emphasizing the threat that Al-Shabaab poses to Kenyans rather than the effects that the military operations in Somalia have had on ordinary Somali civilians. Al-Shabaab's threat to Kenyans includes terrorist attacks, kidnappings, and piracy. Most of those fleeing their country were women and children; as a direct consequence, some refugees were imprisoned by government authorities at the various places where they crossed the border. In other instances, the media tried to downplay the military operation's negative effects by showing images of members of the KDF distributing food and medicine to sick and emaciated Somalis.

2.3 Challenges of Non-Custodial Reintegration Programmes on the Welfare of Returnee Terrorist Fighters

The degree to which home countries perceive the return of terrorist fighters as a threat to national security is one of the distinguishing characteristics of this new wave of foreign militants. Because the conflict is not isolated to the region, as demonstrated by the horrifying attacks that have taken place in Europe over the last five years, there is a possibility that some returnees will do so to carry out violent acts in their home countries. At least six of the terrorists who carried out the terrible attacks that took place in Paris in November 2015 were Belgians and French nationals who had recently returned from fighting in Syria (News, BBC, 2016). Similarly, at least three of the five assailants in the Brussels attacks in March of 2016 were natives of the country (Pop, 2016). The possibility of major "blowback assaults" by returnees was groundless because earlier waves of returnees had not previously demonstrated this higher level of concern (Hegghammer T., 2013).

The decision to leave one's home country to fight or participate in a conflict in another nation is not recent; famous examples of this option include the American Revolution, the Greek War of Independence, and the Spanish Civil War. At least four significant waves of foreign fighters have been lured to fight in the name of protecting Islam due to wars that have taken place in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Iraq, and now Syria and Iraq. This phenomenon has been witnessed all over the world. There are a lot of similarities between those who supported liberation wars in the 1960s and 1970s and those who rallied to safeguard democracy overseas in the 1850s or the 1930s or even ethno-nationalists; the rise of Muslim foreign fighters is a very modern phenomenon.

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, some Islamic leaders underwent a theological shift that condoned, encouraged, and occasionally needed armed jihad. This shift brought about the first appearance of the phenomenon. Additionally, this organization promoted a narrative that presented these wars as an existential danger to Islam (Hegghammer T., 2010).

2.3.1 Nexus Between De-radicalization and Disengagement of Returnee Terrorist Fighters

It is possible to minimize the risk that a person formerly involved in a terrorist action or extremism may engage in terrorist activities by reintegrating them into society. Reintegration is the term used to describe this process (Schmid, 2013). Recent years have seen a rise in the number of people interested in specialist programs focusing on the reintegration of ('jihadist') terrorists worldwide (Schmid A. P., 2013). Some of these projects focus on terrorists or radicals currently being held in custody, while others emphasize the context of parole after detention (Barrett & Bokhari, 2009). Despite the extensive application of these programs, it is still largely unknown whether or not they impact the reduction in recidivism linked to acts of terrorism. This is primarily due to the lack of evaluative studies that are currently available. A second issue connected to this is that it is difficult to precisely define what "success" means in the context of the non-custodial reintegration of returned terrorist fighters and extremists. For instance, in the Netherlands in 2008, more than fifty percent of adult and juvenile offenders committed new offenses within two years of their release from prison (Wartna, 2011).

There are two main reasons why it is debatable whether or not a similar recidivism rate for terrorist criminals may be regarded as successful. Given the impact that terrorism has had

on society, many citizens may not consider a recidivism rate of 50 percent to be a successful outcome or at least one that is in line with the average for the nation. A paucity of information on terrorist recidivism, particularly in the EU, makes it impossible to identify a realistic recidivism rate, let alone a desirable one, for reintegration programs to aspire for. This is because it is difficult to determine a desirable recidivism rate (Sim & Ismail, 2016). Therefore, even though many reintegration programs have the reduction of recidivism as one of their primary goals, it is impossible to determine how successful these programs have been due to a lack of statistics.

One should investigate the dynamics beneath these non-incarcerated reintegration programs for returned terrorist fighters to understand how these programs work. When the need arises, two tactics can be identified: de-radicalization of returnee terrorist fighters and disengagement of those individuals. Because of this dearth of actual knowledge regarding what strategies effectively reintegrate former terrorists and extremists into society, one is forced to rely on these mechanisms (Horgan, 2009). The methods of deradicalization and disengagement are not mutually exclusive; nevertheless, since it is not yet known which techniques are most effective, combining both approaches provide more space for maneuverability and raises the possibility of success.

The terms "radicalization" and "de-radicalization" have made their way into ordinary language ever since they were first brought up in the context of the policy discussion. Their popularity highlights their shortcomings (Schmid A. P., 2013). The concept that holding radical ideas necessarily results in holding extreme behaviours and that rejecting terrorism equally necessitates that one hold extreme opinions is the most problematic notion. It should be abandoned (Genkin & Gutfraind, 2011). This kind of relationship oversimplifies

a quite complicated reality and is unsupportable both conceptually and experimentally. Millions of people in the world hold radical or extremist ideologies, but the percentage of those who commit acts of terrorism is relatively low (Khalil J., 2014).

In addition, research has shown that not all terrorists are primarily motivated by their beliefs in the cause they are fighting for (Abrahms, 2008). A strategy for the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist combatants that focuses mainly on de-radicalization misses the essential point that desistance from extremist and terrorist organizations is based on multiple variables beyond ideology. This point is that desistance from extremist and terrorist organizations is based on various factors beyond ideology. These include losing faith in the usefulness of violence, fighting with other citizens, and becoming enamored with the idea of living a regular life (Hwang, 2015). The inverse is also true; it may be difficult to avoid joining terrorist or extremist organizations due to factors such as peer pressure and the fear of retaliation from former allies (Koehler, D., 2015)

When discussing ways out of extremism and terrorism, the danger of focusing exclusively on the empirically and theoretically flawed idea of de-radicalization is that several other approaches to lowering recidivism may be missed. This is a concern because de-radicalization is an empirically and theoretically dubious idea. If, for example, the social benefits of participation in terrorist groups (such as status, comradeship, and a feeling of purpose) lead an individual to become involved with the group, then an alternative, non-radical social environment that can provide similar benefits should be created (Horgan, J, 2016). De-radicalization is still an essential strategy for individuals who were first motivated to conduct acts of terrorism by a particular ideology. Because we now have a

better grasp of the issues at hand, the primary tool that reintegration programs should rely on should be replaced with something else.

An excessive focus on de-radicalization causes one to overlook the innumerable occasions throughout history in which terrorists successfully reintegrated into society without first becoming less radicalized (Silke, 2011). Between 1960 and 1990, many terrorist organizations across Europe, such as the IRA, ETA, the Italian Red Brigades, and the German RAF, were responsible for the imprisonment of thousands of people. Most of those who were incarcerated were eventually released without having to participate in any de-radicalization programs. As a result of the fact that the bulk of these individuals are no longer actively participating in terrorist activity or are doing so to a significantly lesser extent, de-radicalization is not necessarily a prerequisite for reintegration. This is proven by the fact that. It is possible that current efforts to reduce recidivism rates could benefit from a more in-depth analysis of previous cases of terrorists who were able to successfully reintegrate into society.

A strategy centered on deradicalization is one option for reintegration, while another option is the concept of disengagement. A person is said to be disengaging when they experience a change in their work or function, often accompanied by a reduction in the amount of violent behaviour they participate in. Although leaving the movement may not always be involved, doing so is often connected to a significant change in the profession, either temporarily or permanently (Horgan, 2009). On the other hand, de-radicalization places a greater emphasis on changing one's worldview, whereas disengagement encourages one to change their behaviour. Even if they continue to espouse radical views, disengaged

terrorists or extremists can effectively reintegrate into society if they refrain from using any form of terrorist violence.

Understanding how and why someone became involved in violent extremism or terrorism in the first place is essential to de-radicalization and also to the process of disengaging from such activities. These people become group members for various reasons, some of which have nothing to do with adhering to a specific philosophy (Hwang, 2015). Therefore, non-custodial reintegration programs for former terrorist fighters who have returned home should be flexible and tailored to each participant's specific history and objectives (RAN, 2017).

This necessitates considering the likelihood that some returning foreign fighters will be hardened extremists who have seen battle. On the other hand, some individuals may have been influenced or motivated (at least initially) by non-violent causes, such as a desire to assist those in need. This could be the case with others. In this sense, it is essential to highlight the babies born in Iraq and Syria to foreign combatants and the young children taken there by their parents. These children require specialized care, in part to address the psychological trauma they have experienced and in part to address the possibility that they have internalized the ideology of extremist groups, as it is possible that they were subjected to IS brainwashing designed to turn them into child soldiers (Horgan, J, 2016).

In conclusion, the dearth of research on non-custodial reintegration programs and the lack of statistics on terrorist recidivism rates significantly hinder our knowledge of how and when such programs are effective. Even while these problems need to be addressed as quickly as possible, the underlying assumptions of these programs regarding success and how to achieve them provide direction on building and administering efforts of this nature.

According to the most recent research, it is best to employ a combination of de-radicalization and disengagement tactics rather than just one. This has the additional benefit of ensuring that non-custodial reintegration programs have a certain amount of flexibility in dealing with their clients, which is a prerequisite for achieving recidivism reduction. Given the variety of motivations and backgrounds among those who engage in extremism and terrorism, this has the added benefit of ensuring that non-custodial reintegration programs engage in recidivism reduction.

2.3.2 Dilemma of Non-Custodial Reintegration of Returnee Terrorist Fighters

It is challenging to leave violent extremism because it is rooted in identity conceptions, psychosocial dynamics, and practical concerns. Many academics think dissociating oneself from a group is often the precipitating factor in a cognitive shift away from a commitment to violent extremism. Research in this area typically differentiates between de-radicalization and disengagement (Horgan, 2009). Consequently, disengagement does not necessarily guarantee de-radicalization, even though it commonly comes before it. As a result, the path to rehabilitation requires a shift in one's point of view and a modification of one's social relationships and personal circumstances.

The non-custodial reintegration processes of returnee terrorist fighters are made more difficult by the possibility that the host society may reject the returnees. This is especially true for those returns who bear the stigma of criminality. When some people return, they bear the additional risk of being persecuted by those they formerly considered comrades. Access to a social support system and a friendly environment that encourages genuine disengagement and creating a new identity must be provided (Garfinkel R., 2007). Numerous additional nations, such as Somalia, Afghanistan, Belgium, and the

Netherlands, are already implementing various reintegration schemes with varying degrees of success. Most research on these programs provides descriptive explanations or is essentially theoretical (Koehler D., 2016). According to Grossman and Barolsky (2019), there are significant knowledge gaps in the significance of communities in the fight against violent extremism (CVE) and the methods by which communities might be engaged in CVE-related activities.

In recent years, particularly in Europe, a proliferation of non-custodial programs designed for post-detention settings has taken place to cope with the migration of combatants from Syria and Iraq. This is mainly because there has been a need for such programs. At this early point, however, there is scant evidence to suggest that there has been any impact. One of the most significant challenges in establishing the effectiveness of non-custodial reintegration programs is the time necessary to analyze the programs' effects and the difficulty of obtaining data on the program's long-term effects. In addition, the concept of recidivism is problematic in the context of activities aimed at deradicalization because it is not certain that an individual will not return to their radical beliefs even if they stop using violent tactics (Horgan & Taylor, 2012).

Even if individuals do not directly participate in violent activities, peaceful extremists may still contribute to the radicalization of others or the advancement of the movement's goals. It only takes a few high-profile cases of violent recidivism, especially in the context of a horrific terrorist attack, to erode the political will and public support that are necessary to pursue non-custodial reintegration measures (Porges, 2011). On the other hand, non-custodial reintegration continues to be a vital component of any comprehensive plan to combat violent extremism (CVE). It is essential to develop communities with more

resilience.

Similarly, placing less emphasis on encounters with individuals who "had previously been radicalized to violence or otherwise exposed to violent radicalized views, influences, and environments." As a consequence of this, there is a gap in the existing body of knowledge about the rehabilitation and reintegration of returning terrorists, in particular about the concept of the role that communities play and the experiences that they have had. This research aims to contribute to the body of knowledge by addressing this gap in the existing research. The phrase "countering violent extremism" (sometimes written as CVE) has become increasingly used when discussing preventing terrorist attacks. CVE includes various components, one of which is using strategies to counter radicalization. CVE is a discipline of practice within the realm of policy, as opposed to academic research. Notably, the CVE industry emerged in response to the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001.

After September 11, 2001, there was a focus on utilizing coercive and brutal power measures to respond to the threat posed by terrorism. However, as a CVE discourse developed, these responses shifted away from using these methods. The use of force in the fight against terrorism is something that CVE has never supported. It advocates using less harsh measures that do not include coercion to prevent the inception of terrorism in the first place (Harris-Hogan, 2016). CVE is distinct from traditional counterterrorism techniques that rely on military tactics since it is designed to adapt to the ever-changing security landscape created by terrorist organizations (Mogire & Mkutu, 2011).

It is almost usually the case that non-custodial interventions cannot give a broad range

of activities that can better address the diverse needs and welfare of those who engage in violent extremism, even though personalized treatments are required. This is the case even though non-custodial interventions need to be offered. In addition, there are five distinct kinds, or baskets, of intervention support, commonly recognized by the public. Some options include counselling for families, assistance with cultural and recreational activities, spiritual or ideological support, psychosocial support, and assistance with socioeconomic issues. Everyone has the potential to need different kinds of baskets, such as those that assist with social welfare, housing, career prospects, and educational programs. There is a fair likelihood that some of the other wicker baskets will go exceptionally well with some of the other categories. For instance, individuals who have only recently escaped a conflict zone may require psychosocial counselling more frequently to deal with the trauma and other mental health illnesses that were brought on as a direct result of their exposure to violence. In addition, non-custodial reintegration programs for returnees should include relevant family or other community members, just as with former violent extremist offenders returning to their communities, in order to assist an individual returnee in developing a support system that can act as a safety net in the event of a future crisis. This is similar to the approach of former violent extremist offenders returning to their communities.

When returnees receive financial assistance to improve their socioeconomic situations, it makes it easier to reintegrate into society and reduces the risk of committing another offense. A few examples of the different kinds of assistance that might be provided are housing, education, assistance in finding a job, assistance in developing relevant skills, and medical care. The county government or another appropriate authority in Kenya

could create this support package for violent extremist offenders upon their release from prison (or upon surrender from Al-Shabaab in Somalia), for those looking to break away from violent extremist groups, and for those entering (or re-entering) their jurisdiction which may have had some connection to violent extremist groups when it becomes necessary to do so (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017).

Education and training specifically geared toward a profession can be quite valuable in their own right. However, suppose they do not result in employment for the intended beneficiary. In that case, that person may become frustrated, which may impede or even stop the R&R process. Education must be linked to increased opportunities for civic participation to forestall an escalation of discontent (Edwards, 2016). Education and training specifically geared toward a profession can be quite valuable in their own right. However, suppose they do not result in employment for the intended beneficiary. In that case, that person may become frustrated, which may impede or even stop the R&R process. Education must be linked to increased opportunities for civic participation to forestall an escalation of discontent (Hummer, 2015).

Additionally, it is essential to refrain from having cultural or gendered preconceived notions regarding the work that women (and men) can or ought to do in the workforce. In conclusion, evaluations of the labour market should be used to inform programs that aim to improve employees' capabilities rather than beginning completely from scratch. Cooperation with the private sector (or relocating to a different community) should be considered to help encourage long-term economic growth and job creation in the places where individuals who have benefited from R&R programs are returning. With the support of local businesses, it may be possible to establish the pressing needs of the

community's economy, the potential for the growth of new sectors, and the availability of vocational training for both men and women.

When hostility is cultivated throughout a neighbourhood, those participating in non-custodial reintegration programs are subject to the same hazards as the rest of the community. Especially in a suffering economy where unemployment is high, and work prospects are scarce, care must be taken to prevent mistakenly conveying that people who benefit from the R&R programs are given more possibilities than law-abiding community members. This is especially important to remember when speaking about the R&R programs. Suppose former violent extremist offenders or refugees from conflict zones are given preferential treatment compared to others who may have been involved in other criminal activities. In that case, this can lead to resentment among community members who may feel unfairly disadvantaged. Even the perception that preferential treatment is being given to these groups can lead to this reaction.

Regarding the non-custodial reintegration of former terrorist fighters who have returned home, the significance of providing them with psychological and social support cannot be overstated. The procedure is made more difficult and becomes a significant obstacle in R&R accomplishments when there is insufficient or no such thing. Many forms of psychosocial help can make the process of reintegration and disengagement from VERLT easier. People who require such care include those who have been traumatized by violence (for example, as a result of having lived in a conflict zone) and those who are depressed or nervous or who otherwise require help for their mental health in some other way. Despite the lack of evidence supporting a direct link between mental illness and violent extremism, mounting evidence suggests that adolescent radicalization is

influenced by poor psychological adjustment. This is the case even though the two have no obvious causal linkage (Dodd, 2016).

A variety of psychosocial supports could help address this challenge; the appropriate choice of support will depend on the need of the returnees individually. The promotion of critical and complex thinking, problem-solving, and decision-making skills; the improvement of interpersonal relationships; the development of self-esteem; the addressing of beliefs and ways of thinking that support violence; the improvement of self-knowledge and understanding; the healing of emotional pain and the elimination of confusion; and the addressing of identity issues are all important aspects of this type of therapy (GCTF, 2018). As is typical for other types of non-custodial interventions, the individual who is returning needs to be amenable to the concept of commencing a counselling process while they are in the process of reintegrating back into society. It is essential to develop a trustworthy relationship with clients before offering any kind of assistance because there are situations in which they might not be receptive to receiving psychosocial treatment due to cultural or other considerations (Koller, 2019). In order to accomplish this goal, it may be beneficial to bring in cultural facilitators both before and during therapy or counselling sessions.

As is the case in a great number of other countries across the world, Kenya is having trouble dealing with the reintegration of its citizens who have either fought for Al-Shabaab or joined the organization to take on various tasks. According to Cragin (2019), over a hundred Kenyans have travelled to Iraq and Syria to fight for Al-Shabaab or the Islamic State. This makes it abundantly evident that Kenya is a significant supply of foreign soldiers for these terrorist organizations. At this time, at least seventy of them

have not been found, and eight are now held in custody (Cragin, 2019). After joining Al-Shabaab in Somalia, many individuals have since left and returned to their home countries. According to Horgan and Braddock (2010), many questions still have not been answered. Some of these problems include the acceptability of the host communities, the standing of the returns in society, and their possibilities of reintegration: Where exactly are they going? Who will be monitoring their whereabouts? There is a chance of repeat offenses. While inside bars, is it possible for them to be dissuaded from engaging in terrorist activity? Will members of the public consider any level of recidivism to be acceptable?

In Kenya, an emphasis has been placed on encouraging the reintegration of terrorist fighters who have recently come home. Radicalism's danger to the nation's safety is well known throughout Mombasa County. It was found out that numerous locals, including some who had defected to Al-Shabaab, knew which foreign fighters were returning from Al-Shabaab. This included fighters who had deserted to Al-Shabaab and those who had not. This study aims to better understand the perspectives held by local communities in the coastal region of Mombasa on the reintegration of these returning individuals.

2.4 Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework is a construction of hypotheses that try to explain the link between a range of occurrences, as Lederman and Lederman (2015) stated. This definition was found in their article. A conceptual framework can be constructed using these hypotheses. The theoretical framework of this study serves as the framework that links and sustains the various hypotheses that are explored in this study. Any programs that are not based on jail

and are meant to reintegrate terrorist fighters who have returned home should be based on recent evaluations of relevant therapies and good assumptions that are supported by evidence. This is because incarceration is not the most effective means of reintegrating former terrorist combatants. In order to understand why the issue is being looked at and to consider potential choices for building the best practice for the reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters, this research is guided by the Programme Theory and the Desistance Theory. These theories are the Programme Theory and the Desistance Theory, respectively. The Programme Theory and the Desistance Theory are the names of these two theories.

2.4.1 Programme Theory

Pawson and Tilley (1997), in setting out a realist approach to evaluation, argue that programme theory or theory of change explains how an evaluand either being a project, a programme, a policy, or a strategy is understood to contribute to a chain of results that produce the intended or actual impacts. These can include positive impacts (which are beneficial) and negative impacts (which are detrimental).

Programme Theory has its roots in the field of program evaluation and has emerged as a structured approach to understanding how programs work and the factors influencing their effectiveness. Its origin can be traced back to the works of early proponents such as Carol Weiss, whose seminal contributions highlighted the significance of the Theory of Change (ToC) in program evaluation. Weiss emphasized the need to elucidate the causal pathways between program activities and desired outcomes, thereby laying the foundation for the development of Programme Theory.

Programme theory encompasses several key tenets. The 'Logic Model' serves as a visual representation, illustrating the inputs, activities, outputs, and expected outcomes of a

program. This was further developed by Michael Quinn Patton (2010), who stressed the importance of incorporating a comprehensive logic model to clarify the program's components and anticipated results. Furthermore, Programme Theory emphasizes the identification and examination of 'Assumptions and Risks' that could impact the success of a program. Patton has contributed significantly to this aspect by emphasizing the critical role of acknowledging and addressing potential assumptions and risks during the program evaluation process. The recognition of 'Contextual Factors' as crucial elements influencing program implementation and outcomes has been underscored by Joseph Wholey (1979). Wholey's work highlighted the need to consider cultural, social, and political contexts when designing and evaluating programs, thereby enhancing their effectiveness and relevance within specific environments. Additionally, the 'Involvement of Stakeholders' is an essential tenet in Programme Theory, emphasized by all the aforementioned proponents. Engaging relevant stakeholders throughout the program cycle fosters a sense of ownership, increases program relevance, and enhances the likelihood of success.

Programme Theory can inform the design of non-custodial reintegration programs for returning foreign terrorist fighters by providing a comprehensive understanding of the causal pathways between program activities and the desired outcomes. By utilizing the Theory of Change, stakeholders can create a clear roadmap outlining the steps necessary for successful reintegration. The inclusion of a robust logic model, as advocated by Patton (2010), can aid in visualizing the inputs, activities, and anticipated outcomes of the reintegration program. Considering contextual factors, as highlighted by Wholey (1979), can help tailor the program to specific cultural, social, and political contexts, thereby increasing its effectiveness and acceptance within the community. Lastly, active

stakeholder involvement, as emphasized by all proponents, ensures that the reintegration program aligns with the needs and aspirations of both the returnee foreign terrorist fighters and the communities they are reintegrating into, thereby fostering a more successful and sustainable reintegration process.

The individuals who have become violent and radicalized (including, but not limited to, terrorist criminals) and maybe their relatives are the audience that the non-custodial reintegration projects in Kenya aim to reach out to. People who, for several reasons, have not yet been incarcerated but may exhibit some level of support for violent extremism are another target audience for the programs. People who have just relocated from parts of Iraq, Syria, or Somalia under the control of the Islamic State are a good illustration of this phenomenon. R&R courses can be offered in jails and prisons, in non-custodial settings such as communities, or as a component of probation services, which can be administered either in jails or in the community. Programs can also be delivered as part of a community-based alternative to incarceration. In addition, programs can be provided to patients as an element of their therapy for substance abuse and alcoholism. Programs are typically centered on the participants' reintegration into society. Some components that may be included in programs are mentoring, counselling that is either religious, psychological, or familial, job training and placement, career guidance, education, and cultural and recreational activities.

As a consequence, programming theory, founded on prior knowledge and experience, specifies the shifts that are anticipated to take place. How you describe the "why" and "what" of the program will determine how you describe the program's goals and the steps that will be required to achieve those goals. The incorporation of evidence-based program

theory into the design of non-incarceration reintegration programs is an illustration of a feasible method for the development of such programs. This theory is grounded in Pawson and Tilley's previous research, which provides the evidence necessary to support it. It is premised on the knowledge that no approach is universally applicable to creating public policy and that implementing identical programs in various circumstances can lead to distinct outcomes from those envisaged. It is predicated on the realization that no universally applicable method for formulating public policy (Pawson & Tilley, 1997).

Following an analysis of the primary premises upon which the theory is founded, Howard White (2009) proposes six considerations that ought to be given attention to ensure the successful use of the approach. The causal chain ought to be mapped out, the context ought to be understood, heterogeneity ought to be anticipated, the program's impact ought to be rigorously evaluated using credible counterfactual and factual analyses, and mixed methodologies must be utilized (White, 2009).

The realism approach examines the fundamental processes through which various policy instruments accomplish particular outcomes by particular conditions to explain why certain policies are successful in certain contexts while others are not (Banks, 2009). An explicit programming theory is one in which the decision-makers have described in no uncertain terms how the policy instrument will operate and the consequences that they wish it to have. This type of theory is called "explicit" in computer science. An open-ended program theory is another name for this particular category of theory. This is based on the assumption that the outcome will be perfect. Therefore, the question that needs to be asked from a pragmatic point of view is not "what works," but rather "what works for whom in what situations" (Sanderson, 2002).

The research that is now available, as well as reviews of relevant therapies, should serve as a guide for developing effective non-custodial reintegration programs for returning terrorist fighters. This proposition is meant to make it abundantly obvious that decision-makers ought to take on this responsibility and meticulously lay out the particulars of the intervention before it is put into effect. This proposal's objective is to make it abundantly evident that decision-makers ought to take on this obligation. The policy description should always be able to respond to several general questions about the interaction between the intervention's outcomes, mechanisms, and context. This is true regardless of whether the rehabilitation initiative is focused on returning foreign terrorist fighters, on individual or group treatment, or prison-based or community-based programs. Regardless of whether the rehabilitation effort is geared toward individual or group therapy (Pawson & Tilley, 1997), this is the situation. The realism approach to social policy has as its overarching objective the simplification of complex social programs by elucidating the circumstances under which various policies have a higher or lesser possibility of success. The structure is laid out by the three basic functional concepts, which are the Outcomes, the Mechanisms, and the Context.

The program's outcomes are used to measure the consequences of a policy on a certain population. Policy outcomes refer to the societal shifts brought about as a result of implementing one or more interventional components. There is a possibility that the results will vary based on the target demography and the circumstances, regardless of whether the results were expected or unanticipated, wanted or unwelcome, etc. (for example, the same policy may yield different effects for men and women). Increases in police presence and patrols inside the community that the returnee terrorist combatants are being hosted in, for

example, may reduce the risk that the returnee will participate in acts of violence. However, it can potentially unintentionally raise the general population's levels of worry.

The non-custodial reintegration program needs to explain the type of societal shift it intends to bring about. What are the goals that the intervention hopes to achieve? It is possible to create a hierarchical structure using the goals, objectives (or criteria), and sub-objectives that are associated with the rehabilitation programs' aspirations, in contrast to goals, which are articulated in general terms and specify broad and more general ideal end states, objectives and sub-objectives are more carefully specified and provide detailed descriptions of the accomplishments that are required to obtain the intended results. Protecting society through reducing criminal activity and improving the administration of justice are the overarching goals of various rehabilitation and reintegration efforts (Cullen & Applegate, 1997).

Regarding criminals who have previous convictions for acts of terrorism or violent extremism, non-incarceration reintegration programs are part of a larger anti-terrorist framework. Their ultimate goal is to end violent radicalization and terrorism, as well as the individuals and groups responsible for those things, and to fight against them. The programmed goals are then converted into more specific objectives that will act as benchmarks for judging whether or not an intervention has generated the expected results. Programs aimed at rehabilitating and reintegrating violent extremists into society have as one of their key purposes the process of preparing inmates for their release back into society in a manner that reduces the possibility that they would conduct crimes once they have been released from jail. The "regular" treatment of offenders inspires these programs

(Cullen & Applegate, 1997). In order to achieve these objectives, you will first need to gain several additional sub-objectives by responding to several additional questions.

The first question that needs to be answered is whether the goals of programs not involving incarceration should be de-radicalization or disengagement. Not everyone may leave violent extremism on the same path, and renouncement of violent behaviour isn't necessarily accompanied by renunciation of the philosophy that drove someone to become violently extremist in the first place (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). Put another way, a terrorist fighter who has returned home may be persuaded to reconsider using violence. However, this does not necessarily imply that he is no longer committed to the political cause he formerly supported. If the individual refrains from performing any additional terrorist acts after being released from prison or leaving the terror organization, one could argue that giving up violent activity (also known as disengagement) may be adequate from the point of view of criminal justice. In other words, if the person successfully avoids committing additional terrorist acts after leaving the terror organization. After all, adhering to extreme ideologies is not in and of itself a criminal offense; rather, these ideas only become relevant to the administration of criminal justice when they give rise to actions that violate the law.

According to Horgan (2009), even though most programs identify themselves as "de-radicalization programs," a closer analysis indicates that they focus more on attempts to induce disengagement and desistance from terrorist activity than they do on opposing violent extremist ideology. This is the case even though most programs call themselves "de-radicalization programs" (Horgan, 2009). The challenge is to get to a stage when people have completely abandoned the use of violence and are steadfast in their opposition

to terrorism. But how on earth is something like that possibly conceivable? The fundamental question that needs to be answered is: Which comes first, violent extremist attitudes or violent extremist behaviour?

According to psychological insights, a shift in one's behaviours does not always represent a shift in their attitude, and vice versa. This highlights the complex relationship between how individuals feel or think and their actions (Fishbein, 2010). When dealing with offenders who have become ideologically radicalized, the assumption that extreme behaviour, even if not directed by a fundamentalist belief system, is at least justified by one further complicates the situation. Given the complex nature of the connection between the beliefs and actions of extremists, most experts on terrorism appear to agree that efforts to rehabilitate terrorists require a balanced strategy that targets both beliefs and behaviour and is intended to encourage de-radicalization while simultaneously encouraging disengagement (ICCT☐The Hague, 2012).

The second question that needs to be answered is whether or not non-custodial reintegration should be pursued through individual or group initiatives. The response to this question depends on how the target demographic is defined, particularly on the organization of the extreme movement that the intervention is intended to address, as well as on the standing of the various individuals within the movement (Rabasa et al., 2010). In addition, the answer to this question also depends on how the intervention is intended to affect the various individuals within the movement. The only way for group therapies to have a fighting chance of being effective is if the people taking part in the program are members of a coherent, community-based organization that has some type of hierarchical structure (Neumann, 2010). Community-based organizations that place a significant emphasis on

leadership at the highest levels have the authority to mandate a shift in strategy and cultivate a sense of belonging among the group members through this power. The desire of the leaders to participate in the intervention program and initiate a shift away from violent behaviour will have a substantial impact on the program's success. When the necessity of core leadership is diminished, collective efforts may be less effective in decentralized movements (Neumann, 2010).

Similarly, the intervention ought to be individualized according to each returnee's particular social status within the larger network. Residents who have moved away from the center of a violent movement but have since returned have different demands than the movement's core members. For instance, those who take on a facilitative role but are otherwise barely integrated and hardly familiar with the core violent extremists may not benefit from group therapies that put them in contact with other group members since these therapies put them in contact with other group members. Participants in this category may benefit more from an individualized community rehabilitation and reintegration strategy that does not involve incarceration.

Thirdly, what are the short-, medium-, and long-term goals of the efforts toward integration and rehabilitation? In the short term, the primary objective is to help incarcerated individuals become law-abiding members of society and prepare them for their eventual readmission into society. The participants in non-custodial reintegration programs should not be encouraged to return to the people or organizations that initially encouraged them to become involved in extremism and terrorism. This should be the primary objective of these programs. Long term, the goal of these reintegration programs should be to assist in the establishment of an environment in which repatriates can settle down and lead law-

abiding, productive lives. Therefore, it is important to avoid repeat offenses not only in the short term but also in the intermediate term and throughout the long term.

The policy mechanisms are what make the program go in the right direction. The mechanisms explain what it is about the intervention that causes the change, as well as how different tools contribute to accomplishing the objective (Pawson, 2006). In keeping with the previous image, increased patrols and the presence of security professionals in the community could lower the threat of terrorism through various processes, such as identifying explosives or other potentially hazardous things and discouraging terrorist organizations from planning attacks. In addition, the presence of these elements in the neighborhood could dissuade terrorist organizations from planning attacks. After deciding what the objectives will be, the next step is to figure out which strategies and resources will be necessary to achieve the desired outcomes. Program theory describes the many policy tools and, more importantly, how these tools are believed to assist in accomplishing the goals.

Initiatives for the non-custodial reintegration of returnees who are First Time Offenders (terrorist fighters) are built on the assumption that the returnees' cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioural qualities can be adjusted to lower the possibility of re-offending. This is the premise upon which initiatives for the non-custodial reintegration of returnees who are First Time Offenders are based (Cullen & Gendreau, 2000). The most significant barrier to achieving this objective is the need to plan and carry out the interventions capable of bringing about the desired changes. The program's various components should be evidence-based and rooted in prior knowledge of the factors that predict future criminal behaviour and the strategies that may be used to address those factors in accordance with

a realist perspective. This information is acquired through both academic study and practical participation. A program theory might include the following activities to reintegrate individuals who once participated in terrorist fighting activities. This directly results from the valuable lessons acquired from comprehensive prison reform.

Providing educational opportunities features prominently among today's many non-correctional reintegration and rehabilitation programs. Those who have returned from fighting for terrorist organizations are provided access to various programs, such as those that provide instruction in elementary mathematics, history, civics, and languages. There may be programs at the college or university level available, but this will rely on the educational history of the returnees. Education is the spark that ignites several societal revolutions of varying kinds. It contributes to intellectual enlargement, boosts self-esteem and self-efficacy, nurtures individuals' resilience to violent extremist ideologies and domineering other convicts, improves returnees' academic capacities and work prospects, and so on (Cullen & Applegate, 1997).

Second, the returnee's rehabilitation and reintegration efforts will normally concentrate on finding employment as their primary goal. Indeed, it is believed that a lack of work and job abilities are closely related to both criminal behaviour and subsequent offenses (Hagan, 1993). Vocational training typically focuses little on theory or the capacity to analyze data, and it is frequently adapted to fit the requirements of a specific occupation or trade. The practical uses of acquired skills are emphasized significantly throughout the program. It is believed that vocational training is effective because it increases employment capabilities and prepares the returnee to accept a skilled job upon reintegration into society (Western B., 2002). Certificates could be awarded to former combatants to demonstrate to potential

employers that they possess the abilities necessary to work in a specific professional occupation.

Third, cognitive behavioural therapy (often known as CBT) is indispensable to reintegration programs. According to the findings of many pieces of research, the theory is often successful in dramatically reducing recidivism rates among "generic" (not radical) criminals. The assumption that returnees' cognitive, attitudinal, and motivational tendencies—the ideas, emotions, and convictions that initially led them towards deviancy—are taught rather than innate is the premise around which cognitive behavioural therapy is built (Lipsey et al., 2007). This is the central tenet of cognitive behavioural therapy. It focuses on comprehending and modifying these cognitive functions to lower criminal propensities (for example, improving abstract thinking, critical reasoning, goal planning, and perspective taking), and it can be especially effective in reforming violent extremist offenders.

As a method for bringing about change in the legal system, religious counselling is gaining popularity as a choice among an increasing number of individuals (Sundt, 2002). According to Beckford and Khosrokhavar (2005), religion has always played an important role in the environment of correctional facilities. Studies have shown that offenders can benefit from religious therapy by adjusting to their circumstances and lowering their chance of committing additional crimes (Johnson, 1997). Regarding religious extremism, religious counselling may convince inmates to adhere to a more moderate and peaceful view of their faith, one that does not condone violent or destructive acts in the name of religion. These are only a few instances of the potential advantages of participating in religious therapy. It may also be possible for returnees who are not currently detained to

participate in positive attitude and motivational transformation programs. Other aspects of non-custodial reintegration of former terrorist fighters who have returned to their home countries may include financial after-care, group discussions, on-the-job training, parole and probation, individual classification and needs assessments, social and recreational activities, testing and evaluation (Robertson, 1968).

The contextual conditions of a reintegration `program impact whether or not a policy instrument has an effect and how that impact manifests itself. Regardless of the validity or validity of the underlying assumptions underpinning the assertion that non-custodial reintegration programs are effective in decreasing recidivism, the setting in which these programs are carried out will decide whether or not they achieve the effect intended to reduce recidivism. Policy instruments impact the non-custodial reintegration programs differently depending on the context (Sridharan, 2010). For example, the degree to which people of the host community experience fear in response to an increase in the number of police officers stationed there and the frequency with which they patrol may be contingent on their familiarity with and views towards the military's role in day-to-day civic life. This realist approach's clear acknowledgment that programs are dynamic enterprises situated in complex social systems that greatly impact policy procedures and outcomes is one of its best aspects. Another of its best features is that it is one of the most often-used approaches. Therefore, the Realist approach is premised on the idea that interventions are dynamic systems that change over time as the context and the thinking of stakeholders do and that they depend on the context in which they are implemented. This idea is based on the belief that context and stakeholder thinking are intertwined.

Even though there is a fundamental comprehension of who, when, and why particular things work, certain programs cannot be copied in their entirety from one context to another as a consequence of this. However, there is a replicable understanding of the programs themselves. Because of this, the Realist approach is particularly useful for complex interventions such as non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters. These programs consist of numerous interconnected components (such as training programs, economic support, and after-care). They are implemented in various contexts (such as countries with different criminal justice systems and prison settings). In addition, the Realist approach is useful for various extremist offenders (such as Islamic State members).

The fundamental rationale and particular intervention of the "program theory" have allegedly rarely been publicly expressed or converted into real plans, which is one of the criticisms leveled against the idea by those who disagree with it. In many cases, computer programs are developed through the use of intuition and unstated presumptions about how various actions can achieve particularly intended consequences. Consequently, it is frequently necessary to clarify the specific goals of these policies, how their instruments are expected to assist them in achieving these goals, and how the effectiveness of these policies may be judged. For example, are the goals of these initiatives "simply" to provide participants with a set of tools that they have been assured will assist them in avoiding engaging in violent behaviour, or are the goals of these initiatives to transform participants into pacifist citizens by addressing the ideology that initially justified violence (a process known as "de-radicalization")? How do these approaches use the information already available regarding the causes that lead to the radicalization of violent behaviour and the

actions of terrorists? The most crucial question is how to judge their performance and how much influence they have had.

Considering that to this day, only several, if any, non-custodial reintegration programs have been subjected to a comprehensive review, attempts to evaluate the efficacy of these programs are hampered by considerable difficulties (Kruglanski, 2011). However, in order for governments and prison authorities to determine whether or not investing in the non-custodial rehabilitation and reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters is worthwhile or a waste of resources, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of what these policies seek to accomplish, how they do so, and whether or not they are successful. This is because governments and prison authorities must determine whether or not to invest in the non-custodial rehabilitation and reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters.

This study justifies using Evidence-based Programme Theory as a Realist approach to developing non-custodial reintegration programs for returnees with a history of terrorism or extremism. These programs would be designed for those who had previously been involved in either terrorism or extremism. Therefore, it is emphasized under this realist paradigm that the results of non-custodial reintegration programs should be seen as a result of the application of context and policy processes. This is because the realist paradigm emphasizes the importance of reducing recidivism (Veldhuis, 2012). Given the particular setting, it is of the utmost importance to have a clear understanding of the underlying presumptions behind how the intervention should be carried out to assist in the accomplishment of its aims to increase the likelihood of it being successful. As a result, the Realist approach emphasizes the significance of separating the numerous layers of the

policy framework and understanding how they affect the intervention. Pawson and Tilley are on record, acknowledging these nested levels of contextual impacts (Pawson, 2006).

The success of the non-custodial reintegration initiatives is greatly impacted by the returnees who choose to participate in those programs. Returnees need to be appropriately motivated before they can participate in the program and critically assess the attitudes and actions that they have developed over their time away. In addition, the reintegration programs should be specially created to satisfy the needs of each returnee. This includes considering the returnees' political aspirations and ideological backgrounds, as well as the organizational structure of the movement that the returnees joined. On the other hand, in order to guarantee that the intervention will be successful, the staff, which may include corrections officials, parole officers, and social workers, must be aware of the conceptual framework and the goals of the program, in addition to having the Education, credibility, and interpersonal abilities that are required.

Second, the various stakeholders and players in the reintegration program need to establish healthy interpersonal connections with one another. The establishment and management of a non-custodial reintegration program for returned terrorist fighters require collaboration between several different players. At varying points and stages during the process, every performer contributes unique experiences, abilities, and insights to the table. For a business as complex as this one to be successful, having players who feel a sense of ownership in the enterprise and who can communicate effectively with one another are vital criteria (ICCT, 2011).

Thirdly, it is of the utmost importance to consider the institutional structure. Who should be responsible for designing and carrying out the non-incarceration reintegration program?

It is vital to assess, for example, whether returnees participating in extremist rehabilitation programs should be kept in separate facilities from other convicted individuals so that they can be isolated from one another. If this is the case, should the probation or jail systems be granted central authority, or can privatization adequately meet the requirements of non-custodial reintegration programs? In either case, the appropriate institution's culture, ethos, management style, and resources need to support the efforts being made toward rehabilitation and inclusion. Concerning the protocols and regulations to be followed, the government authorities, program management, and any other actors involved should reach a consensus.

In conclusion, Pawson and Tilley point out that a crucial contextual component significantly impacts how programs function within the context of the larger infrastructural system (Pawson, 2006). Interventions in rehabilitation are prone to limits imposed by infrastructure and are nestled within complex legal and administrative frameworks. Both the way the R&R program operates and the outcomes that it produces are influenced by the particular parameters of the nation's incarceration and criminal justice systems. Therefore, rehabilitation programs for former terrorist fighters who have returned to society are subject to various contextual factors, each of which has the potential to significantly restrict the programs' ability to function and provide the desired outcomes.

Suppose reintegration initiatives are to have any chance of altering the returnee terrorist fighters and reducing recidivism. In that case, non-custodial reintegration programs must be adapted to the distinctive aspects of the milieu they are administered. This suggests that any potential contextual limits, as well as elements that can confound the necessary

mechanisms and reduce the efficiency of the intervention, should be addressed efficiently and at the top of the list to ensure the best possible outcome.

While Programme Theory has been instrumental in guiding program evaluation and development, it has also faced certain criticisms, particularly in the context of designing effective non-custodial reintegration programs for returning terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya.

One of the key criticisms pertains to the potential oversimplification of complex social and political dynamics within the specific context of Mombasa County. Critics argue that Programme Theory may not adequately account for the intricate interplay of local cultural norms, historical tensions, and regional dynamics, which can significantly impact the success of reintegration programs for former terrorist fighters. This oversimplification could lead to the implementation of interventions that fail to address the nuanced challenges that are unique to the local context.

Another critique relates to the potential lack of inclusivity and community participation in the design and implementation of reintegration programs. The critique suggest that Programme Theory might not fully consider the perspectives and voices of the local communities in Mombasa County, leading to a top-down approach that does not effectively address the concerns, needs, and aspirations of the community members. This could result in a lack of community support and engagement, undermining the sustainability and success of the reintegration efforts.

Furthermore, some critics highlight the limited focus on long-term sustainability and impact assessment within Programme Theory. From this argument therefore, the theory

may not adequately emphasize the importance of continuous monitoring and evaluation to assess the long-term effectiveness of reintegration programs in Mombasa County. Without comprehensive and sustained evaluation mechanisms, it becomes challenging to measure the lasting impact of the programs on the individuals and the community, thereby hindering the ability to make informed adjustments and improvements over time.

Critics also point out the potential challenge of balancing security concerns with reintegration efforts. Given the sensitive nature of dealing with returnee terrorist fighters, there might be a perceived tension between the imperative to ensure national security and the need to facilitate successful community reintegration. This delicate balance may not be adequately addressed within Programme Theory, potentially leading to a lack of cohesive strategies that effectively address both security concerns and rehabilitation efforts.

In light of these criticisms, it is imperative to approach the design of non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya, with a nuanced understanding of the local context, active community engagement, robust long-term evaluation mechanisms, and a careful balance between security imperatives and rehabilitation efforts. Integrating these considerations can contribute to the development of more effective and sustainable reintegration strategies that address the complex challenges specific to the context of Mombasa County.

2.4.2 Relative Deprivation Theory

Relative Deprivation Theory traces its origins to the works of Samuel Stouffer, an American sociologist, who first introduced the concept in the 1940s. Stouffer's research during World War II examined the effects of relative deprivation on soldiers' morale, revealing that individuals' perceptions of their relative standing in society influence their

sense of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Building upon Stouffer's work, subsequent scholars such as Runciman and Gurr further developed the theory, emphasizing the role of perceived inequality in fostering feelings of deprivation and discontent among individuals or groups within a society.

The theory posits several key tenets. Firstly, it underscores the significance of individuals' subjective perceptions of their social status in relation to others. Runciman (1966), a notable proponent of the Relative Deprivation Theory, highlighted that individuals' assessment of their relative standing compared to others significantly influences their psychological well-being and behaviours.

Secondly, the theory emphasizes that feelings of relative deprivation can contribute to various forms of social and political unrest. Gurr (1970), another prominent figure in the field, expanded on this idea, emphasizing how perceived inequalities can lead to collective grievances and potentially fuel social movements, protests, or even violent conflicts. Moreover, the theory highlights the role of social comparison processes in shaping individuals' sense of relative deprivation. According to Stouffer and other proponents, people tend to evaluate their own well-being and success based on comparisons with others, thereby influencing their sense of relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction (Geschwender, 1964).

In the context of designing non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee foreign terrorist fighters, Relative Deprivation Theory can be instrumental in informing the development of effective interventions that address the underlying dynamics of deprivation experienced by the returnee foreign terrorist fighters thereby help in designing interventions that target the root causes of dissatisfaction and alienation among the

returnees. Additionally, considering contextual factors, such as the specific societal and cultural dynamics of Mombasa County, Kenya, can facilitate the development of tailored interventions that resonate with the local community, fostering a sense of inclusion and reducing feelings of relative deprivation among the returnees. Lastly, actively involving stakeholders throughout the program cycle, as advocated by Programme Theory, can help cultivate a sense of ownership and inclusivity, promoting the success and sustainability of the non-custodial reintegration programs aimed at enhancing the welfare of the returnee foreign terrorist fighters. This indicates that the deprivation that is being complained about may be a product of the returnee terrorist combatant who is unable to integrate into the community effectively.

Robert Merton, who is known for being a supporter of this idea, contends that social movements, such as the returnee terrorists, flourish in environments in which individuals have the perception that they are being denied or deprived of something that they believe is justly entitled. He reiterates that those who feel deprived are the ones who give rise to social movements (Gurney & Tierney, 1982). When people compare themselves to others, the theory goes, they may have the impression that they are at a disadvantage; hence. As a result, they may become involved in social movements to find a solution to their problems. This is a push factor in and of itself for the returnee terrorist combatants to rejoin promising or tempting groups of terrorists, ultimately leading to them reoffending in violent wars.

The most important claim made by this theory is that a former offender will be compelled to join other social movements, such as unlawful terror groups, if he does not have something he believes is being denied to others in the host community. He does not have it even though others in the host community have it (Brush, 1996). Returned terrorist

warriors in Mombasa County may think their freedom, possessions, justice, life, and space have been taken away. The hope of the former terrorist fighter who has returned home and joined such a movement is to rectify the situation so that they are on an equal footing with the host community members to whom they compare themselves. When a returnee feels denied the right to use a social benefit that other community members enjoy and is promised the provision of the right through fighting for it, he is willing to join the movement (terrorist) in pursuit of his or her solace. This is an example of a push factor (Gurney & Tierney, 1982).

According to this theory, political socialization in Kenya, which can be defined as the process by which various institutions of society (such as the family, religious leaders, and community elders) influence the mindset of their individuals to adopt certain attitudes that are not for the system, has caused returnee terrorist fighters to feel as though they are isolated from society. Their perspectives on how the government treats them have helped to solidify their position. As a result, they are willing to embrace alternative worldviews, such as those promulgated by organizations like the Al-Shabaab militia, as a solution to their plight.

They argue that they are less likely to get government job posts or that when they apply, they must present further supporting documentation that other Kenyans do not supply because they have been tagged as returnee terrorist fighters in Kenya. This causes them to feel discriminated against, and they base their claim on the fact that they have been marked (Horgan & Taylor, 2012). Some of these differences are unhelpful to any effort or strategy adopted by the government towards non-custodial reintegration, which aims to stop the drift into additional terrorist actions or even reverse the damage already caused by

radicalism. It is widely believed that ensuring the psychological and financial wellbeing of former terrorist fighters is of utmost importance in promoting a transition away from engaging in illegal behaviour and towards the successful reintegration of former terrorist fighters (Farrall S., 2002).

According to this point of view, non-custodial reintegration programs should center their efforts on boosting the social welfare of returnee terrorist fighters and building the social bonds between returnee terrorist fighters in order to prepare them to lead "good lives" as regular citizens. According to Laub and Sampson (2003), the level of a returnee terrorist fighter's social welfare is the primary factor determining whether they would give up their unlawful career (Laub, J. H., and R.J. Sampson, 2003). One of the most important things that can be done to alleviate their sense of deprivation is to improve their chances of finding a reliable job and strengthening their connections with their families and communities. According to Maruna (2001), a former terrorist fighter who has returned to society must first have the motivation to change and the cognitive readiness to use these social relationships to successfully reintegrate into society (Maruna S., 2001).

The returnee terrorist fighter is put at the foreground and core of the non-custodial reintegration process by relative deprivation theory. This acknowledges that the experiences of all returnees are different, and that the social welfare of all returnees is founded on the fundamental right to social integration. This is made possible by providing equitable opportunities to engage in all elements of social life, which is essential to enable the returnee to lead a life commensurate with human dignity (Scheirs V., 2016). The mission's success in reintegrating former terrorist fighters into society as full citizens is therefore essential to ensuring the health and happiness of these individuals (Maruna, S;

Lebel, P T, 2003). The purpose of the non-custodial reintegration process should be to highlight the potential of the former offender rather than focusing on risk factors and inadequacies. The primary questions should be asked are what value this individual can bring and where they have expertise. The relationship between the person dealing with the returned terrorist fighters and the returnee terrorist fighters and their professional views or the guiding principles of the rehabilitation and integration program are also essential factors.

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Marriage is another aspect of a person's life that can affect their stability after returning home. Finding work is a crucial step on the journey for returnee terrorist combatants to the path from the feeling of deprivation, and being accepted by society and finding a spouse is a significant step towards that acceptance. However, getting married alone does not guarantee that a person's criminal tendencies will change, with pleasure again an important factor in this context (Harper, 2017). In addition to these social aspects, it is essential to bear in mind that personality-related problems may be just as relevant in predicting the success of the long-term reintegration of the returnees. This must always be kept at the forefront of your mind.

Therefore, relative deprivation theory convincingly reveals that the personal attitude shift of a returned terrorist fighter is a crucial determinant in the effectiveness of non-custodial reintegration programs (Alexander, Lowenkamp, & Robinson, 2014). Deprivation theory, therefore, highlights the necessity for the government of Kenya to deploy all means possible through solid policies and tactics that prevent attempts by individual returnees to join other terror organizations. This requirement is underscored by the fact that deprivation theory is a method for countering terrorism.

While the Relative Deprivation Theory has provided valuable insights into understanding the psychological and social impacts of perceived inequality, it faces several criticisms, particularly in the context of designing effective non-custodial reintegration programs for returning terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya.

One of the key criticisms pertains to the potential oversimplification of the complex array of factors contributing to the radicalization and violent extremism of terrorist fighters. Critics argue that the Relative Deprivation Theory might not fully account for the multifaceted nature of radicalization, which could involve a combination of political, ideological, and socio-economic grievances beyond the scope of relative deprivation alone. Additionally, critics highlight the challenge of generalizing the theory across diverse cultural contexts. The Relative Deprivation Theory's emphasis on individuals' perceptions of inequality may not fully consider the specific cultural, historical, and religious dynamics within Mombasa County. This limitation could undermine the applicability of the theory in understanding the nuanced drivers of radicalization and the specific needs of returnee terrorist fighters in the local context.

Furthermore, some critics argue that the Relative Deprivation Theory might neglect the role of ideological indoctrination and extremist narratives in shaping the beliefs and behaviours of terrorist fighters. By focusing primarily on perceived socio-economic inequalities, the theory might not adequately address the ideological motivations and radical narratives that underpin the actions of terrorist groups, thereby limiting its effectiveness in informing comprehensive reintegration strategies for returning fighters.

Critics also raise concerns about the potential exclusion of broader structural and systemic issues that contribute to social marginalization and radicalization. The Relative Deprivation Theory may not sufficiently account for systemic discrimination, governance challenges, and other structural inequalities that perpetuate social exclusion and fuel extremist ideologies. This oversight could hinder the development of holistic reintegration programs that effectively address the root causes of radicalization and foster sustainable community reintegration for returning terrorist fighters.

Given these criticisms, it is essential to complement the insights from the Relative Deprivation Theory with a comprehensive understanding of the broader socio-political and cultural dynamics at play in Mombasa County, Kenya. Integrating a multifaceted approach that considers a range of factors, including ideological influences, systemic inequalities, and cultural nuances, can contribute to the development of more effective and culturally sensitive non-custodial reintegration programs tailored to the specific needs of returnee terrorist fighters in the region.

2.4.3 Desistance Theory

Desistance theory originated from the works of criminologists such as Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck in the early 1950s. The Gluecks' research focused on the factors influencing

criminal behaviour and highlighted the concept of desistance as a process through which individuals cease engaging in criminal activities over time. The theory emphasizes the role of social bonds, life events, and personal agency in the process of desistance from criminal behaviour such as would be propagated by returnee foreign terrorist.

The theory is characterized by several key tenets. Firstly, it underscores the significance of personal agency and the individual's capacity to make positive changes in their lives. Laub and Sampson's contributions emphasized the role of agency in the desistance process, highlighting the importance of personal motivations and aspirations in overcoming a criminal lifestyle (Laub, Sampson , & Sweeten, 2006).

Secondly, desistance theory highlights the importance of social bonds and supportive relationships in facilitating the transition away from criminal behaviour. The Gluecks' research emphasized the role of family, employment, and community ties in promoting prosocial activities and reducing the likelihood of reoffending. Moreover, the theory emphasizes the impact of transformative life events and transitions in facilitating desistance. Laub and Sampson's work highlighted the significance of critical life events, such as stable employment, marriage, and parenthood, in prompting individuals to disengage from criminal activities and adopt more conventional lifestyles.

In the context of designing non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee foreign terrorist fighters, desistance theory can be instrumental in informing the development of effective interventions aimed at enhancing their well-being and promoting their successful reintegration into society. By incorporating insights from desistance theory, stakeholders can create reintegration programs that focus on fostering personal agency, strengthening social bonds, and facilitating positive life transitions for the returning individuals.

Employing the Theory of Change, stakeholders can develop a clear understanding of the steps and processes involved in the desistance journey, outlining the necessary interventions to support the returnees' positive behavioural changes. The integration of a comprehensive logic model can help visualize the inputs, activities, and expected outcomes of the reintegration program, ensuring that the interventions effectively address the returnees' personal aspirations and needs.

Furthermore, considering the significance of supportive relationships and social bonds, as highlighted by the proponents of desistance theory, can guide the design of interventions that foster a sense of belonging and community integration for the returnees. Incorporating transformative life events, such as employment and educational opportunities, can facilitate the transition towards a more constructive and law-abiding lifestyle, thereby promoting the successful reintegration of the returnee foreign terrorist fighters into society.

Desistance theory, which is a conflict transformation theory, explains a phenomenon in criminology regarding how terrorist offenders cease engaging in criminal activity. It helps to explain how transformation narratives influence the desistance of released lifers and other returned foreign terrorist fighters. This groundbreaking theoretical framework developed by Moffitt (1993) is especially important because it attempts to conceptualize offender rehabilitation and reintegration as well as the career of a criminal. It also has applications for probation officers who work with convicted criminals in the community.

A classification of two categories of offenders served as the foundation of the desistance transformation hypothesis. The first category consists of those who commit crimes only sometimes. This group typically begins to act inappropriately in the first few years of adolescence and stops soon after. 'Life-course persistent offenders,' in contrast to this group

of 'adolescence-limited offenders,' begin offending considerably earlier in life and continue well through their teenage years (McNeill, Farrall, & Lightowler, 2012). The theory aims to describe the process through which offenders learn to lead law-abiding lives. Although desistance is a process rather than a single event, the theory contends that those who stop engaging in criminal behavior transform their personal identity and self-narrative in observable ways and create a new, "better" self that no longer emotionally aligns with offending (Giordano, Longmore, Schroeder, & Seffrin, 2008).

Since rehabilitation is both a social and a personal endeavor, desistance theory can help to explain why non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee FTFs are beneficial. Outside influences may also support such shift (McNeill, 2012). According to the desistance strategy, only a mental shift can put an end to a criminal career (Rocque, 2017). The social welfare of FTFs who have returned is thought to be extremely important in fostering a shift in criminal behavior toward effective FTF reintegration (Farrall, 2002).

According to this perspective, non-custodial reintegration programs should focus on strengthening the social relationships between returned FTFs and enhancing their social welfare so they can have "good lives" as regular citizens. According to Laub and Sampson (2003), the decision of an ex-fighter to cease their illegal career is primarily influenced by social welfare (Laub, J. H., and R.J. Sampson, 2003). The primary contributing factors to their desistance process are their ability to locate a steady place of employment and a positive social family bond. According to Maruna (2001), a returnee FTF must first be motivated to change and cognitively ready to use these social ties in the process of being reintegrated back into society (Maruna, 2001).

Desistance theory places the desister at the forefront and center of the desistance process, acknowledging that every person's experience is unique and that every person's social welfare is anchored from the fundamental right of social integration, which refers to the opportunity to participate in all aspects of social life that are necessary to enable a person to lead a life in accordance with human dignity (Scheirs, 2016).

The objective of integrating returnee FTFs into society as full citizens, then, plays a crucial role in the wellbeing of these individuals (Maruna & LeBel, 2003). Instead of emphasizing risk factors and inadequacies, the goal of the reintegration process should be to highlight the (former) offender's assets. What value can this person add and where do they have expertise should be the key questions? The relationship between the returnee FTFs and the person dealing with them, as well as their professional attitudes or the rehabilitation and integration program's guiding principles, are also significant.

The natural and artificial changes brought about by non-custodial reintegration programs or community initiatives that result in desistance processes are influenced by a number of factors. Some experts argue that criminals, especially young people, effectively "grow out" of crime. Research on age-related arrest rates provides support for the idea that aging is a natural assistance to abstinence. The age-crime curve, which was initially documented in the middle of the 1980s, indicates that the mid-teenage years are the peak age for offending (Harper, 2013). Another aspect of resistance that influences social welfare is life stability. Regular job enables ex-offenders to put their concentrate on something more worthwhile than crime. To put it another way, the consistency of labour replaces the urge to commit crime brought on by a lack of income-generating activities or financial stress.

Marriage is a factor that affects life stability. Finding a spouse is a significant step on the returnee FTFs' path to desistance, much like locating employment. However, getting married alone does not ensure that a person's offending tendencies would alter, with satisfaction once more being a crucial aspect (Harper, 2017). In addition to these social factors, it is critical to keep in mind that personality-related concerns need to be looked at as well because they may be just as significant in predicting long-term desistance. Therefore, research on substance abuse does not develop its own theory about how to effectively treat offenders; instead, it provides a framework for assessing offender treatment programs.

Desistance theory thus strongly demonstrate that a returnee FTF's personal attitude change is a significant factor in the success of non-custodial reintegration programs. Desistance theory also shows that successful social integration after release improves the ex-social offender's welfare and has an impact on their propensity to commit crimes again (Alexander, 2014). The United Kingdom's Desistance and Disengagement Programme is an example of a non-custodial reintegration program that successfully applied the Desistance theory. The Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP) concentrates on people who are subject to court-approved conditions, such as all terrorism and terrorism-related offenders on probation licenses and those on Terrorism Prevention Investigation Measures (TPIMs) (GOV.UK, 2016) and additionally, individuals returnees who are covered by Temporary Exclusion Orders and have just returned from conflict-ridden areas like Syria or Iraq (TEOs).

The multi-actor program is carried out in collaboration with a number of organizations and partners, including the Ministry of Justice, police, the Prison and Probation Service, as well

as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with the broad goal of providing a more holistic approach to disengagement. The program aims to combat the causes of radicalization to violent extremism, foster resilience, and facilitate recovery through a variety of intense, personalized interventions and practical support. Mentoring, psychological assistance, and theological and ideological counsel could all be provided as support for the program. These interventions are made to give these individuals the best means available to stop supporting terrorism and safely reintegrate into society.

The DDP works in conjunction with the government's already established statutory risk assessment and management procedures to strengthen those already in place. The optimum way to keep monitoring the risk that a person poses while also assisting with their rehabilitation and reintegration is determined by regular reviews of terrorism cases with relevant stakeholders (DDP, 2016). The DDP is a non-custodial rehabilitation and reintegration approach that is required in some circumstances, unlike other components of the national CVE policy of the United Kingdom. Non-compliance with requirements could result in charges for violating the terms or being sent back to prison when mandated for people subject to TEOs, TPIMs, or probation requirements. 116 persons reportedly participated in the DDP program between October 2016 and September 2018 despite the fact that little information about it is publicly available (Grierson, 2019).

Desistance theory assists the Criminal Justice System (CJS) in identifying viable strategies for lowering reoffending in the community by implementing community-based punishments. The number of individuals held in short-term prison facilities may decline as a result of this. The establishment of training programs for professionals dealing with ex-offenders in the community can also be aided by desistance theory. The professionals who

work in the probation service are an example of a group of people who could profit from such influence.

Critics of this notion contend that unless criminals can "prove" their rehabilitation, they are frequently viewed as a threat to society. For this reason, it is recommended that the general public see desistance as nothing more than a long-term relapse prevention strategy. In connection with this, there have been instances where attempts at reintegration of released convicts have sparked public outcry.

While desistance theory has provided valuable insights into understanding the process of moving away from criminal behaviour, it has also faced several criticisms, particularly in the context of designing effective non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya.

One of the key criticisms pertains to the limited applicability of traditional desistance theory to the unique context of terrorist activities and extremist ideologies. Critics argue that the theory's focus on conventional criminal behaviour might not fully account for the complex ideological motivations and radical narratives that underpin the actions of terrorist groups (Kessler & Levitt, 1999). This limitation could hinder the theory's effectiveness in informing comprehensive reintegration strategies tailored to the specific needs of returning terrorist fighters in Mombasa County.

Furthermore, critics raise concerns about the potential neglect of broader structural and systemic issues that contribute to the process of radicalization and extremist activities (Grasmick & Bryjak, 1980). The focus on individual-level factors and life transitions within desistance theory might overlook the systemic inequalities, social marginalization,

and governance challenges that can perpetuate extremist ideologies and hinder the successful reintegration of returning terrorist fighters into the community.

It is also argued that the theory might not fully consider the unique challenges and stigmatization faced by returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County (Nyariki, Bor, & Onsarigo, 2019). The lack of emphasis on the social and psychological complexities associated with the reintegration of individuals with a history of terrorism could lead to the development of reintegration programs that do not adequately address the specific needs and vulnerabilities of this population. Moreover, the limited attention to the socio-cultural dynamics and community-specific challenges in Mombasa County within the desistance theory framework is another criticism. Therefore, the theory may not sufficiently account for the cultural nuances and historical contexts that influence the dynamics of radicalization and reintegration in the local community. This oversight could undermine the effectiveness of the theory in guiding the development of culturally sensitive and contextually appropriate reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters.

Considering these criticisms, it is crucial to complement the insights from desistance theory with a comprehensive understanding of the specific socio-political, cultural, and psychological dynamics at play in Mombasa County, Kenya. Incorporating a holistic approach that considers both individual and structural factors, as well as cultural nuances, can contribute to the development of more effective and culturally sensitive non-custodial reintegration programs tailored to the specific needs and challenges faced by returnee terrorist fighters in the region.

2.5 Conceptual Framework Model

According to Ravitch and Riggan (2012), a conceptual framework model is a tool that can

be used in several situations and variations to analyze and generate conceptual differences to organize ideas and concepts in a practical and clear way to demonstrate a problem. This tool may analyze and generate conceptual differences to show an issue. It can also be used to analyze and generate conceptual differences to organize ideas and concepts (Riggan, 2012). In this particular piece of research, the concept of non-custodial reintegration will serve as the independent variable, while returnee welfare will play the role of the dependent variable. The research focused on the efficacy of non-custodial reintegration strategies in terms of the objectivity and relevance of the programs, the individual returnees' commitment to the success of the program, and also on the community's resilience and support of the process. This was done in order to interrogate the independent variable. Since non-custodial reintegration occurs predominately in local communities throughout an open period and is both a social and economic process, it falls under the ambit of national responsibility and development and frequently requires long-term assistance from the outside.

It is vital to implement reintegration programs to enhance community resistance to violent extremism, reduce the likelihood of radicalization among juveniles, and prevent recidivism among those who have been released from incarceration (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017). In a similar vein, the intervention should be particularly developed for the social standing of each returnee within the larger community in which they will reside when they are back in their home country. Some indicators of successful rehabilitation and non-custodial reintegration programs include individual returnees' dedication to the program, the program's design, and the community's willingness to embrace the ex-offender.

It will continue to be determined by the success of the non-custodial reintegration programs how well the returned terrorist fighters are handled when they are brought back into society. To determine whether or not an ex-economic offender is doing well, one will look at the extent to which their mindset has shifted, the level of social acceptance they have received from the community, and how far along they are in regaining their independence. Consequently, the theoretical framework for this investigation is predicated on how the intervening elements shown in Figure 2.1 interact with the dependent variable and the independent variable.

Independent Variable   **Dependent Variable**

Non-custodial Reintegration programs

. Individual returnee's commitment

. Reintegration programs design

. Community engagement

Returnee Terrorist Fighters Welfare

. Social factors

. Economic factors

. Psychological factors

Intervening Variable

. Government amnesty policies

. Existing political environment

. Rehabilitation institutions in place

. Non-custodial Reintegration actors

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework

Source: Researcher, 2021.

2.6 Summary of Gaps in the Literature Review

Based on the study of the previous research, it is abundantly evident that there are holes in the knowledge that need to be filled. According to the literature review findings, in the present environment, a greater amount of attention is being paid to R&R by multilateral organizations, governments (including donors), multilateral organizations, civil society organizations, and other non-governmental actors. On the other hand, most of the policy and programmatic focus has, to this point, been dedicated to R&R in the context of prisons. This is evident by the numerous manuals, guidelines, and recommendations centered on the prison setting and relevant experiences and expertise from across the OSCE region. As a result of these factors, the purpose of this study is to add to the body of knowledge already accumulated by concentrating on a variety of non-custodial settings. It outlines a few of the potential steps that the state and other parties might take if they decide to institute non-custodial R&R programs as a part of an all-encompassing, multidisciplinary P/CVERLT approach.

According to the evaluation of the relevant literature, relatively little research has been conducted on the efficacy of rehabilitation programs that do not occur within the confines of Kenyan prisons. In Mombasa County, the non-custodial programs also lack evidence and an existing evaluation of relevant interventions before developing the reintegration programs. As a result, there is a lack of evidence regarding the process, program outcomes, and mechanism of operationalizing the programs within the community context and the requirements of returnee offenders. The literature research also found that the government has to address the fundamental causes of criminogenic tendencies in Mombasa by employing new technology for surveillance and monitoring and inspiring rehabilitators

working in counter-terrorism mechanisms. This can be done by using new technology for surveillance and monitoring and by addressing the core causes of criminogenic tendencies in Mombasa.

2.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter contains a comprehensive overview of the pertinent literature about the strategies currently used for reintegrating returned foreign terrorist combatants that do not include correctional facility use. The literature study provides an overview of the characteristics of the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters, the efficacy of non-custodial strategies for doing so, and the opportunities and restrictions for doing so in Mombasa, Kenya. It is generally agreed that the reintegration of people determined to have had considerable exposure to or involvement in terrorism and VERLT is a crucial component of a comprehensive plan to deal with these challenges over the long term. As a result, non-custodial reintegration is essential for both the short-term avoidance of violence and the long-term development of community resilience in response to VERLT. The Plan of Action of the UN Secretary-General and several of the P/CVERLT national action plans and strategies, all of which are still being prepared, place a significant amount of emphasis on the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters.

The significance of adopting a realistic worldview in the process of designing non-incarcerated reintegration programs for convicted foreign terrorists who have returned to their home countries is the primary subject of this research. Accordingly, it is argued that programs for non-custodial reintegration must be established on sound evidence regarding what motivates international terrorist fighting and what reasons give rise to violent extremism. This is because such programs are essential for preventing violent extremism.

In addition, the program theory that is developed for the implementation of the non-custodial reintegration program should prominently describe in detail what the intervention aims to achieve, how the various policy instruments are aligned with the program's objectives, what social mechanisms the intervention aims to set in motion, and how the program may be influenced by the context in which it is introduced.

In addition, program theory determines the essential conditions for achievement and transforms the goals into quantitative signals of whether or not they were achieved. The importance of such precisely stated program theories lies in the fact that they guarantee consistent interpretations among management and practitioners and the continuation of the program even as new generations of stakeholders and staff are hired and leave their positions.

The results of the literature review make it abundantly clear that countries located in the OSCE region are placing a growing amount of emphasis on putting into practice a holistic strategy for dealing with the threats posed by terrorism. There are many reintegration programs, each with unique objectives, components, intervention providers, and levels of participant voluntariness. CSOs and other non-governmental organizations operate some programs, while others are run in conjunction with the public and commercial sectors working together. Most alternatives to incarceration provide participants with access to a wide range of services, including ideological and psychosocial counselling, job placement, training for certain occupations, assistance with housing and educational costs, and opportunities to participate in cultural or recreational activities. As is the case in many other countries all over the world, Kenya needs assistance to manage the return of its nationals who fought with Al-Shabaab or joined the group to operate in a variety of

roles. Kenya is the source of a sizeable number of foreign fighters for the terrorist organizations Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State. Services of reintegration and community rehabilitation back into society are offered to convicted criminals in Kenya through the Department of Probation and After-care Service.

New projects continuously emphasize community participation to stop radicalization, gather intelligence about terrorism, and detect violent extremists. These goals are all to improve interactions between people and law enforcement. The Kenyan government delegated the power to develop County Action Plans (CAPs) to the country's various counties to bolster local CVE initiatives at the national level. The action plan for Mombasa County recognizes the crucial role that an efficient reintegration program may play in the fight against violent extremism and considers this.

The conceptual framework, which aims to explain the relationship between the independent variable (non-custodial reintegration programs) and the dependent variable (returnees' wellbeing wellbeing), was also brought to light in this chapter. This framework was highlighted as part of the chapter. Other intervening factors, including current government policies, the political environment, and rehabilitation institutions, have also been found as a result of this research. The achievement of the desired output of the non-custodial reintegration initiatives is, to some degree or another, impacted by the intervening variables.

To summarize, considerable challenges are presented by the non-custodial reintegration programs that are intended for terrorist fighters who have recently returned from taking part in violent battles. Even though the programs involve intangible concepts and are executed in various settings, they are used by various employees to serve an even bigger

audience of people and movements. In addition, the programs are applied in a wide variety of conditions. This research aimed to shed light on these complexities by concentrating on the most significant facets of policy and analyzing them within the context of the well-known realist framework for creating policy. Our challenges in convincing violent radicals to change their ways are not unique. To unravel the complexity and, more importantly, to ensure that future non-custodial reintegration programs are authentic, meaningful, and increasingly likely to achieve their aims, it is necessary to have an understanding of how outcomes, procedures, and context interact in each reintegration program.

The research approach to this investigation is outlined in the next chapter, which may be found here for your convenience. In order to establish effective non-custodial reintegration programs on the welfare of returnee terrorist combatants in Mombasa County, the methodology takes into account the bulk of the previously examined literature and the information gaps that have been found. This was done in order to achieve the goal of achieving success.

<p style="text-align:center">CHAPTER THREE</p>

<p style="text-align:center">RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</p>

This chapter discusses the research approach that was used in the study that was being analyzed. This section outlines the processes and methodologies applied throughout data collection and analysis to achieve this study's objectives. It goes into depth regarding the topic of the study, the audience that it is intended for, the research design, the sampling plan, the methodology for data collecting, the validity and reliability of the data collection tools, the data analysis, presumptions, and limits, as well as the budget and work schedule.

3.1 Research Design

To get a better understanding of the nature of the non-custodial reintegration programs that are already in existence in Mombasa County, a descriptive research design was adopted for this study. It allowed for data triangulation, which ultimately helped strengthen the credibility of the study's findings (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2011). The descriptive study approach helped describe the nature or information concerning, for instance, the living situations of the reintegrated returnees within the community. This was done so researchers could investigate reintegration programs' impact on the welfare of returnee terrorist combatants in Mombasa County, Kenya. The study took a descriptive method and focused on the nature of the reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters. The goal of the study was to help understand the returnee terrorist fighters' attitudes, perspectives, and well-being in order to provide answers to essential concerns (Kombo & Tromp, 2006).

The study utilized a descriptive research design using quantitative and qualitative methods to evaluate the efficacy of non-custodial reintegration programs on the well-being of

<p style="text-align:center">229</p>

returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya. This evaluation was carried out in the context of Kenya (Moore & McCabe, 2006). As part of the thorough and methodical assessment process, data were collected regarding the operation of the non-custodial programming, the processes that were put in place, the projects and services that were delivered, and the resources that were utilized. This process also included the analysis and reporting of the acquired data. The evaluation made it possible to make decisions and contribute to the body of knowledge regarding non-custodial reintegration. It also analyzed the findings about real-world applications. When evaluating the efficacy of non-custodial reintegration programs for the well-being of returnee terrorist fighters, it was clear that the characteristics of a descriptive study design were present. As a result, this study aims to explain the connection between non-custodial reintegration measures and the well-being of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County. As part of a descriptive survey study design, the researcher used focus group discussions (FGDs), interviews with key informants, and questionnaires that were physically delivered and electronically disseminated using the tools provided by Google Forms. The advantage of the electronic version was that it was easy to disseminate, and the responders found it fascinating. It was efficient in providing feedback on time.

When discussing the obstacles that prevent non-custodial reintegration programs from having a beneficial influence on the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters, descriptive design was also an essential aspect of the conversation. The researcher was able to weigh in on the strong points in support of the program in comparison to the challenges in order to come to a conclusion and make some recommendations that should enhance the non-

custodial reintegration programs in order to provide a practical impact on the welfare of the returnee in Mombasa County and Kenya as a whole.

3.2 Study Area

The County of Mombasa has a long history of serving as a hub for terrorist activity and radicalization. According to Mkutu and Opondo (2019), this County is home to several mosques with radical religious influences and branches of organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir that advocate for forming a caliphate. Furthermore, extremist organizations use cover organizations, which move young people to countries such as Yemen and Syria to offer them jobs in such countries. It has been determined that Mombasa County, situated on the eastern coast of Kenya, is a hotspot for violent extremism and recruiting young people to join terrorist organizations. The following are some of the many variables that have contributed to this phenomenon:

To begin, there is the long-standing marginalization and discrimination at the hands of the national government that the coastal communities have experienced. A lengthy history of discrimination and marginalization against Mombasa's Muslim population often results in estrangement and mistrust toward the city's government and security institutions. This feeling of exclusion can help foster an environment favorable to recruiting young people vulnerable to extremist groups.

The second reason why Mombasa is considered one of the poorest counties in Kenya is due to the high rates of unemployment and poverty that are prevalent there. This might make young people more susceptible to radicalization and recruiting by extremist groups,

which may give them money and other incentives in exchange for their support. This can make young people more sensitive to radicalization and recruitment by extremist groups.

The proximity of the County to Somalia is the third factor. Because of its location on the coast and proximity to the Somalian border, the city of Mombasa is a prime target for recruiting by Al-Shabaab, a terrorist organization with roots in Somalia that maintains a substantial presence in the region. It is well known that the organization utilizes the port of Mombasa as a point of transit for shipments of armaments and other supplies.

The fourth reason is that the County Government of Mombasa has been plagued by poor governance and corruption. The city of Mombasa has been beset by problems of poor governance and corruption, which have combined to produce an atmosphere of impunity and lawlessness. This has not only given extremist groups the ability to carry out their activities with relative impunity, but it has also eroded public trust in the institutions of the government and the security agencies. And last, variations in religious and ideological perspectives. The people who call Mombasa home come from various backgrounds and adhere to various religious and ideological tenets. This diversity can result in tensions and disputes, which extremist groups can use to further their agendas by exploiting the situation.

Several youths have come forward and admitted to being members of Al-Shabaab ever since Kenya initiated an amnesty program for Al-Shabaab returnees from Somalia in 2015. The program was introduced in 2015 (Ombati, 2015). Cragin (2019) claims that at least 20 former members of ISIS who have returned to Kenya are still at large there. These individuals have not yet been arrested. Only in Mombasa the number of returnee terrorist fighters is estimated to range anywhere from 300 to 1000, according to Mkutu and Opondo

(2019) (p.13). In their socioeconomic and demographic survey of Kenyan returnees carried out in 2015 (IOM, 2015), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) estimated a total population of approximately 700 returnees dispersed across the coastal counties of Kilifi, Kwale, and Mombasa.

It is possible that Mombasa County was the scene of some of the most horrific acts of violent extremism that Kenya has seen in recent years. This has taken the shape of many acts associated with violent extremism (VE), which have resulted in innocent bystanders' deaths and property destruction. It was significant because innocent bystanders were the intended victims, and a suicide vest was employed. In addition, attacks on Kenyan security forces and key infrastructure have continued occurring in the coastal region bordering Somalia. These attacks have been carried out mostly through Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and ambushes.

It appeared that the government's immediate reaction to acts of violent extremism and terrorism committed within the country was the adoption of stringent security measures. On the other hand, the shift towards soft measures has gained relevance (NCTC) since the establishment and introduction of the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) by the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). The NSCVE has proposed nine pillars that should be utilized while implementing soft approaches. These include the psychological, social, educational, political, security, religious, ideological, artistic and cultural, legal and political, media and online, faith-based, and ideological factors. Training and capacity-building are also included in this category (MCCVE, 2018). In contrast to the complex security approaches, which regarded CVE only as a security issue and the

government security institutions as the only entity with the exclusive right to respond to violent extremism, the soft approaches, pushed by the NSCVE, support multi-sectoral solutions to CVE. This contrasts with the complex security approaches, which saw CVE as a security issue.

The Indian Ocean can be found east of Mombasa County, located in the southern part of Kenya's coastal region. It has a boundary with Kilifi County to the north, Kwale County to the southwest, and Kilifi County to the west. The land area of Mombasa County is only 219.9 km2 (not including the 65 km2 of water mass), making it the smallest County in Kenya. However, its contribution to Kenya's GDP is 4.7% on average, placing it in fourth place among the country's counties in terms of GDP. A significant advantage of the County's location is that it is near a huge body of water, specifically the Indian Ocean, with which it shares an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In total, approximately 1,100,173 people are living in the County (United Nations). The County is broken up into six different electoral districts, and those districts are named Changamwe, Jomvu, Kisauni, Likoni, and Mvita, respectively. At least one thousand returnees are estimated to live in Kenyan towns close to the shores of Kwale and Mombasa County (Juma & Githigaro, 2021). The demographic breakdown of Mombasa County is presented below in Table 3.1.

Table 3. 1: Population Distribution in Mombasa County

Constituency	Population Census (2009)		Number of wards	Names of the Electoral Wards
Changamwe	121,334		5	Airport, Changamwe, Port Reitz, Kipevu, and Chaani
Jomvu	149,699		3	Mikindani, Miritini, and Jomvu Kuu
Kisauni	263,742		7	Shansi, Mtopanga, Magogoni, Mjambere, Junda, Bamburi, and Mwakirunge
Nyali	197,999		5	Ziwa la Ngombe, Frere Town, Mkomani, Kongowea, and Kadzandani
Likoni	228,472		5	Shika Adabu, Mtongwe, Bofu, Likoni, and Timbwani
Mvita	138,927		5	Shimanzi, Majengo, Makadara, Tudor, and Tononoka
Total	**1,100,173**		**30**	

Source: Census of Housing and Population in Kenya, 2019

A short distance from Mombasa County is the Gedo region of southern Somalia, known for being a hotbed of terrorist activity during the previous two decades. Mombasa County and other coastal areas experienced economic stagnation due to past governments' policies of marginalization, which also affected other coastal areas. The youth of Mombasa County have been subjected to repeated extremist speeches from organizations that adhere to a radical interpretation of Islam and radio transmissions that originate in Somalia. As a direct consequence, radical messages that negatively influenced the youngsters in the County were disseminated and spread throughout the County. There are currently a significant

number of people in the region who hold extremist Islamist ideas. It is possible that the County was the scene of one of the bloodiest outbreaks of violent extremism that Kenya has seen in recent history. It has been determined that the city of Mombasa, located on the coast of Kenya, is one of the hotspots in the country for violent extremism and radicalization. According to several estimates, at least 1,000 people have returned to Kenya's coastal region (Mkutu, 2019). According to research conducted by Mkutu (2019) and numerous reports from the media, Mombasa County is the place where the majority of returnee terrorist combatants choose to settle down after coming back from engaging in deadly wars fought outside of the country.

Local governments and nongovernmental organizations in Mombasa County have collaborated to create several alternative reintegration programs for individuals with criminal records. In Mombasa County's Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (MCAP-PCVE) (2017–2022), the execution and construction of programs for the rehabilitation and reintegration of returned foreign terrorist combatants are discussed in detail. This plan covers the period from 2017 to 2022 (MCG, 2017). It is important to note that there is a dearth of research on the efficacy of non-custodial reintegration programs in Mombasa. This dearth of research is due to several factors, including the ongoing nature of the process, the lack of transparency from government security actors, safety concerns, and many of these programs are still in their infancy. Figure 3.1 is a map that displays the six different constituencies that make up Mombasa County. These constituencies are as follows: Kisauni, Nyali, Jomvu, Changamwe, Mvita, and Likoni Constituency.

Figure 3. 1: *Geographical Map of Mombasa County, Kenya*

Source: GIS Map, 2023.

3.3 Target Population

According to Phelan and Julie (2006), a study population is a group of animals or people from which a researcher hopes to conclude once the study has been finished (Phelan & Julie, 2006). In the context of this study, the target population consisted of various clusters of residents located within Mombasa County. These clusters comprised clan elders and chiefs. Officials from the county governments who are essential participants and actors in the reintegration efforts, such as academics with substantial expertise in research on community policing and reintegration in Kenya. Participants in the study included not just nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) but also civil society actors (CSAs). They supplemented and validated the accounts provided by crucial respondents, who ranged from volunteers working with community-based organizations to the coordinators and executive directors of nongovernmental organizations. The researcher spoke with notable religious figures from Christian and Muslim institutions, representatives from County, national, and international organizations, and returnee terrorist fighters who were already enrolled in non-custodial reintegration programs. All of these individuals served as additional vital informants. Officers of the National Intelligence Service, the Kenya Prison Service employees, and the National Police Service were crucial participants in this study as security actors.

3.4 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size

According to Orodho and Kombo (2002), sampling is a method that involves selecting numerous humans, animals, or items from a target study population. The individuals, animals, or objects selected from the population must contain components indicative of the traits developed in the total group (Orodho & Kombo, 2002). Singleton (1998) goes on to

say that it is the process of picking a small number of instances from a large population to research them and then extrapolating the results to the whole population. He describes it as "the process of selecting a small number of examples from a significant population to study them" (Singleton, 1998). The calculation table that was used as the basis for the sample size for this study was established by Glenn D. Israel (1992), and Yamane's (1967) sample size calculation formula was used as the basis for its verification.

According to the most recent population count from 2019, Mombasa County has 1,100,173 people living there (KNBS, 2019). The study's goal was to collect information from a total of 400 respondents taken from each of the several clusters of respondents, as shown in Table 3.2. This population served as the source of the respondents for the study.

Table 3. 2: Sampling Table

Calculating the Sample Size for a Known Population	
Size of Population	**Sample Size (n) for Precision (e) of:** ±5%
10,000	385
15,000	390
20,000	392
25,000	394
50,000	397
100,000	398
>100,000	400
	Source: Glenn D. Israel (1992)

A more straightforward formula to determine sample sizes is provided by Yamane (1967). The sample sizes in the table below were calculated using this formula. For the Equation, P = 0.5 and a 95% confidence interval are considered.

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where:

n = the desired sample size

e = Margin of error (5%)

N = Population of study

$$n = \frac{1,100,173}{1 + 1,100,173(0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{1,100,173}{2750.4}$$

n = 400

3.4.1 Study Sampling Frame

A visual representation of the various people within the population that the researcher is interested in examining is what is known as a sampling frame. In addition, the researcher used this sampling framework to estimate the optimal sample size to accurately reflect the complete population (Kirby, 2002), enabling the findings to be applied in various contexts. Table 3.3 presents an illustration of the approximated list frame that was utilized in the research.

Table 3. 3: Sampling Frame

Unit	Population
Residents of Mombasa County	1,046,072
Returnee terrorist fighters	1,000
County government officials	21,670
Police Officers	5,268
Prison Officers	2,567
National Intelligence Officers	567
Religious representatives	15,000
NGO officials	3,000
CBO officials	5,020
Total	**1,100,173**

Source: Mombasa County Government Service Board, 2022

3.4.2 Study Sample Size

The process of deciding how many observations to include in a statistical sample is referred to as "sample size determination," and it is carried out to deduce information about a population from the sample (Bartlett, Kotrlik, & Higgind, 2001). To determine the appropriate size of the sample to draw from the whole study population, the researchers of this study used a ratio variance estimate. As seen in Table 3.4, the sample size was ultimately decided based on the percentage of the total population it represented.

Table 3. 4: Study Sample Size

Unit	Population	Sample size
Residents of Mombasa County	1,046,072	179
Al-Shabaab Returnees	1,000	30
County government officials	21,670	65
National Police Service personnel	5,268	38
Kenya Prison Service personnel	2,576	17
National Intelligence Service personnel	567	2
Religious representatives	15,000	45
NGO officials	3,000	9
CBO officials	5,020	15
Total	**1,100,173**	**400**

Source: Researcher 2022.

3.4.3 Sampling Procedure

The research utilized a multistage sample approach, during which information was collected from the institutional level all the way up to the level of returnees from fighting for foreign terrorist organizations. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2012), this technique ensured that the study could attain total coverage of the population it was aiming to investigate. The research used a kind of sampling known as purposive sampling both on the institutional level and on the individual community members who participated in the study. According to Taylor and Steele (2008), the method is helpful in the context of assessment research. It requires identifying major stakeholders involved in planning, receiving, giving, or administering the examined non-custodial reintegration programs and policy analysts who could be influenced by it in other ways.

The rationale and power of purposive sampling rely on selecting instances that provide much information for in-depth research. Cases that educate us a lot about topics that are very important to achieving the study's objective are considered particularly enlightening. The population of Mombasa County government officials, National Police Service personnel working in Mombasa County, Kenya Prison Service personnel handling correction and rehabilitation, National Intelligence Service personnel, representatives from NGOs, FBOs, and CBOs operating in Mombasa County, residents, chiefs and clan elders, and Al-Shabaab returnees were purposefully sampled in order to collect information from key informants, as shown in Table 3. 5.

Table 3. 5: Sample Procedure

Unit	Population	Sampling Procedure
Residents of Mombasa County	1,045,952	Simple random sampling
Chiefs and clan elders	120	Purposive sampling
Al-Shabaab Returnees	1,000	Snowball sampling
County government officials	21,670	Purposive sampling
Police Officers	5,268	Purposive sampling
Prison Officer	2,567	Purposive sampling
National Intelligence Officers	567	Purposive sampling
Religious representatives	15,000	Purposive sampling
NGO officials	3,000	Purposive sampling
CBO officials	5,020	Purposive sampling

Source: Researcher, 2022

The returnees were selected using the snowball method, a non-probability sample technique. This method considered the respondents' availability, willingness, and the ease with which they could acquire the information. This sampling method was employed since

the research project focused on a relatively small and highly limited sample of former foreign terrorist fighters who had since returned home. The distribution of the respondents may be seen in Table 3.6 according to the constituency in which they were located.

Table 3. 6: Sample Frame by Constituency

Respondents	Changamwe	Jomvu	Kisauni	Likoni	Mvita	Nyali	Total
Residents	21	27	39	35	26	31	179
Returnees	2	-	2	10	5	11	30
County Govt	9	11	14	10	9	12	65
Police service	6	7	7	9	5	5	38
Prison officers	-	-	17	-	-	-	17
Intelligence officers	-	-	-	1	-	1	2
Religious reps	7	8	10	8	7	5	45
NGOs officials	1	1	3	1	1	2	9
CBO officials	2	3	4	3	1	2	15
							337

Source: Researcher, 2022.

The majority of Mombasa County's six electoral districts can be reached through the county's road network. The majority of its population is centered near the shore, which is also where the majority of its economic activity is concentrated. Because of this, it was possible to go around the county to gather data from respondents in the various constituencies.

3.5 Data Collection

Data will be collected using various data collection instruments, followed by analysis, and then findings will be provided. In addition to the computer-assisted interviewing technologies Survey Monkey and Google Forms, a paper questionnaire was utilized in the research project (Census Bureau, 2010). In this study, a mixed technique was used to collect data from both primary and secondary sources. To collect primary data for this study, one of the research instruments used was a questionnaire. The questionnaires were distributed to community members and other people taking part in the reintegration programs for the returnees. Studies of the relevant literature, interviews with important informants, and discussions in focus groups all contributed to the secondary data collection. Interviews with important personnel, high-ranking government officials, and leaders of influential organizations that fund the reintegration programs took place and focus group discussions also took place.

A snowball sample of respondents was done to collect primary data for the aim of the study. Through a procedure known as "snowballing," information was obtained from each returnee who responded to the survey. Snowball sampling is a non-probability sampling approach that involves current study participants recruiting potential volunteers from among their acquaintances. Chain-referral sampling is another name for snowball sampling. Consequently, the sample group's size grows like a snowball. Participants in the survey were asked to identify themselves as either male or female. In order to enhance the data obtained through questionnaires, an interview schedule for semi-structured interviews with key informants was utilized. The key factors that went into establishing the interview schedule, focus group discussion topics, and questionnaires were the research objectives.

According to Mumma-Martinon (2021), key informants contribute to developing complete information and making fact-checking and confirming the data's reliability possible (Mumma-Martinon, C A, 2021). In addition, the research utilized data triangulation to evaluate and analyze primary and secondary data, such as government records and scholarly literature, to confirm the information obtained and better understand the phenomenon of non-custodial reintegration in Mombasa County (Yeasmin, 2012).

The information was gathered through the use of the probability sample approach using the administration of questionnaires, the conduct of interviews, and the holding of focused group discussions with the participants who had been chosen. The study took an interpretive philosophical approach to better understand the phenomenon of reintegration by offering the participants' viewpoints and avoiding attributing to Mombasa the generalized reintegration attributes gained from a worldwide mandate or debate. The study's goal was to better understand the phenomenon of reintegration (Bryman A., 2016). Twenty-one in-depth and semi-structured interviews with key informants, stakeholders, and participants in non-custodial reintegration programs in the County were carried out, with five of the interviews being conducted with returned foreign terrorist fighters. In the sample, there were representatives from various important groups of informants, including civil society activists, academics, journalists from major media outlets, government administrators, religious leaders, and village elders.

To collect information from residents in the community, both paper and online surveys were used. A total of 337 responses were obtained for the purpose of the study purpose. An interview guide was developed for every interview conducted in English and occasionally translated into Kiswahili to make the information more easily understandable.

The first stage in processing the data received from the interviews was to transcribe the interviews, which functioned as the initial step. After applying qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis to the data, the resulting information was further categorized and organized into themes by the issues the study intended to address. Tables, graphs, and percentages were utilized to analyze and display the results of surveys that were carried out with the help of Survey Monkey statistical software.

3.5.1 Questionnaire

According to Kothari (2011), the questionnaire is regarded as the most important part of survey instruments for data gathering purposes (Kothari, 2011). Therefore, when discussing questionnaires as a data-collecting technique, we discuss an instrument meticulously organized to obtain primary data. Once the respondents fill out the questionnaires, they will consist of a sequence of questions that have been carefully constructed to elicit pertinent information from them (Bell, 1999). DeVaus (1996) conceptualizes a questionnaire by looking at it from a much more broad-ranging perspective. According to him, a questionnaire is a device that can be used to ask various individuals the same set of questions and collect responses from each of them individually. Mellenbergh (2008) defines a questionnaire as a research instrument that consists of a series of questions and other prompts to collect information from respondents (Mellenbergh, 2008).

Because a questionnaire either implies or requires that each respondent complete the form on their own, a high level of literacy is required to complete the questionnaire. In contexts or settings where speaking many languages is common, questionnaires should be crafted using the prevalent languages of the audience or community for which they are intended.

Every time it is determined that translating the questionnaire is necessary, additional caution and attention must be paid to ensure the translations are accurate. In the same way, as interviews can include open-ended, multiple choice, and structured questions with gaps that need to be filled in, questionnaires can also include open-ended questions where the respondent is encouraged to expound on their responses and, to some extent, choose their topic. Questionnaires can also include structured questions with gaps that need to be filled in. During this research, questionnaires were helpful in the process of gathering survey data, which led to quantitative data.

In order to investigate all of the pertinent data, the study included a combination of structured and semi-structured questionnaires and open-ended and closed-ended questions. The questionnaires were distributed to members of the community and the village, as well as to government representatives, armed security officials, and religious organizations. According to Gill and Johnson (2001), structured and semi-structured surveys include both open-ended and closed-ended questions inside the same questionnaire. This is in contrast to unstructured questionnaires, which only feature closed-ended questions. They are typically constructed so that a question with a predetermined answer is followed by another question with an open-ended format that allows the respondent to further explain why they chose a particular response to the earlier question (Gill & Johnson, 2001).

On the other hand, open-ended questions asked the respondent to submit an answer in their own words without providing any suggested possibilities. This contrasted with multiple-choice questions, which gave the responder a choice between several possible responses. Open-ended questions have the advantage of allowing a variety of responses, which helps to capture the diverse perspectives held by people and are represented in people's responses

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without impacting the answer to the question by predetermining alternative responses. This is because open-ended questions do not restrict the range of possible responses (Gill & Johnson, 2001). Closed-ended questions can take a variety of forms. However, regardless of their structure, they all have one thing in common: they demand that their respondents provide answers that are unambiguous and straightforward. According to the authors, these questions make it simpler for respondents to respond and, subsequently, for the questionnaire interpreter to understand those responses.

The questionnaires were employed in a drop-and-pick mode of data collection, and the researcher allowed sufficient time for the respondents to complete and immediately return the forms in instances where the respondents could do so. Through the utilization of the *Survey Monkey* tool and *Google Forms*, extra respondents were reached out to through the utilization of an online platform. The surveys were filled out by the respondents themselves in order to ensure that they provided objective responses. As a result, the questions were created to be answered only by people with the necessary reading and writing skills as a prerequisite. The study questionnaire the researcher completed to collect quantitative data is in Appendix II's appendices.

3.5.2 Interview Schedules

During a discovery-focused approach to data collection, known as an in-depth interview, it is possible to have profound contact with the respondents' ideas and perspectives regarding the research's subject matter. The term "interview" refers to a face-to-face conversation that often takes place between a researcher and a participant respondent. During this conversation, the participant respondent gives the interviewer information (Creswell, 2012). In most cases, qualitative data, also known as in-depth or specific

information gleaned from subject matter specialists, is produced by key informants. Successful interviews result from a dialogue between individuals who are familiar with one another or who have a friendly relationship. Because of this, the environment is conducive to people freely interacting with one another and among themselves. This setting encourages the free flow of ideas, which, in turn, leads to the successful collection of the necessary information for analysis. Interviewers come up with their questions on their own and phrase them in a manner that is not structured; they also make it a point to probe their informants to obtain the information they require. While conducting the interviews, they take notes, which are then developed further at a later stage.

In this study, the researcher was only able to complete 21 of the intended 26 key informant interviews across the course of their interview sessions with various key informant respondents. Interviews were also conducted with returned terrorist fighters. The respondents were chosen for the study based on their prior expertise and experience in the subject matter of the investigation. Due to the nature of the themes selected for discussion, the interviews were conducted on an informal basis (USAID, 1996). The researcher interviewed key informants using respondents who had been purposefully selected for this reason. Important top government figures, religious leaders, specific returnees, heads of security organizations, and leaders of CBOs and NGOs working with non-custodial reintegration programs were selected to participate in the survey as respondents. The researchers questioned key informants to obtain information from them and then documented it. Structured interviews included open-ended questions, and a research assistant was present to take notes as the interviewees spoke about their experiences. The interviews started with a set of baseline questions, which were designed to collect new

information that might come as a surprise by prompting the key informant to elaborate on their previous answers. In addition, in-depth explanations of the respondents' impressions of the topic, feelings towards the topic, and emotional sequences were elicited with the assistance of penetrating questions, which were used to help elicit the information.

For this research, this technique resulted in the most fruitful collection of in-depth descriptive data on beliefs and practices, including historical practices and occurrences. In addition, it was useful in gaining a viewpoint and context on the topic at hand, and it allowed respondents to share what they considered significant. The interviews focused on the primary informants who hold prominent positions within the cadre of decision-makers and policymakers. Appendix III contains the interview guide the researcher utilized; this appendix can be found in the accompanying materials.

3.5.3 Focus Group Discussions

A Focus Group Discussion, often known as an FGD, is a method of data collection in which individuals from similar backgrounds or who have had corresponding experiences join together to discuss a topic of interest. According to Toolkits (2009), a moderator or facilitator guides the group, presents topics for discussion, and encourages participation in lively, impromptu discourse among the group members. According to Toolkits (2009), the power of FGD lies in allowing participants to agree or disagree with one another's points of view to obtain insight into how a group thinks about a certain issue. FGDs can be utilized to study the implications of survey data and come to fresh discoveries when statistical explanations cannot be provided for the findings.

The following is an example of one of the rules that govern the makeup of an FGD: the number of members should range from five to twelve. All of the members should fall within

the same general age range. Young people must be grouped with other young people, the elderly be grouped, and religious beliefs be taken into account so that Muslims are grouped with other Muslims and Christians are grouped with other Christians. Because of the importance placed on education, the respondents were organized into categories based on the highest level of education attained by any of them.

Due to the proximity of the two constituencies and the simplicity with which the researcher could travel between the two constituencies, the researcher was able to complete all 5 FGDs within the Nyali and Mvita constituencies. The five wards that make up the Nyali constituency are as follows: Kadzandani, which is the largest of the five; Mkomani; Frere Town; Ziwa la Ngomb'e; and Kongowea. Participants in the FGDs included village elders, people recently returning to the area, religious leaders, representatives from CBOs and NGOs, and returnees. The participants' ages were considered when designing the FGDs for this study; as a result, younger and older participants were divided into distinct age categories. Another criterion was based on the staff of security services, such as the Kenya Prisons Service, the National Police Service, community Chiefs, and elders.

In addition, some participants in the FGDs were representatives of community-based organizations and nongovernmental organizations engaged in rehabilitating and reintegrating former terrorist fighters. At least five people participated in each of the focus groups that were conducted. The following participants made up each of the five FGDs: FGD 1 was made up of community elders and area chiefs; FGD 2 was made up of security officers, such as those from the police, the prison, and the National Intelligence officers; FGD 3 was made up of people who had previously lived in the area; FGD 4 was made up

of religious leaders, including both Christian and Muslim figures; and FGD 5 was made up of officials from NGOs and community-based organizations.

3.6 Validity and Reliability of Research Instruments

The degree to which a research instrument would provide similar results, even if utilized in an entirely different setting, is its reliability. An investigation of the dependability of the instrument ensured that the results were consistent across all the specified variables because the conditions under which the measurements were taken were standardized. According to Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009), reliability is defined as the extent to which a data collection method will provide comparable results, similar observations, or similar conclusions from various researchers (Saunders, 2009).

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), the validity of the instrument is determined by the appropriateness and relevance of the findings obtained from the study data that was gathered. It assesses the degree to which the study's variables are portrayed appropriately in the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the collected data. The degree to which the research findings correspond to reality or whether the study accurately measures what it was designed to measure is its validity (Cooper, 2011). The extent to which a measurement tool accomplishes the objective for which it was designed is referred to as its validity. In light of this, validity can be defined as the extent to which the results of an analysis of the data from the study reflect the phenomenon that is the subject of the investigation (Lim, 2012). The strength of our judgments, conclusions, or propositions can be judged by whether or not they are valid.

The reliability of a research instrument is measured by how consistently it produces data after being put through several tests. They also say that reliability decreases when there is an increase in the number of random errors. The deviation from an actual measurement brought on by factors that need to be effectively addressed by previous studies is an example of random error. Random errors are also caused by inaccurate coding, interviewer weariness, and interviewer bias. However, random errors will always be present in a study, regardless of the method used to conduct the research (Wolf, 2010). From a scientific point of view, the dependability of the results is directly proportional to how exactly and consistently they reflect the entire population that is the focus of the study. If the findings of a study can be replicated using a methodology comparable to the original research, then the research methods can be considered reputable (Cooper, 2011).

The supervisors and specialists from the School of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (SDMHA) at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST) were responsible for determining the validity and reliability of the research tools. In order to validate the dependability of the research tools, the researcher ensured that the apparatus consistently produced the same findings throughout the study. The researcher utilized a test-retest methodology before collecting reliable data. All the variations from this procedure were ironed out to ensure that the results were the same as if the research were to be conducted again in the same environment. The survey's degree of dependability was evaluated by applying the Cronbach Alpha method. Research conducted by George and Mallery (2003) indicates that the credibility of the questionnaire can be determined by determining whether or not the value discovered falls within the

acceptable range (0.6 - 0.9). Because of this, the questionnaire was given the go-ahead to be utilized in the research.

The instrument's validity was improved by the researcher so that he could make certain that the sample taken for this study accurately represented the population. In addition, the researcher made use of criterion-related validity in order to evaluate the efficiency of the measures that were, in the end, implemented in order to carry out empirical estimation. The validity of the study tools, both in terms of their appearance and their content, was evaluated by the researcher. According to Tojib and Sugianto (2006), the content-related technique can be used to determine the extent to which the question items reflect the specific regions to be addressed.

3.7 Data Analysis and Presentation

According to Yin (2003), in his definition of the term, data analysis is an activity that involves looking at the data, assigning categories, and organizing emergent concerns into themes to answer the research questions. This is done to address the research questions (Yin, 2003). Yin (2003) observed, while defining the term "data analysis," that it is a process that involves looking at the data, assigning categories, and organizing emerging concerns into themes in order to answer the study objectives. This was included in the definition of "data analysis" (Jwan & Ong'ondo, 2011). According to Mugenda (2008), in scientific research, data are transformed into knowledge when they are analyzed and interpreted appropriately and when meaning is ascribed to the interpretations.

This study aimed to evaluate the efficacy of non-custodial reintegration on returnee foreign terrorist fighters. The scope of the study was restricted to three areas: first, the nature of

non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters; second, the effectiveness of the existing non-custodial strategies towards the reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters; and third, the challenges and opportunities for non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa, Kenya. Following the completion of the data collection stage, the next step was to analyze the data. Because of this, statistical methods were required to be utilized. During the data analysis, the researcher used qualitative and quantitative approaches. This provided the researcher with the necessary expertise for descriptive rationalization. The data management approach was utilized when working with quantitative data. As a necessary step in this process, the data must be cleaned up, sorted, and checked for duplicates and gaps in coverage (IBM, 2017).

According to UIS-UNESCO (2010), data management is a collection of procedures that can be performed manually, automatically, or digitally. These processes include validating, sorting, aggregating, and summarizing the data. Following the completion of these operations, subsequent steps included the retrieval of data, the transformation of that data, the classification of that data, the analysis of that data, and the reporting of that data. After the data was coded, Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences Version 20, also known as SPSS, was used to enter it to analyze it. The most recent release of the software used for data analysis comes equipped with features that allow for advanced analysis, the collection of data, and qualitative data analysis. It is one of the newest examples in its particular field. The findings are presented as tables, charts, and graphs.

The qualitative data were examined with the assistance of a summary sheet by compiling certain phrases and keywords in the order in which they were used by the population that was the subject of the study. This was done to assist with expressing certain themes and

depicting certain scenarios. In addition to that, the researcher employed brief abbreviations as codes when they were labeling the data. In most instances, remarks that originated from key informants or respondents were afterward grouped, considering themes, concepts, questions, or important ideas. This was done using suitable groupings, such as number codes. After determining the differences and similarities between the items, those items were grouped into broader categories, and after that, those categories were further broken down into sub-themes.

Because it produced summarized data from interview schedules, the summary sheet analysis approach proved indispensable for assessing the data obtained from interviews. The summary sheet's most important strength was the fact that the summary sheet was able to assist in compressing vast amounts of data to more manageable and readily examined core theme areas. When gathering the findings about the development of typed transcriptions, these summary sheets aided the research team members who were out in the field conducting interviews by allowing them to check the notes taken by one another.

Data presentation refers to the form in which data is presented after analyzing and interpreting it. Quantitative findings are offered in graphs, tables, figures, and charts for this study's quantitative data, while qualitative findings are presented in prose or descriptive narratives.

3.9 Limitations of the Study

Because terrorism is such a sensitive matter in terms of national security, the research project encountered a few challenges when attempting to investigate a subject connected to terrorism from the point of view of a civilian. While the researcher was able to get key

information on the governments' registers of returnee terrorist fighters at the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, the researcher was not allowed to make a copy of the record to appendix to this study since register is considered a restricted security information that cannot be published for general readership.

On the other hand, the researcher insisted unequivocally that the interviews were conducted exclusively for academic purposes and not for any other purposes. Due to the shame and secrecy connected with the act of terrorism, the research was also restricted in its access to former terrorist fighters who had since returned home. The researcher enlisted the cooperation of senior officials working in the correctional service department at *Shimo La Tewa* Maximum Prison's counter-terrorism unit and other registered organizations working with returnees on their reintegration programs to compile the data. This limited the scope and nature of the data the researcher intended to collect and use to achieve the study objectives. To address this issue, the researcher promised the respondents that the study was conducted purely for academic purposes and that all information sources would remain anonymous and confidential. They were also assured that the study would not be used in any way against them or the organizations they represent.

3.10 Ethical Considerations

According to Mathew & Ross (2010), research is an activity aimed at testing hypotheses, allowing conclusions to be reached, and adding to generalized knowledge stated in theories, concepts, and explanations of relationships (Mathew & Ross, 2010). All stated ideas, methods, and outcomes belonging to other individuals should be acknowledged and given proper credit. The unavoidable truth is that survey research is inherently intrusive, and the information gathered might be easily misused. Considering Bryman's

recommendations, the researcher adhered to the fundamental research ethical norms (2008).

First, the researcher ensured that the study participants wouldn't suffer any adverse effects due to their involvement. This is the major ethical rule guiding data collecting, taking precedence over all other factors. Respondent's right to privacy was always upheld throughout the study, and no unwarranted pressure was applied. In other words, the respondents had every freedom to decline to answer questions without justifying. They also had the choice of who would be allowed to access the information they had at their disposal and how it would be used. No information about identifiable individuals or groups would ever be released without their consent. Respondents were given enough initial information about it to give their informed consent for participation in the survey and the use of their responses (Bryman A., 2008).

Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology's (MMUST) Institutional Review Board reviewed the research proposal, and approval was given to move forward with the study. Before starting the field study, the researcher obtained approval from the National Council of Science and Technology Innovation (NACOSTI) per the ethical norms and procedures. A permit with the permit identification number 375440 was obtained from NACOSTI and granted for the research. Specifically, it relates to NACOSTI's rules (NACOSTI, 2013). At all times, the County of Mombasa administration and all other organizations where data was gathered received a copy of the authorization letter. This was done to ensure the appropriate authorities were aware of the study.

To get honest and accurate responses, additional permission to participate in the study was requested from the respondents, who were guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality. All

interviewees were identified only by their professional category and unique number identifiers to maintain their anonymity. To ensure participants understood the study's goal, the research team gave them an overview and explanation. The study's intentions and goals were communicated to the participants as the researcher saw it. To ensure that all respondents made an informed decision to participate in the study, the study's goal was reinforced to them repeatedly throughout the process. An introduction letter to each respondent was used to accomplish this. Following a thorough explanation of the study's methodology and data collection, respondents' willingness to participate in the study was ascertained. Data collection did not include respondents who, for whatever reason, were unwilling to take part in the study. The respondents' identities were kept anonymous and confidential by the researcher. This was accomplished by not requesting that participants sign their names on the questionnaires and by keeping the lead host from knowing the answers provided by each respondent. No names were mentioned in the study notes or reports, and no interviews were videotaped to guarantee security and anonymity. Only individuals actively involved in the research were allowed access to the hard copies and electronic versions of the interview notes and questionnaires. Throughout the investigation, collaboration with law enforcement, civil society organizations, and local and national governments was sought to reduce dangers for the interviewees.

3.11 Summary of the Chapter

A descriptive survey design was utilized for the study that was analyzed and described in this chapter. The County of Mombasa is the focus of this research. Participants in the study included local chiefs and elders, as well as officials from Mombasa County, local and foreign nongovernmental organizations working in Mombasa County, staff from FBOs,

CBOs, KPS, NPS, and NIS, and local government officials. It was decided to take a sample of 400 people from the total. The data for the study was acquired through the use of questionnaires that were given to the study population. In addition to that, the researcher also conducted in-depth interviews with a total of 21 key informants in order to get information from them. Additionally, the researcher organized and led five focus group sessions.

The next chapter will cover the presentation of study results and an analysis of the study's first purpose, which was to assess the nature of the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya. The initial objective of the study was to determine whether or not returnee terrorist fighters had been imprisoned upon their return to Mombasa County. The study's objectives will be addressed through the utilization of triangulation, as well as the analysis of quantitative and qualitative data.

CHAPTER FOUR

NATURE OF REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMES ON RETURNEE TERRORIST FIGHTERS IN MOMBASA COUNTY, KENYA

This chapter presents the findings of the results of data analysis for this study. Together with the respondents' demographic characteristics, the chapter also analyzes their background characteristics. The research's conclusions are presented about each of the study's goals. Determining the nature of the reintegration programs for returning terrorist fighters in Mombasa County is the first of the study's aims.

The study also attempted to determine the demographic details of the participants. These examined the respondents' Age, gender, religious affiliations, type of residence in Mombasa County, and experience with and knowledge of the reintegration programs offered to the returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County. This information was crucial in providing details on the research participants to determine if the study subjects were a representative sample of the target population for generalization purposes. Gathering background data made it possible for the researcher to assess if the data sought for the study came from reliable sources.

4.1 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

4.1.1 Rate of Response

Among the questionnaires given to the study sample, 84% of them were returned, according to the study. The researcher gave out 400 survey questionnaires was given out. A total of 337 respondents, or 84.2% of the target population, filled out the researcher's questionnaires from this group, while 64 questionnaires were not returned. Given that

Mugenda and Mugenda (2008) observed that a return rate of over 75% is a sample size sufficient to inform a study, and the findings can be used to generalize characteristics of a community, the data was utilized to inform the findings of this investigation. Furthermore, the researcher successfully conducted a total of 21 interviews with key informants out of the targeted 26. The researcher further conducted five focus group discussions out of the targeted 6 successfully. Table 4.1 illustrates the distribution of the return rate.

Table 4. 1: *Return Rate of the Data Collection Tools*

Instrument	Returned	Percentage
Questionnaires	337	84.25%
Key informant interviews	21	80.77%
Focus group discussion	5	83.33%

Source: *Field Data, (2022)*

The study's high return rate is explained by the fact that Mombasa County has been the scene of several terrorist assaults over an extended time and is still a prime location for returning foreign terrorist combatants from Al-Shabaab in Somalia. As a result, Mombasa County people, foreign organizations, significant stakeholders, and even the local security apparatus are interested in and involved in any attempt to find a way to stop these actions.

4.1.2 Age of respondents

The Age of the respondents was a requirement of the survey. The respondents' ages were distributed according to Table 4.2. The results showed that 34.7% (117) of the respondents were young people, with a majority being between 18 and 28, ages making up a larger proportion of those potentially susceptible to radicalization and recruitment into militias for Foreign Terrorist Fighters. Ages 29 to 39 comprised 24.9% (84) of the population.

Between the ages of 40 and 50, 25.8% (87) of the respondents fell, with respondents between the ages of 51 and 61 accounting for the lowest percentage at 14.5%, translating to 49 people.

Table 4. 2: Distribution of Respondents by Age

Age group	Frequency	Percentage
18-28 years	117	34.71%
29-39 years	84	24.93%
40-50 years	87	25.82%
51-61 years	49	14.54%
Total	**337**	**100%**

Source: *Field data, (2022).*

The results show that most respondents are young and in a stage of development known as "young adulthood" in Erik Erikson's psychosocial developmental theory (1968). Mombasa County's occurrence of a demographic youth bulge may indicate several societal issues, some of which may be somewhat linked to violence, particularly if the County is struggling to find enough employment opportunities to accommodate school-age kids. Particular factors that frequently have complex ramifications for violent outcomes include many teenagers who are susceptible to ending up in horrible working circumstances, un or underemployment, and extreme poverty. As mentioned earlier, the results are consistent with earlier studies that have found that the bulk of terrorist fighters worldwide is young people who frequently engage in less positive and adoring relationships (Van, Voorhis, Wright, & Salisbury, 2010).

According to Erikson (1968), success in this stage of development leads to the creation of satisfying interpersonal connections that include marriage, parenthood, and other life milestones like falling in love and becoming best friends. Because they suffer from feelings of shame and guilt for the failed connections, Salisbury (2007) observes that most young people who grow up in unstable and dysfunctional households tend to withdraw from their friends, families, coworkers, and other relationships (Salisbury, 2007). Similarly, the relational theory of psychological development links teenage aggression to mental health issues, including depression and self-destructive behaviours brought on by unhappy and dysfunctional relationships in their familial environments. Eventually, the majority of these youths turn to extensive drug usage, which explains some of their criminal behaviours (Salisbury, 2007).

The relational desire of such youths is subsequently satisfied by substance addiction. This is because, even while incarcerated, young individuals must realize the need to develop strong intimate connections as a fundamental need that may deter criminal behaviour. Kenyan murder, child abuse, and theft are strongly correlated with drug abuse by foreign terrorist offenders (Murugi, 2012). Because none of the non-custodial reintegration programs in Mombasa County appears to use any clinical treatment modality to help these young terrorist offenders work out this problem in their lives, the current study found that these young terrorist offenders with substance abuse problems are severely disadvantageous.

4.1.3 Gender of Respondents

Additionally, the responders had to specify their sexual orientations based on their physical formation. The findings revealed that the respondents comprised 286 males constituting

85% of the respondents, and 50 females, making 15%. The researcher also studied one respondent who indicated to be intersex, constituting a negligible percentage. The distribution is shown in Figure 4.1.


Figure 4. 1: *Gender distribution of respondents.*

Source: Field data, (2022).

When selecting participants for the study, inclusion across genders was still a factor that was considered. This was a typical example of how men are recruited at higher rates than women by terrorist militia groups. Even though gender is an important factor in the reintegration of returnee terrorist offenders in Kenya, the idea of gender-responsive programming in the reintegration of offenders is largely ignored and not systematically integrated into the various non-custodial reintegration processes that are currently present in Mombasa County. This is the case even though this concept has existed for some time. It was unclear from the study's findings whether or not a wide range of needs related to the needs of female offenders are met within the framework of the programs currently in

place. Although the study found that some reintegration actors demonstrated that both individual and group counselling were essential elements of the non-custodial reintegration process, it was unclear from the study's findings whether or not this was the case. To this end, the current study determined that it was necessary to investigate how the available programs addressed issues identified with female offenders, such as parenting and parental skills, drug and alcohol use/abuse, victimization, and whether or not the programs provided a framework for empowering offenders with life skills training and ways of reuniting with their families. This was done in order to meet the aforementioned objectives. Because of their lower levels of education, women have fewer opportunities to earn a sufficient living, which is also a significant contributor to the challenges they face in this area of their lives.

4.1.4 Religion of the Respondents

The study aimed to determine the variety of religious affiliations and practices held by the people of Mombasa County, specifically focusing on the role that religious institutions play in reintegrating former members of terrorist organizations who have since returned home. Figure 4.2 illustrates the results of the inquiry that was carried out.

Figure 4. 2: *Religion of Respondents*

      Source: Field data, (2022).

According to the study's findings, which are displayed in Figure 4.2, a total of 201 respondents were polled, and 59.6% identified as Christians. Of those 201 respondents, 87 were Roman Catholics, making up 25.8% of the total, and 114 were protestants, making up 33.8% of the total. The majority of the key informants in the study believed that radical Islamists had used the youth of Mombasa County to promote their radicalization and extremism. This is the case even though Christians make up the majority of the population of Mombasa County. Additionally, one of the religious leaders pointed out that;

> Mombasa County, which Muslim believers predominantly dominate, has become a breeding ground for terrorists who spread extreme ideas in the name of Islam in order to radicalize adolescents. Extremist Islam preachers have used Madrassa classes for young Muslims to instill extreme views in the minds of the Muslim faithful.
>
>   -(FGD with Religious leaders in Jomvu, 2nd August 2022).

Therefore, it is confident that Mombasa County has an array of religious believers who are both Muslim and Christian.

4.1.5 Status of Residents for Respondents

The purpose of this study was to establish if the individuals who participated were long-term residents of Mombasa County or just visitors. In this regard, the recognized visitors included tourists, people who were visiting in connection with work, visiting businessmen, and students studying at various colleges and other institutions of higher learning. During the study, those individuals who had been living permanently in Mombasa County as locals were the ones who were approached. The findings of this investigation are presented in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4. 3: Residency status

      Source: Field Data, 2022

This information was crucial in providing details on the research participants to determine if the study subjects were a representative sample of the target population for generalization. The researcher could tell if the data the study sought came from the correct sources by gathering background information. According to the statistics gathered, 24% (81) of the respondents were tourists, while 76% (256) were Mombasa County citizens.

The study found that the primary informants, who included government administrators (chiefs), and leaders of faith-based and community-based organizations, were primarily local Mombasa County inhabitants. Most other respondents, including security personnel and INGOs, were tourists who had come to the County to work as employees in various fields and duty locations and reported back after that.

The study showed that the respondents had a wide knowledge of Mombasa County concerning the nature of non-custodial reintegration initiatives undertaken with Mombasa County. The respondents also exhibited knowledge of how the returnee terrorist fighters were being reintegrated back into their communities after surrendering from fighting for Al-Shabaab in Somalia. They indicated that most of the non-custodial reintegration of the returnee terrorist fighters was facilitated by CBOs and FBOs with the support of correction staff from *Shimo La Tewa* Prison. The respondents reiterated that while the non-custodial reintegration of the returnee terrorist fighters was a good initiative, the program still faced several obstacles from the community, who failed to support it due to fear and mistrust of the returnees. Terrorism has made the country not gain much development due to investors being scared of investing in the County (Business Daily 2019). The respondents indicated their genuine desire to defeat terrorism to realize development by attracting investment in the County, which has lagged due to marginalization and historical injustices by the previous governments.

4.2 Nature of Reintegration Activities for Returnee Terrorist Fighters in Kenya

In order to provide answers to the research questions, the researcher investigated the different aspects of the study and presented the findings in a way that was consistent with the research objectives. According to the survey findings, eight primary rehabilitation and

reintegration strategies are in use in Mombasa County. There were such things as the following among them: Examples of measures that will be taken include the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act (2020), public civil education, the development of income-generating activities for returnees, arrests, and prosecutions, ministerial pardons for terrorists upon surrender, security forces combating terrorism, a multi-agency approach to radicalization and recidivism, monitoring and the interception of financial transactions supporting the terrorists, and the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act (2020).

The respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism activities in Mombasa County (highest impact) on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 represents the least impact, 2 represents a low impact, 3 represents a moderate impact, 4 represents a strong impact, and 5 represents a significant impact. The respondents were told that 1 represents the least impact, 2 represents a low impact, 3 represents a moderate impact, 4 represents a strong impact, and 5 represents a significant impact. The order in which the reintegration strategies are presented is as follows:

4.2.1 Enactment of Anti-Terrorism Act

Returning foreign fighters pose a significant danger to national security due to their prior experience in battle, proficiency in the use of various types of weaponry, and connections to international terrorist networks (Coolsaet, 2013). The Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 30 of 2012 was strengthened by passing a resolution adopted by the Kenyan Parliament. The resolution approved the Anti-terrorism Act's implementing rules and regulations. Because it is an Act passed by Parliament, it contains processes that can be used to identify and repress terrorist activity. The Act is the most recent attempt to tackle the issue of terrorism and other similar activities while simultaneously keeping the protection of our

civil and political rights. It does this by maintaining the protection of our civil and political rights. As a result, the respondents were questioned about their estimations of the efficacy of the anti-terrorist Act implemented by the government of Kenya in the fight against terrorism, as well as how effectively it has contributed to the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County. The results are illustrated in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4. 4: *Enactment of the Anti-terrorism Act.*
Source: Field Data, (2022).

According to the data displayed in Figure 4.4, 28.2% (95) of the respondents assigned the Anti-terrorism Act's (2020) lowest impact on combating terrorism in Mombasa County, while 30.8% (104) of the respondents believed it had the least influence. These results are compared to the respondents' responses who thought it had the most influence. It had the biggest impact on 12.6% (42) of the respondents, a moderate impact on 15.3% (52) of the respondents, and a high impact on 13.1% (44) of the respondents, according to the findings

of the survey. In the fight against terrorism, non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters can be seen as an innovative approach that moves beyond strategies that depend on harsh oppression and detention of terrorists to a gentler approach that includes other stakeholders, particularly the host community, religious institutions, community organizations, as well as family members of the returnees. This is because the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters moves beyond strategies that depend on harsh oppression.

While initiatives to reform and integrate terrorists in jails have given convicted terrorists a stage to confess their sins, repent, or change their violent ideologies (Gunaratna, 2011), this study disagrees because current prison and detention practices encourage the re-radicalization and hardening of terrorism offenders. Without being maintained in isolation, detainees and prisoners are more open to indoctrination and training by their fellow prisoners and detainees. Detainees and inmates are typically housed together in most prisons and detention centers. Due to the co-location of security prisoners and criminal inmates in some facilities, knowledge, motivation, co-recruitment, and lasting relationships are transferred.

In contrast, this study makes a case for the widespread adoption of non-custodial reintegration as the best potential for the reversal of radicalization in custody recidivism connected with it after examining the nature of such programs in Mombasa County and evaluating the successes made. Regeneration of violence can be stopped by establishing community-based initiatives to interact with indoctrinated extremists and rehabilitate active terrorists. These programs can be developed in collaboration with government

authorities, other important stakeholders, and community socialization agents like families and religious organizations for efficacy and complementarity.

4.2.2 Arrest and Prosecution of Terrorist Offenders

Respondents were also required to rate the impact of the arrest and prosecution of terrorist offenders and supporters to counter terrorism in Kenya.

Figure 4. 5: *Arrest and prosecution.*
Source: *Field Data, (2022).*

From the analysis in Figure 4.5, 51.3% (173) of respondents regarded the strategy as having a high impact. This is because it spells fear and sends a strong message to the youths about the danger of getting involved in any acts of terrorism. 33.3% (112) rate it to have a moderate impact, 7.7% (26) as most impactful, 5.1% (17) as least impactful, and the remaining 2.6% (9) rate it not to have any impact on fighting terrorism.

Considering that jail environments in many nations frequently do more to strengthen a combatant identity and devotion to the cause (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017), key informants

described the disadvantage of using the strategy of arresting and prosecuting those who surrender from the terror group and instead highly recommend taking them through non-custodial reintegration programs that help them return to the society and become productive to their families. A director of the *Jiunge* Rehabilitation Project reiterated that;

> Prisons have evolved into a haven for hardening terrorist offenders. The government should use alternative and gentler methods of dealing with returnees who have chosen to surrender of their own volition, such as allowing them to register and admitting them to non-custodial reintegration programs where they can be monitored and assisted in becoming useful community members.
>
> - (Interview with the Director Jiunge Project in Mvita, 24 August 2022).

4.2.3 Ministerial Amnesty to the Returnee Terrorist Fighters on Surrender

Additionally, to address anti-terrorism measures in Mombasa County, respondents were asked to estimate the efficiency of the ministerial pardon and amnesty as a plan for reintegrating the returned terrorist fighters after their surrender.


Figure 4. 6: Ministerial Amnesty.

Source: Field data, (2022).

It is evident from the study's findings, provided in Figure 4.6 that 35.9% (121) of the respondents regarded ministerial amnesty as a low-effective method for the non-custodial reintegration of terrorist fighters in the community. This is the case because the research shows that ministerial amnesty is a strategy for the non-custodial reintegration of terrorist fighters. 28.2% (95) of respondents found it to be the least effective, 20.5% (69) found it to be moderate, 12.1% (41) found it to be more effective, and 3.3% (11) found it to be the most effective.

According to a report in the Daily Nation newspaper, the Kenyan government granted amnesty to Kenyans who had previously been a part of Al-Shabaab after the terrorist attack that took place at Garissa University in 2015 and was carried out by Al-Shabaab (Kega, 2016). At the same time, plans have been in the works and on the government's agenda to construct reintegration programs to create conditions favorable to the consolidation of peace by providing rehabilitation and new homes for people who have left the country.

After the introduction of an amnesty policy by the government of Kenya in 2015, a sizeable number of young people who had become radicalized and joined terrorist organizations overseas are returning to Kenya as returnees. Many of these individuals have already wanted to reintegrate into society. To be able to handle the challenge posed by the enormous number of returnees who are illegally entering the nation, the government needs the assistance of relevant non-state institutions, and they must work together to do so (Muhula, 2007) as a result, avoid a scenario in which returned terrorist fighters become yet another dangerous threat to the nation's security.

Those who have participated in the amnesty program are eligible for protection, counselling, and reintegration services that do not include incarceration. It was promoted

as a component of a plan to combat violent extremism to win over former combatants and assist in de-radicalizing the places where they reside. This was done in order to prevent violent extremism from spreading. A screening mechanism has been developed for returning to the country as part of the amnesty program. This will ensure former combatants do not rejoin new criminal or extremist networks. The primary goal of the screening procedure carried out by the government authorities is to determine and appreciate the level of responsibility and engagement held by these former fighters and how they will be reintegrated into the community once the screening process has been completed.

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> Since 2015, there has been discussion over the possibility of amnesty; however, it has not yet been formally adopted as a policy. Because of this, the applicability of the guidance is not very strong, and it leaves room for users to interpret it in various ways. This has resulted in the torture and unlawful killing of some returns at the hands of the police.
>
> - Interview with Mombasa County Commissioner, 28 September 2022.

The absence of policies is cited as the reason why many returning terrorist fighters choose not to apply for amnesty, which has led to divisions among returnees. Returnees who are engaged in amnesty programs and whose names have not been made anonymous in their communities, experience fear and envy over the alternative sources of income offered to them and incite hostility from other returnees. The amnesty approach, according to one scholar

> Continued to be ineffectual because the management of the government was not prepared to adopt amnesty from a long-term perspective. The policy did not provide any methods to maintain the activity as a component of the programs offered by the correctional service.
>
> - Interview with academic scholar in Nairobi on 14 September 2022.

Several parties involved in reintegration efforts think returnee terrorist fighters will only accept amnesty if no other options are available. According to Mumo Nzau, returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County believe they will be killed if they don't sign up for the non-custodial reintegration programs. The Mombasa County Commissioner also affirmed that returnees who do not register in the amnesty program are detained and charged.

4.2.4 Security Forces Fighting Terrorism

To improve the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, respondents were asked to estimate the efficiency of security forces against terrorism. The findings are presented in Figure 4.7.

Figure 4. 7: Security forces fighting terrorism.

Source: Field data, (2022).

According to 61.5% (207) of the respondents, security forces are the most successful at combating terrorism. Of the respondents, 20.5% (69) of them gave it a moderate rating, while 15.4% (52) gave it a more effective rating, and the remaining 0.5% (2) gave it a low rating. Notably, 1.3% (44) of the respondents gave this counter-terrorism tactic a negative effectiveness rating, and 1.3% (4) gave it a negative one. It is necessary to have formal police and protection measures, community-based early warning systems, and information management systems that actively oppose rumors (not vigilante organizations) to keep the community secure.

According to the study's findings, the security operations in Mombasa are internally focused. This implies that they defend the entire community instead of just protecting select individuals or organizations, nor do they participate in actions targeting individuals or groups in other communities. Not only does the implementation of stringent security

measures make it more likely that a violent extremist act would be carried out, but it also undermines the community's relationships and ability to bounce back from adversity.

Kenya's government is countering terrorism in several ways, one of which is bolstering the country's security infrastructure. It monitors individuals who have the potential to become terrorists, identifies swiftly those who show signs of becoming extremists and enhances the security afforded to vulnerable people and infrastructure. It has also come to light that the government's approach to terrorist organizations and violent extremist groups has been characterized by using force rather than delicate measures.

The questioned returnee respondents accused security personnel of targeting returnees with excessive force and unlawful killings. According to the County Commission official, some people might mistakenly feel that returnees are being specifically harassed if they see arrests of returnee terrorist fighters who are involved in criminal activity or not registered in amnesty. Additionally, it has been reported that local elders who had ties to security personnel, such as respected informal community leaders and members of the peace committee, have been murdered by returnees (Mwabege, 2016).

When a genuine security concern is evident, comprehensive criminal justice procedures are needed to manage returns, but not all nations have these available. Little is done to ensure that returnees relinquish their commitment to violent action and identities as combatants due to human rights abuses within the court and penitentiary systems. As a result, the returnees occasionally experience torture, extrajudicial execution, or other grave human rights abuses, including arbitrary detention or denial of a fair trial. This violates the international legal responsibility of non-refoulment.

4.2.5 Monitoring and Intercept of Money Transaction

As a further measure to combat terrorism in Kenya, the respondents were asked to estimate the efficiency of the government's strategy of observing and intercepting financial transactions intended to fund terrorist organizations.

Figure 4. 8: Monitoring and Intercepting of Money Transactions
Source: Field data, (2022).

It was clear from the results shown in Figure 4.8 that 48% (161) of the respondents thought this method was the most successful. Another 30.8% (104) of the respondents gave it a higher effectiveness rating, and 15.3% (52) gave it a moderate effectiveness rating. Monitoring and intercepting financial transactions were judged as ineffective by 2.6% (9) respondents and least effective by another 2.6%, constituting nine respondents.

Activities involving the financing of terrorism and money laundering are exceedingly intricate and widespread. Several factors may link money laundering to terrorism and funding of terrorism. Additionally, money laundering connected to terrorist offenses qualifies as a predicate offense and, as a result, constitutes a serious crime. There is

unmistakable proof that terrorists commit crimes to finance their terrorist activities. Money laundering refers to activities that involve obtaining, converting, transferring, hiding, disguising, or using the illegal proceeds of crimes committed by terrorists, such as kidnapping for ransom, trafficking in arms and drugs, exploitation of natural resources without authorization, and trafficking in a cultural property without authorization. Bank robberies, merchandise smuggling, credit card fraud, insurance and loan fraud, and tax offenses are among the other prevalent crimes performed by terrorists (FATF, 2015).

There is a connection between corporate entities, such as used car dealerships and restaurant chains, and terrorist organizations in Kenya, according to multiple law enforcement investigations and prosecutions. Under these conditions, the proceeds from commercial endeavors are channeled into the funding of terrorist organizations. The report indicates that the government of Kenya is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). Because of this, it has successfully prevented the funding of terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab by disrupting the money laundering networks of these groups. This has been of great assistance in maintaining control over the various security services in Kenya. As a direct result of these measures, Kenya has not been subject to any attacks by Al-Shabaab in recent memory.

4.2.6 Media Reportage of Non-Custodial Reintegration Activities for Returnee Terrorist Fighters

The non-custodial reintegration of the reformed returnees calls for media dialogue to fully reintegrate them into society (Apikyang & Diamond, 2014). One of the most effective ways to oppose the violent rhetoric of terrorists was to launch a broad media campaign to highlight the success of anti-terrorist initiatives, expose the wrongdoing of extremists, and

disseminate sermons aimed at educating, particularly young people. News coverage in the mainstream media is supposed to provide the public with factual information without jeopardizing efforts to combat terrorism. The study aimed to determine the degree to which participants agreed or disagreed with various claims about the mainstream media's objectivity and accuracy in reporting on the non-custodial reintegration efforts of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County as a crucial component of anti-terrorism messaging.

Table 4. 3: Media Reportage of Non-custodial Reintegration Activities

	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neutral		Disagree		Strongly Disagree	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
News media reporting glorifies terrorist activities	33	9.8	175	51.9	76	22.6	42	12.4	11	3.3
Media reports on the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters are accurate	9	2.7	11	3.3	68	20.2	204	60.5	45	13.4
Media reporting of non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters promotes anti-terrorism fight	152	45.1	90	26.7	57	16.9	34	10.1	4	1.2
The accuracy of media news reports on the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters is highly influenced by the accuracy of the source of the information	166	49.3	96	28.5	51	15.1	24	7.1	0	0

Where F=Frequency

Source: *Field data, (2022)*

From the outcomes of data collected and displayed in Table 4.3, accumulative 61.7% (208) of the respondents agreed that mainstream media reporting glorifies terrorist acts, with 22.6% (76) being neutral and 15.7% (53) being in disagreement. Also, accumulative 6% (2) of the respondents agreed that media reports on reintegration activities of returnee terrorist fighters are accurate, 20.2% (68) remained neutral, while 73.9% (249) disagreed. In contrast, 71.8% of the respondents agreed that mainstream media reporting of the non-custodial reintegration activities of returnee terrorist fighters promotes anti-terrorism fights, with 16.9% (57) remaining neutral and 11.3% (38) being in disagreement. On the level of accuracy of media news reports, accumulative 77.8% (262) of the respondents agreed that the source of information highly influences the accuracy of mainstream media news reports on the non-custodial reintegration activities of returnee terrorist fighters, with 15.1% (51) being neutral while a minority 7.1% (24) disagreeing.

The findings, therefore, noted that not all mainstream media reports on non-custodial reintegration activities of returnee terrorist fighters were accurate; the cause could have been because the mainstream media news reports were always glorifying terrorism activities. Consequently, the study noted that to achieve accuracy and objectivity, the mainstream media need accurate and verifiable sources of information besides their news messaging being aligned towards supporting and promoting the anti-terrorism fight. Supporting sentiments to this were shared by key informants in the study who noted that lack of objectivity by the mainstream media influenced the accuracy of the new reports on non-custodial reintegration activities of the returnee terrorist fighters. The deputy County Commissioner interviewed noted that;

Reports on accurate news can only be obtained by journalists if the sources they use are reliable and can be confirmed. And one of these sources is us, the provincial administration because we are a component of the security system for the government. If the government's security agencies are not involved, there is a high likelihood that journalists may publish false information.

- (Interview with DCC in Changamwe, 25 August 2022).

Additionally, the Administration Police Officer interviewed reiterated that;

The media can only aid in promoting the non-custodial reintegration of terrorist fighters by providing accurate and favorable information to the public through transparent and objective fact-finding and information sourcing. Otherwise, if they are motivated to make headlines and sell stories and documentaries, they just serve to glorify terrorism and support terrorists against us.

- (Interview with an Administration Police Officer in Likoni, 25 August

2022)

An official from the Islamic religious community, Sheik Masoud Mosque, reiterated that;

The new stories we occasionally hear, see, and read in the mainstream media are inaccurate. Regarding messages, some journalists lack professionalism and neutrality, sometimes out of malice or provoking emotions. To promote non-custodial reintegration programs to assist the community in accepting returnee terrorist fighters and accommodating them as part of their family, the media must assist in the fight against terrorism and recidivism by being accurate, truthful, and realistic.

- (Interview with Islamic Religious leader in Nyali, 20 August 2022)

The above key informant interview findings may be correlated to Catherine Dean's (2006) writing on Truth and Media news reporting. She establishes that as an essential principle of journalism, the pursuit of Truth is imperative in the news reporting about non-custodial reintegration activities of the returnee terrorist fighters. Even though it is occasionally viewed or criticized as doing so, the quest for Truth while reporting on terrorism also entails the right and duty to explain (Spencer, 2012). To avoid murky journalism, the facts acquired must be carefully verified. Therefore, fact verification is necessary for media reporting to be objective.

A sense of responsibility is something that should always go hand in hand with freedom of expression, which is something that media operators all over the world strive for and preserve. Journalists are held accountable for their reporting even if they are allowed the freedom to conduct research and write articles. If journalists are to be held accountable for the stories they cover, there needs to be some standard against which they may evaluate whether their work is ethical. This raises the question of whether or not workers in the media should have access to self-regulating systems and codes of ethics. When reporting the news, journalists are expected to adhere to the principle of objectivity, which dictates that there should be no overlap between the two categories of information (news and opinion). In order to maintain objectivity in their reporting, journalists need to ask themselves the following questions. Do we distinguish clearly between the editorials, opinion pieces, and news articles that appear within our organization? Are our news reporters and staff who provide opinions treated differently from one another?

Journalists must make a clear distinction between comment, speculation, and Truth in their reports, according to the Kenyan Union of Journalists Code of Ethics. They must write so the reader can tell the difference between opinion, speculation, and fact (Media Council Act, 2013). Media writers should verify the information's sources before breaking news to establish credibility. Journalists should avoid using unnamed sources of information whenever possible: "Unnamed sources of news should not be used unless the pursuit of the Truth will best be served by not naming the source, which the editor and writer must know." When a report uses material obtained from sources other than the reporter's own, it must provide citations for those sources (Benson K., 2018). It is important to properly attribute statements, whether made by individuals or other news media outlets.

Images, sounds, and quotations must not be presented in a context that is deceptive in order to keep the accuracy of the reporting high and conform to the criteria for factual reporting. Because they have a limited amount of time to prepare articles and a limited amount of space to work with, news reporters are expected to provide information that is as accurate as possible. Consider the following specific guidelines so you can achieve such precision. The following standards need to be met; a) the effort to locate reliable sources; b) the reporting of events with a single eyewitness with attribution; c) the reporting of events with two or more independent eyewitnesses as facts; d) the reporting of controversial facts with attribution; and e) it is preferable to have an independent fact-checking by another publisher employee. If mistakes are made, they ought to be rectified and publicized as soon as they are discovered. The difficulty of reporting on terrorist warriors who have returned to their home countries and are now facing accusations is of particular significance. People in this situation should only be portrayed as having "allegedly" committed crimes before their conviction, which is the customary time when their crimes are reported as facts. The only exception to this rule is if there is a significant disagreement concerning a wrongful conviction. People should not be deemed guilty until their innocence has been proven, yet this does occur periodically in our media when such individuals are genuinely named and displayed in photos while they are still waiting to be tried for the crimes they are accused of having committed.

Another essential one is limiting the amount of damage that can be done. During a normal assignment, a reporter might gather material by conducting interviews with various individuals, conducting research, conducting background checks, taking photographs, filming videos, and recording audio. Should they tell everyone about everything they found

out? If such is the case, how should the process be carried out? In light of the limiting of harm idea, the negatives of complete transparency must be given some thought. Media news reporting about terrorism should be framed in a manner that does not glorify evil and instead should be targeted at discouraging any support for such acts. While reporting on the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters, media news should focus more on the success story to encourage more terrorist offenders to surrender and register with the programs. Positive reporting will also help enhance community resilience toward readmitting the returnees into the community.

4.3 Summary of the Chapter

The chapter examines the respondents' residence, and it becomes clear that most of them are Mombasa County citizens born and raised there, with a majority being Christians and a sizable proportion being devout Muslims. This chapter aimed to explore the nature of Mombasa County's reintegration programs. The following key activities have been identified and discussed: passing the Anti-terrorist Act (2020), detaining and charging returnees, the ministerial pardoning returnees upon surrender, security forces battling terrorism, and monitoring and intercepting financial transactions. The study found that these methods were unresponsive to the well-being of the returnee terrorist fighters, even though they had achieved some headway in reducing terrorist attacks in Mombasa County. The significant number of surrenders led to a ministerial amnesty for terrorist criminals.

The study findings also showed that additional actions taken in the non-custodial reintegration of the returnee terrorist fighters included the creation of community-focused rehabilitation and reintegration programs for the returnees, improved youth access to funds to empower them and engagement in income-generating activities, public awareness

raising regarding the significance of reintegrating the returnees back into the community, and finally the development of social-cultural pillars and family support systems.

According to the findings of the study, the majority of the existing programs in Mombasa County for rehabilitating terrorist offenders are centered on providing technical and vocational training to the returnees. This provides the returnees with the skills they need to become economically stable. Computer training, formal primary and secondary education, agricultural training, hairdressing, catering, pottery, dressmaking, knitting, and counselling are just a few of the activities included in the reintegration programs and have something in common. Building a gender-responsive reintegration program requires incorporating vocational and technical training programs since these programs are one of the most effective means of empowering women offenders, increasing both their self-esteem and their sense of their ability. Unfortunately, the programs are insufficient on their own to address additional psychological requirements connected to criminality. So, it is impossible to achieve effective rehabilitation of returned terrorist offenders when utilized primarily in non-custodial reintegration.

The study recommended the following additional measures to improve the implementation of non-custodial reintegration programs for the returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County in light of the existing approaches that the government has put in place: Review of education curricula within training institutions to include counter-terrorism measures; examination of religious and Islamic studies in all communities; implementation of the National Strategy on countering Violent Extremism announced by the president in May. Global collaboration with other nations to combat terrorism; participation in peace support operations through a multi-agency approach on the military, police, and civilians in the

fight against terrorism; review of education curricula within training institutions to include counter-terrorism measures; examination of religious and Islamic studies in all communities. The management of post-traumatic stress disorders for the returnee terrorist fighters through NGOs and civil societies to the returnees as a way of de-militarizing and de-radicalizing them.

Finally, the chapter presented the assessment of the level of accuracy and objectivity of media reportage of non-custodial reintegration activities of returnee terrorist fighters as a factor that influence the success of the implementation of non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County. It was realized that the mainstream media had not played a very active role in disseminating verified and reliable news broadcasts, thereby suffering a lack of achievement of its purpose as a force multiplier in the fight against terrorism and reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters. The researcher believes that mainstream media, both broadcast, and print, must report truthfully and objectively to make the news credible. The mainstream media should avoid broadcasting non-factual news to sell news to make profits. The mainstream media should not dwell on explaining the news to the public, which would be construed as the perception that the media justifies terrorism.

The results and analysis of the study's second goal, which evaluated the impact of non-custodial reintegration programs on the well-being of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya, are presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-CUSTODIAL REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMES ON THE WELFARE OF RETURNEE TERRORIST FIGHTERS

Terror attacks have been associated with the loss of lives and property and the displacement of communities (Dzoro, Nzau, & Okumu, 2019). To help solve this menace, communities and governments have developed mechanisms that include the non-custodial reintegration of Al-Shabaab returnees. The effectiveness of non-custodial reintegration programs on the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters is examined in this chapter. The chapter discusses a variety of initiatives, including the evaluation of the impact of journalism on how non-custodial reintegration was reported in the media, the role of government security organs, civic education for the general public, the development of income-generating activities, and the use of a multi-agency approach to improve the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters. Effective non-incarceration-based rehabilitation and reintegration programs are necessary to prevent and fight the violent extremism and radicalization that are the root causes of terrorism.

To determine the effectiveness of non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa, various methods were employed, including post-program assessments. In analyzing this, returnees, after participation in the reintegration programs, evaluate changes in their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour related to violent extremism. This was done through individual interviews with the returnees and during focus group discussions. Social and economic indicators were evaluated to assess the effectiveness of the non-custodial reintegration programs. The degree to which returnees can successfully reintegrate into their communities and become productive members of society is one way

in which reintegration programs can be evaluated for their level of success. This was determined by seeing how actively they participated in various social and economic activities such as education, employment, and others.

Feedback from stakeholders, such as community leaders, civil society organizations, and law enforcement agencies, was analyzed to provide valuable insight into the effectiveness of the reintegration programs. This feedback was collected through surveys, focus group discussions, or other forms of engagement. To determine the most effective approach, a comparative analysis was done to weigh the effectiveness of non-custodial reintegration programs compared to the outcomes of other interventions, such as custodial sentences. The success of non-custodial reintegration programs was evaluated by monitoring the long-term outcomes on the returnees, such as a reduction in recidivism rates and their continued engagement in violent extremism.

It is crucial to highlight that assessing the efficacy of non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters in Kenya might be difficult. This is something that should be kept in mind. It is necessary to conduct continuous evaluations and make necessary adjustments so that they can continue to cater to the requirements of returnees and the requirements of the larger community. The following aspects were taken into consideration:

5.1 Media Intervention

The effectiveness of media involvement through unbiased reporting and messaging in Kenya's war against terrorism as a plan for successful non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County was also asked of respondents.

Figure 5. 1: *Media intervention*

    Source: Field data, (2020).

To increase the effectiveness of the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in the fight against terrorism recruitment in Mombasa County, according to the findings in Figure 5.1, 41% (138) of respondents believed that media intervention through objective reporting was more effective. In comparison, 33.3% (112) rated it the most effective. Another 20.5% (69) of them rated it as moderately effective, 2.6% (9) rated it as being the least effective strategy, and another 2.6% (9) also rated it as not effective.

It was noted that journalists who broadcast on mainstream media used their informers and sources even though there were relevant and well-informed sources, such as the security and administration personnel who could have provided verifiable and accurate information. This practice, therefore, places accuracy and objectivity in the line of bias, and using unverifiable sources and informants is equally risky. The study revealed that media houses disseminated information through short documentaries and radio programs. The impact of terrorism on communities and their livelihoods, the realities of the front line as described

by disengaged members, and many other issues were some of those that the media emphasized. Most interviewed participants believed that the media changed their thinking regarding non-custodial reintegration. The study's findings also demonstrated that the media played a key part in the educational process in institutions of higher learning, religious communities, and public gatherings. The media was discovered to be a major disrupter in undermining extreme narratives that extremists spread.

According to the findings of Dr. Mumo Nzaus' study on the Effectiveness of Dialogue in the Reintegration of Al-Shabaab Returnees in Kwale County, Kenya (2020), the media plays an essential role in the process of non-custodial reintegration. These include the ability to educate and advocate for youth to avoid or disengage from forces that encourage youth to join extremist groups, as well as the ability to raise public awareness of the plight of these returnees and the role that the media plays in the process; the fact that high levels of participation and involvement of the various actors allow for a holistic reintegration; and the fact that social awareness of the plight of these returnees and the role that the media plays in the process.

Media interventions should be complemented with in-person community outreach efforts as frequently and intensely as feasible to provide the community with a chance to put ideas and possibilities brought to their attention to practice (Hornqvist & Flyghed, 2012). These findings are consistent with those of Carroll (2013), who claimed that one of the most effective methods for addressing the violent rhetoric of terrorists was the creation of a strong media campaign to highlight the success of anti-terrorist initiatives, denounce the crimes committed by extremists, and disseminate sermons to enlighten the public (Carroll, 2013).

5.2 Public Civic Education

The impact of educating the public on the battle against terrorism and the need for non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters into society in Mombasa County were both evaluated by the respondents.

Figure 5. 2: Educating the public.

     Source: Field Data, (2022).

According to the data shown in Figure 5.2, 28.2% (95) of respondents believe that raising awareness of the necessity of reintegrating terrorist fighters who have returned to society has been more successful in preventing terrorism and other radicalization-related crimes. Among respondents, 23.3% (79) assessed it as being moderately successful, 22.9% (77) as most effective, 15.1% (51) as least effective, and 10.5% (35) as less effective.

According to qualitative research, Kenya's Muslim populace is becoming more radicalized due to security forces' offensive counterterrorism operations. The emphasis on influencing target populations' hearts and minds and the predominance of strict military and security

measures to combat violent extremism have conflicted, creating a dilemma. Because witnessing terrorist activities can be upsetting, and because people who believe terrorists justify violence frequently have strong opinions, terrorism is still a sensitive subject. Young people can be helped to remove themselves from extremism and avoid the pull forces that could encourage recruitment by receiving a high-quality education. Community-focused strategies, such as training and intercultural discussion, are viewed by community actors as a successful way to promote social inclusion and active citizenship while reducing discrimination and social exclusion.

A sense of inclusion can be created by community actors through community-focused programs as preventive measures. Such an initiative has been lauded for being effective in the dwellings in Bamburi and Mikindani areas. In these locations, the programs have been fully owned and driven by community members with little support from NGOs and the government for funding. The communities in Mombasa County have formed village groups to help monitor the returnees and include them in youth group projects to help them earn a decent livelihood. Some projects where the returnees have been included include a local tricycle transport business called "*TUK TUK*." The youth groups also own a Car Wash business where the local youth, including the returnees, work and save money for their personal development besides daily earnings.

From the study, local CBOs and NGOs have taken the lead in conducting public civic education to sensitize the locals on the dangers of terrorism and, to a large extent, on the effectiveness of rehabilitating those who had returned to the community after surrendering from participating in the terror groups. Religious institutions' involvement was also appreciated as key in countering extremists' narratives that lure the youths to join the terror

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groups. The study's key respondents appeared to hold contrasting opinions about how widely civil education and information about the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters should be disseminated to the general public. As a local policy advisor states:

> You'll often hear that the returnees have fewer chances and that there is discrimination, and the returnees feel they cannot get jobs. This distorts the returnees from other community members, enhancing the feeling that they are not accepted.
> - (Interview with a Policy Advisor in Kisauni, 26th August 2022).

A society comprised of people from various racial, religious, and cultural origins can cultivate a shared sense of culture through civic participation and citizenship. Honesty, integrity, respect for others, and loyalty form the foundation for a returnee's character development and encourage citizenship. Strong character traits include compassion, honesty, and fairness. They also include the ability to make wise decisions, respect others, be courageous in standing up for their convictions, have a strong sense of responsibility, be good neighbors caring about their community, and maintain their respect. These moral and ethical principles should be taught and reinforced throughout the non-custodial reintegration process. The respondents believed public awareness and dialogue significantly promoted non-custodial reintegration programs. One of the Al-Shabaab returnees affirmed this finding that;

> NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) in Mombasa County raised awareness about the significance of non-custodial reintegration. The growing killing of returnees had previously disturbed the community. The defendant was a man they suspected of being involved in terrorist activity. The community and security apparatus were perplexed about why they believed he was innocent. For fear of being attacked, the community also conceals the existence of returns.
> - (Interview with a returnee in Nyali, 30th August 2022)

According to the study's conclusions, the Mombasa County returnees have already begun developing a regional communication strategy to combat extremist propaganda. Additionally, they participate in anti-radicalization campaigns created in educational settings, places of worship, and businesses. The survey found that the national government has already started a public awareness campaign aimed at extremist organization members and those considering joining them. In addition, an initiative supporting non-custodial reintegration brings together former inmates, community members, women, and police to help build trust.

5.3 Creation of Income-Generating Activities

Additionally, as part of a non-custodial reintegration approach to combat terrorism in Kenya, respondents were asked to judge the efficacy of newly formed income-generating activities to support the welfare of the returnee terrorist fighters.


Figure 5. 3: *Creation of income-generating activities.*

    Source: Field data, (2022).

According to the results shown in Figure 5.3, 33.3% (112) of respondents believe that the intervention had a moderate impact on helping returnee terrorist fighters reintegrate. In comparison, 28.2% (95) believe it had the least impact, 17.9% (60) believe it had no impact, 12.8% (43) believe it had a greater impact, and 7.7% (26) believe the strategy had the greatest impact. Most defectors leave Al-Shabaab with nothing since they were on the run. They must be assisted in reaching their communities when completing the rehabilitation phase. To cater to their immediate basic needs, the returnee terrorist fighters are given some cash or virtual assistance. During this period, they are joined by their family members. Organizing sporting activities, skill-transfer vocational training, and educational opportunities are all part of the non-custodial reintegration process.

Many young people have deserted and made dangerous journeys away from their home countries due to Al-Shabaab's economic incentives for recruiting them to their terrorist organizations. This means that more effort and funding allocated to combating terrorism and violent extremism might go into avoiding support for violence up-front and reducing recruitment to terrorist organizations down the road (Dzoro, Nzau, & Okumu, 2019). The government of Kenya has made a deliberate effort to address youth issues by establishing the Youth Enterprise Development Fund, a state company with the mandate to support financial and business development services to youth-owned firms. This is part of the government's attempt to create the Youth Enterprise Development Fund.

The fund aims to inspire young people to become job creators rather than job seekers by encouraging them to start their businesses and offering employment possibilities for other young people. Other programs, such as the Uwezo Fund and the Women Enterprise Fund, offer financial assistance to young people to further their education. The latest development

is the creation of a hustle fund by the present government to avail seed capital for youths to start small enterprises. Young entrepreneurs, particularly those working to produce cultural goods and services, can borrow money from the Youth Fund easily and affordably.

5.4 Multi-agency Approach

Respondents were asked to judge the success of employing a multi-agency approach for the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters to combat terrorism in Mombasa. This was done in order to prevent terrorist attacks in the city. The findings are presented in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5. 4: *Multi-agency approach*
    Source: Field data, (2022).

According to the results shown in Figure 5.4, 48.5% (163) of respondents said using a multi-agency approach to reintegrate the returnee terrorist fighters was the most successful way to fight terrorism in Mombasa County. Another 20.6% (69) gave it a high rating, followed by ratings of moderate effectiveness from 23.1% 78 respondents, low effectiveness from 5.2% (18), and lowest effectiveness from the remaining nine

respondents, constituting 2.6%. All interested parties must be included in using non-custodial measures to reintegrate returnee terrorist fighters successfully. Understanding better the best strategies to prevent extremist recruitment and radicalization (Gatimu, 2014).

To develop measures for the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa, the Administration of Kenya and the County government collaborated with faith-based organizations, civil society organizations, and foreign partners. These non-governmental organizations act as reliable spokespersons for the community and are frequently in the greatest positions to comprehend complaints, use networks, and transmit messages. The most crucial venues for the non-custodial reintegration of returned terrorist fighters into their communities are discussions among all parties involved.

Using a multi-agency strategy in the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist combatants primarily focuses on reducing the possibility of recidivism among terrorist and extremist offenders through re-socialization and aftercare processes. This is the primary objective of the use of this strategy. The non-custodial reintegration programs that assist returning inmates with job searching, education, housing, debt reduction, and dealing with their psychological issues, including post-traumatic stress disorders or family reconciliation, are crucial parts of the multi-agency strategy. Aftercare programs or other surveillance measures are implemented to keep an eye on recent graduates and lower the risk of recidivism. Families, clan members, security measures, and program employees who remain engaged in the graduates' lives after their release all reduce the likelihood that they will engage in terrorist action (Haynes, 2012).

Through the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), the institution tasked with coordinating the plan's execution, the government is currently working with various partners to implement some components of the strategy. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) collaborated with the European Union and the Government of Denmark to develop and implement training programs for various law enforcement officials and officers working in prisons and probation services. These programs aimed to equip these professionals with the appropriate intervention tools and techniques for identifying and managing radicalization cases.

Accordingly, the findings of this study lend support to the diverse approach to the non-custodial reintegration of former terrorist fighters who have returned home. This must involve counter-radicalization processes and de-radicalization programs, the goals of which are to change the ex-combatants' notions about the acceptability of using violence as a priority, as well as their radical views on Islam and politics. Therefore, to provide a holistic approach emphasizing deterrence and rehabilitation, both the means and messages in non-custodial reintegration programs need to be designed and addressed. This is necessary in order to provide an effective holistic strategy.

5.5 Availability of Gender-Responsive Programs

The objective of the study was to investigate how existing non-custodial reintegration programs have promoted not only the improvement of returnees' welfare but also equally developed programs that are gender-responsive and that address particular unique issues, which may impede the successful rehabilitation and reintegration of both male and female terrorist offenders back into society. Accessible non-custodial reintegration programs ought to concentrate on issues unique to women, such as post-

traumatic stress disorder, dysfunction in the lives of returnees, parental anguish, and low self-esteem, all of which frequently lead to incarceration for returnees (Clark, 2009). This is because these issues are frequently the root cause of returnees being sent back to prison. Advocates for gender-responsive programming also warn administrators of prisons and jails about "gender-neutral" programs, which are based on male conventions and hence primarily mirror the criminal trajectories of male offenders. Advocates for gender-responsive programming. Programs that are gender-responsive or offer therapy are thus known as those that recognize the varied paths that male and female offenders take to become criminals. These programs are recognized as understanding the various routes male and female offenders take to become criminals.

Considering this, the respondents were asked to indicate, by checking [√] in the available boxes, which gender-responsive therapies are provided within their respective non-custodial reintegration programs. The study also looked at how many people participated in the provided programs that were gender responsive. In Table 5.1, the level of participation for those programs is displayed.

Table 5. 1: Participation Levels in Programs that are Gender Responsive

Reintegration Programmes	% of returnees participating
Training on life skills	18.8%
Economic empowerment training and Mentorship	15.9%
Training about how to interact with your spouse and family	59.7%
Parenting skills education	8.6%

Source: Field data, (2022).

In the survey, out of the 30 returnee terrorist fighters studied, it was discovered that 18.8% (6) of the returnees took part in life skills training, and 15.9% (54) actively participated in the program for economic empowerment training and mentorship. The returnees are trained on interpersonal connections with spouses or family members in 59.7% (201) of the program events. These results may indicate that the non-custodial reintegration programs and activities offered to returnee terrorist offenders in Kenya have not yet considered their psychological requirements. The perceived objectives of the interpersonal relationship skills training are an encouraging step towards addressing dysfunctional and strained relationships, reconciling with one another, and strengthening ties between returnees and their spouses and other family members to increase participation in the host community in the reintegration process.

Given that young women who leave for foreign terrorist groups eventually return home to resume their parental roles and responsibilities, it is possible that programs that emphasize parenting and parenting skills training could give them practical skills in childcare and other skills, thereby reducing their chances of recidivism. Ferraro and Moe (2003), in their Defence of the necessity of gender-sensitive programs, emphasize the need to equip mothers participating in correctional programs with parenting knowledge and skills in order to lower their level of parental distress and, in turn, lower crimes associated with it, such as drug and alcohol abuse, forgery, child neglect, and parent-child murder. In their argument, Ferraro and Moe (2003) point out the necessity of equipping mothers with this knowledge and skills to lower their level of parental distress (Ferraro & Moe, 2003).

Reintegration programs that fall short of activities that directly assist mothers in developing coping mechanisms for their parental roles and responsibilities run the risk

of leaving mothers who must return home less equipped to handle the same problems that may have radicalized them and drawn them into terrorist organizations. The results indicate the non-custodial reintegration programs' failure to adequately address Kenyan women offenders' demand for parenting education.

Even though 18.8% (6) of the returnees stated that they had engaged in life skills training, the survey indicated this was the case regardless. Although it is generally accepted that the harrowing experiences of the battlefield are significant factors and may be strongly associated with criminality in returnee offenders, several studies (Covington, 2014) show that the majority of returnee offenders lack the fundamental life skills to deal with life's challenges, which explains why they tend to engage in criminal behaviour. This is even though it is widely acknowledged that the harrowing experiences of the battlefield are significant factors.

According to the findings of scholarly research conducted by Lindsay and Michelle (2013), the vast majority of terrorist combatants who have successfully returned home face significant difficulties in terms of their life skills, which makes it difficult for them to successfully reintegrate into society. Some of these challenges included having difficulty finding a job; having anger problems that are difficult to manage; having difficulty building healthy human connections; and being unable to create attainable goals (Onditi & Odera, 2021).

The United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (also known as the Bangkok Rules) specifically require authorities to use as many options as possible such as home leave, open prisons, halfway

houses, community-based programs, and services for women prisoners. This is to ease their transition from prison to liberty, reduce stigma, and re-establish contact with their families at the earliest opportunity. Additionally, the Bangkok Rules mandate that this be done.

> "The authorities in charge of prisons must use alternatives such as home leave, open prisons, halfway houses, and community-based programs and services to the fullest extent possible for female inmates. This is done to ease women inmates' transition from incarceration to freedom, lowering the associated social stigma and re-establishing contact with their families at the earliest possible stage. In addition, this reduces the likelihood of women inmates being subjected to social stigma".

> - (Bangkok Rule 45).

The Rules call for the establishment of comprehensive programs that offer pre- and post-release reintegration therapies and services, with particular attention paid to the requirements of female inmates.

> "The authorities in charge of corrections are tasked with developing and implementing comprehensive pre- and post-release reintegration programs for women that consider the unique challenges they face due to their gender. These programs must be carried out with local community organizations and non-governmental organizations".
> - (Bangkok Rule 46)

Correctional facility administrations should implement these programs in conjunction with local community organizations, non-governmental organizations, and probation and social welfare services to successfully reintegrate formerly incarcerated women into society. These programs should also provide additional support for released female inmates who require psychiatric, physical, legal, and practical assistance when granted freedom.

"In order to ensure the successful social reintegration of released female convicts, additional support should be provided to them after their release. This support should be psychological, medical, legal, and practical assistance. This assistance should be provided in collaboration with community services".

- (Bangkok Rule 47)

The United Nations, the OSCE, the Global Criminal Task Force, the European Union, and other organizations have issued proposals and good practices or have provided practical guidance. These are available for states to consider as they attempt to solve women's frequently special reintegration challenges. A good number of these ideas might be included in the development of non-custodial R&R programs that are more thorough and sensitive to issues of gender. An illustration: Risk and need assessment methods for non-custodial reintegration programs should be gender sensitive. It is important for the professionals who are engaged in producing and using them to have gender-sensitive skills and training to notice and reduce the amount of unconscious bias present in assessments. Assessments must consider the possible threat posed by certain women, both in terms of safety and the possibility that other women will become radicalized and violent.

Programming for non-custodial reintegration should consider how women and girls experience violent extremism and conflict, given that their experiences are likely to be very different from those of men and boys. The programming that is intended for women and girls should have unique components that are directed toward them. Some examples of these components include those that deal with parenting and concerns associated with parenting, socioeconomic empowerment, and networking. The reintegration programs ought to be directed by professionals who are aware of the effects of trauma, gender-

sensitive, and sensitive to the issues that women face in their daily lives. In addition to this, they ought to deal with the "push factors" of misogyny, unfairness, and a general lack of respect for women that are present in their communities. If the problem is not addressed, there is still a chance that women will be attracted to the ideology of terrorist organizations that use violence.

Interventions aimed at women and girls, as well as P/CVE initiatives in general, ought to incorporate the participation of women both in the planning and carrying out of those interventions. This encompasses female law enforcement officials and practitioners, psychosocial care providers, religious and other types of therapists, and women who hold leadership positions in CSOs. In addition, governments should provide training on gender sensitivity to organizations, practitioners, and professionals that engage with female returnees or other women and girls who may be the target of non-custodial R&R programs. These women and girls may include returnees from non-custodial R&R programs.

The Reasoning and Rehabilitation Program, also known as the "Cognitive Skills Training Program," as well as the Anger and Emotional Management programs, if they are incorporated into the non-custodial reintegration programs, may be able to assist the returnee terrorist fighters in changing their behaviours and learning to survive in a socially acceptable way. This assistance may be provided if the programs are included in the non-custodial reintegration programs. According to the Red Cross (2013), having good life skills is one of the most important factors in dealing with life's challenges and changes. Improving a person's psychological and social well-being can be accomplished by cultivating life skills such as efficient communication, optimistic thinking, analytical ability, goal planning, cooperation, and coping. Improving people's and communities' life

skills enables them to face and overcome difficulties and risks, grab opportunities, and work together to find peaceful and cooperative solutions to problems.

This study also highlighted the crucial need to treat other psychological needs, such as abuse of drugs and substances, victimization, trauma, and parental sorrow. According to the demographic statistics, most offenders may require vocational training despite the fact that most offenders lack the skills and education necessary for a formal job. This is evidenced by most offenders lacking the skills and education essential for formal employment. Suppose the programs only focus on teaching them skills geared toward economic empowerment. In that case, the psychological needs of the returning terrorist fighters during the process of reintegration will not be satisfied. The discussion as a whole suggests that, in order for the initiative to be successful and meaningful in the lives of the offenders and the host community, it is urgent for the national and county governments, along with other decision-makers, to translate the new knowledge on non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters into an actual action plan. This is because the initiative will not be successful unless the offenders and the host community find the initiative to be successful and meaningful.

5.6 Chapter Summary

In Mombasa, Kenya, numerous efforts have been made to establish and carry out non-custodial reintegration programs for terrorist combatants who have returned home after participating in an overseas conflict. However, it is not always obvious that these programs are beneficial, and obstacles may be involved in ensuring that people receive enough support and properly reintegrate themselves into society. For the non-custodial reintegration program for the welfare of returnee terrorist combatants to be successful, it is

assumed that one can support change based on the returnee's cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioural characteristics. The study's second goal was to determine whether non-custodial reintegration programs in Mombasa County, Kenya, successfully improved the well-being of terrorist fighters who had returned to their homes. Overall, it is clear that the different tactics implemented to improve the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters have been more successful. The research specifically showed that the best ways to promote the non-custodial reintegration of the returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County were to use a multi-agency strategy, public education, and the development of income-generating activities.

The most important objective of non-custodial reintegration programs is not just the conversion of Al-Shabaab returnees into civilian lives but more transforming them into law-abiding citizens hence preparing them as people who are capable of earning a living legitimately as expected by every member of the society while receiving acceptance and understanding at the family, community, and government administration and security levels. Reintegration into society outside of custody has a relational and emotional purpose considering context, emotions, and a person's overall capacity for empathy. Given the option to react with fear, hatred, and violence or with open-mindedness, acceptance, and understanding in the face of the world's daily violent conflicts, the non-custodial community reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters is an infinitely important strategy for human coexistence. However, in all cases, non-custodial reintegration must be viewed as a peace-building tool whose potential must be utilized.

For this reason, the purpose of this study was to determine the success of the non-custodial reintegration programs at the level of the government administration, security, and

community, as well as at the level of other stakeholders, including NGOs and CBOs. This study aimed to assess the influence of non-custodial reintegration programs on the well-being of returned terrorist fighters in Mombasa County while also considering the risk that these programs may present if they are not employed appropriately. After considering the factors described earlier, this study intended to determine these programs' impact on well-being.

To help reduce the number of people who join the militia groups, besides increasing the number of returnees, the host community and the County Government of Mombasa should support and encourage community participation and involvement in designing the non-custodial reintegration programs for the returnee terrorist fighters. This will ensure that the community members are involved in reintegrating the returnees. Consequently, the returnees will be embraced as part of society. Creating awareness in society is very important. The host community must understand that returnees in society need encouragement. This will help members of the family and host community to accept them. The government and other non-state actors should provide a support system for the returnees to improve the efficacy of the non-custodial reintegration process.

Therefore, non-custodial reintegration programs aim to help reintegrate individuals involved in terrorist activities into their communities. These programs include counselling, education and vocational training, and other support to help individuals reintegrate into society and avoid returning to terrorist activities. The effectiveness of these programs depends on various factors, including the specific program's design and implementation, the individual returnee's level of engagement and commitment to the program, and the level of community support and acceptance for the returnee's reintegration. Non-custodial

reintegration programs can effectively prevent recidivism and promote successful

reintegration, but they require careful planning, implementation, and monitoring.

CHAPTER SIX

CHALLENGES FACING NON-CUSTODIAL REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMES FOR RETURNED TERRORIST FIGHTERS IN MOMBASA COUNTY, KENYA

To improve the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters under Mombasa, Kenya, non-custodial reintegration programs were evaluated for their chances and obstacles in the third goal. Repatriation of returnee terrorist fighters and their families is a problem that is currently of considerable concern in many states and is a task that is currently of great concern. The question of ensuring that these individuals, who may or may not have deserved to be accused of a crime and put behind bars, can finally reintegrate into society is important from the perspectives of national security and human rights. To improve the welfare of the returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya, the study identified several obstacles that prevent the non-custodial reintegration programs from being implemented successfully.

The chapter will also highlight the opportunity to enhance the non-custodial interrogation initiative to more effectively achieve the desired goal as the best alternative to custodial imprisonment of the returnees who have surrendered from terrorist offenses.

6.1 Lack of Clear Definition of Terrorist

Respondents were required to rank how the lack of a clear definition of a terrorist was a challenge to achieving effective non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County.

Lack of clear definition of terrorist

Level of impact	Percentage
Highest	15.40%
High	61.50%
Moderate	19.20%
Low	2.60%
Lowest	1.30%

Figure 6. 1: *Lack of clear definition of terrorist*

Source: Field data, (2022).

Figure 6.1 from the study's findings shows that 61.5% (207) of respondents said that a significant obstacle to the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County was the absence of a clear definition of terrorism. Another 19.2% (65) of them ranked it as moderate, 15.4% (52) of them as highest, 2.6% (9) of them as low, while 1.3% (4) ranked it as lowest.

Reintegrating terrorist fighters who have returned home has been made more difficult by the lack of a widely accepted definition of terrorism, affecting how important institutional and State actors have tackled criminal justice issues (UNODC, 2018). Legally, there is still difficulty in determining human rights and international legal standards to define terrorism. Under the current global legal circumstances, there is a dilemma as to whether, for example, members of the Al-Shabaab militia group meet the threshold of combatants under the International Humanitarian Law. Under international humanitarian law, those considered combatants can employ force in armed conflict (Ipsen, 1995). On the other

hand, they are lawful military targets during hostilities times. As long as their use of force complies with the terms of the law of armed conflict, often known as humanitarian law, soldiers may participate in hostilities without being susceptible to criminal charges, unlike civilians.

When there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism for use in legal contexts, this might have several different effects. If there is no definition, there is a risk that the term "terrorism" would be misused and politicized to stop activities that are not considered to be terroristic or even criminal in nature. Every time pressure organization in Mombasa County complain about being ignored by the national government, they are victimized and falsely accused of being terrorists. This can lead to governments breaching their citizens' rights, including those guaranteed by international human rights law, as part of their counter-terrorism activities (Duffy, 2015).

Domestic laws that are unclear in their full scope and purpose regarding the conduct they penalize, and its consequences can violate the legality principle. This rule states that unless an act was criminalized when allegedly committed, a person should not be subject to criminal prosecution or punishment under domestic or international criminal law. As a result, criminal law cannot be imposed retroactively (Fletcher, 2009). This legal principle's inherent requirement for certainty in the law, which ensures that the criminalized conduct and the associated consequences are unambiguously stated before they are allegedly committed, is of particular interest.

Another significant issue has been the absence of coordination between several national and regional pieces of legislation and normative standards for preventing terrorism. In the wake of the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, the United Nations

Security Council unanimously voted to enact Resolution 1373 (2001), which mandated that individual states pass appropriate national laws as part of their efforts to combat terrorism more effectively on a global scale (United Nations, 2001). Although, on the one hand, this compelled states to take legal action, the absence of a uniform definition of terrorism has resulted in a patchwork of legislative reactions and methods by member states. These responses and approaches can frequently hinder rather than facilitate international cooperation. Kenya is not an outlier in this regard. It has been possible for the legal system in Kenya to enforce the national laws to the extent that offenders convicted of violent extremism are being imprisoned by international humanitarian law.

6.2 Public Sympathy with Terrorists

Respondents were required to rate their public sympathy with terrorists as one of the challenges to fighting terrorism through non-custodial reintegration in Mombasa County.


Figure 6. 2: Public Sympathy with Terrorists

   Source: Field data, (2022)

The results shown in Figure 6.2 shows that 35.9% (121) of the respondents rated public sympathy as a moderate barrier facing the non-custodial reintegration strategy on the welfare of the returnee terrorist fighters in preventing terrorism recruitment in Mombasa County and 12.8% (43) of them ranked it as an either low or lowest challenge. Only 5.2% (18) of the respondents felt that public sympathy was the highest challenge facing non-custodial reintegration strategy to returnee terrorist fighters' welfare. In Mombasa County, the Al-Shabaab militants have opted to operate by allowing a small group of supporters to carry out assaults to elicit official responses in the expectation that they will be regarded as unfairly targeting all Muslims (Dzoro, Nzau, & Okumu, 2019).

The traits and motivations of the group influence the choice of targets for terrorism. It has come to light that there is a sizable radical milieu in towns with most Muslims. Although most Muslim countries do not support jihadist extremists, the Islamic community provides more than enough fertile ground for terrorism. Jihadi terrorists are portrayed as the true heirs of the Salafi, with Allah believed to be on their side, and their religion is promoted as being under attack by Western powers and influences; Jihadi terrorists are viewed as vicarious vengeance takers for insults and injustices Muslims endured either personally or collectively in the recent past; Jihadi terrorists are characterized as "daring," "heroic," and "successful," and they are carrying out legal jihad. Specific objections to Western support for authoritarian/legitimate regimes in the Muslim and Arab world contribute to sympathy for and support for terrorism.

Some villagers in Mombasa see the terrorist as a revolutionary and one of their heroes battling to free them from an oppressive and tyrannical government. This is consistent with Vilde Skorpen Wikan's work from 2018, which asked the rhetorical question, Is "One

Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?". If the claim is pushed to its logical conclusion, it will almost always be confirmed by definition. After all, it only takes "one guy" to regard terrorist activity as legitimate in order for it to do so, and in many cases, this "one" is the terrorist. The slogan's potency lies in the paradox that "terrorist" is fundamentally terrible while "freedom fighting" is desirable, and thus designating an action as "freedom fighting" prevents it from also being considered as "terrorism."

Aisha Shezadi, at 26 years old and joined the Islamic State in 2014, is at the center of a contentious debate on her case in Norwegian media. Cases involving supporters and (former) members of extremist groups give rise to ethical, legal, and political challenges and dilemmas, which is one of the reasons why these cases are problematic. This case serves as an illustration of these issues and dilemmas and serves as an example. Shezadi's narrative demonstrates how such cases frequently split the public and potential host communities, regardless of whether the discussed course of action seeks rehabilitation and reintegration or a "lock them up and throw away the key" response to the situation. Shezadi's story exemplifies how such cases frequently divide the public and potential host societies (Andersson et al., 2017). The narrative of Shezadi touches on various tough topics, contributing to the question of foreign fighters being such a complex one. When the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made it illegal to sponsor terrorist organizations and "foreign fighters" and prohibited all travel to Syria, the young woman began her trek to Syria to join IS.

Shezadi's case, like many others involving foreign fighters and other travelers in Syria, is difficult to investigate, making it difficult to assess the extent of her involvement and the types of acts in which she may have participated. It is difficult to study these situations and

determine, as is the case in this one, whether Shezadi was merely a Syrian housewife, as she claims, who did not work for IS despite staying in IS territory and aiding the terrorist organization's cause (Christensen & Bjrgo, 2017). This is the case because it is impossible to determine whether Shezadi was simply a Syrian housewife.

Regarding the debate over whether or not she is an "enemy or traitor" who should be left to her own devices, as one far-right politician in the Parliament claims, or whether or not the Norwegian Foreign Ministry should help her return as one liberal politician claims, Shezadi's case will unavoidably bring up the already contentious issue of immigration and foreigners in the context of Norwegian politics. Abid Raja, a controversial politician, claims that the children of Islamic State fighters have not committed any wrongdoing and should thus be returned to their homes. While he maintains that it is difficult to sympathize with Norwegian citizens who have engaged in mass murder and cold-blooded organization IS, the Norwegian authorities have an equal duty to support Norwegian citizens. This is even though it is entirely impossible to have any pity for Norwegian nationals who have participated in the organization. Concerning the youngster, who did not go to Syria of his own free will and had the legal right to be protected, many issues still have not been resolved.

A secessionist group called the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) claimed that Mombasa had been marginalized by the Kenyan government and suggested that Mombasa break away from Kenya to form an independent state called the Mombasa Republic that would include the Coast Province of Kenya. An activist group with the catchphrase *"Pwani si Kenya"* was born due to this (the coastal region is not part of Kenya). The movements have been singled out as a radical organization with Al-Shabaab sympathies. In order to

entice more young people in Mombasa County to join the gangs, the militia group has leveraged this trend. In the Kenyan setting, where considerable fragmentation and ideas contest the sovereign control of inland Kenya over the coastal strip, the phrase "Pwani si Kenya" is not new. Nevertheless, the removal of the Sultanate flag was simply a part of a well-thought-out strategy to unite the rebellious coastal dwellers with the soon-to-be-born Kenyan State left in the hands of prominent interior politicians in KANU and KADU (Otieno, 2021).

The 1895 treaty between the British and the Sultan of Zanzibar is one argument used by those who believe that Kenya's coastline was never a part of it. According to these people, it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the Zanzibar Sultan and his people are distinct people who belong to a distinct sovereign state. According to historical documents, the breadth of the commerce along the shore particularly intrigued the British colonists when they first arrived in Kenya. Mombasa was a bustling commercial trade hub and route that provided an ideal setting for trade between the Arabs along the coast and the people in the interior. However, the Sultan of Zanzibar governed the entire coastline strip at that time, around the end of the 19th century. Since 1840, the Sultans of Oman had ruled the coastline. There was no restriction on travel between Zanzibar, Pemba, the "10 Mile Coastal Strip," which covered the ten nautical miles inland from the coast from Vanga at the Kenya-Tanzania boundary to Kipini in Lamu, and the three islands, all of which were under Sultan's control.

The knowledge of returning foreign fighters from Al-Shabaab, some of whom are defectors, among the population can be used to triangulate this finding. A respondent's awareness of individuals who had joined the Al-Shabaab in Somalia was the subject of one

question in the online poll. As seen in Figure 6.3 below, 98 respondents (29.18%) indicated they knew a local who had joined the Al-Shabaab in Somalia before returning home.


Figure 6. 3: *Knowledge of someone who joined Al-Shabaab in Somalia and then left and came back.*

Source: Field data, (2022).

Even though the government and security agencies do not have any records of these individuals, most of the critical respondents who were interviewed stated that it is not unexpected that the community is aware of who the returnees are. This was stated by those who thought it was not surprising that the community was aware of who the returnees were. A senior police officer in Nyali has stated that the community does not often report returnees because "it defends their own." The officer explained that this " protection " resulted from a distrustful relationship between the public and the police.

> In the neighborhood, those returnees are unreported. They are present, but we are yet to learn who they are. They will not object if he launches an attack if it does not occur in their neighborhood. You will not often hear anything from locals born and raised there. Those who have moved here

from other parts of the country are the primary sources of the information
we receive.

<div align="right">- (Interview with a Senior Police Officer on September 12 in
Likoni, 2022)</div>

Previous repressive police techniques, such as arbitrary arrests and excessive force, among other negative practices, have led to a lack of trust between security actors and the community. Other damaging practices include the use of excessive force. According to the research of scholars like Omeje and Githigaro (2012), this topic has typically been seen as placing a greater emphasis on regime policing than citizen policing. The same coercive techniques used in counter-terrorism policing have further damaged relations between the police and the communities they serve as a result of violations of domestic law (Prestholdt, 2011). Under the pretense of combating terrorism, most Kenyans believe that the Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) is responsible for numerous violations of several human rights (Githigaro, 2021).

6.3 Unemployment

In the rating of unemployment as a factor that deters effective non-custodial reintegration programs on the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, respondents revealed their opinions, as shown in Figure 6.4.

Figure 6. 4: *Unemployment factor*

      Source: Field data, (2022).

The study showed that 204 respondents (60.5%) ranked unemployment as the biggest obstacle to successfully implementing the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County. Of the respondents, 2.6% (9) of them gave it the lowest rating, 18.2% (61) gave it a high rating, 12.8% (43) gave it a poor rating, and 5.9% (20) gave it a moderate rating.

The study of conflict and violence in developing nations has been significantly impacted by unemployment (and beyond). Poor people have a comparative advantage in violence, which is one of the effects of violence, having a low opportunity cost. A person's utility is more likely to be maximized by committing violent conflict and extortion if they lack access to legal, cooperative gainful employment. Concerns are raised about the possibility that Mombasa County's rising youth unemployment rate and youthful population bulge are fueling terrorist recruitment. Based on many development characteristics, such as

corruption, ineffective administration, and a lack of the rule of law, the study's findings indicate a positive association between youth unemployment and domestic terrorism.

However, as anticipated, youth unemployment is not a reliable indicator of transnational terrorism between nations (Adelaja, 2020), even if it can only adequately account for a small percentage of the country's overall terrorism risk. Although the researcher believes that economic exclusion can be a motivator for terrorism just as political exclusion can be, regardless of a country's overall wealth, the researcher acknowledges that the economic inequality and marginalization that the residents of the coastal region have long complained about may have a significant correlation with terrorist risk. The researcher emphasizes the importance of giving unemployed youngsters a more significant part in terrorist prevention methods in his conclusion.

6.4 Poverty Level

Respondents were required to rate poverty levels as a challenge facing effective non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County.

Figure 6. 5: *Poverty level*

Source: Field data, (2022).

It is clear from the study that findings presented in Figure 6.5 that 48.4% (163) of the respondents ranked poverty levels as the highest challenge in fighting terrorism through the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County. Another 28.1% (95) of them rated it as high, 13.1% (44) as moderate, while the remaining 5.2% (18) each rated it as either low or lowest factor. A condition of poverty can be broadly defined as a state in which the fundamental necessities of life - such as food, clean water to drink, sanitary facilities, health care, housing, education, and information - are severely lacking. Inequality in access to services is a factor, in addition to low income. More than merely having low incomes is involved with poverty.

The researcher disagrees with this finding with the claim that terrorism happens in both wealthy and poor countries, as well as democracies and authoritarian states, and that terrorism must be fought at its root causes, which include poverty and inequality. This

disagreement stems from the findings from key informant interviews. Studies have also shown that not all returnees terrorist fighters are from poor backgrounds. Some of them are from high-end families who live in riches and have a high level of education and family status. This theory agrees with Carol Lancaster's assertion that poverty neither creates nor eradicates terrorism, according to her writings on aid to Africa (Lancaster, 2003). Nevertheless, the research also acknowledges that there sometimes seems to be a connection between poverty and bad governance, which can result in civil unrest and state breakdown. The study concludes that a combination of poverty and lousy administration might increase regional unrest and serve as a refuge for terrorists.

Contrary to widespread assumption, poor economic situations in returnees' home countries are not a significant motivator for them to join international terrorist warfare, despite what many in the media, economists, and policymakers believe. Contrarily, many foreign combatants are citizens of nations with advanced political systems, low-income disparity levels, and high levels of economic development (Benmelech & Esteban, 2016). With undergraduate and graduate degrees from their native countries, many warriors are likewise highly educated. Due to Mombasa County's very high number of Al-Shabaab foreign fighters in Somalia, this study indicates that poverty is not a driving force behind recruitment to terrorism. They contend that Mombasa County's language and ethnic homogeneity facilitate Muslim immigrants' easy absorption, creating some conditions necessary for radicalization.

6.5 Radicalization Ideologies

The respondents were required to rate extremists' ideologies in radicalization as a factor challenging the effective implementation of non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County.

Figure 6. 6: *Radicalization*

Source: Field data, (2022).

It is clear from the findings presented in Figure 6.6 that 64.1% (216) of the respondents rated radicalization as the highest challenge to the effective non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County. Another 25.6% (86) of them ranked it high, 5.2% (18) of them rated it as moderate, and 2.6% (9) as low, while the remaining 2.6% (9) of the respondents ranked it as lowest.

Radicalization is a product of misrepresenting religious beliefs, dogmas, and religious texts and manipulating the trust the faithful bestowed on clerics/religious leaders. The National Program for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaged Ex-Combatants is the typical

framework for de-radicalization programs. According to the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, combatants are people taking part in international armed conflicts, soldiers serving in their country's armed forces, or members of unofficial military groups. Within a national army or other armed organization, they may be in positions of command or decision-making, carry weapons, or don uniforms. Extremist movement supporters frequently exhibit fanaticism, intolerance, unyielding resolve, and monomania, believing that they alone understand "truth" and possess the answer to today's most critical societal issues (Schmid, 2012). Ideological radicals ignore signals that conflict with their perception of reality due to cognitive dissonance (Benson B. W., 1994).

Political, religious, economic, environmental, or social extremist ideologies are all possible. They do not assume any particular doctrine or variety of doctrines. However, the core of extremism is the existence of a rigid ideology. This divide has both political and valuable repercussions. According to this definition, the Mombasa Republican Council in Kenya, which is thought to use terrorist field tactics, is an example of a separatist group rather than an extremist one because it is concentrated on a specific set of political or territorial objectives rather than a pervasive political ideology.

A pervasive and widely circulated victimization narrative that has gained traction due to historical injustices that have gone unresolved, particularly socioeconomic, and political exclusion, uneven development, and previous injustices regarding land allocation, underpins the success of this network, particularly in the recruitment of Kenyans. Political realities, social considerations, and individual qualities make many people, especially young people, vulnerable to recruitment. Groups like Al-Shabaab are aware of this and use it to their advantage. The distinctive characteristic behind the ideologies put forward by

most extremist groups in Africa is that the end justifies their violent means (Naya, 2018). It is, therefore, essential to include religious leaders in any solution for religious extremism and radicalization. Since matters concerning radicalization and extremism are ideological, they need an ideological solution, especially for the youth, ensuring the smallest unit of all, the family unit, provides good behaviour to be emulated by the children.

6.6 Violent Extremism

The respondents were required to rank violent extremism as a challenge facing non-custodial reintegration activities in Mombasa County.

Figure 6. 7: *Violent extremism*

Source: Field data, (2022).

From Figure 6.7, 41% (138) of the respondents rated violent extremism as a higher challenge. Another 33.3% (112) of the respondents ranked it as the highest, 20.5% (69) as moderate, and 2.6% (9) as low, while another 2.6% of the respondents rated it as the lowest.

Violent extremism is thus the use of the Holly Book to sell misguided ideologies for violent ends and manipulation of the adherents to uphold violent tendencies. Most defectors face

severe threats from Al-Shabaab members, who want to revenge on them for leaving the group. At the same time, some of the returnees could have committed serious crimes and abuses within their communities and may thus be targeted by their communities. There are cases where they are even threatened with death by their family members or communities, and an interview with one returnee living in a rehabilitation camp explained.

> I am troubled, and I continue to be afraid for my life. I cannot go back to living with my community since they are very angry with me and have threatened to kill me if I try to do so. I am unable to do so.
>
> - (Interview with a returnee in Jomvu, August 27, 2022).

There are cases where the communities are unwilling to admit or accept them back since, in the eyes of these communities, they are considered armed groups. Additionally, the Deputy County Commissioner interviewed noted.

> Threats to the returnees' ability to successfully reintegrate into their society are posed by the persistent dread in some communities and the derogatory titles given to returnees, such as "killers" or "Al-Shabaab".
>
> - (Interview with DCC in Kisauni, August 27, 2022).

6.7 Weak or Lack of Policy Guidelines on Non-custodial Rehabilitation

The respondents were asked to evaluate the efficacy of the policies and procedures for the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County.

Policy Guidelines

- Lowest — 15.40%
- Low — 5.20%
- Moderate — 30.80%
- High — 28.20%
- Highest — 20.50%

Rating Level

Figure 6. 8: *Weak / lack of policy guidelines*

Source: Field data, (2022)

According to research results shown in Figure 6.8, 30.8% (104) of respondents said implementing the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County would be brutal because of the County's poor regulations. Another 28.2% (95) rated it as high, 20.5% (69) as highest, 15.4% (52) as lowest, and 5.2% (18) rated it as low.

Counter-terrorism strategies such as surveillance and military operations have proved futile in the long run, with the war on terror seen as having worsened the problem instead of improving it (Capriles, 2012). This is because policymakers neglect the unintended consequences of counter-terrorism policies while devising them. However, the non-custodial reintegration strategies established for rehabilitating and de-radicalizing ex-militants have proved promising, as they effectively deconstructed the radical ideals of the ex-militants and reintegrated them into society (Apikyang & Diamond, 2014).

Countering terrorism through non-custodial measures, therefore, requires a two-prolonged strategy, preventing susceptible individuals from getting radicalized and ensuring that

those who have been radicalized can be rehabilitated so that the propagation of extremist views and recidivism is mitigated. This innovative approach to counter-terrorism strategy entails rehabilitation, resettlement, and reintegration. The de-militarization mechanism is necessary to create an environment of trust and security between former belligerents and the host community, essential for any successful peace process.

The study also showed that Kenyan programs and services for returnee terrorist fighters place less emphasis on gender responsiveness. A lack of non-custodial reintegration policies, procedures, and practices are to blame. The study indicated that the demographic factors of poor educational attainment and poverty among the returnee terrorist fighters seemed to impact the current focus of reintegration programs offered by correctional services on vocational and technical training in prisons. In this sense, the focus is mainly on equipping the returnees with abilities that would affect their economic situation subsequently. During a key informer interview, a senior officer in charge of rehabilitation at *Shimo la Tewa Prison* in Mombasa reiterated:

> We do not have a policy paper approved for the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters. We started working on a policy several years ago. However, little has happened since the document was handed to the necessary government authorities to be tabled for consideration and approval by Parliament. Each prison facility decides what to start regarding vocational programming and counselling. However, our partners (NGOs and FBOs) provide us with significant assistance.

- (Interview with a Senior Prisons Officer at Prison Headquarters, Nairobi on September 2, 2022)

The survey also found no authorized policy document governing the non-custodial reintegration activities of the returnee terrorist fighters at the Kenya Prisons Services department. The Kenyan government widely reported 2001 prison reforms to appear to

have been primarily focused on human rights issues, addressing difficulties such as extreme overcrowding in the jail, lousy food, denial of due process and inability to receive legal help, and inadequate medical care, among other concerns (Miriti & Kimani, 2017) (Omboto, 2013). In a similar vein, the findings do not consider the gender mainstreaming policy adopted by the Kenyan government in 2006, which aims to increase equality and end gender-based discrimination in the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and programs in both the public and private sectors at all levels (Nyachieng, 2011).

Although not specific to facilities for women offenders, implementing the gender mainstreaming process is still challenging due to a variety of issues, including the government's lack of political will, a lack of staff awareness of gender-related issues, a lack of adequate funding and technical staff, and a lack of adequate training in these areas (Gatimu, C, 2014). Overall, as was already said in the debate, the creation and implementation of gender-responsive programming are receiving less attention. Policies and processes in the criminal justice system must be a top priority for internal control, according to Bloom, Owen, and Covington (2004). As a result, Trochim (2009) notes that policies play a significant role in directing decisions and behaviours within an organization.

For the well-being of the returnee terrorist fighters enrolled in non-custodial reintegration programs, the absence of policy suggests ad hoc techniques that might not be successful. Devoid of policies and processes, the correctional department will be unable to realize its vision and objectives for successfully reintegrating terrorist

offenders. The lack of documentation or a policy on non-custodial reintegration, which has resulted in discrepancies in the non-custodial reintegration of terrorist offenders in various correctional facilities, may be one cause, as was noted during the data-gathering exercise.

The study found that instead of viewing the efficiency of rehabilitation and reintegration as specified in the Prisons Act (GOK, 1977), correctional facilities tended to view it in terms of how well it would fit into their budget. The study also found that the "open-door" policy, which permits stakeholders to enter correctional facilities to support the government's efforts in rehabilitation, has produced less success in reintegrating terrorist offenders and other offenders generally than it would have if there were effective coordination of the reintegration activities by multiple interested parties and inclusivity to partnerships. The verbatim that follows gives an idea of the reality as seen by the FBO and NGO key informants:

> Since introducing the open-door policy in prisons in 2000, various organizations have entered to support the government's reform agenda. Despite the amazing work that various organizations have done in prisons, there are serious difficulties due to a lack of consistency and strategic direction. The stakeholders' incapacity to collaborate has led to program repetition and a lack of commitment to decisions made during the rare meetings, conferences, or workshops that did take place…. Unfortunately, even more, established groups have withdrawn after seeing that things are not going as anticipated. The fact that numerous critical entities occasionally give the government contradictory reports on rehabilitation and reintegration issues complicates our task. It adds another impediment to our capacity to collaborate.

- (Interview with NGO representative in Nyali on September 2, 2022)

The detailed quote raises a significant issue regarding stakeholders' responsibilities within correctional facilities. The open-door approach has instead resulted in various

initiatives in the penal facilities, most of which need more scientific evidence bases and hence have low successful outcomes. These groups include both NGOs and FBOs. As mentioned earlier, the statement also hints at unhealthy rivalry and a need for goodwill on the stakeholders' part in achieving their objectives. In summary, the lack of policy guidelines hinders the process even if organizations may have excellent intentions and solid ideas for rehabilitating returnee terrorism offenders.

6.8 Inadequate Funding and Reliance on Donors

Respondents were required to rate inadequate funding and reliance on donors' influence as a factor challenging implementing the non-custodial reintegration programs in Mombasa County. In response to the question, the findings in Figure 6.9 indicate that 35.9% of respondents rated it as a high influencer, 30.7% rated it as moderate, 10.3% as a low influencer, and 12.8% said it had the lowest influence.

In-adequate Funding

| Rating	Percentage
Lowest	12.80%
Low	10.30%
Moderate	30.70%
High	35.90%
Highest	10.30%

Rating of the influence

Figure 6. 9: Inadequate funding & reliance on donor

 Source: Field data, (2022)

Coordination and continuity among the implementers of the non-custodial reintegration programs have been challenging as the staff is frequently transferred due to insecurity. In addition, the lack of government funding poses a challenge since there are no budgetary allocations for the reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters. The non-custodial reintegration programs were thus entirely dependent on volunteers and donor funding, which is insufficient due to the increasing number of defections. Most of the donor funds come with underlying influence by the donors.

According to the qualitative research findings, the government's funding support for the Kenya Prisons Services needed to be more comprehensive to cover all of the department's responsibilities, including creating non-custodial reintegration programs. The funding allotment is negligible for many reasons, including the rising number of returnees and terrorist fighters who surrender, which makes implementing meaningful and successful non-custodial reintegration programs challenging and nearly impossible. For instance, the then-Finance Minister reported in the 2004 budget address while responding to concerns regarding the financial allocation for the prisons department; he reiterated that the government would lessen cell overcrowding in prisons by enhancing institutional cooperation between the legal system, the attorney general's office, the prison system, the police, and the departments in charge of youngsters on probation. Additionally, community service with increased corrective supervision will be used to penalize minor infractions. One informant stated the following:

> It is difficult to successfully plan and provide the necessary materials for the programs already in place and develop new strategies because there are too many people.
> - (Interview with Key informant in Mvita on September 3, 2022)

The low budget may explain the lack of research on practical techniques for reintegration, staff training, and the creation of new pertinent programs and treatment approaches that align with the returnees' paths to criminality. The findings of other studies (Fletcher et al., 2003; GOK, 2001) noted that limited budgetary allocations by governments to correctional facilities are a contributing factor to the appalling living conditions found in prisons, including the inability to provide meaningful services for efficient rehabilitation and reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, are consistent with the finding of this study regarding insufficient funding and reliance on donor support.

6.9 Human Rights Violation

The respondents were required to rate acts of violation of human rights as a factor that hinders effective implementation of the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County.

Human Rights Violation

Rating	Percentage
Lowest	5.20%
Low	17.90%
Moderate	20.40%
High	46.20%
Highest	10.30%

Rating of human rights violation

Figure 6. 10: Human rights violation

Source: Field data, (2022)

The study's findings presented in Figure 6.10 reveal that 46.2% (156) of the respondents ranked human rights violations a high challenge in the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County. Another 20.4% (69) rated it moderate, 17.9% (60) as low, 10.3% (35) as highest, and the remaining 5.2% (18) rated it as the lowest challenge.

Kenya has approved several international agreements assuring the observance of human rights in prisons. Its 2010 Constitution also included most of the important international human rights tenets. However, despite having a complete legal framework, the execution of human rights enforcement mechanisms still needs to be improved in Kenya, according to reports from the International Justice Observatory study from 2016 (Randazzo, 2016). Human rights breaches are more likely to occur in Kenyan rehabilitation and reintegration facilities due to this subpar execution. This initiative, titled "Strengthening Human Rights inside Correctional Facilities in Kenya," seeks to end all human rights abuses in Kenya's imprisonment and custody facilities.

Non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters are essential to the administration of justice since they aim to not only detain the offenders but also provide them a chance to be rehabilitated. Preventing recidivism and ensuring that terrorist offenders leave the program at the end of the rehabilitation time, able and willing to contribute to the welfare of the broader community, should be the primary goals of non-custodial reintegration programs worldwide. The achievement of these goals depends on the host community. These programs uphold human rights and international norms, which is vital for guaranteeing the dignity and rights of returnees enrolled in the programs, regardless of their prior transgressions. This group of people is especially susceptible since

they are enrolled in non-custodial reintegration programs and live in areas where state officials and community members may profile them at their leisure because they are still viewed as criminals.

The treatment of returnees is primarily a function of many factors, including host-community economic standing, observance of human rights in other areas and for all vulnerable populations, cultural attitudes towards criminal behaviour, and a culture of violence. Due to this, one of the most incredible activists, philanthropists, and politicians of our time, Nelson Mandela, sums up this fundamental tenet in one of his best-known speeches given in 1998 while serving as President of South Africa: "How a people treat its prisoners is one of the clearest representations of its character."

In Mombasa County, there are both male and female returnee terrorist fighters. The female returnees experience insecurity at the rehabilitation facilities and struggle to reintegrate into society or obtain employment. It is important to address human rights breaches when people arrive in rehabilitation centers with dependents, especially when young children are present. Furthermore, it is challenging for females to live when they cannot regain protection from their clans or communities or their communities themselves. In contrast to their male counterparts, they find it challenging to return to urban areas. It was demonstrated through the non-custodial reintegration programs, notably in the Mvita Constituency, that the project's objective was to protect returnees' human rights. This was done by encouraging policy dialogue, lobbying, and support of Kenyan Human Rights Defenders (HRDs), all of which were necessary for the successful implementation of the project. The programs emphasize the reformation and integration of returnees by enhancing the function of HRDs and their engagement with other authorities through an inter-agency

approach, as well as by enhancing monitoring processes in non-custodial reintegration institutions. This is accomplished through a combination of measures. Because the Mvita Constituency is home to the city center of Mombasa and the commercial harbor of the coastal town, it has accomplished this goal.

6.10 Poor Investigation

The respondents were required to rate poor investigation as a factor affecting the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County.

Figure 6. 11: Poor investigation

**Source:** Field data, (2022).

It is evident from the findings in Figure 6.11 that poor investigation was ranked moderate challenge to the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County by 48.7% (164) of the respondents. Another 30.8% (104) of them rated it as high, 15.3% (52) as low, and 2.6% (9) as highest, while another 2.6% (9) rated it as the lowest challenge.

According to the facts gleaned from key informant interviews, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which had its most recent iteration in 2014, was still being utilized by the Kenyan government to investigate and punish acts of terrorism. The investigation found that trials involving terrorism cases usually proceeded sluggishly and inefficiently. Most delays are caused by court schedules that are already full and a lack of current trials. In addition, the poll results demonstrated that the three divisions of the National Security Service are responsible for distinct parts of anti-terrorist work. First is the Kenya Police Service, which is made up of the General Service Unit, traffic police, regional, County, and local police, as well as a paramilitary component; the second is the Administration Police; and the third is the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, which includes the Border Police Unit and houses the investigating Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, Bomb Disposal Unit, and Cyber Forensics Investigative Unit.

Accountability was also shared between the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the interagency Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the National Intelligence Service. Uneven coordination, restricted budgets, a dearth of training opportunities, and a lack of clear command and control all contribute to a lack of clarity that makes it difficult to conduct effective investigations into potential terrorist threats. The National Counter-terrorism Center (NCTC) of Kenya continued working with commercial security services to prevent attacks on easy targets. The study also revealed that government authorities in Kenya make an effort to obstruct the movement of terrorist fighters, such as Kenyan nationals who are attempting to join terrorist organizations like ISIS or AS or who are returning to Kenya from fighting abroad. Positively, Kenyan security forces have also successfully discovered and thwarted terrorist plots and responded to numerous instances related to terrorism.

6.11 Media Actions Glorifying Terrorists

Respondents were also required to rate media glorification of terrorism as a challenge facing the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County.

Figure 6. 12: Media glorifying terrorism

Source: Field data, (2022).

The study findings presented in Figure 6.12 reveal that 35.9% (121) of the respondents rated media reports glorifying terrorists as the highest challenge facing the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County. Another 28.2% (95) of them rated it as a high challenge, 20.5% (69) as moderate, and 10.2% (34) as low, while 5.2% (18) rated the factor to contribute the lowest challenge.

Given that one of the goals of terrorist acts is to gain as much attention as possible to influence public opinion, there has been some correlation between terrorism and media coverage. Key informants reported that the media's portrayal of Al-Shabaab as both a sophisticated and advanced organization gave the impression that the organization was superior. The researcher saw that, despite specific news reports being genuine, there is a propensity for terrorists to use media coverage as leverage to feel more powerful and

valiant in their actions, creating the impression that they can easily outwit the government's security machinery.

The media coverage accorded to terrorists affects how the host community perceives and receives the returnees into society. This would then impact the success of the non-custodial reintegration programs for the returnee terrorist fighters into the community. Public opinion is shaped in a certain way regarding future responses towards terrorist activities, thereby developing mistrust of the community to the returnee's possibility of wedging an attack on them. The media creates a complex link between government agencies, the public, and terrorists. This relationship is usually complemented by how journalists report on news concerning terrorism. The way journalists formulate, frame, and present news, how they describe the violent attacks, how to prime the news about terrorist acts, and how they emphasize the news has a significant impact on terrorist activities in the future (Paletz & Schmid, 1992).

While the media has the prime duty to inform the public, it is common knowledge that security officers hold classified information. This means that the information is held sensitive. It is therefore important for them to maintain a close and warm working relationship with the media to avoid improper disclosure of sensitive information that the enemy would otherwise use to cause harm, injure or damage the country's reputation. Therefore, information concerning the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters should be utilized responsibly and with care without compromising the lives of security officers, journalists, returnees, survivors of terror attacks, or an ongoing security operation (Media Council of Kenya, 2016).

Having the police and military hold frequent briefing meetings with media journalists helps to create a synergy of working together and enabling the media to act effectively as a force multiplier to the security actors' efforts. The researcher also believes that having joint training on information management between the journalists and the security actors would be the best approach to bridging the mistrust between security actors and media journalists. Regular, consistent, and credible information sharing on the process and stages of security operations can help improve or create a healthy working relationship and improve access to information or volunteering by security forces, translating into responsible media reportage (Media Council of Kenya, 2016).

6.12 Poor Early Warning System for Counterterrorism

Respondents were asked to rank the effectiveness of non-custodial reintegration programs for returned terrorist fighters in Mombasa County due to insufficient early warning systems on terrorism.


Figure 6. 13: Inadequate warning mechanism

Source: Field data, (2022)

According to the study results shown in Figure 6.13, the biggest obstacle to the successful non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County was, according to 48.5% (337) of respondents, the inadequate early warning system on terrorism. 30.7% (103) of the respondents gave it a high rating, 13.1% (44) a moderate rating, 5.2% (18) a bad rating, and 2.6% (9) the lowest rating.

In order to avoid violence (including violent extremism) before it occurs, early warning systems are defined as the routine and structured collecting and analysis of publicly available information on violent conflict situations by local, national, and international players (Subedi, 2017). This interpretation highlights that prompt action is the goal of an adequate early warning, so accepting that thorough data gathering and analysis can result in prompt action. Terrorist organizations today pose a threat to national security and the stability of the world. Effective early warning assists in keeping an eye out for prospective terrorists, quickly spotting those who may be turning radical, and assisting the government in enhancing security for those who are in danger and for specific locations. The development of global collaboration and information sharing in the fight against terrorism is a crucial component of the approach. Additionally, new organizational cultures and policies that aggressively encourage collaboration and information sharing must be implemented in place of the Intelligence Community's outdated and ineffective organizational bottlenecks for counter-terrorism initiatives to be more successful (Sullivan, 2005).

6.13 Refugees' Presence in the County

Respondents were lastly required to rate the presence of refugees as a challenge to the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County.

Presence of Refugees in the County

Lowest	2.60%
Low	5.20%
Moderate	7.70%
High	51.30%
Highest	33.20%

Level of impact

Figure 6. 14: Refugee Presence in the County

Source: Field data, (2022)

According to the survey results in Figure 6.14, 51.3% (173) of the respondents rated it a high challenge. 7.7% (26) gave it a mediocre rating, while 33.2% (112) gave it their highest rating. It was rated a low challenge by 5.2% (18) and the lowest by 2.6% (9). According to the report, refugees who come from countries with a high rate of terrorism and go to another nation as migrants have a significant role in spreading terrorism. According to estimates, there are currently more than 232 million migrants living abroad, accounting for more than 3% of the world's population (UCP, 2016). Global migration has significantly increased during the last few decades. International migration is a topic that has been discussed previously by academics and decision-makers, and it has long been a major concern on the security agenda of many nations (Rudolph, 2003). The argument about the connection between immigration and terrorism has been fanned by the participation of migrants, or their descendants, in several major terrorist occurrences of the last few decades.

According to past research, there is a greater chance of conflict spillover when there is a larger number of refugees from close-by war-torn nations (UCP, 2016). In response, if

immigrants are from nations where terrorism is a problem, terrorist organizations may be able to take advantage of the bonds between a group's members, which would subsequently encourage radicalization among migrants and develop a shared identity and ideological commitment. Eventually, this might result in more terrorism (Perliger & Pedahzur, 2011; Sageman, 2004). Corruption has contributed to terrorism in Kenya, among other things. From Ethiopia, Somalia, and Southern Sudan, many illegal immigrants enter Kenya. By offering bribes to border-crossing immigration officers, these illegal immigrants purchase their entry into Kenya. When they come to Kenya, they use corruption to obtain identification cards. In Kenya, these undocumented immigrants are employed to carry weapons and recruit terrorists (Thuranira, 2007).

This explains why Mombasa County, situated at the border of Somalia, has reported more incidences of terror attacks and radicalization leading to recruitment to terrorism. Mombasa County is near the Gedo region of southern Somalia, which has been infested with terror activities over the last two decades. Due to past regimes, Mombasa County and other coastal regions suffered marginalization, resulting in an economic slowdown (Rakodi et al., 2000).

The youngsters of Mombasa County have been subjected to repeated extremist preaching from radical Islamist groups and radio broadcasts operating from within Somalia due to their proximity to the Al-Shabaab terrorist backyard. Due to these, the County has been exposed and socialized to radical messages that influenced the youth negatively. Many local populations have become sympathizers of the radical Islamist views. One of the deadliest outbreaks of violent extremism in recent Kenyan history may have occurred in the County. Mombasa, a seaside city in Kenya, has been identified as one of the country's

hotspots for violent extremism and radicalization. Numerous estimates place the number of returnees in Kenya's coastline region at least 1,000 (Mkutu, 2019).

This study, therefore, urges state actors to implement stringent measures to prevent the use of identity papers and travel documents that have been falsified, counterfeited, or otherwise fraudulently obtained, as well as to ensure effective border controls and controls on the issuance of identity papers and travel documents to migrants coming from countries with a history of armed conflict.

6.14 Opportunities for Non-custodial Reintegration Programs for Returnee Terrorist Fighters in Mombasa

Even though non-custodial reintegration programs confront several obstacles, the current environment also provides several opportunities that can be investigated to improve the programs' efficiency in the welfare of returnees who participated in terrorist fighting. When improved, non-custodial reintegration programs can play a significant role in supporting the successful reintegration of terrorist fighters who have returned to Mombasa, Kenya, from other countries. The chance provides persons who have returned from conflict zones with practical support in order to assist them in rebuilding their lives and avoiding re-engaging in violent extremism. At the same time, the opportunity addresses the underlying causes of radicalization and violent extremism. In Mombasa, Kenya, some of the potential opportinities for effective non-custodial reintegration programs for returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) include the following:

6.14.1 Providing Vocational Training and Job Opportunities

One of the elements that can lead to further radicalization is the absence of economic possibilities for terrorist combatants who have returned home from fighting overseas. This is because one of the primary obstacles that returnees encounter is the lack of employment prospects, which can lead to emotions of dissatisfaction and isolation, as well as an increased likelihood of being radicalized. Non-custodial reintegration programs can assist returnees in gaining new skills, earning a living, and providing for their families by providing vocational training and work opportunities. This helps facilitate the successful reintegration of returnees into society and makes it easier for them to be accepted back into society.

Overall, vocational training and jobs are critical components of non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee foreign terrorist fighters in Mombasa. By providing these opportunities, the programs can help address the lack of employment opportunities, promote self-sufficiency, restore a sense of purpose and belonging, and facilitate social reintegration, which is crucial in the successful reintegration of returnees into society.

6.14.2 Providing Psychological Support to the Returnees

Many returnees may have experienced traumatic events abroad, including exposure to violence, torture, and other forms of abuse. These experiences can significantly impact their mental health, making them vulnerable to further radicalization and re-engagement in violent extremism. Incorporating psychological support into non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters can help to address their mental health needs and promote successful reintegration into society. Psychological support can enhance non-custodial reintegration programs for the returnees in different ways. Psychological support

can help returnees address the trauma associated with their experiences, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, and depression. By providing a safe and supportive environment for returnees to express their emotions and feelings, psychological support can help them to cope with traumatic experiences and avoid re-engaging in violent extremism as a coping mechanism.

Psychological support can help returnees to build resilience and develop coping mechanisms to deal with challenges and stressors. By providing training on stress management, conflict resolution, and other life skills, psychological support can help returnees to build their capacity to deal with the challenges of reintegration. Psychological support can help returnees to develop social and emotional skills, such as empathy, communication, and problem-solving, that are critical for successful reintegration. By training these skills, psychological support can help returnees build positive relationships with others and become more engaged in their communities. Psychological support is, therefore, a critical component of non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa, Kenya. By addressing trauma, building resilience, improving social and emotional skills, and addressing mental health stigma, psychological support can help returnees to overcome the challenges of reintegration and build successful, productive lives.

6.14.3 Providing Access to Education for the Returnees

Education is a critical factor in preventing radicalization and promoting social cohesion. Non-custodial reintegration programs can provide returnees access to education, including literacy and numeracy classes and religious education, promoting peaceful and tolerant interpretations of religion. By providing access to education, non-custodial reintegration

programs can help returnees to build new skills, expand their horizons, and build positive relationships with others. By providing basic literacy and numeracy skills, non-custodial reintegration programs can help returnees to build the foundation they need to access other educational and vocational opportunities. Non-custodial reintegration programs can provide vocational training in various skills, including carpentry, tailoring, and computer skills. This can help returnees build marketable skills to access employment opportunities and contribute to their communities.

Education is, therefore, a critical component of non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa, Kenya. By providing access to basic literacy and numeracy skills, vocational training, religious education, critical thinking skills, and promoting social cohesion, education can help returnees to build new skills, expand their horizons, and become more engaged in their communities. This can help to prevent re-engagement in violent extremism and promote social cohesion.

6.14.4 Facilitating Community Engagement

Community engagement can help returnees to reintegrate into society and build positive relationships with their neighbors. Non-custodial reintegration programs can facilitate community engagement by connecting returnees with local organizations and religious leaders and organizing cultural and social events. Community engagement is crucial to enhancing non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee foreign terrorist fighters in Mombasa. In this context, community engagement refers to the active participation of individuals, groups, and organizations in developing and implementing reintegration programs to rehabilitate and reintegrate returnees into their communities.

Community engagement can enhance non-custodial reintegration programs by creating a sense of ownership and accountability among community members. Community members become more invested in the program's success when actively involved in the reintegration process. They are more likely to support and participate in its implementation. This can build trust between returnees and their communities and reduce the risk of recidivism.

Community engagement can also help identify and address the specific needs and challenges returnees and their families face. By engaging with community members, reintegration programs can gain insights into the cultural, social, and economic factors affecting the program's success. This can help tailor the program to meet the specific needs of returnees and their families and ensure that it effectively achieves its goals.

Additionally, community engagement can help to counter the stigmatization and marginalization that returnees often face upon their return to their communities. By involving community members in reintegration, the program can promote greater understanding and acceptance of returnees and reduce the risk of discrimination and exclusion. Community engagement is a valuable opportunity for enhancing non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee foreign terrorist fighters in Mombasa. By involving community members in developing and implementing reintegration programs, these programs can be more effective in rehabilitating and reintegrating returnees into their communities and reducing the risk of recidivism.

6.14.5 Promoting Family Reunification

Promoting family reunification is crucial for enhancing non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa, Kenya. Many terrorist fighters may have left their families behind when they went abroad to join extremist groups, causing

significant emotional and psychological distress for the returnees and their family members. Family reunification can provide a support network for returnees and reduce the risk of re-engagement in violent extremism. By promoting family reunification, non-custodial reintegration programs can help to address these issues and promote successful reintegration. Reconnecting with family members can provide emotional support to returnees, who may have felt isolated and alone abroad. By reuniting with their families, returnees can receive emotional support that can help them overcome the reintegration challenges.

Promoting family reunification is critical to non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa, Kenya. Providing emotional support, addressing stigma, providing a sense of belonging, addressing family dynamics, and addressing child protection issues, promoting family reunification can help to promote successful reintegration and prevent re-engagement in violent extremism.

6.15 Chapter Summary

Non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters is a unique concept because it does not emphasize the prosecution of defectors. Although the returnees may have a long history of atrocities, they are rehabilitated and reintegrated into the community. It does not promote activities such as military prosecution and even prosecution of the defectors in the International Court of Criminal Justice. Instead, the communities are encouraged and empowered to welcome their brothers or sisters who have defected from the militia terror groups and to host them at all costs (Mumma-Martinon, C A; Ododa, Opiyo, 2019).

Other than the challenges of lack of clear definition of terrorist, public sympathy with terrorists, high unemployment level among the youths, high poverty level of communities within the County, existing extremist ideologies propagated by jihadist preachers, radicalization and violent extremism activities, media reports glorifying terrorists, other challenges were noted as an impediment to successful non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County.

Due to the stigma associated with terrorism, a lack of trust exists. Communities may not trust individuals involved in terrorist activities, making it difficult to reintegrate them into society. The social stigma associated with terrorism can make it difficult for individuals to find employment or housing, hindering their reintegration efforts.

Lack of adequate funding is also a challenge. Non-custodial reintegration programs require adequate resources, including funding, staff, and infrastructure. If these resources are limited, the programs may not be effective. Due to the impact of radicalization, returnee terrorist fighters may still hold extremist beliefs, making it challenging to reintegrate them into society and ensure they do not engage in terrorist activities again. This then raises security concerns. Ensuring the safety of both the returnee and the community can be challenging, mainly if the individual is considered a security risk.

Lastly, effective non-custodial reintegration programs require coordination between multiple government agencies, community organizations, and other stakeholders. If coordination is lacking, the programs may not be effective. Due to this, non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee foreign terrorist fighters can be challenging to implement and require careful planning, coordination, and resources to be effective. The County government of Mombasa must put in place the necessary tools to handle these

issues to enable the development of effective policies and programs that uphold human rights.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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7.1 Summary of Findings

Terrorism has often been used as a weapon by non-state actors like liberation movements and other clandestine organizations fighting for recognition to advance a different agenda or ideology. Addressing the threat of terrorism and recidivism call for innovative and creative ways, and that is why non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee offers a unique opportunity to address the re-radicalization, recidivism, and violent extremism by enhancing family resilience and the involvement of community-driven programs.

7.1.1 Nature of Non-custodial Reintegration Programme for Returnee Terrorist Fighters

According to the study, reintegrating returned foreign fighters and terrorists who still maintain an intellectual commitment to the cause will be much more difficult and complex than reintegrating returnee foreign fighters and terrorist offenders who have made amends. The people do not acknowledge the authority of governmental and conventional religious institutions, and they commonly oppose punishments and financial incentives designed to encourage them to pursue meaningful employment. This is because the people do not accept the legitimacy of traditional religious organizations. When radical beliefs are ingrained for a long time, locating interlocutors who are believable to the returnees, and acceptable actors to the authorities can be difficult.

However, the knowledge that not all returnees are good candidates for non-custodial reintegration programs should not diminish the programs' overall legitimacy and substantial advantages. Instead, it should emphasize how crucial it is to thoroughly assess applicants before and after reintegrating into society, emphasizing those who appear to gain the most from the programs. Regarding objective one on the nature of the non-custodial reintegration program for the returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, the study found that in the process of non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters, communication plays a critical role in providing a forum within which to engage and examine the history of the conflict. The study revealed that thoughtful, consistent, balanced, and accurate communication helps to set positive expectations and build confidence in both the returnee and host community during peacebuilding and reintegration. In addition to the global and regional backdrop, Kenya is currently dealing with the problem of violent extremism and tension.

The study revealed that the government's use of security forces fighting terrorism head-on to combat the militia groups was the most effective. Another strategy the government has utilized to combat terrorism that has received high praise is the arrest and punishment of terrorists. In contrast to extrajudicial killings, arresting and prosecuting suspected terrorists and their supporters restore civility in society. However, ministerial pardons for terrorists who surrender have remained ineffective since most people who have returned to their home countries are hesitant to do so because of concern that the security services may execute them extrajudicially.

Returnees face the additional hardship of being shunned by the community, which continues to regard them as potentially harmful and places them in the category of social

outcasts. It has been discovered that monitoring and intercepting money transactions is effective as a preventive action against funding and sponsoring the recruitment of returnees back to the terror gangs. Preventing terrorism using the Anti-terrorism Act provides measures for both the detection and prevention of recidivism by the returnees after the surrender and getting involved in the non-custodial reintegration programs.

7.1.2 Effectiveness of Non-Custodial Reintegration of Returnee Terrorist Fighters

According to the findings of the study, the most successful methods in the fight against terrorism in Kenya and the region as a whole include adopting a multi-agency strategy for non-custodial reintegration and producing income-generating activities. These are both efforts that are being undertaken as part of the efforts being made by the government. This conclusion was a response to the second aim, which asked about the impact of non-custodial reintegration programs on the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County. The multi-agency approach promotes efficiency and coordination among all key actors in the non-custodial reintegration process. The creation of income-generating activities to support the returnee during the reintegration process was effective since it helped to engage the returnee in meaningful, productive work. Some of the jobs that the returnees have been engaged in include tailoring, welding, and other casual employment. A few returnees with professional training have also worked within NGOs and community-based organizations.

The intricacies of the ongoing conflict in Somalia influence how well the non-custodial reintegration programs in Mombasa County can assist returning militants in successfully transitioning back into society. As long as peace and stability in Somalia continue to be elusive, as long as the Al-Shabaab war continues to claim lives and create a large number

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of refugees, and as long as reactive terrorist attacks continue outside the conflict zone, the process of non-custodial reintegration of returnees in Mombasa County will face increased tensions and difficulties. The returnees come from a country with elusive peace and stability. The government of Kenya has to devote a greater amount of time and energy to these extremely important programs.

The terms "aftercare," "transitional care," "re-entry support," "reintegration," or "resettlement" have all been used to describe post-release community-based treatments in recent years. Some post-release treatments for returnee terrorist fighters get started while offenders are still in jail or prison to help them adjust after release. Controlling convicts' re-entry into society is being given more attention in various nations. Re-entry usually takes place after a prison term. However, it may also happen sooner as part of a conditional release program, sometimes with official supervision and others without monitoring or help. Effective aftercare programs can lower the proportion of returnees who commit crimes again by assuring their successful reintegration into society and their abstinence from criminal activity. Fewer terrorist offenders will return to jail, appear in court once again, contribute to overcrowding there, and overall increase the expenses of the criminal justice system if their effective reintegration into society.

The welfare and needs of returnees and those of the entire society are ultimately addressed by holistic and comprehensive non-custodial reintegration programs, essential in creating more resilient and secure communities by guiding returnees away from religious militancy and toward a nonviolent and tolerant way of life.

7.1.3 Challenges Facing Non-Custodial Reintegration Programmes on the Welfare of the Returnee Terrorist Fighters in Mombasa

To evaluate the non-custodial reintegration programs, the study examined the challenges and opportunities for the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya. One of the most outstanding challenges in addressing this problem has been how to undertake and sustain the process that has to do with the reintegration of reformed and returnee combatants who have been involved in the activities of certain terrorist organizations. Approximately 700 Kenyan Al-Shabaab recruits left the terrorist organization after discovering that the contract the Al-Shabaab gave them was not as profitable as was promised, according to a report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), at least by 2016. In addition, several returnees, mostly between the ages of 24 and 34, suffered brain traumas, amputated limbs, and other undisclosed body ailments. In a separate Daily Nation article, Mwakimako and Shauri of Pwani University examined the government's amnesty program for Al-Shabaab returnees. Many were afraid to go to the police since there were no clear rules governing how they would be handled (Mwakimako, 2016).

Government efforts to educate the public about the value of reintegration programs for terrorist fighters who have returned to society through civic engagement have not been very successful. Due to the large geographic region that public education needs to cover, it has not proven successful. Mombasa County is divided into six sub-counties, each remote and has a difficult infrastructural network that makes it difficult for civic educators to move about. Since some areas of the County still have significant levels of illiteracy, there is also a restriction on the breadth of the language barrier.

The study found that returnee terrorist fighters experience particular psychological requirements that exacerbate their engagement in crimes and increase their likelihood of recidivism. After the surrender, convicts are expected to go through reintegration and punishment, keeping them safe in the community. According to the survey, most returnee terrorist fighters described challenging life conditions as the reason behind their delinquent behaviour. Many returnees disclosed victimization experiences, dysfunctional family dynamics, parental anxiety, and decreased self-efficacy. Some of the returnees experienced psychiatric and psychological morbidity issues, such as mental illnesses brought on by post-traumatic stress disorder, substance use and misuse, personality disorders, and self-harm, mostly impacted by the conditions of their lives.

7.2 Conclusion

Given the rise in demand for reintegration capacity, the issues and knowledge gaps identified in this study need to be addressed as soon as possible. This study makes policymakers, practitioners, and academics aware of these challenges. It is hoped that the study will make it possible to approach the non-custodial reintegration of terrorism offenders and extremists with more assurance and a greater chance of actually and measurably reducing the danger of recidivism.

7.2.1 Nature of Non-Custodial Reintegration of Returnee Terrorist Fighters in Mombasa County

Most non-custodial punishments aim to enhance offender-community connections wherever possible to promote community safety. Instead of destroying these connections, they want to reinforce them. People who have strong ties to their community and who genuinely care about the people in their immediate environment are statistically less likely

to commit crimes in the future. The imposition of these punishments could also serve the purpose of holding criminals accountable for their acts. It is possible for ex-offenders to successfully reintegrate into society with the assistance of programs that do not involve incarceration. These programs allow ex-offenders to accept responsibility for their actions, make amends, and change their behaviour. Consequently, they can assist criminals in preventing recurring relapses and engaging in illegal activities by allowing them to develop new skills, attitudes, and coping mechanisms. The best practices for reducing recidivism and promoting offenders' social integration use non-custodial sanctions.

When dealing with juvenile criminals, putting them in jail for any length of time and for the shortest amount of time possible should only be done as a last resort and by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international standards. Therefore, there should be other options besides going to jail. The availability of a wide variety of disposition measures, such as guidance and supervision orders, counselling, probation, foster care, education and vocational training programs, and other alternatives to institutional care, is required by international standards to ensure that children are treated with the care that is appropriate to their needs and proportionate to both their circumstances and the offense. This is to ensure that children receive treatment consistent with the child's best interests while also considering the gravity of the offense. When responding to juvenile transgressions, priority should be given to punishments and actions that can have an educational influence and function as a restorative reaction. These measures must be adapted to fit the several stages that juvenile offenders go through during their development.

According to the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Criminals (also known as the Bangkok Rules), female offenders should not be separated from their families and communities without first taking into consideration their upbringings and the nature of their familial relationships. Alternative techniques for dealing with female criminals, such as pretrial proceedings, diversionary measures, and alternative sentencing, should be employed wherever possible and appropriate. These approaches include diversionary measures, pretrial procedures, and alternative sentencing.

> "Women criminals must not be isolated from their families and communities without considering their history and family relationships. Pretrial and sentencing options and diversionary measures should be used wherever practicable and appropriate to manage women who commit crimes".
>
> - (Bangkok Rule 58).

When sentencing or choosing pretrial sanctions for mothers-to-be or the only or primary caregiver of a child, the same framework requires that non-custodial remedies be chosen whenever possible and appropriate. This is referred to as the "wherever practicable and appropriate" provision.

The study's findings indicate that, even though returnees' families and the general public want to see their loved ones, many conflicting concerns arise when returnee terrorist fighters reintegrate into society. These issues include stigma and the labeling of returnee terrorist fighters in an unfavorable light. The research also found insufficient systems to ensure that host communities are appropriately involved in reintegrating returnees into their communities. Because of this, the process is impeded by a lack of trust and negative stigma, which interferes with reintegrating ex-offenders into society outside of prison. The study's

findings can therefore be utilized to better formulate anti-radicalization policies and effective community-level initiatives for peacebuilding.

7.2.2 Effectiveness of Non-Custodial Reintegration Programmes on the Welfare of Returnee Terrorist Fighters in Mombasa County

Research has converged on addressing affective, social, and cognitive components to reintegrate persons into society. This is true of any endeavor that is made. In order to be successful, the non-custodial reintegration programs on the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County need to be based on an in-depth understanding of the specific social and cultural dynamics that led to the radicalization and recruitment of the offenders into terrorism. These programs also need to take into account the factors that caused the fighters to return home again. Developing an effective non-custodial reintegration program, therefore, requires multiple levels of research and a fusion of technical know-how with the knowledge and capabilities of the local community.

Additionally, a single concept of a non-custodial reintegration program cannot cover many cultural contexts. Cultural norms describe honor, shame, forgiveness, reconciliation, and societal and familial obligations. When successful programs are created by communities and guided by an awareness of local social norms, community relationships, and cultural traditions, they have a stronger influence and validity. The roles and influence of families, community leaders, and institutions and how communities interact and are constructed differ greatly.

For returns to successfully reintegrate, family members and communities must actively participate. In many respects, family and the community go through the reintegration process with the returnee and need support and help with aftercare. Non-custodial

reintegration is supported by strengthening family and community links. The importance of long-term psychosocial treatment, supervision, and specialized mentoring programs cannot be overstated. A person can gradually and non-linearly break their affiliation with a violent extremist group through non-custodial reintegration programs.

To be self-sustaining, Mombasa's non-custodial reintegration programs for return terrorist fighters have been created. Their goals are clear, and they have established the reliability of their partners. Clear metrics for success have been established thanks to these traits. Interlocutors have undergone thorough screening to reduce the risk of interlocutors advancing undemocratic or illiberal values or agendas that can be detrimental in the long run. Former members of violent extremist or extremist groups who now advocate nonviolence are participating in deradicalization programs in some community organizations, which is a valuable contribution to genuine rehabilitation and reintegration.

7.2.3 Challenges Facing Non-Custodial Reintegration Programmes of Returnee Terrorist Fighters in Mombasa County

The non-incarcerated reintegration into society of returning extremists and terrorist fighters will always be a difficult and contentious undertaking due to the nature of the individuals involved. It is highly possible that such a plan will be criticized strongly, and some people may perceive it as being "soft" on terrorists. The issue of what to do with extremists and terrorists who have been released from prison or returned from overseas conflicts is one that simply cannot be avoided, given the anticipated increase in the number of returning foreign fighters and the rate of "home-grown" radicalization, which includes radicalization of both an Islamist and right-wing kind.

People who have been through conflict usually have the emotional scars of being exposed to and participating in violence. This makes them more vulnerable to recidivism after enrolling in non-custodial reintegration programs, which is why it is important to address these emotional wounds. Non-custodial reintegration programs need to be designed in such a way that they can meet these challenges while also maintaining their professionalism, adaptability, interactivity, and sustainability; they also need to be able to cater to the specific needs of men, women, and children; and they need to be able to address the lingering effects of trauma that are associated with post-traumatic stress disorders.

Through re-socialization and aftercare programs, the primary goal of non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters is to lower the likelihood of recidivism among terrorist and extremist offenders. Non-custodial reintegration activities geared toward helping the program's so-called clients find employment, education, housing, and debt relief, as well as dealing with their psychological issues or mending relationships with their families, are crucial elements of this approach to enabling the welfare and livelihoods of the returnees.

7.2.4 Overall conclusion

The study's overall conclusion is that the employment of a multisectoral and multi-agency approach alongside participation and inclusion of community members in the non-custodial reintegration process is a key factor in ensuring sustainable and effective programs that impact the welfare of the returnee terrorist fighters. This will enable the nesting of non-custodial reintegration programs into large economic and social stability efforts at National and County governments to enhance structural plans in development, implementation, and evaluation.

7.3 Recommendations

To create and develop successful non-custodial programs to reintegrate convicted terrorists and former foreign combatants into society, this study offers numerous significant guiding concepts. A person's identification with a violent extremist group or identity is unlikely to be changed by theological re-education provided by the religious clergy. A difficult task for any deradicalization or preventative program is establishing secure, responsible, and efficient communication channels with reliable interlocutors supporting these efforts. Law enforcement must be involved when a threat of violence arises since they play a crucial, if not the primary, role in keeping communities safe. To ensure that participants have the chance to fully rehabilitate on their own, those civil society organizations aren't used as tools for gathering intelligence, and that participants' civil rights are fully respected, managers of non-custodial reintegration programs must maintain some distance from security actors.

Programs for non-custodial reintegration will have a better chance of success if they are integrated into wider initiatives for economic, social, and political reform and stability, particularly at the municipal and County levels of government. Suppose the local structural issues and grievances that encourage radicalization are not addressed. In that case, it is naive to anticipate that non-custodial reintegration programs will result in long-lasting and significant reintegration outcomes. As a result, the National Government needs to address the complaints of organizations like the *"Pwani Sio Kenya"* movement and other groups that assert they have been excluded in the Mombasa coastline region. To do that, it is necessary to ensure that reform of the security and justice sectors and good governance are given equal attention.

7.3.1 Nature of Non-Custodial Reintegration Programmes

More assistance for women in Mombasa County areas is desperately needed. Women are more susceptible to attacks, and because of the way that society views them, it is easier for them to be persuaded. In certain cases, these groups regard women as suitable tools for suicide bombs since they are less likely to arouse suspicion. They, therefore, require a lot of assistance.

To make the media work as a force multiplier in the war on terrorism, journalists must receive immediate and adequate training on how to report terrorist activities, and best practices, with core skills and areas limited to ethics, objectivity, and accuracy in gathering and reporting news concerning the non-custodial reintegration of the returnee terrorist fighters. Given the challenges posed by media reportage glorifying terrorists, the study recommends that the media fraternity draft and adopt a policy framework that encourages professional journalism related to the reportage of terrorist activities. The policy would reduce the effects of the challenges posed by the media in the reportage on non-custodial reintegration of the returnee terrorist fighters.

7.3.2 Effectiveness of Non-Custodial Reintegration on the Welfare of Returnee Terrorist Fighters

On the effectiveness of the non-custodial reintegration programs on the welfare of the returnee, the study suggests the following:

The County government of Mombasa should strive to work with development partners to create employment for the youth who are largely found to be jobless and hence become easy targets for recruitment into militia gangs. Such opportunities, when made available,

will help the returnee terrorist fighters get meaningfully engaged in productive work when they get back to their communities during the reintegration process.

The reintegration stakeholders, such as human rights groups and activist groups, should employ active communication and consultations with the host communities to enhance public education and awareness of the roles and benefits of engaging the community members in the non-custodial reintegration programs for the returnee terrorist fighters. This is for a smooth transition to occur during reintegration and to help the communities accept the returnees, some of whom had harmed them in one way or another. The use of defectors as community liaison officers is also recommended. This is to build trust between the host communities and the returnees.

Community leaders and religious leaders are also encouraged since they enjoy the respect of their faithful, and the host communities may listen to them more. They may be very effective in civic education to create a positive attitude among the community to accept the returnees back to society and provide effective family support systems to the returnees.

An active, non-custodial reintegration plan is to be developed by the County Government of Mombasa for the returnee terrorist combatants. This is to be done by the National Action Strategy developed by the national government to combat the roots of violent extremism. According to the United Nations, every member state should develop a national action plan to combat violent extremism. This plan should define national priorities for addressing the regional roots of violent extremism.

7.3.3 Challenges Faced by Non-Custodial Reintegration Programmes for the Returnee Terrorist Fighters in Mombasa

Even though significant progress has been made in the battle against violent extremism in Mombasa County by implementing non-custodial reintegration programs for returning terrorist fighters, significant obstacles continue to stand in the way of even more achievement. Because of the high number of spiteful returnees, the non-custodial actors in the reintegration program face potential safety risks. Several ex-combatants, community elders, and reintegration workers have been killed mysteriously on suspicion of being government informants. Also, the hard power approach of the government on violent extremism has further polarized community-state relations. This has made it difficult for the affected family members of the ex-combatants to open up for fear of being victimized by the security actors. Communities blame the police for many killings and disappearances of community members suspected of associating with some returnees who surrendered on their own (Bogah, 2018).

All non-custodial reintegration initiatives should be guided by a set of principles, even as it is acknowledged that specific, context- and conflict-sensitive techniques must be developed to address the obstacles of non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters. Political leaders must convince the public and community of the benefits of non-custodial reintegration programs. These programs need to address all signs of violent extremism and radicalization that can lead to terrorism in order to be effective. The focus should be placed on refraining from violent behaviour (changing one's actions) rather than deradicalization (changing one's views), even though it is important not to overlook the ideological concepts held by an individual.

To maintain the proportionality and continuity of non-custodial reintegration activities, multi-agency, and multisectoral involvement are also crucial for creating effective reintegration programs. This approach should avoid giving the idea that those who benefit from the non-custodial reintegration programs are receiving preferential treatment while navigating and reducing stigma. It is imperative to the success of the non-custodial reintegration programs that communities participate in and support the programs in some way; therefore, efforts should be taken to prepare and engage communities. Because women and children are the most susceptible to being affected by terrorism and are at the greatest risk of being influenced by it, non-custodial reintegration plans should be sensitive to the needs of women and children and fulfill the frequently special requirements that they have. Therefore, the programs should draw on the capacities and structures of the family and community while bolstering them as needed. A theory of change should be included in all non-custodial reintegration programs. This has the advantage of making it easier to evaluate the effects of the process on the well-being of returnees after they have been reintegrated into the community. It is necessary to assist in exile for him to meaningfully integrate with the community.

It is imperative that the roles played by religious leaders in the non-custodial reintegration of returned terrorist fighters be accorded the utmost significance and that the role of religion is given significant consideration. In addition to supporting religious actors in their roles as effective political advocates in addressing the political dynamics that contribute to violent extremism and as potential middlemen with extremists, the government ought to acknowledge that religious actors have a unique role to play in providing psychological and social support to individuals who are at risk of being recruited by extremist groups.

This is especially important given that many individuals susceptible to recruitment are members of religious groups (Abbey-Quaye, 2018). Religious leaders need to take a substantial role in assisting with the correct interpretation and study of the scriptures to reduce the likelihood that the scriptures would be exploited in the future for radicalization. Young people in Africa are more likely to experience social isolation, social disconnection, and economic discrimination than their counterparts in other regions. Football tournaments are a well-known example of sporting events frequently organized to keep young people engaged in useful activities. These gatherings also provide wonderful opportunities to teach young people about the harmful implications of radicalization and violent extremism and offer them other possibilities for addressing their complaints and unhappy situations. In addition, these events provide fantastic opportunities to educate young people about the negative consequences of radicalization and violent extremism.

On available opportunities for improvement of the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters, various ways of improving the existing programs were identified. This included the proposal to conduct an assessment of the needs of all returnee terrorist fighters based on issues that led them to recruitment to crime; conduct of capacity building training for key community leaders and other stakeholders on how to manage and effect non-custodial reintegration programs for returnee terrorist fighters and lastly, permit more cooperation and joint ventures with other NGO's and FBO's active in the host communities. These were supported by the results of the interviews with the stakeholders involved in the non-custodial reintegration programs for the returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County and the officers in charge of the correctional facilities.

Based on their interactions with community organizations and other religious organizations, the majority of respondents to the survey believed that the best way to strengthen non-custodial reintegration programs was through improved collaboration with like-minded partners and stakeholders (notably Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims). These organizations significantly support the government's efforts to rehabilitate, integrate, and enhance the living circumstances of the returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County. To create and use evidence-based approaches for the non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters, the study underlined the importance of collaboration and partnerships. The Department of Corrections ought to work together with any parties that are pertinent in order to support the government's efforts in rehabilitation and reintegration. The findings on the call for cooperation between the Department of Prisons and stakeholders are consistent with prior calls made in the past, and this request is no exception.

Collaboration among the many players involved in offender rehabilitation is necessary and an important technique for achieving good results in the field. This is especially true because the government is handicapped in effectively rehabilitating criminal offenders inside and outside of prisons due to a lack of financial and human resources. This is true for both situations. Even if such cooperation may appear to be a milestone in implementing effective non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters, it is possible that this will not be accomplished without proper policy guidelines for the reintegration programs that set out clear policies and processes. As a result, it would seem that the government ought to use a structural plan in developing, putting into action, and evaluating the non-custodial reintegration programs and activities.

7.4 Suggestions for Further Research

After the study's results are presented, the researcher discovers more gaps that develop during or as a result of the research work. During the investigation, the researcher had a duty to present these gaps as they were seen in the field. We can research to fill these emerging gaps. This will complement the current study to fully address the issue under study. We advise additional research in the following areas:

i)   To improve the well-being of terrorist fighters who returned to Kenya, this study examined the effectiveness of non-custodial reintegration programs. Investigating additional distinct demands that cause returnees to engage in behaviours that result in recidivism and how to fulfil them may need comparative research.

ii)   The study advises research on contextualized non-custodial reintegration methods to effectively address the particular psychological requirements of returnee terrorist fighters in Kenya. Community-based initiatives aiming at treating the post-traumatic stress disorders the returnees encounter should be part of this.

iii)   To manage and treat returnee terrorist fighters effectively during the non-custodial reintegration process, the study advises doing a critical training needs assessment to identify any training shortages for correctional staff, reintegration actors, and host community leaders. This might guarantee the creation of a training curriculum that emphasizes returns and crime rehabilitation models for convicted terrorists.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY

My name is Michael Osew Ngachra, and I am a PhD candidate at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST) researching the following topic:

"*Effectiveness of Non-Custodial Reintegration Programmes on Welfare Returnee Terrorist Fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya*"

You have been chosen to participate in the study by answering the following questionnaire because you are a significant stakeholder. This form contains crucial information regarding the purpose of the study, the requirements for participation, and how the researcher plans to utilize your personal data should you opt to participate in the study.

This study's goal is to assess how non-custodial programs employed in Mombasa County have helped returnee foreign terrorist fighters get back on their feet and integrate into society. A report of the findings will be issued at the end of the study, which is scheduled to run from January 2022 to March 2022. Your information will only be used for the study's academic goals because it is purely academic and will not be used in any other way.

Your knowledge will be crucial in helping to create and carry out policies that will support counterterrorism initiatives and programs for ex-foreign terrorist fighters who have returned home. Participation in this study will not be compensated in any way. However, the researcher will make sure you have a nice, roomy setting that makes it easy for you to comfortably answer the questions. Your information

will be used only for academic reasons and will be maintained in absolute confidence. In addition to not writing your name on any of the provided questionnaires, your identity will not be disclosed to anyone.

PARTICIPANT

1. I hereby attest to having read and comprehended the study's information sheet. I had the chance to analyze the facts, ask questions, and receive satisfactory answers to those questions.

2. I am aware that participation is completely optional and that I can withdraw at any time by notifying the researcher and without it having any negative effects on my rights.

Statement of Consent: I agree to take part in the research.

Your Signature _____ Date _____

Your Name _____

Name of the individual requesting consent is printed: **Michael Osew Ngachra**

Date _____

(After the study is finished, the researcher will keep this consent form for at least three more years).

APPENDIX II: UNIVERSITY APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL

MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MMUST)

Tel: 056-30870
Fax: 056-30153
E-mail: directordps@mmust.ac.ke
Website: www.mmust.ac.ke

P.O Box 190
Kakamega – 50100
Kenya

Directorate of Postgraduate Studies

Ref: MMU/COR: 509099

29th July 2022

Michael Osew Ngachra
CPC/H/04-54131/2019
P.O. Box 190-50100
KAKAMEGA

Dear Mr. Ngachira,

RE: APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL

I am pleased to inform you that the Directorate of Postgraduate Studies has considered and approved your PhD proposal entitled: *"Efficacy of Non-Custodial Reintegration programmes on Returnee Foreign Terrorist Fighters' Welfare in Mombasa County Kenya."* and appointed the following as supervisors:

1. Prof. Kennedy Onkware   - SDMHA - MMUST
2. Dr. Susan Kimokoti   - SDMHA - MMUST

You are required to submit through your supervisor(s) progress reports every three months to the Director of Postgraduate Studies. Such reports should be copied to the following: Chairman, School of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Graduate Studies Committee and Chairman, Department of Peace and Conflicts Studies. Kindly adhere to research ethics consideration in conducting research.

It is the policy and regulations of the University that you observe a deadline of two years from the date of registration to complete your PhD thesis. Do not hesitate to consult this office in case of any problem encountered in the course of your work.

We wish you the best in your research and hope the study will make original contribution to knowledge.

Yours Sincerely,

Prof. Stephen O. Odebero, PhD, FIEEP
DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

APPENDIX III: NACOSTI PERMIT

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: 375440

Date of Issue: **17/August/2022**

RESEARCH LICENSE

This is to Certify that Mr.. Michael Osew Ngachra of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, has been licensed to conduct research in Mombasa on the topic: Efficacy of Non-Custodial Reintegration Programmes on Returnee Foreign Terrorist Fighters\' Welfare in Mombasa County, Kenya for the period ending : 17/August/2023.

License No: **NACOSTI/P/22/19762**

375440

Applicant Identification Number

Director General
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION

Verification QR Code

NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document,
Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.

APPENDIX IV: QUESTIONNAIRE INSTRUMENT

SECTION 1: Biographical Information of Respondents

(Please respond by either checking the box inside the brackets (✓) or by putting your answer in the area provided).

1. Age: …………………
2. Level of education:

Class 8 level	Form Four level	College level	University level

3. Marital status:

      Single ( )   Married ( )   Separated or Divorced ( ) Widowed ( )

4. What was your occupation before joining the terror group?

     i.   Business (Jua Kali) ( )   iii.   Student ( )

     ii.   Farmer ( )   iv.   Housewife ( )

     v.   Other (specify)……………………………………………………………

5. Reason for being in joining terror group: (Kindly specify)

………………………………………………………………………………………….

6. How long have you been a terrorist fighter?

     i.   0-3 years ( )   iii.   7-9 years   ( )

     ii.   4-6 years ( )   iv.   Over 10 years ( )

SECTION 2: **Psychological Requirements of Returnee Terrorist Fighters**

Trauma-related victimization, dysfunctional relationships, parental sorrow, low self-esteem, and efficacy are some of the psychological requirements of returnee terrorist fighters. Please select the appropriate box for your answer.

Sub-section I: Relationships within the original family (father, mother, and siblings)		
7.	How well do you get along with your family? (Father, mother, and siblings). i. Good (We don't disagree)　　( ) ii. Fair (On occasion, we disagree.)　( ) iii. Bad (We don't see eye to eye)　( )	

Please tick [✓] the correct box true for you.		**Yes**	**No**
8.	As a child, my parents would often argue and fight in front of me.		
9.	The atmosphere in our house was always serene and pleasant.		
10.	When you return from fighting terrorists, can you rely on your family for help getting things going?		

Sub-Section II: Individual Self-Esteem.

How you evaluate yourself in comparison to others OR how you believe others view or evaluate you.

Please tick (✓) the response that best describes you.		**Strongly Agree**	**Agree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly Disagree**
11.	I am a valuable individual who is on an equal level with other people.				
12.	I believe I possess a lot of positive traits.				
13.	I think my life has been a waste.				
14.	Like others, I am competent in what I do.				
15.	I have not had a lot of cause for celebration.				
16.	I have a positive self-perception.				
17.	I am satisfied with myself.				
18.	I often make decisions that I come to regret.				
19.	I sometimes feel worthless.				

SECTION 3: Nature of Non-Custodial Reintegration Programmes for Returnee Terrorist Fighters in Kenya.

Sub-Section I: Non-custodial reintegration activities	
20. Which of the activities listed below are offered in the non-custodial reintegration program in your community you are taking part in?	Put (✓)
i. Training in computers	
ii. Primary Education Preparation for the KCPE (Standard 8)	
iii. Secondary Education: KSCE (Form 4) Exam Preparation	
iv. Farming - Training in horticulture	
v. Hairdressing	
vi. Catering Skills	
vii. Tailoring and dressmaking	
viii. Spiritual guidance	
ix. Individual /Group counselling e.g., on matters such as H.I.V, anger problems	
x. Any other………………………………………………….. (Please specify).	
Sub-Section II: Programs that are gender-responsive and consider the needs of returning women. (Women returnee terrorist fighters are the focus of treatment).	
21. Which of the following activities is provided by the non-custodial reintegration program in your area? Please mark (✓) the appropriate box. Please enter (X) in the box if the program is NOT available.	**Tick (✓) or (X)**
i. Mothers can take classes on how to take care of their children, including how to feed them, bathe them, correct bad behaviour, and choose toys.	
ii. Screening, first-level detoxification, and substance abuse treatment	
iii. Counselling for persons who have experienced sexual or physical abuse, HIV, etc.	
iv. Training in life skills, such as how to resolve disputes amicably, control one's emotions, handle stress, manage one's time effectively, etc.	
v. Skills for enhancing relationships with close friends and family members, such as their husbands or wives.	

SECTION 4: Do the Existing Programs for Non-Custodial Reintegration Meet the Needs of Returnee Terrorist Fighters?

Please tick (✓) where applicable		Yes	No
22	I was given information (orientation) on the non-custodial reintegration programs that are available when I first registered after returning from terrorist fighters during the first week.		
23	I received assistance in selecting a program that could help with my need(s), such as anger management, alcoholism, skill development for a job, etc.		

24. Why, in your opinion, do some returnee terrorist fighters NOT participate in the available non-custodial reintegration programs?

Please tick (✓) where applicable		Yes	No
i	There is insufficient equipment, such as computers and sewing machines.		
ii	The opportunity to take part has been declined or denied to them.		
iii	None of the programs are appealing to them, therefore they refuse to take part.		

SECTION 5: How to Make Non-Custodial Rehabilitation Programmes for Women Convicts Better

25. What, in your opinion, is THE MOST IMPORTANT method to guarantee the successful non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters?

Please check the option(s) (✓) below you consider to be MOST essential.		Tick (✓)
i	Educate the professionals in the field of rehabilitation on how to run/manage non-custodial reintegration programs	
ii	Evaluates needs and rehabilitate returned terrorist fighters in light of the problems that contributed to their criminal behaviour	
iii	Inform the public on the value of reintegrating returnee terrorist fighters outside of custody.	
iv	Increase the level of cooperation and partnerships with various stakeholders, including NGOs and Resources-Oriented Development Initiatives (RODI), etc.	

APPENDIX V: INTERVIEW GUIDE

Section A: The Nature of Reintegration Programs on Welfare of Returnee Terrorist Fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya.

1. Are there any existing reintegration programmes within Mombasa County for returnee Foreign Terrorist Fighters? If yes, which are they?

2. Who are the beneficiaries of these programmes?

3. Who are the implementors/sponsors of the non-custodial reintegration programmes for returnee terrorist fighters?

4. Do the existing reintegration programmes meet the welfare needs of returnee terrorist fighters?

Section B: Effectiveness of Non-custodial Reintegration Programs on the Welfare of Returnee Terrorist Fighters in Mombasa County, Kenya.

5. How effective are the non-custodial reintegration programmes in addressing the welfare of the returnee terrorist fighters?

6. How do you measure the success of the non-custodial reintegration programmes on the welfare of returnee terrorist fighters?

7. How does the involvement of the local community contribute to the effectiveness of non-custodial reintegration programmes?

8. Why, in your opinion, do some returnee terrorist fighters NOT participate in the available non-custodial reintegration programs?

9. What, in your opinion, is the MOST IMPORTANT method to guarantee the successful non-custodial reintegration of returnee terrorist fighters?

Section C: Challenges non-custodial reintegration programs face on the welfare of returning terrorist fighters in Mombasa, Kenya.

10. Which challenges does the existing non-custodial reintegration programmes for the returnee terrorist fighters experience?

11. How do these challenges affect the enhancement of the welfare of the returnee terrorist fighters?

12. Are there any opportunities that can be explored to make the non-custodial reintegration programmes become more effective in enhancing the welfare of the returnee terrorist fighters in Mombasa County?