EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE'S EXECUTION OF ITS MANDATE

IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KENYA AND SOMALIA

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the confirment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

January, 2021

DECLARATION AND CERTIFICATION

DECLARATION BY THE CANDIDATE

I declare that this thesis is my original work prepared with no other than the indicated sources and support, and has not been presented elsewhere for a degree or any other award.

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DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my wife, Catherine Wanjiku Gichangi and my children Simon Kabage, Nelly Kabage and Gloria Kabage, who endured long hours of my absence while undertaking this study. It is also dedicated to all victims of terrorist attacks in Kenya and Somalia.

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ABSTRACT

The nature and numbers of intrastate conflicts in the early nineteen nineties challenged regional security; thereby requiring a collective regional response. This explains the formation of a number of regional security mechanisms such as East African Standby Force (EASF) with a mandate to maintain peace and security in the Eastern Africa region. Despite over a decade of its existence, EASF efforts to tackle the seemingly intractable peace and security dilemmas in the region and especially in Kenya and Somalia have remained elusive and insignificant, making it more of a bystander. This study sought to address this gap. The general objective of this study was to assess Eastern Africa Standby Force's execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. More specifically, the study examined the structure and nature of Eastern Africa Standby Force; assessed Eastern Africa Standby Force's efforts in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia and; examined challenges and opportunities arising from Eastern Africa Standby Force's execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. The study adopted a conceptual framework underpinned by three theories; the Regional Security Complex theory, the Neofunctionalism theory and the Power theory, all emanating from the Realism school of thought.The study used a descriptive survey research design. The study was conducted in Kenya and Somalia.The study utilized simple random sampling strategy to determine the settings and the participants .A sample size of 385 officials was achieved from the total population using the Mora and Kloet (2010) formula. The sample size was distributed evenly across the study areas. Questionnaires, interview guides, and Focused Group Discussions (FGD) were used to collect primary data whereas secondary data was gathered from journals and reports. Quantitative data was analyzed by SPSS version 24 while qualitative data was analyzed through coding, verbatim and thematic organization. As for the structure and nature of the EASF, the study found out that EASF has an adequate operational structure with 61% of the respondents agreeing that EASF had adequate mission support structure to be able to execute its mandate in Kenya and Somalia. On nature, the study found out that the EASF does not operate in vacuum and so its operations are shaped by regional governments, 73% of the respondents avouched that regional governments played a significant role in maintaining peace and security. As for EASF efforts to enhance its capability to be able to maintain peace and security, the study found out that EASF has put in place a number of initiatives. Thus, the study found out that, 67% of the respondents acknowledged that regional organizations contributed significantly to EASF efforts to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.On challenges and opportunities, the study found out that EASF effectiveness is hampered by dearth of political cohesion, with 89 % of the respondents agreeing that lack of political cohesion has a high impact on the performance of EASF in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.Notwithstanding the challenges, the study also found out that there were opportunities available to EASF in its maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia, to include establishment of maritime planning cell in its structure. The Study concludes that, despite efforts employed by EASF to promote Peace and Security in Kenya and Somalia, there are prevalent challenges that continue to undermine and stymie EASF's effectiveness. This, therefore, calls for more political cohesion among its member states, renewed commitment of member states to pledge forces, contribute finances, provide logistic support while harmonizing its training and doctrines so as to create an effective EASF.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACCORD	African Center for Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACDS	Africa Chiefs of Defence and Security
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AHC	African High Command
AGCP	Adhoc Group on Cooperation and Peacekeeping
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	Africa Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	Africa Union Mission in Somalia
AMLB	Africa Union Military Logistics Depot
APSA	Africa Peace and Security Architecture
ARRC	Allied Command Rapid Reaction Europa
Art.	Article
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASC	African Standby Capability
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUABC	African Union Advisory Board on Anti Corruption
AUC	African Union Commission
CAC	Cronbach Alpha Coefficient
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CAF	Community Action Forums
CENTCOM	Central Command
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

CEWERU	Conflict Early Warning Response Unit
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFI	Connected Force Inititaive
CIMIC	Civil Miliray Cooperation
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CLB	Continetal Logistics Base
COMWARN	COMESA Conflict Early Warning System
CPMR	Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
CSF	Civil Society Forum
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CSSDA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
DC	Defence Commission
DCI	Defence Capabilities Initiative
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DPC	District Peace Committess
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
EACDS	East African Chiefs of Defence Staff
EAR	East Africa Region
EASBRICOM	East African Brigade Coordination Mechanism

EASBRIG	Eastern Africa Standby Brigade
EASCO	East African Common Services Organization
EASF	Eastern Africa Standby Force
EASFCOM	Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire and Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of Western African States
ESF	ECOWAS Standby Force
EU	European Union
EWM	Early Warning Mechanism
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
FOC	Full Operational Capability
FOMAC	Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Standby Force
FPU	Formed Police Unit
GLR	Great Lakes Region
HOSG	Heads of States and Governments
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICPAT	IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGAD	Inter- Governmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Interl Governmental Authority on Development and Desertification

IGASOM	IGAD Mission in Somalia
INFPL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IPF	International Partners Forum
IPO	Individual Police Officer
IPSTC	International Peace Support Training Centre
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IT	Information Technology
J/1-J/9	Joint Staff officers 1 to 9
JTFHQS	Joint Task Force Headquarters
LOGBASE	Logistics Base
LoN	League of Nations
KAIPTC	Koffi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KNFP	Kenya National Focal Point
MAD	Mutual Assuarance on Defence
MAPROBOU	African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi
MARCOM	Allied Maritime Command
MINUSCA	African Union Mission to Central Africa Republic
MONUSCO	United Nations Stabilization Mission to DR Congo
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MS	Member States

MSC	Military Staff Committee
MSLMC	Multidimensional Startegic Level Mangement Capability
MSU	Mission Support Unit
NAC	NATO Atlantic Council
NARC	North African Regional Capability
NARSBRIG	North Africa Regional Standby Brigade
NATO	Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCM	National Coordination Mechanisms
NFD	Northern Frontier District
NFLD	Northern Frontier Liberation Army
NGO	Non Governemntal Organization
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSC	National Steering Committee
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developemnt
OLMEE	OAU/AU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea
PAN	Protocol on Non-Aggression
PANWISE	Panel of the Wise
PCC	Prague Capabilities Commitment
PEV	Post Election Violence
PKF	Peace Keeping Force
PLANELM	Planning Element

PM	Prime Minister
PMAD	Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence
POC	Protection of Civilians
POM	Policy Organs Meeting
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
PTA	Preferential Trade Area
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RECSA	Regional Center for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RMs	Regional Mechanisms
RIMC	Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee
RINR	Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
R2P	Right to Protect
RoL	Rule of Law
RPTC	Regional Peacekeeping Training Center
RSC	Regional Security Complexes
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
RSO	Regional Security Organizations
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Command Europa

SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SCPO	Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
SDI	Smart Defence Initiative
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SMC	Standing Mediation Committee
SNM	Somali National Movement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPSS	Scientific Package for School Scientists
SRPC	Special Representative to the President of the Commission
SRO	Sub Regional Organization
SRSG	Specail Representative of the Secretary General
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSF	SADC Standby Force
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
UDHR	Universal Deaclaration of Human Rights
UNAMID	United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNITAF	The Unified Task Force
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda and Rwanda
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office in Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection in Bosnia and Herzegovinia
UNSAS	United Nations Standby Arrangement System
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USG	Under Secereaty General
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WMO	World Mediation Organization
WSC	Women Service Corps

OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

Eastern Africa region: In this study, refers to the part of Africa that comprises the countries of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia, Djibouti, Rwanda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, Seychelels South Sudan, and Madagascar

Eastern Africa Standby Force mandate: in this study refers to the role of maintaining peace and security in the Eastern Africa region

Conflict: in this study it implies the struggle among EASF member states as individuals or collectives, over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are to assert their values or claims over those of others.

Conflict management: efforts made by the Eastern African Standby Force to prevent, limit, contain, or resolve conflicts, especially violent ones within Kenya and Somalai, while building up the capacities of all parties involved to undertake peace building.

Conflict prevention: refers to measures taken to keep low-level or long-festering disputes from escalating into violence in Kenya and Somalia.

Conflict resolutions: are efforts to address underlying causes of a conflict by finding common interests and overarching goals between Kenya and Somalia.

Early warning: is the assessment of high-risk situations so as to provide timely notice of escalating violence between Kenya and Somalia.

Eastern Africa Region: refers to the areas coverd by the countries of Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, the Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius and Burundi, which comprise members of the Eastern Africa Standby Force.

Panel of the wise: in this study is a group of distinguished and well-respected African individuals who are used by the African Union to mediate conflicts in

the continent, while in this study it applies to Eastern African Standby Force member states especially Kenya and Somalia.

Partnerships: are the relationships between the various organizations involved in peace and security in Africa, to include all the five the Regional Economic Communities, Regional Mechanisms in Africa, but in this study it refers to the East African Staby Force in Eastern Africa region.

Peace: is a period of harmony among EASF member states that is characterized by lack   of violence or conflict threats, and the freedom from fear of violence.

Peace building: in this study refers to post-conflict recovery efforts to promote reconciliation and   reconstruction,

Peacekeeping: are actions undertaken to preserve peace where fighting has been halted and   to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.

Peace operations: are activities taken to foster peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building efforts within Kenya and Somalia.

Security: is the status of Kenya and Somalia being resilient against, potential harm caused by threats to peace and harmony in the East African Region to include from terrorism, violent extremism and piracy among other threats.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides the background to the study, the statement of the problem, the objectives of the study and the related research questions. The chapter also provides academic, policy and philosophical justifications and scope of the study. The last section of the chapter highlights the summary.

1.1 Background to the study

World history is replete with accounts of wars and internecine conflicts and their attendant destructive nature (Williams, 2011). It was however the first and second world wars that pushed countries to come together and establish an organization to take the lead in the collective prevention and management of violent conflicts. The first attempt was the establishment of the League of Nations (LoN) in 1919,after the end of the First World War with the mandate to prevent war and guide pacific settlement of disputes (Williams, 2011). With the emergence of the Second World War, the LoN was replaced by the United Nations (UN) in 1945.

The United Nations was founded to maintain international peace and security and save succeeding generations from the scourge of war (UN Charter, Article 1). Tragically, the world witnessed over two hundred (200) armed conflicts after the organization was founded in 1945 (Williams, 2011). The deteriorating security situation, especially the growing incidents of intra-state conflicts with its attendant impacts became major concern to the international community in the early nineteen nineties. This challenged the concept

of international peace and security, especially when the international community under the aegis of 'New World Order' era, witnessed tremendous shift from state qua state affairs to multifaceted approach that involved an array of players. The led to increased need for regional security mecahnisms.

In Western Europe, the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was formed in 1949 as the regional security mechanism, to ensure peace and security within the region. It comprised eighteen countries. They included Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and the United States that joined in 1949. Others joined later and they included Greece and Turkey in 1952,Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982. Others that joined in 1999 were the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. NATO participated in various peace support operations and military interventions in the region like the intervention in Bosnia in 1994, Haiti in 1995 and Yugoslavia in 1999(Coker, 1985).

In Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and its allies formed the Warsaw Pact in 1955.It was designed to protect its members from any external threat and to ensure peace and prosperity within the region. It had eight members, which included the Soviet Union, Albania, Poland, Romania, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria (Coker, 1985).

In 1967,ten countries of South East Asia came together and formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This was a regional grouping to promote economic, political, and security cooperation among its members. It comprised ten countries of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (Mely, 2005).

With those realignemnets-taking place in the world, Africa was not left behind. The OAU was established in 1963 with a mandate to promote the unity and solidarity of Africa states by defending their sovereinity, territorial integrity, independence and to eliminate all forms of colonialism in the continent (OAU 1963: Article XX).

OAU was later replaced with a new regional organization, the African Union (AU) in 2002. AU adopted a more interventionist approach to that of its predecessor and established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The APSA had a mandate for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts using its six key pillars;to include the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Panel of the Wise (PanWise), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) , the Military Staff Committee (MSC) and the African Peace Fund (APF) (AU PSC Protocal, 2002).

The PSC is the standing decision-making organ of the AU. It is composed of 15 members, elected from five regions (AU PSC Protocal, 2002). The Panel of the Wise is an advisory body with tasks in the field of conflict prevention and peacemaking. It is composed of "five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development in the continent. They advise the PSC and the African Union Chairperson on all issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security and stability in Africa (AU PSC Protocal, 2014).

The CEWS is a body created "in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts". The main task of CEWS is to collect and analyse data concerning potential conflicts on the continent (AU, 2002) and provide options to decision makers (AU PSC Protocal, 2002). The African Union Peace Fund (APF) was created "in order to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security" in Africa. The Military Staff Committee (MSC) is established pursuant to Article 13 of the PSC Protocol as an advisory body to the PSC.It is composed of Senior Military Officers of the Members of the Peace and Security Council and it advises the PSC on all issues relating to security requirements for the promotion of peace and security in Africa (Tlalka, 2014).

The African Standby Force (ASF) is the continental African multidisciplinary peacekeeping force that acts under the direction of the AU PSC. It was established in 2003 to enable the PSC perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of PSO missions and intervention pursuant to Articles (h) and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act. It is composed of standby, multidisciplinary contingents comprising civilian, police and military components from the five RECs/RMs of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) comprising of thirteen countries, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) comnprising of eleven Countries, the Easten African Standby Force (EASF) comprising of thirteen countries, the Economic Community Of Central Africa States (ECCAS) compricing of eleven countries and the North African Regional Capability(NARC) comprising of six countries. They serve as the building blocks of the ASF (Omanyo, 2015).

The EASF is the regional Standby Force for Eastern Africa. It is a politico-military organ that was established following the Decision of the AU Summit held on 6-8th July 2004, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to provide capability for rapid deployment forces to carry out

preventive deployment, rapid intervention, peace support and stability operations, and peace enforcement. It is one of the building blocks of the ASF. Its membership comprises the thirteen Eastern Africa countries of Kenya, Djibouti, Madagascar, Mauritius, Burundi, Uganda, Seychelles, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Comoros Islands (Omanyo, 2015).

Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the AU PSC in 2002, directs the EASF to carry out the following functions: observation and monitoring missions; other types of peace support missions; intervention in Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act. It was further to undertake preventive deployment in order to prevent, i).a dispute or a conflict from escalating, ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or States, and iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement. It also mandates the EASF to undertake peace building missions, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and any other functions as may be mandated by the AU PSC or the Assembly (AU PSC Protocal, 2002. Additionally, the Protocol encourages the ASF and the EASF to cooperate with the UN and its Agencies, other relevant international organizations and regional organizations, as well as with national authorities and NGOs, where appropriate (AU PSC Protocol, 2002).

However, the EASF has been critiqued for its failure to respond to the numerous security threats in the Eastern Africa region, especially in Kenya and Somalia.It has failed to

respond to a number of crisis situations in Kenya especially during the December 2007 to February 2008 crisis when Kenya experienced ethnic violence triggered by a disputed presidential election held on 27 December 2007,resulting in the death of 1,312 individuals and dispacement of 600,000 persons (Timberg, 2008). Additionally, it has also failed to intervene during terrorist attacks in Kenya, especially during the 2013 attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi, the 2015 Garrissa University attack in north eastern Kenya and the 2019 Dusit Hotel attack in Nairobi.In Somalia, EASF has failed to intervene in the on going conflict in the country, that dates back to 1991 and the numerous Alshaabab terror attacks in Mogadishu and elsewhere in the country (Wise, 2011). It has equally been blamed for remaining silent over the on-going maritime border dispute between Kenya and Somalia (Hansen, 2020).

As such, this study endeavoured to assess EASF execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in the EAR with a focus to Kenya and Somalia.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Bayeh (2014), observes that the security quagmire in the Eastern Africa region has inadvertently facilitated the construction of hegemonic competition by assertive regional states with contending issues of terrorism, cross-border incursions and state fragility, coming to the fore. A complex alchemy of hegemonic competition and endemic security concerns in the Eastern Africa region, characterizes a region whose member states clamor for supremacy battles overshadows the quest for regional security (Oluoch, 2015). With bouts of long-time civil strife among its membership coupled by a litany of emerging security dilemmas such as terrorism and egregious refugee influx, the quest for collective peace and security arrangements is more needed in the region than ever before. Despite the efforts put in place by the EASF to integrate militarily as well as politically to address such challenges in the

region, EASF has been undermined by a number of intractable factors that renders it a mere bystander, especially in the case of Kenya and Somalia. EASF performance has been critiqued and subject of considerable research (Mumma-Martinon, 2013, Kagwanja 2013, De-Conning 2013, Tlalka 2014, Robinson 2014, Omanyo 2015, Oluoch, 2015),but factors contributing to its inability to maintain regional peace and security in Kenya and Somalia are yet to be adequately documented. It is in this context that the study seeks to fill this research gap, by assessing EASF's execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

1.3 Research Objectives

The overall objective of the study was to assess Eastern Africa Standby Forces' execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

The specific objectives were to:

i. Examine structure and nature of Eastern Africa Standby Forces in execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

ii. Asses Eastern Africa Standby Forces' efforts in execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

iii. Examine challenges and opportunities facing Eastern Africa Standby Forces in execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

1.4 Research Questions

i. What is the adequacy of the structure and nature of Eastern Africa Standby Force in execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

ii.   What are the Eastern Africa Standby Force's efforts in execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

iii. What are the challenges and opportunities facing Eastern Africa Standby Force in execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

1.5 Justification of the Study

At the East African regional level, literature on maintenance of regional peace and security using regional security mechanisms is still scarce, more especially literary aspects that specifically address the security situations in Kenya and Somalia The two countries are faced with a varied mixture of security challenges; especially emanating from the scourge of terrorism, cross border vulnerabilities and other internal hostilities. This has seriously impacted on their political, economic and social wellbeing. Although a number of regional security mechanisms; to include the EASF, have been developed with a mandate of maintaining peace and security in the region, only a few studies have been conducted to assess the effectiveness of EASF interventions against security threats facing Kenya and Somalia (De Conning et al, 2016). This study is premised on philosophical, academic and policy justifications as expounded.

1.5.1 Philosophical Justification

Philosophy analyses the entities of the world from different aspects: reality, nature of knowledge, mind, matter, truth and logic of abstract phenomena (Brain, 1996). Omanyo (2015), observed that the Eastern Africa region was mired in endless instability and so the establishment of the EASF in 2004, as a regional security mechanism to maintain peace and security in the region heralded a lot of hope. It was expected that EASF would provide

antidote to the endless insecurity dillemas in the region, and especially in Kenya and Somalia in execution of its mandate. Booth (1991), in his work titled; *"Security and Emancipation"*, underscores the philosophy of regionalizion; as an emancipative effort of promoting peace and security; broadening the concept of maintenance of peace and security beyond the understanding of many States that still hold the view of maintenance of national security as being synonymous with use of force to sustain state security and even more narrowly maintain regime security. However in a study done by Matanga (2018), he asserts that while peace occupies an integral place in the emerging discourse of peace and conflict studies, the concept remains a contested one. Other scholars like De-Conning et al (2016), have thus attempted to conceptualize and re-conceptualize the concept of peace and security vis a vis use of force. Robinson (2014), opines that regional formations cannot be relied on to resolve conflicts since regionalization is adversely affected by member state ties in the conflictual environment, undermining their provision of force capabilities.

 Despite these criticisms, the discourse for more regional responsibilities is still strong. Additionally, Onkware (2018), while arguing from the utilitarian point of view, contend that any action that is morally right and brings greatest benefit in terms of balance of good over evil should be pursued. However, Alkerlund (2012), argues that, EASF has been mooching, is less productive and failing to provide sustainable peace in the region through application of architecures beyond force. Consequently, EASF has therefore, been unable to shutter the glass ceiling and is comparatively behind other regional security mechanisms like ECOWAS in the maintaining of regional peace and security in the region. This study was therefore important as it sought to assess EASF's execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia as a regional mechanism. The outcomes of the study will therefore contribute to the philosophy of regionalization of peace and security.

1.5.2 Academic Justification

The history of protracted conflicts experienced in Eastern Africa region and other security threats that the region still faces like, terrorism, refugee influx, trafficking in arms, drugs trafficking, internal hostilies and human trafficking continue to pose serious challenges to the regional security agenda, sometimes causing strained relations among countries of the sub-region (Bakwegeza, 1993). According to Bayeh (2014), the capacity of individual states to address these transnational and irregular threats has also been weakened over time.

Previous studies in this regard, have tended to rely more on the operationalization of the broad continental peace and security architecture; the APSA. This was without emphasizing on the maintenance of peace and security using regional security mechanisms to includen the EASF. For instance, in a study titled "*Constructing hegemony via regional pursuits in Eastern Africa,*" Were (2018), argues that, Eastern Africa has shied from addressing these challenges adequately due to hegemonic competition among its member states. He cites a case where Kenya resisted the establishment of EASF within IGAD for perceptive fear of transforming Ethiopia into a regional military hegemon. Akin to this assertion is, Desmidt and Hauck's (2017), supposition as narrated in their article, "*Understandingthe Eastern Africa Standby Force,a Regional Mechanism without political home,".* Desmidt and Hauck's contribution to the understanding of a regional mechanism is insufficient to inform the peace and security discourse in Kenya and Somalia. Further, they argue that areas of traction and potentials for Kenya and Somalia are still opaque. Additionally, Nzau et al (2018) are of the same supposition as highlighted in their article, "*Security Sector Reforms and the Challenges of Military Capabilities in the 21st.Century,"*

Mwikali (2018),in her thesis entitled "*The Role of Africa Standby Force in Securing Africa:A case of the Eastern Africa Standby Force*", also observes how weak states in the region are still far off from establishing an effective regional peace and security framework;where she alludes to Somalia case that is ridden with incessant conflicts and Kenya, which is angling up for regional supremacy. However, her contribution does not foresee a stable and effective EASF. In this case, Kenya and Somalia will therefore, need to embrace increased regional cooperation, requiring some level of fused and integrated defense and security systems in order to effectively contain these threats and promote peace and security in the region. For this reason, findings in the current research will help inform other studies by acting as a baseline, whereby regions experiencing similar security challenges, can use the findings to improve the effectiveness of their regional security mechanisms to maintain peace and security within their member states.

1.5.3 Policy Justification

Though fragmentary literature exists on sustainable efforts of EASF to maintain peace and security in the region, Mwagiru (2004), contends that a deliberate and concerted policy of regional collective security and self-reliance occasioned by military cooperation between Kenya and Somalia incorporated with the existing regional mechanisms will help eliminate insecurity and foster peace in the sub region and in the entire continent. For this reason, a thorough examination of the current design of the EASF is indispensable. Tlalka (2014), therefore opines that the examination of the necessary factors that will enhance the functionality of the EASF and efface the intractable challenges will be preponderant. Realizing that peace and security is a prerequisite to meaningful development and social justice, regional and sub-regional organizations in Eastern Africa and other stakeholders in the region have given and should give security cooperation a top priority and shun

hegemonic competition. Kadiagala (2008), underscores that the maintenance of peace and security in the East African region therefore requires application of concerted, sustainable and durable efforts at the policy level that is devoid of inter territorial competition and duplication of efforts by regional bodies. For this reason, the findings of the study will provide policy makers with literature that will assist them make informed policy decisions on interventions that will enhance effectiveness of the regional security mechanisms.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The study specifically analysed EASF in the context of xecution of its mandate in the maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. It focused on three aspects of peace and security which include: the structure and nature of EASF to respond to security threats in Kenya and Somalia; Eastern Africa Standby Force's efforts in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia and challenges and opportunities facing EASF in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. The study was underpinned by three theories; the complex security theory,the power theory and the neofunctionalism theory. The study employed descriptive research designs, drawing its respondents from state and non-state actors in six regions of: Nairobi, Mombasa, and Lamu, in Kenya and Mogadishu, Kismayu and Ras Kamboni in Somalia respectively.

The study period was between 1991 and 2011. The year 1991 is significant to the Eastern Africa Region because this is when the government of President Siad Barre of Somalia collapsed with almost all neighboring states suffering spillover effects of the conflict that followed. The year 2011is also important because this is when Kenya officially decided to militariry cross into Somalia as part of self-defence against security thretas emanating from Somalia.

Data was collected between the months of November 2019 to January 2020.

1.7 Chapter Summary

Chapter one has presented a background introduction on EASFs execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia; from global, regional and national perspectives. The statement of the problem highlighted critical gaps the study has filled. The objectives of the study and research questions that guided the study have also been stated. The justification and scope of the study provide clear indications of the need for more studies in this area. The study will not only boost knowledge banks in the area of EASFs execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia but will also help to formulate policies that will help to enhance the effectiveness of standby forces in the African continent. The next chapter provides a detailed analysis of literature related to the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter covers the review of existing literature as regards EASF Standby Forces execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. It is arranged into three thematic sections, namely the structure and nature of EASF in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia, EASF efforts in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia and challenges facing EASF in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. This was purposely done to systematically identify the research gaps to inform the specific objectives of this study.

2.1 The structure and nature of Standby Forces in maintaining peace and security

Gilham (2005), defines structure as the system of task reporting and authority relationships within which the organization does its work. Its purpose is to establish the formal alignment, arrangement, and hierarchy of jobs within an organization. It is that system that outlines how activities in an organization are directed in order to achieve the goals of the organization. On the other hand they define the nature of an organization as the division of works, determination of activities, grouping of activities, delegation of authority and the establishment of proper co-ordination and balance among various departments of individuals towards the attainment of predetermined goals.

Williams (2011), opines that when analyzing the structure and nature of security organizations, it is important to address them from a global, continenatal and regional perspective within the overall concept of security. He opines that security is not only concerned with the state of being free from danger or threat but is linked to the eradication of

threats that prevent one from enjoying their treasured times and if these threats are not contained they can threaten the existence of a person's life. Booth (2007), views security as 'survival plus' where the plus denotes freedom from threats and gives life choices.

This concept is anchored on two philosophies of security. The first is where security is similar to the increase of power; meaning people must own certain items like property, money, and weapons among other things. Here power acts as a way to security; meaning the more power one has the more security he or she will have. The second philosophy of security challenges the link of security to power. According to this view security is linked to human rights and the dispensation of justice. Here it is a relationship between different people and not just an object that can be viewed in a negative light or a positive light (Ligawa,2015).

This second philosophy illustrates to us that security is not about exercising power over others, but cooperating with others to achieve security without denying it to others. Security is all about joint venture rather than threats and destruction; one that takes into account seriously issues to do with human rights and justice. But, the question is; whose security? Is it the states or the people? After the Cold War; a period considered to span from the Truman Doctrine of 1947 to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991,when both the communist east and capaitalist west supported major regional conflicts known as proxy wars,it was the states security. Why? This is because the states were under threat after the Cold War (communism east vs capitaist west). However, some analysts differ with this line of thought and state that it is the people's security, which now matters most (Duffield, 1995).

Booth (1991), further goes on to say that human security does not have to do with weapons, but with human dignity such as food security, economic security, community security, environmental protection, political security and democracy, personal safety and environmental

protection, which determine the nature and structure of securiy organizations from the global, continental and regional contexts.

Globally, Duffield (1995), observes that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 1949. It comprised the c o u n t r i e s o f Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, the United States, Greece, Turkey, Germany, Spain, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.Its purpose was to serve as a security entity at the beginning of the cold war by the United Stases and its European Allies, to deter and contain the Soviet Union from further expanding its influence beyond East Berlin. Castaldi (2007), concurs that this placed importance on the concept of denationalization of NATO security by its members, whereby the interets of the alliance acquired more weight than that of one nation (Castaldi, 2007),

Zachary (2014), observes that this principle is in line with Article 5 of the NATO charter, which states that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. The NATO was therfore established with appropraiote structures to enable it undertake the role of providing security to its member states. It included consultative organs, force planning elements and integrated military structures. He contends that such organizational structures are supposed to be flexible enough, to be able address changing security dynamics (Onditi,2015).

Sloan (2008), observes that with the break up of the Soviet Union between 1990-1991, globalization and rise of Muslim extremism in the last several decade, the Alliance was met by challenges that informed transforming its structures, to continuously address the new security environment. Decisions on how to relate to former Soviet states posed one challenge, while

another major challenge was redefining its Strategic Concept and altering its modus operandi. The reorientation of the NATO rationale from defense in place to managing threats outside Alliance borders is deeply connected to the content of NATO's diverse military development initiatives, with marked realignment of its nature and structures. Developing rapidly deployable, combat capable expeditionary forces. This is echoed in the 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), and the 2011 Smart Defense Initiative (SDI).

Though NATO was essentially a political as well as military organization, at the Washington Summit in 1999, the DCI was approved as a way of addressing the cumulative gap in military capabilities and technologies between the US and its allies. The summit occurred shortly after the NATO operation in and surrounding areas of Kosovo, thus unintentionally providing greater incentive for the need of increased allied interoperability and demonstrating deficiencies in military capabilities of allied states. The NATO structure in the DCI comprised deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, survivability, effective engagement, and command and control and information systems, with intrinsic goals intended to be overseen, but NATO allies made no definite commitments (Sloan, 2008).

Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union between 1990-1991, NATO began to adapt its multinational, joint military command structure to the new security environment, hence the release of the New Strategic Concept in 1991. What was referred to as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), during the 1990s, thus shaping the essence of military change, includes several concepts along technological, doctrinal and organizational lines, distinct but yet closely interrelated in that each facilitates the other. The most noteworthy advancements in

NATO structures are related to organizational transformation, and explicitly the design of command and control structures concerning rapidly deployable force projection as the guiding doctrine for transforming their armed forces. Early in the 1990s, NATO formed the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), a mobile army headquarters of a thousand multinational military personnel, meant for conducting humanitarian and peacekeeping missions (Sloan, 2008). Following this idea, the Alliance launched the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) structure shortly thereafter, a concept for assisting allied forces in shifting from collective defense capabilities to those necessary in operating "out of area"(Duffield, 1995).

The concept would also reflect the readiness to make the alliance's assets available for the members. Approved at the 1994 NATO Summit, the CJTF concept structure sought to create headquarter structures, enabling different allied forces and services to converge as a task force and carry out several types of operations outside NATO borders (Rynning, 2005). Over the the years 1990-1999 the Alliance went through vast conceptual work in instituting command and control arrangements for many different operations, in addition to conducting exercises for assessing planned structures (NATO, 1999). It was not until the Prague Summit in 2002 that ideas of the CJTF concept truly progressed. Additionally,to radically reduce and streamline the entire NATO command structure by forming a command purposely devoted to center on military change and to establish a NATO Response Force (NRF), intended to serve as a catalyst for thrusting transformation in practice. The Alliance's new command structure now entailed one operational command, Allied Command Operations (ACO), which merged the former two operational commands; the Allied Command Europe and the Allied Command Atlantic.These endured upto the 1950s (Ilik, 2009).

Simultaneously, NATO created a non-operational command, Allied Command Transformation, tasked with being "NATO's forcing agent for change", for evaluating strategic surroundings the Alliance encounters, identifying the need for new capabilities in adapting to these surroundings, and facilitating innovations of capability solutions (Velde, 2006). Essentially, it remains the long-term strategic branch of NATO, with joint force headquarters around the world. As Boland asserts, its creation "represents a transformation in NATO from being an entity that reacts to imminent threats to an organization that plans for future troop capabilities" (Boland, 2006).

This organizational reform of the allied command structure also imposed great impacts on the maritime domain as well. Based on the decisions in Prague, the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon determined to create an even leaner and more effective command structure, by reducing the number of major headquarters from eleven to six which led directly to the deactivation of the Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) Naples in 2013.This left the newly named MARCOM as the sole maritime component of NATO.For ensuring the inter-operability and readiness of allied forces, MARCOM was responsible for planning and conducting all maritime operations, in leading four standing maritime groups two frigate groups and two countermeasures groups. Being multinational, the groups integrate maritime force composing vessels from allied countries, thereby providing NATO with continuous maritime capability (Castaldi, 2007).

Finally, the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) was another crucial organizational undertaking at the Prague Summit.It comprised 25,000 personnel and combining land, sea, air and special operation forces (SOFs). It was capable of being deployed within a five-day notice

and to sustain itself for thirty days or more if resupplied. Its tasks were to contain Article V collective defense, non-Article V crisis response (evacuations and disaster management), responding to humanitarian crises, counter-terrorism, and acting as an "initial entry force" for larger, subsequent forces. Even if the NRF was declared fully operational in 2006, it faced challenges in upholding necessary force strength. For example, allied states sought to avert forces initially promised to the NRF, to operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Kosovo, which urged NATO heads to question the NRF concept. The NRF is ideally a key operational instrument for addressing crises in the current security environment (Castaldi, 2007).

When the former USA defence Secretary Rumsfeld presented the NRF in 2002, it was also with the intent of it being a practical force promoting transformation. As various allied forces rotated through the NRF, they would be trained to high NATO standards and learn about new concepts and technologies, thus favoring military innovation. Also, the practice would be continuous. The NRF could be viewed as a perpetually ongoing allied military training exercise, applied for assessing new concepts and capability advancements (Coker, 1985).

Jones (2005), argued that "for NATO, the operational path for transformation lies in the emergence of the NRF". Yet, struggles in realizing the NRF prophecy could question its ability to appear as a channel of promoting NATO transformation. In some way the missions themselves to the extent NRF forces has been averted have still adopted this role. However, according to Hallams (2004), all the members of the organization have an equal voice at the table when deciding whether to take military action, but all decisions require consensus. There are benefits to this structure because NATO can set expectations for behavior and maintain consensus in a way that is more structured and effective than using "ad-hoc coalitions." The

interesting thing about this is there is no strict interpretation in the Treaty where unanimity is needed (Hallams, 2004).

Accordingly, Vincent *et al*,(2009), author of the book titled"*Capability Theroy and the future of NATOs Decision making rules"*, noted that "NATO planners deliberately left that point flexible so that the Council (NAC) would be free to act (as it rarely has) without consensus. Nevertheless, the daily practice of NATO decisionmaking has historically emphasized unanimity. As long as there was only one real mission to plan, prepare, and exercise together for joint resistance to an invasion of Western Europe the rule of unanimity and the practice of consensus were considered pragmatic and not too damaging constraints (Kington, 2007).

Over time, there has been a shift in the functions of NATO and the weight that NATO places on certain operations. Wagnasson (2008), stated that the evolution of NATO's security structure and its strategic concept has allowed it to define itself based on a broad security understanding that is directed towards new challenges that fall out of the realm of the Article 5 governance. Rather than having a reactionary security structure, NATO has morphed from a strictly defensive organization to a security (Wagnasson, 2008).

Continentally, Mwagiru (2014), opines that the Protocol relating to the establishment of the African Peace and Security Council (PSC) established the African Standby Force (ASF) in 2002,as a continetal security mechanism to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act. Among the structures of the force are five Regional Standby Forces comprising of multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian, police and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.

The ASF regional standby forces are depicted in the figure 2.1:

Figure 2.1: The ASF regional standby forces

Source: ASF Policy Framework, May 2003

Member States under the provisions were obliged to take steps to establish standby contingents for participation in peace support missions that have been mandated by the Africa Peace and Security Council or by the General Assembly of the African Union. The strength, type and structural organizations of such contingents, are determined by the African Union Peace Support Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that are subject to periodic reviews depending on prevailing crisis and conflict situations. Their detailed tasks and modus operandi are considered and approved by the Peace and Security Council upon recommendation of the Commission (De Conning etal, 2016).

The development of the concept of the ASF was informed by the dynamics of relevant conflict and mission scenarios, the instructive experiences of the existing Mechanism, as well as by the experience of the United Nation System in peace operations. It is also informed by other models evolved outside of Africa. As far as possible, the ASF utilizes the UN doctrine, guidelines, training and standards. Khadiagala (2014), further observes that the generic structure of a multidimensional ASF peace support operations capability comprise of a Mandating Authority, which is the AU Peace and Security Council.It remains the legitimate political capacity to mandate a mission under the UN Charter. This is consistent with the endorsed recommendations of the Second African Chiefs of Defence Staff (of the Central Organ) Meeting, held in Harare in 1997(Khadiagala, 2014).

The other organ is the Multidimensional Strategic Level Management Capability (MSLMC). This is in line with UN provisions on enforcement action by regional arrangements. This ensures that while the AU will seek UN Security Council authorisation of its enforcements actions, African regions similarly will seek AU authorisation of their interventions. Furthermore, based on UN advice, instructive experiences of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution, a series of strategic level Headquarter structures for the AU are available to manage operations for each of the six AU typical conflict scenarios. Scenario 1 is when there is need to deploy AU/Regional Military advice to a Political mission. Scenario 2 is when AU/ Regional observer mission is co-deployed with UN. Scenario 3 is when a stand- alone AU/ Regional observer mission is deployed. Scenario 4 is when AU/Regional peacekeeping force is deployed for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions. Scenario 5 is when AU peacekeeping force is deployed for complex multidimensional missions including to low-level spoilers, which is a feature of many current conflicts in Africa. Scenario 6 is when AU deployes a rapid intervention mission, especially in

genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly (ASF Policy Framework, 2003).

The other structure is the Mission Headquarters level multidimensional management Capability.This is necessary to pursue a chance for the involvement and support of the UN in the conduct of missions in Africa. To enable a smooth and easier transition to the UN, similar UN based structures used in UN Missions are likely to be used. In this regard any mission Headquarter level structure should be able to be handed over to, or incorporated into, a UN Peace support operation with relative ease based on the nature of the conflict or Mission. If not being the case arrangements are effected prior to deployments as was the case between the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) and the hybrid Mission; United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). At the Mission level, a Brigade unit structure is to be used as the basis for a viable peace operations capability. The Brigade is the first level of military command where multiple arms and services are grouped under one Headquarter. It is also the first level that is genuinely self-contained and capable of sustained independent operations (Desmidt and Hauck, 2017).

The final level structure is the manoeuvre Units.These are easily adjusted depending on the situation. It is a sound building block for the military component of Scenarios 4 and 5 (traditional and complex AU/Regional peacekeeping forces (PKFs) earlier explained. A reduced version of a brigade HQ can also provide the headquarters for Scenarios 2 and 3 (co-deployed and standalone observer missions). As part of the ASF, other structures, if properly supported could include components from the Police, Disaramanet, Demobilization and Reitegration (DDR), human right, gender, child protection and humanitarian elements among

others. This is to give the multidimensional purpose for which it is intended in the execution of duties as would be mandated by the AU PSC (De Conning et al, 2016).

Regionally, Desmidt (2017), observes that the nature and structure of the Economic Community of West Africn States Standby Force (ESF) enables it to undertake its mandate. The ESF is a multidimensional regional Force, comprising of police, civilian and military contingents, which are well trained according to AU standards, equipped and prepared to be able to face any security threats within the region. The ESF is capable of carrying out quick interventions to crisis situations within the region (Onditi, 2015).

ESF is formed by a group of fifteen member states namely, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Varde, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. These member states have an economic approach to peace and security within their region and have pledged various capabilities to the standby force. ESF takes her legitimacy from a number of Continental and Regional framework documents. They include the AU constitutive Act, which concerns the development of a common defense and security policy (Art. 4), which provides the continental legal framework (Darkwa, 2017).

The ECOWAS protocol relating to the mechanism of conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security of December 1999,Art.2, is the regional legal framework, which focuses on a number of specified missions to be undertaken by ESF.They include observation and monitoring, Peacekeeping and restoration of peace, Humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian disaster, enforcement of sanctions, including embargo,

Policing activities and the control of fraud and organized crime.Others are Peace building, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, preventive deployment and any other operations mandated by the mediation and Security Council of ECOWAS (Onditi,2015).

Desmidt (2017), also observes that the ESF has a three-tier command structure. They include strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the strategic level is the President of the Commission, his Deputy and a secretariat. The Special Representative to President of the Commission (SRPC) when appointed will form part of the strategic level of command. At the operational level, the military component will be headed by a Force Commander, deputy Force Commander and a chief of Staff. The force headquarters has nine staff offers appointed as J/1 through to J/9 categories. J/1 is the officer responsible for personnel matters. J2 is responsible for operational intelligence matters while J3 is responsible for current operations. J/4 is responsible for administrative matters while J/5 is responsible for Policy and Crisis Planning. J/6 is the officer responsible for Communication and Information Systems while J/7 handles issues of Joint Training. J/8 is responsible for finance and human resources matters and J/9 handles policy, legal and media operations. These staff officers will be selected/ nominated from all ECOWAS Member States. At the tactical level will be the three fighting Battalions of the ESF Brigade.They include the Western, Eastern and logistic Battalions. The three Battalions are organized into a Task Force (TF). Each Batatlion comprises 850 personnel each (Agyapong, 2005).

In 2017, ECOWAS was reorganized from being a Commission to being a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF Hq). This Headquarter is headed by a President of the Commission.the president is supported by the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) and a Taskforce

Headquarters. The PSOD is composed of a Military Component Strategic Assessment and Directive Cell, Operations and Plans Cell, Training and Force Organization Cell, Intelligence and Evaluation Cell and a Personnel and logistics cell. The Task Force Hqs is structured to have the director of the PSOD division as its head. The director is assisted by the Chief of staff of the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JFHQs). There are three branches namely; Operations and Plans, Intelligence and Security and Personnel and logistics. The training wing comes under Operations and Plans this restructuring has greatly enabled the regional force to effectively respond to any conflict situation in the region (Desmidt, 2017).

In the Eastern Africa region, Talka (2014), in his book, "The East *African Standby Force, Shortcomings and prospects for the future*", opines that the nature and structure of the EASF is influenced by political, social, economic and technological dynamics in the region. There exist structural weaknesses within EASF.This has created a gap in its operations. The EASF also operates within a complex constellation of various regional organisations, with overlapping memberships and commitments by countries in the region. According to Hull, Skeppström and Sörensen (2011), there has been a multitude of historical animosities and conflicts across the region and the heterogenous nature of the countries across East Africa, regional integration has been notably slow in East this therefore begs the question, to what extent is the policy organs structured to deal with the incessant issues?. Additional factors include effects of the global insecurity and protracted transnational threats that have culminated to a high trajectory on security with tremendous impact on peace and security in the region (Ligawa, 2015).

Others are political and social conflicts, or proxy wars between countries in the region where disputes over international borders in the region have sometimes resulted into armed conflict

between states. (Migue, 2014), argues that the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977-1978) and the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998-2000) are good examples. Other territorial disputes in the region that continue to define the structure of EASF include the Kenya - Uganda dispute over Migingo island of Lake Victoria, the Sudan-South Sudan dispute over their common border in the Abyei region and the Kenya–Somalia diplomatic row over their shared maritime border dispute. Tlalka (2014), further contends that the internationalization of internal conflicts in countries like in Somalia, the DRC and Sudan, and the resultant increased tensions between Member States continue to pre-occupy the EAR and define the structure and nature of EASF (Nzau, 2013).

Ligawa (2015), contends that the Eastern Africa region is further characterized by a long history of conflicts and also accounts for some of the world's deadliest conflicts. There are also non-conventional and transnational security threats like terrorism, but the capacity of individual states to address insecurity has weakened over time. Additionally, over the years structural vulnerabilities in the EAR have aggravated conflict dynamics with dire implications for peace and security, deepening grievances and feelings of marginalization. This situation is especially worrisome in post-conflict countries in the region, which are more likely to experience the re-emergence of conflict unless they are addressed swiftly and appropriately. She concludes that insecurity continues to render the region unstable despite the efforts put in place to ensure peace and security (Omanyo, 2015).

Other accounts of insecurity include several terrorist attacks carried out in Kenya and Somalia. Others include electoral instigated conflicts, ethnic/tribal conflicts like in the newly independent state of South Sudan between the Dinkas and the Nuer, and conflicts related to presidential constitutional terms, such as the civil unrest in Burundi over late President

Nkurunzinza's 'third' term in office. The inflow of refugees and increase of Internally Displaced Persons in States that are already struggling to provide basic services to their citizenry is also another dimension that puts a strain on the social fabric of society. This has increasingly manifested as violent expressions of anti-migrant sentiments, which have resulted in loss of both life and property (Ligawa, 2015).

Additionally, Oluoch (2015), opines that increasingly, political transitions in the EAR have become a key source of conflict in many Member States where electoral processes are being manipulated, and where Constitutionalism and rule of law are under threat, from their very custodians. The situations that play themselves out during elections in countries like Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan are a cause for concern and EASF needs to be more engaged through a flexible and proactive structure. On his part, Williams (2008), adds that the proliferation of armed and militia groups and linkages with extremist groups continue to undermine efforts at promoting and consolidating Rule of Law across the region. Given the increased, visible disenchantment among the youth, the need for sustained dialogue and support to the implementation of peace accords has never been greater in the EAR (Oluoch, 2015).

Further, conflicts in the EAR, more so the intra state ones, can be attributed to persistent high level of poverty and the rise in the susceptibility of many parts of Africa to drought. Environmental factors like climate change have also caused conflicts in the region. One of the factors attributed to the Darfur conflict is competition for the scarce water resources and grazing lands. For this reason, conflicts in the region have been shaped by resource abundance and the struggle to control the exploitation of these resources. Nzau (2011), further observes that in the Great Lakes region; which included the countries of Burundi, the Democratic

Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, competition to control high value minerals has also been a major conflict driver. A good case is the situation prevailing in DRC.The same is also evident in countries outside the GLR with notable examples being in Sudan and South Sudan, where disputes still linger over the control and exploitation of revenues from oil and natural gas deposits in the border town of Abyei. The spillover effect of such conflicts also attracts external actors, bringing with them their own interests in the conflict dynamics (Kimathi, 2010).

On the other hand, Migue (2014), opines that the geostrategic importance of the Eastern Africa region (EAR), contributes to its insecurity and elusive peace. The effects of the Cold war and the superpowers left the region with many weapons hence contributing to the continuous problem of Small Arms and Lightv Weapons (SALW) proliferation. The post 9/11 anti-terrorism campaigns have also contributed to the strategic importance of the EAR. Incidences of insecurity in the region have been high given that both terrorism and counter-terrorism activities come into play in the region. In the EAR region, some heads of state have themselves come to power through rebel groups that overthrew the Central governments. Out of perceived fear of the existence of other rebel groups, such governments often use military force to silence the rebel groups, and or support insurgent groups to fight proxy wars against the enemy of the regime, usually a neighboring state. The conflict in Sudan, before secession of South Sudan, and the insecurity in Northern Uganda had greatly been sustained by the acts of insurgency supported by the Khartoum and the Ugandan regimes (Migue, 2014).

Munene (2015), observes that the extent of conflicts in the EAR that have been discussed herein can define all the countries in the region. Consequently, there is no individual state in the region that can plan for its own security without taking into account the security dynamics

of the neighboring states. (Kibuko, 2014), therefore contends that security interdependence and collective approach to security in the region is thus not a choice but a necessity. For this reason, the EAR has been regionalizing its collective security and conflict resolution capabilities and capacities within the structure and nature of the EASF to be able to address the numerous security challenges facing the region This has therefore, gone along way to define the structure and nature of the EASF. Tlalka (2014), underscores that, The African Standby Force has been developed as the ideal mechanism within the African Peace and Security Architecture to marshal forces to maintain peace and security in the continent. However, hegemonic competition, protracted civil strife, conflict over resources and dearth of political goodwill has punctured its effort to realize this collective objective (Tlalka, 2014).

As observed by Spivak (2009), the African continent has experienced myriads of conflicts over time and though ASF has played an important role in mediating peace agreements and assisting in their implementation, thereby helping to reduce the level of conflict in several regions. In West, ASF intervened in the Gambia crisis in January 2017 by deploying the ECOWAS military intervention in the Gambai (ECOMIB) while in the Southern Africa region ASF intervened in the crisis in Lesotho by deploying the SADC preventative mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho (SAPMIL) in September 2017. Omanyo (2015), observes that some ASF interventions have registered minimal success and this has resulted in increased internally displaced persons, refugee crisis, protracted communal violence that stems from tensions along ethnic and religious lines, contested electoral processes and outcomes,rise in transnational organized crime, including those related to migration and stagnated economic development. This has further complicated the security situation in and around such conflict areas in Africa, to include the East African Region (Spivak, 2009),

Omanyo (2015), observes that, the structure and nature of EASF is quite subjective as it is perceived and conceived as a phenomenon of both society and the state. This aggravates the understanding that there is little literature to understand the subjectivity of EASF. For this reason various assessments of the EASF have elicited academic disputations and policy bluffs as far as peace and security is concerned. Traditionally and from security standpoints, states are the most important actors where military capability is determined. Therefore, varying combinations of state and non-state networks come to play. Accordingly, Nzau (2016), opines that new security arrangement of regional security bodies have broadened the security context. In this vein, democratization, human rights and development have become issues of more concern (Nzau, 2016).

However, Nzau's assertions fall short of altruistic reality of intractableness of EASF. He fails to echo the fact that EASF has been undergoing a number of difficulties in realizing its mandate as a regional security mechanism. For this reason, the ineffectiveness of the EASF has been axiomatic due to want of broadening the mechanism to incorporate states' rivalry and supremacy battles (Nye, 2011). Besides, EASF setback includes the division of its structure between Ethiopia and Kenya.;While the planning element is based in Kenya,the logistics base and the force headquarter are based in Ethiopia, thus an apparent lack of an hegemon. Consequently, peace and security has been elusive in the EAR despite efforts put in place and security conceptions from conventional state-centric underpinnings to multifaceted approach of EASF. This has inspired this study to address gaps of security delivery by EASF in the region and especially in Kenya and Somalia occasioned by its structure and nature (Ligawa, 2015).

As regards the structure and nature of the EASF and its contribution in enhancing the mission of EASF, Omanyo (2015),in her works titled;*Regional Collective Security Mechanisms In Eastern Africa: The Case of the Eastern Africa Standby Force From 2004-2015*,contends that the EASF is a sub-regional standby force of the ASF for Eastern Africa Region whose mission is to undertake in a timely manner, the functions of maintaining peace and security in the region as mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council and in accordance with the Constitutive Act of the AU. The EASF is organized with a policy organ and multidimensional force consisting of military, police and civilian components that are pledged by member states and ready to be deployed at short notice and be to be able to successfully undertake its mandate within the EAR. From a historical perspective, this was a key consideration. At the time of its establishment, the region had no single regional organization that encompassed all the eight member states of the EAR (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia), nor had a directly mandated security role. Due to IGAD's recognition by the AU and the international community in the area of peace and security in the region and its inclusion of majority of states of the region, the organization was tasked to serve as the interim coordinator of efforts towards the establishment of the EASBRIG (Omanyo, 2015).

Subsequently, under the auspices of IGAD, the Jinja meeting of Experts on the establishment of the EASBRIG was held in February 2004, followed by a meeting of Eastern African Chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS) that adopted the Draft Policy Framework for the establishment of EASBRIG (Nzau, 2016). The policy framework was approved and a MoU to that effect signed in April 2005 at the 1st Ordinary Summit of the EASBRIG. In the MoU, EASBRIG's organs were to consist of the Assembly of Eastern Africa Heads of State and Government, the Eastern Africa Council of Ministers of Defense and Security, the Eastern Africa Committee of Chiefs

of Defense Staff, the planning element, the brigade headquarters, and the logistics base as depicted in the structure in figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: EASF Structure

Source: EASF Annual Report 2015

The Signatories to the memorandum were the Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, the Seychelles, and Madagascar. By 2011, thirteen (13) states were active members of EASF; they include Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, the Seychelles, Madagascar, Mauritius and Burundi. Eastern Africa as a sub region includes the Greater Horn, East Africa, the Great Lakes Region and the Indian Ocean islands.

Tlalka (2014), underscores that the key mandate of the EASF as structured was to carry out the functions of peace and security in the EAR in a timely manner and in accordance with the constitutive act of the AU. To attain this objective, EASF structure was designed with a structure capable of enhancing regional and continental peace through an effective and efficient regional CPMR capability in Eastern Africa and across the African continent. EASF thus strived to improve its structure to achieve a fully operational and multidimensional integrated force ready for deployment by 2015,as was contained in the EASF Strategic Development Plan 2010-2015, that was approved during the 2nd Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government held in Comoros, in March 2010. EASF achieved full operational capability in 2014 (Tlalka, 2014).

To this end, Nzau (2016), observes that the MoU on the establishment of the EASBRIG deliberately provided for three policy organs of the EASF, structured at three levels to manage the affairs of the EASF towards the realization of the Organization's mission and vision. These are the Assembly of Eastern Africa Heads of State and Government, the Eastern Africa Council of Ministers of Defence and Security, and the East African Chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS). Tlalka (2014), argues that the organizational structure and nature of EASF was purposely intended to provide adequate checks and balances within the EASF and its operations. The Assembly is the supreme authority of EASF. It formulates policy, directs and controls the functioning of the EASF. It also authorizes the deployment of the EASF in accordance with the AU Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol. The Heads of State and Governments meet at least once a year. The Council of Ministers of Defence and Security of the EASF Member States is the second tier of policy organs of the EASF. It manages day-to-day EASF affairs, appoints the EASF Director, Heads of Department, heads of other EASF units. It also appoints the EASF Commander upon recommendation of the EACDS for stand-

alone missions within the EAR. The Council of Ministers were the signatories to the MoU. Bayeh (2014), observes that the EACDS in the effectiveness of the EASF. It provides technical support to the other two organs in their work as it has an advisory role to the Assembly and the Council. It further directs and manages the Planning Element (PLANELM), the EASF Headquarters, and the Logistics Base. For this reason, its meetings precede those of the Council and the Assembly respectively. Together, the work and meetings of the Assembly, the Council and the Committee are called the Policy Organs Meetings (POM).

Ligawa (2015), observes that, as indicated in the EASF organizational structure in figure 2.1, the EASF is further composed of four main sets of structures at the operational level. They are split over two locations. The EASF Secretariat or the Planning Element (PLANEM), is based in Nairobi, Kenya. It coordinates and supports all EASF activities and it receives its political directives from the Council of Ministers, which is supported by the Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff. The PLANELM HQs is well established and has offices allocated with necessary communication and information systems infrastructure. On the other hand, the EASF Command Headquarters is co-located with the Mission Head Headquarters and the logistics base (LOGBASE) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The EASF HQ is composed of regional military, police and civilian staff on secondment from EASF Member States. It serves as a command headquarters for force preparation and operational command. The LOGBASE serves as the base for sub-depots and for maintaining, storage and management of the logistical infrastructure of the EASF, such as the rapidly deployable and Forward Force Headquarter.

Additionally, Talka (2014), observes that at the operational levels, the EASF   has now developed adequate capacities and skills within its operational capabilities, which the

organization and the region can use to engage in peace support operations if mandated. They include the Early Warning and Conflict Analysis that provides regular updates and analysis of conflict in the region and media monitoring. Others are the Integrated Mission Planning, Civilian skills, Military capabilities; Police Capability, Communication and Public Information as well as well tested Standard Operating Procedures (AU Report, 2013).

Cilliers and Malan (2005) also contended that a number of EASF Member States troops have a lot of peacekeeping experiences having deployed in a number of AU / UN Missions in Africa. A good example is the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) where troops from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia are deployed. Same case applies to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) where Kenya, Rwanda and Ugandan troops are also deployed. In the hybrid United Nations -Africa Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda have also deployed their troops. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Dr Congo (MONUSCO), has a number of Military Observers from Kenya. Additionally in the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA), there are troops from Burundi, Kenya and Uganda (AU Report, 2010)

As regards the structure and nature of EASF in the mission of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia, Robinson (2014), underscores the necessity of the collective security concept, to counter any attempt by states or any aggressor to change the status quo or the world order of independent sovereign states with overwhelming force.. For this reason,the League of Nations (LoN) and its successor, the United Nations Organization (UN) were established at for the maintenance of peace and security in the international system by promoting a collective security mechanism that would address major threats to global peace and security.

Kaldor (2012), further observes that, since 2011, conflicts and wars in different parts of the world escalated necessitating the need for collective responses at global, regional and national levels. From Arab uprising in Tunisia in January 2011,Egypt in January 2011,Libya in February 2011 to Morocco in October 2011,there has been an upsurge in conflict ranging from different reasons (Cuman, 2012). While some are politically instigated, others arise due to social marginalization and some due to economic melt down. This calls for collective security response. However the collective security concept has evolved and is varied in meaning. During Cold War period, security was state-centric. Post cold war period, the emphasis is on human security and the responsibility to protect (R2P). The international community through the UNSC has the responsibility to protect, where a state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens from violations against humanity. The AU too, unlike the OAU, adopted the principle of R2P as one of the basic tenets of its existence. While Somalia was engaged in R2P from 2007,Kenya got involved from 2011,both purposefully to foster peace and maintain security (Oluoch, 2015).

Collective security is thus an integrated organization that can avert threat or intervene in the internal affairs of states to stop crimes against humanity, the prohibition stated in article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, notwithstanding. It is based on four principles which are that; all agree that peace is indivisible, all countries reject the use of force except in self-defense, all pledge to unite to halt aggression and restore the peace, and finally all agree to supply whatever resources that are necessary for the collective security (Souza, 2013). In this regard, Omanyo (2015), avers that, an effective collective security mechanism need to be flexible in structure, nature and composition. It requires to be organized with essential elements that promote consensus, and commitment to act based on the system's principles. Additionally, it requires

to have capacity to deter most potential violators and to defeat an actual aggressor. On the other hand, Mason (2006), argues that the concept of collective security has been said to be unrealistic. The author opines that States in a region may not abandon conceptions of self-interest as a guide to policy in preference of a world society interested in preserving law and order everywhere. For this reason some countries may not be engaged in operations that they consider too risky, expensive or against their national interests as often demonstrated within EASF due to its structure and nature (Mason, 2006).

Kagwanja (2013), observes that this is not just common within EASF, but is also prevalent at the United Nations level, where most countries in the UN system have been reluctant to entrust their sovereign interests to collective action, only doing so, if it is of interest to them. This is despite the fact that it is contrary to Article 43 of the UN Charter that obliges member countries to provide assistance in maintaining international peace and security.

Additionally, in his work ,'How "Organized Hypocrisy "within the standby forces is Pulling African Institutions from Global Dominance, Onditi (2019), compliments the dominant focus from the international top-down perspectives of regional mechanisms such as EASF, ECOWAS and APSA. However, he contends that, in the case of EASF and associated structures such as peace keeping training centres, organized hypocrisy has deeply entrenched civil-military tensions. He therefore argues that, resolving such challenges requires a deeper understanding of the influence of organized hypocrisy on institutional structures. Further in their article," Civil-Military Relations and the African Standby Forces' Multidimensionism", Onditi and Okoth (2016), contend that regional norms doctrines and policies have played a role in altering the structures established as a result of this asymmetric relationship between the military and tensions have not only catalyzed the challenges but catapulted the intricacies

surrounding EASF mandate on maintaining peace and security. The researcher therefore argues that this has been the case with EASF in Kenya and Somalia.

2.2 Efforts of Standby Forces in maintaining peace and security

Globally, at the beginning of the Cold War, the United States and its European allies created a security organization that sought to deter the Soviet Union from further expanding beyond East Berlin. In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed and it served as the premier world security organization. The United States has been a central member of NATO with its role enhanced since the end of the Cold War. In recent conflicts, the United States has been involved in NATO military operations, particularly in Eastern Europe, South Asia, and North Africa. Lindberg (1963), noted that international actors that seek to attain their interests will require "systematic and durable cooperation" and institutions will seek "to attain their ends, including increasing their shares of gains from cooperation, through the use of political influence." To sum up, institutional cooperation allows states to increase their benefits in issues of international political importance. As an organization, NATO was created to defend Europe and maintain stability with a significant U.S. footprint. Ikenberry (2003), opines that through NATO, the United States saw its goals for Europe expand," realizing that reorienting and stabilizing Europe was in its interest as the conflict with the Soviet Union expanded. This is complimented by scholar Hallams who observes that;

> NATO is a formalised alliance whose members meet regularly and work together through institutional structures designed to facilitate agreement and consensus. It acts as a 'consensus engine,' whereby decisions are taken only with the agreement of all member states, unlike an ad hoc coalition, where states can opt in and opt out as they choose. Like a coalition, its members have come together for a common purpose and may offer resources and capabilities to that end, but unlike a coalition, there is

nothing temporary or transient about the NATO alliance and it is its institutional structures that give NATO its permanence (Hallams, 2010).

In addition to this idea, Duffield (1995), placed importance on NATO's "denationalization of security policy," which means that the interests of the alliance have more weight than that of one nation. He argued that the denationalization policy, which includes NATO's consultative organs, force planning process and integrated military structure help forge a common identity among alliance members. It allows members to view operations in the interest of the alliance itself in addition to their own national interests. Yet there appears to be a discrepancy between the ideal functioning of NATO and the theory of liberal institutionalism as the guide to cooperation in international organizations. NATO may have structures in place to "denationalize" the interests of its members, but NATO still functions as a cooperative security institution on the conceptions of its members' own self-interests, which is a key point of the liberal institutionalist theory. Countries still view their participation in NATO actions through the guise of its own self-interests, which would go against the ideal concept of NATO's functionality according to Duffield (1995).

Particularly, NATO's actions in military conflicts are governed by Article 5 of its charter. Article 5 stipulates the reasons for action.

> "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

However, for NATO to carry out operations, a decision-making process needs to be utilized that allows all the member-states to have a voice in the alliance. The process of decision-making for NATO occurs on the basis of consensus. NATO's functioning capability is divided into military and defensive structures with the Military Committee making proposals for the military decisions, while the North Atlantic Council (NAC) serves as the governing body that makes decisions on action by reaching an agreement. The NAC allows for consensus to be reached when "no government states its objection" during the decision-making process, which does not include a formal vote on action. This has hindered the progress of NATO to certain extent.(Coker,1985).

The post-Cold War thinking of NATO focused more on the rights of the individual rather than the defense of nations. However, the success of this shift did not come without a price that included the failure to effectively build consensus in a swift manner in order to deploy forces before a situation deteriorated further. This was evident in NATO's operations in Kosovo when the consensus-building process impeded NATO from quickly agreeing on target packages for bombing runs in Kosovo. According to Hallams (2010), "NATO's 'war by committee' also gave rise to a series of operational and tactical weaknesses with NATO members finding it difficult to agree on a common approach during Operation Allied Force." (Hallams,2010).

As discussed subsequently the other states in NATO had significant influence in preventing a consensus from being reached to conduct bombing runs in Kosovo causing concern on the part of the United States to remain involved in NATO for future operations. However, in the end, this was how NATO was intended to function with all its members working to reach consensus on how to conduct effective military operations in order to have an impact on the

conflict. Following the Prague summit of 2002, NATO's transformation evolved even further to prevent this indecisive consensus building from impeding its functions and alienating certain partners like the America and the European Union (Castaldi, 2007).

Following the Al Qaeda terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 in America, the role of the alliance changed dramatically. The United States focused its attention on avenging the attacks by conducting a military operation against the country that provided a safe haven to Al Qaeda. NATO offered to help and for the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 of the NATO charter, which stated that an attack on one NATO nation was an attack on all of NATO. While NATO was very involved in conflicts across the Balkans during former President Clinton administration, it was the administration of former President George Walker Bush that did not see much benefit for NATO to have a key role in the U.S. plan to respond to September 11 with a military operation in Afghanistan. The United States chose a more "unilateralist" approach at the outset of the Afghanistan conflict because former President Bush administration was frustrated with NATO's lack of precision capabilities during the conflicts in the Balkans (Ilik, 2009).

While this led the European allies in NATO to feel a sense of discouragement, it actually pushed NATO to transform itself to prepare for the looming threat of terrorism; a transformation that Hallams (2010), notes was driven by the United States, which still maintained strong commitments to NATO. However, while the United States was responsible for beginning the conflict in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in 2001, it was NATO that took over management of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from the United Nations in 2003. In order to understand what caused this shift, an examination of how the United States advocated for NATO's involvement following the initial stages of the

operation and NATO's decisions through consensus for involvement in Afghanistan is vital (Cecilia,2011).

Following the September 2011 terrorist attacks in America, NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter for the first time in its history. However, while the charter stipulated that NATO would provide any assistance needed following the attack of a member-state, the former president G. W. Bush administration only sought to use NATO as a small component of a much wider coalitionto avenge the attacks. According to Hallams (2010), regardless of the invocation of Article 5, the United States did not seek to use any of NATO's structures or utilize NATO collective action against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, only asking for contributions from member-nations that were "willing to engage in combat operations." Following the invocation of Article 5 by NATO, it did not take long for the United States to quiet speculation about a substantial role for NATO, particularly with comments made by U.S. the former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld about whether NATO would take a role in planning operations to retaliate for the attacks. Rumsfeld stated that, "the mission determines the coalition, the coalition must not be permitted to determine the mission."(Chester,2013).

Basically, the United States was telling NATO "thanks, but no thanks" to your offer for substantial involvement in Afghanistan. An interesting point that Hallams argued is that the nature of NATO's involvement in Afghanistan was different from past NATO operations, pre-September 11. She stated that, "Unlike in Bosnia and Kosovo, where only NATO had the capabilities to mount a military campaign, following 9/11 NATO was one of many options the United States had at its disposal. Unlike in the Balkans, where Europe depended upon U.S. involvement and indeed, leadership, in Afghanistan the harsh reality was that the U.S. simply was not dependent upon NATO support." (Macfarnace, 2014).

This occurred because the former president G W Bush administration was concerned after the Balkans experience that if there was NATO involvement, the decision-making and war-fighting strategy that was "clumsy and constrained" should not be repeated. Hallams (2010), further noted that the G. W Bush administration had "disdain" for the role of multilateralism, particularly when the administration was determined to pursue its own interests through a unilateral approach, and this tactic initially worked towards America's advantage. This is due to the fact that this approach does not require building of concesus, which takes time to react (Hallams, 2010).

Following this development, the United States conducted Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2001, through an ad hoc coalition, which allowed for a swift defeat of the Taliban through airstrikes and utilization of U.S. Special Forces to train Afghan tribal forces to take over the country. Even with its overall command, the Americans did not encounter much difficulty in conducting this operation in a rapid and effective manner (Hallams, 2010).

 According to Castaldi (2007), "the outcome of the military campaign seemed to confirm the utility of the American approach. After the demise of the Taliban, one of the main lessons that emerged was that 'a military hub-and-spoke command operation has worked far better for Washington than the consensus decision-making on which it had to rely during NATO air campaigns over Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, which left many in the U.S. Defense Department deeply frustrated.'" After the victory against the Taliban in the span of a month, the United Nations authorized the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to serve as an international peacekeeping force to maintain security in Kabul to assist with reconstructing the

country. ISAF was a NATO-led military mission in Afghanistan that was established by the United Nations Security Council in December 2001 by Resolution 1386, as envisaged by the Bonn Agreement. Due to America's original inclination not to be dictated how it would fight its own war to avenge attacks on its soil, it was unwilling to use the structures of NATO decision-making to carry out operations. The American ability to serve as a hegemon in the unipolar world allowed it to dictate terms on how NATO would utilize its footprint in Afghanistan and who would be in charge of the operational command in Afghanistan (Castaldi, 2009).

According to Press-Barnathan (2006), "immediately after the United States begun its operation in Afghanistan, there was a real eagerness on part of the European allies to offer military burden sharing to the operation." In addition, the European states believed there was a mutual perception of the inherent threats by Islamic terrorists, not only to the United States, but also to the Western world, and Europe was "eager to cooperate with the United States." While NATO did not take a major role initially in the conflict, NATO member-states did offer individual and bilateral assistance to the United States in its efforts to respond to the attacks, particularly assistance from Great Britain, France, and Germany. Press-Barnathan (2006), further argued that the reason for European involvement was that these countries wanted the United States to remain an active part of the NATO alliance, not only as a way to keep the alliance relevant, but also to restrain and influence the United States on its policies in Afghanistan (Press-Barnathan, 2006),

When studying the war in Iraq, one tends to remember that the United States had a unilateral approach of becoming embroiled in a military operation alone while dictating the terms for

involvement by other nations in a "coalition of the willing." However, while the United States did push for the war, other allies (not including Great Britain), and NATO itself did not want to get involved in the conflict because it was not in their collective interests to do so. According to Hallams (2010), "Between December 2002 and March 2003, the transatlantic community became locked in a titanic diplomatic struggle, not only with late president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, but also within itself, as the "United States" sought to lead the charge to war only to find itself facing significant opposition from many of its traditional NATO allies (Hallams, 2010).

According to Lorenz (2003), the differeing opinion on the war between the allies had destroyed the alliance. The fascinating thing about this case was that while NATO eventually became involved in the war in Iraq, it was with a light footprint. This was due to the differing interets within NATO membership. Most NATO members joined the war as part of the US led "coalition of the willing", The coalition comprised the countries of Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and Uzbekistan. Most of them joined to pursue their individual interests. So this prevented NATO from becoming entrenched in Iraq (Lorenz, 2003).

As the United States continued to respond to the global war on terror, it began to re-engage on the issue of Iraq's intransigence. The United States and Iraq were in a constant war of words and some infrequent airstrikes following Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait after the 1991 Gulf War. However, the terrorist attack in USA on September 11 in 2001,changed the thinking of American policy makers because the global war on terror gave the United States an opportunity to finally oust the regime of the late president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein by

connecting his regime to Al Qaeda networks. As the United States took its case to the global stage, including the United Nations, it was met with opposition from fellow allies especially during the debate in the UN security council on 18 February 2003,when allies from NATO like France and Germany opposed the US report on Weapons of Mass destruction min Iraq (Lorenz, 2003).

According to Hallams (2010), the push for military action and bickering between the parties caused a "fundamental schism within the transatlantic alliance" because there were different perceptions by the countries on what constituted major threats to their interests. The United States focused on preventing the late president of Iraq Saddam Hussein from acquiring weapons of mass destruction that he could use on American citizens and with the wounds of terrorist attack of September 11, a year old, this potential threat was even more important for the former president GW Bush administration. This caused global opinion to be mixed with some arguing that the former president GW Bush administration was using September 11 atatck as a "smokescreen for putting in place long-held objectives" to finish the job from 1991(Hallams, 2010),

Continentally, the ASF as a multidimensional force was formed to ensure continental stability. Since most conflicts on the continent are complex and of long duration, they call for a multifaceted approach and require capabilities to address not only security and military aspects, but also the political, humanitarian, developmental and legal/institutional dimensions of the conflicts. According to Darkwa (2018), the African Union came to life in July 2002. With 53 founding members (all African countries joined except Morocco) and a wide-ranging agenda, the AU replaced the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and reflects a fundamental shift in thinking for African leadership. The AU HQs is based is based in Addis Ababa,

Ethiopia. It is structured and better designed to respond to conflicts on the continent than its predecessor,the OAU, which emphasized the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, lacked both the statutory authority and capacity to intervene in matters related to peace and security(Desmidt *et al*,2010).

The AU, which embraces international cooperation and recognizes the primacy of the UN Charter in peace and security, has also adopted a wider field of engagement options, from mediation to using force to intervene in specific circumstances. Article 4 of the Constitutive Act specifies: The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. It also provides for the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security (Darkwa, 2017).

African governments have tried to create peace and security in Africa through different mechanisms. However many peace and security bodies like IGAD have been in place over many years. African Heads of States and Governments, in an effort to enhance their capacity to address the scourge of conflicts on the Continent and to ensure that Africa, through the African Union, plays a central role in bringing about peace, security and stability on the Continent, acknowledged the contribution of African regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution in the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent and the need to develop formal coordination and cooperation arrangements between these regional mechanisms and the African Union. Furthermore, the impact of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons threatens peace and security in Africa and undermines efforts to improve the living standards of African peoples (Derosso, 2010).

Also, the AU in reaffirming their commitments during the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) noted that armed conflicts in Africa have forced millions of people, including women and children, into a drifting life as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood and human dignity. This informed the establishment of an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. This is in accordance with the authority conferred to that regard by Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Thus, the Peace and Security Council was established to monitor and intervene in conflicts with an African force, conducted in a manner consistent with both the UN and the OAU Charters and the Cairo Declaration of 1993 on the establishment of the mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) (Kasumba etal 2010).

According to Derroso (2010), tragic scenes of conflict on the continent in the 1990s resulted in the deaths of millions of African men, women and children, and led to mounting criticism and internal reflection on the OAU's inability to intervene adequately in the series of unfolding crises. The genocide of Rwanda, and the conflicts in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), served to motivate African leaders towards the revitalization of the OAU into a body that was more progressive in promoting and achieving democracy, development and the human rights and basic security of African citizens. The restructuring of the continental body would provide an opportunity for African member states to seek ways of addressing the number of perennial challenges facing the continent collectively whilst, at the same time, promoting the unity of Africa and strengthening its ability to play a more dynamic role in both the regional and global arenas. During the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in

Sirte, Libya, on 9 September 1999, calls were made for the establishment of the AU. This was followed by the adoption of the Constitutive Act during the OAU Lomé Summit on 11 July 2000 (Onditi, 2015).

The ASF concept has contributed to the development of African capabilities for peace support operations, but it has been less useful in terms of deploying these capabilities. The strength of the ASF concept lies in setting common standards for the identification, training and retention of capabilities at the national level, which can be deployed when required. The ASF concept has also led to the development of multidimensional planning capabilities at the level of the AU Commission and the regional economic communities planning elements. However, actual deployments have relied on lead states and coalitions of the willing. The mission in Burundi (2003 – 2004) was mostly undertaken by a single lead state, all subsequent missions by coalitions of willing member states, often also involving lead states at critical times. As in other multilateral deployment contexts, the willingness of member states to contribute to a particular operation will always be based on considerations of national interest and the prevailing political climate. The AU and the regional economic communities will therefore have to deploy missions using what resources are available at the time, and probably not on the basis of a readily-deployable force from a particular region that can be deployed as a coherent entity (Nzau, 2013).

Additionally, Onditi (2015), reiterates that the AU Constitutive Act also provides for the establishment of the APSA in which a rapid reaction force under the African Standby Force (ASF) was envisaged. The ASF has five standby forces in which the participation of all countries in regional peace and security initiatives is expected. The Regional Standby Forces

(RSFs) that makes up the ASF include: the East African Standby Force (EASF), the Economic Community of West African States Standby Force (ESF), the North African Regional Capability (NARC), the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SSF), and the Economic Community of Central African States Standby Force (ECCAS)(Onditi, 2015).

The Eastern Africa component of the ASF is the EASF and so can assist incase of a conflict beyond the capabilities of the regional mechanism. Further, while the AU provides strategy, guidance and policies for regional peace and security, RECs and RMs play a major role in the development of APSA as coordinating and facilitating instruments towards a holistic approach to peace and security in the continent, and EASF is part of this security arrangement. The AU therefore, through its PSC has the responsibility of monitoring and intervening in conflict situations on the continent and also mandates and oversees an African force capable of rapid deployment and conducted in a manner consistent with both the UN and the AU Charters and the Cairo Declaration of 1993 on the establishment of mechanism for Conflict Prevention, management and Resolution. The AU protocol relating to the Establishment of the PSC Protocol and the APSA also realized the importance of RECs and RMs like EASF in addressing conflicts in Africa (Kimathi, 2010).

As noted by De Conning (2010), APSA is holistic, as it consists of interconnected decision making bodies that support peace and security on the continent. It therefore, represents Africa's framework to deal with peace and security issues, following lessons learnt from the Rwandan genocide between April-July 1994. Accordingly the AU PSC has the mandate to resolve conflict by deploying peace support missions through the ASF. The ASF consists of

standby multidisciplinary contingents stationed in their countries of origin and ready for deployment at appropriate notice. The concept of a standby capacity is not intended to have a standing army in Africa, but rather a standby arrangement that consists of contributions from AU member states and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs)(Darkwa, 2017).

Okumu and Wafula (2010), contend that the standby capacity for Africa is important for a rapid response to conflict linked to the ASF six deployment scenario most especially in scenario six against genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly. The Regional Standby Forces (RSFs) that makes up the ASF include: the East African Standby Force (EASF), the Economic Community of West African States Standby Force (ESF), the North African Regional Capability (NARC), the Southern African Development Community Standby Force (SSF), and the Economic Community of Central African States Standby Force (ECCAS) (Okumu and Wafula, 2010).

The AU PSC has undertaken peacekeeping missions in Sudan in the Darfur region where the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed in 2004, in Burundi where the African Union Mission In Burundi (AMIB) was depoloyed in 2003, in Somalia where African Union Mission In Somalia (AMISOM) was deployed and in Mali where the African Uninion Led International Stabilization Mission in Mali (AFISMA) was deployed in 2013.This is in line with the ASF PSOs doctrine; which clearly illustrates the AU PSOs strategic context, concepts and direction. According to this doctrine, the AU envisions a continent united in preventing and acting against conflict. This gives the AU the responsibility to capacitate itself with the operational structures to intervene where there is a threat to peace, including in Kenya and

Somalia while, recognizing the sovereign rights of states to decide whether or not they want to participate in multidimensional peace operations (ASF Doctrine, 2006).

To this end, Okumu and Wafula (2014), acknowledges that the AU has worked closely with RECs/RMs in Africa: among them ECOWAS, SADC and EASF to coordinate its peace operations since they are its building block. The AU and its RECs/RMs have significantly increased their capacity to undertake and manage peace operations in recent years and today, the AU continues to put the relevant policy frameworks and structures in place to build its capacity (Okumu and Wafula, 2014).

Darkwa (2017), acknowledges that Africa now has a more comprehensive peace and security architecture in place, with structures that are already operational and which needs to be continuously utilized to address conflict situations in the continent. One key operational framework that the AU has put in place to carry out an effective peace support operation is related to the Protection of Civilians (PoC). This was developed when AU noted that PSOs in Africa are increasingly tasked with PoC mandate, and the ability of PSOs to deliver in this respect is closely linked to the legitimacy and credibility of the mission. This is due to the fact that as long as pcilinas are being killed then a mission is deemed to have failed. So the AU made efforts to put in place relevant modalities. In this regard, in 2012, the AU developed guidelines for the PoC within its operations (Darkwa, 2017).

The guidelines are intended to assist the PSC in preparing for PSOs, and in the development of mandates and additional strategic documents. The guidelines support the developing of a

consistent and effective strategy to implement protection objectives, in coordination with the host state, and local communities, Civil Society Organizations and external protection actors like UN agencies. The guidelines therefore contains aspects from the United Nations Missions in South Sudan (UNMISS) PoC Strategy Concept, (2009); the United Nations Missions in Darfur (UNAMID), Mission Directive No 2009/01: PoC in Darfur; the United Nations Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)/Protection Cluster Protection in Practice: Practical Protection Handbook for Peacekeepers; the Draft Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces and Security Services of West Africa adopted by the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) Committee of Experts of 2006 (Kasumba *et al*,2010).

The guideliens have also borrowed from the Aide-Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the PoC in Armed Conflict approved under UN Security Council Resolution 1894 (2009) adopted by the Security Council at its 6216th meeting on 11 November 2009, (UN Doc. S/RES/1894, 2009). The AU narrowed all the contexts in those documents to come up with a document that suits the context of an AU mission specific PoC strategy. Williams (2018),in his book*"Fighting for Peace in Somlai;A History and analysis of the AMISOM from 2007-2017"* observes that AU has further developed a mission specific PoC strategy for AMISOM(Williams,2018).

Gelot *et al* (2016), however observes that while the AU has become an important peace operations actor on the African continent, a major feature of its peace operations is its reliance on international support. This is because the AU is comprised of African countries that are the least developed in the world, and they are often faced with severe economic challenges. Thus, the AU's ability to finance its own peace operations is limited. The success of AU peace

operations is largely dependent on cooperation with the UN. This is because, both the UN Security Council and the PSC of the AU have a vested interest in conducting more effective peace operations in the world and in particular Africa. These operations are once again in high demand with possible deployments in Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Sudan, which continue to experience instability (Gelot *et al*, 2016),

Williams (2012), avers that AU deployments have also increased largely due to AU-UN collaboration in Somalia and Mali. In February 2012, the UN Security Council endorsed the expansion of the UN support package for AMISOM, and increased its uniformed personnel from 12,000 to 17,731. Despite the proliferation of UN-AU coordination mechanisms and a growing mutual recognition that each institution has its comparative advantages, there is still significant scope for enhancing collaboration between the AU, its RECs like the EASF through cooperation and harmonization of best practices (Williams, 2012).

Regionally, understanding EASF efforts in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia presupposes the primacy of EASF in the maintenance of EAR peace and security. This however begs a number of questions that include; what are the peace and security efforts put in place by EASF? What is an effort? In what context is peace and security pursued in the EAR?. What lessons can EASF learn from other regional organizations like ECOWAS as it endeavours to maintain peace and security in the West Africa region?(Agyapong,2005). It is argued that, the presence of several organizations within the East Africa region are not well coordinated. This has been identified through political squabbles among regimes and wobbly political will among member states. Consequently a synergy gap stares at the functionality of

EASF (Bouhuys, 2011). The study therefore is aimed at evaluating the efforts of EASF as complimented by other regional organizations.

The antecedent questions remain a dilemma in EASF's quest to maintain peace and security not only in the region but also in Kenya and Somalia. Nye (2011), moots that operationalization of collective security is a roadmap towards creation of security policy environment. Though he alludes to this possibility by referring to a set of actors, structures and processes that permeate the whole policy cycle, he does not foresee or prescribe the timeline the policy can be effective. His postulations are just but diagnostic endeavours rather than directly providing prognosis for the peace and security dilemma in the region. Therefore, a thin and blurred line exists in his suppositions. Another critical aspect in the peace and security agenda is the shift from autocratic systems to a democratic consolidation of power as underscored by Nzau (2013), in his book titled"*Implications of Kenya's Operations Linda Inchi in Somalia on the future of Peace and Security in the Greater Horn of Africa"*. Albeit this is a positive step, the security environment within EAR is little appreciated considering that the regional environment is still volatile especially in the face of terrorism and radicalization threats emanating from war-torn Somalia (Ligawa, 2015).

Botha (2014), observes that radicalization alone has created more insecurity in Kenya and Somalia than any other factor. Conflicts between youths and security have greatly affected peace agenda in the region and more especially in Kenya and Somalia. Vines (2013), is among the authors who concur that conflicts continue to ravage a number of countries in the EAR to include; in *Sudan*, where the conflict in Darfur has claimed approximately 200,000 lives. Comparatively, according to Global security .org in their artcle of 2018,from the fall of Siad

Barrae in 1991,an estimated 350,000 to one million Somalis have died from the civil conflict (Global Security.org-Dec 2018).

Reno (2011), observers that fortunately wars between sovereign states have nearly ceased in the EAR; for example between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Bachman (2012), notes that EASF must envision a society free of inter-state conflicts and focus more on intra-state conflicts. Vines (2013), opines that the EASF as the sub-region`s standby force for conflict management, will be expected to carry out intervention missions mandated to it by the AUPSC to address the new trends in security management to be able not only end conflicts in the region but also in Kenya and Somalia. Among the new trends are terrorism, climate change (Bachman, 2012).

In light of the foregoing, the study therefore, endeavored to assess EASF's regional efforts in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Omanyo (2015), underscores that EASF is not the only regional security mechanism existing in the Eastern Africa region since there are also other regional bodies that work towards promoting peace and security. Nzau (2016), underscores that, among the efforts to be used by EASF to maintain peace and security in EAR and in particular in Kenya and Somalia is to explore ways of working with other continental and regional organizations with a peace and security mandate. These include, the AU, IGAD, and ICGLR among others, which EASF has to find ways to cooperate and work closely with for it to achieve its mandate (Nzau, 2016).

As regards the capabilities of the AU, it was founded in March 2001 in Libya with a broader mandate than its predecessor the OAU. The AU Constitutive Act, while recognizing the

respect for territorial integrity and respect for sovereignty of nation States, mandated the organization pursuant to a decision of the Assembly, to deal with human rights issues which are no longer regarded as matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States, in Member States (MS). This thus forms the basis of collective security mechanism in the Eastern Africa region (AU Report on APSA, 2010).

Nzau (2016), observes that the other effort by EASF in its mandate of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia is through cooperation with IGAD. It was founded in 1996 to replace Inter Goveremntal Authority on Developmen and Desetification (IGADD), which had earlier been founded in 1986 to address, alongside national efforts of Member States, the recurring natural disasters that had caused severe hardship in the Eastern Africa region. Its member states are; Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. IGAD's mandate goes beyond the promotion of greater regional political and economic cooperation. It is focused on promoting peace and security in the region by seeking to create mechanisms for the conflict prevention and management (CPMR) of inter and intra-State conflicts through dialogue; facilitate repatriation and reintegration of refugees, returnees and displaced persons, demobilized soldiers (Eriksson, 2013).

Sousa (2013), in his book titled; " *The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Subsidiary and the Horn of Africa: The Intergovernmental Authority for Development* " reiterates that IGAD has developed adequate capacity to deal with a variety of disputes within the sub-region before they are referred to other regional or international organizations and can cooperate with other conflict management mechanisms in the region to include EASF. Such

threats to regional security comprises of developmental, environmental and economic issues (Sousa, 2013),

The key organs of IGAD are the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, and the Committee of Ambassadors. Other organs are the IGAD Member States' Speakers of Parliament, the Civil Society Forum (CSF), and International Partners Forum (IPF). In 2000, IGAD established sub regional mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR) of inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Member states adopted the protocol on the "Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism" (CEWARN) to assist in conflict prevention through information gathering and early responses to any detected problem. IGAD develops capacity in the management of arms proliferation through the Regional Center for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) based in Nairobi. Additionally, it has the IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT), which is a counter-terrorism initiative, supported by IGAD partners. Additionally, IGAD has an established Mediation Support Unit (MSU), with considerable experience in mediating conflicts in areas like the Sudan and Somalia peace processes. it had also proposed deployment of a Peace Support force in Somalia; the IGAD Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) in 2012 (Baldwin,2012).

Kimathi (2010), in her work titled; "*A Common Agenda of Post-Conflict Reconstruction among Eastern Africa Sub-Regional Organizations: Exploring the Challenges*", acknowledges that ICGLR is another inter-governmental organization of the countries in the Great Lakes region that EASF is cooperating with to maintain peace and security in the EAR. Its formation was motivated by concern by the UNSC, through its resolutions 1291 and 1304, which decried

the long and deadly conflicts that were going on in the Great Lakes Region, and by the spillover effect of conflicts in the region, like refugee criis and human migration The main objective of ICGLR as a regional mechanism is to transform the Great Lakes region into a place of sustainable peace and security, stability, democracy and development through coordinated efforts of the member countries (Daniel,2011).

The organization also values the importance of working together with other stakeholders in particular the Group of Friends and Special Envoys, the EASF and the AU to provide financial, diplomatic, technical and political support. She underscores that the legal framework of the ICGLR and its agenda is a guided pact, which contains many protocols; action programs and projects geared towards the ICGLR objectives. It came into effect in 2008, after ratification by eight parliaments of the 11 Member States. The Pact places special emphasis on non-aggression and mutual defense in the ICGLR region. The headquarters of ICGLR is based in Bujumbura, Burundi and its functions involve coordination, facilitation, monitoring and implementation of the Pact in order to attain peace, security, political stability and development in the Great Lakes Region (GLR). Its main pillars are peace and security, good governance, economic development and humanitarian issues. The ICGLR experts and authorities meet regularly to fast track implementation of its projects and protocols. Executive board of the ICGLR is in charge of assessing the progress made. There are also National Coordination Mechanisms (NCM) with representatives from civil society, women and youth, to ensure follow up and implementation of decisions made by the Summit and the Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee (RIMC)(Allan, 2012).

William (2011), observes that the organization has been involved in many activities aimed at conflict prevention such as Joint security management of common borders that involves

implementation of projects related to disarmament and repatriation of Armed Groups in Eastern Congo, development of border zones and promotion of human security and demining of the GLR. ICGLR also has a programme on inter-state cooperation on peace and security through projects that deal with the fight against the proliferation of SALW and against Transnational Crime and Terrorism (William, 2011).

Tlalka (2014), also underscores the need and appreciates efforts by EASF to cooperate and work closely with the East African Community (EAC), being an intergovernmental organization composed of six countries in the African Great Lakes region in eastern Africa: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.These countries also happen to be members of the EASF with the exception of the Republic of Tanzania. EAC initially started as an integration arrangement between Uganda and Kenya; which were both colonies of the British. The integration began after completion of the railway through Kenya to Uganda in 1902, followed by the establishment of an East African Currency Board in 1905 to offer bank notes to the two territories and finally the establishment of Postal Union in 1911.This was occasioned by the fact that the British saw it favorable to coordinate services between the two territories (Findlay, 2014).

In 1917, the two colonial territories of Kenya and Uganda united to form a free trade and this marked the first phase of East Africa integration. The second phase of regional integration of East Africa began in 1923 when Tanganyika was incorporated into the Customs Union after joining the Currency Board in 1921. It later joined the Postal Union in 1933. From 1926-1950, other initiatives to integrate their economies were put in place like the formation of a Common Market, Joint East African Income Tax Board and the Economic Council. In 1948, the East African High Commission was formed. It consisted of colonial governors of Kenya, Uganda

and Tanganyika. This marked the third phase of regional integration of East Africa (Cuman, 2013).

The High Commission was a corporate body and the Governors met at least two to three times in a year. The Governor of Kenya was the Chairman of the commission and according to the Order of Council, in the absence of the High Commission at the Conference; the Chairperson had the powers to act on his behalf on matters agreed upon by the High Commission. It had the powers to make laws for peace, order and good governance of territories with the consent of the territorial Legislative Council (Duina, 2012).

The East Africa Common Services Organization (EACSO), was formed in December 1961 and its initial charter was drafted to consider Tanganyika as a State; thus its President would represent it whilst the Governors would represent the two territories, as it was not clear when they would achieve their independence. When Kenya and Uganda attained independence in 1963 and 1962 respectively, the Constitution of EASCO was amended to include the two Presidents in the authority. The EACSO's headquarters was in Nairobi and its main aims were to centralize the administration of East Africa customs, currency, land, sea, air transport, telecommunication services, education and exercise of revenue authorities. In the process of pursuing its goals EACSO faced various challenges including trade imbalances and unequal distribution of resources (Chipea, 2013).

In 1964, Kampala agreement was signed to address the persisting problems in the pursuit of integration. This was to be achieved by correcting the imbalances prevailing in the common market primarily to decrease trade deficit and industrial imbalances in Uganda and Tanzania. The Agreement proposed methods of redressing trade imbalances. This did not come to effect

because Kenya failed to ratify it. Instead, Kenya insisted on single currency to be maintained. This was never accepted by the other parties and because of this, the agreement had been referred to as the Kampala 'Disagreement' as it was never implemented (Bar, 2016).

In 1967,the three now independent countries of East Africa signed the Treaty for East African Co-operation. This officially established the East African Community. It was signed in Kampala by former presidents Mzee Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Milton Obote of Uganda, on June 6 1967 and it came into force in December 1967. The main objective of the community was to strengthen and to regulate industrial, commercial and other relations of the partner states. It was agreed that all benefits accrued were to be shared equitably through the establishment and maintenance of a common market and the operation of common services (Mays, 2009).

Ligawa (2015), in his work titled, "*The Challenges facing the Eastern African Community In Conflict Intervention*" observes that the EAC started exhibiting problems in1972. The EAC ministers made frantic efforts to save the regional economic cooperation, but it finally collapsed in 1977.This was ten years after the Treaty of East Africa Cooperation had been signed. The collapse was attributed to various factors that had manifested themselves rapidly after the *Uhuru (Independence)* of member states. One was that territorial and national consciousness emerged and this resulted to national belonging and national interests, which took precedence over supranationalism. This resulted in a lot of energy being placed on national building as each state felt its national interest were too basic to compromise. This resulted in escalating the breakup of the East Africa Federation because, the three member states did not completely agree on what regional unity entailed. For this reason the level of

understanding differed between all of them what Tanzania and Kenya understood, as regional unity was that, it involved the concept of a tightly constructed federation (Ligawa, 2015).

For Uganda, regional unity inferred a loose plan of inter-territorial co-ordination that should respect citizenship, foreign affairs, agriculture and external borrowing of each member state to be dealt with by the individual government. However, the essence of regional integration is primarily political, aimed at meeting security needs and enhancing bargaining power. Economic considerations in integration are paramount in sustaining a regional integration arrangement. This is because a country enters into an economic bloc with the goal of benefiting from it. Failure to adequately address the socio-economic disparities leads to conflicts, insecurity or eventually break-ups of regional unions. This explains the demise of the first East African Community especially when Kenya was perceived to be benefiting at the expense of the other two members (Munene, 2015).

Adan and Pkalya (2005) in their works titled*," Closed to Progress: An Assessment of the Socio-Economic Impacts of Conflict on Pastoral and Semi Pastoral Economies in Kenya and Uganda"* observed that for an integration to survive, there is need for political will that unconditionally supports integration and involves public participation and the involvement of civil society in its establishment. A stable foundation for legitimate and formal democratic procedure provides a climate for long-term economic reforms that are pursued and ensures that institutions are not dependent on the political leaders, heads of states and political appointees. This does not mean that all benefits will be distributed equally neither does it mean that problems and constraints will be non-existent. It however means, that no member state will benefit at the expense of another and that any obstacles will be seen as providing

opportunities for adoption of new innovative initiatives to enhance the union (Adan and Pkalya, 2005)

Ligawa (2015), avers that,it is however important to appreciate the fact that East Africa's economic problems cannot be treated in isolation. This is because; East African economies and the world economic systems have links in form of loans and financial aid from World Bank and International Monetary Fund. These financial ties are from time to time influenced by the international politics especially when a country does not follow reforms as agreed, which makes it to risk losing financing from these two organizations. Trade is equally affected as the value of the cuurency keeps fluctuating depending on its value compared to that of dollars. This was the case especially when each member state introduced its currency and when the formation of a federation that could have given member states better bargaining grounds failed (Ligawa, 2015).

Presently, the EAC comprises the countries of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan. It has its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. The main organs of the EAC are the Summit of Heads of State, the Council of Ministers, fourteen ministerial-level sectoral councils, the Co-ordination Committee, and the East African Court of Justice, the East African Legislative Assembly, and the Secretariat the primary focus of the EAC is regional economic integration. However EAC recognizes the importance of regional security in fulfilling its mandate. Articles 124 and 125 of the EAC Treaty deal with defense and security respectively. While defence largely refers to military matters, security broadly refers to matters such as the police reforms, education and infrastructure. Chapter 5 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC provides that peace, security and good neighborliness in the region shall be among the fundamental objectives of the Community. Vital areas of collaboration in security and

defense among member states include the fight against SALW proliferation, cooperation among partner state police forces aimed at stemming cross border criminal activities. These activities are restricted to joint exercises and collaboration between member states. The EAC has no authority over national troops (Birech, 2018).

William (2012), observes that regionally, the EAC continues to cooperate with ECOWAS, EASF, IGAD and the AU. The latter, which operates various types and levels of early warning mechanisms, has helped EAC to establish its own Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) and this is considered as one of the most important pillars of conflict and crisis prevention. Additionally the EAC also put up the Nyerere Centre for Peace Research in Tanzania, to provide informed policy options, training and research to the EAC in the field of peace and security as well as promote peace and security as the main requisites of integration and development in the region. Among the key challenges of EAC is that it gets financed from a partnership fund from which partners support specific projects. It however funds for its daily running expenses from the member states assessed contributions (Williams, 2012).

Other challenges facing the EAC include lack of adequate personnel, slow enforcement of agreements made at EAC meetings at the national level and the difficult for EAC to act on military security matters within member states since the community has no authority over national troops. In addition, Tanzania seems to be reserved concerning the envisaged political federation of East African countries. However, despite all these challenges, the security activities of EAC, which falls under the broader definition of security, can complement the efforts of other regional security mechanisms, like the EASF, to not only maintain peace and security in the EAR and in particular with reference to Kenya and Somalia (Munene, 2015).

Cilliers and Malan (2005), contends that EASF efforts to maintain peace and security need to borrow lessons from ECOWAS experiences in West Africa. ECOWAS has successfully intervened in conflicts in Liberia in 1990, Sierra Leone in 1997, Guinea Bissau in 2012, Mali in 2013 and the Gambia in 2017. This success is collaborated by, Vines (2013), in his book titled;*"A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture"*, where he observes that ECOWAS is a sub-regional organization with a mandate to maintain peace and security in West Africa Region. ECOMOG was the name given to the force created by ECOWAS to intervene as peacekeepers in the sub-region's conflicts. ECOMOG was created in a meeting of the organization in Banjul, capital of Gambia, on August 6-7, 1990, with the objective of intervening (citing humanitarian grounds) in the civil war in neighbouring Liberia. This was the first attempt by a sub-regional organization to actualize the mantra of Africans taking care of their own problems (Cilliers and Malan, 2005). This success of ECOWAS is further reiterated by Onditi (2015),in his thesis; *Civil–Military Relations Influencing Viability for Multi-dimensional Peace Support Capacities within the Eastern and West African Standby Forces".*

2.3 Challenges and opportunities facing Standby Forces in maintaining of peace and security

Globally, even though the UN is not the exclusive institution to deploy in peace operations, it still is the dominant one. Other multinational standby forces like NATO and the EU, AU has joined the UN in deploying missions, mostly mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Surprisingly, it was not the long time peacekeeper UN but NATO that issued the first detailed Doctrine on Peace Support Operations; the Allied Joint Publication (AJP-3); that was published in July 2001. In June 2003, a Doctrine on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), the AJP-9, followed (Castaldi, 2007).

The formation of NATO's Peace Support Operations Doctrine was, influenced by the experiences from NATO's first missions in this field, for instance the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid and late-90s. In 1997, members of NATO's Adhoc Group on Cooperation and Peacekeeping (AHGCP) undertook a comprehensive lessons learned evaluation exercise on these missions. The British debate in the 90s on concepts like "wider peacekeeping" and "defensive peacekeeping" as well as the Report of the Brahimi Panel on UN Peacekeeping, published in 2000, also had considerable influence on the formation of NATO's doctrine. The Brahimi Report for the first time explicitly recognized "robustness" as a decisive principle for UN peacekeeping in complex emergencies, particularly in failed states (Luckystar, 2012).

The absence of explicit reference to the police in NATO's doctrine as a later important actor in modern peace operations is striking. In Bosnia and Herzegovina a major police force, the so-called IPTF (International Police Task Force) led by the UN, had been one of the main partners of NATO. Surprisingly, the lessons learned from this cooperation did not enter into NATO's doctrine. However, NATO was quick to learn from the severe problems of the UN Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR), had experienced in implementing its mandate due to weak capabilities. Its credibility was totally undermined due to this weakness, culminating in the Srebrenica tragedy. Credibility was therefore incorporated in NATO's doctrine as a key term and is defined as "a reflection of the parties' assessment of the force's capability to accomplish the mission"(Afyare, 2012).

Yet, despite this emphasis on credibility formulated in December 2001, NATO member states, unfortunately, have been at the very same time most reluctant to provide International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan with a level of capabilities that would have assure such credibility. Despite half a century debating the problem of burden sharing, NATO has proven incapable of generating equal sharing of the defense burden. As noted in the foregoing, a growing gap in technology and military capabilities has limited the interoperability. However, despite this gap and moving beyond the organizational changes, the Alliance still made advances in other areas associated with military innovation (Larsen, 2018).

Williams (2018), opines that, the first comprehensive UN peacekeeping doctrine was developed much later. It took until March 2008 for the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to publish its "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines." Although unofficially labelled the "Capstone Doctrine", it does not constitute an officially agreed doctrine. In his introduction, the former Under Secretary General (USG) for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Mr Jean Marie Guéhenno,in 2009,declared it a codification "of major lessons learned from the past six decades of United Nations peace-keeping"(Williams,2018).

A number of UN departments, UN specialized organizations as well as relevant international and regional think tanks and peacekeeping actors where involved in a process of consultations to bring this document about. Before its publication the document was presented to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (SCPO), in New York for final deliberation. It is not surprising that the UN is much more cautious than NATO with regard to the military aspects of peacekeeping. This starts with the fact that peacekeeping and not peace support operation or peace operations remain the official term of the UN. Consultations in particular with member states from the global south countries (developing countries in the global south like Brazil, India and Kenya), convinced the authors of the guidelines to drop the term peace operations

although used more frequently in earlier drafts of the document and in the Brahimi Report, it smelled too Western and interventionist (Williams, 2018)

However, the UN document like NATO one, also fails to sufficiently acknowledge the police as a key actor in peacekeeping operations. It only incorporates the recent change in terminology from CIVPOL (Civilian Police) to UNPOL, thereby indicating that the police now are to be considered an actor on its own merit, and not simply another civilian actor. Yet, the so-called Formed Police Units (FPUs) and their strategic importance in closing the "public security gap" between the military and the civilian side are not dealt with in the documents, although their introduction into peacekeeping is one of the most innovative developments of UN peacekeeping, as well as non-UN-led missions (Derroso, 2010).

In 2002,after three years of consultations and with minor accomplishment, NATO heads and governments met at Prague, adopting a dissimilar approach from that of the DCI in efforts of improving its broadness and softness. Instead of completing all of the capability goals, the allies agreed under the PCC to upsurge their military capability in one of the following eight areas: Defense against weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); intelligence; command, control and communications; combat effectiveness (with precision-guided munitions); air-to-ground surveillance; strategic airlift and sealift; aerial refuelling and deployable combat support units (NATO, 2002). In all of these areas, specific nations accepted to forge ahead in pushing capability forward. Spain agreed to lead a group of countries to lease air-to-air refuelling tankers. These explained the nature of NATO operations. The Netherlands did the same for securing smarter weapons, Norway to develop sealift, and Germany to lease airlift. These groups were created in which states sought to increase their capabilities in specific areas.

Accordingly, the overall line of the PCC was an attention to multinational teaming or pooling, crisis management, and to role sharing or specialization (Sloans, 2008).

Although allies made advancements in certain PCC capability areas, the structural gaps remained mostly the same four years after the plan's adoption in 2002. This reflected the lacking political will to commit, and that actual implementation would continue to be a slow process, putting great emphasis on the funding by national governments. While the PCC seemed more adjustable than the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), the Smart Defense Initiative (SDI) is regarded as a way of getting "more bang for the buck". The former Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen unveiled the initiative at the 2011 Wehrkunde Security conference in Munich, presenting it as a new means of "ensuring greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility" (Jack etal, 2009),

NATO leaders agreed to incorporate Smart Defense at the Chicago Summit in 2012, for making sure that the Alliance could develop, acquire and maintain the capabilities required to achieve goals for NATO Forces by 2020, due to the continuing lack of inter-operability and persistent capability shortfalls. Central for this is the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), adding emphasis on supporting measures in the areas of education, training, exercises and technology Because of pressing requirements for results; the SDI is different from the DCI and PCC. NATO has faced increasingly more complex and diverse challenges such as threats from non-state actors, conflicts out of NATO territory and cyber-attacks (NATO, 2010; NATO, 2016). The revise of the Strategic Concept in 2010 not only strengthened the credible deterrence and Article V mission, but also simultaneously included more tasks and challenges, such as ballistic missile defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, maintenance of readiness,

training, force preparation, effective engagement and force protection (NATO, 2012). Adding to this complexity, these challenges needed to be met in a time of decreasing military expenditures and military structures of allied states. In dealing with this problem, SDI required change in national along with the alliance's culture of cooperation (Desit and Perks, 2012; Viereck, 2013).

At the continental level, the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) in 2002 was a significant development in African peace operations. The ASF with its Military Staff Committee was conceived to conduct, observe, and monitor peacekeeping missions in responding to emergency situations anywhere on the continent requiring rapid military responses. In May 2003, the African Chiefs of Defence and Security (ACDS) adopted the AU Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee. The framework called for five brigades comprising of military, civilian, and police components in each of the continent's five geographic regions. The AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) in Addis Ababa is the coordinating mechanism and is anticipated to command an Africa-wide integrated communication and information system linking the brigades to the PSOD at the AU, as well as the regional headquarters (Murithi, 2005).

The target date for the ASF to be fully operational was June 2010 but this was achieved in 2015. Africans had to find a way to address challenges that confronted them. They chose to promote a framework of solidarity through which they could support each other and achieve their aspirations of self-determination, respect and the ability to live in peace as a breakthrough to embracing globalism. African Uninion has been the basis from which member states indicated their willingness to take risks for peace and accept their share of responsibility for the continental stability and development (Darkwa, 2017).

The first step was initiation of the protocol relating to Peace and Security Council (PSC) of African Union, which entered into force in December 2003. The council is composed of fifteen members; five of who are elected every three years and remaining ten are elected every two years. Its objectives as indicated in the protocol include the promotion of peace, security and stability by anticipating and preventing conflicts in the continent. In case of a conflict, the PSC will take the responsibility of peace building through dialogue and mediation. It also acts as the authority for deployment and management of the AU led peace and stability operations. The decision to intervene requires a common perspective on what threat to the peace would entail, and the AU Constitutive Act has defined the conditions under which a collective response could be implemented (Kasumba *etal*, 2010).

To facilitate duties of the PSC, especially the implementation of Common African Defense and Security Policy, the AU equipped the PSC with three key bodies: Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System and the Standby Force. The Panel of the Wise is a team of highly respected Africans with wide experience relating to peace and security activities in the continent. Their role is to provide the council with advice on areas of peace and security. The Early Warning System is a mechanism that has the capacity to collect, process and act on information in order to provide the council with early warning regarding threats to peace and security. Lastly the Standby Force is composed of civilians, police and military components located in their respective countries but capable of rapid deployment at short notice (Darkwa, 2017).

The Force operates in various areas and carry out all types of peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions and disaster relief operations. ASF is based on a Brigade size force provided by each

of the five African regions and the force operates on the following six mission scenarios under the mandate of the AU: Scenario 1: AU/regional military advice to political mission, Scenario 2: AU/regional observation mission co-deployed with UN mission, Scenario 3: Stand alone AU/regional observer mission, Scenario 4: AU/regional peace keeping force for Chapter VII and preventive deployment, Scenario 5: AU peace keeping force for complex multidimensional peace keeping Missions and Scenario 6: AU military intervention in circumstances such as genocides whereInternational community fails to act promptly (Deroso,2010).

According to Derroso (2010), the establishment of the Standby force was done in two phases. In phase one (up to 30 June 2005), the Commission of the AU was expected to develop its capacity to manage scenario 1 and 2 missions, while the regions were expected to assemble standby brigade groups capable of handling scenario four, including a small full-time planning element. In phase two (1 July 2005 up to 30 June 2010) the Commission was to work to develop the capacity to manage scenario five, while all regions were expected to have increased their rapid deployment capability. The following deployment timeline target was recommended for the Standby Force; deployment for simpler missions should be accomplished in thirty days, deployment for complex missions should be completed in ninety days, with military component being able to deploy in thirty days. Darkwa (2017), notes that while a lot of effeort has been made to effectively achieve these timelines, more still requires to be done since same gaps were realized during Amani Africa Field Training Exercise conducted in 2015 in South Africa (Darkwa, 2017).

Darkwa (2017), underscores that, addressing the challenges of the ASF lies within the AU and therefore, it is imperative that African Heads of States should show political will and support

for effective implementation of the AU Constitutive Act. The road ahead is not an easy one; it will require AU and its regional groupings to address those strategic and operational challenges related to the complexities of multinational peace enforcement tasks. The ability to plan, command, direct and support a multinational peacekeeping force has been identified as a key element of rapid deployment capacity. However, in order to meet the set timeframes, the AU must also have the capacity to react quickly on three interdependent aspects of rapid deployment: personnel, material readiness, and funding. These have continued to be elusive (Darkwa, 2017).

The issue of HIV/AIDS in Africa is another setback to the future of ASF. Previous deployment of troops to former war torn countries such as Liberia, Burundi and the DRC has contributed to relative stability. On the other hand, the spread of HIV/AIDS is partly blamed on those troops deployed for peace keeping. According to the World Health Organization (WHO) records, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is high among African armed forces, and presents serious challenges towards troop contribution for the ASF. High prevalence leads to alarming loss of experienced senior officers at all levels of command, the especially mid levels at the ranks of captains to majors and fewer lietenant colonesl. This has led to loss of specialized and technically trained staff that cannot be replaced within a short period of time. The other concern is fear of attending injured soldiers due to possibility of contacting the virus, blood transfusion is no longer safe due to the virus and this is becoming one of the limitations of medical support provision during military operations (change this and source). This is a challenge that requires regional leaders' commitment to address HIV/AIDS pandemic (Kasumba *etal*, 2010)

Cillers and Malan (2005), argue that logistical support is a primary and fundamental challenge

for deployment due to lack of sufficient logistics and equipment stocks to support peacekeepers in-theater, as well as mission specific items such as communications equipment. It is therfore important to convert political will and resolve into responsive and effective interventions that provides a sound logistics foundation that can be able to support the entire spectrum of ASF operations; whether preventing the outbreak of violence, providing humanitarian assistance or carrying out peace support operations. To this end AU and the regional organizations have continued to embark on putting in place effective logistics arrangements to support these activities, Transportation is also fundamental; this includes airlift or sealift into a mission area, and appropriate vehicles for the mission once in the field. It is also important to address the issue of equipment standardization at regional level to enable deployment with inter-operable equipment in order to reduce the cost of logistics support. Colonialism and the Cold War influenced procurement of military hardware among African nations, hence a mixture of Western and Eastern Block military hardware making it difficult to interoperate (Cillers and Malan, 2005),

However, standardization in key areas where interoperability is essential such as inter-unit communications is required, but would have to be discussed within regions because this impacts on national governments' defense procurement practices. Each region requires the capability to stockpile essential equipment to facilitate rapid deployment of equipment, thus a need for suitable central logistics facility to further enable a cost effective logistics support. On the other hand, poor lines of communication between these facilities and deployment areas present another challenge to rapid deployment capability, especially, during wet seasons when roads are difficult to negotiate (Cillers and Malan, 2005).

Kasumba etal (2010), observes that the ASF framework therefore proposed a system of Africa Union Military Logistics Depot (AMLD) to address the ensuing challenges. This is a logistics structure and resupply system based on the UN logistics base concept, with each region having

its regional logistics depot and a Centarl Depot. In its efforts to provide effective and efficient administrative and logistics support to the African Standby Force (ASF), and crisis response operations across Africa. To this end, the Commission of the African Union (AU), enetrd into an Memorandum of Undersatnding (MOU) with the Governemnt of Cameroon to establish the African Continental Logistics Base (CLB) in the coastal citty of Doala in Cameroon.The CLB will support the five Regional Logistics Depots (RLDs) located in the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs). The CLB was operatioanlized in 2018 and now offers adequate infrastructure for a rapid deployment of African troops, thus conferring the African Union more autonomy in the conduct of its humanitarian and peacekeeping operations (Williams, 2018).

Kasumba et al (2010), opined that in developing its African Standby Force structure, the AU had to provide a clearer understanding of the role of these forces and identify a common doctrine and strategy to guide the sub-regional groups in developing their roles. Multilateral training programs were conducted at regional levels. They managed to improve the operational capability and cohesion building among the various ASF componests. It is notable that designated Traing Centers of excellence in Africa like the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) based in Kenya, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) based in Ghana and the SADC Regional Peace Training Centre (SADC RPTC) based in Zimbambwe contributed immensely in the development of AU doctrine and incorporating lessons learned from ECOWAS, SADC and other regional organizations with peace keeping operations experience. This needs to be reinforced in future by putting in place a mechanism to track training programs and new initiatives at regional and national levels in an attempt to resolve the issue of training (Harned, 2016),

To this end, Darkwa (2017), observes that AUC is enaged in the Conduct of workshops aimed at developing standardized Standard Operations Procedures (SOPs), facilitation of doctrinal coherence and dissemination of lessons learnt. The AU and regional Planning elements (PLANELMs) area also in the process of harmonizing the ASF training cycle with UN and other external initiatives in order to enhance and synergize ASF capabilities through training. Other measure that are on going include the adoption of an appropriate training policy providing for cycling of national, regional and AU-wide training. This activity needs to be coordinated with external initiatives, and has to be consistent with UN doctrine with a view to standardizing doctrine. This is due to the fact that based on the Standard Generic Training Modules (SGTM), ASF training beyond this level would require to be be regionally coordinated and enhanced through regional peacekeeping centers of excellence (Kasumba,et al,2010)

Funding of the ASF is another challenge that the AU has to find a way to address. Regional peace support operations are currently funded through bilateral arrangements between troops contributing nations and donor states because AU is unable to provide sufficient funds. Lack of sufficient funds to support these operations has reduced the level of participation from less developed countries, and therefore affecting political cohesion at regional level. A major obstacle that AU faces is the actual reimbursement of costs incurred by individual states undertaking peace support operations under the auspices of AU, and without adequate finance, the ASF does not meet its intended purpose of providing military solution to conflict affected areas (Kelly, 2012).

One way to address funding issue is for the AU and its regions to maintain their traditional bilateral and multilateral cooperation with developed countries in order to further provide financial assistance. On the other hand, the AU has committed itself to carry out some assessment aimed at determining the financial requirement for the ASF. The AU has agreed to assess the cost of ASF structure, including pre-deployment activities such as training and PLANELM activities. It also intended to assess the cost of the types of missions based on the relevant level of forces and mandate; with an average mission timeframe of between one and two years, and another assessment for a short term peace support mission with a timeframe of between six months and one year only. AU member states will also be encouraged to maintain a good record of their contribution to the AU peace fund (Darkwa, 2017).

Munene (2015), contends that Corruption and bad governance are other challenges that have have posed incessant threat to the effectiveness of the Standby Force. Even though African leaders have shown willingness to solve African problems, some leaders have acted otherwise by destroying the country's economy and contributing to insecurity in ythe continent. Some good examples include corruption and exploitation of natural resoursces in the DRC, which have prolonged the civil war causing unnecessary sufferings to civilians. Additioanlly, in Nigeria, the oil wealth is not equaitably distributed to benefit the entire population. These are and many other conditions prevailibg in Africa have discouraged international donors to offer debt relief to Africa. Erriksson (2013), observes that as long as such conditions continue to manifest in Africa, the international community can not be convinced that financial aid is used for the intended purpose. When this takes places,it affect the operationalization of the ASF to adequately provide the AU with the capability to react timely towards crises in the region(Kimathi,2010).

Ligawa (2015), argues that with an opertaonal and effective ASF, hopefully chances of situationals grave atrocties to the civilian population in Africa like the history of genocide in Rwanda may not repeat itself. However, it remains to be seen if the composition of the force for specific missions in terms of the ethnicity of the troops contributed will not hinder ASF's neutrality and impartiality. The demarcation of African boundaries during the colonial era cut off tribes and separated them between states. This situation presents a daunting challenge to ASF. The Great Lakes conflicts that are on going at the moment serve as a good example of how negative ethnicity impacts between neighboring countries like in Burundi among the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups. Neutrality is further undermined by the existence of regional hegemony, as it was the case with Nigeria during ECOWAS intervention in Liberia in 1990, and South African intervention during Operation Boleas in Lesotho in 1998(Agyapong, 2005).

Even though regional major powers provide their regions with the resources, capacity and political legitimacy to respond to regional conflict, their dependency on regional hegemony compels small countries' peace and security agendas to be shaped by domestic problems and national interests of regional major power countries. Reliance on regional powers also raises the question of how to address regional conflicts whereby the regional power state is part of the conflict. The question of impartiality is one of the main challenges to the future of the ASF, especially, with regard to negative ethnicity (Desmidt *et al,* 2012).

Regionally, ECOWAS was originally formed to promote economic cooperation between member states. The member states vested authority on ECOWAS that provided for the necessary institutions to fulfill its goal as a regional economic organization in West Africa. At the beginning of the Liberian conflict in 1990. ECOWAS opted to deviate from economic to dealing with security issues on the premise that security is a function in regional economic

development. It is however important to note that at initiation, ECOWAS did not foresee itself engaging in regional conflict and as such was ill prepared for this task (Mortimier, 1996).

Until the creation of ECOMOG in 1990, ECOWAS was unable to reach a regional consensus on the establishment of an institutionalized sub-regional organ for security issues and conflict management; this partly was due to the fact that its charter lacked the legal prerogative permitting it to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. On the premise of the forgoing reason, the deployment of armed forces in Liberiaby ECOWAS was considered by the francophone member states as violation of its organizational charter and, thus, an illegal extension of its mandate. ECOWAS intervention in Liberia in 1990 was therefore, not supported by all the states in the sub-region, and the states that supported were experiencing economic challenges thus making the financial support of the ECOMOG difficult to sustain (Amate, 1996).

Until the creation of ECOMOG, ECOWAS did not have a special institution within itself to financially support actions related to security. Additionally, member states did not pay their contributions regularly leading to financial insufficiency for ECOWAS to sustain its normal activities. Due to lack of institutional structures, ECOWAS improvised a shaky series of ad hoc structure to deal with security issues, including the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), the ECOMOG, the Special Emergency Fund, and later the Committees of Five, and Nine. At its inception, the SMC was composed of Ghana, Gambia, Mali, Nigeria and Togo. SMC was assigned the mission to mediate the Liberian conflict and address other regional security issues. Over time, the SMC became the only institution within ECOWAS to monitor the implementation of ECOWAS peace processes and consequently, played an active role in managing the deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia (Agyapong, 2005).

Representatives of ECOWAS in Liberia were entrusted with all administrative and financial tasks, though the command of the forces on the ground was assigned to the Force Commander. To give more credibility to the improvised structure of ECOMOG, at the same time temporarily decreasing the dominant role of Nigeria, the SMC decided that the command of forces would be established in such a way that the contributing countries could play a more significant role. On that understanding, the Force Commander's role was entrusted to Ghana, the deputy force commander's role to Guinea, and the chief of staff's role to Nigeria. The SMC stipulated "the commander was to have full command authority over ECOMOG, which he would derive from the chairman of the ECOWAS Authority through the Executive Secretary."(Howe, 1997).

Discord among the member states of ECOWAS as to the appropriate role of various organs within the structure contributed to most shortcoming and challenges related to the management of ECOMOG. Additionally, the political and legal advisory positions in ECOMOG were not filled due to financial difficulties. Therefore, deficiencies at the structural level often exacerbated the dominance within ECOMOG of a single country. Berman and Sams (2000), capitalizing on the lack of a functioning security framework, contend that Nigeria pushed through the creation of an entirely new structure, one that would better serve its purposes, the Authority's decision to establish the SMC with a very broad mandate, and to make Nigeria a member of that body provided Lagos with an opportunity to influence ECOWAS policy on Liberia (Agyapong, 2005).

The ad hoc structure of ECOMOG made it not to function effectively thereby making the SMC, acting under the influence of Nigeria, continue to be the sole authority supervising

ECOMOG's deployment in Liberia in 1990. The ECOMOG deployment in Liberia in 1990, Sierra Leone in 1997 and Guinea Bissau in 2012, was without structures. It was therefore subject to abuse and manipulation by some of its member states. A good example is that the ECOMOG forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone were dominated by Nigeria, and this caused lack of sub regional unity, depriving the force of important legitimacy in fulfilling its tasks. The ECOMOG force in Guinea Bissau under a Togolese commander, reported directly to the Togolese leader Gnassingbe Eyadema, who happened to the ECOWAS chairman (De Conning et al 2016).

Operational challenges were also evident in ECOMOG. Assessment of the efficiency of ECOMOG as a regional peacekeeping and peace enforcement force can be premised upon its operational performance with the key pointers including in its ability to ensure a favorable environment for political resolution of the three civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau due to its propensity to decrease violence, ability to monitor ceasefires and ability to deal impartially with all parties in a conflict. Initially, ECOMOG entered Liberia to monitor the ceasefire between fighting factions. However, ECOMOG was attacked when they landed in Liberia by the National Patritic Front of Liberia (NPFL), who then controlled almost all of the country outside the capital city of Monrovia. This unexpected action made ECOMOG to transform from being mere monitor of ceasefire to peace enforcer a move that was literally beyond its means at the time, due primarily to the lacks of having sufficient troops on the ground and enough expertise (Mortimier, 1996).

When late President Doe was captured by the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) in ECOMOG headquarters, the situation grew worse. To repulse NPFL forces and create a buffer zone around the capital ECOMOG allied itself with the INPFL and the AFL.

The move to ally itself with factions was a clear demonstration of its inability to deal with the factions neutrally (Mortimier, 1996).

In its structure, ECOMOG was designed in such a way as to accommodate the interest of all contributing countries. Operationally their seemed to be challenges in the assignments; for instance, all forces were formally under the authority of the Forces Commander and was the sole authority, designating the sectors of the mission area to the respective contingents yet within this structure, each country's contingent maintained its own command structure under its Contingent Commander. The presence of two chains of command was in itself a challenge that caused enormous operational difficulties. The contingent commander could not make decisions, or take part in combat or offensive operations, without the approval of his home government. In essence, before any tactical decision could be implemented by ECOMOG, each contingent commander had to consult his own government, resulting in delays in implementation of missions, thereby reducing their effectiveness on the ground. The high level of control from the contributing country meant that the contingent commander was not absolutely answerable to the force commander; this often resulted in delayed military actions and jeopardizing ECOMOG's act as a unified force (Howe, 1997).

Agyapong (2005), contends that the troops from contributing countries often served under vastly different conditions. He further adds that a discrepancy in the quality of supplies, wages, and personal equipment was evident causing some peacekeeping troops to behave irresponsibly. A military operation requires synchronicity and homogeneity for its success on the ground. Due to the fact that ECOMOG prior to deployment in Liberia in 1990, the contributing countries had never had a joint exercise as a single fighting entity to enhance their cohesiveness. It therefore lacked the basic requirements for success. There were also

communications difficulties between Francophone and Anglophone forces, and an overall lack of training in counterinsurgency operations (Agyapong, 2005).

Financially, from the time of its initiation, ECOMOG lacked reliable financial and logistical support. The arrangement at the initial stages of ECOMOG was that each country had to support its troops for the first three months. ECOWAS had anticipated that three months was enough to consolidate funding to sustain the mission for the period of intervention. However, meeting this expectation was not possible for ECOWAS because most of ECOMOG's contributing countries had limited resources; therefore, they were often unable to respond, even to the urgent needs of their own forces at home. ECOWAS member states were unable to sustain the high cost of military operations; this caused financial and logistical problems for ECOMOG operation. Contributing countries to ECOMOG continued to support their own forces due to lack of sustainable funding to support ECOMOG. The cost of the mission was borne mainly by Nigeria, because this country was the only country within ECOWAS that had, relatively speaking, adequate means and capacities to support such forces. In the absence of unified logistical structure, most of ECOMOG's other contingents suffered from logistical problems throughout the period of their deployment in Liberia in 1990, they depended on their own government for transportation, uniforms, foods, weapons and ammunition, although Nigeria provided all participants with fuel and lubricants (Carol, 2004).

ECOMOG deployment in Sierra Leone in 1997 was not any different; it faced similar challenges as those in Liberia. Financial and logistical deficiencies again like in Liberia(in 1990, kept ECOMOG from pursuing its mission of peace enforcement resulting in limited ECOMOG's effectiveness in the field. Contributing countries were also unable to cover the cost of the mission in Sierra Leone; once again ECOWAS was unable to fulfill its

commitment to ensure adequate and permanent funding to sustain ECOMOG in the Sierra Leonean mission. Another difference of the Sierra Leonean mission form the Liberian mission was availability of the pledge from the UN and the international community even though this was not sufficient to respond to the increasing needs of ECOMOG to pursue its mission (Agyapong, 2005).

Regional politics has since the advent of ECOMOG been an issue that influenced its operation. Francophone countries in the region, such as Togo, Mali, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso initially rejected the ECOWAS peace plan for Liberia and ironically supported one or another of the fighting factions, both militarily and politically. The political struggle between the Francophone and the Anglophones stems from the earliest days of the independence. This struggle has always been among the obstacles to the economic and political integration of this region, and has had a major influence on security issues in West Africa as well. The West Africa region is considered a zone of French influence, where the French still have vital interests and a conspicuous military presence. Many independent Francophone countries still depend on the French presence in the region for their own security, which often irritates Nigeria's sensitivities, and presents a challenge in its quest for regional hegemony (Barnett et al ,2005).

Afraid of losing its influence in West Africa due to the increasing role of Nigeria, France instigated rivalry between Francophone countries, led by Côte d'Ivoire, and Anglophone states, led by Nigeria. Accordingly, the political struggle between Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire for regional leadership became intense. The political rivalry between the Francophone and the Anglophones was fueled by the adoption of the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense by ECOWAS. Initially, some Francophone countries opposed the adoption of this

protocol, "fearing the potentially overbearing influence of Nigeria." For its part,"Nigeria regarded the protocol as a further chance to weaken France's grip on its former colonies by making them more dependent on Nigeria in the military sphere, as it has tried to do in the economic sphere through ECOWAS."(Agyapong,2005)

The decision to create ECOMOG and intervene in Liberia in 1990 fueled the political confrontation between the two blocs in general, the Anglophone achored by Nigeria and the Francophone anchored by Côte d'Ivoire.. While Nigeria supported the military intervention, Côte d'Ivoire advocated for a diplomatic process. When the SMC made the decision to intervene in Liberia in 1990, the dominance of Anglophone countries in ECOMOG, along with the commitment of Nigeria to solve the Liberian crisis by military means, further inflamed regional rivalries and suspicions. The Francophone countries were apprehensive that Nigeria, among the leading English-speaking countries in the SMC, would impose its hegemony over the entire region. There was no agreement within the region about the preferable outcome of the conflict in Liberia by the time the deployment was taking place (Gilham,2005).

This division had very serious repercussions on the regional organization. It was not only unable to fulfil its mandate in Liberia, but also its stance as a neutral force working to restore peace to the beleaguered country. Howe (1997), contends that political tensions and ineffectiveness within regional organizations like ECOWAS are often a reflection of linguistic and political rivalries. In the ECOWAS case, Mortimier (1996), argues "the multilateral, but Nigerian-dominated force is more a classic study of competing national interests in the West African sub-region than a case study in regional peacekeeping." Within ECOWAS two sub-

regional cleavages the Francophone/Anglophone divide and Nigeria's quest for hegemony created difficulties for ECOMOG (Mortimier, 1996).

The Francophone countries in West Africa as noted by Howe (1997), opposed the intervention in Liberia in 1990, which they viewed as a tool for furthering Anglophone domination in the region. Further, they argued that the Anglophone bloc had not allowed enough time for the political option to be pursued, instead preferring the use of force in order to press the fighting parties into a peace process brokered by ECOWAS. According to de Mortimier (1996) , the Francophone countries saw the ECOWAS Peace Plan as an "Anglophone road show"(Mortimier,1996),

Consequently, the two leading Francophone countries in West Africa; the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso covertly supported Taylor's NPFL. Burkina Faso was alleged to have supplied arms to Taylor's rebels while the Ivory Coast is said to have allowed the rebels free transit across its border into Nimba County in Liberia. Agyapong (2005), observes, that attempts made in 1990 to place the Liberian crisis on the Security Council's agenda failed, partly because of the Ivory Coast's opposition and partly because the Council members shared the US view that the problem should be solved by Africans. For instance, on 13 August 1990, in a terse message to ECOWAS members, former President Compaore of Burkina Faso declared his country's "total disagreement" with the intervention stating that the SMC had "no competence to interfere in member-states' internal conflicts, but only in conflicts breaking out between member-countries." He cautioned of "an eventual expansion of the internal conflict, which could break out among member countries if an intervention force is sent to Liberia against the will of the Liberian people." (Agyapong, 2005).

Côte d'Ivoire's and Burkina Faso's continued to support of the NPFL to sustain the conflict, and undermined ECOWAS efforts to bring the main fighting parties to the negotiation table early in the intervention. Lack of political agreements within ECOWAS prevented a number of member states from contributing forces to the ECOMOG, or financially supporting the mission in Liberia. The lack of political consensus with regard to the Liberian crisis also prevented ECOMOG from building an adequate environment for political resolution of civil wars especially due to the interference by the external actors the countries (Agyapong, 2005).

Therefore, without full political support and unity of purpose from the members of the sub-regional organization, the diplomatic initiative of ECOWAS was destined to encounter serious difficulties as it did. In the Sierra Leone deployment in 1997, the political rivalry was less pronounced, despite disagreement on the use of the military option against the faction of Revolutionary United Front (RUF) despite Nigeria's unilateral attempt, to drive the junta out of power. Notwithstanding the opposition of Burkina Faso, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia to the Sierra Leone mission, unlike the Liberian intervention, there was a relative degree of political consensus upon the Sierra Leonean crisis, among ECOWAS member states regarding the ECOMOG mandate. For a while, this political consensus was threatened because of the ambivalence role of Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso and the Nigerian's unilateral action upon the interpretation of the ECOMOG mandate, but that changed with the political development in Nigeria following the death of former president Sanni Ababcha in 1998 (Breshin,2002).

In Guinea Bissau there was evidence for the first time of regional consensus. The consensus was apparently reached due to the fact that the political rivalry between Anglophone and Francophone countries had been improving in the years immediately preceding the conflict; the region was already suffering from protracted conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where

the antagonism between the two blocs made resolution to the crises difficult; the negative consequences associated with the continual competition between the two sides were apparent to the member states of ECOWAS. As a result, they had joined in the effort to mediate between the belligerents, with hopes of convincing them of the necessity of reaching a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Majority of ECOWAS member states condemned both the coup attempt and the unilateral military interventions of Senegal and Guinea by Nigeria (Agyapong, 2005).

The political rivalry between the two blocs was also attenuated by the fact that the third bloc;the Luscophone; comprising the six Portueguese speaking African countries of Angola,Cape Verde, Mozambique ,Guinea Bissau ,Sao Tome and Principe belonged to neither of the two main linguistic blocs. Additionally, the active role played by Portugal and other Portuguese-speaking countries in brokering a peace plan for Guinea Bissau, pressed ECOWAS member states to reach a consensus in order to prevent external powers like France and the US from intervening in their region (Mortimier, 1996).

Finally, the volatility of the West Africa sub-region and the threat of contagion to other countries, prompted ECOWAS member states to address this conflict before the regional security situation deteriorated further. During the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia in 1990, the main problem it faced was the proliferation of fighting factions. During the first five years of ECOMOG's 1990 intervention, ECOWAS sponsored a series of peace agreements, all of which ultimately failed due to ECOMOG's inability to deal impartially with different factions in the conflict (Agyapong, 2005).

As political standoff and military stalemate continued to block efforts to resolve the conflict, with new warring movements emerged, driven by looting and illegal exploitation of natural resources. The mission became overloaded with the responsibility of securing a fragmented country that was under the control of many warlords. ECOMOG did not achieve its original goal of defeating the main faction, nor did it succeed in convincing the parties to the conflict to adhere to a peace pact. ECOMOG's failure to attain peace in Liberia prompted the joining of the United Nations after the Cotonou Peace Agreement of July 1993, sponsored by ECOWAS. The Security Council, through Resolution 866, established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in October 1993. The collaborative effort was established to aid in supervising and monitoring the implementation of the signed peace plans, and to restore ECOMOG's neutrality and legitimacy. The United Nations was invited to join the search for peace effort in Liberia only after ECOWAS had failed to make any appreciable progress towards conflict resolution (Howe, 1997).

ECOMOG's approach in the Liberian crisis by bringing the fighting elements under control was fruitless. On regular occasions, peace plans were violated by the fighting parties because of the presence of "spoilers." The criminal exploitation of natural resources had flourished, existing in a climate of competition between the warlords during the civil war in Liberia. Each fighting movement aimed at building more strength in order to eliminate the others, and in order to realize a comfortable position during the negotiation over power. Based on the aimsof the fighting movements to spoil all peace plans and agreements that were not favoring them, they continued with a race towards the capture of more un exploited resources. As the conflict advanced, the ambition of most of the Liberian fighting factions was the rise to power by the means of fighting. This circumstances precipitated complexities in much of ECOWAS' peacemaking actions, as is usually the case when disputes are over power and resources. With

the continued frustration in attainment of peace in Liberia, ECOMOG changed tactics by allowing the warlords to serve on the Council of State without being disqualified from contesting elections. At the regional level, the change of tact was tied to the domestic political situation in some contributing countries of ECOMOG. "Some of the participant countries, including Ghana and Nigeria, began to show some political fatigue with regard to continuing the intervention and finding a mediated solution (Mortimier, 1996).

Following the Abuja peace agreement sponsored by the UN and ECOWAS, and signed on August 19, 1995, a cease-fire was reached between the different factions. The peace accord marked the beginnings of the resolution of Liberian civil war. Accordingly ECOMOG and UNOMIL were deployed throughout the country to monitor the cease-fire and disarm the combatants. The provision of the Abuja agreement broadened the responsibilities of ECOMOG, particularly in calling for it to disarm and demobilize fighters throughout the Liberian territory. Implementation of this agreement required more peacekeepers on the ground. As the political situation in Liberia evolved, the UN became more involved in the conflict. Alongside the ECOMOG forces three hundred UN peacekeepers were deployed to supervise the cease-fire and peace process until the execution of the legislative and presidential elections. After this agreement, ECOMOG succeeded to a great extent in disarming and demobilizing fighters by collecting massive quantities of weapons (Agyapong, 2005).

In Sierra Leone contrary to the Liberian approach, ECOMOG tried to negotiate with the AFRC/RUF for the settlement of the conflict via political means before resorting to the use of force. The diplomatic approach failed prompting the intervention of Nigeria on June 1, 1997, who equally failed to drive the junta out of power. After the failed attempt by Nigeria,

ECOWAS, with the cooperation of the OAU, convened a meeting on 26 June 1997, in Guinea upon the Sierra Leonean crisis, following the degradation of the security situation in this country (Byne, 2009).

During this meeting, member states of ECOWAS reached a consensus about the Sierra Leonean crisis and called for the reinstatement of the legitimate government, the initiation of a dialogue with the rebels, the imposition of sanctions and enforcement of an embargo and the use of force in case of non-compliance. With the failure of the diplomatic efforts tension in the country escalated prompting Nigeria to intervene militarily for a second time in February 1998, and succeeded to oust the AFRC/RUF from power (Agyapong, 2005).

After the reinstatement of the elected president, the UN became actively involved in this conflict: "in June 1998, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for an initial period of six months. With Special Envoy named as Special Representative and Chief of Mission. ECOMOG was mandated by the UN to remain in the country in order to deploy its own forces to secure the countryside and contribute alongside the UNOMSIL in disarming and demobilizing combatants, as well as forming and training the new Sierra Leonean army. Fighting continued with the rebel forces in the hinterlands despite being overthrown from power. To secure the country, ECOMOG engaged in offensive attacks against the AFRC and the RUF in attempt to secure the country (Agyapong, 2005).

In the Guinea Bissau case, a Civil War was fought from 7 June 1998 to 10 May 1999.It was triggered by an attempted coup d'état against the government of President João Bernardo Vieira led by Brigadier-General Ansumane Mané. ECOWAS attempted to mediate between

the two belligerents in order to solve the conflict following the outbreak of violence. ECOWAS efforts were diluted by external mediation efforts. It started with consultations with the lusophone; a Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries (CPLP), created as a multilatral forum to deepen cultural, economic, and political cooperation among the Portuguese-speaking nations of the world. It consists of Portugal, Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Mozambique, São Tome and Principé. Following the consultations, Guinea Bissau's warring factions signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a Portuguese frigate, Corte-Real, on 26 July 1998.This called for withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean troops from Guinea-Bissau and their replacement by military observers from lusophone states. ECOWAS reacted by holding a meeting in Abuja on November 1st, 1998 to negotiate a cease-fire between the two antagonists, and brokering a peace plan for the conflict. The resolution in the meeting forced former President Joao Bernardo Vieira and Retired General Mane to sign a peace agreement in Novemebr 1998.It called for a cease-fire, the establishment of a unified national government, ordering the withdrawal of Senegal and Guinea's military forces from the country and a simultaneous call came for the deployment of ECOMOG (Agyapong, 2005).

In Guinea Bissau therefore, ECOWAS mediation successfully negotiated a cease-fire and a peace accord between the belligerents. It also mandated ECOMOG to interpose its own forces in a mission of peacekeeping and the formation of a government of National Unity. However, despite efforts of ECOWAS to resolve this conflict, just like in the Liberian and Sierra Leone cases; financial and logistical hardships again prevented the successful implementation of the peace process. In addition to the burden being borne by ECOMOG simultaneously in Liberia and Sierra Leone, their mission in Guinea Bissau became overwhelmed, prompting its premature withdrawal from Guinea Bissau without achieving all of its assigned goals in June 1999 (Desmidt *et al*, 2017).

In the Eastern African Region, Kaldor (2012) opines that the regional standby force (EASF) was established for conflict intervention in the region. Oluoch (2015), observers that one of the challenges facing EASF in its efforts,is the dearth of cooperation in the EAR; which is due to overshadowing competition for regional supremacy among its member states in establishing a regional hegemony for full command of regional politics, social systems, economic interests and technological forays. Hence the fight for regional hegemony dominates political landscape of Eastern Africa. Undoubtedly, supremacy battles undermine institutional credibility of EASF. In this light, the quest for regional kingship affects largely a dysfunctional organization especially with reference to Kenya's incursion in the Somalia in 2011(Oluoch, 2015).

Whereas Omanyo (2015), avers that weak bureaucratic systems in the EAR impede EASF mandate, this faintly takes cognizance of the fact that systems should be heterogeneous entities. The author de-links bureaucratic systems from state control which apparently has mooched EASF operational work to a greater extent. The author's assertions that planning, deployment, operations and withdrawal are bureaucratic in nature without directly involving state actors, is a glaring oversight. These issues of factors are overwhelming responders, stakeholders and policy makers as far as peace and security is concerned (Omanyo, 2015).

Kibuko (2014), in her book titled *"Potentials and Pitfalls of Civilian component in African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)"*, observes that from the UN interventions in Somalia, the dearth of civilian component in the design and planning of the intervention is a constant misstep in international and regional peace enforcement missions, as they assume the security angle only. While peace support operations in areas where there is "no peace to keep" largely

depend on the military strength, a commensurate civilian political and humanitarian perspective is important for a successful intervention (Kibuko, 2014).

 In this regard, Kibuko (2014), contends that Civilian capabilities augment military operations and consequently ease the work of conflict intervention. There is dearth of literature on how civilian capabilities can help in maintenance of peace and security under the auspices of EASF. A number of literatures only attempt to offer a peripheral suggestion on how civilian components can be an asset in conflict intervention. Thus, civilian components remain ignored and misrepresented in the wider Peace Support Operations (PSO), especially in EASF. It is axiomatic that the road to the realization of a functioning EASF has not been easy since its inception in 2004. It has been a protracted journey. However, some of the regional standby forces like the one for the North African Standby Force Brigade (NASBRIG), is still far away from achieving the full operational capability (Darkwa, 2017).

 As Tlalka (2014), observes, EASF, which is not anchored on any regional economic community, has gone through, similar challenges like the other four standby forces but because of the determination of member countries and their mutual understanding, the Force has managed to meet some of the targets towards attaining its FOC. EASF has a standby multidimensional, multifunctional and integrated standby force, a well-established PLANELM that coordinates the activities of the force and lately an agreement on the establishment of the EASF signed in 2014 by member states. This phenomenon has led to the general view that although the EASF troops have not been deployed in peace support operations, the force is comparatively doing well compared to the other standby forces in terms of attaining the FOC by December 2014 (Omanyo, 2015).

Tlalka (2014), further observes that funding dilemma is one of the challenges impeding the effectiveness of EASF. He decries the non-commitment of EASF members to fund its operations as one of the reasons that has curtailed to a greater extent the functionality of this regional mechanism. This glaring resource-management as well strategic gap impedes the operations of EASF. Consequently, this hampers maintenance of peace and security in the region. Member states are supposed to carry out their obligations among them, financing the EASF, but few have regularly done so either because of low financial capacity or because of their national commitment and interests. In this light therefore, planning, deployment of troops and logistical concerns have not been fully realized due to want of finances to operationalize these activities (Omanyo, 2015). Cases where funding has been cut off have pushed EASF to vulnerable positions. Omanyo (2015), therefore, opines that this has made EASF to be lackadaisical and hence hindered to undertake its activities of maintaining peace and security in the region and especially in Kenya and Somalia (Omanyo, 2015).

Robinson (2014), in his book titled", *The Eastern Africa Standby Force: History and Prospects",* opines that another challenge hampering the effectiveness of the EASF is the weak legal framework it operates in. He ascertains that EASF has had a relatively weak legal basis operating under the Policy Framework for the Establishment of EASBRIG that was adopted in 2004 and the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade which was signed in 2005 but which is not binding. He avers that globally, a number of standby forces have been rendered moribund due to lack of legal instruments to enhance implementation of their mandate. The same scenario has been witnessed at continental level (Robinson, 2014).

Omanyo (2015), further observes that regionally, it is in December 2014 that an agreement on the establishment of the EASF was signed by ten participating states. Albeit an agreement has been put in place to replace the arbitrary MoU that existed before, there still exist several grey areas in the area of pledged capacities by member states. Further to this, there is still no binding arrangement between commitments of States for force deployment although every year Members States renew their MoUs on pledged capabilities. EASF operations largely depend on the mutual understanding of states and on the changing political will of states involved. Commitment and contributions of member states towards the activities of the EASF depends on the threat perception of the situation and interests of individual nations in the activities of the regional force. These political as well as strategic gaps make EASF a near toothless dog in the region and as regards maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia (Omanyo, 2015).

Tlalka (2014), contends that the structural weakness of most EASF members states in general and national armed forces in particular is an impediment to the effectiveness of EASF in maintaining peace and security in the region and more so in Kenya and Somalia. This is because the concept of EASF could be truly materialized only by strong, formidable regional contingents pledged by the member states that are capable of mobilizing resources to prepare such units and sustain them in the long period of time. Unfortunately, in most cases, if not all states in East Africa are far from internal stability (Tlalka, 2014).

In this context, Omanyo (2015), observes that in 2013 three countries that could be viewed as pillars of the EASF of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, were classified in *The Fragile States Index* at positions 19, 17 and 22 respectively. The classification was conducted by the Fund For Peace (FFP); which is an independent, nonpartisan, non-profit research and educational

organization that works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security through conflict assessment and early warning. It then creates practical tools and approaches for conflict mitigation that are useful to decision-makers. Additonally, another three EASF member states countries of Burundi, Somalia and Sudan were also assessed in the top twenty (positions 20, 1 and 3) respectively. So the fact that 6 out of 13 EASF member states were considered as highly dysfunctional states only goes further to justify the   questioning of their ability to prepare and sustain rapid reaction forces when required by the regional body (Omanyo, 2015).

Migue (2014), opines that lack of interoperability among EASF military components is among, the core challenge in the operationalization and future effectiveness of the EASF. This is due to the fact that in East Africa, there are different colonial backgrounds and indigenous traditions, doctrines and organizations of the armed forces and so the achievement of full interoperability would be especially difficult. This impacts on its ability to intervene in any conflict in the EAR and more so in Kenya and Somalia (Migue, 2014).

Fisher *et al* (2010), observes that among the other challenges facing the EASF is the absence of a single Regional Economic Community that brings together all the 13 countries of the region. While other regional ASF forces are implemented by Regional Economic Communities (RECs), namely ECOWAS, SADC and ECCAS with respective regional protocols already in place, the EASF is an entirely different regional arrangement, called Regional Mechanism (RM), that co-exists with several economic communities in East Africa that also implement security measures. During its formative stages, EASF establishment was centered around the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which assumed the coordination role. However, since, it only consisted of seven states (Djibouti, Eritrea,

Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda), non-IGAD countries of the region like Rwanda, Seychelles and Madagascar protested against this move. This remained a challenge despite the establishment of EASBRICOM in 2007. Currently, most countries in the Eastern Africa belong to a multiplicity of regional organizations. They include the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Common Market for Eastern and southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Cooperation (EAC) as depicted in figure 2.3

Figure 2.3: Regional Economic Blocs in Eastern Africa region

Source: **EASF Report (2017).**

Ligawa (2015), in his works titled" *The Challenges Facing The Eastern African Community in Conflict Intervention: A Study of Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) as A Regional*

Security Mechanism" opines that ICGLR as an intergovernmental organization comprising twelve African countries in the Great lakes Region.It is also engaged in addressing the root causes of intractable conflicts and constraints to development in a regional and innovative approach. Among the Eastern African Countries in the organization are; Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Sudan and South Sudan (Ligawa, 2015),

It was established in 2000 based on the recognition that political instability and conflicts in these countries have a considerable regional dimension and thus require a concerted effort in order to promote sustainable peace and development. On the other hand, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was formed in December 1994 to replace the former Preferential Trade Area (PTA) from the early 1980s in Eastern and Southern Africa. It comprises the countries of Burundi, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Seychelles, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The organization offers a large economic and trading unit to overcome trade barriers faced by those states as individual countries (Oluoch, 2015).

Additionally Tlalka (2014), observes that the East African Community (EAC) is an intergovernmental organization composed of six countries in the East Africa and Great Lakes region. They include; Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The EAC is a potential precursor to the establishment of the east Africa Federation, a proposed federation of its members into a single sovereign state. In 2010, the EAC launched own common market for goods, labor, and capital within the region, with the goal of creating a common currency and eventually a full political federation. This situation has not helped to create hegemony in the EASF region (Tlalka, 2014).

Williams (2011), in his work titled; *"The African Union's Conflict Management Capabilities."* observes that the challenges facing EASF are similar to those facing other regional security mechanisms. He notes that, ECOWAS Standby Force, despite its successes in addressing conflict situations in the West Africa Region,it had to contend with challenges in the areas of inadequate funding for her mandated missions,inadequate logistic support systems for PSOs and lack of Strategic airlift capabilities for Rapid Deployment.Other challeneges are non-commitment from Member States to honor their troop pledges to the ESF and inadequate staffing at the PLANELM seceratiat Headquarters; with some permanent posts remaining unfulfilled.These are issues that ECOWAS standby force continues to address to improve its effectiveness(Williams,2011).Despite the aforementioned challenges,it is unclear yet if there is a broader consensus on whether the EASF should broaden its mandate and if so, in which direction.

2.4. Conceptual Framework

This study employed three theories in assessing Eastern Africa Standby Force's execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. These theories are; the Regional Security Complex Theory, Neo-functionalism and the Power Theory; emanating from the realism school of thought.

2.4.1 Regional Security Complex Theory

The Regioanl Security Complex Theory was advanced by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2003), in their works "*Regions and Power*". It is a theory of international relations, which posits that international security should be examined from a regional perspective, and that

relations between states exhibit regular and geographically clustered patterns.

The Regional Security Complexes (RSC), are defined as distinct and stable patterns of security interaction between actors. They are distinguished from one another by degrees of interaction. The level of interaction between members of the same RSC is high, while between members of different RSCs is comparatively low. As the name implies, *regional* security complexes are by nature geographical, consisting of neighboring actors and being insulated from one another by natural barriers such as oceans, deserts and mountain ranges. The RSC theory underscores those actors' actions and motivations in the field of international security are heavily regional in character. This means that an actor's security concerns are primarily generated in their immediate neighborhood. The security of each actor in a region interacts with the security of the other actors. Most security concerns do not travel well over distances, and threats within an actor's immediate neighborhood are therefore, most likely felt the strongest. Due to the way adjacency works; there is often intense security interdependence within an RSC, while interaction with outsiders is much less active.

The theory explains the structure of international security and spills it over to the regional segmentation of the concept of security. In particular, this theory explicates how security is clustered in geographically slated regions. It avouches that security concerns do not travel well over distance and threats are therefore, mostly linked and witnessed in the geo-political regions, hence affirming security interdependence.

According to Tlalka (2014), specific security threats and challenges should be treated differently. He avers that, by nature the boundaries of EASF countries are comparatively

permeable since they are not efficient barriers to national and regional security. On trans-boundary issue, Darfur conflict for example has spilt over to Chad and Central African Republic and therefore EASF must appreciate the dynamism of threats posed to peace and security in the region.

The Regional Security Complex Theory underpinned this study in the sense that, it helped unravel the intricacies surrounding the nature of EASF effectiveness in maintaining peace and security in the region and specifically in Kenya and Somalia. It also endeavoured to explain whether it is the member states that are anarchic or the EASF itself by nature. It also helped in explaining the challenges that impede EASF efforts in maintaining peace and security in the region and more importantly in Kenya and Somalia.

However, this study found a number of shortcomings with the RSC.First the theory was found to be too particularistic and, thus, not fully able to encapsulate the complexity of regional clusters of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.It indeed generally focused on the causes of regional peace, without due considetaion to the fact that security instruments are also vital structural compomnents of regions, hence remaining limited in this regard. Buzan and Wæver allude to 'securitization actors' and 'functional actors': the first are actors who securitize issues by declaring something as a referent object, existentially threatened, whereas the latter are actors that affect the dynamics of a sector (Buzan *et al*. 1998, p. 36). But besides the actors that perceive something as being threatened, who has, in fact, the capacity to manage security issues at the regional level,for instance,who is responsible for the deterrence of an attack in the case of Kenya and Somalia? Or who are the actors behind the creation of a regional security community to deal with peace and security in Kenya and Somalia? And how is this carried out? Beyond the territory of Kenya and territory of Somalia, are regional economic actors,

regional civil society, and/or regional organizations preponderant agents in regional security practices? Even though Buzan and Wæver argue that a securitization actor 'claims a right to use extraordinary means or break normal rules, for reasons of security' (2003, p. 71), the researcher was left with no guidance on what means (mechanisms) could be used for this effect.

Secondly, although the choice of adopting patterns of amity and enmity (ranging from conflict formations to 'security regime' and 'pluralistic security community') as the variable that indicates the efficacy of EASF mandate is a relevant one, it seems to be, nonetheless, incomplete. 'Conflict formations' may give the impression of a regional environment marked by tumult and fear. It disregards, however, the conflict pattern that influence peace and security agenda. There are conflict formations that, unlike what is tacitly assumed, have not been touched by war for almost 50 years as in the case of Kenya. Somalia on the other hand has been ravaged by conflicts for over two decades.

Thirdly, and in association with this last aspect, RSC is devoted mainly to understanding processes of securitization, which implies that its capacity to understand relationships marked by amity, trust, and lack of threats is limited. This is a shortcoming acknowledged even by the authors, Buzan and Weaver.By focusing on insecurity rather than security, and on violence rather than peace, RSC is not fully able to integrate the broad nature and composition of regional clusters and this warrants another 'enforcement'-power.

Fourthly, the sense of process is still a relatively weak one. Buzan and Wæver take securitization as the process inherent to an RSC. But the study variables   included give an indication of mutation and dynamism. Even though they point out that 'the changes bearing on

EASF mandate affect the maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia, grounding a framework in only two key components, that is, patterns of amity and enmity, for Kenya and Somalia would not equip us to account for change, for example, in the levels of regional integration, the instruments used to attain peace and security, or the agents that drive the process. Even though they argue that RSC can be used to generate scenarios and predictions about regional stability and change (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 15), this capacity is somewhat compromised by the shortage of components of regional security complexes.

Due to the foregoing weaknesses of the RSC theory, neo-functionalism Theory was also employed in the study to compliment the shortcomings.

2.4.2 Neo-functionalism Theory

The Neofunctioalaism theory, according to Laursen (2008), was originally developed to explain European integration. This is due to the fact that regional integration started in Europe in the early 1950s with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. Ernest Haas theorized this experience in "The Uniting of Europe "(1958). The concept of 'spillover' is perhaps the most important part of the theory of neo-functionalism. Spillover refers to the mechanism by which integration in one area creates the conditions and incentives for integration in another related policy area (Moravcsik, 2005).

The theory of neo-functionalism stresses the role of non-state actors like the secretariat of the regional organization like EASF and related actors in directing the pace for further integration. It asserts that states merely set the terms of the initial agreement of the regional integration, but they are not the only determinants of the course and extent of subsequent transformation (Tive, 2013). Hamad (2016) also agrees with this view and asserts that neo-functionalists place a major emphasis on the role of non-state actors and social interests as dynamic forces

for integration. Neo-functionalism focuses on the immediate process of integration among states, that is, regional integration. Initially, states integrate in limited functional or economic areas. But can they integrate on aspects of peace and security? Can they form formidable organization to promote stability? Yes they can, if they incorporate peace and security as integral aspect of EASF thus fulfilling its mandate. Thereafter, partially integrated states experience increasing momentum for further rounds of integration in related areas, which will later open the way to full-fledged political unification- supranational organization (Coleman, 2000).

Ginsberg (2007) defined integration as interstate reconciliation: a process by which several states, (which might have been) previously engaged in conflict (political, military or economic), engage with one another in order to come to terms with the past, work through differences, negotiate and make amends and restitutions as needed, and agree to establish a new relationship based on structural (institutionalized) peace and mutual respect. Hass (1958) defined political integration as the process whereby political actors are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end of a process of political integration is a new political community.

Neo-functionalist proponents assert that regional integration is essentially an irregular and conflictual process and so has been the case with EASF. However, under a democratic situation, states discover they are progressively entangled in regional pressures, necessitating the resolution of their conflicts by yielding to a wider scope and transferring more power to the created regional organization. This particular element is disturbingly missing within the scope of EASF. Consequently, citizens of these states gradually start looking up to the

regional organization for their expectations and satisfying them thereby enhancing the possibility that economic integration spillover into political integration (Tive, 2013).

According to Rosamond (2000), a high authority should be set up as a sponsor of further integration; the first steps will create functional pressures for integration of related sectors and the momentum would gradually entangle national economies and social interests; deepening economic integration will create the need for further institutionalization, making political integration and a long-term system of peace inevitable. Mattli and Woods (2009) discussed the roles of interest groups and elites in shaping policy outcomes. It should be noted that interest groups include commercial groups and civil society groups within Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Therefore, neo-functionalism proposes that supranational institutions are a major reason for regional integration.

Tive (2013), posits that in furtherance of the process of integration, interest groups and organizations within the pluralistic societies of the states, will assign their loyalty to the supranational organization. This is due to the realization that the new institutions are a preferred channel through which to pursue their objectives and interests.

According to Lindberg (1963), neo-functionalism can be summarized as foreseeing loyalties, expectations and political activities to shift towards a new political setting in a 'process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making to new central organs. This works through the spillover effect whereby integration was perceived to have the potential to move on from one decision to another, from one sector to another, and even from less salient matters to issues which are traditionally

perceived as touching the core of national sovereignty and identity (Mutimer, 1994, O'Neill, 1996).

Neo-functionalism has however been criticized for assuming a degree of automaticity in integration processes and failing to account for increasing protectionism and limitations to integration put up by member states at times (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006). Lee (2007), blames the theory for being too ambitious and simplistic as it assumes that spillover would make integration inevitable without setting a time limit, as well as for underestimating the value of national sovereignty; member states' resistance to and discretion when implementing integration polices.

Realists criticize that it underestimates the importance of nation states and, to a certain degree, the legitimacy of policies. It seems to stress too much on the sub-national and international actors.

The emergence of regional institutions that spearhead regional rule and order is a fact. The regional bodies like EASF are more readily available to deal with conflicts in their regions: where EASF's mandate in the Horn of Africa is a clear evidence of this fact. EASF operations have been dominant in skewed intervention; something that has elicited a barrage of questions. After reviewing the theory, despite its criticism, it can be concluded that it makes some fair arguments. However, the power element is not explicated by this theory on how states wield power and control others. Therefore, a third theory was necessary; the power theory.

2.4.3 The Power Theory

The Power Theory was advanced by Hans Morgenthau (1960), and emphasized on the importance of "the national interest"in politics among nations. He wrote "the main signpost that helps poltical realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the

concept of interest defined in terms of power". It underscores the fact that individual states are able to invoke their domestic power to maintain peace and security within their territory. Additionally, Waltz (1986), observes that power is a key concept in realist theories of international politics, while conceding that 'its proper definition remains a matter of controversy.' While Gilpin (1981), describes the concept of power as 'one of the most troublesome in the field of international conflict' and moots that the 'number and variety of definitions should be an embarrassment to political scientists', there is however a widespread consensus among international conflict scholars on both the necessity of addressing the role of power in international interactions and the unsatisfactory state of knowledge about this trope-power (Guzzini, 2000; Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Berenskoetter and Williams, 2007).

Traditionally, the study of international conflict was predominantly a state-qua-state affair with non-state actors only playing spectator role. Populations, territory, wealth, armies and navies defined these relations. However, it is the shift from absolute power to relative power that has seen the upsurge of the need of 'control' by non-state entities such as terrorist organizations and belligerent groups. On the basis of relativeness, power is multidimensional unlike absolute power, which is a monolithic and not dimensional aspect that defines relations. For instance, scope refers to the aspect of B's behavior, affected by A.

In this case, EASF the mediator versus the victims or perceived instigator. This calls attention to the possibility that an actor's power may vary from one aspect to another depending on the motive. Baldwin (2012), avers that weight of an actors' power is the probability that B's behavior is or could be affected by A. Thus a country that has only 30 percent chance of defending itself from external aggression is less powerful than one that has 90 percent chance of attacking, and so is EASF in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

Consequently, this becomes an optimal strategy to fulfil the social-political objective of the EASF, which Baldwin (2012), opines that, dimensions of power such as scope, domain, weight, costs and means are preponderant exponentially explains why member state actors use geopolitics to advance their interests (Baldwin, 2012).

Power theory holds the view that both costs to A and B are relevant to assessing influence and effect (Baldwin, 2012). If A can get B to do something that is costly for B, it would be contented that it is indicative of more power than if A can only get B to do things that are cheaper for B, this, though contended is a rare case.

The weakness of this theory is in the fact that no dimension of power is specified for scholarly communication, nor single right answer to the question, whether means, scope or costs is the elixir of the conflicting groups; terrorist organizations or any entity that exercises power. Thus, the multidimensional nature of power makes it hard to sum up various dimensions in order to arrive at some estimate of an actor's power (EASF Report, 2010).

In social and political science, power is the capacity of an individual to influence the conduct of others. This is further argued by Luhmann (1975), who opines that 'power' does not instrumentalise an already will, it constitutes that will, and can oblige it, bind it, make it absorb risks and uncertainties, can tempt it and make it fail.' Thus EASF can justify its course through a communication process that is daring and constructive at the end. In other words, the power theory explains exertion of influence of one party EASF, group or individual over another. The analytical-philosophical question is asked: why do we need 'power' (Morris, 1987)? This assertion was utilized by EASF in Kenya and Somalia in the quest to establish a geo-political balance for propagating political agenda.

This theory underpinned this study in the sense that, hegemonic struggles have become unprecedented among EASF member states and therefore, the concept of power was key in explicating the relationship between EASF and the member states. Power theory also explained that balance of power is necessary in unpacking "power weaknesses" exhibited in EASF region or deconstructing power relations among member states.

The researcher therefore argues that the power theory goes along way to compliment shortcomings identified with the RSC. With this theory, individual states are able to invoke their domestic power to maintain peace and security within their territory. Further, the complexities surrounding RSC suggested that power is needed to lobby for funding mechanisms, enhance mission support capabilities, enhance pledged strategic lift capabilities as well as PLANELM staffing, hence the use of additional theory; the power theory. Power is needed primarily by the states to counter terrorist attacks, conduct peacekeeping interventions, contain IEDs threats, protect lives and property, counter inter-ethnic clashes and provide humanitarian support. Baldwin (2012), reiterates that, dimensions of power such as scope, domain, weight, costs and means are preponderant and exponentially explains why member state actors use geopolitics to advance their interests (Baldwin, 2012).

With the power theory, the state therefore plays a prime role in domestic peace and security. The state provides the legal continuity of national society, thus enabling the individuals to experience the nation as a continuum in time and space. The state too provides most of the institutional agencies and processes of both political and social change and significantly; the state provides the agencies for the enforcement of its law (Baldwin, 2012).

The researcher therefore argues that, though the states' contribution to peace and security is indispensable but they are not in themselves sufficient; hence other actors are key in ascertaining the efficacy of EASF in its role of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

2.5 Conceptual Model

The conceptual model demonstrates the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables. It indicates how the structure and organization of EASF and member states' interest affects peace and security processes through peace conventions, peace agreements and dialogues. In this study, the independent variable is the Eastern African Standby Force mandate while dependent variables is maintenance of peace and security as depicted in figure 2.4.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	DEPENDENT VARIABLE

✓ EASF Mandate
- Conduct Peace Support Operations
- Carry out Humanitarian Activities
- Conduct Capacity building initiatives
- Promote negotiation and mediation mechanisms
- Ensure adequate staffing levels

✓ Maintenance of peace and security
- Peacekeeping interventions
- Counter terrorist attacks
- Protect lives and property
- Contain IEDs threats
- Counter inter-ethnic clashes
- Provide humanitarian support

✓ Intervening Variables
- Regional hegemonic competition
- Geo-Political Factors
- Funding mechanisms
- Peace and security frameworks
- Structural factors
- IGOs
- International Partners

Figure 2.4: Conceptual Model showing variable interaction

Source: Researcher, 2019

2.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has aptly captured the objectives of the study through exploring the empirical studies conducted by various scholars and brought to fore the issues under interrogation. The chapter has attempted to explicate and review the effectiveness of EASF in maintaining peace

and security in Kenya and Somalia. It has further delved into EASF's efforts in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia and finally examined the challenges and opportunities that confound EASF in execution of its mandate. The chapter has also brought to fore the theories that underpin this study: Regional Security Complex Theory and the Power Theory. These theories have been conceptualized and a conceptual model developed to show the relationship between the various variables. The next chapter explains the research methodology that was employed by the researcher.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter provides the methodological approach that was employed in the study, which included both historical and descriptive survey research design. The chapter further underscored the primacy of data collection techniques that was employed in this study. How to arrive at accuracy and meaningful inference to the study was also explained. The measure of degree of research instruments was explicated. The chapter took cognizance of the procedure of data collection by stating the channels that were pursued in collecting data and how collected data was analyzed and presented. It also discussed the limitations and delimitations of the study and how they were overcome. Finally, ethical considerations that are preponderant to the study were examined. Chapter summary is also included.

3.1 Research Design

This study adopted descriptive research design. Orodho (2003), defines descriptive design as a method of collecting information by interviewing or administering questionnaire to a sample population to get their attitude, opinion and habits on any variety of educational or social issues. This design was used to describe the demographic elements under study. It gave a detailed account of demographic characteristics of the respondents to the study. The descriptive approach aided in describing the status of the variables in objective one while showing how the variables relate in the natural setting (Creswell, 2009).

In line with specific objective one, descriptive research design was employed to describe the nature and structure of EASF. It described the structure as the system that is used to define the hierarchy within the organization that establishes how it operates to execute its goals, for instance, EASF planning element, early warning system, negotiation and mediation capability of EASF as well as how the political and geopolitical structures are made up.

In line with specific objective two, the design was used to describe a compendium of actors' contribution in EASF's mandate of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Besides,it was also used to describe the role of IGOs and INGOs in complementing EASF's mandate in Kenya and Somalia.

In line with specific objective three, the design was used to explicate the challenges facing EASF in discharging its mandate in Kenya and Somalia as well as bringing out the opportunities arising from the challenges themselves. This design was useful for greater understanding of complex security phenomena as it allowed the researcher to retain whole and meaningful real events in Kenya and Somalia. It allowed the researcher to delve and concentrate on a particular case, that is, Kenya and Somalia, which elicited greater depth in the inquiry.

The outcome was fit for making generalizations with regards to the topic under investigation. This design further employed the qualitative approach in gathering data from the sampled population. It was used for objectives one, two and three.

3.2 Study area

The study was conducted in Kenya (Nairobi, Mombasa, Lamu,) and Somalia (Mogadishu, Kismayu and Ras Kamboni). The choice of these regions was centred on the Kenya Somalia relations. The attempt by Kenyan-Somalis to join Somalia in the 1960s to fulfil Somalia's

expensionist plan of the time, conjoining Somalia, Djibouti, the Ogaden of Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya to comprise one large state called *Soomaaliweyn* was brutally suppressed (Amed and Herbold, 2009). Since then, the intertaction between Somalia state and Northern Kenya has been mediated through brute force and mutual suspicion, and mainly viewed as a matter of security. Therefore EASF's involvement in both Kenya and Somalia was seen as an emancipative effort for promoting peace and security (Amed and Herbold, 2009).

Further, Kenya has been victim of sporadic terrorist attacks and border incursions from Somalia. The most prominent of these incidents was on August 7, 1998, when Al-Qaeda attacked the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, killing 213 people, mostly Kenyans. Thereafter a number of terrorost attacks have been carried on Kenyan soil to include the November 28, 2002, Al-Qaeda militants attack on the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, killing 15 people (Bar, 2016). In 2013 the Al-Shabaab conducted a terrorist attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi and in 2015, they attacked Garrissa University attack in northeastern Kenya killing over 147 people. In 2019, they attacked Dusit Hotel in Nairobi. By 2018, al-Shabaab's infiltration in Kenya's northeast region had intensified, and locals had started increasingly accommodating their presence (Hansen, 2018).

The situation in the area around the coastal town of Lamu is similar. Al-Shabaab is taking advantage of animosities between the Muslim Bajunis and the Christian elite who settled in the area in the 1970s to create animosity against the administration. There is also escalation of terrorist attacks in the area too. All this is the direct result of the Al-Shabaab terrorsoit insurgency from neighbouring Somalia.The terrosits usually operate from Mogadishu, Kismayu and they cross over to Kenya through the porous border, especially in the area of, Ras-Kamboni. All these terrorist attacks are also taking place in the backdrop of the on going

Kenya-Somalia dispute over maritime borderline (Jamal, 2017).

The series of Alshabab cross-border incursions, coupled with terrorost attacks into Kenyan territory, as well as tourist kidnapping incidents on Kenyan soil, motivated Kenya's military intervention in Somalia on 14 October 2011(Nzes, 2012). Kenya launched an offensive operation against Al Shabaab terrorists in Somalia code-named "Operation Linda Nchi" (Operation Protect the Nation) on October 16, 2011 (Migue *et a*l 2014).

On the other hand, the Somalia government is heavily reliant on AMISOM forces fighting in coordination with their local allies, the Somali Security Forces for its security. Such a strong role for foreign forces, compounded by the absence of an indigenous Somalia security capability, makes it difficult for the Somalia government to claim local legitimacy and raises concerns of transnational security tools being employed (Findlay, 2014). In the face of a new common threat from international religious extremism, Kenya and Somalia have engaged each other in order to address modern conflicts through increased levels of international cooperation and individual domestic policy efforts (Findlay, 2014). Therefore EASF's involvement in both Kenya and Somalia was seen as an emancipative effort for promoting peace and security in the two countries (Amed and Herbold, 2009).

Maps showing the delineation of the study area in detail are provided in figures 3.1 and 3.2.

Figure 3.1 Map of Africa Showing location of Kenya and Somalia

Source: GIS,2020

MAP OF KENYA AND SOMALIA SHOWING THE STUDY AREAS

Figure 3.2: Map of Kenya and Somalia showing the study areas

Source: Researcher, 2019.

3.3 Study Population

A target population is an entire set of units for which the findings are meant to generalize. Target population delineates both the geographic and temporal charaterictics (Lavrakas, 2008). The study targeted six regions in both countries: two cities (Nairobi and Mogadishu); as well as other towns including Mombasa and Lamu in Kenya, Kismayu and Ras Kamboni in Somalia. The population is 6,051,975 as distributed in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Distribution of target population by region (Town/city)

No.	Categories	Populations
1.	Nairobi	3,138,136
2.	Lamu	101,539
3.	Mombasa	1,200,090
4.	Mogadishu	1,353,000
5.	Kismayu	183,300
6.	Ras Kamboni	76,000
	Total	6,051,975

Source: The World Fact Book, 2014

The foregoing cities and towns in Kenya and Somalia are categorized based on their vulnerabilities and recent conflicts and attacks meted upon them by Al shabaab terrorists. Nairobi and Mogadishu have experienced numerous terrorist attacks. Notable examples in Nairobi include the Westgate Mall attack in 2013 that left 71 people dead, and 200 people wounded in the ensuing mass shooting (Jamal, 2017). In 2019, Al shabaab terrorists also attacked the Dusit Hotel in Nairobi, which left more than 20 people dead. Mogadishu has equally sufferd major terrorist attacks to inlcusde the 2017 attack where a large truck bomb exploded in central Mogadishu (Hodan District), killing 300 people and injuring many more. Additioanlly in December 2019,a car bomb exploded at a busy security checkpoint in Somalia's capital, killing 78 people and injuring 100 people (Sperber, 2019).

The other towns visited include Lamu and Mombasa in Kenya, Kismayo and Ras Kamboni in Somalia, due to their vulnerability from terrorist attacks. Lamu town on Kenya's coast is a tourist paradise, investment hub which has also been a battleground of Kenya's internationally backed war on terror with Al-Shabaab.The latest attack was on 5 January 2020 when Alshabaab terrorists attacked a military base in Manda Bay killing three US personnel. In 2014, a large group of armed men commandeered several vehicles and entered the town of Mpeketoni, a town on the mainland in the Kenyan coastal county of Lamu, burned buildings and killed 47 people dead. Among the significant terrorist attacks in Mombasa was in 2002 against an Israeli-owned hotel and a plane belonging to Arkia Airlines when an all-terrain vehicle crashed through a barrier outside the Paradise Hotel and blew up, killing 13 and injuring 80 people. Additionally in 2014,three Kenyan policemen were killed and over a dozen wounded in a grenade attack during riots in the port city of Mombasa over the killing of Islamist (Schimdt and Savage, 2019).

Notable terror attack in Kismayo was on 12 July 2019, when four al-Shabaab gunmen attacked the Asasey Hotel in Kismayo, killing 26 people and injuring 56.Ras Kamboni is actually more of a place wher terrorist attacks are conducted from. Attacks believed to have been launched from Ras Kamboni include the 1998 United States embassy bombings and the 2002 Mombasa hotel bombing in Kenya (Schimdt and Savage, 2019).

The study population it included state actors and non-state actors in those six areas. In Kenya, state actors were officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and coordination of national government and the immigration department in Kenya. Others were officials from Somalia Embassy in Kenya and senior staff from EASF planning element in Nairobi. Non-state actors included officials from the International Crisis Group and Institute of Security Studies (ISS) based in Nairobi. Others were representatives from

International Media houses operating in Somalia and NGOs based in Somalia, Civil society and religious organizations operating in Somalia.

In Somalia state actors were officails from the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Somalia Nartional Army and Local Adminstration Units in Mogadishu, Kisamayu and Ras Shamboni. Non-state actors were officials from members of youth for Peace Forum in Mogadishu, Youth Agenda in Kismayu and religious leaders from Muslim and Christian faiths in Ras Kamboni.

3.4 Sampling strategy and sample size

Sampling is the procedure a researcher uses to gather people, place or things to study. Tesch (1990) defines sampling as the process of selecting a number of individuals or objects from a population such that the selected group contains elements representative of the characteristics found in the entire group. Creswell (2004), further posits that sampling is the methodical selection of a specific number of elements from a certain population of elements.

 On the other hand, a sample size is a finite part of the target population whose properties are studied to gain information about the whole population. It is a set of respondents selected form a larger population for the purpose of the survey (Tesch, 1990).

The sample size for this study was derived from the target population as reflected in table 3.1 using, Mora and Kloet (2010), formula as follows:

$n = N / 1 + (e)^2$

Where, n=Sample

size;N=populatio

n size

e=the level of precision (or the margin of error or the confidence Interval).

Accordingly, given the population size of this study as 6,051,975(Table 3.1), with

a level of precision at ±5% while confidence level of 95%, the calculated

sample size will be;

n= 6,051,975/1+6, 051,

975(0.05)2 n= **3 8 5**

So, the total sample size for the study is **385**

The study employed simple random sampling strategy to select respondents from specific government ministries and non-governmental organizations in Kenya and Somalia. According to Kothari (2004), random sampling strategy is used to give each member of population equal chance of selection. The researcher therefore preferred this strategy so as to be in a better position to examine and explore a wide array of dimensions of the study from perspectives of the state and non-state actors. Additionally, this was complimented by purposive sampling startegy. A purposive sample is a non-representative subset of some larger population, and is constructed to serve a very specific need or purpose. The researcher employed purposive sampling to select informants for interviewing from the sample size.

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), a sample size of between 10 and 30% is good representation of the target population. For purposes of obtaining key desired information; the study used 10% of each of the targeted population or herein referred as population size;as in tables 3.2 and 3.3.

Table 3.2: Summary of study population units (State Actors)

Population Cluster	State Actors	Population Size (10%)	Sampling Strategy	Sample Size
Nairobi	Officlas from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Somalia Embassy in Kenya and staff of EASF Planning Element in Nairobi	1000	Simple Random	100
Mombasa	Officials from the Ministry of interior and National Government coordination and Immigration Department	900	Simple Random	90
Lamu	Staff from Manda Military Base	200	Simple Random	20
Mogadishu	Officials from Somalia Federal Government ministry of Foreign Affairs, Somalia National Army and Local Administration Unit	300	Simple Random	30
Kismayu	Officials from Somalia military base in Kismayu and from the Local Administration unit.	200	Simple Random	20
Ras-Kamboni	Officials from Ras-Kamboni Brigade and local administration unit.	200	Simple Random	20
	TOTAL			**280**

Source: Reseacher, 2019.

Table 3.3: Summary of study population units (Non-State Actors)

	Non-State Actors	Population Size (10%)	Sampling Strategy	Sample Size
Nairobi	Officials from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), International Crisis Group (ICG), International Media House Correspondents (BBC &CNN)	500	Purposive	50
Mombasa	Officials from International Association for Religious Freedom and Religious leaders from the Muslim For Human Rights (MUHURI).	300	Purposive	30
Lamu	Religious leaders from Muslim and Christian faiths	40	Purposive	4
Mogadishu	Members from Youth for Peace Forum	100	Purposive	10
Kismayu	Members from Youth Agenda-Kismayu	50	Purposive	5
Ras-Kamboni	Religious leaders from both Muslim and Christian faiths	20	Purposive	2
	TOTAL			105

Source: Researcher, 2019.

The sample for the study was obtained from 385 key personnel; comprising 280 state actors and 105 non-state actors in both Kenya and Somalia. Key personnel from state institutions in Kenya, included specific senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and coordination, the immigration department, Somalia Emabssy and the EASF PLANELM in Kenya.In Somalia, they included senior officaials from the Ministry of Foreign Affafirs, Ministry of Defence and Local Administrative Units.The selected officials were specifically those involved in the coordination of regional peace and security activities in the ministries/departments/units/orgaizations:.key among them are senior military commanders in charge of operations and plans dockets in the ministry of Defence in both countries, Desk officers manning regional desks in the ministry of foreign affairs in both countries, immigration

officers in charge of Mombasa county in Kenya, Provincial Administration officers in Mombasa and Lamu counties due to their interation with security threats emanating from Somalia.Others are senior military commanders deployed in operational bases in Lamu (Kenya),Kismayu and Ras-Kamboni in Somalia. The Somalia ambassador to Kenya was also selected because he represents his country in the ministerial committee of EASF.

Key officials from Non state organizations included the head and at least two field officers from International Crisis Group and Institute of Security Studies (ISS) based in Nairobi, International Media houses operating in Somalia and with offices based in Kenya, NGOs based in Somalia with offices in Nairobi, Civil society and religious Organizations operating in Somalia and with offices in Nairobi because they operate in both countries on areas touching on peace and security.

In Nairobi, a total of one hundred and fifty (150) key officials were sampled. Eighty (80) respondents from state actors were selected to respond to the questionnaire while forty (40) from non-state actors were purposively selected to respond the questionnaire. Besides, an eight member (8) focus group discussion was conducted drawing participants from EASF secretariat. Focus groups are appropriate in situations where highly efficient data collection is necessary. The researcher considered a group of between eight to ten (8-10) members focus group; as supported by Creswell (2009), indicating that group size should be kept between 8-10. In addition, twenty two (22) key informants were purposively selected from the state and non-state actors.

In Mombasa, a total of one hundred and twenty (120) key officials were sampled. Ninety (90) respondents from state actors were selected to respond to the questionnaire while twenty (20) from non-state actors were purposively selected to respond to the questionnaire. Additionally, a focus group discussion was conducted from eight member (8) group. Further, two (2) interviews were conducted from the non-state actors. In Lamu, a total of twenty four (24) key officials were sampled. Two eight-member focus group discussions were conducted amongst military officers as well as interview with four (4) religious leaders and four (4) questionnaires for military officers.

In Mogadishu a total of forty key officials were sampled. Twenty three (23) questionnaires were administered to Somalia National Army while one (1) interview purposively were carried out among Somalia Federal Government officials. Additionally, two eight-member focus group discussions were carried out among the Youth for Peace in Mogadishu.

In Kismayu,a total of 27 key officals were sampled. Nineteen questionnaires were administered amongst government officials, one FGD was conducted. The study was also conducted in Ras-Kamboni and a total of twenty four (24) key officials were sampled. Twenty questionnaires were administered while interviews intended to be carried out among religious leaders were not done due to unwillingness from the respondents.

3.5 Data Collection methods and instruments

This section dealt with how the primary and secondary data was collected. This was facilitated by a letter of the research proposal approval from the Directorate of Postgraduate Studies of

Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST). Research instruments were prepared in advance by the researcher and administered to the respondents whom the researcher selected as a sample of the study. Questionnaires were administered and interview schedules carried out.

The research employed both primary and secondary data. Triangulation method was used in the study to obtain different but complimentary data on the same subject matter. It allowed in depth understanding of the effectiveness of EASF in the maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia

3.5.1 Primary Data

Primary data refers to information that is derived from the field through various data collection tools. This study used questionnaires, interview guides and Focussed Group Discussions to collect primary data.

3.6.1.1 Questionnaires

The instruments for collecting data from the field involved written questionnaires. According to Kombo and Tromp (2006), a questionnaire is an appropriate instrument suitable for obtaining information from a larger group of respondents. According to Kothari (2004), questionnaires are usually free from the interview bias as the answers are in respondents' opinions. They are tools of research that are widely used to get information about current conditions and practices to make inquiries concerning attitudes, behaviours and opinion.

Closed ended questions to obtain both personal and specific information was sent to government officials from government ministries, in Somalia and Kenya as part of the state actors and other non-state actors. The structured questionnaires are suitable because, they are easier to administer

and each question item were followed by alternative response for choice. They are also economical in terms of time and money and are in a form that is easy to analyse (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). The instrument composed of 21 questions (Appendix II),which were used to capture all the responses to the questions in relation to the three specific objectives of the research which are to: Examine the structure and nature of Eastern Africa Standby Force in its mission of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.; Assess Eastern Africa Standby Force's efforts in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia and Examine the challenges facing Eastern Africa Standby Force in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

3.5.1.2 Interview Guide

Interview method is often superior compared to other research tools because certain confidential pieces of information can be divulged, which would otherwise escape the researcher and a follow up can be traced on un-clear issues (Gilham, 2005). The interview guide in this study was used to collect data from senior government officials, from government ministries and embassies in Kenya and Somalia. It also used for information gathering from senior staff of EASF PLANELM in Nairobi to obtain information on underlying motives, feelings and desires of the respondents. The interview schedule comprised 8 questions, carefully selected to fulfil the study objectives (Appendix IV). It therefore helped to explore the needs, desire and feelings of the respondents as opined by (Kothari, 2004). It was further used to supplement the questionnaires used in the study (Kombo and Tromp, 2006).

3.5.1.3. Focus Group Discussions

Focus group discussion (FGD) is considered a good way to gather information (Krugger, 1988)

from homogenous respondents.. It was used in this study to explore the meanings of survey findings that cannot be explained statistically and the range of opinions/views on the topic of study. It was useful in providing an insight into different opinions among different parties involved in the EASF process, thus enabling the process to be managed more smoothly (Morgan, 1988). It comprised eight people in each group (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002) to develop data collection instruments.the discussions were separated to give the groups an opportunity to contribute to the study from an independent point of view. FGD contained 10 questions (AppendixIII) and in total there were seven (7) FGDs.

3.5.2 Secondary Data

Secondary data refers to information that is derived from other sources to support the primary data (Creswell, 2014). The secondary data forms the literature review in chapter two. In this study, it was done through critical analysis of books, journals, newspapers, conference proceedings, government/corporate reports, theses, dissertations, Internet and magazines. Secondary analysis is analysis of data by researchers who are probably not have been involved in the collection of data (Allan, 2012). This analysed collected data within another study to examine existing data to produce new and more detailed information, including the emergence of conclusions that differ from those in the original report. The advantage of secondary analysis is that it is of high quality data and is quick and easy to access. Additionally, documentary research is largely free of the restrictions (Bryman, 2001).

According to Creswell (2009), contends that documents are a valuable source of information to qualitative studies and these consist of both public and private records that qualitative researchers obtain about on site or participants in a study. In order to have access to the said

documents, the researcher sought permission, consent and assent from relevant ministries from the Government of Kenya and Somalia other departments.

In this study the researcher also used document analysis as secondary data. Further the researcher collected documents such as EASF policies, Roadmaps and Assessment reports among other documents to get the requisite data that helped answer the research questions.

The researcher examined the said documentation for accuracy, completeness and usefulness in answering the research questions in the study. In the examination, the researcher took note about the documents in addition to optically scanning them to form a qualitative text database for the study.

According to Creswell (2009), this strategy provided the researcher with a functional database that would be a rich source of information for research. In the final analysis, the researcher sought to specifically determine if the nature and purpose of the said documents would shed more light on the adequacy of EASF structures and nature in the maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia among other objectives.

Overall, it was actually through secondary data that the researcher derived relevant information that helped in developing the background of the study, the literature review and the problem statement.

3.6 Validity of Data Collection Instruments

Validity is the extent to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure and performs as it is designed to perform. As a process, validation involves collecting and analysing data to assess the accuracy of an instrument (Biddix, 2009). In order to ensure content validity,

the preliminary questionnaire was pre tested on a pilot set of respondent for comprehension, logic and relevance. Respondents who took part in the pilot study were purposively drawn from the study population, which was similar to those in the actual survey in terms of background characteristics. The pre-tested respondents were excluded from the target population of the study since this could bring about assessment biases and contamination of the respondents (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). All the aspects of the questionnaire and interview schedule were pre-tested including question content, wording, sequence, question difficulty, layout and form. The instruments were also discussed with supervisors. Feedback obtained was used to revise interview schedule and questionnaire before administering them to study respondents.

3.7 Reliability of Data Collection Instruments

Reliability refers to the degree to which an instrument measures the same way each time it is used for data collection in the same condition with the same subjects. A measure is considered reliable if a person's score on the same test given twice is similar (Golafshani, 2003). In this study, the reliability of the research instruments was established using Cronbach Alpha Coefficient (CAC) analysis using Scientific Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). CAC is an appropriate package for determining instrument reliability necessary for quality of research findings. The reliability test also covered computable responses to the research items of the pilot survey instruments, particularly the questionnaires and interview schedules. The test considered all research items in logical sections related to the research objectives. Research instrument reliability level was determined based on the recommended scale that ranges from 0.7 and 1.0 (Weiner, 2007).

The pilot study was formulated as a try-out of research techniques and methods, and involved administering the research instruments to selected individuals. In this study, respondents were

purposively selected including civil society group (Haki Africa Group) in Nairobi and Somali National intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) staff in Dobley, Somalia. During this process, the researcher also tested a brief interview from one key informant from the media fraternity as well as one key informant from one EASF secretariat in Nairobi. Furthermore, a six -member focus group discussion was conducted on a group of members from the International Peace Support Training Centre in Nairobi, which is the training centre of excellence for the EASF.The intent for the pilot study was to help the researcher determine possible flaws, limitations, or other weaknesses within the instrument design and allowed making the necessary revisions prior to the implementation of the study (Kvale, 2007).

3.8 Administration of Research Instruments

Four research assistants were used to assist in questionnaires, FGD and interview schedule administration after a thorough training in the procedure of administration. They were thoroughly oriented on the content of the questionnaire, FGD and interview schedule.

3.9 Data Analysis and Presentation

Data analysis and interpretations ensured that all relevant data is available for making contemplated comparisons and analysis. In this study, data was analyzed by use of descriptive statistics; through quantitative and qualitative techniques.

3.9.1 Quantitative Data Analaysis

Quantitative analysis involved use of numeric measures Bhattacherjee (2012). Quantitative analysis was statistically used to describe, aggregates, and presenting the constructs of interest between the constructs, that is, independent variable and dependent variable of the study. This was further used to evaluate the role of EASF in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Analysis was done based on descriptive statistics. Under descriptive statistics,

frequencies and percentages were used to describe the data sets and results were presented in tables and charts. To achieve this, the International Business Machines (IBM) Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24 was used to analyze quantitative data.

3.9.2 Qualitative Data Analysis

According to Bhattacherjee (2012), qualitative analysis is the analysis of qualitative data such as text data from interview transcripts. Unlike quantitative analysis, which is statistics driven and largely independent of the researcher, qualitative analysis is heavily dependent on the researcher's analytic and integrative skills and personal knowledge of the social context where the data was collected. In qualitative analysis the researcher underscores "sense making" or understanding a phenomenon, rather than predicting or explaining. Qualitative analysis involves a creative and investigative mindset based on an ethically enlightened and participant-in-context attitude, and a set of analytic strategies. In this study qualitative data was coded and analyzed thematically and in verbatim, which helped to highlight the emerging thematic areas. The data was organized into various themes as per the objectives. The researcher had the opportunity to develop new approaches for data that was not within the pre-planned thematic areas. The text data collected across various respondents was factored in during analysis.

3.10 Limitations of the Study

In pursuit of this research, the researcher encountered a number of challenges. They include but are not limited to: language barrier especially while conducting the interviews; distortion of information, in case of an interpreter, respondents being reluctant to respond to questionnaires effectively and with honesty. Similarly, the study generated an avalanche of data and this made

analysis and synthesis rigorous. Security was also a limitation when collecting data in areas like Lamu, Mogadishu, Kismayu and Ras Shamboni in Somlaia.

These challenges were overcome by recruiting reliable and competent research assistants. The research assistants helped in giving the right interpretation of information as well as managing the numerous data collected. A databank of information retrieved from Internet sources, were created to manage information. Security challenge was overcome by liasing and requesting support from Kenya military units based in Manda Base Camp and also requesting support from AMISOM contingents based in the various locations Mogadishu, Kismayu and Ras Shaboni in Somalia.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

Permission for the research was sought from the Kenyan Government as well as Somalia Embassy in Nairobi. A letter of introduction from the Directorate of Postgraduate Studies of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST) facilitated this. Research instruments were prepared in advance by the researcher and administered to the respondents whom the researcher selected as a sample of the study. Questionnaires were administered and interview schedules carried out.

According to Okoth (2012), mistreatment of human research subjects, amounts to unethical practice. The consent of research informants and protection of the rights of informants was therefore a key issue in this research. Protecting research assistants and informants, was also vital. In connection to the foregoing view, a researcher was to take responsibility for ensuring that confidentiality is not abused. In this regard, stealing of ideas from others' work without permission was unacceptable. This study considered the importance of credit for someone else's work and always acknowledged such facilities and their contribution.

Okoth (2012) avers that, willful ignorance and failure to acknowledge the source of material employed in research, is tantamount to academic ill mannerism. The study, therefore, took cognizance of research mannerism in Kenya and Somalia. It also took into consideration inviolable human rights as far as the study was conducted. Several practices were considered a breach of ethicsand hence avoided. To this end,any researcher who perpetrated any academic malpractice was subjected to strict disciplinary action. In this regard, the researcher and his assistants observed the following; they sought consent and maintained confidentiality of the information given, eschewed plagiarism and falsification of data. The researcher also acknowledged every work done by various authors whose work was relied on in the study.

3.12 Chapter Summary

This chapter has highlighted the methodological approach that was employed in this study. It has further underscored the primacy of data collection techniques that was employed in this study. The process of coming up with accurate and meaningful inferences has also been explained. It also highlights the procedure of data collection by stating the channels that were pursued in collecting data. Limitations of the study and how they were overcome have been discussed. Ethical considerations that are preponderant to the study were also examined. The next chapter provides discussion of the findings.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE STRUCTURE AND NATURE OF EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE IN EXECUTION OF ITS MANDATE IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KENYA AND SOMALIA

This chapter presents analysis of results and discussions on the structure and nature of EASF in execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. The chapter begins with a presentation of the key demographic information and characteristics of the respondents. This will explain their understanding of the structure and nature of EASF in maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia, actors' role in maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia, historical factors contributing to incessant hegemonic competition within EASF and whether EASF is a source or resource for contest in the maintenance of peace and security. This chapter also delves into leadership styles and their influence on governance structures within EASF. It concludes with a chapter summary.

4.1 Demographic characteristics of respondents

Cline *et al* (2006), opines that demographics comprise an array of socio-economic, socio-political information, to include a breakdown of respondents by gender, age, as well as employment status of the respondents that capture a snapshot in time. The author further concludes that Socio-demographic data are important in understanding the concept of peace and security as well as the diverse objectives. In this study, demographic characteristics and data of all categories of the study population; as regards their distribution by gender, education, age and occupation was essential, because their responses had a bearing to the objectives of the study. It enhanced their undertanding the contribution of current EASF structure and nature in execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia, the impact of EASF efforts in execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia and the implications of challenges and opportunities available to EASF in execution of its mandate of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

4.1.1 Response Rate

The demographic information of the various respondents for this study was collected through the administration of questionnaires. A total of 300 questionnaires were administered to the respondents. 255 were returned, while 45 were not returned. This implied that there was 85% response rate. This impressive rate was achieved due to the rigorous engagement of the respondents by the research assistants.

Respondents	Responded (%)	Not Responded (%)
300	85% (255)	15%(45)

Table 4.1: Response Rate

The 15 % who did not manage to complete the study was either due to busy schedules or failure to submit the questionnaires in time. The study findings are considered valid since, according to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), a response rate of 50% is adequate for analysis and reporting. A response rate of 60-69% is considered to be good, while that of above 70% is excellent. So the response rate for this study was excellent (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003).

This section provides key demographic information of the respondents as regards their gender status, occupation, age and education levels, which are vital for this study.

4.1.2 Distribution by Gender

The study sought to understand the gender distribution of respondents. The study encompassed both male and female participants from the state and non-state actors. Out of the 255 respondents, the study found out that majority of them were male at 57 % (145), while 43% (110), were female. As indicated in Figure 4.1, there was a balance in terms of gender representation due to the minimal difference between the two. According to Creswell (2014), a gender balance in the study population helps to reduce gender bias, which makes the findings valid and generalizable. This is further collaborated by Mugenda and Mugenda (2009), who opine that balancing gender in the sample size increases the credibility of the research. The findings in the current study were therefore based on balanced opinions, feelings, and reactions

from both the male and female participants within the EASF region, which means that the findings can now be generalized across similar regions in Africa experiencing similar security challenges (Creswell, 2014).

Figure 4.1: Distribution of respondents by gender

Source: Field, Data 2019.

The finding could further be explained by the nature of EASF and its operations, where male respondents could relate better with military operational interventions as compared to females since they are more accustomed to muscular undertakings. The latter are more involved in culinary duties, though a number also find themselves in some combative assignments, which are no mere, fete. This is collaborated by Rodriguez (2012), who averred that the role of women in militaristic intervention has a long history. Despite the escalating and growing involvement of female in garrison and combat settings, gendered stereotypes are still evident. As demonstrated

in Afghanistan theatre, in the commitment of Afghan women in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), women in forces played a crucial role that should not be overlooked. Albeit disproportionate impact of conflict, war and violent extremism limit access of women to combat units, it is appropriate to give credit where it is due. Besides, the antiquity explicates that women have been actually involved in military intervention with the aim of creating peace and promoting security (Kamarck, 2016).

Notable examples include, Agustina de Aragon of Spain who defended Zaragoza during the sieges in the Spanish war of independence of 1807-1814 where women were very few in the frontlines. Additioanlly, during the creation of the Unified Armed Forces in Germany in 1955, that was to form part of Germany force in the NATO, there was a vivid demonstration of outright exclusion of women from participation in armed forces. It was not until February 19, 1975, that women in Germany got a reprieve after an inclusivity debate sailed through in favour of their inclusion in combat operations. In Austria gender inclusivity begun serving in Austrian Armed Forces in 1998 with no moxie and specialization required on their side (Macfarance, 2014).

In Kenya, the situation was not different. Women started joing the military in 1971 with the formation of the Women Service Corps (WSC). This was as an only women unit. They were then prohibited from the majority of roles and operations that require a higher level of physical performance, such as combat and infantry funcions. The WSC was however disbanded in 1999 and women were integrated to work alongside their male colleagues (Kimathi, 2010).

Koppel (2009), however observes, that in as much as gender inclusivity in the military continues

to be controversial in many a society, the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in October 2000, caling for an end to the traditional inequality between men and women in Peace keeping Operations was a stepping stone in the history of military interventions. He notes that in December 2007, NATO complied to the resolution by incorporating few women in UN operations as military observers and civilian police members. This is explained by the fact that by this time, gender mainstreaming was inescapable and an important issue. In Kenya, by 2000, women were finally co-opted into the main arms of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), whereby they continue to excel in their performance in otherwise male dominated roles such as in engineering, medicine, education, law, communication, air, land and sea operational capabilities,but still the numbers are few(Ombati, 2015).

In 2017, KDF developed a landmark gender policy, which provided a comprehensive overall framework to guide gender mainstreaming. It guides the KDF on how to to give equal opportunity to all genders. In July 2018, Fatuma Ahamed became the first woman to be promoted to the rank of Major General. Many women continue to be deployed in peacekeeping missions as military observers, staff officers and as contingnet members. KDF continues to appreciate the role of women in the military and some are deployed in operational assisgnments, even in Somalia as part of the AMISOM troops from Kenya, where they are contributing significantly to the work the African Union to bring peace and stability in the country (KDF Majeshi Yetu Journal, Edn 15:2020).

In 2020, KDF appointed the fist woman spokespaerson, Col Kioko. It also deployed the first female officer to the Command Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTHOA), and liason office in

Djobouti. The foregoing, demostartes that though women continue to be under represented in military operational areas,a lot is being done to comply with UN Resolution 1325 by steadily incorporating them in the military (KDF Majeshi Yetu Journal, Edn 15:2020).

4.1.3 Distribution by level of education

The study sought to find out the level of education of the respondents. It was measured using four constructs: primary, secondary, tertiary/college and University levels. As illustrated in figure 4.2, the study found out that majority of the respondents had attained tertiary education. While there were no respondents with primary level education, out of the 255 respondents, 33 (13%) of them had attained secondary level education, 150 (59%) of them had tertiary /college education and 72 (28%) had university level of education.

The foregoing indicates that the study was well balanced in terms of education levels as all categories of education were well represented.

Figure 4.2: Illustration of education level of respondents

Source: Field Data, 2019.

This importance of this finding is collaborated by Carol (2004),who opines that having different opinions, feelings, and sentiments from a diverse group of people helps present the true picture on the ground. According to Creswell (2014), selecting a study sample with different educational and socio-economic status helps reveal the underlying factors to a phenomenon. The fact that a majority of them had atatined tertiary/college education reflects that most of them were literate and they understand many issues from a logical point of view. Therefore, the findings in the current study can be said to be representative. This is collaborated by study of Adan and Pkalya (2006), which also showed that a composition of a well-balanced sample in terms of academic and socio-economic statuses could result in representative conclusions (Adan and Pkalya (2006).

In view of the prevenient discussion, one of the informats from EASF secretariat said:

> We in EASF are privileged to have academically qualified staff. From technical to operational levels, EASF has dynamic workforce. However, staff of low cadre performs menial jobs that help other EASF staff run day-to-day activities. Those with high educational cadre help in analysing affairs of EASF member states, gathering of intelligence and making essential communications to and from important EASF's departments (Interview with key informant on 20/11/2019, EASF PLANELM, Nairobi).

The foregoing is an indication that training and ability enhances proffesionalism, which is important in maintaining peace and security between Kenya and Somalia. Low, high or optimal levels of education has an impact on productivity since training enhances skills acquisition,

knowledge building and capacity development. It also explains that formal education is important for skills and knowledge improvement. However professional training which focuses on enhancing skills relevant to the working environment is also a key aspect. This applies more to those who are advanced in age, because it enables them to acquire skills from experts in the workplace. It gradually contributes to improved employee performance as it allows the employee to strengthen the desired skills. This brings all employees to possess higher levels of skills and knowledge and function at the same levels of performance (Kavanagh, 2005).

4.1.4 Distribution by Occupation

The study sought to ascertain the occupation of respondents. As illustrated in figure 4.3, the study found out the respondents were either from the management, operational, technical and support staff categories in their organizations. Out of the total 255 respondents, 110 of them (43%) were from the operational category and they were the majority group. The study further revealed that, 59 (23%) were from the technical category. Additionally, 54 (21%) were part of the management category, while 32 (13%) of the total respondents were from support staff category.

Figure 4.3: Occupation of respondents

Source: Field Data, 2019.

The foregoing implied that varied skills are needed for better functionality of an organization like the EASF. This view is supported by Rodriguez (2012), who reiterates that skills and competency are key requirements in performance of standby forces. This compares well with most military establishments in the world. Gilpin (1981), in his book titled "*War and change in World Politcs*", observers that in Germany military, staffs are distributed according to their skill categories; where they are either classified as common corps, topography experts, specialists in health and arms. Others are nurses, telephone operators, secretaries and doctors. However different occupations throughout history have attracted contestations and disputations of different magnitudes. Munene (2015), observes that inferior physical conditions, differing hygiene

requirements and potential negative impact on the cohesion of EASF as an organization could be a concern in attracting key categories of staff (Munene, 2015).

This scenario is also evident in EASF due to staff specialization categories within most EASF member states. Giving Kenya as an example, the KDF management category comprises 11 % of the staff (KDF Journal, 2019). This includes commissioned officers, warrant officers and non commissioned officers from the rank of corprals. The Technical specialists comprise 14 % of the staff. This category includes the mechanics of all equiopments, operators of all systems and various tradesmen. The Operational category comprises 60% of the staff. They include those in the fighting arms, combat specilaized units and Comabt service support staff. The support category comprises 15% of the staff. Those are the ones deployed in administrative and logistics functions (KDF Journal: Majeshi Yetu, 2019).

4.1.5 Distribution by Age

The study sought to ascertain whether age was a key demographic factor in understanding the operations of the EASF. As illustrated in figure 4.4, out of the 255 respondents, majority of them totalling to 89 (35%) were between 35-44 years of age. The study also found out that 69 (27%) of the EASF staff were between 25-34 years of age. Additionally, 38 (15%) of the total respondents were between 45-54 years and 33 (13%) and 26 (10%) were between 18-24years of age and 55 years and above consecutively.

Figure 4.4: Age of the respondents

Source: Field Data, 2019

The foregoing indicted that there was a variation in terms of age of respondents. The age variations show that the study was also well balanced in terms of age. However, the figures also reveal that most respondents were between 35 and 44 years. This confirms that the youth play an active role in maintaining peace and security. This is collaborated by studies of Elder et al. (2014), which reveal that communities entrust their security to the youth during conflict situations. The same sentiments are echoed by Birch and David (2018), who found out that young people play a huge role in determining the sustenance of peace and security in most communities and especially in Kenya and Somalia. The results therefore implied that most reasponsents were in the category largely involved in operations at between the age of 35-44 years. This category is young, vibrant and more experienced and have adequate exposure in

international interventions. They also have the stamina and expertise to unleash in demanding situations. The age group also has a better understanding of geo-strategic perspectives in conflict scenarios (Birch et al, 2018).

Those between 25-34 years of age were found to comprise relatively newly recruited staff. They have relative experience in operational-like assignments and have been involved in peace operations as well as supporting civilian and police components in operations. They are relatively physically stronger and bring with them military gusto and enthusiasm to effectively intevene in conflict endeavours. Those between 18-24 years are comparatively newer recruits than those between 25-34. They possess a daredevil spirit. They are dexterous upon training, agile and forward moving upon command. They are extremely loyal as opposed to those between 45-54 years. These are commandeering and mostly they mentor intervention personnel. They exude confidence and loyalty in orhganizations that they serve in since they have seen it grow from the defunct EASBRIG to the near vibrant EASF of today. They have undertaken numerous assignments too and are relatively experienced in combat. Those over 50 years and above are few and they are those that majorly offer advisory roles. They are empiric in nature and quite few in number.

4.2 Structure of Eastern African Standby Force

Minterzberg (1972), in his book, *"The structures of an organization"* explains structure as the system that is used to define the hierarchy within the organization that establishes how it operates to execute its goals. It involves the jobs, the processes, the people and groups making efforts to achieve its goals. Jack et al (2009), when analyzing the structure of NATO, reiterates

that the organization is structured with international political and military organs, to be able to undertake its role of guaranteeing the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. The overall organ is the North Atlantic Council.This is the highest decision making entity and is comprised of the Representative Ambassadors of the Allied countries. Other organs are the Military Committee, which is comprised of the Defence Chiefs of Staff of the Allied countries, to which the Allied Command Operation and Allied Transformation Command report. The third organ is the International Staff and the International Military Staff, which prepares plans and directs operations. As an organization, NATO has very few permanent own forces and so when the Atlantic Alliance decides to launch an operation, the Member States provide military forces voluntarily (Jack et al, 2009).

At the continental level, Darkwa (2017), observes that a similar hierarchical structure exists in ECOWAS. To be able to articulate its mandate of promoting peace and economic integration of the constituting countries, ECOWAS is   organized with three arms of governance.They include the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. At the helm of the structure is the Chairman of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, who is appointed by other Heads of State and Government to oversee and coordinate the affairs of the organization for a period of one year. Others are the Council of Ministers, the Community Tribunal, the Community Court of Justice, the Executive Secretariat, the ECOWAS Parliament, and the Specialised Commissions to imnclude one on Peace and security (Agyapong, 2005).

At the sub regional level in the East African region, Ligawa (2015), opines that the EAC, being a sub-regional intergovernmental organisation of the Republics of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania,is structured with seven main Organs.They comprise the Summit,the Council of Ministers, the Co-ordinating Committee, the Sectoral Committees,the East African Court of Justice,the East African Legislative Assembly and the Secretariat. Each of these organs undertakes specified functions to enable the organization achieve its mandate of widening and deepening co-operation among the partner states and other regional economic communities in, among others, political, economic and social fields for their mutual benefit (Ligawa, 2015).

To be able to achieve its mandate of maintaining peace and security in the EAR, this study found out that EASF is also organized with a structure that establishes how it operates to execute its goals. The structure constitutes the Planning Element (PLANELM), the Early Warning Systems (EWS), the Mediation and Negotiation capability, the political and geo-political systems as well as the Mission Support capabilities and the Logistics Base (Kimathi, 2010).

4.2.1 EASF Planning Element

The study sought to underscore the structure of EASF. It sought respondents' understanding whether they strongly agreed, agreed, not sure, disagreed or strongly disagreed to factors determining the structure of EASF. As illustrated in figure 4.5,out of 255 respondents, 9% of them strongly agreed that EASF planning element was a defining structure for EASF. Besides, 45% agreed that EASF planning element was a critical element of EASF structure. Additionally, 13% of the respondents were not sure. A further, 27% of the respondents disagreed to the inquiry

as to whether EASF planning element constituted EASF structure. Minutely, 6% of the respondents strongly disagreed to the inquiry. Cumulatively, 54% of the respondents agreed that the PLANELM is a critical entity in the structure and effectiveness of the EASF.

EASF Planning Element

N=255

Level of Response	Percentage
Strongly Agree	9%
Agree	45%
Not Sure	13%
Disagree	27%
Strongly Disgree	6%

Figure 4.5: EASF Planning Element.

Source: Field Data, 2019.

In light of the foregoing discussion, one of the key informants had this to say:

> Planning element of EASF is part of EASF structure based in Nairobi. This is the engine of EASF since virtually all plans of the EASF are developed, designed and implemented from the planning element directives issued from the Nairobi office. However, for effective operations of EASF to take place, there are has often been need for coordination between the LOGBASE in Ethiopia and PLANELM offices in Kenya The coordination process is broadly making up the EASF structure that consists of the thirteen member states. However more tailored approach towards better planning is necessary in future (Interview with key informant at EASF PLANELM, Nairobi Kenya 20/11/2019.

The foregoing is illustrative of planning elements witnessed across the globe, the continent and within transnational formations. However, it is important to note that, the planning elements without proper coordination mechanisms become moribund. Such was the case with the restructuring of EASBRIG in 2004 into EASF. The PLANELM was composed of a regional military and civilian staff on secondment from all EASBRIG member states, and was equipped at its location at Karen, outside Nairobi, close to the existing International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), with funding from Britain. The function of the PLANELM was to serve as the multinational full-time planning headquarters for EASBRIG and it is empowered to enter into agreements with national and other training institutions for necessary capacity building. However, the restructuring of EASBRIG was necessitated by its ineffectiveness, hence the need to come up with a more effective structure (Cilliers & Malan, 2005). This finding is supported by Robinson (2014), who reiterates that during the 2013 verification of the ASF pledged capabilities, EASF, ECCAS, ECOWAS and SADC, were found to have operational PLANELMS. NARC capabilities were still not operational but were working towards achieving operational readiness (AU Verification Report, 2013).

However, Kibuko (2014), on the other hand, observes that the military components are the most dominant within the PLANELMs with a relatively fair capacity to plan, launch and sufficiently manage missions. This is attaributed to the original Brigade concept of the ASF whilst gradually being shed, but is still evident. The military components at the regions are comprised of staff officers across land, maritime, air and service support elements who report to a Head of Component and/or Chief of Staff. There is therefore need to enhance and develop the police and civilian components. There also remains a need for integration/integrated capacities. This will

ensure that each component is afforded the opportunity to develop and manage its affairs in its unique manner whilst contributing to the overall strategic objectives that have been set within the PLANELM. This is due to the fact that Police and civilian components continue to report through the military and it was observed that they are not adequately represented in decision-making structures and processes such as the Chiefs of Defence meetings wherein decisions that inform and drive the activities of the PLANELMs are taken. Where technical expert groups are utilised (such as in the EASF region), it was informed that they are for the most part comprised of military representatives. The communication flow and correspondence are also coordinated and managed by the Military Chiefs of Staff and this leads to communication being more directed to the Ministers and Chiefs of Defence and not to Chiefs of Police and Ministers responsible for police matters as well as Ministers of Foreign Affairs on civilian matters (Kibuko, 2014).

Amanyo (2015), agrees that staffing and funding constraints still remain a challenge for the regions, especially with respect to the police and civilian components within the PLANELM. When it comes to funding, there is still quite a dependency on partner funding to support posts within the PLANELMs. This again is especially particular to the police and civilian components. As partner funding continues to wane, the sustainability of staffing positions becomes a major challenge. Thus regions also need to ensure that they include funding for posts in their regular budget structures for the PLANEMs. All the regional PLANELM structures provide for three police experts in the police component. And it was observed that the only region where these positions are all filled, is the EASF with only one officer in SADC and two each in ECCAS and ECOWAS (Darkwa, 2017).

According to regional security complex theory, specific security threats and challenges should be treated differently since by nature the boundaries of EASF countries are comparatively permeable and that there are no efficient barriers to national and regional security. Thus planning element requires well-structured security frameworks to realize its objectivity.

4.2.2 EASF Early Warning Systems

Regarding early warning systems as composing EASF structure, 130 respondents (51%) of the total 255 respondents agreed that Early Warning Systems (EWS) had been initiated by EASF. 59 (23%) of the respondents disagreed to this inquiry and 28 (11%) strongly agreed that early warning systems had been put in place by EASF. Besides, 20(8%) strongly disagreed that EWSs were part of EASF structure and 18 (7%) of the total respondents were not sure.

Cumulatively 156 (62%) of the respondents agreed that Early Warning System was a vital component that had been opertaionalized within the EASF structure.

These results are illustrated in figure 4.6.

EASF Early Warning Sytems

N=255

Figure 4.6: EASF Early Warning Systems

Source: Field Data, 2019.

In view of the foregoing deliberations, one informant had this to say during the interview:

> Early warning systems are essential for EASF role. In maintaining peace and security, it is important to understand the dynamics that comes with early warning. It is not just about issuance of alerts, slapping countries with travelling advisories as witnessed by the red-tape countries like USA and UK. Early warning entails activating preparedness levels in readiness to respond to crises (Interview with Kenya Immigration government official on 23/11/2019,Mombasa, Kenya).

Chikwanha (2010), reiterates that EASF, working with the Africa Union Commission CEWS has developed many capacities and skills. This has enabled the organization and the region to engage in peace and security operations when mandated. Key among them is the Early Warning and Conflict Analysis system, which provides regular updates and analysis of conflict in the region.

This finding is supported by previous studies; for example by the Friendrich-Ebert-Stiflung (2010), on the enhancement of Early Warning Capacity in Africa. It revealed that a lot of progress has been made to enhance this capacity in the continent. While the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) was put in place by Article 12 of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), its operationalization is guided by the provisions of the "Framework for the Operationalization of CEWS". The two instruments stress the importance of collaboration with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on matters of early warning and conflict prevention as a pre-requisite for the successful operation and full operarionalization of CEWS (Chikwanha, 2010),

The PSC Protocol specifically States that the African Union Commission shall collaborate with International Organisations, Research Centres, Academic institutions and NGOs, to facilitate the functioning of the CEW. Against this background, the ASF and CSOs have provided an important contribution in the operationalization of CEWS.This si done through participation in various meetings and workshops convened by the AU Commission since 2003. During this period, three consultative meetings have been held with REC/RMs and CSOs, in the continent. They have basically focused on creating awareness and understanding amongst them on the mandate, structures, operations and status of operationalization of CEWS (Bouka, 2016).

This has enabled the development of an effective working methodology between the CEWS, RECs/RMs and CSOs.This has facilitated emergence of an effective, practical and sustainable relationship; and elaborate the modalities for engagement and their effective participation in

conflict prevention and early warning with the CEWS and RECs/RMs. As a follow-up to the consultative meetings, CEWS indentified five CSOs and Research Centres from the 5 AU regions to coordinate data collection activities and thematic research initiatives. Further, the Africa Reporter tool, which is an important online platform, has been used to enhance exchange of information between the AU, the RECs/RMs and CSOs. Through this the RECs/RMs and CSOs, are able to exchange information with CEWS, in countries/regions, where they have a presence or through existing networks (Cuman, 2012).

4.2.3 Negotiation and Mediation capability

As far as negotiation and mediation capability is concerned, out of the 255 respondents, 115 (45%) of the respondents disagreed to the inquiry whether negotiation and mediation capability constitutes EASF structure. 81 (32%) of the respondents agreed that EASF had capability in terms of mediataion and negotiation. 26(10%) of the respondents were not sure, while 15(6%) strongly disagreed and 18 (7%) strongly agreed. Cumulatively, only 39% agreed that EASF has a functional mediation and negotiation capability. This is illustrated in figure 4.7.

Figure 4.7: Negotiation and Mediation Capability

Source: Field Data, 2019

In view of the foregoing discussion, one informant adduced that:

> Negotiation and mediation are important aspects of regional organization like EASF. While, EASF has in the past been involved in negotiation and mediation efforts in attempts to maintain peace and security, it may need to be further developed to be a more effective conflict prevention tool in the Eastern Africa region, especially in Kenya and Somalia. (Interview with Key informant Nairobi, 24/11/2019)

The AU continues to support REC/RMs to develop their negotiation and mediation capabilities through the APSA framework and given legitimacy to the RECs/RMs mediation activities. This is contained in the UN-AU Ten Year Capacity-Building Program. ACCORD (2009), in a study on negotian and mediation capabilities in Africa emphasized that what is required now is the development of a sustainable work program for the support to RECs/RMs capabilities. It recommended that the process of strengthening the mediation relationship between the UN, AU and the REC/RMs should be broadened. The UN should further offer support for building the mediation capacity of the sub-regional organizations. This will go along way in ensuring that the relationship between the AU, the UN and the RECs/RMs regarding mediation is strengthened through desk-to-desk contact; sharing information and early warning. It will also develop a system for jointly identifying emerging conflict issues and designing timely response measures (ACCORD Report, 2009).

In power theory, negotiation and mediation capability depends on power dynamics of member states as well as regional organizations. One dominant state can armtwist another in negoatiation and mediation and have its own way at the expense of future consequence. This resonates with power theory where power attributes of one entity are capable of influencing another player within EASF organizational set up.

4.2.4 Political and geo-political structure

The study sought to ascertain whether political and geo-political structures formed part of EASF structure. As illustrated from figure 4.8, out of the 255 respondents, 145 (57%) of the respondents strongly agreed that political structure exists in EASF and is affected by member state politics. Additionally, 58 (23%) of the respondents agreed with the foregoing inquiry. Besides, 26 (10%) of the respondents disagreed to the inquiry, 13 (5%) concomitantly were not sure while a further 13 (5%) strongly disagreed that the political/geopolitical structures exhibited effectiveness of EASF.

Cumulatively, 80% of the respondents agreed that a political and geopolitical structure existed within the EASF and was key to its maintenance of peace and security in the EAR.

Figure 4.8: Political and Geo-political Structure

Source: Field Data, 2019.

In view of the foregoing discussions, one of the FGD participants observed that:

> Political and geopolitical structures are key in the operations of the EASF.Regional orgaizations are by nature political entities of member states. In most cases politics guides issues that circumnavigate around national interests. Politics have been structured, well rooted into the political fabric of EASF member states (FGD participant on 20/11/2019, PLANELM Nairobi).

This finding is supported by study conducted in the ECOWAS by the World Mediation Organization (WMO) in 2017. It found out that endless politics and geo-political interests always pervade all regional and sub regional security organizations. When ECOWAS was established in 1975, its mandate was restricted only to economic issues. This tradition changed in 1990, when ECOWAS decided to intervene in the civil war in neighboring Liberia. The economic

organization redesignated itself as a security organization with the objective of making and enforcing peace. Making peace involved negotiation, mediation and arbitration. Enforcing peace involved the deployment of a 3,000-strong military force to supervise the ceasefire in August 1990 (Mortimeer,1996).

Due to political/geo political interests, in 1999, Mauritania withdrew its membership. When ECOWAS decided to create a Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), in 1990, serious political divisions between the Anglophone nations led by Nigeria and the Francophone nations represented by Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire became apparent. This division, which eventually included most Anglophone countries on one side and most of the Francophone countries on the other side, not only hindered the implementation and the effectiveness of the operation, but also strained the cohesion of the organization. This explains that incessant politics will always take centre stage from member states. Reflecting neo-functionalism theory, to a greater extent,this to a greater extent has shaped the politics of peace and security in regions such as Eastern Africa and even in major blocs like the NATO (Howe, 1997).

According to Desmidt and Huuck (2017), this explains why EASF lacks a political home; with some key structures in Kenya and others in Ethiopia. He observes that the political climate in the Eastern Africa region is unpredictable, especially among member states due to prevailing political and geo-political interests. In this regard power dynamics are evident. Desmidt and Huuck (2017), observes that the dearth of any member states failing political legitimacy to house regional organizations is worrying but inevitable in today's geopolitical environment (Desmidt and Huuck, 2017),

4.2.5 Mission Support Capability

Regional security mechanisms are only strong and efficient when they possess adequate mission support capabilities. These are the capabilities that enable them to respond expeditiously to various conflict situations and scenarios without much support challenges. Mission support is an integrated capacity of military, civilian and contracted resources. The mission support component is responsible for the overall management and coordination of all logistic support functions for the EASF (Apuuli, 2016).

In order to know whether there are adequate mission support capabilities within in EASF structure, the study found out that, out of the 255 respondents, 156 (61%), of the respondents agreed that EASF had adequate mission support structure, while 43 (17%) of the respondents disagreed. Besides, 33 (13%) of the participants were not sure and 23 (9%) strongly agreed. None of them strongly disagreed.

Cumulatively, 179 (70%) of the respondents agreed that there exists a mission support capability within EASF structure. This is illustaed in fig 4.9.

Figure 4.9: Adequate Mission Support Capabilities

Source: Field Data, 2019.

The findings are underpinned by Kibuko (2014), who singled out mission support component as the most misunderstood yet critical components for the effective functioning of peace support operations. Based on her experience in UNAMID, she explains that effective delivery of mission support during operations becomes a clear indicator of a successful mission and hence a force multiplier. She observes that, if the procurement and supply units are not working well this means that even the military and police activities are hampered. In her opinion, regional security mechanism can learn from the UN pre-deployment training for the mission support functions such as Information Technology (IT), which has not been well explored by EASF. She detests any attempt by EASF to operate with limited resources, and duplication or overlap of efforts and resources must be minimized, if not avoided, as best as possible (Kibuko, 2014).

This finding is further supported by an ASF Pledged Capabilities verification, which was conducted in the EASF by AU team led by Gambari in 2017. It found out that EASF, ECOWAS, and SADC were at different stages of establishing their mission support capabilities. The EASF and ECOWAS were assessed to possess adequate logistics capabilities, which could perform procurement and administrative functions beyond the storage of pre-positioned equipment. NARC and ECCAS were still yet to establish such capabilities in their regions (AU Report, 2017).

4.2.6 Logistics Base (LOGBASE)

The heart of all humanitarian and peace support operations lies in the ability to conduct operational logistics to sustain the assigned forces. The EASF sub-region`s austere environment presents difficult logistic challenges. The research findings show that 115 (45%) of the respondents felt that the Force has an important logistical Unit as shown in figure 4.5. Out of the total 255 respondents, 69 (27%) of them averred that EASF has no operational logistical unit. Furthermore, 23 (9%) of the respondents strongly agreed that EASF has a functional LOGBASE and 15 (6%) strongly disagreed. In an interesting fashion, 33 (13%) of the respondents were not sure whether EASF has a LOGBASE or not.

Cumulatively, 138 (54%) of the respondents agreed that EASF has a functional Logistics Base, within its structure. This is illustrated in figure 4.10.

Figure 4.10: Logistics Base

Source: Field Data, 2019.

The foregoing was underpinned by Oluoch (2015), who argued that the identification of broad sustainability, logistical support, and funding requirements are key components for the deployment of any peace operations including military intervention under any mission scenario. Emphasising that the problem of logistics is not only that of outdated communication and operational equipment,he conetended that it is also the ability of the force to maintain modern logistical infrastructure and operational supply systems. The standardization of logistical equipment among the contingents of the EASF in as much as possible is a very important element of successful operation. However, due to different development capacities of member state defence forces, equipment standardization will not be possible across the whole spectrum of EASF military equipment. One kind of solution to bridge the gap that may exist between the different EASF member states` defence forces is the early identification and standardization of

areas where interoperability between contingents is crucial to the success of the EASF (Oluoch, 2015).

This prevenient assertion was supported by Bayeh (2014), whose opinion is in tandem with Oluoch's credence of EASF. However, he contends that African armies as well as security mechanisms put in place, have 'notoriously' weak logistics facility. In order to promote peace and security, Bayeh (2014), calls for offensive equipments such as artillery and other force multipliers like helicopters instead of small arms that were being used. He argued that such equipments were crucial in dismantling groups that stymie peace and security efforts. The researcher, therefore, believes that, LOGBASE in a regional security mechanism acts as the centralized warehouse for storage of logistics that are key to operations of EASF troops in maintenance of peace and security in Eastern Africa region. The LOGBASE controls virtually all the aspects of logistics in Eastern Africa (Bayeh, 2014).

The above assertion is further supported by the findings of the AU team tasked to verify ASF Pledged capabilities that was led by Gambari, which assessed that EASF has an operational Logistics Base that was established in 2007 in Ethiopia to provide and coordinate logistical support to EASF operations. Its mandate includes amongst other aspects, managing the logistics infrastructure; providing training for logistics personnel; maintaining start-up kits for the Force HQ for rapid deployment; undertaking contingency planning and coordinating all logistics activities. Personnel responsible for the maintenance of the equipment and the entire facility

have already been trained and the equipment is maintained using state of the art technology, ready to be deployed when the need arises (AU Report, 2017).

4.3 Nature of Eastern African Standby Force

Stevenson (1989), in his book titiled"*Introduction to management science",* underscores that the nature of an organization is shaped by the division of works, determination of activities, grouping of activities, delegation of authority and the establishment of proper co-ordination and balance among various departments and individuals towards the attainment of predetermined organizational objectives. In this regard, the nature of EASF is shaped by a number of regional actors that explain its rationale in execution of its mandate. This is captured by Sousa (2013), in his book titled "*African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Subsidiary and the Horn of Africa: The Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)",* where he reiertes that every regional security mechanism mandated to maintain peace and security has core and peripheral actors that underpin its nature. Core in the sense that they are directly in charge and peripheral in the sense that they influence the maintenance of peace and security in the EAR (Souza, 2013).

This study sought to find out the actors that shape and define the nature of EASF in execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. As illustrated in figure 4.11,they range from regional governments, the media, the civilian capability enforcement agencies, and the military component, albeit differently.

Figure 4.11: Actors involved in maintenance of peace and security in EASF Region

Source: Field Data, 2019.

4.3.1 Regional governments

This study sought to ascertain the various actors involved in EASF and what role they play in its maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. As illustrated in figure 4.12, out of the 255 respondents, 186 (73%) of the respondents avouched that regional governments played a significant role in maintaining peace and security, while 69 (27%) of the respondents indicated that regional governments played insignificant role in maintaining peace and security. However, questions such as when to intervene have elicited a plethora of reactions with scholars like Berenskoetter (2007), in his book titled "*Power in World Politics*"contends that,"to maintain international peace and security", is exclusively the UN affair. However, Waltz (1986), observes that in line with power theory,power is a key concept in realist theories of international politics, albeit conceding that 'its proper definition remains a matter of controversy.' In fact, compelling debates around regions and regionalism are arguably persuading scholars of peace and security

that there are 'tectonic shifts' in the manner in which peace and security are maintained. Therefore, regional actors' credence juxtaposes EASF critical role that has been somewhat obscured by international interference. The case of Kenya and Somalia is a stellar one, in the sense that it sheds light to the prevailing ideology of the primacy of security mechanisms.

During the interview, one respondent averred that:

> Various actors play significant or insignificant role in the maintenance of peace and security in the East African Region. EASF's role is complimented as well complicated by other players in the scene of peace and security. Regional governments are involved; so are non-governmental organizations, the media and other opposing groups are all involved. EASF, therefore is not the only player in the region (Interview with AMISOM military officer, Mogadishu, 20/12/19).

Regional organizations define security mechanisms differently. A go-it-alone strategy is considered *mano-a amano* (head to head), with international bodies such as the UN and therefore security mechanisms mostly embed themselves on regional organizations. For instance, NATO or US influence is under the prerogative of UN framework and therefore EASF plurilaterism may be considered as anathematization process, if it disregards other regional entities such as the EAC, COMESA, IGAD or ICGLR. However, the increasing gap between legality and legitimacy of plurilateral security mechanism thereby bringing regional arrangements closer home can more often than not, encounter 'external implication, by global entity such as UN. Moreover, contemporary credence does not accommodate the pervading ideology of hierarchical order.

Therefore, EASF as a regional security mechanism assumes a degree of actor capacity that has been absent in some traditional arrangements.

4.3.2 Military Component

On the role played by the military component, out of the 255 respondents, 120 (47%) of the respondents indicated that the military component had played an insignificant role while 135 (53%) of the respondents asserted that the military component had played a significant role in shaping the nature of EASF. The findings of the study are illustrated in figure 4.12.

It was underscored that EASF consistently struggles to marshal the requisite military personnel, capability and range of military assets needed for complex peace operations. This finding is supported by Kibuko (2014), who observes that EASF member states have pledged a total of 3640 military personnel in the units of Light Infantry Battalion, Recce Squadron, Headquarters Company, Force Headquarters, signal Company, Combat Engineer Unit, Mechanized battalion, Level Two Hospital, Specialized Forces, platoon of Military Police and a Troop of Artillery. However assets in highest demand in difficult operational theatres of areas such as Sudan and Somalia are missing in the pledged capabilities. They include utility helicopters, armoured personnel carriers, C3IS assets, intelligence equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles, night vision goggles, strategic lift and in the case of troops in Mogadishu, battle tanks.

Williams (2012), also points out that EASF military troops, despite being involved in operations, also lacks sophisticated mortar radar systems, which could have helped it reduce levels of civilian casualties. Without such equipment, despite the level of training of the soldiers being high, they cannot defeat the contemporary insurgency. This is because; the modern militia

groups are more equipped than even some national armies. Troops should not be taken to a theatre of war with no adequate military hardware. In such cases, their defeat could be eminent causing more complications to already a complex security and humanitarian situation (Williams, 2012).

Further, Muriithi, (2012), observes that EASF is supposed to draw soldiers from the member states for robust deployment in mission scenario six, which requires rapid deployment to AU intervention missions. This poses grave danger since the member states are supposed to set aside a battalion plus for the deployment at all times. However in the EASF; member states have got no standing force set aside to be deployed by the EASF at short notice. If and when EASF is to deploy at a short notice then generating a relatively sufficient strength from member states would be difficult and it would require a long time to do so. In this regard, Tlalka (2014), concurs that the EASF brigade that is stationed at Addis Ababa is supposed to be having ready fighting units, but it only has strength of four officers and no soldiers on standby (Tlalka, 2014).

4.3.3 Civilian capability enforcement agencies

The civilian capability enforcement agencies are seen through the lens of civilian components. Civilian component comprises non uniformed civilian staff members in EASF that perform many of the mandated tasks of peacekeeping operations: including promoting and protecting human rights, helping strengthen the rule of law, fostering political and reconciliations processes, promoting mine-awareness, and serving as public information officers who explain and build support for the peace processes and the work of the EASF.

The study found out that out of the 255 respondents, 99 (39%) of them agreed that civilian capability enforcement agencies had played an insignificant role whereas a majority of them totalling to 156 (61%) stated that civilian capability enforcement agencies had played a significant role in the promoting EASF efforts of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

The finding is supported by Kibuko (2014), who contends that Civilian capabilities augment military operations and consequently ease the work of EASF in conflict intervention, especially in the areas of conducting electoral processes, such as voter education, voter registration and training, mentoring and support to local independent electoral commissions. They offer support for the restoration of state authority or the establishment of state services where these did not exist before, especially in the context of the Rule of law (RoL). They support various aspects of security sector reform (SSR), particularly, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), though civilian components remain fairly ignored and misrepresented in the wider context of Peace Support Operations (PSO), especially in the EASF.

While Omanyo (2015), supports the same finding, but is quick to observe that the level of EASF civilian component capability may not be adequately justified since EASF troops have not been deployed in peace support operations, where the civilian component has been incorporated.

4.3.4 Media

When asked to indicate whether the media is an actor and played any role in EASF operations, out of the 255 respondents, 137 (54%), of them stated that the media was an actor and had played a significant role in the maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. On the contrary, 118 (46%), of the respondents reasoned that the media had played an insignificant role.

Those in agreement contended that the media has played a pivotal role in maintenance of peace and security within EASF member states, where it has perfected its role as a platform where the public can exchange diverse issues and foster productive debates in the society. Essentially, the media is regarded as a contemporary "*Greek agora*", usually a city or square in which the population gathers to discuss affairs of the state (Watson, 1998).

Watson (1998), further observes that the principle of the public sphere shapes the way human rights processes are initiated within media and institutional frameworks. On its part, the media can be seen to contribute to public good by defending, protecting and promoting human rights. The media has a duty to facilitate the "public sphere" against the encroachment of the state in corporate powers, hence performing the role of the watchdog. This is not always the case, since government and other authorities have used human rights themes to manipulate or inflame public opinions, especially during periods of conflicts or political ventures (Watson, 1998).

The International Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) of 2001 on media usage found out that those in positions of influence usually employ public relations strategies or persuasive communication to manage conflicts and peace. More often than not, politicians manufacture statements, which help to push their agendas forward. The challenge is for the media to stand above such influence even though it may not be an easy task. Cuman (2012), contends the media can be seen as a source of redress against abuse of power by others. For this reason, the media bears the responsibility to inform the public and politicians about national issues and suggest ways to promote and protect human rights situations in any country. In their capacity as watchdogs, the media are the "eyes

and ears" of the public. They are defenders against possible abuses of rights in the society. While the mainstream media endeavors to achieve these roles, it cannot ignore competition from the alternative or sensational media. Alternative press is sometimes characterized with the manufacture of misinformation and falsehoods (ICHRP, 2002).

Dahal (2011), while supporting the finding, avers that in EASF, media is trained to be responsive, with ability to judge whether the power used by opposing parties to a peace process, is legitimate and consistent with people's aspirations for peace, democracy and social justice or just resisting each other's power to enact national strength. In situations of political uncertainty in Kenya and Somalia, it ensures it focues on efforts by political actors to achieve common good together, not what they oppose. Importance of this positivity by the media is captured in Hartley's (1992), statement that "the media defines what is right by describing what is wrong". In essence, by reporting on conflicts and ills in society, the media provides a synthesis to the social problem and opportunity to correct errors (Dahal, 2011).

In view of the foregoing discussion, one of the media correspondents asserted that:

> The media can be utilized to bridge the gap between violent conflicts and peace and in turn promote human rights. The argument is that the media preservation of human rights is only possible in the presence of a legitimate government, which acts as an instrument of public power and helps media to assume its responsibility. Rather than a state, which coerces the media to manufacture consent or threatens to limit its freedom of choice. In conflict situations, the public is desperate for information, for assurance and for guidance and leadership, while sometimes conflict may push the public together in pursuit for peaceful solutions (Interview with Media correspondent, on 12/12/2019,Kismayu, Somalia).

Dunsky and Nyama (2003), while further emphasizing on the importance of media in conflict resolution, they observe that in some cases, conflicts present opportunities for further tensions, which media can either accelerate or reduce. This is because the public relies on the media for information, but sometimes the media depends on governance authorities to provide updates on the situation. They note that at times, the media in Africa has failed to be critical and analytical on conflicts and shaping the peace agenda. In this regard, some reporting on conflicts in Kenya and Somalia has lacked concise explanation of root causes of problems and only mirrors on simplistic causal effect features. These sometimes do not offer adequate answers to consumers. They caution that media within EASF should always strive to accurately present events in a fair and balanced manner. Usually, these values are used interchangeably but they simply mean, giving each side an opportunity to express its opinions.

There are however contradicting views on the social responsibility role of the media in general. Ochilo (1993), on one hand criticizes this role as too idealistic in the absence of free and democratic structures. However Lauk (2004), separately contends that within EASF, the media can inflame conflicts by circulating "negative messages" in society. He advises that it should strive to be messengers of peace, reconciliation and unity of people by being sensitive to inherent conflicts in the region and especially in Kenya and Somalia.

4.4 Chapter Summary

This chapter has presented findings on the structure and nature of Eastern Standby Force's execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. It also discussed the demographic characteristics of the respondents to the study. From the findings,

EASF has a functional structure comprising of Command, Planning, Logistics and Early Warning Elements, capable of enabling it achieve its mandate. Its nature is shaped by a number of entities operating within its jurisdiction with regional governments, military component, media and civilian capability enforcement agencies leading the pack. The next chapter presents EASF efforts in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

CHAPTER FIVE

EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE'S EFFORTS IN EXECUTION OF ITS MANDATE IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KENYA AND SOMALIA

This chapter outlines the findings on EASF's efforts in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. The efforts discussed include strengthening funding support, use of diplomatic missions, deployment of peace support missions and enhancing actors collaborative contribution to EASF efforts in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. It concludes with a chapter summary.

5.1 Strengthening of EASF Funding Support

The study sought to find out if improving the financial support of EASF was an initiative used by EASF to enhance its capability of mainataing peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Out of the 255 respondents, 204 (80%) strongly agreed and 26 (10%) agreed. On the other hand 18 (7%) of the participants disagreed and 7 (3%) strongly disagreed. Cumulatively 80% of the respondents agreed that strengthening the financial support of EASF was an effective effort to enhance EASF effectiveness in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

The results are as illustrated in figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 Strengthening EASF Funding Support

Source: Field Data, 2019.

One interviewee had this to say:

> Funding for EASF operations remains still one of the key challenges facing the organization. If it is on the annual financial contribution, it is based on the GDP of the countries. While Kenya pays over 800 million USD per year, Uganda pays between 400 and 500 million USD while other EASF member states pay even less. This support is not sustainable. EASF has initiated efforts to establish a predictable funding mechanism through securing contributions from international partners like the UN, grants from bilateral sources and the AU to be used to establish the EASF peace fund. The efforts are at different levels of success. (Interview with Key informant, on 20/11/19,Nairobi EASF Headquarters)

The foregoing findings were supported by Bayeh (2014), who argues that, though most EASF

member sates were paying their contributions to the EASF, their individual contribution numbers were not obtained. In 2015,the EASF was financed by its member states for one third (33%) of its budget while the rest was expected to be contributed from partner support. This budget would not suffice in case of a deployment or extra exercises.

Reliable funding remains a pre-requisite for effective maintenance of peace and security not only in Kenya and Somalia by the EASF but also in Africa by the ASF. This is reinforced by the fact that successful peace operations and capacity building measures require adequate financing. Lack of funds for EASF in the past had created a problem of dependence on external support. This undermined local ownership of the Force and as a result called into question the role of the EASF as an "African solution to African problems"(Bayeh, 2014).

This weak financial capability in the EASF was explained by its member states weak internal funding capacities and occurrence of donor fatigue. Lack of funding in return rendered member states to refrain from actively committing their forces to the regional mechanism for operational deployment due to the mere fact that there were no sufficient funds to reimburse them costs they incured in such operations. This continued to affect the ability of EASF to address security challenges not only in Kenya and Somalia, but even elsewhere. The assertions had been echoed by Allehone (2008), who averred that this kind of scenario discouraged contributions from especially states with less financial capacity, thereby undermining the EASF's multi-national effort towards peace and security in the region. Most of EASF activities are left to be supported by funds from partner,which is not sustainable (Munene, 2010).

One of the initiatives that EASF is employing to overcome this funding challenge was to establish a predictable financial mechanism by establishing a peace fund. The EASF peace fund was established in 2014, through an agreement signed by all the members of EASF.They pledged to establish the EASF peace fund. By 2015, the EASF fund had received support amounting to $8.7m from member states, while donors had contributed $2.6m. This amount was only capable of supporting deployment for 90 days. EASF was however expected to be able to finance a deployment of at least six months, which would be difficult with the current budget. The Fund continues to generate contributions from a variety of sources. They include 12% of the annual budget, voluntary contributions, and external sources such as the EU's African Peace Facility (Tlalka, 2014).

After operationalization of the fund, EASF was then able to authorize its members to provide for the self-sustainment of their forces for timeframes that vary from 30 days to 90 days for deployment of their standby capabilities in regionally mandated/approved missions. EASF would later use the peace fund to reimburse expenditures incurred by the Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) using the peace fund. EASF would thereafter proceed to finance the mission from the predictable funding instrument. Through the Fund, EASF has managed to secure more predictable and sustainable funding for PSOs and related activities in its endarvor, especially to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia (Tlalka, 2014).

The initiative by EASF to set up a peace fund was motivated by a similar mechanism developed by ECOWAS. Darkwa (2017), observers that a verification of ASF operational readiness that was conducted by AU in 2013 found that other regions had adopted similar mechanisms. In

2013,the AU Chairperson constituted a panel of experts to assess the operational readiness of the African Standby Force.The team was led by Prof Gambari. Among the issues to be assessed was the status of funding capability of the REC/RMs. Their report revealed that ECOWAS had already managed to develop a peace fund, which had enabled it to effectively conduct its peace and security activities in West Africa. The region had applied a Community Levy approach, wherein the Commission makes in its annual budget a provision to fund Peace Support Operations through an ECOWAS Peace Fund. The levy is a tax percentage of goods being imported into the region at the rate of 0.5 % of the customs value of the goods. A percentage of the Levy was earmarked for Peace and security operations and kept in the ECOWAS Peace Fund (Darkwa, 2017).

Darkwa (2017), ascertains that the mechanism enabled ECOWAS to also generate finances from donor forums conducted regularly to sensitise partners on the fund and provide overview on its modalities. The idea to start the fund was established after ECOWAS deployed in peace and security scenarios in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Mali in the 1990s and had serious financial challenges to reimburse the participating countries. The situation was made dire by the fact that, despite the operations being mandated by the AU, reimbursements to the REC by the continental body were not forthcoming in time. This became a huge source of frustration to the ECOWAS, especially in the face of consistent demands for reimbursements from the concerned Member States.This informed their decision to set up a peace fund, which has henceforth provided sustainable mechanism to ECOWAS operations (Darkwa, 2017).

Strengthening EASF funding also resonates with neo-functionalism which foresees loyalties,

expectations and political activities to shift towards a new political setting in a 'process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions on bolstering their financial midas.

5. 2 Use of Diplomatic Missions

The study sought to find out if use of diplomatic missions by EASF would enhance its efforts of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Out of the 255 respondents, 120 (47%) of them strongly agreed, 58 (22%), agreed, while 32 (12.5%) and 45(17.5%) disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively.

Cumulatively, 70% supported that the effort would enhance EASF effectiveness in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. The results are as shown in figure 5.2.

**Figure 5.2: Use of Diplomatic Missions**

Source: Field Data, 2019.

One respondent had this to say:

EASF has a military heavy structure. The concept of military diplomacy therefore, applies in its operations in Kenya and Somalia. The EASF has not adequately employed intensive diplomatic initiatives and missions to address the peace and security concerns in Kenya   and Somalia. It has instead cooperated and coordinated   its diplomatic efforts with other regional actors   and organizations like IGAD and EAC.(Interview with   Key informant on 20/12/19,Mogadishu military camp)

The findings are supported by previous study conducted by Migue (2014), which revealed that the concept of military diplomacy was more contextualized within the realm of state defence diplomacy, and less within the wider framework of regional diplomacy. From the foregoing, it does seem logical to argue that military diplomacy is to be seen within the confines of the traditional practice of diplomacy by states. And the question that does arise is, "Does the military conduct diplomacy?" In answering this question one is bound to bring to the fore the peculiar characteristics that define military diplomacy and distinguishes it from the traditional diplomacy alluded to earlier (Migue, 2014).

One may also want to understand how military diplomacy has evolved over the years. Military diplomacy gains relevance considering that diplomacy has experienced a significant transformation particularly in the last decades of the 20th century. Specific reference has been made to the erosion of the barrier of sovereignty, by globalization, revolution in communication and infrastructure, which has cushioned states against interference in their internal affairs by

other states and non-state actors. Sovereignty may be the single most vital attribute of the state security. The configuration of the present state system is credited to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. The attendant acquisition of sovereignty among states meant that these new units of political organization were equal with no overarching supreme authority to superintend over their relations with each other. In spite of their "equality" however, their relations have been characterized by competing self interests resulting in what has been called the anarchical international state system (Williams, 2012).

The potential for conflict is therefore, forever present in the international system due to the lack of a common authority. Indeed the main thrust of a state's relations with another is to influence these relations for its own maximum leverage. It is within this influencing that diplomacy gains credence in what Barston (1995), calls, the statecraft of force. This entails such actions as preventing aggression, building alliances, threatening or cautioning an enemy and soliciting for international support for legitimacy and use or control of force. States over time came to the realization that persuasion was critical in their relations. Indeed states became aware that persuasion was usually more successful than the actual use of force. However, the use of the carrot and stick became a useful strategy in determining interstate relations. It is not uncommon therefore, to find the employment of military force to give "muscle" to negotiations (Souza, 2013).

Diplomacy and military force have been used by states and regional security mechanisms for ages and can be seen as the traditional instrument of foreign policy. Used this way, diplomacy is combined with other instruments besides the military to include economics and subversion in

what has been labeled as "mixed" diplomacy. In this regard, diplomacy is a communication channel through which the use of threat to use other instruments is relayed to other parties (Robinson, 2014).

One important aspect as regards the EASF was the realization that problems in Kenya of Somalia were not essentially military problems but was also political. As advocated by the deputy chair of the AU, Mr Erastus Mwencha in 2014, these problems therefore, required a mixed approach owing to their complexity. They required a more heavy diplomatic approach, than military. For this reason EASF required to deploy its diplomatic initiatives and missions to address peace and security concerns in the two countries; and where there were gaps, EASF was to continue cooperating and coordinating diplomatic missions with other sub -regional organizations like IGAD and EAC.

5.3 Deployment of Peace Support Missions

This study sought to find out whether deployment of peace support missions would enhance EASF efforts of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. From the findings, out of the 255 respondents, 65 (26%) strongly agreed, 78 (31%) agreed, 29 (11%) disagreed and 83 (32%) strongly disagreed.

Cumulatively, 57% concurred that this activity would enhance maintainance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

The results are illustrated in figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: Peace Support Missions

Source: Field Data.

One respondent from AMISOM underscored the following:

> EASF has been engaged in the PSO activities in Somalia but not in Kenya.This is however in the context of the African Union Mission in Somalia.EASF has deployed a 231 police component to AMISOM that was largely composed of East African countries' troops. Albeit small, the EASF police mission is significant in the development of the police dimension of the ASF. EASF has been also incorporated as part of United Nation Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). Additionally, on the request of the African Union, EASF carried out a fact-finding mission in Somalia (Interview with Key informant, Date 20/12/19,AMISOM HQs, Mogadishu.)

The finding is supporterd by Aboagye (2012), in his book titled,"*A Stitch in Time would have saved nine. Operationalising the African Standby Force''*, who underscores the important roles

undertaken by peace support missions when deployed in conflict situations. Key among them is the protection of civilians from sexual violence and other vices during armed conflict. They also provide conducive environment for humanitrain agencies to operate and support victims of the conflict. They undertake disarmament; demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) programs to ensure comabatants in a conflict are provided with long-term support. They work with other agencies to provide health care and counselling services for victims of conflict-related sexual violence who are eligible for the DDR programmes. They also assist in the establishment of a secure and peaceful environment for the holding of free, transparent and inclusive elections. To ensure future sustainability they work with other specialized agencies to conduct Security Sector Reforms that ensure new Security Sector mechanisms are put in place to provide Justice and Rule of Law through accountability in conflict situations (Aboagye, 2012).

EASF is fortunate to have members like Kenya that have a long-standing experience in peacekeeping operatiosn and that are capable of contributing immensely to EASF peace support missions to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Shah (2009), in his book titled"*Conflicts in Africa*", observes that the situation between Kenya and Somalia has always been contentious due the latter's policy of irredentism and the occasional incursions of its troops into the Northern Province of Kenya, which is predominantly inhabited by a Somali ethnic population. Tensions between Kenya and Somalia, over the Somali inhabited region occurred right after the independence of Somalia in July 1960. The first Somali independent state declared its intention to unify the Somalia inhabited regions in the horn of Africa under one state in which north eastern province of Kenya was included. Northern Frontier Liberation Army (NFLA), an ethnic Somalia secessionist movement, was established in the early 1960s to fight against

Kenyan rule in this region. The Somali government at the time backed up this movement and provided them moral and material support. However in spite of history, Kenya has always been friendly with the Somali people since the war broke out in Somalia in 1991. Kenya accommodated the largest number of Somalia refugees who fled the war in Somalia (Shah, 2009).

According to UNHCR Report (2012), Kenya hosted about a half a million Somalia refugees in 2012, but had reduced to two hundred thousand in 2019 due to UNHCR assisted repatriations thereafter. The fact that all conflicts affect regional countries in several ways, the scale of Somali refugees in Kenya could hugely affect this country in variable aspects. This is exemplified by Brown (1996), where in his concept on regional dimensions in internal conflicts, he explains that refugee is a result of internal conflict and it mostly affects the neighboring countries. Even though Kenya hosts the largest number of Somalia refugees in the world, Kenya's role in the Somali conflict remained quite neutral for many years. Kenya has been involved in mediation processes between Somalia internal actors and has hosted several peace processes meant to reconcile conflicting parts in that country. This includes the one that was held from 2002-2004 in Mbagathi Conference Centre, Nairobi in Kenya under the auspices of IGAD member states and the international community supporting the Transitional Federal Governemnt (TFG) of Somalia. Regardless of its role in the conflict, Kenya always experienced insecurity incidents posed by this conflict since it broke out in 1991 (Wise, 2011).

The relations between Kenya and Somalia worsened from 2006, due to the changing dimensions of Somalia's conflict. During this time Al-Shabaab armed groups, who controlled larger areas in

Somalia threatened to destabilize Kenya. The terrorist organization carried out several attacks inside Kenya targeting tourism and other economic sources of the country. Moreover, the group started to recruit youngsters of Kenya, Somalis in Kenya and other Muslim nationals inside Kenya to join them. The Kenyan government perceived this as serious security threat against its national security and interest. Recruitment of youngsters provided the terrorist organization a capacity to destabilize Kenya through home grown elements. Consequently, the Kenyan government changed its behavior towards the Somali conflict by sending the Kenyan defense forces (KDF) into Somalia to fight Al-Shabbab and prevent their attacks against Kenya. In relation to the dimensions and the behavior of the actors in the Somalia conflict, the conflict can be classified as what Kaldor (2012), explained to be new wars. Recruitment of young men of different nationalities by Al-Shabaab and involvement of Al-Qaeda terrorists indicated a new war character in this conflict (Kaldor, 2012).

It is against this background that KDF's military deployment in Operation Linda Nchi (2011-2012) against terrorist agents in Somalia is to be contextualized. It is understood that, Kenya joined the community of nations on attaining independence on 12th December 1963 and has a rich history in the field of peace support operations. On 16th December 1963, Kenya became a member of the UN and since then, Kenya has been committed to supporting UN peace initiatives all over the world. Peace Support Operations (PSOs) within the KDF can be traced back to 1973 when the UN requested the Republic of Kenya to contribute forces for peace operations in the Middle East after the Israel-Arab war. However, in spite of Kenya acceding to the request, KDF troops were not deployed due to various logistical constraints. Later within the same decade, KDF started participation in UN PSOs in a career spanning twenty-six missions in sixteen

different countries in Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans and in Asia in a period covering over thirty years (Migue, 2014).

In Africa, KDF has participated in various UN PSOs as follows: in former Rhodesia in 1979, in an OAU peace support mission in Chad in 1982, in Angola between 1988 and 1997, in Namibia in 1989, in Western Sahara in 1991, in Liberia between 1993 to1997 and again from 2003 to 2005, in Rwanda between 1993 and 1996, in Mozambique between 1992 and 1995, in Somalia between 1992 to 1995, in DRC from 1999 to 2001, in Sierra Leone between 1999 and 2003, in the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea between 2000 and 2008, in Burundi between 2004 to 2007 and in Sudan in Darfur from 2005 to date. Other missions include the UN Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) from 1988-1990 and the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia. Whereas KDF's involvement in the aforementioned missions were PSOs, its engagement in Somalia in October 2011, ushered in a new dimension, that of Peace Enforcement under Chapter V11 of the UN Charter. While in these previous engagements KDF was a neutral arbiter promoting peace, in Somalia, KDF was an interested party to the conflict. The incursion to Somalia was a pre-emptive and preventive campaign aimed at flushing out Al-Shabaab terrorists after series of kidnappings and cross-border incursions into Kenya; hence threatening the security and lucrative tourism industry of Kenya. (Migue, 2014).

This study also proffers that the events leading to the deployment of KDF into Somalia constitute defense diplomacy while KDF's military engagement in Somalia in the period under review constitute military diplomacy. In response to the challenges affecting the national security and interest, the Kenya government increased its involvement in Somalia by integrating the Kenyan

forces in Somalia with the AMISOM peacekeeping forces operating under the mandate of the AU and UNSC. The Kenyan forces operating in Somalia initially invaded Somalia with an individual self-defense decision by the Kenyan government under Aticle 51 of the UN Charter. The AU and UNSC officially allowed KDF to join AMISOM peacekeeping forces through in UNSC resolution 2036 of February 2012. The resolution provides legal framework, mandates and resources to the Kenyan forces to fight Al-Shabaab in Somalia (Migue, 2014).

In order to protect its own national security, Kenya strives for peace and stability in Somalia, particularly in the nearby regions of Juba land. Therefore, in order to get security in her territories, an active Somali regional state in the nearby regions is an option for Kenya in the context of Jubaland. This friendly region creates a security buffer zone to protect Kenyan national security and interest. Moreover, Kenya argues that such an authority can create a safe and secure environment for Somalia refugees living in Kenya to return and resettle in their country (Erickson, 2013).

Even though Somalia's conflict has prolonged and passed through different dimensions and multiple identities, the intervention by neighboring states such as Kenya and Ethiopia can lead the conflict to a new dimension with new identities based on regional states. The behavior of Kenya in this conflict is unlikely to produce a holistic solution for Somalia's conflict; it rather focuses on a partial solution in which its national interest is bounded. Even though, Kenya explained this is an action of defensive intervention which, Williams (2018), explains to be when states intervene others' conflicts with the objectives of self-defense and target to bring cross-

border problems, such as refugee flows or military assaults to an end, to keep wars from spreading or more ambitiously, to bring wars to an end (Williams, 2018).

As highlighted by the respondents, the EASF has so far made some efforts to deploy a peace support mission in Somalia but to a limited extent, in the context of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In 2011,the EASF deployed a 231 police component to AMISOM, though it was composed not only of East African countries' troops. Albeit small, the EASF police mission was significant in the development of the police dimension of the ASF. What is more, the EASF was also later incorporated as a part of United Nation Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). Additionally, on the request of the African Union, EASF carried out a fact-finding mission in Somalia in 2011.These are encouraging steps toward EASF efforts of maintaing peace and security in Kenya and Somalia (Abdow, 2012).

5.4 Enhancing Mediation Capability

It has been observed throughout Africa, that traditions have since time immemorial emphasized on harmony or togetherness over individual interests and humanness. This was expressed in terms such as *Ubuntu (*meaning humanity in Bantu Nguni language) in South Africa and *Utu* (meaning humanity in Swahili language*)* in East Africa. Such values have contributed to social harmony in internecine African societies and have been innovatively incorporated into formal justice systems in the resolution of conflicts. In this way conflicts have been averted and where they have arisen, there have been mechanisms and institutions that have been put in place to effectively resolve them through mediation without resorting to fighting.

It is against this background that the study sought to find out if enhanced EASF mediation capability would contribute to its efforts to maniatin peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

As illustrated in figure 5.4, out of the 255 respondents, 77 (30%) of the respondents strongly agreed that this would help alot, 51 (20%) agreed that this would help. 99 (39%) disagreed and 28 (11%) strongly disagreed. Cumulatively therefore, 128 (50%) agreed that enhanced EASF mediation capability would contribute imemsely to EASF efforts of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

Enhancing Mediation Capability

N=255

Strongly disagree	11.00%
Disagree	39.00%
Agree	20%
Strongly Agree	30%

- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

Percentages

Figure 5.4: Enhancing Mediation Capability

Source: Field Data, 2019.

The findings are collaborated by Abdow (2010), in his book titled "*The factors that influence the extent to which community leaders play their role in conflict resolution*". He argues that

traditional conflict resolution mechanisms like the adjudication and cross-examination processes among the Yoruba in Nigeria were employed whenever intercommunal differnces arose. This was because they offered great prospects for peaceful co-existence. It was therefore, imperative that traditional conflict management mechanisms were harnessed to manage conflicts, as they were more of resolution mechanisms rather than settlement initiatives, in the wider context of mediation (Abdow, 2010).

He argues that African societies have used mediation processes to resolve conflicts for hundreds of years. It was used informally where disputants could just sit with a third party such as the council of elders who could facilitate the mediations. However, the formal legal system has failed to recognize that mediation is not a new concept and has tried to classify mediation as part of the Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms. It views mediation as an alternative to litigation. This view of mediation is flawed as it gives mediation a second place in the conflict settlement continuum. Mediation can stand alone as a method of resolving conflicts. Care has to however to be taken to ensure that parties enter into mediation voluntarily. With this the outcome of the process is respected and the solutions reached are acceptable and enduring to all parties to the conflict (Abdow, 2010).

Menkhaus (2005), acknowledges that mediation processes, if carried out correctly leads to outcomes that are desirable to all parties and are enduring. This is because parties have autonomy over the process and the outcome. Parties who have a conflict may decide to negotiate. When negotiations hit a deadlock they get a third party to help them continue with the mediation. The mediator's role in such a process is to assist the parties to keep engaging, throughout. He or she

does not dictate the outcomes of the mediation. Parties must have the autonomy of the process and of the outcome since it is a voluntary process. When the voluntariness is lost then the process of mediation is negatively affected. The parties are expected to report back the outcome of their mediation to court for it to endorse it. It is however important to ensure that the process is not exposed to the vagaries that bedevil the court system including delays, bureaucracy and inefficiency (Abdow, 2010).

The concept of utilizing mediation as a mechanism to resolve conflicts was adopted by EASF, as one of its key conflict resolution initiatives at its establishment. Conflict situations were in the region were initially being addressed by the West, but following the end of the Cold War, the West became disinterested and attached many conditions before being involved in any conflict in Africa. A combination of factors explains this attitude. The main one was the death of 18 USA marines in Mogadishu and the chaos that engulfed the Balkans in the 1990s, diverting Western attention. This neglect manifested itself in the lack of intervention in the Rwandan genocide, Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. It is this situation that saw intervention by ECOWAS in Liberia, which set a precedent for sub-regional interventions (Agaypong, 2005).

This led the debate on sub-regional intervention. The debate was dominated by two contradicting views. Whereas Nye (2011), in his book titled,"*The Future of Power"*, supports the approach, to use sub regional organizations to resolve regional conflicts, others argued on the contrary. He further contended that sub-regional organizations were better placed because they were nearer to the conflict and could afford to stay long after an agreement to stabilize the situation has been

signed. Equally, sub-regional organizations have the advantage of understanding the conflict better and had relationships with the parties to the conflict. Those who contended this view however, argue out that sub-regional organizations lack the resources and capacity for intervention (Nye, 2011).

The opposing side of the debates argued that because of their proximity to the conflict such organizations were entangled with the conflict to the extent that, they lacked the legitimacy that an international intervention would have. IGAD's intervention in Somalia in 2005,when viewed from this perspective had the advantage of an in-depth knowledge of the conflict and relationship with the parties to the conflict. But it also had serious shortcomings; with the main one being lack of resources. To overcome this problem, IGAD partnered with the International Partner Forum (IPF), comprising of a consortium of countries willing to provide resources towards the resolution of the Somali conflict responsibility to sub-regional organizations (Williams, 2011).

However, throughout the dabate, mediation has been accepted as an important aspect of not only resolving conflict but also for peace building. If properly utilized, it could achieve not just a settlement of conflict but facilitate a full transformation of relations. If peace building is defined as identifying and supporting those structures that can strengthen and solidify peace in the aftermath of peacemaking and peacekeeping, then peace building encompasses a range of activities and structures before, during and after formal peace agreements between parties are signed. It is also therefore a dynamic process of resolving conflict and rebuilding societies involving mechanisms and structures that can prevent, terminate, transform or resolve conflict. It

further involves mechanisms and structures that can strengthen the capacity of a society to manage change without violence. This may involve addressing the root causes of conflict through long-term economic and social provisions as well as policies of reconciliation. There is a growing recognition of the potential of mediation outside its traditional role in conflict resolution (Vines, 2013).

Souza (2013), observes that the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is a group of 34 member countries that support free-market economies in the world also encourages mediation as a way of strengthening the resilience capacity of states and state-society relations. Important elements include supporting dialogue processes between civil society, the private sector and state institutions. Mediation initiatives have also strengthened private sector investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Between 2004 and 2006, local mediators resolved disputes between companies and thereby facilitated the release of €8 million in private-sector investments (Vines, 2013).

Robinson (2014), further observes that examples abide on the potential gains of mediation support activities for economic development. He reckons that the value added of current mediation practice provides important insights into strengthening political accords and economic conditions in war-to-peace transitions. For this reason, defining a role for development agencies as strategic partners for peacemaking is therefore an important element to managing the transition from war to peace. Their engagement during peace process helps create a new vision of the economy and society that convinces parties that it is worthwhile to stop fighting. If a future without armed conflict becomes a more viable reality, the parties to a peace process may

increase their commitment in negotiations as companies commit to post-conflict economies before the signature of a peace agreement. In addition, development actors can marshal important financial flows into conflict countries that could be used as incentives for peace, an arrangement used by EASF in Kenya and Somalia (Robinson, 2014).

Bouka (2016), in his book titled,"*Missing the Target: The African Union's Mediating Efforts in Burundi*" observed that since conflict is dynamic and unavoidable in the East African region, EASF has been involved in a number of conflict mediation interventions, albeit few. He underscores the role-played by EASF in mediating the 2015 Burundi crisis. This was after late president Nkurunziza decided to run for a controversial third term in office. EASF was supposed to deploy in Burundi as part of the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), However, in Decemebr 2015,three members of the AU PSC, that were also members of the EASF, namely Uganda, Ethiopia and Burundi became very instrumental in undertaking mediation initiatives among the opposing parties in Burundi. The mediation efforts team was headed by the defence minister of Uganda, Mr Kiyonga.This contributed to easing of tensions in the country (Bouka, 2016).

EASF has played significant roles in offering mediation forums for Somalia during its long period of instability and also in Kenya, especially during the 2007/2008 Kenya's post election violence (PEV). In 2019,EASF was also working closely with IGAD, whose chair, the Prime Minisrter (PM) of Ethiopia, Dr Abiy, was leading mediation efforts between Kenya and Somalia to resolve the maritime dispute between them. Though the case still remains at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), such regional meditation efforts were taking place to resolve the issue

amicably. EASF has also partnered with other regional organizations like IGAD and ICGLR to promote peace and security in Eastern Africa region through various mediations efforts. These EASF mediation efforts especially in Kenya and Somalia have made things much better because prior to the end of the Cold War, interventions in Africa and especially in the Eastern Africa Region, were determined by allies, either from the Eastern bloc, led by the Soviet Union, or Western bloc led by the USA (Derroso, 2010).

Munene (2015), in his book titled "*A Look at the East Africa Standby Force*", obsrevers that EASF has attempted to unearth dozens of underlying factors that contribute, as well aggravate Kenya–Somalia relations through a number of mediation efforts. By and large, this effort has assisted to address the issue of refugee flows, humanitarian crises, arms cross border flows and Islamist terror attacks that have strained and compounded the Kenya-Somalia peace quest.

This supports the finding that an enhanced EASF mediation capability will therefore greatly improve EASF efforts to maintain peace and security in the region and especially in Kenya and Somalia (Munene et al, 2018).

5.5 Actors'contribution to EASF efforts in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia

A number of actors have contributred to EASF efforts in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia at various levels. As illustrated in figure 5.5,the study found out that they range from regional organizations, professional peacekeepers, civil society organizations,

member state citizens, International Non Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and international partners.

Figure 5.5: Contribution of actors to Peace and Security in Kenya and Somalia

Source: Field Data, 2019.

5.5.1 Regional organizations

The study sought to identify the level of contribution of regional organizations to EASF efforts of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. The study found out that, out of the 255 respondents, 156 (61%) of the respondents avouched that the contribution of regional organizations was high, 84 (33%) said it was less, while 15(6%) averred that it was very high.

Cumulatively, 67 % of the respondents' acknowleged that regional organizations contributed significantly to EASF efforts to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. This is illustrated in figure 5.6.

Figure 5.6: Contribution of regional organizations to EASF efforts to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia

Source: Researcher, 2019.

In view of the foregoing discussion, one of the Kenya government officials observed that:

> Regional organizations like EAC and IGAD and many others play a crucial role in promoting peace and security in Kenya and Somalia since the two countries are also members of these organizations. Though there is sometimes duplication of roles, which put member states at loggerheads, economically, politically and technologically, these institutions have played a leading role in supporting EASF efforts of maintaining peace and security in the two countries. This is because they all have a security mandate in their protocals.(Interview with Kenyan Government official, on 28/11/2019,Nairobi).

This finding is collaborated by Abdulrahim (2017), in his book titled"*Introduction to Internatrional Organizations:Universal and Regional*", which reiterates that regional and subregional organizations play a central role in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in their jurisdiction. Among the regional organizations that promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation among EASF member states include the EAC, IGAD, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), ICGLR and many others. They contribute positively to EASF efforts of maintaining peace and security in the EAR and especially in Kenya and Somalia.This is because these tow nations have memberships in all those regional organizations and so they provide an additional forum tom address cponflicts between the countries in the region. Further, most of the organizations have an element of security maintenance in their mandates. So they mutuallyt compliment one another, while at times coodinationing their mechanisms (Kasumba, et al 2010).

The EAC, for example comprises the countries of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. Its mandate is to promote prosperity, competitiveness, security, stability and political unification among its member states. The EAC is working towards further widening and deepening of co-operation among the partner states and other regional economic communities in areas of political, economic and social fields for their mutual benefit. Somalia applied to be the

7th member of EAC in 2012. Though as at June 2019, the application was frozen due to instability in the country, when approved,it will provide the EASF with an additional forum to

engage the two countries. EAC collaborates a lot with EASF on issues of peace and security in the EAR.(Tlalka, 2014).

The other key regional organization, which plays a crucial role in the region, is IGAD. It comprises the countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. IGAD seeks to assist and complement the efforts of its member States to achieve, through increased cooperation, food security, environmental protection, peace and security, economic cooperation and integration in the region. IGAD as a regional organization has been consistently engaged in trying to resolve the prolonged conflict in Somalia. Its member states have committed resources, time and energy to dealing with this conflict. EASF ccordiantes its activities with IGAD, since it actually acts as the regional econmic mechanism, with most countries in the region in its membership. This organization positively, contributes to EASF efforts of maintaining peace and security in the region and especially in Kenya and Somalia (Munene, 2015).

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), is a another important regional organization within the EAR. It is a free trade area organization. Its membership comprises 21 countries stretching from Tunisia in the North to to Eswatini in the South. The member States of COMESA are Burundi, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Seychelles, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.Its objective is to remove all the internal trade tariffs and barriers in the region, promote trade, development and security in the region. EASF cooperates with it in the area of security and so contributes to its efforts to

maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia (Shah, 2009).

ICGLR is another important regional security player. It was founded in 2006, as an inter-governmental organization with membership stretching over Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. Its membership comprises 12 countries of the Republic of Angola, Republic of Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Rwanda, Republic of Sudan, Republic of South Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania, Republic of Uganda and the Republic of Zambia. It seeks to promote improved support services in the areas of resource governance and peace and security. (Souza, 2013).

EASF collaborates with all those organizations in the area of security enhancement. The fact that both Kenya and Somalia are members of the same regional organizations, provides EASF with a better forum to enhance its its efforts of maintaining peace and security in the two countries.

5.5.2 Experienced Peace Keepers

As regards the contribution of experienced peacekeepers from EASF countries to effortrs of EASF in the maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somlia, out of the 255 respondents, 81(27%) of the total respondents said that peacekeepers' contribution was high. Besides, 219 (73%) of the respondents argued that their contribution was low.

Among the interviewed respondents, none indicated whether the contribution was very high or there was no contribution at all. Details are illustrated in fig 5.7.

EXPERIENCED PEACE KEEPERS

No Contribution 0%

Very High Contribution 0%

High Contribution 27%

Less Contribution 73%

N=255

- No Contribution
- Less Contribution
- High Contribution
- Very High Contribution

Figure 5.7: Contributions of experienced peacekeepers to challenges facing EASF

Source: Field Data, 2019.

The findings were confirmed during a discussion with one of the key informants, who averred that:

> Experience in Peacemaking, peace keeping and peace building are essential characteristics of professional peacekeeping. They work towards restoring normalcy and building back better societal institutions that have been broken down. Kenya was nearly broken down in 2007. Somalia has been a collapsed state since 1991.Well trained and experienced peacekeepers from EASF membership, leverages on key competencies and resources that are needed in maintaining peace and security in the region. However these peacekeeprs have not been deployed to intervene in the insecurity scenarios in Kenya and Somalia (Interview with key respondents at Kismayo Military Camp on 23/12/2019,Kismayo).

The foregoing is collaborated by Cecilia et al (2011), in the book titled"*Patchwork for Peace Regional Capabilities for Peace and Security in Eastern Africa"*, who underscores the fact that EASF region has some of the most experienced peacekeepers in the region, especially from Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. The countries also have capability and resources to marshal capacities to deploy at short notice. At the moment these countries are all deployed in Somalia as part of AMISOM forces. They have also deployed in the region under other institutions to include the UN and IGAD. They therefore, form a firm resevoir of support to efforts of EASF to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. (Shah, 2009).

The importance of experienced peacekeepers in peace operations is underscored by Besteman (2019), who in the book,"*The costs of war in Somalia,*"observes that profeesional and experienced peacekeepers contribute significantly to peacemaking efforts in a country. This is due to the fact that peace operations are usually the first step towards long-term conflict resolution measures. It involves the very first techniques that lay foundation for effective peacekeeping process. In order for conflict resolution practitioners to decide on the method to use in a specific conflict situation, they depend on the guidance and advice from professional and experienced peacekeepers (Besteman, 2019).

To be able to harness capacity of experienced peacekeeeprs in the regaion, this study established that EASF has taken maeasures to develop their database. It contains profiles of the experienced peacekeepers in the region and capabilities available within each of its member states for eventual rapid deployment as part of enhancing its efforts to respond to any conflict situations in the region and specifically in Kenya and Somalia. The AU Report (2017), on the verification of

ASF operational readiness status, reported that EASF maintains an updated database of civilian, police and military experienced peacekeepers. It comprises 3640 Military personnel, 5 Formed Police Unit (FPU's) totalling to 700 personnel, 440 Individual police officers and 420 civilian personnel in the roster (AU Report, 2017).

The police component members have been pledged by Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. The Military have been pledged by Burundi, Commoros, Djobouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Seychelles and Uganda. Other specialized capabilities like the combat engineer unit has been pledged by Ethiopia, level 2 hospital to support the peacekeepers has been pledged by Kenya and strategic lift capacity by Uganda. EASF has managed to train the peacekeepers in the datatbase. This was achieved during a Command Post Exercise in 2008 held in Kenya, a Field Training Exercise in 2009 held in Burundi, a Map Exercise in 2010 hosted by Uganda and a Field Training Exrcsie known as "Mashariki Salam 2017" (meaning Peaceful Eastern Africa"), which took place in November 2017 in Sudan (AU report, 2017).

However, most respondents could not identify the significance of having experienced peacekeepers and the fact that they have not yet been deployed in either Kenya or Somalia under EASF. Such capacities have however been deployed in the region, as part of initiatives undertaken by other organizations like the UN, EU, AU and IGAD (Mwagiru, 2014).

Citing the example of their involvment in the UN operations in the region, Pouligny (2006), in the book titled *"Peace operations seen from below",* reiterates the role played by UN troops in Somalia under UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II and UNITAF.There were no countries from EASF member states that contributed peacekeepers to the force, though they supported the effort as it was taking place in their neighborhood. The UN deployed in Somalia in 1992 after a ceasefire

agreement, which satisfied the desire of all parties to the conflict to maintain peace was signed. This presented an opportunity for intervention and the UNSC established the first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). Its mandate was to provide humanitarian relief and address the main threat of famine and the difficulties associated with delivery of the relief food by NGO workers who were impeded by the clan warfare. Mohammed Sahnoun was appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to Somalia, alongside a force of fifty UN technical observers to monitor the ceasefire. The mission comprised 24 countries, with bulk of them from the USA. Its deployment was pegged on the consent of the belligerents (Pouligny, 2006).

 The SRSG arrived in Mogadishu on 4 May 1992 and he sought to reconcile all the clans and the factions. He established an inclusive peace process. Sahnoun's strategy was to negotiate with the various clans and sub-clans. He deployed out an authorised troop ceiling of 3,500 troops. They however faced constant looting, banditry and violence, and the operation proved ineffective in addressing the situation (Pouligny, 2006).

 UNOSOM I was followed in December 1992 by a UNSC authorised, US-led operation to secure relief operations in Somalia; the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). It was also known as Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF consisted of around 37,000 troops from more than 30 countries and was conceived as a transitional force to cover operations until a new UN-controlled mission (UNOSOM II) was established. UNITAF was dissolved in May 1993, after which UNOSOM II took over responsibility. It was tasked with the "consolidation, expansion and maintenance" of security in the country. From mid-1993, clashes between troops of General Aydid and UN forces intensified. This prompted the UN to engage in an unsuccessful operation to hunt for Aydid (Pouligny, 2006).

In a notorious incident in October 1993, Aydid's forces shot down an American Black Hawk helicopter and killed eighteen US soldiers in the incident. The body of one of the slain American Soldiers were dragged around the streets of Mogadishu, with images broadcast on all major international news channels. The then US President Bill Clinton initially deployed additional troops. The US was ultimately forced, in March 1994, to withdraw its forces from the operation. The US withdrawal was soon followed by other western troop contributing countries. Although UNOSOM II's focus was on humanitarian efforts, which initially bore some fruit, violence increased in the absence of a political resolution and the whole mission withdrew in March 1995 (Pouligny, 2006).

For the next ten years following the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, there was little progress in obtaining a negotiated peace settlement in Somalia. Clan-based politics and fighting dominated the country, and traditional leaders turned to one of the only perceived viable ways to restore order, through religion. Increasingly sharia (Islamic law) was adopted as a mechanism for enforcing law and order. Clan elders created Islamic courts to control the militias. It was therefore left to regional organizations to address the problem in their backyard (Pouligny, 2006).

Among the regional organizations that initiated efforts to address the situation in Somalia was IGAD, which was comprised of members that were later to form the EASF. In 1986, six Eastern African countries namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda signed up to form the Inter-Governmental Authority against Drought and Desertification (IGADD). The regional organization aspirations were confined to functional co-ordination on environmental protection, food security strategies and natural resource management. With the accession of newly independent Eritrea to IGADD in 1993, the membership grew to seven. By then, Somalia was no

longer a functioning state hence the engagement was left to the other six states. The IGADD charter was later amended in 1996 to expand its mandate to include need to enhancing co-operation in the already existing areas of food security, agriculture, and environmental protection. This saw the inclusion of the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, both inter and intra-state through dialogue. This also led to the change of its name from IGADD to IGAD (Boulluys, 2011).

IGAD key principles provided for the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security, and the protection of human and people's rights. The revision of IGADs mandate resonated well with the changing international security context following the release of the "An Agenda for Peace" by the former United Nations Secretary General; Boutros-Ghali in 1992. The new agenda set out a vision for securing peace and security in the post-cold war world. It empahsized that regional organizations could engage in conflict prevention and peace-making activities in their respective regions. It articulated a new collaborative relationship between the UN and regional bodies for the management of regional crises that is now firmly established in international practice. IGAD therefore engaged in a pivotal role towards reconciliation and peace making in Somalia after the departure of the UN Peacekeeping interventions in 1995 (Williams, 2013).

IGAD planning for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia became more accelerated in 2004 with the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) and later the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia on Kenyan soil. Planning for a movement of the TFG from Kenya to Somalia included the formation of an African regional peacekeeping mission to support the government. To this end the AU approached IGAD and requested the organization to assemble the operation. In February 2005, a meeting of the AU PSC officially mandated a

peacekeeping operation for Somalia and requested IGAD to plan and deploy it in support of the TFG (Mulu, 2008).

In March 2005, IGAD agreed to field the peacekeeping operation called the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM). However despite the organization working consistently for one year to deploy, the mission failed to take off for a number of reasons. They included lack of legal and political framework for peacekeeping intervention, dearth of coherent peacekeeping strategy from the UN, AU and IGAD. Others were Member States' political complexities, insufficient resources for the operation and lack of civilian component in the planning for the intervention (Mulu, 2008).

According to Mays (2009), amongst the various reasons that the peacekeeping operation failed to deploy was also the existence of a UN arms embargo on Somalia. Despite various diplomatic actions directed to UNSC by AU and IGAD to lift the arms embargo, the embargo remained and the organization announced its inability to deploy. This raised the entire question on arms embargo, which portrays a disjointed, un-harmonized effort towards maintaining international peace and security. While the UNSC approved the IGASOM mandate on December 6, 2006, it was perturbing that they couldn't remove the hindrance identified by the AU and IGAD to enable IGAD deploy. It is however encouraging that peacekeepers from EASF member states, that are also members of IGAD were key in the planning process of IGASOM (Mays, 2009).

A similar scenario played out during the establishment of the AMISOM force in 2007, with bulk of its forces being contributed by EASF member states. Underscoring the role of EASF member states peacekeepers in AMISOM operations, Williams (2013), in his Journal titled"*Fighting for Peace in Somalia: AMISOM's Seven Strategic Challenges*," he reiterates that, the UNSC authorised AMISOM in early 2007 to deploy the force. They mandated the mission with

protecting the TFG, supporting dialogue and reconciliation. Others were assisting in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilisation Plan for Somalia, which is the national plan of action laying out priorities for the transitional period, conducting offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and other actors intent on destroying the TFG and supporting and training Somali security forces, among other things. The mission's first troops totaling to 1,650 were peacekeeeprs from Uganda. They were deployed in March 2007 and were subsequently joined by Burundian troops in late 2007. They were subsequently joined by contingents from Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya (Williams, 2013).

The foregoing debate eandeavors to highlight the fact that the contribution of EASF experienced peacekeepers to EASF efforts in maintaing peace and security in Kenya and Somalia is significant. It has however, been blurred by the duplicated roles and responsibilities determined by mandates and interests of those other institutions that EASF collaborates with in the domain of peace and security in the region. This explains the reason as to why majorty of the respondents to this study were convinved that the professional and experienced peacekeepers from the EASF region had so far played a minimal role in EASF efforts of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

5.5.3 Member states' citizens

Member state citizens constitute a crucial constituency in the EASF region, particularly in Kenya and Somalia where the study was focused. The study sought to understand their contibution to EASF efforts of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.The study found out that, 156 (61%) of the total 255 respondents stated that the contribution of member states citizens to EASF was high. Besides, 69 (27%) respondents indicated that their contribution was less and 30

(12%) of the total respondents stated that the contribution of member states citizens was very high.

Cumulatively 73 % of the respondents contend that thir contribution is significant. Details are illustrated in figure 5.8.

Figure 5.8: Contribution of member state citizens to peace and security in Kenya and Somalia

Source: Reseacher, 2019

One of the respondents, when interviewed on the outcomes, had this to say:

> We hear a great deal about planning and logistics of EASF. That Kenya and Ethiopia are immensely involved in the operations of EASF in the region. However, there is little regard as to what citizens of various states have to say and Somalia has been in oblivion. The civilian component of EASF is not understood. As

citizens we are largely confined to our states' ideologies of preserving national interest other than regional interest. Though the citizens have been sensitized on the need to appreciate EASF, the current process of holding EASF opend days in our countries has enabled us to understand them better, especially their intentions and capabilities, which has now encouraged the citizens of the region to willingly support and appreciate them. The ongoing restructure of EASF to include more member states' citizen in key aspects of its operations is a great step in the right direction (Interview with EAF staff on 02/11/2019 at EASF Headquaters, Nairobi).

The foregoing is complimented by observations of Tlalka (2014), who observed that most citizens of EASF were not clear on the role of EASF in the region. Initially, there was lack of appreciation of the EASF and its achievements among the citizens of its member states. This was based on a narrow interpretation of the EASF mandate. Most viewed EASF as essentially, as just another military outfit without understanding its agenda. During the interview, most respondents agreed that the EASF had come a long way since its establishment. They appreciated that the organisation is still fairly young but is doing a lot. They were proud to note that the EASF only attained Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2010 and Full Operational Capability (FOC) in 2015.This was well before other regions. When the EASF attained its FOC, it provided a detailed report and presented its achievement not only to the African Union but its member sates citizens during open days forums conducted every year. This can be seen as part of the EASF's (and mainly the Secretariat's) ongoing efforts to gain more explicit recognition from its membership the respondents recommended more sensitazation sessisons on the organization but pledged to support it achieve its goals (Tlalka, 2014).

In this regard, Munene (2015), observes that EASF started conducting open day forums hosted by the various member states in 2015.Their aim is to create awareness of EASF in the region in support of the overall mandate of enhancing peace and security in the Eastern Africa region. The

campaign element of "EASF Day" was designed to present the organization with an opportunity to talk to its citizenry in the region to include decision makers, academics, journalists, civil society and students in all member countries. it also includes a "university" forum will provides students in EASF that are studying political science, peace and security studies and international relations as well as university lecturers in the same faculties to engage with staff from the EASF. Other participants that are invited for the open day forums are representatives of the government, civil society and journalists. This composition of participants ensures that local audience of have an oppeotunity to interatct with EASF on any subject. Peace support practitioners are also provided with an opportunity to attend a lecture like forum where they are able to add value to the activities of EASF (Munene, 2015).

The first EASF Open Day was conducted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 14th November 2015. It was a single day event to explain and demostrate the dynamics of the organization to the citizens of Ethiopia. The event was conducted as part of the efforts to create awareness of EASF and increase its visibility in the region and beyond. Participants of the activity included Senior Government officials from the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, representatives from various Departments of the Ministry of Defence of Ethiopia, Members of the Diplomatic community based in the country, media houses and members of the public. Other similar open days have since been held in Kenya in 2015, Sudan in 2016, Seycheles in 2016, Uganda in 2017, Comoros in 2017, Burundi in 2018 and Rwanda in 2018(Muriithi, 2018).

One interviewee, also observed that the Council of Ministers' meetings that are held on ratational basis and hosted by different member states have also contributed to sensitize and rally the EASF citizens to the importance of the organization and its contribution to regional peace and security,

especially those in Kenyta and Somalia.These meetings allow for a degree of exchange on shared peace and security challenges between the various countries and how EASF is addressing them. The meetings also bring together members of the security sector from those countries, who accompany the ministers to the meetings. They appreciate that; unlike before the establishment of the EASF, there is a forum to interact on issues of peace and security in the region. One interviewee noted that the EASF had created a platform for coordination, exchange and harmonisation of conflict resolution (Muriithi, 2018).

5.5.4 Inter-Non Governmental Organizations (INGOs)

 Intergovernmental organizations (INGOs) play a complementary role as well as supplementary one in governance, peace and security matters all over the world. The study sought to understand the level of contribution of INGOs like UN, AU, IGAD, ICGLR and EAC to EASF efforts of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Out the total 255 respondents, 69 (27%) of them agreed that INGOs' contribute to EASF efforts to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia was high, while the rest 186(73%), argued that the contribution was low. None of the respondents rated INGOs' contribution as either very high or no contribution at all.

Cumulatively only 27% responded in the positive. Details are illustrated in fire 5.9.

INGOS

N=255

- No Contribution
- Less Contribution
- High Contribution
- Very High Contribution

No Contribution 0% 0%

Very High Contribution 0%

Figure 5.9: Contribution of INGOs to EASF efforts to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia

Source: Researcher, 2019

The foregoing finding contradicts Thomas et al (2015), in his book titled *"Gridlock.Why global cooperation is failing when we need it"*, where he observes that since 2014,the world has been confronted with a series of crises that challenged the ability of one state being able to address them alone. The challenges included the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, the dispute between Russia and the West in Ukraine, to the spread of Ebola in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. These crises struck at the core of the international system. They underscored the aspect of global inter-connectivity. This was because the crisis situations were all beyond the

capacity of any single state to respond to them in isolation. This was occasisoned by either lack of resources or other persistent geopolitical obstacles, among other factors. This occasisoned a moment of growing complexity, that required more actors, institutions, and networks of interests to be engaged in the international sphere than ever before, hence the engagement of International non-governmental organizations (INGOs)(Thomas et al, 2015).

Chester (2013), posits that INGOs are powerful forces in the delivery of aid, and important actors within the international development architecture. They are providing more aid to developing countries than ever before, and the budgets of particularly large INGOs have surpassed those of some OECD donor countries. Among the notable INGOs are World Vision International, Oxfam International, Save the Children International, Plan International, Médecins Sans Frontières, CARE International, CARITAS International, ActionAid International and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). By 2011, those INGOs had combined revenue of more than US$11.7 billion (Richardson, 2014).

These INGOs therefore represented a major presence in many developing countries and they received substantial sums from other donors to carry out humanitarian assistance and development work, and continue to be increasingly influential actors in policy processes and in the global governance, peace and stability. They actually play a major role in developing countries and sometimes constitute the main international presence in some regions or locations, in particular those that are more remote, affected by conflict or less important economically or politically (Chester, 2013).

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Thomas et al (2015), however explains that respondents to this study might have not understood the role of INGOs because in third world countries, such INGOs only operates through CSOs. So their role might not seem promimnet at regional and local levels. They are different from

national CSOs in donor and recipient countries in several respects. This includes terms of their operations, their size, scale, and geographic reach, access to funds, budgets, and roles in development. In this regard, there is a heavy onus of responsibility on INGOs to operate collaboratively and productively with communities, to ensure positive outcomes of their interventions through specific CSOs that address targeted concerns. They are also required to be accountable for their actions through the CSOs. In this regard, most of those INGOs play a big role in strengthening African CSOs, for instance by enhancing capacities. African CSOs.They also, lobby governments and empower communities to campaign for better policies and improved livelihoods (Thomas et al, 2015).

World Vision International, in their 2013 annual Report titled*"Where we work",* explained that in Somalia, World Vision, for instance, had established a 15-year presence in communities through its Area Development Plans and CSOs that support these plans. Through this, they were to provide representative civil society with voices in the mediation of peace accords that help to improve both the chances of coming to an agreement among the belligerent parties and of sustaining the peace once agreed. It also includes civil society voices in the negotiation of peace agreements, which helps to introduce social concerns that go beyond the balancing of interests and negotiation of power among armed actors. Through this, civil society actors help to bring issues of justice, gender, victim's rights, and livelihoods, among others, to the table. More importantly, the civil societies through the platform also facilitate and support the implementation of accords in the interest of long-term peacebuilding (Chester, 2013).

Jervis (1982), in his book titled"Security regimes', International Organizations" acknowledges that Saferworld is another independent international organisation working to prevent violent

conflict and build safer lives in Somalia and other 12 countries across Asia, Africa and Middle East. In Somalia,it works through Community-based structures, such as community action forums (CAFs) and district peace committees (DPCs), in peacebuilding and conflict-resolution processes from the community level. They have made tremendous strides in supporting communities in preventing conflict and play an important role in identifying the drivers of conflict across different regions. These community-based structures have managed to work well in areas with limited or no access to formal justice systems and have helped fill a void in many of these areas. They hold dialogues within communities and between communities and state authorities, work collaboratively on security issues and plan responses. Their work also involves includes conflict early warning and resolving issues related to: land, water, marital and gender-based violence, inheritance and property disputes, murder, rape, banditry, inter-ethnic and inter-clan conflicts, and petty crime. In some areas, DPCs and CAFs have established a positive reputation and are respected and called upon by local governments and other traditional leaders to assist in dispute resolution in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa (Saferworld, 2018).

The ensuing discussion supports the finding of this study that INGOs plays fewer roles in the efforts of EASF to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. This is however a misconception. Its only because most INGOs operate through CSOs based in those countries at the local levels as with Saferworld in Somalia. So their contribution is there but it is not seen rather its the CSOs face that is seen at the local level. They however are a key actor in EASF efforts to contribute to peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

Therefore, it can be argued from a neo-functionalist perspective that, regional integration is essentially an irregular and conflictual process. Consequently, citizens of these states gradually start looking up to the regional organization for their expectations and satisfying them thereby enhancing the possibility that economic integration spillover into political integration (Tive, 2013).

5.5.5 International Partners

Heinrich et al (2016), in his book titled,"*Public opinion and foreign aid cuts in economic crisis"* reiterates that international partners build or break regional cohesion of states. The study sought to find out the contribution of international partners to EASF efforts to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. The study found out that international partners highly contributed to EASF efforts to peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Out of the 255 respondents 150(59%) affirmed this finding. 99(39%) of the respondents indicated that international partners' contribution was low while 6(2%) of the total respondents averred that the contribution of international partners was very high.

 Cumulatively, 61% of respondents acknowledged in the positive. The details are illusteated in figure 5.10.

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS

N=255

- No Contribution
- Less Contribution
- High Contribution
- Very High Contribution

Very High Contribution 2%

No Contribution 0% 0%

Less Contribution 39%

High Contribution 59%

Figure 5.10: International Partners contribution to EASF efforts to maintain Peace and Security in Kenya and Somalia

Source: Researcher, 2019.

This finding is collaborated by Tlalka (2014), who opines that partnerships are vital in the operationalization of EASF capabilities. This was identified through a study of an organization known as the Friends of EASF, which was formed in 2007. The forum partnered with Japan, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Germany through GIZ, United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden to provide physical and material support to EASF to be able to enhance its operational readiness. The support by those partners was channeled through two principal ways: either directly to the EASF and EASF budgets or by bilateral partner support,.This was guided by MOUs directed to support certain programmes

managed by EASF. Besides direct funding, EASF received technical advice through a number military and police advisors seconded to EASF (Tlalka, 2014).

Munene (2016), further notes that by 2015, there were five military advisors providing technical support to EASF Secretariat from the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway.Ther was also a police and civilian advisor from Germany. In 2015, Germany also intiated a capacity building project to the Secretariat, that was implemented by the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ). Through this project, Germany provided a second military advisor to the Secretariat, in 2016. China also contributed minimal support through the membership of the Friends of EASF in 2016 (Williams, 2018).

Other partners like the EU occasionally partook in Friends of the EASF meetings contributed support to EASF.The Netherlands were seen as good supporters and as traditionally, they supported coordination and military copperation compared to other international partners. The Friends of the EASF continues to function as an avenue for information exchange between donors and direct exchange with the EASF elements itself. They also continue to ensure that EASF sustainability is enhanced on the longer term to enable it achieve its mandate of maintaining peace and security in the EAR and especially in Kenya and Somalia (Apuuli, 2016).

The foregoing discussion supports the views of the respomdents that intenational partners play a great role in supporting EASF efforts of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.It provides this through physical, material and technical support that it provides to EASF to enhance its capabilities of achieving its mandate not only in the EAR but also in Kenya and Somalia.

5.6 Chapter Summary

From the foregoing analysis, this study holds that there are a number of positive efforts made by EASF to enhance its effectiveness. They comprise the strengthening of its financial capability, use of diplomatic missions, deployment of peace support missions and employment of measures to enhance its mediation capabilities. While this has immensely contributed to its effectiveness in the regions, EASF has also exploited capacities of other actors in the region that have provided a force multipliesr effect to its efforts. They include collaborating with other regional organizations with similar mandates, holding database of professional peacekeepers that can be rapidly deployed, engaging the regional vibrant and supportive civil society organizations and other international partners for support. All those efforts have been harnessed by EASF to deliver a full operational standby capability that is effective and prepared to execute its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

In the next chapter, the study makes a critical examination of the challenges and opportunities facing EASF in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

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CHAPTER SIX

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FACING EASTERN AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE IN EXECUTION OF ITS MANDATE IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KENYA AND SOMALIA

This chapter provides findings on the challenges that EASF faces in its execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. The challenges discussed include inadequate funding, weak logistic support systems for peace operations, and many more. It also discusses opportunities available to the EASF arising from the challenges that it encounters in execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. It finally provides a summary of the chapter.

6.1 Challenges facing the EASF

This study sought to find out the challenges facing the EASF in its endeavor of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. The findings on the EASF bureaucratic organizational structure, inadequate funding of the organization from its member states and weak legal instruments among other challenges are illustrated in the subsequesnt paragraphs of this chapter.

6.1.1 Bureaucratic Organizational structure

This study sought to find out extent to which EASF bureaucratic organizational structure impacts on EASF's effectiveness of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. The respondents were asked to rate the impact as either very high, high, fairly high or not high. Out of 255 respondents, 170 (67%) of the respondents stated that EASF bureaucratic structure had a fairly high impact on its effectiveness to maitain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

52 (20%) of the respondents stated that its impact was high, 20 (8%) stated that it was very high, while 13(5%) stated that the impact was not high.

Cumulatively, 95% concur that EASF bureaucratic structure had an impact on the effectiveness of EASF in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

Details are illustrated in figure 6,1.

Figure 6.1: Impact of Bureaucracy on EASF

Source: Field Data, 2019.

In view of the foregoing discussion, one FGD participant averred that:

> Bureaucracy is everything. Every organization bears the brunt of complicacy of procedures and arrangements. Adhering to formality though costly is believed to be the modus operandi of most organizations. EASF is no exception. There are bureaucrats who plan, arrange and execute matters at their own will. Unfortunately, these arrangements are unchallenged more often than not. Consequently, they impact on the organizational effectiveness and the general well being of its members especially when engenderd (FGD participant on 20/12/2019 at Mogadishu AMISOM Camp)

The finding is supported by Chipea et al (2013), in the book titled,"*Bureaucracy Versus New Administrative Management",* who underscores that bureaucracy more often than not affects organization effectiveness in more ways than one. He contends that a bureaucratic organizational structure has many hierarchical levels, adhering to inflexible rules. They also use many forms and folders, which require consultation of various superiors to express agreement towards a solution to a problem. This, he reiterates is a common characteristic of a bureaucratic system whether at operational, technical or managerial levels. The fact is, that red-tape procedures can hurt an organization's performance (Chipea et al, 2013).

This is also complimented by Kelly (2012),who further reiterates that the concept of bureaucracy has a long-term antiquity and historical development. He notes that some philosophers like Maximilian Karl Emil Weber, who are regarded today as one of the most important theorists on the development of modern Western society, performed various studies in different terms and brought various definitions to this concept. They agreed with the idea that when an organisation is characterised as being bureaucratic, it implies that it has challeneges to perform effectively. This is due to the fact that bureaucracy acts as a pressure device of dominate grades for continuing of their hegemony, not as a neutral management device of government (Kelly, 2012).

Parlak (2011), also explains that bureaucracies have critical distinctive features that impacts on their perforamnce. These features include clearly defined hierarchical structure, division of labor based on functional specializations, adherence to formality and format. Others are presence of a

series of abstract rules (principles and methods), implementation of legal authority and legality. Others are personnel selection and promotion of personnel based on rational principles, separation of staff duties, and prevention of outside intervention to the organization, employee salaries and wages and job security of employees. All these features have a vital importance on stating bureaucracy concept as a rational management type as expounded by Weber.He concludes that all these aspects have a negative impact on flexibility in the functioning of an organization (Parlak, 2011).

The EASF structure fits these descriptions. It is organized with a political structure, the Planning element, the Early Warning system, the negotiation and mediation element, the Force Headquarters and the logistics base. The political /geo political structure is composed of the Assembly of Eastern Africa Heads of State and Government, the Eastern Africa Council of Ministers of Defence and Security, and the East African Chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS), with responsibility of formulating policy, directing and controls the functioning of the EASF (Tlalka, 2014).

Omanyo (2015) observes that early warning system provides regular updates and analysis of conflicts in the region to the secretariat, they will not act until the issue is approved by the Heads of State and Government, through the Eastern Africa Council of Ministers of Defence and Security, with advise from the East African Chiefs of Defence Staff (EACDS). The negotiation and mediation structure, though responsible for identifying emerging conflict issues and designing timely response measures, through the EASF panel of the wise, they will also not take any action until activated by the superior entities in the structure. Finally, the logistics base, which is based in Ethiopia, will only initiate mission support mechanisms for providing

operational and sustenance support to the EASF after receiving authority from the supeior organs in the structure (Omanyo, 2015).

This web of structures and operational interconnectedness of EASF supports the respondents concern. Its bureaucratic structure has an impact on effective performance of its mandate of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

6.1.2 Lack of Political Cohesion

The impact of political cohesion in the effective performance of an organization cannot be concretely estimated. However, there are indicators that explicate the scenarios exhibited by member states within the context of a regional organization like the EASF.

This study sought to find out the level of impact of lack of political cohesion in the region to the effectiveness of EASF in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Out of the 255 resondents, 170 (67%) of the respondents argued that it was fairly high. 56 (22%) reasoned that the impact of political cohesion on EASF was high, whereas 28 (11%) argued that the impact was not high. There were no responses as to whether the impact was very high.

Cumulatively the respondents 89 % of the respondents agreed that lack of political cohesion has a high impact on the performance of EASF in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Details are illustrated in figure 6.2.

LACK OF POLITICAL COHESION

N=255

Very High, 11% Not High, 0%

High, 22%

Fairly High, 67%

Legend:
- Fairly High
- High
- Very High
- Not High

Figure 6.2: Lack of Political Cohesion

Source: Field Data, 2019.

The above discussion was underpinned by one Somali Diplomat who adduced that:

> Politics is difficult to eschew. We consume and produce politics.
> We talk and dream politics. However, EASF politics are largely
> attributed to member states positions on key issues of relations
> such as security, trade, peace and infrastructural development.
> Cohesion has been talked about but on fair grounds. This is due to
> the fact that EASF is a political outfit, outgrowing from another
> political entity EASBRIG. Despite the levels of cohesion
> experienced, hard politics nuanced with political overtones and
> overtures have hampered EASF critical role as a regional security
> mechanism to maintaining peace and security in Kenya and
> Somalia (Interview with Federal government of Somali embassy
> official on 24/11/2019,Nairobi).

The foregoing finding is supported by Munene (2015), in his book titled"*A Look at the East
Africa Standby Force",* who contends that the concept of political cohesion has been elusive
within the EASF for quite some time. He observes that EASF member states have largely

treated the organization as a peripheral issue rather than a core issue, at least by their demeanour and political undertones. Striking at the core of the issue is the hegemonic struggles that have dogged the political fabric regionally. Kenya and Somalia have always had endless geopolitical struggles to include the maritime border dispute, which is currently at the ICJ (Munene, 2015).

On the other hand, Eritrea and Ethiopia had not seen eye to eye on security issues for some time until in 2018, when they re-established diplomatic relations. Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda have also always played the hegemonic undercurrents in their relations. Kenya and Uganda have the unresolved border issue over the Migingo Island.All this, arguably leads to political dysfunctionality in the region. This has a stemyfying effect on EASF effectiveness. They rarely compliment each other's efforts of enhancing the mandate execution of the EASF as a regional security mechanism. They are always competing against each other in quest for regional dominance at the behest of a dysfunctional EASF (Williams, 2019).

This prevailing scenario within EASF membership supports the respondents concern that lack of political cohesion within EASF is a challenege to EASFs effectiveness of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

In power theory, every state is angling up for hegemonic supremacy thus wielding power in measure uncontrolled by less dorminant states. Consequently, dearth of political cohesion is evident when states do not shelve their hegemonic ambition instead each state wants to influence another to adhere to their wishes.

6.1.3 Weak EASF identity

This study sought to find out whether weak EASF identity poses a challenge to EASF effectiveness in execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. . Out of the 255 respondents, 84 (33%) contended that the impact of EASF identity was not high. 77 (30%) respondents argued that the impact was very high, whereas 66 (26%) and 28 (11%) reasoned that the impact was fairly high and high respectively. This was attributed to the fact that EASF is not established around a regional economic community.

Cumulatively, 67% of respondents agreed that weak EASF identity is having a high impact on EASF's role of maintaining peace and Security in Kenya and Somalia.

Details are illustrated in figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3: Weak EASF Identity

Source: Field Data, 2019.

In view of the discussion, one of the FGD participants observed the following:

> That EASF is not anchored on a single economic community, hence known as regional mechanism. This bleeds intractable contestations and forces that tend to pull it back in performance, more so complicated by its dual membership with mixed loyalty to multiple organizations, which continuously undermines its identity and thrust in effectiveness.(FGD particicpants on 20/11/2019 at EASF PLANELM, Nairobi).

This finding is supported by Saman (2015), who argues that identity is about merging various parameters, to make an entity. The school of thought is advanced within two debates. The first is based on unchangeable characteristics, which views identity as fixed. The prominence here is the physical, observable attributes such as race, ethnicities, geographic territories and entities. The second category refutes fixity of identity and argues that the physical characteristics and features of an entity acquire meaning through social constructions. This begs the question, then what is the EASF identity? Is it a group or classification of a people, and a political formation of entities with dual membership, ideology, physiognomy, or a combination of all these aspects?. The process of forming identities involve constructing and reconstructing entities to various objects and subjects to a point where both the constructed and the constructor acquire an inter-subjective structure. This is achieved through actions or acknowledgment of the external and internal environment notwithstanding (Saman, 2015).

Munene (2015), further observes that, the identity of EASF as a standby force suffers the obvious reality that affects the overall integration process in Africa. The process suffers several setbacks because governments formulate regional integration initiatives without addressing key governance and development challenges at the regional level. While most regional security mechanisms in Africa like ECOWAS and SADC are established around a regional economic

community, this is not the case for EASF. Bouka (2016) further observes that the road to EASF operationalization has therefore been rather rough and marked by an immense array of identity challenges due to the absence of a Regional Economic Community, covering all the 13 countries of the region. At its establishment in 2004, IGAD had to be requested by AU to assume the coordination role of the new orgainzation. It was only in 2007,that EASBRIG Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM), took over responsibilities to coordinate the affairs of EASF.This has consistently contributed to its weak identity because most of its member states are members of other organizations with duplicated mandates,to include maintenance of peace and security (Bouka, 2016).

Dahal (2011), further reckons that most EASF members, are not clear as to the mandate of EASF. They are not sure whether it is supposed to be a mechanism to separate warring factions or restoring lost sense of faith and confidence to distraught people. He quintessentially opines that EASF has a capacity malaise and cannot undertake either of the perceived roles or both effectively. This is because, since its inception in 2004,EASF has continued to suffer from identity crisis owing to bureaucratic tendencies initiated by its members who have multiple loyalties. This is excemplified by the fact that it has its key elements in two countries; both in Ethiopia and Kenya.While Ethiopia hosts the logistics base, Kenya hosts the Planning Element.Both of them tend to perceive that the entity they are accommodating are the most important, while in fact they are both part of the whole (Dahal, 2011).

To support the discussion, Bailes and Cottey (1992), contends that Regional Security Organizations built around economic framework leads to formation of security communities.

They define a security community as a group of states among which there is a 'real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically but will settle their disputes in some other way. This concept was developed by Karl Deutsch in the late 1950s to reflect the particularly far-reaching goals of post-World War II European integration, which in turn placed Europe in a larger security community of the world's industrialized democracies. A security community implies more intense, sustained and comprehensive interaction. It starts by removing the risk of conflict within the group, and it continues to develop strengths that are greater than the sum of its parts for security tasks going well beyond the prevention of specific ills. This gives the organizations identity and contributes immensely to its effectiveness. They note that ambitions to build such communities have recently been displayed also in several non-European regions including ASEAN (Bailes and Cottey, 1992),

Malak (2015), further observes that Regional Security Organizations (RSO) built around economic frameworks are very effective in strategic planning and utilization of resources This because such RSOs provide a forum where states can discuss their security, exchange information, train their militaries together, and coordinate peace operations, if needed. These activities require scarce, expensive, and interoperable resources, which are easily available within when achored around a strong economic community because they have got financial capability to finance its activities, programmes and operations. While giving the example of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Chester (2013), explains that it is closely linked to the organization's Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme.This is the forum that promotes dialogue and practical cooperation between NATO member states and partner nations based on scientific research, technological innovation and knowledge exchange. The SPS

Programme offers funding, expert advice and support to tailor-made, security-relevant activities that respond to NATO's strategic objectives. This makes it have a clear identity, which enhances its execution capability (Chester, 2013).

The foregoing discussion confirms that failure for EASF to be anchored around an economic framework renders it suffer a weak identity, which poses a challenge to its effectiveness in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

6.1.4 Funding Constraints

The study sought to know whether the respondents agreed or disagreed that funding constraints was a challenge to EASF's mandate of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. As demonstrated in figure 6.4, Out of the 255 respondents, 222 (87%), agreed that inadequate funding was a hindrance to EASF's effectiveness. Conversly, 33 (13%) of the total respondents disagreed to the inquiry. Those who agreed to the inquiry argued that in as much as member states contribute certain amount of EASF funding, it is just a drop in the ocean and cannot adequately fund the numerous programs of EASF in the region. Consequently, this situation has stymied the efforts of EASF in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. On the contrary, other respondents averred that sufficient funding had been rolled out to EASF but they reasoned that these funds have not been fully utilized and channeled appropriately to useful activities.

Figure 6.4: Inadequate Funding/constraints

Source: Field Data, 2019.

This finding is supported by Chong (2008), in his book titled"*What determines foreign aid? The donors' perspective"*. where he opines that for EASF to successfully conduct its Peace Support Operations (PSO), a huge amount of funding is required. He notes that funds are important in the day-to-day operations, deployments, training, and exercises of EASF capabilities and even for observer missions. His observation is further reinforced by findings from as a study undertaken

by Ligawa (2015),in his thesis paper titled"*AMISOMs influence towards peacebuilding in Somalia"* where he contended that even at the continental level, the AU, which has the supreme authority over the standby forces lacks finances to discharge its duties and has to to rely on donors and partners to be able discharge its duties. He notes that member countries have not been regularly contributing to the AU peace fund. He further notes that force sustainability, reimbursement and logistics requires funding. This is however hardly met by the member states contributions. The issue of funding is the most crucial problem that has affected the whole AU system, both at its establishment and deployment levels. Funding under the ASF is needed for pre-deployment activities such as training, communication, logistical interoperability, deployment and post deployment activities such as transportation and remuneration of personnel costs. (Ligawa, 2015).

Nzau (2013), posits that at the sub regional level, EASF faces similar challenges concerning funding. While member states are supposed to carry out their obligations of financing the EASF, few have regularly done so. This is either because of low financial capacity or because of their over bearing national commitments and priorities. The lack of mechanisms and resources for effective planning, coordination, implementation, monitoring and pragmatic adjustment of programs on the ground has equally constrained regional integration in the EASF. The epileptic state of the economies of some states, coupled with their obligations to pay annual dues to the various sub-regional organizations they belong to, largely contributes to their inability to discharge their operational obligations For this reason, just like in the AU, the EASF is forced to work with partners or donors to realize its objectives because the contribution from its member sates is not adequate. This however affects some of its key progarmes and essential training activities (Nzau, 2013).

Gelot et al (2016), in his book titled"*The future of African Peace Operatins*" further posits that there is no gainsaying the point that the availability of funds is crucial for the virility of any organization, most especially an organization charged with the responsibility of furthering a capital-intensive project – like regional peace and security. This key aspect is prevalent, even in other sectors. Citing an example,in the area of trade and mobility of factors of production, he observes that African integration has been relatively more outward looking at the expense of intra-regional trade. Xenophobia has partly hampered labour movement among members, while capital mobility has been constrained by largely undeveloped financial markets. Domestic, regional and international financial and investment constraints have also hampered regional integration, which requires considerable resources to plan, coordinate, implement, and monitor progress in its implementation. There is low saving as a percentage of gross domestic products, while foreign direct investment (FDI) remains elusive and eschews Africa. Furthermore, he adds that official development assistance has also been dwindling. This is made worse by lack of full private sector involvement at both planning and implementation stages, which has not elicited maximum deliberate input from this important sector, which usually has the financial resources and owns productive capacity. In most countries in Africa the private sector remains weak and is still not well organized. Civil society involvement has also been wanting (Gelot *et al,* 2016).

The finding is further supported by, a study conducted by Sousa (2013), who further opines that whilst, deficiency of funding for most peace operations including those mounted by UN or EU is a constant concern,in the of IGAD ,the situation is dire due to the dependency of external funding's for most of its core operations and activities. On agreeing to deploy in Somalia in 2005, IGAD members requested the then IGAD Chairman, President Museveni of Uganda, to

secure funding and technical support for the mission from countries in the region, AU members, and states outside the continent. Within two weeks Uganda officially offered soldiers to IGAD for inclusion in the peacekeeping operation, however the government made it crystal clear that they couldn't afford the cost of the deployment and required external funding due to lack of self-sustaining funding. In February 2005, IGAD established a fund for funding IGASOM with an initial request to UN to provide initial demand of $10.3 million to fund the costs of airlifting the first two battalions of peacekeepers to Somalia, but by June that year there was no provision of that cash (Souza, 2013).

This same malaise is the one that has been a challenge to EASF effectiveness to maintain peace and security especially in Kenya and Somalia. This is due to the fact that failure of member states to pay assessed contributions to the regular budget of the EASF has had a negative impact on the capability of the organization. It struggles with servicing of actual committments and long-term financial support. This has forced EASF to over rely on support from partners and donors to undertake their activitities. This has its own share of disadvantanges because EASF lacks the ability to plan on such support, as its flow is not consistent. With this state of affairs, EASF losses some degree of indepencence and political autonomy. For this reason, the sub-regional security concept continues to lose momentum because EASF cannot deploy or sustain its troops in long deployments. It sometimes has to do what the donors want done, and this is against the mantra of African solutions to African problems. Lack of funding, therefore remains a serious challenge to EASF effectiveness to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia (Heinonen,2006).

6.1.5 Weak Legal Instruments

Ikenberry (2003), in his book titled,"*State Power and the Institutional Bargain: America's Ambivalent Economic and Security Multilateralism in US Hegemony and International Organizations,*" observes that it is important to have legal instruments, through developed frameworks of litigation. He contends that they offer avenues to address members' grievances and amicably provide solutions to contentious issues. However, for these structures to be strong, commitment of member states is paramount. This study therefore sought to find out whether weak legal structures and non-commitment of member has an impact on EASF's role in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia (Ikenberry, 2003).

As illustrated in figure 6.5, out of the 255 respondents, 194 (76%) of the respondents agreed that this is an impediment to EASF's effort in maintaining peace and security. On the contrary, 61 (24%) of the total respondents avouched that weak legal structures were not an impediment to

EASF's mandate of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

Figure 6.5: Weak Legal Structures

Source: Field Data, 2019.

This finding is supported by Khadiagalla (2008), who observes that over ten years, EASF has had a relatively weak legal basis. This is because EASF continues to operate under the Policy Framework for the Establishment of EASBRIG that was adopted in 2004 and a Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade, which was signed in 2005. However both documents are not binding. In December 2014, a new agreement on the

establishment of the EASF was developed bu was only signed by ten participating states. There also still exist several grey areas in the area of pledged forces by member states. There is still no binding arrangement between Members States for force deployment although every year Members States renew their M.o.Us on pledged forces. For this reason, EASF operations largely depend on the mutual understanding of states and on the changing political will of states involved. Commitment and contributions of member states towards the activities of the EASF continues to depend on the threat perception of the situation and interests of individual nations in the activities of the regional force. Additionally, there is lack of committement of EASF members and staff to the regional organization (Khadiagalla, 2008).

Gelot et al (2016), further observed that even though EASF personnel get standardized training from the regional Training centers of excellence and training institutions, their loyalty to the EASF and deployment is only valid if the concerned states do not object to their deployment. This raises concern over the question of divided loyalty of officers towards the force and towards their countries. This is a serious issue especially, as it touches on the integrity of senior officers deployed at EASF Headquarters, who are involved in the formulation and implementation of policies. Loyalty to EASF has also been questioned among member states, especially when deployment in a certain country or area is of pertinent interest to the concerned states. This is also prevalent where intervention is to be carried out in a 'friendly' State against the wish of the sitting government. This was the case when EASF was supposed to deploy MAPROBU in Burundi in 2015 (Gelot et al, 2016).

For EASF to remain effective and be able to undertake its mandate of not only maintaining peace and security in the EAR, but specifically to Kenya and Somalia, then it needs to develop an agreement which is acknowledged and signed to by all members and that which is also binding to its entire membership.

6.1.6 Poor Operational framework

Williams (2018), in his book titled, "*Fighting for peace in Somalia: A History and analysis of the AMISOM from 2007-2017*" observes that operational frameworks are hinged upon well-coordinated mechanisms. He underscores that where such mechanisms are missing, dysfunctional system is inevitable. This study sought to understand the impact of operational frameworks to EASF's effectiveness of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.The study asked the respondents to agree or disagree with the question as to whether poor operational framework impedes EASF's mandate.

As illustrated in figure 6.6, out of the 255 respondents 171 (67.06 %), agreed that poor operational framework hinders EASF effort in maintaining peace and security. They argued that even though such framework exists, it is poorly managed. Conversley, 84 (33.94%) of the respondents disagreed to the inquiry by asserting that EASF operational frameworks were not poor, instead the perception was created by member states to tilt the thinking towards unforeseeable inefficiency.

Figure 6.6: Poor Operational Framework

Source: Field data, 2019.

This finding is further supported by De Conning (2016), who observes that the core functions of the EASF PLANELM are planning, preparation and training of the force. It is also charged with responsibility of conducting verification of brigade headquarters and standby elements. This is considered a full time engagement, implying that the PLANELM should be staffed on a permanent basis and where possible, be co-located with the regional brigade headquarters for ease of command, control and communications. However, while the EASF has its PLANELM located in Kenya, its brigade headquarters and logistics base are located in Addis Ababa. This

renders the coordination of these structures difficult and also causes logistical and communication constraints especially for an organization like EASF, which just like the others in the region is constrained in terms of resources. Though arrangements like those may satisfy the countries concerned, they may also jeopardize the effective function of the force. Kenya may be happy to host the PLANELM, and Ethiopia, the EASBRIG HQ, and the LOGBASE but operationally, this framework has a lot of challenges in coordinating its activities. This, compounded with the resource deficiency facing EASF makes the organization highly ineffective leading to poor ability to execute its mandate in EAR and especially in Kenya and Somalia (De Conning, 2016).

Hetne (2008), during a study on theories and the rise in regionalization of security further posits poor operational framework negatively affects the operational decision-making process, especially at the policy and operational levels. This has therefore posed a big challenge to EASF effectiveness in execution of its mandate in Kenya and Somalia. He concludes that the EASF dysfunctional operation framework, further affects its decision-making capability to deploy its troops. This is due to the fact that structures and institutions upon which EASF was established will continue to curtail its sphere of operation for some time to come. Otherwise the challenge requires to be addressed as it has an impact not only on the effectivess of EASF mandate implementation but maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia (Hetne, 2008),

6.1.7 Internecine Conflicts in the Eastern Africa Region

The Eastern African region has been characterized by both interstate and intrastate conflicts and this largely affects the development of a strong EASF. This study therefore sought to understand from the respondents whether internecine conflicts in the region affect effective implementation

of EASF mandate of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. As demonstrated in figure 6.7, out of the 255 respondnets 227 (89%) of the total respondents agreed that internecine conflicts in the region were nebulous and affected virtually all member states of EASF, hence impacting on EASF in many ways. On the contrary, 28 (11%) of the respondents argued that the conflicts were manageable and have not affected EASF capability. However they acknowledge the need to still address these conflicts.

Figure 6.7: Internecine Conflict in Eastern Africa

Source: Field Data, 2019.

This finding is supported by, Akerlund (2005), who observes that conflict tends to involve an incompatibility between two or more parties. This occurs when views of two parties are incompatible, which may be due to some form of scarcity. He contends that conflict may arise in a wide variety of contexts and occurs on multiple levels, including at the inter and intrapersonal levels, the intergroup, the organisational, as well as the international levels. A conflict will hence evolve in a life cycle, during which phases of escalation and de-escalation may occur. Escalation of the conflict, or de-escalation achieved by third party intervention, tends to result from various forms of bargaining, threats and pressures which are used to influence the other party's behaviour and decisions (Akerlund, 2005).

The finding is further supported by Omanyo (2015), who contends that conflicts in the region have an impact on effectiveness of the EASF. She cites conflicts that are ongoing in the Sudan's Darfur region, South Sudan, Somalia and in other countries in the region. She observes that hostilities also exist between Eritrea and Djibouti. She notes that earlier conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia even resulted into Eritrea withdrawing its active participation from the EASF activities. This only goes against the principle of inclusivity of all member states in the Eastern Africa Region for an effective, collective security arrangement and hence undermine the progress of the EASF (Omanyo, 2015).

These conflicts in the EAR have an impact on the effectivess of the EASF as a regional security mechanism in a number of ways. They result to reduced resources to the EASF and it is no wonder that most of the time, member states have been unable to meet their financial obligations or have only pledged limited number of personnel and equipment, probably maintaining a substantial amount of resources to counter their internal insurgencies. These conflicts have also necessitated the deployment of UN and AU peacekeeping missions in which countries of the

EASF participate but not as part of EASF.This leads to undermining level of resources used in strengthening this regional force. Again for such states, EASF regional security duties are considered secondary to their national security. The conflicts have also created tension between countries in the EASF because of among other issues, support for proxy wars by member countries and their international relations. This has led to mistrust among EASF member States and has really affected the collaborative efforts required to nurture the EASF as a regional security mechanism with a mandate to maintain peace and security in EAR and especially in Kenya and Somalia (Derosso, 2010).

This confirms that the intercine conflicts therefore impacts EASF effectiveness to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Shah (2009), while further explaining the impacts of conflict in the effectives of organizations like the EASF, notes that there are multiple effects of conflict, that have had disastrous and long lasting effects on the social, economic and political situation of the communities. Conflict destroys a society's social fabric and coping mechanisms when civilians are direct targets or affected bystanders. Returning to normal community life takes years following the deliberate destruction of social institutions and ways of life (Shah, 2009).

 Abdille et al (1995) also argues that conflicts in the EASF region disrupt the support provided by wider family and kinship systems, exacerbates divisions between groups, increases intra-group insecurity and hostility, disrupts inter-group economic relations, and promotes disease. For instance, after the killing subsided in Rwanda in mid-1994, deaths continued as refugees and the internally displaced fell victim to disease from lack of food and potable water, thus conflict has the following effects on political, economic and social set up of the communities involved in a conflict (Ruto, Mohamud and Masinde, 2003).

Akerlund (2005), noted that the emergencies of complex violent conflicts have profound short- and long-term consequences on economic resources and institutions needed to enhance the effectiveness of the EASF. They destroy local and national economies, capital and investment, and skew productive economic activity. The conflict destroys the physical and social infrastructure, human capital, and local economic institutions Killings or forced conscription can mean insufficient labour for productive work deliberately disrupting trade and economic activity thereby reducing investment by the government, aid agencies and domestic and foreign entrepreneurs. This reduced the possibilities for recovery by frightening away foreign investment, reorientation of resources from socio-economic development to the military, further promoting the arms trade sales as the means to support armies of the warring communities thus diverting the resources that would have been used in a gainful means ((Mulu, 2008).

Matthew, Brown, and Jensen (2009), opines that complex and violent conflicts destroys national political systems, needed to strengthen the capacity of the EASF. It also leads to killing of current and future leaders, sowing seeds of bitterness and division between communities, destroying or altering traditional political institutions, and changing power relations and national political institutions. In civil wars, the distribution of power or assets depends on who is harmed or spared; this distribution is often along ethnic or regional lines. Conflict worsens political inequalities. For example, when the powerful are enriched by stealing assets or when poverty affects a group's ability to exercise human rights. Democratic institutions are compromised when war suppresses press freedoms and civil rights thereby diverting scarce international resources into relief, peacekeeping, and reconstruction (Abdow, 2010).

 Lind (2006), also notes that conflicts have long lasting effects on communities of EASF and social structures, environmental sustainability, humanitarian and reconstruction aid costs,

jeopardizing regional stability and security, effects on political institutions, effects on national economies Ironically, a real world opportunity to learn from and experiment with tools of conflict resolution goes relatively unnoticed by the greater international community (Lind, 2006).

Giving an example of the Somali Civil War that started in 1991 with the overthrow of former president Barre, Moller (2009), in the book titled ". *The Somalia Conflict and the Role of External Actors",* observed that this was a unique and sustained conflict, which has lasted several decades. While it garnered little international attention compared to other conflicts around the globe during this period, it affected both the humanitarian and political structures. It caused years of anarchy, factionalism and bloodshed. It occasioned violation of basic fundamental of human rights. It affected the security, economic well being, and a sense of belonging among the Somali citizenry. It impacted on development and provision of essential services in pastoralists' areas through disruption of the communities' livelihood systems by restricting access to natural resources and marketing systems. It also encouraged the spread of diseases to animals. This was in addition to loss of livestock that were the main source of livelihood for the pastoralists in the region. The conflict led to destruction of social amenities to include the education system. This had an impact on the effectiveness of EASF, because Somalia will take along time,in its current status, before it can be able to meanfully particpate in the activities of EASF (Jessa, 2011).

Cilliers et al (2005), observes that the conflict in Somalia have brought members of the EASF to operate together in Somalia as part of AMISOM. All five troop-contributing countries to AMISOM have a major stake in the outcome of Somalia's conflict. Kenya, as part of the AMISOM structure, is expected to act as a key ally of the national government,but due to its

strategic objective to create a buffer zone in Jubbaland, it also works closely with local actors such as the Ras Kamboni militia in southern Somalia. This is intended to secure its border with Somalia.This has been viewed as an ulterior motive by the central government in Mogadishu and has led to undercurrent tensions between the two countries. This does not augur well for EASF mandate to maintain peace and security between the two countries of Kenya and Somaia (Cilliers, 2005).

Armel (2013), notes that the Kenyan Defence Force troops deployed in Somalia has been criticized within AMISOM for failing to liaise sufficiently with the Force Commander. Because AMISOM's deployment to Somalia is an AU mission authorized by the UN Security Council, it is difficult for Kenya to freelance and act as it wishes. The Somali government in Mogadishu has already accused Kenya of operating outside its mission mandate, such as by assisting logistically and security-wise, not to mention diplomatically, in the creation of a Jubbaland state against the express wishes of Somalia's new federal government. Kenya has also given direct political, economic and military support to the Ras Kamboni force. The principal reason given for this support was that both groups proved to be major allies in the struggle to eject Al Shabaab from southern Somalia in general, and Kismayo port in particular. The Ras Kambon Brigade is dominated by Ogadeni Somalis, and members of the same clan are prominent in both Kenyan and Ethiopian Somali regions. The relationship between these two-armed groups and the FGS is currently low. This is not good for EASF effectiveness, since the two countries are its members and it is supposed to manage any tensions between them amicably as their regional security guarantor (Armel, 2013).

Mwaura (2013), observes that the other major conflict in the region that had an impact on EASF efefctivemness is the one between Ethiopia and Eritrea, from 1998 to 2000.The Eritrean–

Ethiopian border conflict was a violent standoff and a proxy conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It consisted of a series of incidents along the then-disputed border of Badme The final peace agreeemnet was only achieved in 2018, twenty years after the initial confrontation..This had an impact on EASF because; Eritrea refused to join the EASF because their perceived adversary was already part of the organization (Mwaura, 2013).

Robinson (2014). In his book titled"*The Eastern Africa Standby Force: History and Prospects",* observes that the other security challenge that excercebates conflicts in the EASF region, especially between Kenya and Somalia is the ploriferation of illegal weapons. Kenya and Somalia have incessantly been caught locking horns across their borders due to infiltration of light weapons by bandits and militia groups. In this light, EASF has had to contend with the shifting terrain of intervention as well as promoting peace and security in these two countries. The widespread ownership and easy availability of small arms in the border areas is widely cited as an intensifier of armed conflicts between the two neighbors. This is made worse by the chronic insecurity and porous borders ibetween the two countries (Robinson, 2014).

Ericksson (2013), further contends that small arms proliferation will remain a dangerous reality for the border area communities in the foreseeable future. Some modest efforts by Kenya and Somalia to contain the problem have involved the disarming of the youth. However, the prospects for large-scale disarmament in the region remains remote. In southern Somalia, weapons are known to come from a variety of sources, including conflict prone neighbouring countries like Sudan, Ethiopia and Northern Uganda. Guns are even paid for in terms of animals. One of the off shots of this scenario is the challenge of cattle rustling. The cross border nature of the cattle raids complicate mechanisms intended to address the challenge. Cattle

rustling among communities living along the common border of Kenya and Somalia is further motivated by the gun culture among the border communities. It is therefore likely to reamin a disruptor of peace and security in the two counties for some time to come. This discussion underscores the argument from majority of the respondents that intercine conflicts among the EASF member sattes especailaly Kenya and Somalia has an impact on the effectiveness of the EASF to not only maintain peace and security in the EAR,but specifically in   Kenya and Somalia(Erickson, 2013).

6.1.8 Dearth of Resources

Lorenz (2003),in his book titled "*Ethics of development in a global environment*" observes that resoursces is not just funding, but is stock or supply of money, materials, staff, and other assets that can be drawn on by a person or organization in order to function effectively. The Eastern Africa region is endowed with abundant of resources.but such resources have not been utilized to operationalize EASF for the effectiveness of the oeganization as a regional security mechanism. This study therefore sought to understand whether scarcity of resources was a hindrance to EASF's effectiveness in maintaining peace and security in the region and especially in Kenya and Somalia specifically. According to results in figure 6.8, out of the 255 respondents 140 (54.90%) , agree that dearth of resources hampers the effort of EASF in maintaining peace and security while 115 (45.10 %),of the respondents disagreed and reasoned that there are sufficient resources to steer EASF in its effort in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia (Lorenz,2003).

Figure 6.8: Dearth of Resources

Source: Field Data, 2019.

Kibuko (2014), supports this finding by observing the ASF policy framework provides that EASF will be deployed in operational scenarios on self-sustainable basis of either 30 days, or up to 90 days.It is only after this period that AU or the UN will take over the responsibility for sustaining the missions. Such deployments will require regular joint field exercises with all units and a standing fully staffed Brigade HQ, which are highly resource intensive. Although EASF is said to be ready for such operations, having achieved FOC in 2014,Kibuko, observes that in real

terms, most countries in the EASF that are expected to deploy and contribute resources to the force Log Base, do not have adequate resources to sustain these missions within the ambitious timelines (Kibuko, 2014).

Additionally Duina (2012), further observes that such operational demand for resources could probably only be met by some AU member states that possess relatively well-endowed military capabilities like South Africa and Nigeria and which are also supported by a strong resource support base. He posits that while EASF is limited in terms of strategic lift capabilities.it also has a limited number of experts working for it. EASF therefore continues to rely on some military and police operational experts that are seconded through the Friends of EASF forum. These are the ones assisting to EASF to develop key operational plans and policies. He reiterates that lack of resources creates a problem of dependence on external support. This concept undermines local ownership of the Force and the overall mantra of ASF 'African solution to African problems', which guides its activities as a guiding motto (Duina, 2012).

To this end, EASF continues to be resourced in various ways by a number of countries and organizations. They have come together in a forum known as 'Friends of EASF' that established in 2007. Some of them like Netherlands has played a very instrumental role towards resourcing some objectives of the EASF strategic development Plan.It have assisted EASF to develop a command, Control and Communication Information System (C3IS). The Unoted Kingdom has also provided EASF with a lot of force equipments and operational resources. China has also shown willingness to join the Friends of EASF to provide resource support to EASF to build its antiterrorism capability (Fredrick, 2012).

Dearth resourses within the EASF membership is a challenge that negates the effectiveness of its capability to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia,that needs to be adsdressed for optimal operational capability of the regional mechanism.

6.1.9 Duplication of Regional Organizations' roles

The Eastern Africa region plays host to a number of sub regional organizations, some of them having been formed way back before the establishment of the EASF. These are EAC and IGAD. In such a multipolar environment where a number of organizations are formed, the aspect of duplication does arise with implications. This study sought to ask the respondents to indicate whether duplication of roles of the various sub regional organizations in the EAR was impacting on EASF's effectiveness of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

As illustrated in figure 6.9, out of the 255 respondents 171 (67.06%) of the total respondents argued that duplication of regional organization was an impediment to EASF's mandate of fostering peace and promoting security in the region. On the other hand, 84 (32.94%) of the respondents stated that such duplication was not a problem and did not stymie EASF from playing its role.

Figure 6.9: Duplication of Regional Organizations' role

Source: Field Data, 2019.

This finding is supported by Kimathi (2010), in the book titled,"*A Common Agenda of Post-Conflict Reconstruction among Eastern Africa's sub-Regional Organizations: Exploring the Challenges",* who observes that duplication of effort has been recognized as a challenge to international cooperation projects with strategies aimed at addressing them. She contends that it is important to appreciate the commitment that member states have to these organizations, their

loyalty to these organizations and the impact thereof, positive or negative, depending on the collaboration or lack of it among the sub regional organizations(SROs)(Kimathi,2010).

For the EASF, even with its status as sub-regional security architecture, there has been minimal collaboration among it and the other organizations in the area of security. This is ironical since all of them have a security role in their mandates. This is evidenced by the actions of the institutions like IGAD and EAC.They continue to take their own actions in the same domain of peace and security. Unfortunately, they use capacities from the same member states. They also all go to the same donors for assistance. This creates unnecessary competition for same donor support. This obviously creates donor fatigue. So their existence as multiple and competing organizations with overlapping mandates or objectives has a negative impact on the development and effectiveness of the EASF in its execution of mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia (Booth, 2007).

Kasumba et al (2010), opines that overlapping membership by Member States within EAR further creates the problem of commitment and loyalties, which undermines the support of member states for EASF. This is due to the facty that States usually lean towards organizations that best meet their expectations or interests. Tanzania, which is geographically located in the EAC region and is founder Member of the EAC, preferred to join the SADC Standby Force (SSF) instead of EASF. Tanzania seems to be even more active in SADC than it is in EAC. On the other hand, Kenya and Uganda are also actively involved in the EAC probably, more than they could be engaged in the EASF. But again, unlike other standby forces in Africa which enjoy the participation of almost all member states due to the existence of one strong REC upon which they are anchored, EASF lacks this binding aspect of its membership. This impacts commitment

by member states as well as competition for external donors with other RECs/RMs (Kasumba, et al, 2010)

Darkwa (2017), argues that greater collaboration among member states and among the security and development organizations is important. This will allow members to take advantage of the synergies that exist among the different organization and reduce duplication of resource and divided commitment and effort. This is the case affectiving the effectiveness of EASF to not only maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia but also in the EAR.There is need for more collaborative efforts in this area to create synergies and reduce competition and duplication of effort in a region that already has constrained resources.

6.1.10 Dearth of leadership and Hegemonic Competition

Khadiagala (2008),in the book titled"*Eastern Africa:Security and the Legacy of Fragility*" observsa that leadership is an important function of management which helps to maximize efficiency and to achieve organizational goals. It also determines the level in a region like EAR, where there are multiple SROs with duplication mandates as earlier discussed. The EAR is a region where hegemonic competitions have epitomized a number of states. This study sought to know whether lack of strong leadership within EASF membership coupled by hegemonic competition has impact on its effectiveness of maintaining peace in Kenya and Somalia.

As illustrated in figure 6.10,out of the 255 respondents,145 (56.86%) reasoned that this state of affairs has affected EASF's mandate of maintaining peace and security whereas 110 (43.14%) ,were of contrary opinion. They reasoned that there is demonstrable leadership in the region and

that   hegemonic   competition   was   good   for   the   organizatio

Dearth of Leadership and Hegemonic Competiotion

Figure 6.10: Dearth of Leadership and Hegemonic Competition

Source: Field Data, 2019.

This finding is supported by Menkhaus (2004), who opines that in most situations, security matters are sensitive and therefore call for prompt decisions or actions. In regional security architectures, the significance of a lead nation cannot be underestimated. EASF lacks a clear hegemonic power unlike the case of ECOWAS Standby Force and the SADC Standby Force where Nigeria and South Africa are hegemonies. In EASF, the two relatively powerful states;

namely Ethiopia and Kenya, are in a state of constant competition to secure their respective supremacy in the region (Menkhaus (2004).

The competition between the two countries was manifested at the establishment of the EASF. Ethiopia's perceived dominance in IGAD led to a number of States among them Kenya, initially resisting the coordination of EASF affairs under IGAD during its formation stage. Consequently EASBRICOM, and later EASFCOM, were established and it was decided that its headquartes be located in Nairobi. Ethioipa also used their supremacy to have the logistics base and the force Headquarters based in Addis Ababa.While Kenya considers EASFCOM as the supreme organ of all other structures, Ethiopia regards all structures as equal. This has always created some tension. Therefore, even though the EASFCOM was established as a solution, the two countries' rivalry still continues to affect the smooth running of EASF. Having these elements separated, more so the PLANELM and the structures of the EASF Brigade Headquarters has affected the coordination of the EASF activities and has further delayed the rapid deployment of EASF. For effective coordination, if not all elements of the EASF, then the PLANEM and the Brigade Headquarters should be in one place for more flexibility and effectiveness (Fisher, *et al*., 2010). This is an aspect that needs to be addressed as such competition only renders EASF ineffective to not only maintain peace in the regaion bau also in Kenya and Somalia occasioned by unnecessary competion nad stymied coordination of its efforts.

6.1.11 Culture-phobia and mistrust

The study sought to understand from the respondents whether fear arising from cultural differences in the EASF region and mistrust were impeding factors on EASF's mandate of

maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. As evidently illustrated in figure 6.11 out of the 255 respondnets 156 (61.18 %) contended that culture-phobia was real and mistrust was rampant in the EASF region. On the other hand, 99 (38.82%) disagreed and stated that the perceived fear is but mere speculation and that there was no culture-phobia affecting EASF as a security mechanism in Kenya and Somalia.

Figure 6.11: Culture-Phobia and Mistrust

Source: Field Data, 2019.

This finding is backed by Gouzou (2012), who observes that under the authority of the AU PSC and the AU General Assembly, EASF is expected to be deploy, when need arises, a multidimensional, multifunctional and well integrated standby force that is to be assembled from member states. For force efficiency and effectiveness, standardized training and doctrine have been carried out by the EASF through the regional training centers of excellence and training institutions. Joint planning and deployment courses have been conducted and exercises have also been carried out to prepare the forces to ensure smooth joint operations of EASF (Gouzou, 2012).

However there exists cultural diversity among the peoples of Eastern Africa. They are defined by various ethnicities, culture and values, religion and the Anglophone-Francophone divide. It is contended that such diverse cultures affect the progress and effectiveness of the EASF. This has significant impact on the process of establishing unified command during operations. In operational scenarios, commanders may experience difficulties in communicating with their troops if they don't share common values, cultures and more importantly the resultant doctrine (Cuman, 2012).

Kimathi (2010), further contendst that mistrusts and suspicions have their anchorage in the political antiquity of East African member states, most especially in the post- independence of African states. At a time when African security architecture was being formulated, East African states quickly degenerated to selfishness, animosity and greed. The mistrust and suspicion has been occasioned by resource competition and conflict between and among member states. Kenya and Somalia are no exception. The foregoing discussion was underpinned by one of the key informants who averred that:

> EASF member states are not only mistrustful but
> also are suspicious of one another. There are a

number of issues that aggravate the situation. Issues of territorial integrity, economic rivalry, political supremacy and technological prowess take centre stage in mistrust and suspicion politics. Kenya and Somalia have locked horns over their maritime continental shelf, resources, Uganda has contended the Ugingo and Migingo islands and other manifestation therein (Interview with key informant at Somalia Embassy 30/11/2019,Nairobi)

The prevenient discussion was further supported by Kagwanja (2013) who aver that, the Eastern Africa region lacks a clear hegemonic power unlike the case of West Africa and Southern Africa where Nigeria and South Africa are unrivalled hegemonies. Respectively, Kimathi, (2010), underscored that notwithstanding their historical cordial relations, the two relatively antagonistic states, of Ethiopia and Kenya, are in a state of constant competition to secure their respective supremacy in the region. The competition between the two countries was manifested at the very outset of EASFs creation. Some maintained that as Ethiopia is dominant in IGAD, it is using the organization as a tool for pursuing the country's national security project under the cover of regional security. Due to this reason Kenya strongly resisted the establishment of EASF under the mandate of IGAD as the event was felt to boost Ethiopian dominance in the region through the accumulation of military force. This mistrust and unholy alliance of the two countries, therefore, hindered the institutional development as well as smooth running of the EASF. Consequently, the protest by Kenya and other IGAD and non-IGAD countries in the region led to the establishment of EASBRICOM, later EASF with its PLANELM Headquarters in Kenya while the Brigade headquarters and the Logistics Base are located in Ethiopia .The suspicion has further been exacerbated by Kenya-Somalia maritime row, which Somalia has taken to the ICJ (Jamal, 2017).

In view of the foregoing discussion and since EASF is mandated to maintain peace and security in the EAR, there is need to address the aspects of culture phobia and perceived mistrust among its members. This will ensure that   deploying troops from different countries, cultural and doctrinal background are able to operate together under one unified command to be able to enhance EASF effectiveness in maintaing peace and security not only in the region but specifically in Kenya and Somalia.

6.1.12 Belligerent Groups

A belligerent is an individual, group, country, or other entity that acts in a hostile manner, such as engaging in combat. The study found out that there are acts of belligerency that are perpetuated by belligerent groups, which scuttle EASF's execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. This is a challenge that affects operational capability of the EASF.

Out of the 255 respondents, 160 (63%), of the respondents stated that belligerent groups played an insignificant role in maintenance of peace and security whereas 95 (37%) of the total respondents reasoned that belligerent groups were actors in the region and had played a significant role.

Figure 6.12 Belligerent Groups

Source: Field Data, 2019.

The Somali belligerents are nebulous in their operations and hardly engage security personnel in breaking truce and resolving conflict. The foregoing is corroborated by an interview with a Military officer, in Lamu Military camp who asserted that:

> *Kundi haramu ya Alshabaab inatuhangaisha sana katika mpaka. Inatushambulia sisi kila mara. Hawataki kuhusishwa na serikali yao, hawataki serikali yetu. Wanajifanya wanakuja biashara kumbe wanakusanyika kutushambulia. Tumepata hasara kubwa.* (The Alshabaab belligerent group disturbs us a lot along the border. It attacks us every time. They don't want to be involved by their government; they also don't want to be involved with our government. They disguise themselves in business forays only to attack us. We have greatly run at a loss (Interview with Kenya Military officer, 30/11/2019,Lamu, Kenya).

The foregoing is in tandem with the opinion of Taarnby and Hallundbaek (2010), who asserts that, the main thrust of Al-Shabaab propaganda has concerned the movement's role within the global Jihad and also its opposition to other political factions in Somalia. This explains their fluidity and relentless spirit of martyrdom. Besides the standard usage of citations from the

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Quran to legitimize their political statements, there has actually been relatively little effort to provide religious doctrine to al-Shabaabs audience. According to Fisher (2014), in Africa, the unprecedented emergence of Alshabab intelligence networks and threats, exhibited by growing audacity as well as obstinacy of belligerent groups, is a trend that thrives on militancy. Terrorist attacks perpetuated by various belligerent groups operating in the EAR caliphate remains one of the distabilizing and challenging factor to EASF efforts to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia due to the incessant attacks, especially in Kenya and planned in Somlia

6.1.13 EASF Internal Organizational Dynamics

Sheila (2015), in her book titled"*The physcology of fear in an organization*", observes that fear has become institutionalized in many organizations. There is much to fear from within than from without. This dictum reverberates almost throughout every organization. The study, sought to ascertain the level at which three key internal organizational dynamics of management, adminstration and structural aspects affect EASF's effectiveness in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

As illustrated in figure 6.12, on management dynamics;out of the 255 respondents, 231(77%) stated that management in EASF was poor, 18(6%) of them indicated that the management was fair, whereas 30 (10%) stated that it was good. 15 (5%) of them stated that management was very good while 6(2%) reported that it was excellent. Cumulatively, (83%), of the respondents reported that they were not satisfied with management within EASF.This meant that it had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the organizations performance.

On administration, 189 (63%) of the 255 respondents reported that administration was fair. 51(17%) of the respondents stated that tadminstartion was good, while 15 (5%) concomitantly opined that adminstartion was poor and the rest 15 (5%) reported that it was excellent. Cumulatively, 68% of the respondents were not satisfied with the administration within EASF. The study found out that those who argued that administration was good, were motivated by the fact that they have been beneficiary of EASF system and could fairly relate their experiences. Those who stated that adminstartion was excellent reasoned so because they were actively engaged in EASF administrative issues, either as administraton staff or were part of the supervisory team. Those who stated that the adminstartion was poor (majority), argued that the EASF was dysfunctional on the ground and that member states were not committed to realize peace and security in the region.

The study also sought to find out whether EASF structures formed part of EASF internal dynamics and their impact on its effectiveness. While seeking the opinion of the respondents, out of the 255 respondents, 115 (45%) of them said that the structures were good. 77 (30%) respondents reasoned that the structures were fair, while 33 (13%) stated that the structures were very good. Only 27 (11%) stated that they were poor, while 3(1%) opined that they were excellent. Cumulatively, this showed that a majority (59%) of respondents were satisfied with EASF structures that they had positive impact on EASF effectiveness.

Figure 6.13: Internal Organizational Dynamics of EASF

Source: Field Data, 2019.

6.2 Opportunities for EASF in the maintenace of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia

Despite the numerous challenges impacting on the effectiveness of EASF in the maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia, this study sought to find out the opportunities arising from the challenges. Among those mentioned by the respondents that EASF can build on to enhance its capability included the achievement of full oprertaional capability (FOC), conduct of numerous training and exercises, the establishment of maritime planning cell and experiences gained from its participation in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) among other aspects.

6.2.1 Achievement of Full Operational Capability

The study sought to establish whether achievement of full operational capability was an opportunity for EASF to adequately enhance its mandate implementation in Kenya and Somalia. As evidently illustrated in figure 6.14, out of the 255 respondents 94 (37%) of the respondents agreed to the inquiry, 84 (33%) of the total respondents disagreed and 77 (30%) were not aware. Those who agreed shared past experiences while those who disagreed had not seen it as a viable avenue for EASF.Those who were not aware of such opportunity had not participated in any peace sensitization program by the EASF.

Figure 6.14: Achievement of full operational Capability

Source: Field Data, 2019.

The findings are in tandem with the scholarly work by Munene (2015), titled: "*A Look at the East Africa Standby Force (EASF)*", where he asserts that, the EASF achieved FOC in 2014 and it was among the four regional standby forces to have achieved the status even before the stipulated timeframe. The others that achieved FOC were ECOWAS, ECCAS and the

SADC.This was a credit, to EASF because while all others achieved this status in 2015, EASF was the first one to do so in 2014. This is a clear sign of the commitment of the organizational leadership and its member states to improve their organization and is a significant progress in the operationalization of the EASF. Additioanlly, EASF also adopted a new roadmap in the same year to continuously develop the organization (Munene, 2015).

Developemnt of key guiding documents, such as *The EASF Strategic Development Plan*, in 2014,was eveidence that despite political tensions between some of its members as discussed earlier; EASF states were determined still to enhance   EASF capabilities. This was to make it a viable and effective regional security mechanism to not only address peace and security concerns in the region but specifically between Kenya and Somalia.

6.2.2 Conduct of Training and Exercises

The study also sought to ascertain whether conduct of training and exercises to enhance EASF capacities presents an opportunity to the peace and security mandate of EASF. As illustrated in figure 6.15,out of the 255 respondnets, 130 (51%) of the respondents agreed that conduct of training and exercises provides an opportunity area that can be utilized by EASF to enhance its effctiveness. 64 (25%) of the respondents disagreed to the inquiry while 61(24%) were not aware as to whether or not conduct of training and exercises is an opportunity for EASF.

Figure 6.15: Conduct of training and exercises

Source: Field Data, 2019.

The foregoing findings on whether conduct of training and exercises is an opportunity for EASF were supported by Bouhuys (2018), who observerd that between 2008 and 2017,EASF had successfully conducted several exercises. These had offered EASF member stattes with great opportunities for enhancing their capabilities, cooperating together in an operational environment and improving interoperability among them. Such exercises had been conducted in the form of Command Post Exercise (CPX), Field Training Exercise (FTX), and Map Exercises (MAPEX). They included the FTX 2017 held in Sudan, · the CPX 2014 atht was hosted by Ethiopia.It was during the 2014 FTX that EASF was determined to have achied FOC.Others were the FTX of 2013, that was conducted in Uganda; the CPX of 2011 that was held in Sudan; FTX of 2009 held in Djibouti, CPX of 2008, that was conducted in Kenya (Bouhuys (2018).

Bouhuys (2018) also commended the achievement of the latest FTX that was codenamed "Mashariki Salam"(Peaceful East Africa), and conducted in Sudan in 2017. He observed that this

offerd an opportunity for 1200 troops comprising military, police and civilian personnel from all 10 contributing countries to particpate in the exercise as "peaceful East Africans". While acknowledging that the exercise had achieved its goals, while summarising the exercise, the EASF Director, Dr Abouh, declared that EASF had once again, demonstrated that it had the capacity to undertake any mission assigned to it by the United Nations or the African Union.' (Bouhuys, 2011).

6.2.3 Establishment of Maritime Planning Cell

Maritime planning cells are preponderant avenues for EASF efforts of promoting peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. As illustrated in figure 6.16, out of the 255 respondents, 99 (39%)respondents agreed to the inquiry, 69 (27%) respondents disagreed to the inquiry and 87 (34%) of the respondents were not aware of the existence of a maritime planning cells as opportunity for EASF.

Figure 6.16: Establishment of Maritime Planning Cell

Source: Field Data, 2019.

The prevenient discussion is tandem with the views of Desmidt (2017). He observes that in 2017,the EASF developed a maritime palnning cell in its structure. This was a very interesting development within the EASF, both in the context of its possible future activities, as well as in the light of possible changes in the main six scenarios of the EASF. This was seen as a reaction to the problem of piracy off the Eastern Africa coast as well as the broader issue of a growing importance of maritime transport in the EASF operational domain off the Indian Ocean. Of worth noting also was the construction work of the Lamu port, in northern Kenya, that are still underway. This will be used by Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, South Sudan and a host of other countries in the region. As a result, the ability for EASF to react to maritime security threats in the waters surrounding East Africa was key to its effectiveness (Desmidt, 2017).

This explains why the EASF maritime planning capacity, as a new structure in its organization is

an opportunity in its desire to effectively maintain peace and security specifically in Kenya and Somalia, that already have a maritime border dispute.

6.2.4 Enhacement of Civilian and Police Capability

Civilian and police capability is an interesting and intriguing capoability for EASF utilization for peace and security tasks. In an effort to achieve, multidimensionality in peace support operations, EASF has developed a civilian and police capability a part of its capabilities. The study sought to know whether EASF efforts to enhance its civilian and police capability was an opportunity to improve its effectiveness. As illustrated in figure 6.17,out of the 255 respondents, 170 (67%) of total respondents agreed to the inquiry while 70 (27%) of the total respondents disagreed to the inquiry. Besides, 15 (6%) respondents were not aware if enhancing civilian and police capability was an opportunity for EASF.

Figure 6.17: Enhancing Civilian and Police Capability

Source: Field Data, 2019.

This finding is supported by Kibuko (2014), in her book titled*"Potentials and Pitfalls of Civilian component in African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)"*, who acknowledges that the EASF has made tremendous efforts to enhance the capability of the civilian and police components. The EASF civilian component was the first to be established in 2008 within the ASF system,.It even   preceded the establishment of the civilian component at the continental PLANELM level,which was established in 2010. As such, proffesional EASF civilian personnel have been instrumental in the processes that developed guidelines and policies for civilian integration in ASF peace operations. As such, the component has had a head start on a number of key areas of work including on the development of the African Stanby Roster (ASC)(Kibuko, 2014).

Kibuko contends that to enhance the civilian capability further, the EASF operates two civilian rosters, a regional roster and the African Standby Capacity (ASC) roster. The regional roster system predates the establishment of the ASC roster, which was only launched in 2015. The EASF Regional roster has 424 expert profiles, which the EASF can utilize at any time. Of those, 43 percent are female with competencies in various areas of expertize. The ASC roster consists of 53 fully rostered experts and 98 registered profiles. This makes the EASF the most advanced region when it comes to regional contributions to the ASC roster. EASF also has a system wherein they have identified civilian experts who assit EASF as national focal points. These are used to support sensitization and generate support for civilian issues at the level of Member States (Kibuko, 2014).

To further enhance their capacity, the EASF civilian component, with the support of the national focal points,has been able to conduct recruitment drives on an annual basis in the Member States.

Whilst such direct engagement with the Member States for the purposes of the roster is time intensive and expensive, EASF maintains that it remains a very important method in which to ensure visibility for the roster(s). It also more directly translates into increased numbers for the roster(s). As such, EASF will continue with the methodology for the foreseeable future and for as long as funding permits whilst also looking to perfect more cost effective options for recruitment in future. One option that EASF is exploring for this purpose is using of technology and working together with the Training Centers of Excellence (TCEs) to identify potential roster candidates (Kibuko, 2014).

Tlalka (2014), observes that similar efforts have been used to support the EASF Police Component. It is currently composed of 440 Individual Police Officers (IPOs) out of an ASF standard requirement of 720 IPOs. The pledged IPOs are from Burundi (20), Comoros (20), Djibouti (10), Ethiopia (120), Kenya (100), Rwanda (100), Seychelles (10) and Uganda (60). Further to this, 635 police officers have also been trained and participated in exercise Njiwa 2012(Dove). This was a police exercise to enhance the opetional readiness of the police component in EASF.They have also participated in all other EASF exercise and training activities. Most of police officers from EASF member states are the ones operating in Somalia under AMISOM (Jobson, 2012).

The foregiung discussion underscores that enhancing the police and civilian capability of the EASF is an opportunity that the organization should exploit to improve its effectiveness of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

6.2.5 Operational Experience from Peace Keeping Missions

Peacekeeping missions are significant tools for fostering peace and security in Kenya and Somalia through conflict management, and so its experiences are important in maintenance of peace and security. As illustrated in figure 6.18, this study sought to find out if operational experience of EASF member states is an opportunity for EASF in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.Out of the 255 respondents, 145 (57%) of them agreed to the inquiry that operational experience from peace keeping missions was an opportunity, 79 (31%) respondents disagreed to the inquiry and 31(12%) were not aware.

Figure 6.18: Operational Experience from Peace Keeping Missions

Source: Field Data, 2019.

The antecedent findings are in tandem with Kibuko's (2014) scholarly work on the *"Potentials and Pitfalls of Civilian component in African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)"*. Member states of the EASF have been participated in a several United Nations and African Union Missions in Africa. EASF Member States troops are currently deployed in the AMISOM in Somalia; where there are troops from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia. They are also deployed in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in South Sudan where there are troops from Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. In Darfur, the United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), there are troops from Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda. In the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO, there are Military Observers and police officers from Kenya.In the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA), there are peacekeepers from EASF countries like Burundi, Kenya and Uganda. EASF has also successfully deployed a 231 police component to AMISOM.She acknowledges that, "albeit small, the EASF police mission is significant in the development of the police dimension of the ASF and the EASF. (Kibuko, 2014).

Aboagye (2012), further observes that in the AMISOM senior leadership team by 2012,of the six senior officers, half of them were from EASF members states of Uganda, Burundi and Kenya. What was even more encouraging is that EASF officers had also been incorporated as a part of United Nation Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) teams supporting AMISOM. Further, on the request of the African Union, EASF also conducted out a peace support fact-finding mission to Somalia in 2012. (De Conning, 2016).

The foregoing discussion is an indication that EASF members' states have participated in several AU and UN peacekeeping missiuons which has provided them with unparalled experience in peace keeping and peace support missions. This experience provides EASF with an opportunity to harness its peacekeeping capability for use in not only maintaining peace and security in the EAR but specifically in Kenya and Somalia.

6.2.6 Civil Society Contribution

Civil society plays a preponderant role in societies. The study sought to understand if the contribution of civil society is an opportunity available to EASF's execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Out of the 255 respondents, 135 (53%) agreed that it was high and the other 120 (47%) respondents were of the contrary opinion and argued that their contribution was less.

The details are illustrated in figure 6.19.

CIVIL SOCIETY

No Contribution 0%

Very High Contribution 0%

N=255

Less Contribution 47%

High Contribution 53%

- No Contribution
- Less Contribution
- High Contribution
- Very High Contribution

Figure 6.19: Contribution of Civil Society

Source: Researcher, 2019.

The foregoing is supported by Gouzou (2012), in his book titled"*Study on the role of civil society in governance processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*", who observes that nearly all the existing conflict management and peacebuilding approaches were initiated as a result of prolonged violence that affected large populations and addressed by the civil society organizations. This is due to the fact that many of such interventions exist primarily in those parts of the country that are referred to as conflict prone areas and mostly accessible to civil society organization (CSO). Factors dependent on social, economic, political and cultural contexts of these areas have over time determined the type of approaches taken in the interventions. The life of these interventions in terms of active peacebuilding structures have apparently been pegged to the availability of external funding which itself is driven by the violent phase of the conflicts (Gouzzou, 2012).

In Kenya and Somalia, which are both members of the EASF, governments are major players in conflict management and peacebuilding. However, the concern for government in the face of conflict is first and foremost violence prevention. This is evident when governments have formed commissions/enquiries from time to time to investigate causes of violent conflict in the country. A good example is in Kenya during the Akiwumi Commission, which was constituted, to investigate politically instigated ethnic clashes of 1990/91. Unfortunately, the recommendations of these enquiries are often never implemented. In addition, States have formed structures and institutions to promote security and prevent violence in society. The major state approaches in conflict management and peacebuilding include Disarmament and Development interventions, Conflict Early Warning and the Judicial System. It should however, be noted that state interventions in conflict management are short-term and reactive, with little implementation of visionary policies (Gouzzou, 2012).

This, hence, introduces the engagement of civil society organizations. One of the FGD particpants in Ras Kamboni, during this study the following:

> Parties involved in conflicts have preferred to avoid the courts and instead resort to informal traditional peace processes that are flexible enough to their needs including their cultural values and the need for fast and cost effective justice. These processes also allow for the participation of all affected persons in the conflict rather than those injured and the use of traditional peace-building processes and negotiations to achieve justice that is recognized by the communities involved. Civil society orgaizations have remained key in enhancing   reconciliation and building of new relationships amongst the warring communities at the grass roots level. Such activities include dialogue, negotiations, and problem solving workshops, information, education and communication. These have set precedence to the coexistence in places where violence was the norm in the past, especially in Kenya and Somalia

where they continue to provide peace building support to reduce relapse to conflicts (FGD participant in Ras Kamboni AMISOM military camp on, 30/11/2019).

Edward (2005), observes that within the EASF region the last few years have seen a tremendous increase in the number of civil society agencies working on peace and conflict domaion, especially in Kenya and Somalia.They are in good numbers at the local, national and regional levels. They provide an opportunity to EASF, as they are able to reach out to all levels of conflict spectrum. This is due to the fact that the high incidencies of conflicts within the continent, calls urgency in response and CSOs are able to achieve this principle. They have set up conflict management initiatives in almost all Arid and Semi-Arid conflicts prone areas in the two countries, which are usually difficult to reach (Edward, 2005).

In Kenya for example, in an attempt to strengthen, coordinate, and integrate various conflict management initiatives, the government and the civil society organizations (CSOs) have jointly come up with a structure known as the National Steering Committee (NSC) on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (Gouzzou, 2012). The NSC was established in 2001 within the Office of the President, and it became operational in November 2002 with the placement of a Secretariat. It brings together government officials and representatives from civil society organizations. Its Secretariat also services the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP); and, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit (CEWERU). It is also responsible for co-ordination of issues related to community policing. This coordinated approach at the national level, compliments efforts of a regional security mechanism like EASF to contribute to peace and security in the country (Hermonen, 2006).

On the other hand, Mohamed (2003), in his works titled"*The Role of Somali Women in Search of Peace,"*observes that Somalia civil society has played an important role in service delivery in the country. It offers great potential to EASF efforts to maintain peace and security in the country. It has contributed to promoting inclusion, trust, dialogue and reconciliation, all of which are essential to building bridges in a polarised society, like it is in Somalia.CSOs are involved in democratization of the country, improved the representation of women and minority groups and showcase the same values they want the government to embody. They have however been beset by challenges that have hindered progress on a number of issues but are doing their best to promote governance and provide vital services in the war torn country. They have played other important roles to include, supporting peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts to promoting democratisation and providing humanitarian aid (Mohamed, 2003).

Adan (2005)), further reiterates that even after the return of a functioning central government in Somalia through the Transitional Federal Governemnt in 2012, CSOs continued to demonstrate their value as facilitators, advocates, election observers and innovators. Many are financially and politically independent institutions, acting as watchdogs, ethical guardians and advocates for the marginalised and under-represented. As the political context continues to evolve, so too has the role of CSOs. They continue to provide a chance to marginalized groups, including women, youth and unrepresented minority groups (Adan, 2005).

Abdulrahim (2017), concludes that CSOs played a major role in the peacebuilding process in Somalia, acting as the only major unifying factor in the country for a long time now. They have

used ethnic identity as a unifier among communities to create trust, safety and cultural intimacy, and to build effective networks that provide access to development projects and overall peace and security,which breeds firm ground for regional security memcahnisms,like the EASF to operate. CSOs that already exist at the national level work together to create cohesion and display a coordinated front. They have been able to promote citizens' exercise of their rights and responsibilities while fostering open channels of communication that allow governments to hear and act on public concerns (Abdulrahim, 2017).

In view of the foregoing discussion, Edward (2005), observes that CSOs also have contributed to EASF efforts of managing cross-border conflicts between the two countries. He postulates that CSOs are the "associational life of society" that develops values such as tolerance and cooperation among the people. Further, he contends that CSOs as "the good society" based on social contracts, have negotiated between government, business, and citizens to secure lasting peace. Lastly, he conceptualizes CSOs as the "public sphere" that cares about the common good. This has to do with shared interests, willingness to accommodate others with opposite views and work together to pursue common goals. This is important in building capacities and complimenting other organizations such as EASF in managing potentyial conflicts between Kenya and Somalia.He underscores the level of commitment of CSOs to build conflict management capacities in the two countries. He acknowledges CSOs significant role in assisting communities participate in good governance and living together as one. This commitment, he observes, implies greater support and time contribution to a viable course (Munene et al (2017).

Concertedly, CSOs can pull massive funds to manage conflicts as noted by one FGD participant:

Beyond promoting democratic governance, civil societies play a potentially important role in conflict resolution. Conflicts tend to arise over non-negotiable disputes over the satisfaction of fundamental basic needs. Therefore conflict resolution means going beyond negotiating interests in order to meet all sides' basic needs. Civil society actors can be instrumental in this respect. CSOs have access to the parties involved in conflict and the ability to bring parties to dialogue. They also induce local populations to get involved in long-term reconciliation efforts. By working directly with local populations on the ground, civil society is also able to assess the situation more effectively than top levels of governance or external actors. (FGD participants on 24 November 2019, in Nairobi).

This view is supported by a study conducted on CSOs in Morrocco in 2005. Civil society in Morocco has existed in different forms since independence, but it is only in the 1980s and 1990s that, along with economic liberalization, CSOs evolved and reached its current structure. Today, there are several associations that are different in their aims and fields of action. This includes in economic development, human rights, women rights and the fight against corruption. However, civil society organizations (CSOs) in the country are often perceived as potential competitors by political actors, who usually try to either exploit or undermine their capacities. They do this by getting involved in their structures or linking them to political parties. The King's attitude towards CSOs is mixed. This depends on the kind of decision he has to take; in some cases the King has opted for the building of a broader consensus through an active participation of civil society. In other occasions he has completely excluded any involvement of these organizations. To this end, in the 1990s, the government of Morocco adopted a number of reforms in the area of freedom of association and assembly. According to the European Commission, these changes led to the emergence of a more active and dynamic civil society organizations in the country (Hoffman, 2006).

The other example that illustrates the key role palyed by CSOs in conflict resolution is found in Israel. Conflict resolution in Israel has traditionally been considered the exclusive competence of the government and the military, which had retained monopoly on these critical issues at least until the 1970s. Israeli elites were considered as the only legitimate actors to deal with peace and war, and the state was organized on the basis of centralist and collectivist tendencies. Activities carried out by CSOs were viewed as against the state's interest and as such discouraged, while political parties were the only recognized channels for public expression and demands. Open civil discontent towards this traditional security thinking erupted in the mid-1970s. During these years, the largest right-wing fundamentalist group then, the Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful), and the largest peace movement, the Peace Now, on opposing ends of the Zionist camp, were all both founded, through CSOs of this period. This gave the CSOs a platform of conducting their operations (Apuui, 2016).

Gouzou (2012), posits that elsewhere in Africa, the number of civil society organizations, particularly those working at the grassroot levels, continue to play important roles in promoting and building peace. In Sudan, civil society groups have spearheaded some of the most significant advances towards peace, in particular at the local level. In Sierra Leone, CSOs have also played an important role in the peace process and the formulation of the country's security sector reform policies. Others are involved in negotiations leading to the transitional government, like the case of the DRC (Gouzou, 2012).

This foregoing discussion supports the argument that CSOs are an opportunity available to EASF's efforts of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. They offer immense support to good governance and promotion of harmonius coexistence among communities. As

the repondents to this study observed, CSOs would contribute greatly to EASF's execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

6.3 Chapter Summary

From the foregoing analysis, this study holds that EASF has faced a number of challenges in its efforts of maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Key among them are the bureaucratic structures of the organization, weak legal structures and funding constraints. Of particular concern too, are the actors involved in these challenges that EASF faces. There are however a number of appreciable opportunities available to EASF in the maintenance of peace and security in the region. They include experiences gained from EASF memeber states particpation in numerous UN/AU missions and the fact that EASF has already achieved full operational capability and the fact that the two countries are covered by a web of civili society organizations which offer reach to all levels of the conflict spectrum; local, sub regional and continental. These could be exploited during future assignments in the maintenace of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. The next chapter provides the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations as well as suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents summary of findings, conclusions, recommendations and suggestions for further research. This chapter summarizes the whole study. It also brings the objectives of the study into perspective.

7.1 Summary of Findings

The overall objective of this study was to assess Eastern Africa Standby Forces execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Specifically, the study examined the structure and nature of Eastern Africa Standby Force, assessed EASF efforts in maintaining peace and security and examined challenges and opportunities facing EASF in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.The study adopted a conceptual framework underpinned by three theories; the Regional Security Complex Theory as, advanced by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, the Power theory as advanced by Baldwin and argued by Morgenthau and the neofunctionalism theory as advances by B Hass. The study used the descriptive research design.

The study targeted six areas in both countries: the two cities of Nairobi and Mogadishu; as well as the towns of Mombasa and Lamu in Kenya; Kismayu and Ras Kamboni in Somalia. The sample size was drawn from various respondents purposively selected from state and non-state actors. Primary data was collected using questionnaires, interview guides, focus group discussions (FGDs) and and secondary data from document analysis. A total of 7 FGDs out of the expected 10 were conducted with 8 particpants each. The researcher managed to distribute 300 questionaires and received 255 responses. The researcher also managed to conduct 29 interviews

out the expected 30. Data was analysed using SPSS version 24 for quantitative data while qualitative data was coded and analyzed thematically and in verbatim and then organized into various themes, as per the objectives.

As regards the first specific objective, the study sought to examine the structure and nature of the Eastern Africa Standby Force in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. As far as the structure of EASF is concerned, the study found out that majority of respondents 45%(115) agreed that EASF has a functional Planning element, 9% (23) of the respondents also strongly agreed while 13% (33) of the respondents were not sure. A further 27% (69) of the respondents disagreed to the inquiry and only a mere 6% (15) of the respondents strongly disagreed to the inquiry. On whether EASF has an operetaional Early Warning Systems (EWS), 51% (130) of the total respondents agreed that early warning systems (EWS) had been established as part of EASF structure, 23% (59) disagreed to this inquiry and 11% (28) strongly agreed that early warning systems had been put in place in EASF. Besides, 8% (20) strongly disagreed that EWSs were part of EASF structure and 7% (18) of the total respondents were not sure.

As far as EASF mediation and negotiation capability is concerned, 45% (115) of the respondents disagreed to the inquiry whether the capability constitutes part of EASF structure. Furthermore, 32% (82) of the respondents agreed that EASF had the capability for mediation and negotiation,a further 10%(26) responded that they were not sure while 7%(18) strongly agreed. On whether a political and geopolitical structure exists in the EASF, 57%(145) strongly agreed that it exists, 23%(59) agreed, 10%(26) disagreed, 5%(13) were not sure and 5%(13) strongly disagreed.

In order to understand whether there are mission support capabilities in EASF, the study found out that 61%(156) of the respondents agreed that EASF had adequate mission support structure,

and 9% (23) strongly agreed, 17%(59) of the respondents disagreed, while 13% (33) of the participants were not sure. None strongly disagreed. The research findings further illustrate that 45 % (115) of the respondents felt that the EASF has a functional LOGBASE, 27%(69) of the respondents averred that EASF has no operational LOGBASE, 9%(23) of the respondents strongly agreed that EASF has a functional LOGBASE and only 6%(15) strongly disagreed. In an interesting fashion, 13%(33) of the respondents were not sure whether EASF has a LOGBASE or not.

As to the actors that shape and define the nature of EASF in execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia, the respondents agreed that regional governments at 73%186) played a significant role. Others are the EASF military component at 53%(135), the EASF civilian capability 61% (156) and the media at 54%(138).

In line with specific objective two, to evaluate Eastern Africa Standby Force's efforts in execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia, the study found out that there were initiatives being pursued by EASF to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. For instance, 47% (120) stated that EASF was increasingly using diplomatic missions to resolve conflict situations between the two countries. Further 80% (204) of the total respondents noted that EASF was making positive efforts to strengthen its funding support while 26%(66) of the respondents strongly asserted that deployment of peace support missions had been carried out by EASF as part of efforts to maintain peace and security, but 32%(82) strongly disagreed. Disturbingly, 39%(99) of the respondents reasoned that enhancing mediation capability had not been employed by EASF in its effort to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia whereas 30%(77) strongly agreed that such initiative was being pursued.

As regards EASF collaborative efforts with other actors to contribute towards EASF efforts in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia, the study found out that the contribution of regional organizations was high with 61%(156) of the total respondents agreeing to this inquiry. Conversely, 73%(186) of the total respondents averred that experienced peacekeepers' contribution was very low. Further, the study found out that 61% (156) of the respondents stated that member states' citizen contribution complimented EASF efforts to maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Additionally, INGOs were found to contributing less to maintaining peace and security. Summarily, the study found out that actors' contribution to maintaining peace and security was average.

In line with specific objective three, to examine challenges and opportunities facing the Eastern Africa Standby Forcee execution of its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia, the study found out that there were bureaucratic as well as organizational challenges affecting EASF's mandate execution. The study found out that, 67% (171) of the respondents stated that engendering bureaucracy in regional organizations highly contributed to its inneffectiveness. Besides, 20% (51) of the respondents stated that engendering bureaucracy was high, while 8%(20) and 5%(13) stated that engendering bureaucracy was very high and not high respectively.

Further, 67% (171) of the respondents argued that political cohesion had a fairly high impact on EASF's effectiveness in maintaining peace and security,while 22%(56) reasoned that the impact of political cohesion on EASF effectiveness was high whereas 11%(28) argued that the impact was not high. There were no responses as to whether the impact was very high. Additionally, 30% (77) of the respondents averred that weak EASF identity impacted very highly on the role of EASF in maintaining peace and security. Besides, 87%(222) of the total respondents argued

that funding constraints was a huge challenge facing EASF's effort of executing its mandate. Further, 76% (194) agreed that weak legal instruments impacted highly on EASF's role of executing its mandate. The study also found that, 67%(171) of the respondents averred that poor operational framework was a huge challenge affecting EASF's mandate implementation. Internecine conflicts was observed by 89%(227) as a challenge, while duplication of regional organization's role was at 67%(171), dearth of leadership and hegemonic competition was at 57% (145)) as well as culture-phobia 61%(156) and belligerent groups 63%(161) were also cited as challenges affecting EASF's mandate implementation.

Notwithstanding the challenges, the study identified a number of opportunities that EASF could exploit to boost its mandate execution; key among them being that EASF has already been declared Full operational capability at 37%(94) by the AU. Others are the ability of EASF to conduct regular integrated peace trainings and exercises 51%(130) that has enhanced its operational homogenity, has established a maritime planning cell in its structure 39%(99), has improved capacities of civilian and police components 67%(171), has vast operational experience from supporting AU & UN peace keeping missions 57%(145) and enjoys vibrant contribution from CSOs 53%(135) in the region.

7.2 Conclusions

In line with specific objective one, the study concludes that a contemporary peace and security debate leaning towards a well-structured EASF is preponderant since EASF as currently structured is limited to comprehensively execute its mandate in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. The many factors contributing to insecurity in the two countries which range from territorial supremacy battles, cross border terror attacks, asymmetrical theatre threats

are beyond the current EASF structures, as they are currently configured for peace operations. A new discourse therefore emerges, whether to incorporate a special unit to deal with insurgency threats within EASF structure.

In line with specific objective two, the study concludes that despite positive efforts by EASF to promote its capacity to maintain peace and Security in Kenya and Somalia, collaborative efforts with other actors have been lukewarm and lacking in synergy; hence need for EASF, like other regional security mechanisms seek to coalesce with other mechanisms under APSA in order to realize its full mandate potential.

In line with specific objective three, the study concludes that EASF faces a number of challenges in its mandate execution centred on its bureaucratic structures and operational capabilities. Compounding the situation are other actors involved in the maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia that have exhibited dearth of goodwill, rendering EASF mandate execution remain but still a mirage. EASF therefore needs to exploit available opportunities to enhance its mandate execution in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

7.3 Overall Conclusion

The overall conclusion of the study is that, EASF has played minimal role in execution of its mandate to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia, despite having a fairly functional structure and employing a number of commendable efforts. This is occasioned by the numerous challenges it encounters to include hegemonic competition, lack of cohesion among its members and weak identity which continues to undermine and stymie its capability. This, therefore, calls for the need to establish a new unit to deal with unique threats to peace and security in Kenya and Somalia; while devising new approaches that exploit available opportunities as well to

promoting synergies among the various players in the EAR towards stabilizing situations in Kenya and Somalia. Further, measures tailored to prevent as well as manage conflict in the region should be pursued.

7.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions, the study makes the following recommendations;

In line with specific objective one, the study recommends that besides EASF being the only mechanism for maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia, a more structured and collaborative specialized unit; comprising all security elements including anti-terror and National Cohesion and Integration Commission specialists be established within EASF to comprehensively address current peace and security dynamics in the region, especially in Kenya and Somalia.

In line with specific objective two, the study recommends that EASF establishes a real-time monitoring and accountability framework that should aid it in fast tracking initiatives put in place for fostering peace and promoting security in Kenya and Somalia. This involves putting in place multi-pronged efforts to dissemble the impeding factors towards peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. This will involve deconstructing the weak frameworks that do not integrate peace and security adequately and enhance synergy among various security actors in the region.

In line with specific objective three, the study recommends that, stringent measures tailored to breaking down bureaucratic barriers, should be adopted within EASF. There is need for organizing workshops that provide facility for para-expertise with those not directly involved in

peace and security matters. Further, challenges faced by EASF pose an existential threat and seeks to upend the little gains so far. Therefore,it is pivotal to building capacities and bridge operational as well as the technical gaps identified in this study.

7.5 Suggestions for Further Research

This study has aroused need for further studies following existing gaps arising from the specific objectives of the study as follows:

For first specific objective, research should be conducted on" **Relationship between APSA and EASF against intra-territorial threats**"

For second specific objective, further research should be conducted on"**Role of EASF in addressing intractable threats that impede efforts of maintaining peace and security in the East African Region"**

For third specific objective, further research should be undertaken on "B**ureaucratic challenges impacting EASF operational effectiveness"**

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1.1: Introduction letter

Dear Respondent,

My name is Mr Robert Kabage, a PhD Student from Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology. I am undertaking a research on **"Eastern Africa Standby Force's Execution Of Its Mandate In Maintaining Peace And Security In Kenya And Somalia".** The study results would be used for academic purposes only and was treated with utmost confidentiality. The Government of Kenya has given me permission to undertake field survey and you are one of the people that I have selected for interview.

Your participation in this research is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, discontinue participation, or skip any questions you do not wish to answer at any time without any penalty or loss. You may not receive any direct benefits from participating in this research. Please note that any questions regarding this research should be directed to me. I kindly request you to sign this Consent Form and participate in this interview.

I certify that I have read and understood the contents of this form and hereby agree to participate in this study

………………………………   …………

Signature   **Date**

APPENDIX 1.2: Questionnaire for various staff in government ministries, Embassies, and non-state actors in Kenya and Somalia

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Name of the organization……………………………………………………………

Country……………………………………………………………………………

Occupation…………………………………………………………………………

Appellation/Designation……………………………………………………………

1. **Position in the organization**

a.) Management Staff

b.) Technical Staff

c.) Operational Staff

d.) Support Staff

e.) Other (s); Please Specify………………………………………………………

2. **Gender**

a.) Male

b.) Female

3. **Type of organization/Institution**

a.) Public

b.) Private

4. **Highest Level of Education**

   a) Primary
   b) Secondary
   c) University
   d) Tertiary /college

e) None

5. Age (Please tick appropriately below)

a) 18-24 years

b) 25-34 years

c) 35-44 years

d) 45-54 years

e) 55 years and above

SECTION B: THE STRUCTURE AND NATURE OF EASF IN THE MISSION OF MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KENYA AND SOMALIA

i) The structure and nature of Eastern Africa Standby Force in the maintenance of peace and security in the East African Region

Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements as specified below:

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Disagree
3. Not Sure
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

	Structure and nature of EASF in maintenance of peace and security in the Eastern region	1	2	3	4	5
a.	Member states of the EASF region are strongly bound together by their geographic proximity and are committed to maintenance of peace and security					
b.	EASF governments have pledged adequate structures and capacities (military, police and civilian) to be able to effectively maintain peace and security in the region and specifically in Kenya and Somalia					

c.	EASF has adequate mission support capacities to effectively sustain peace support operations in Kenya and Somalia					
d.	EASF region is characterized by endless politics and geo-political interests that inhibit its ability to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia					
e	EASF members states are strongly bound together by common regional interests and are committed to ensuring peace and security among themselves, including Kenya and Somalia					
f	EASF has a mediation capability which it has deploys to conflict situations especially in Kenya and Somalia in a timely manner					
g.	Decision making and mandating structures of the EASF are adequately structured and respond timely to security threats in the region and specifically in Kenya and Somalia					
h.	EASF early warning systems have requisite capacity and they provide timely conflict indicators and offer preventive options in the region and specifically in Kenya and Somalia					
j.	EASF planning element is equipped with adequate planning capabilities to ably plan, launch and manage peace support operations in the EAR and specifically in Kenya and Somalia					

ii.) What is your understanding of the adequacy of structures and nature of EASF in maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia? **Tick accordingly.**

a) Unknown
b) Predictive
c) Elusive
d) State-based
e) Non-state based

iii.). Various actors play either significant or insignificant role in the maintenance of peace and security in EAR. Please indicate who the key actors are in maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

s/n	Actors	Significant Roles	Insignificant Roles
1	Regional governments		
2	Non-Governmental organizations		
3	EASF		
4	Media		
5	Civilian Capability Enforcement Agencies		
6	Military component		
7	Belligerent Groups		

iv.) Historically, the relations among the EASF member states has been fraught with endless hegemonic competition, suspicion and mistrust. Indicate factors that have contributed to this kind of relations. (**Tick any option**)

   a) Negative publicity
   b) Warlords
   c) Western proliferation to key regional resources
   d) Politicized humanitarian aid (by UN and AU)
   e) Geo-political interests of some member states

v.) EASF is a resource or a source of contest in the maintenance of peace and security in the EAR especially in Kenya and Somalia?

      YES   NO

If yes, kindly explain.

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vi.) Governance structures in EASF region exhibit various leadership styles. In your own opinion, do you think that EASF performance in Kenya and Somalia is affected by the different governance styles in the region? **If yes, please explain how.**

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SECTION C: EASF'S EFFORTS IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KENYA AND SOMALIA

xiii.) What initiatives are employed by EASF in the maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia? **Tick appropriately**

a) Mediation emissaries
b) Peace support interventions
c) Advocacy and public awareness
d) Diplomatic missions
e) Financial instruments
f) None
g) Others (specify)…………….

xiv.) What governmental and intergovernmental structures have been put in place to address challenges emanating from EASF's inability to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

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xv.) Mention two occasions when EASF ever intervened in situations threatening peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.
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xvi.) In your opinion, what strategies should be put in place to improve the effectiveness of EASF in the maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

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xvii.) In your opinion, what additional measures should be put in place to enhance the commitment of EASF members states to effectively contribute to regional peace and security efforts in the EAR and especially in Kenya and Somalia

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xviii). In your opinion, is EASF effective in its role of maintaining peace and security in the EAR and especially in Kenya and Somalia?. Explain your answer

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xix).Name two additional efforts/interventions that you would recommend to EASF to enhance its maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

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SECTION D: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FACING EASF IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KENYA AND SOMALIA

xx.) Rate the actors' contribution to challenges facing EASF in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

s/n	Actors	No contribution	Less contribution	High Contribution	Very high contribution
1	The government institutions				
2	Professional Peace Keepers				
3	Civil Society				
4	Citizens				
5	INGOs				
7	Others (specify)				

xxi.) How will you rate EASF internal organizational dynamics and structures as a challenge in effective maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

	Structural Dynamics	Administrative Dynamics	Management Dynamics
Excellent			
Very good			
Good			
Fair			
Poor			

xxii.) In your opinion, what would you say are two key political related factors that impedes EASF efforts in the maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

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xxiii.) Internal politicization of institutional autonomy in EASF has affected maintenance of peace and security among member states and especially in Kenya and Somalia. Do you think this is so? Elaborate your answer.

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xxiv.) Structural capacities contribute to EASF ability to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia. Name two key capabilities that impedes its performance

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xxv.) Rate impact of bureaucratic organizational dynamics that impact on EASF ability to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia.

	Bureaucratic organizational influence on maintenance of peace and security	1	2	3	4	5
a	There is an enhanced sense of EASF identity developing among regional organizations					
b	Fast-tracking political integration in EASF is fostered by a consensus among the leaders of member states					
c.	There remains a significant political cohesion in promoting EASF and maintenance of peace and security					
d	EASF members are engendering bureaucracy in regional organizations					

xxvi.) In your opinion, do you think that member states of EASF interfere with institutional autonomy and functionality of EASF? If yes, explain

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Thank You.

APPENDIX 1.3: FGD for various staffs in embassies, government offices (Kenya and Somalia) and EASF PLANELM

This FGD schedule is designed for you, as a key stakeholder of the EASF regional security mechanism, to seek your opinion on the ***Eastern Africa Standby Force Effectiveness in maintaining peace and security in Kenya and Somalia***. The information you will provide will be treated with utmost confidence and only for the purpose of this study. This forms part of the researcher's doctoral studies in Peace and Conflict Studies and should help foster improve the capacity of EASF in addressing challenges faced in the maintenance of peace and security in the region and specifically in Kenya and Somali. Your honest response will be highly appreciated. Kindly feel free to navigate through the questions without restrictions or being compelled.

SECTION A: THE STRUCTURE AND NATURE OF EASF IN EXECUTION OF ITS MANDATE IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KENYA AND SOMALIA

1. What are your experiences with EASF, locally, nationally and regionally?

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2. Historically, has EASF played significant roles in maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

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3. Whom do you think shoulders greater responsibility in the maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia? Is it the Inter-non-governmental organizations or inter-governmental organizations or individual member states or EASF?

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4. Is EASF adequately structured in to address peace and security challenges in Kenya and Somalia?

a. If yes, what do you think makes it effective?

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b. If not, what do you think needs to be done?

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SECTION B: EASF'S EFFORTS IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KENYA AND SOMALIA

5. Do you believe that regional organizations (AU and EASF) have put enough effort in putting structures and mechanisms in place to maintain peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

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6. Who are majorly involved in maintaining peace and security in EASF region?

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7. Do you think the future of EASF in maintenance of peace and security is in the hands of the international organizations such as UN,AU or its member states ?

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8. Are EASF leaders doing enough to enhance maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

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SECTION C: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FACING EASF IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KENYA AND SOMALIA

9. In your opinion, what challenges impede the performance of EASF in the maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

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10. Do you think politicization of EASF in the maintenance of peace and security is good? If yes, explain

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Thank You

APPENDIX 1.4: Interview schedule to key informants

The interview schedule cuts across senior government officials, diplomats from Kenya and Somalia Embassy in Kenya, senior military officers in ministry of defence in Kenya, and EASF senior staff officers in Kenya. It also solicits information from among non-state actors from the non-governmental organizations and media houses operating in Somalia and with their offices based in Nairobi. The questions herein are structured as per the objectives of the study. Kindly respond to them to the best of your knowledge and judgement.

1. What is the structure and nature of EASF and to what extent does its mandate stretch in maintaining peace and security in the region?

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2. What have been failures and successes of EASF in maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

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3. How has EASF internal dynamics and structures impacted on maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

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4. What efforts and mechanisms have been employed by EASF in maintaining peace and security in the EAR and especially in Kenya and Somalia?

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5. How have the member states' hegemonic rivalry impacted on EASF's performance in the maintenance of peace and security in the region the region and especially in Kenya and Somalia?

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6. Mention two factors that can assist EASF to sustainably undertake its role of maintenance of peace and security in Kenya and Somalia?

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7. To what extent has EASF intervened or failed to intervene in Kenya and Somalia in conflicts?

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8. What challenges do you think affect the operational effectiveness of the EASF in its mandate of maintaining peace and security in the region and specifically in Kenya and Somalia?

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Thank You.

APPENDIX 1.5: Dodoso la wafanyikazi anuwai katika wizara za serikali, Balozi, na watendaji wasio wa serikali nchini Kenya na Somalia

SEHEMU YA A: HABARI ZA KUPUNGUZA

Jina la shirika …………………………………………………………

Nchi …………………………………………………………………………

Kazi ……………………………………………………………………

Uombaji / Ubunifu ………………………………………………………………

1. **Nafasi katika shirika**

Wafanyikazi wa Usimamizi

b.) Wafanyikazi wa Ufundi

c.) Wafanyikazi wa Utendaji

d.) Wafanyikazi wa Msaada

e.) Nyingine (s); Tafadhali fafanua………………………………………………………

2. **Jinsia**

a.) Mwanaume

b.) Kike

3. **Aina ya shirika / Taasisi**

a.) Umma

b.) ya kibinafsi

4. **Kiwango cha juu cha elimu**

    a) Msingi
    b) Sekondari
    c) Chuo Kikuu
    d) Sekondari / chuo kikuu
    e) Hakuna

5. **Umri** (Tafadhali jibu ipasavyo hapa chini)

    a) miaka 18-25

    b) miaka 25-34

c) miaka 35-44

d) Miaka 45-54

e) Miaka 55 na zaidi

SECTION B: MUUNDO NA ASILI YA EASF KATIKA MALENGO YAKE YA KUDUMISHA AMANI NA UTENGAMANO KATIKA KENYA NA SOMALIA

i) Muundo na asili ya Kikosi cha Kudumu cha Afrika Mashariki katika utunzaji wa amani na usalama katika Mkoa wa Afrika Mashariki

Tafadhali eleza kiwango ambacho unakubaliana na taarifa zifuatazo kama ilivyoainishwa hapa chini:

1. Kutokubali sana
2. Kutokubali
3. Sio Uhakika
4. Kubali
5. Nguvu kali

	Muundo na asili ya EASF katika utunzaji wa amani na usalama katika mkoa wa Mashariki	1	2	3	4	5
a.	M ember majimbo wa mkoa EASF ni nguvu amefungwa pamoja na ukaribu yao ya kijiografia na ni nia ya kudumisha amani na usalama					
b.	Serikali EASF waliahidi kutosha miundo na uwezo (wa kijeshi, polisi na raia) na kuwa na uwezo wa ufanisi kudumisha amani na usalama katika eneo hilo na hasa Kenya na Somalia					
c.	EASF ina uwezo wa kutosha wa kusaidia dhamira ya kudumisha kikamilifu shughuli za usaidizi wa amani nchini Kenya na Somalia					
d.	Kanda ya EASF inajulikana na siasa zisizo na mwisho na maswala ya kisiasa ambayo yanazuia uwezo wake wa kudumisha amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia					

e	Nchi za wanachama wa EASF zimeunganishwa kwa pamoja na masilahi ya kawaida ya kikanda na wamejitolea kuhakikisha amani na usalama kati yao, pamoja na Kenya na Somalia					
f	EASF ina uwezo wa upatanishi ambayo inapeana katika hali za migogoro hususan Kenya na Somalia kwa wakati unaofaa					
g.	Uamuzi wa maamuzi na muundo wa maagizo ya EASF umeandaliwa vya kutosha na hujibu kwa wakati vitisho vya usalama katika mkoa na haswa nchini Kenya na Somali.					
h.	Mifumo ya tahadhari ya mapema ya EASF ina uwezo muhimu na hutoa viashiria vya mzozo kwa wakati unaofaa na hutoa chaguzi za kuzuia katika mkoa na haswa nchini Kenya na Somalia					
j.	Sehemu ya upangaji wa EASF imejaa uwezo wa kutosha wa kupanga kupanga, kuzindua na kusimamia shughuli za usaidizi wa amani kwenye EAR na haswa nchini Kenya na Somalia					

ii.) Je! ni ufahamu wako gani juu ya utoshelevu wa muundo na maumbile ya EASF katika utunzaji wa amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia? **Jibu ipasavyo.**

  a) Haijulikani
  b) Utabiri
  c) Haifahamiki
  d) Ya msingi
  e) Isiyo ya serikali

iii.) . Watendaji mbali mbali huchukua jukumu muhimu au muhimu kwa utunzaji wa amani na usalama katika EAR. Tafadhali eleza ni nani wahusika wakuu katika matengenezo ya amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia .

s / n	Watendaji	Majukumu muhimu	Jukumu La Muhimu
1	Serikali za Mkoa		
2	Asasi zisizo za Serikali		
3	EASF		
4	Vyombo vya habari		
5	Raia Uwezo Utekelezaji Mashirika		
6	Sehemu ya kijeshi		
7	Vikundi vya Belligerent		

iv.) historia, mahusiano kati ya nchi wanachama EASF imekuwa fraught na kutokuwa na mwisho hegemonic ushindani , wasiwasi na kutoaminiana. Taja sababu ambazo zimechangia uhusiano wa aina hii. (**Jibu chaguo lolote**)

    a) Matangazo hasi
    b) Wakubwa
    c) Kuenea kwa Magharibi kwa rasilimali muhimu za mkoa
    d) Siasa ya misaada ya kibinadamu (ya UN na AU)
    e) Maswala ya kijeshi ya kisiasa ya nchi wanachama

v.) EASF ni rasilimali au chanzo cha mashindano katika kudumisha amani na usalama katika EAR hasa katika Kenya na Somalia ?

<center>NDIYO AMA HAPANA</center>

Ikiwa ndio, eleza kwa fadhili.

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vi.) Muundo wa serikali katika mkoa wa EASF unaonyesha mitindo mbali mbali ya uongozi. Kwa maoni yako mwenyewe, unafikiri kwamba utendaji wa EASF nchini Kenya na Somalia unaathiriwa na mitindo tofauti ya utawala katika mkoa huo ? **Ikiwa ndio, tafadhali fafanua jinsi.**

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SEHEMU YA C: JITIHADA ZINAZOFANYWA NA EASF KATIKA KUDUMISHA USALAMA KATIKA KENYA NA SOMALIA

xiii.) Ni mipango gani ambeye unahusichwa na EASF katika kudumisha amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia ? **Jibu ipasavyo**

    a) wajumbe wa upatanishi
    b) Uingiliaji wa msaada wa amani
    c) Utetezi na mwamko wa umma
    d) Misheni ya kidiplomasia
    e) Vyombo vya kifedha
    f) Hakuna
    g) Wengine (taja) …………….

xiv.) Je! ni mashirika gani ya kiserikali na ya kiserikali yaliyowekwa kushughulikia changamoto zinazotokana na kutokuwa na uwezo wa EASF kudumisha amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia ?

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xv.) Taja mara mbili wakati EASF iliwahi kuingilia katika hali zinazotishia amani na usalama nchini Kenya na
Somalia. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
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xvi.) Kwa maoni yako, ni mikakati gani inapaswa kuwekwa ili kupunguza matumizi ya EASF katika utunzaji wa amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia?

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xvii.) Kwa maoni yako, ni hatua gani za ziada zinazopaswa kufanywa ili kuongeza ahadi za nchi wanachama wa EASF kuchangia kwa dhati juhudi za amani za kieneo na usalama katika EAR na haswa Kenya na Somalia

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xviii). Kwa maoni yako, EASF inafanikiwa katika jukumu lake la kudumisha amani na usalama katika EAR na haswa Kenya na Somalia ?. Fafanua jibu lako

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xix) .Sema juhudi mbili mbili za ziada / uingiliaji ambao ungependekeza kwa EASF kuongeza utunzaji wake wa amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia.

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SEHEMU YA D: CHANGAMOTO ZINAZOIKABILI EASF KATIKA KUDUMISHA USALAMA KATIKA KENYA NA SOMALIA

xx .) Kadiria mchango wa wahusika katika changamoto zinazowakabili EASF katika kudumisha amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia?

s / n	Watendaji	Hakuna mchango	Mchango mdogo	Mchango wa juu	Mchango mkubwa sana
1	Taasisi za serikali				
2	Watunza amani wa kitaalam				
3	Asasi za kiraia				
4	Raia				
5	INO				
7	Wengine (taja)				

xxi .) Je! utawezaje kupima mienendo na muundo wa ndani wa EASF kama changamoto katika utunzaji mzuri wa amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia?

	Nguvu za Kimuundo	Nguvu za Utawala	Nguvu za Usimamizi
Bora			
Vizuri sana			
Mzuri			
Haki			
Maskini			

xxii .) Kwa maoni yako, ungependa kusema ni mambo gani mawili yanayohusiana na kisiasa ambayo yanazuia juhudi za EASF katika utunzaji wa amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia?

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x xiii .) Mambo ya ndani ya kisiasa ya uhuru wa kitaasisi katika EASF imeathiri matengenezo ya amani na usalama kati ya nchi wanachama na haswa Kenya na Somalia. Je! Unafikiri hii ni hivyo? E laborate jibu lako.

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xxiv.) Uwezo wa miundo unachangia uwezo wa EASF kudumisha amani na usalama nchini
Kenya na Somalia. Taja uwezo mbili muhimu ambao unazuia utendaji wake

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xxv.) Kiwango cha madhara ya ukiritimba wa shirika mienendo ambayo zina athari kwa
EASF uwezo wa kudumisha amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia.

	Ushawishi wa shirika ukiritimba juu ya utunzaji wa amani na usalama	1	2	3	4	5
a	Kuna hisia iliyoimarishwa ya utambulisho wa EASF kati ya mashirika ya kikanda					
b	Kufuatilia kwa haraka harakati za kisiasa katika EASF kunatekelezwa na makubaliano kati ya viongozi wa nchi wanachama					
c.	Bado kuna umoja muhimu wa kisiasa katika kukuza EASF na utunzaji wa amani na usalama					
d	Wajumbe wa EASF wanasababisha urasimu katika mashirika ya kikanda					

xxvi.) Kwa maoni yako , unafikiri kwamba nchi wanachama wa EASF wanaingilia uhuru wa
kitaasisi na utendaji wa EASF? Ikiwa ndio, eleza

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Asante.

APPENDIX 1.6: Mazungumzo ya kundi elekezwa kwa balozi, ofisi za serikali (Kenya na Somali) na mpango wa EASF

Ratiba hii ya FGD imeundwa kwa y , kama mbia muhimu wa utaratibu wa usalama wa mkoa wa EASF , kutafuta maoni yako juu ya *ufanisi wa* Kikosi cha Kudhibiti cha *Afrika Mashariki katika kudumisha amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia* . Habari utakayotoa itatibiwa kwa ujasiri mkubwa na kwa sababu ya utafiti huu. Hii ni sehemu ya masomo ya watafiti wa watafiti katika Masomo ya Amani na Migogoro na inapaswa kusaidia kukuza uwezo wa EASF katika kushughulikia changamoto zinazowakabili katika utunzaji wa amani na usalama katika mkoa huo na haswa nchini Kenya na Kisomali. Jibu lako la uaminifu litathaminiwa sana. Fadhili jisikie huru kupitia maswali bila vizuizi au kulazimishwa.

SEHEMU YA A: MUUNDO NA ASILI YA EASF KATIKA MALENGO YAKE YA KUDUMISHA AMANI NA UTENGAMANO KATIKA KENYA NA SOMALIA

1. Je! Ni nini uzoefu wako na EASF, lly loca , kitaifa na kikanda?

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2. Kwa kihistoria, EASF imekuwa na jukumu muhimu katika utunzaji wa amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia?

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3. Je! Unadhani ni jukumu la nani katika utunzaji wa amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia? Je, ni mashirika Inter-yasiyo ya kiserikali au mashirika baina ya serikali ama mtu binafsi nchi wanachama au EASF?

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4. Je, EASF imeandaliwa vya kutosha kushughulikia changamoto za amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia?

a. Ikiwa ndio, unafikiria nini hufanya iwe nzuri?

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b. Ikiwa sio hivyo, unafikiri kinahitaji kufanywa?

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SECTION C: JITIHADA ZIZOFANYWA NA EASF'S KATIKA KUDUMISHA AMANI KATIKA KENYA NA SAOMALIA

5. Je! Unaamini kuwa mashirika ya kikanda (AU na EASF) yameweka jitihada za kutosha katika kuweka miundo na utaratibu wa kudumisha amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia?

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6. Ni nani majorly kushiriki katika kudumisha ing amani na usalama katika eneo EASF?

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7. Je! Unafikiri hatma ya EASF katika utunzaji wa amani na usalama iko mikononi mwa mashirika ya kimataifa kama vile UN , AU au nchi wanachama wake?

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8. Je! Viongozi wa EASF wanafanya vya kutosha kuboresha matengenezo ya amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia?

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SEHEMU YA C: CHANGAMOTO ZINAZOIKABILI EASF KATIKA KUDUMISHA USALAMA KATIKA KENYA NA SOMALIA

9. Kwa maoni yako, ni changamoto gani zinazozuia utendaji wa EASF katika utunzaji wa amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somali ?

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10. Je! Unafikiri siasa ya EASF katika utunzaji wa amani na usalama ni nzuri? Ikiwa

ndio,eleza……………………………………………………………………………………

Ahsante

APPENDIX 1.7: Ratiba ya mahojiano kwa habari muhimu

Ratiba ya mahojiano inapunguza maafisa wakuu wa serikali, wanadiplomasia kutoka Ubalozi wa Kenya na Somalia nchini Kenya, maafisa wakuu wa jeshi katika wizara ya ulinzi nchini Kenya, na maafisa waandamizi wa EASF nchini Kenya. Pia inaomba habari kutoka kwa watendaji wasio wa serikali kutoka mashirika yasiyokuwa ya kiserikali na nyumba za vyombo vya habari zinazofanya kazi nchini Somali na ofisi zao jijini Nairobi. Maswali hapa yameandaliwa kulingana na malengo ya utafiti. Wajibu kwa wema kwa ufahamu wako na uamuzi.

1. Je! Muundo na maumbile ya EASF ni nini na ni kwa kiwango gani dhamana yake inenea katika kudumisha amani na usalama katika mkoa?

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2. Je! Ni shida gani na mafanikio ya EASF katika utunzaji wa amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia?

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3. Je! Mienendo na muundo wa ndani wa EASF umeathiri vipi utunzaji wa amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somalia?

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4. Je! Ni juhudi na mifumo gani iliyotumiwa na EASF katika kudumisha amani na usalama katika EAR na haswa Kenya na Somalia ?

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5. Ni jinsi gani nchi wanachama 'hegemonic kuelekezana wanashikiliwa katika utendaji EASF katika kudumisha amani na usalama katika eneo kanda na hasa nchini Kenya na Somalia?

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6. Taja sababu mbili ambazo zinaweza kusaidia EASF kutekeleza jukumu lake la kudumisha amani na usalama nchini Kenya na Somali?

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7. Je, EASF imeingilia kati au imeshindwa kuingilia kati Kenya na Somalia katika machafuko?

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8. Je! Unafikiria ni changamoto zipi zinaathiri ufanisi wa kiutendaji wa EASF katika jukumu lake la kudumisha amani na usalama katika mkoa na haswa Kenya na Somalia?

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Ahsante.

APPENDIX 1.8: Research Approval Letter by DPS

MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MMUST)

Tel: 056-30870
Fax: 056-30153
E-mail: directordps@mmust.ac.ke
Website: www.mmust.ac.ke

P.O Box 190
Kakamega – 50100
Kenya

Directorate of Postgraduate Studies

Ref: MMU/COR: 509099

15th October, 2019

Robert Gichangi Kabage,
CPC/H/14-55613/2017,
P.O. Box 190-50100,
KAKAMEGA.

Dear Mr. Kabage,

RE: APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL

I am pleased to inform you that the Directorate of Postgraduate Studies has considered and approved your Ph.D proposal entitled *"Eastern Africa Standby Force's Effectiveness in Maintaining Peace and Security in Kenya and Somalia"* and appointed the following as supervisors:

1. Prof. Kennedy Onkware   – SDMHA, MMUST
2. Prof. Crispinous Iteyo   – SDMHA, MMUST

You are required to submit through your supervisor(s) progress reports every three months to the Director of Postgraduate Studies. Such reports should be copied to the following: Chairman, School of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Graduate Studies Committee; Chairman, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies & Departmental Graduate Studies Committee. Kindly adhere to research ethics consideration in conducting research.

It is the policy and regulations of the University that you observe a deadline of three years from the date of registration to complete your Ph.D thesis. Do not hesitate to consult this office in case of any problem encountered in the course of your work.

We wish you the best in your research and hope the study will make original contribution to knowledge.

Yours Sincerely,

Prof. John Obiri
DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

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APPENDIX 1.9: Research Licence

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

NACOSTI

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: **184556**

Date of Issue: **04/October/2019**

RESEARCH LICENSE

This is to Certify that Mr.. ROBERT KABAGE of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, has been licensed to conduct research in Nairobi on the topic: EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE'S EFFECTIVENESS IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KENYA AND SOMALIA. for the period ending : 04/October/2020.

License No: **NACOSTI/P/19/1937**

184556

Applicant Identification Number

Director General
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION

Verification QR Code

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COUNTY COMMISSIONER
NAIROBI COUNTY
P. O. Box 30124-00100, NBI
TEL: 341666

7/11/2019

APPENDIX 1.10: Authority to Conduct Research within AMISOM Area

AFRICAN UNION		UNION AFRICAINE
الاتحاد الأفريقي		UNIÃO AFRICANA

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER
SUPPORT AND LOGISTICS
African Union Mission in Somalia
Mogadishu, Somalia

18th November 2019

WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

SUBJECT: AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH WITHIN AMISOM AREA

Mr. Robert Gichangi Kabage is a staff of the Peace and Security Operations Division (PSOD) at the African Union. He is currently undertaking a PhD Degree with Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST) in Kenya.

In partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree, he is authorized to conduct a research within AMISOM in Mogadishu, Somalia, on a topic titled "EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE'S EFFECTIVENESS IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KENYA AND SOMALIA".

He understands that any data and documentation he accesses in the course of his research will be treated with utmost confidentiality and that it shall be used for academic purposes only.

Any assistance accorded to him will be highly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

George Owinow
Maj Gen
DFC SP & LOGs

APPENDIX 1.11:   Plates

Plate 1: Researcher with Key informant at EASF PLANELM Secretariat Nairobi, 10th.October 2019. Source: Field Data,2019

Plate 2: Researcher with Key informant at EASF PLANELM Secretariat Nairobi, on 22 November 2019. Source: Field Data, 2019.

Plate 3: Researcher (far right) in an Interview with Kenya Immigration government official in Mombasa on 23/11/2019. Source: Field Data, 2019.

Plate 4. Researcher with respondent from Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs and colleague in Nairobi on 24 November 2019. Source: Field Data, 2019.

Plate 5: **Researcher with FGD participants at EASF PLANELM Secretariat Nairobi, 20th November 2019.Source: Field Data, 2019.**

Plate 6: Researcher (in the middle) and assistant researcher (far right) at MOGADISHU, on 20th December 2019. Source: Field Data, 2019.

Plate 7: Researcher (far left) Interview with Kenya military officer (Right) in Lamu on 30/11/2019. Source: Field Data, 2019.

Plate 8: Researcher (in the middle), with assistant researcher in an interview with Head of Peace Operations Department at EASF Force Headquarters in Nairobi, 20 /11/2019. Source: Field Data, 2019.

Plate 9: **Researcher at Mogadishu Military camp, on 20th. December 2019. Source: Field Data, 2019.**

Plate 10: Researcher at AMISOM military Camp, in Mogadisshu on 20 Decemebr 2019

Source: Field Data, 2019.

Plate 11: Researcher with FGD participants at Ras Kamboni Amisom Military CAMP, on 30th November 2019.Source: Field Data, 2019.

Plate 12: Researcher (bottom right) with FGD Participants in Nairobi, 24 /11/2019

 Source: Field Data, 2019.

Plate 13: Researcher (second-far right) with respondents, in Kismayo Military Camp on 23/12/2019. Source: Field Data, 2019.

Plate 14: Reseacher with FGD particpants at AMISOM Camp, Mogadishu on 20/12/2019

Source: Field Data, 2019

Plate 15: Researcher and assistant researcher (left) with FGD participants (right) at EASF PLANELM, Nairobi on 20th November 2019.Source: Field Data, 2019.

APPENDIX 1.12: To Whom It May Concern-Authority to conduct interview in EASF PLANELM HQs

EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE (EASF) SECRETARIAT

WestWood Park Road
P.O Box 1444 – 00502
KAREN, NAIROBI
KENYA

Phone: +254-20 3884 720
        +254 20 3884 688
Fax: +254-20 3884 696
E-mail: easbricom@easbrig.org

REF:GEN/01/01

DATE: 25 November 2019

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Mr. Robert Gichangi Kabage is a staff of the Peace and Security Operations Division (PSOD) at the African Union. He is currently undertaking a PhD Degree with Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST) in Kenya.

In partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree, he is authorized to conduct a research within East Africa Standby Force Headquarters in Karen, Kenya on a topic titled **"Eastern Africa Standby Force's Effectiveness in Maintaining Peace and Security in Kenya and Somalia".**

He understands that any data and documentation he accesses in the course of his research will be treated with utmost confidentiality and that it shall be used for academic purposes only.

Any assistance accorded to him will be highly appreciated.

DR ABDILLAHI OMAR BOUH
DIRECTOR