EFFECTIVENESS OFPUBLIC SECONDARY SCHOOLS PREPAREDNESS IN COUNTERING RADICALISATION TOWARD VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KAJIADO COUNTY, KENYA

Hesbon Nyagaka Mosiori

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Master of Science in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistant degree of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

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DECLARATION

Declaration by the Candidate

Thisthesisismy originalworkpreparedwithnootherthantheindicatedsourcesandsupport andhasnotbeenpresentedelsewhere for adegree oranyotheraward.

Signature: ………………………………………. Date: ……………………

Hesbon Nyagaka Mosiori
CDM/G/19/06

CERTIFICATION

Theundersigned certifythattheyhavereadandhereby recommendforacceptanceofMasinde MuliroUniversityofScienceandTechnology thesisentitled: ''**Effectivenessof Public Secondary Schools preparedness in countering radicalisation toward violent extremism in KajiadoKenya**''.

Signature: ……………………………………… Date: …………………
Dr Nicholas Ombachi (Ph.D)
Departmentof Emergency Management Studies MasindeMuliroUniversityofScienceand Technology, Kenya

Signature: …………………………………. Date: …………………….
Dr Judah Ndiku (Ph.D)
Department of Educational Planning and Management
MasindeMuliroUniversityofScienceand Technology, Kenya

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my family – wife Beatrice Chelangat and sonLee Lucky Onsoti for their support and encouragement.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

ABSTRACT

The world is faced with an increasing threat of violent extremismthat is preceded by radicalisation processes. Kenya faces this threat from Al-Shabaab who recruit Kenyan youths to join their ranks and executive terror acts internally. Secondary and university students have become their target in Kenya, which formed the foundation of this study. The study aimed to investigate the effectiveness of public secondary school preparedness in countering radicalisation towards violent extremism in Kajiado, Kenya. Kajiado County neighbours Nairobi County, thus sleeper cells potentially reside in it. Specifically, the study determined the level of knowledge on factors inducing students to violent radicalisation, examinedthestrategiesimplementedto addresstheemergingthreatofrecruitmentandradicalisation and examined the challenges faced by the schools' management in their efforts to counter violent extremism radicalisation. Kajiado County has 158 public secondary schools from which the target population was chosen.Thus, the targetpopulation includedall public secondary school principals (158), teachers (2078) students (22,351), Sub-County Education Officers (5) and Chiefs (61). Simple random sampling and purposive sampling were used in the study. The sampled size was 16 principals, 207 teachers,112 students,6 Chiefs and 1 Subcounty Director of Education. Data was collected by the use of questionnaires,interview schedules and FGD guides. The study usedSPSS version 25.0for the analysis of the data and the results were presented in tables andfigures. The results showed that teachers 36.1% confirmed the existence of radicalisation amongst students. Poverty 60% and unemployment 57.1% were the main contributors to students' radicalisation. Moreover, student susceptibility to radicalisation was amplified by frustrated ambitions hence radicalisation toward violent extremism. A continuous scenario of student dropoutwas significantly attributed to radicalisation toward violent extremism (χ^2 (1) = 14.23, $p<$ **.001**).A multi-sectoral approach to countering radicalisation is an acceptable strategy endorsed by the schools to eliminate radicalisation toward violent extremism. Inadequate parental support for most students were also contributorstostudent radicalisation toward violent extremism. In conclusion,radicalisation was happening in public secondary schools in Kajiado County; students were justifying the use of violence as a means to solve their issues;causes of radicalisation among the students were poverty, marginalisation, unemployment, divisive religious ideologies and ever-increasing corruption; the strategies for countering radicalisation in schools were not operational hence school management was not able to effectively counter radicalisation among their students.Recommendation: teachers should be trained to promote counter violent extremism in schools. The strategies developed by the Ministry of Education on Countering Violent Extremism should be fully operationalised in schools in Kenya.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACSS: Africa Centre for Strategic Studies

ASPI: Australian Strategic Policy Institute

EC: European Commission

EU: European Union

FGD: Focus Group Discussion

FTO: Foreign TerroristOrganizations

HIS: Homeland Security Institute

ITERATE: International Terrorism Attributes of Terrorist Events

MoE: Ministry of Education

NCCT: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism

NCTC: National Counter-Terrorism Centre

OSDFS: OfficeofSafeandDrug-FreeSchools

RAN: Radicalisation Awareness Network

UK: United Kingdom

VEOs: Violent extremist organizations

SCDE: Sub-County Director of Education

OPERATIONALISATION OF KEY TERMS

Effectiveness – refers to the extent of success in the identification and management of radicalisationof students toward violent extremism in public secondary schools.

International terrorist groups –refers to the listed foreign terrorist organisation by the Kenyan government that have carried direct attacks in Kenya such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab.

Radical – refers to an individual who advocates and perpetuates thorough social, economic or political reforms by use of terror activities.

Radicalisation–refers to the process of indoctrinating school-going children to adopt radical ideologies on social and or political issues that eventually lead toward violent extremism.

Recruit – refers to an individual that is newly enlisted to join the ranks of radical groups or militants.

Recruitment- refers to the processof enlisting school-going children to join the ranks of radical groups or militants.

School going children: referredindividuals attending public secondary schools

School-aged youth:includes students ranging from kindergarten through college, which generally include young people between the ages of five and twenty-two.

Students: this category referred to individuals attending secondary and higher education such as college and university.

Terrorism:refers to the unlawful use of force against Kenyans and propertyas a way to intimidate the Kenyan government by terrorists – Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab to serve their political objectives.

Terrorist radicalisation:refers to the process where school-going children indoctrinated into adopting radical ideologies to address political and social issues by use of extreme violence.

Violent Extremism: Refer to persons who knowingly advocate, engage, prepare or otherwise help for ideological or justifiable violence and perpetrate extreme violence for further social, economic or political purposes.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Globally, radicalisation by extremist groups is characterised by extreme violence (Borum, 2011). This is focused on a variety of philosophies, including nationalism, separatism, anarchism, and radical left- or right-wing political theories (Cruikshank, 2017). Extreme violence is a challenge to the world, and it is accompanied by radicalisation processes (Koomen& Van Der Pligt, 2015).Appreciating reasons for radicalising and recruiting an individual into a terrorist organisation, forms the basis of addressing the problem (Krueger, 2007). The driving factors for individuals out of school and those in school are somewhat similar bearing in mind that the environment is different (USAID, 2009). The history of radicalisation into violence is quite long and a complex psychosocial process (Borum, 2011).According to Heath-Kelly (2017),the radicalised youths toward violent extremismcarried out attacks in the United Kingdom; one of the four bombers being a model student.

There is a need to understand how people get persuaded to become members of terrorist organisations. Bergin *et al.* (2015) report on the Middle East and Australia's education system calls for the inclusion of counter-radicalisation messages in the school curriculum. It is important to know what causes an individual to embrace terrorism. Recruitment of individuals is performed in more mundane places such as cafes, schools and gym clubs or a more closed environment such as prisons (Basra & Neumann, 2016).To date, most of the empirical work on radicalisation relied on case studies (Lösel, King, Bender & Jugl, 2018). The study capitalised on these gaps in

contextual realities to evaluate the underlying causes of radicalisation of youths in learning institutions to extreme violence.

In Africa, radicalisation into violent extremism has had little in the context of the realities of youths in learning institutions (Ismail, 2013).Al-Shabaab a terrorist faction based in Somalia has terrorised Kenya with its leadership targeting recruits from Kenya. The weak administrative authority in Somalia led to a safe haven for training camps and opportunities for radical violent extremist to flourish – Al-Shabaab. Al-Qaeda and later Al-Shabaab are such groups that have found bases in Somalia from where they are executing attacks in the region by relying on local assistance and support (Amble & Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2014). Al-Shabaab must entice non-Muslims to join its ranks by offering money and promises of a better life (Botha &Abdile, 2014). The key question addressed in this study was: what made people, especially young people, vulnerable to extremists' jihad ideology? Rather than portraying Somalia as the source of all regional problems, the emphasis was on the domestic circumstances that those behind radicalisation use to attract followers. This study focused on the crucial method of recruiting people, in this case, teenagers, to become terrorists.Terrorism is a common occurrence in East Africa. During the 1998 twin attacks in Arusha and Nairobi, Kenya and Tanzania were among the first countries to be targeted on the basis of Islamic extremism. Uganda, for example, has increased the number of threats and attacks as a result of its military involvement in Somalia (ACSS, 2012).In general, member states and the people of East Africa have faced violent extremism, especially the radicalization of their youths into foreign terror networks and homegrown terror groups. As a result of the intensified attacks, the researcher looked into the vulnerability of school-aged children in Kenya's public secondary schools to radicalisation and violent extremism.

Kenya has faced significant terrorism threats and attacks from extremist groups since the 1970s: Starlight Night Club, OTC bus station and the summer home of President Kenyatta in Mombasa in 1975, Norfolk Hotel in 1980, election instigated terror in 1992, US Embassy in Nairobi in 1998, Kikambala Paradise Hotel in 2002, police station in Wajir in 2008, Wastegate Mall shooting in 2013, Mpeketoni attacks in 2014, Garissa University attack in 2015 and Nairobi Dusit D2 Complex attack in 2019. The emerging threats of violent extremist threaten national security, peaceful co-existence and economic prosperity of the country; undermining the freedoms and progress of Kenyans. Statistics indicate that most of the perpetrators of terrorism are young men who are lured by being promised monetary gains and descending to paradise on accomplishing tasks assigned. Odhiambo *et al.* (2012) noted that the Al-Shabaab terrorist group's series of kidnappings and cross-border incursions into Kenya threatened security and the lucrative tourism industry in East Africa's largest economy. This led to the incursion of the Kenyan military force to Somalia to curb terror acts by the Al-Shabaab, which subsequently saw the upsurge of terror attacks in Kenya (Odhiambo *et al.,* 2013). The war led to many terror attacks launched in Kenya –2013 Westgate Shopping Mall Attack (67), 2014 Mpeketoni Attack (Approximately 48), 2015 Garissa University College Attack (148) and 2019 Nairobi Dusit D2 Complex Attack (21).

The people who perished during the terrorist attacks leave a gap, which affects national development in several ways. Also, the destroyed infrastructure requires billions of shillings to reconstruct. There is an urgent need to formulate strategies mitigating radicalisation in the Republic of Kenya. The strategies should target the youth who are most vulnerable (Aiello, Puigvert & Schubert, 2018). The youth converting into Islam have been found to being culpable of attacks in Kenya (Botha,

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2013). It was important that Kajiado County and the rest of Kenya not conflate radicalisation and terrorism, due to sleeper cells residing in the county. Much of the recruitment according to Kenyan security agencies have occurred in schools near Eastleigh (Nzwili, 2013). Nyaga (2017) posit that youth radicalisation was caused by politicians with vested interest to acquire power by causing chaos. Nyaga *ibid* only studied the youth radicalisation process in higher education without the element of extreme violence, whose scanty evidence to support the findings onextreme violence in public secondary schools informed this study. This study, therefore, looked at the teacher's knowledge level on radicalisation toward violent extremism, strategies implemented to address emerging radicalisation of youths toward violent extremismand the challenges faced by the school management in countering radicalisation toward violent extremism.

1.3Statement of the Problem

The analysis of radicalization had piqued the attention of both politicians and academics. Several research programs were created to find new ways to engage with the problem, analyze solutions, and make policy recommendations (Botha, 2013). Nonetheless, a study of the literature from the previous decade indicates that little new information has been gained when it comes to the basic aspect of public secondary schools' preparedness in combating radicalization among their students.Perhaps more importantly, this indicates that there is no strong consensus on the subject of radicalization. The region's security climate is increasingly being defined by Africa's burgeoning youth population. Simultaneously, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) continue to operate in the region and have expanded their presence in a number of areas. Despite the fact that violent radicals in Africa follow a variety of philosophies, the tactics they use to recruit youth are always the same (Anderson, 2013).

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The scientific study of radicalisation raises a number of challenges. To date, most of the empirical work on radicalisation had relied either on case studies. There has been very little in the context of radicalisation preparedness for secondary school-going children in Kenya. Odhiambo *et al.* (2015) found that after the Garissa university attack that led to 148 deaths, it was an eye-opener to public institutions preparedness against radicalisation toward violent extremism. There are relatively few empirical researchessuch as Nyaga (2017) determining why and how students are radicalised to join extremist groups such as Al-Shabaab, and just how various learning institutions can effectively prepare themselves to counter radical extremism. Homegrown terrorism has complicated the fight against terrorism. More so, one of the most complex counter-terrorism measures is counter-radicalisation. Ricardo and Arce (2005) observed that the most important resource in any terrorist organisation was its militants (the foot soldiers). Public secondary school-going children are at risk of becoming foot soldiers, which this studyinvestigatedin Kajiado County; possible sleeper cells residing within Kajiado boundaries and targets students. Therefore, the researcher investigated the public secondary schools' preparedness in countering radicalisation toward violent extremism.

1.4 Research Objectives

The general objective of the study was to investigatethe effectiveness of secondary schools' preparedness in countering radicalisation toward violent extremism in Kajiado County, Kenya.

Specific objectives that guided the study wereto:

1. Determinethe level of knowledge by teachers on factors inducing students toward violent radicalisation.

2. Examine thestrategies that havebeenimplementedto addresstheemergingthreatofrecruitmentandradicalisation among students.

3. Examinethe challenges faced by the school management in their efforts to counter violent radicalisation.

1.5 Research Hypothesis

The study was guided by the following hypothesis:

H_{01} Knowledge levelsof teachers do notinfluence their recognition of student radicalisation towardviolent extremism.

H_{02} Strategies implemented in education do not address the emerging threat of recruitment and radicalisationtoward violent extremism among students.

H_{03} Challenges faced bythe school management do not influence radicalisation toward violent extremism among students.

1.6 Justification of the Study

Radicalisation is a phenomenon that, in most cases, starts in adolescence. Terrorism incidents have included people as young as 15-16 years old in countries such as the United Kingdom and Denmark (Heath-Kelly, 2017). Given the apparent rise in youth participation in terrorist organizations, as well as the shifting demographics of those involved or implicated, it is critical to raise awareness that young people are vulnerable to terrorist recruitment and radicalization.Therefore, this study will upstage knowledge to educate policymakers on the preparedness of schools in countering radicalisation among students.

The study will benefit the school goingchildren by empowering them on how to avoid radical groups and in addition how to prepare them to counter the radicalisation, especially as they go forward on their education journey. According to Lind, Mutahi & Oosterom, 2015), Isiolo Boys High School topped the list, as 10 of its students quit to join Al-Shabaab in Somalia in the year 2014. Also, on the security watch are Marsabit Mixed Secondary School and Moi Girls Secondary in Marsabit. The others are in western Kenya among them, Koseka, Birunda PAG Primary and St Patrick's Bumula Secondary School.

Second, this research will serve as a resource for potential scholars and academicians interested in these topics. This will provide security forces with accurate and timely information on the factors that contribute to radicalization, allowing them to combat the threat. Furthermore, the report will highlight all emerging problems that will need further investigation. Finally, the results could be useful to the government, with the Ministry of Education informing policy changes aimed at eliminating radicalism in schools.

In addition, the study aims to contribute to the scholarly literature on intelligence and security systems in East Africa, which will strengthen security sectors agencies and other key stakeholders, and hopefully enhance key skills and deeper understanding of the radicalisation phenomenon principles and the fight against radicalisation and terrorism among youths in Kenya. The study aims to contribute to action-oriented strategies by the Government and other key agencies, actors and stakeholders in Kenya.

1.7Scope of the Study

The study focused on students attending public secondary schools within Kajiado County.The study evaluatedthe effectiveness of public secondary schools' preparedness in countering radicalisation toward extreme violence in Kajiado County,Kenya. It got responses from the students, school principals, teachers, Sub-CountyDirector of Education andChiefs in selectedpublic secondary schools in Kajiado County. Students were the principal respondents because they were the ones that were the target of the radical groups. The study was conducted between September 2018 and October 2018.

1.8 Summary of the Chapter

the background of the study shows that in Kenya, despite the series of terrorism attacks, with many scholarly works done on radicalisation and deradicalization, none of the studies had investigated public secondary schools' preparedness in countering radicalisation toward violent extremism in Kajiado, Kenya. The education sector is being targeted by radical groups and the strategies developed to guide counter-radicalisation is not implemented that hampers the efforts of school management to spot and mitigate radicalisation.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Empirical Review

2.1.1 The Concept of Radicalisation

The first obstacle to successfully combating radicalization is the concept's elusiveness (Schmid, 2013). The multiple motivations, ideas, and other factors that can lead to radicalisation are numerous and complex, and no single cause is necessary or sufficient to explain terrorist radicalisation (Helmus, 2009). In terms of applicability, radicalization into terrorism is a very complicated process (Cole, 2009). Broad profiles based on stereotypes about religion, race, ethnicity, gender, or socioeconomic status are not only discriminatory, but also ineffective (The Change Institute, 2008).

Radicalisation does not happen on its own; it is the result of a phase that a person goes through before being completely radicalized (Borum, 2011). Various academics have proposed phases that people go through before being completely radicalized (Taarnby, 2005; Sageman, 2011; El-Said, 2012). Furthermore, the process varies from one person to the next, depending on the environment, whether political or religious. The presence of a charismatic person capable of delivering compelling speeches not only in Mosques, but also in schools, universities, and even jails, is essential (Pretch, 2007)

If radicalisation is not linked to violence or other illegal activities, such as incitement to hate, as established by international human rights law, it is not a threat to society (Borum, 2011). Radicalization may be a positive force for improvement (Briscoe et al., 2011). For example, political and human rights activists who were influential in the abolition of slavery and those who advocated for universal suffrage were once

considered radicals because they opposed the dominant views of their communities (Allan et. al.,2015).Terrorist radicalisation is the process by which a person comes to accept terrorist violence as a viable, if not even valid, option (Borum, 2011). This may, but is not always, lead to this individual advocating for, supporting, or engaging in terrorism. However, there is no clear-cut route to terrorism. Terrorist radicalization can happen in a number of ways and at various rates depending on the circumstances. Each case of terrorist radicalisation and recruitment for terrorism is the product of a particular combination of an enabling atmosphere and a man or woman's personal circumstances and psychology (Sedgwick, 2012).

Radicalisation, according to Borum (2014), begins when an individual feels aggrieved by perceived oppression attributed to their policies or institutions. As a consequence, one starts to withdraw, with the ulterior motive of demonizing those who have marginalized them, and thus feels justified in using violence to correct the anomaly (Joffé, 2012). According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), factors known as "push" factors inspire people to become completely radicalized. These factors include dissatisfaction with the government's or institutions' policies. The target audiences are drawn to money or material gain in order to be completely persuaded.These benefits are referred to as "pull" factors. They go on to say that recruiting takes place in families, kinship relationships, colleges, religious institutions, and jails (Borum, 2011). With the passage of time, these individuals gradually become more aggressive. They are then exposed to philosophies focused on a narrative that paints a bleak image of something being wrong and blaming other people or organizations for it (Nwafor&Nwogu, 2015).

Terrorist radicalization and recruiting have little bearing on societal trends or government acts, including terrorist propagandist recruiters (Vidino& Brandon, 2012). Where there is a limited degree of contact with people actively trying to radicalize and recruit a person, the words "self-directed" or "self-initiated" radicalisation are often used. It's linked to the phenomenon of so-called lone terrorists or self-starters, who seem to operate on their own without any external guidance or assistance (Schmid, 2013).Terrorist radicalization is a complex phenomenon that can be sped up, slowed down, and even reversed in some situations (Argonamiz, 2009). To be able to prevent and counter-radicalisation, it is essential to comprehend the essence and impact of various influences, as well as the degree to which they can vary and interact in different situations. It's important to differentiate between push and pull factors in this regard (Andrew, 2003). Certain variables, such as a charismatic recruiter, can gain momentum, leading to the individual's violent radicalization.

Other factors, such as witnessing violence, including violence perpetrated by state agents, can make a person more vulnerable to the appeal of terrorism, leading to violent extremism (Kruglanski& Fishman, 2009; Bartlett & Miller, 2012). It should be regarded as a collaborative mechanism involving the individual and external forces such as terrorist propagandists and recruiters, societal changes, and government acts. Terrorist radicalization aided by the internet has become an increasing source of concern for countries all over the world (Castles, De Haas & Miller, 2013).It's linked to the phenomenon of so-called lone terrorists or self-starters, who seem to operate on their own without any external guidance or assistance (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2016).

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According to Van San and de Winter (2013), young people are easily drawn to extremist ideologies because they crave a sense of belonging. Is it possible for parents and teachers to detect indoctrination of these students? Is it possible to solve the issue of identity crisis that most young people face? These are some of the radicalism-related questions that this study aimed to answer.

2.1.2 The Radicalisation Process

Transgression, indignation, heart, concentration, recruitment of participants, contact, polarization, socialization, adoption of values, radicalization reward, and preparation are some of the processes that make up the radicalization process, which may be separate but are generally mutually reinforcing.

Radicalization always begins with some kind of transgression by one group against another, such as violating rules that the group considers to be extremely significant. Mistreatment may be the transgression, which can be historical and pass down over centuries. It may also include betraying trust, defiling sacred objects, performing

black rituals, blasphemy, or otherwise displaying a shocking disregard for people or social laws.

Some citizens are outraged or experience such a deep sense of betrayal in reaction to transgression that they seek revenge, usually the extreme retribution of retributive justice that operates outside of national laws. This may be due to a perception that the laws are insufficient, or that they serve governments that are the object of the outrage.A core organization is formed at some stage to guide the offended's ideas and actions. This usually occurs in one of two forms. One is when a single leader takes the reins. Second, as interested individuals come together, the center can emerge more spontaneously. To create the central message, people in the center (often a single leader) may write or use a critical text or otherwise use charismatic oration.

The organization begins to grow after the initial creation of the core message and core community. This can be performed in a formal or informal manner. Promoting the message, attracting new members, and motivating members to take action are all important aspects of this point. This emphasis necessitates the involvement of more people in spreading the word and taking action. The core's job is to keep the emphasis and propel the rest of the organization forward. It's possible that the organization is purely hierarchical, but it's also possible that it's very diffuse, with individual cells embracing ideas and operating on their own.

The core group pushes forward in their efforts to attract and convert new members to their cause. Recruitment takes place across a variety of outlets, with a focus on communities with a history of discrimination, such as minority religions, the unemployed, low-status women, and so on. Other people who are vulnerable could be targeted as well.

Preaching, letters, posters, and one-on-one calls are all examples of communication. Although these do not radicalize on their own, they are always the first to express urgency or indignation. Later, the frequency and strength of messages build up to the point where intervention is triggered. The initial contact can be subtle and appear to be about other topics, such as religion. It focuses on creating a desirable place, friendship before radicalization. Sooner or later, the subject of discussion turns to basic transgression and mistreatment. This creates anger, outrage and a desire for action.

Demonizing the other hand, objectifying people as subhumans, using amplification, negative stereotypes, and simplistic schema, and thereby polarizing the case, is a central part of the message. By demonstrating how extreme the other side is, the obvious conclusion is drawn that extreme action is the only way forward. Although the reasons used are rife with fallacies, the enthusiasm and underlying messages are obvious.

The way the message is socialized, being a key part of daily discourse, is also a vital part of radicalization. This dialog should be kept confined in order for socialization to function best, with any contradictory messages kept at bay. People would be separated as far as possible to protect them from outside influences. In the event that this isn't feasible, inoculation can be used to help them avoid other points of view.

To keep people on track, groupthink and other social methods of ensuring conformance can be used. Individuals who deceive group members face drastic repercussions, so they are forced to stay with the group. At some point, the radicalized individual feels compelled to take action in order to demonstrate their commitment. The need to act and the appropriate action may arise from a group leader's direction,

or it may emerge from less organized groups discussing what they should do. Actions can vary from protests to terrorist attacks, and they can begin small and grow in size as success or dissatisfaction with limited success grows. Members are required to commit themselves to the course.

Fulfilling the condition is often associated with a vow of riches, ranging from peer acclaim to a guaranteed position in heaven. Many who have already taken such steps are praised as heroes. They and their acts are exalted, and radicalized people are made to feel as though they are respected by a large number of people. All that's needed is a heroic deed. This is especially helpful for people who are looking for meaning in their lives but are feeling neglected and unimportant. A common thinking is, 'At long last, I can make a difference.'

Preparation for action is also a part of the radicalization process, as it puts the individual on a path that is simple to begin but increasingly difficult to leave. This is especially true when the individual is collaborating with others on a common goal. Simulation, rehearsal, and ongoing indoctrination can be used.

2.1.3Youth and Radicalisation

Terrorists are distinguished from other extremists by their contribution to violence. This process takes time and results in a profound shift in how people see themselves and the world around them (Escobar, 2011). The precise nature of this mechanism is still unknown. External influences, such as domestic and international conditions, as described in the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy, as well as internal, or intimate, factors, play a role in radicalisation (Botha, 2014a). The above is often concerned with how the external world is interpreted, and it can be affected by psychological factors that are directly related to political socialisation (UN, 2010)

Radicalisation is described by Schmid (2013) as "an individual or collective (group) process in which normal practices of dialogue, compromise, and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favor of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational conflict waging tactics."These can include either (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes (Schmid, 2014). On the rebel factions' side, the process is usually accompanied by ideological socialisation away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions and into more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization beyond the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as apposite (Young et al., 2015).

"Terrorists were methodically and deliberately targeting young people and children in the United Kingdom, and MI5 has seen individuals as young as 15 involved in activities linked to terrorism," the UK's MI5 Chief said in November 2007. (Philip, 2007). In March 2009, the Association of Chief Police Officers announced that 200 schoolchildren in the United Kingdom (some as young as thirteen) had been marked and reported as being at risk of extremism or of being "groomed by radicalizers" by community members, including parents, imams, and teachers (Hughes, 2009).

At Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a special youth center known as "Camp Iguana" was built to house young people caught fighting alongside al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Singer, 2005). Similarly, in Iraq, US forces arrested over 100 minors in the first year after the invasion, and over 600 to date (Rear and Mohammed, 2008). Al-Shabaab, which

means "youth," is an al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group based in Somalia that has carried out a variety of operations against various targets throughout the region. The organization has recently made headlines for allegedly attempting to hire young Somali Diaspora residents (Hansen, 2013).

"In the last few years, a number of Somali-American young men have traveled to Somalia, likely to train and fight with al-Shabaab," testified Deputy Director of Intelligence for the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) (NCTC, 2009). At least one of these young men was killed in a suicide bombing attack in northern Somalia in October 2008, the first time a U.S. citizen has been involved in a suicide attack (Philip, 2009). Evidence suggests that youths' positions within terrorist organizations have evolved over time, with an increasing number of cases of a young person carrying out a terrorist act (or attempting to carry out)terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, are a possibility. Children have a long history of being used as suicide bombers by the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers. They've created specialized denim jackets customized to children's sizes to allow them to conceal explosives (Singer, 2005). Two young Dutchmen, aged 20 and 21, were killed in a failed assault on a heavily armed Indian Army patrol at a border checkpoint in Kashmir in January 2002. (AVID, 2002).

2.1.4   Drivers of Radicalisation among Youths

Persons drawn to radicalisation, according to Maclean, have an aspiration to act and do something meaningful at the same time; they see the world in black-and-white terms and seek out to the side of a virtuous cause (Maclean, 2013). On the other hand, some people, such as the Tsarnaev brothers in the Boston bombing, use radical ideology to blame their internal misery on society both at home and abroad (Sageman,

2004).The breakdown of their parents' marriage, as well as the subsequent abandonment of the teens in America, left the brothers without social and financial support, and their situation was rapidly deteriorating. Radical Islamist ideology provided an outlet for their anger at the nation that had failed them and set in motion the sequence of events that culminated in the Boston Marathon's fatal end (Stohl et al., 2017).

When episodes of radicalisation occur, they are typically met with astonished exclamations of "why him," "why there." Why, for example, did one sleepy Norwegian town spawn eight IS recruits (Higgins, 2015), one pre-university school in Montreal 11 (Perreaux, 2015), and one elementary school in Morocco five of the seven Madrid train bombers (Atran, 2010)? Part of the explanation may be that the individuals were members of close-knit, action-oriented social networks, such as neighborhood groups or soccer teams, which provided a group-action template for them to participate in the heroic adventure together in another environment (Atran, 2010). However, the majority of participants in buddy groups are not attracted to radicalism.

Blaming personality traits or demographic features is often ineffective since the offenders are shockingly ordinary people (Post, 2005). Threats from the environment, frustrations, and anxieties can all be factors (McGregor et al., 2010), but most anxious and depressed people do not resort to radicalisation. Even though it is widely accepted that radicalization happens gradually over time, the duration and process of radicalization vary from person to person (Giddens, 2013; Mannheim, 2013).Conscious decisions to join a terrorist group or use violence for political purposes, for example, are taken over time and include a variety of events,

interactions, attitudes, and role players. Communication with and listening to people who hold opposing viewpoints are effective facilitators in preventing radicalization because conversations with people who hold opposing viewpoints force people to continually rethink and improve their own views (Botha, 2014a). Sharing one's views with others who share similar perspectives, on the other hand, would strengthen one's stance, recognise common issues, and prompt collective action (Quintelier et. al., 2011)This form of isolation leads to 'groupthink', which can be described as an irrational style of thinking that causes group members to make poor decisions (Cottam *et. al.,* 2004).

Although Osama bin Laden has an engineering background and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is a paediatrician, the Hamburg Cell, which formed the hardcore of the 9/11 plot, were all educated at German universities (Gunning. et. al., 2011). Deprivation and alienation are commonly assumed to be important predictors of the kind of radicalization that can lead to terrorist action. As a result, there is a proclivity to concentrate energy and money on the young and the poor (Osman, 2013). Another common reason for the kind of radicalization that leads to terrorism is that multiculturalism and integration have failed (Heath-Kelly, 2013).This explanation assumes that children of refugees, who are both trapped and marginalized by the tension between their parents' traditional environment and the sometimes ambiguous and conflicting cultural signals of modern western culture, are at an especially high risk of crossing the line into terrorist acts.

Although terms like "alienation" aren't entirely irrelevant to the problem, they aren't always helpful in anticipating or addressing radicalization (Goodman, 2012). In the end, essentially unquantifiable social, political, and religious motives can prevail over

mere citizenship. Radicalization remains a difficult to predict phenomenon with no related typology (Marret et al., 2013). If pre-radicalisation signs exist or can be detected, they are often extremely subtle, particularly to a cultural outsider such as a police officer or intelligence officer.Nonetheless, a review of some domestic and international cases reveals what seem to be a few common factors, at least in the case of young Canadian Muslims becoming extremists (Ooko, 2014). Family relations, for example, can be extremely important. A Canadian father instilled Islamist philosophy in all of his children and ensured that they were trained in Al Qaida camps in Afghanistan (Burke, 2004).

Religious identity, socioeconomic circumstances (education, unemployment), political circumstances, and the need for a common identity and a sense of belonging, according to Botha and Abdile (2014), are all factors in Al-Shabaab recruitment. The state's crisis, as well as the inability of secular and moderate powers to produce credible results, could provide fertile ground for youth radicalization in many countries in the sub-region. However, other internal and external players must be addressed before this becomes violent extremism. In Somalia, the growth and creation of Islamist radical groups has been a long process (Muhula, 2007).Identity, community safety, and clan association, as well as the associated material benefits and security, can all play a role in many cases. Unmet social and economic needs may not be enough to cause radicalization (Ooko, 2014). However, unmet social and economic needs, as well as a severe form of social exclusion, could signal the start of a serious wave of radicalisation. This has been a popular thread that runs across both Kenya and Somalia. However, this does not imply that radical and terrorist groups are the product of a persistent socioeconomic issue in a given country or area (Ooko, 2014).

Scholars and security experts have attempted to strike a balance and settle on a typology to determine what motivates people, especially young people, to embrace radical ideas that lead to terrorism (Ooko, 2014). Common theories such as poverty and alienation do not hold up to scrutiny. The bulk of radicalized youth in the United States come from the outskirts of society. However, in other situations, such as the Garissa University attack, assassins were discovered to be trained lawyers and medical students (Honwana, 2014).The eight suspects in the foiled terrorist attacks in London and Glasgow's international airport in June 2007 were all professionals: doctors, medical researchers, and an engineer (Ooko, 2014). Both of them lived in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the recent experience has shown that many dangerous radicals emerge from the affluent middle and upper classes.

As the recent Westgate attack shows, globalisation has aided the spread of terrorism that reaches through and beyond national borders, blurring the lines between domestic and transnational terrorism (Moghadam, 2017). This has at least two consequences about how we think about and plan for terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab. The need to better understand their strength, order, and control relationships with the global jihad network is one implication (Agbiboa, 2014). Another inference is that countries fighting terrorism, such as Kenya, Uganda, and Somalia, need assistance in improving intelligence in order to respond effectively. Addressing the underlying existentialand ideological conditions that radicalise exploit is presumed to be necessary as a long-term solution for containing terrorism.

2.1.5 Religion and Terrorism

In Western scholarship, the relationship between religion and terrorism has a long history (Gunning & Jackson, 2011). David Rapoport's 1984 paper on the use of

violence in the three monotheistic religions gave birth to the term "religious terrorism" (Agbiboa, 2013a). David explores why violence and religion have resurfaced in such a dramatic way at this point in history, and why they are so easily found together (Juergens, 2003).Religious terrorism has evolved from a simplistic label to a collection of descriptive features and substantive statements that seem to distinguish it as a distinct "form" of political violence from secular terrorism (Agbiboa, 2013a). The argument that religious terrorism is unique is based on three main hypotheses.

The first hypothesis holds that religious terrorists have anti-modern agendas of restoring civilization to an idealized version of the past, and are thus inherently anti-democratic and anti-progressive. For example, it is argued that the forces of history seem to be pushing international terrorism back to a much earlier period, with traces of "sacred" terrorist conduct. Religious terrorists are often said to have goals that are absolutist, inflexible, impractical, lacking in political pragmatism, and hostile to negotiation (Gunning & Jackson, 2011).'Today's terrorists don't want a seat at the table; they want to kill the table and anyone who sits on it,' Morgan says succinctly. According to Byman (2003), appeasing Al-Qaeda is difficult in principle and unlikely in reality because of the nature of its grievances, its wider goal of redressing humiliation, and a poisoned ideology that glorifies jihad as a remedy (Byman, 2003). In a similar vein, Benjamin (2008) claims that, unlike most terrorist organizations, Al-Qaeda "eschews gradual gains and seeks no part of a negotiating process; it seeks to achieve its primary goals through aggression."

According to the second hypothesis, religious terrorists use a different type of violence than secular terrorists. For the religious terrorist, for example, "violence is a

sacramental act or sacred obligation performed in direct response to some spiritual demand," rather than a tactical means to a political end, according to Hoffman (Hoffman, 2006).

According to the third hypothesis, religious terrorists will elicit complete devotion and fanaticism from their followers. In comparison to the supposedly more measured views of secular groups, religious terrorists are said to be characterized by a suspension of doubt and an end-justifies-the-means worldview (Gunning & Jackson, 2011).

'These unsettling shows have been followed by powerful statements of moral justification and continuing absolutism, marked by the strength of the religious activists' dedication,' writes Juergens (2003). (Juergens, 2003). Furthermore, it is proposed that in some instances, religious certainty and assurances of the afterlife are main motivating factors in driving vulnerable, alienated, and oppressed youths to enter religious terrorist groups as a form of psychological empowerment.It is also claimed that such impressionable, alienated, and powerless young people are susceptible to brainwashing and undue manipulation from recruiters, extremist preachers, or internet materials.

Piazza (2011) describes the increased frequency and severity of terrorist activity among radical Islamists in light of misinterpretations of Islamic doctrine and practice, such as the principle of "lesser jihad," or armed struggle to protect Islam from supposed enemies, or Muslim respect for "Itihad," or martyrdom (Piazza, 2011). The primary distinction between universal/abstract and strategic groups is that the former has highly ambitious, abstract, nuanced, and nebulous objectives that are mainly motivated by ideology (Agbiboa, 2013b).Strategic groups, on the other hand, have a

variety of particular and restricted objectives, such as the liberation of a specific region, the establishment of an autonomous homeland for a specific ethnic group, or the overthrow of a specific government. Because of their global jihadist ideological stance against outposts of the West and alleged or true enemies of Islam, Islamist groups such as Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram, among others, fall into the universal/abstract category.It's worth noting that, when viewed as a whole, Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organizations carry out more deadly attacks and are responsible for a disproportionate number of attacks and overall fatalities than any other religious-based terrorist organization.

After studying how radicalization occurs globally and in Kenya, it is clear that youth are radicalized through social media networks, peer pressure, student skill sets, extremist teachers' presence in schools, and religious extremists' deceptive teaching. As a result, radicalization is a danger that, if not addressed, might spiral out of control. Youth are at risk, and those in schools who can easily be manipulated and/or manipulate others and recruit them into radical groups are particularly vulnerable.To be able to control youth radicalization, youth handlers, especially teachers, religious leaders, and fellow students, must have a basic understanding of how youth become radicalized. But, do teachers and other school stakeholders have this kind of knowledge? As a result, the aim of this study is to determine the level of awareness about factors that lead to violent radicalization among students in the Kajiado Sub-county. Teachers' assessments of students' awareness levels will be critical in determining the underlying factors that lead to militant radicalization in secondary schools.

2.2Knowledge level by teachers on factors inducing students to radicalisation into violent extreme

It is important to emphasize that radicalism is primarily motivated by a socio-political agenda. The youth are the primary focus of radical elements who are passionate about achieving their political goals (McChesney, 2015). This is important to this report, which looked at the role of education and teacher awareness in motivating students to be self-sufficient and avoid falling victim to radical ideology (Pels& de Ruyter, 2012; Botha, 2013). Religious rhetoric has often been used to justify their politically motivated acts and to seduce the Muslim community (Botha, 2014a).As a result, young people are drawn into this conflict without understanding the motivations of their radical leaders. As Nyaga discovered, they end up being used as a tool to achieve their political goals (2017). According to Cannon (2016), Kenya has a large number of western interests, investments, installations, diplomatic corps, and headquarters, as well as foreign organizations such as the United Nations. Furthermore, the country maintains strong military links with a number of western countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel (Cannon, 2016). This comparatively large western presence is the main attraction and focus of anti-western terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda.

Kenya has strong links to Israel, which Muslims around the world despise for its persecution of Palestinians; in 1976, Kenya agreed to provide Israel with vital logistical assistance in its raid on Entebbe Airport to free Israeli hostages held there by Palestinian hijackers in Uganda (Otiso, 2009). This relationship irritates both foreign and native Muslims, who have consistently, but unsuccessfully, called for its termination.According to Cannon (2016), Kenya's tourism industry is a significant contributor to radicalization. Tourists are mostly drawn to the country's coastal

regions, which is at odds with local Islamic culture and tradition. For example, Islam teaches that women should cover their bodies in public except for their eyes and forbids the consumption of alcohol (Botha, 2014b; Odhiambo et al., 2015). Because of the many economic benefits of tourism, the Kenyan government has not shown enough sensitivity to this problem (Newsome et al., 2012).This has made it easier for terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab to enter the region under the pretext of offering solutions to poverty and the erosion of local Islamic culture (Otiso, 2009).

The collapsed state of Somalia has resulted in the spread of radicalism in East Africa, including Kenya (Ibrahim, 2010; Anderson & McKnight, 2014). The emergence of Al-Shabaab, which has links to Al-Qaeda, has aided in the radicalization of Kenyan youth (Botha, 2014b). One of the contributing factors is the US-led global war on terror. Kenya has become a target because of its deployment of troops in Somalia and its alleged support for the United States (Odhiambo et al., 2015). The terror gang is acutely aware of the problems that Kenyan youth face and exploits them, leaving them vulnerable (Watheka, 2015).

In Kenya, youth who convert to Islam have been found to be responsible for attacks. Following the two grenade attacks on the 17th and 24th of October 2011, Botha (2013) announced that a young Kenyan national was arrested. His mother said that he was raised in a strict Roman Catholic family in Busia, western Kenya, and that he started to show signs of radicalisation when he attended school(s) in Nairobi (The Guardian, 2011). What role did a change in climate play in his decision to join a cult of violent extremists?Al-Shabaab and other radical actors are identified as lecturing and recruiting in schools, mosques, and "slums" around Nairobi's Eastleigh

neighborhood, which is sometimes referred to as "Little Mogadishu," where integrated Somali refugees gather and live, according to a National Intelligence Service report written in late September and leaked to the Kenyan media. According to Kenyan security services, much of the recruitment took place in schools near Eastleigh (Nzwili, 2013). As a result, it raises the question of how well-prepared schools are to combat radicalization.

One of the world's greatest security issues is the organic essence of radicalisation in schools and among school-aged children. There is no evidence in the literature to back up claims that the process is taking place within institutions or that youth are being engaged as primary actors in schools.To begin with, the security briefings that make up the guide book show that radicalisation is occurring in various secondary schools in Kenya, and that the process is spreading to other towns such as Kakamega, Busia, Garissa, Mandela, and Mombasa, but there is no factual evidence to back up these statements other than speculation based on student disappearances. As a result, teachers must understand and apply this information in order to detect encroachment in Kenyan public schools.

Since they have little hope of getting an education or a decent job, al-Shabaab or ISIS recruiters often target boys and young men living in the slums (Hellsten, 2016). While researching 'Youth Radicalisation in Kenya University Perspective,' Nyaga (2017) discovered that some politicians' poor political propagation influenced radicalisation among university students by sponsoring a few to engage in radical conduct.

Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda have been enraged by Kenya's incursion into Somalia, and they will continue to target Kenya in response (Odhiambo et al., 2015). Garissa University was targeted by Al-Shabaab, an outlawed group, in order to force the KDF

to flee Somalia, which resulted in the loss of 148 lives – sons and daughters maimed as a result of terrorism that had a bearing on students' complicity.

Radicalisation is a dynamic phenomenon, and the motives for joining extremist organizations differ by social group: poverty and promises of money and material benefits, jihadist ideologies, and dysfunctional politics are just some of the reasons for joining extremist organizations (Hellsten, 2016). Young people aged 9 to 25 are the most vulnerable demographic for recruitment into violent organisations, with boys being the primary target (MoE, 2017). Furthermore, according to Nyaga (2017), university students are the most vulnerable to radicalization, with male students dominating the scene. This raises the question of whether more informed students are an easy target for radicalization, and what about high school students?

Unemployment and rising poverty levels can play a role in radicalization, also leading to violent extremism (Nyaga, 2017). As Nyaga mentions, a substance addict is a group of young people who are at risk of joining organized illegal radical organizations (2017). According to MoE (2017), there has been an increase in the number of youth who embrace violent extremism in secondary schools, as well as organized criminal organizations that promote violence or engage in violent activities. Schoolchildren bringing guns to school; a reference from 2021 mentions a student from Kisii High School who wounded his teacher after attacking him with a knife.

The school's management goals, according to Bhylls Acre Primary School in Wolverhampton, are to ensure that workers are actively involved in being concerned about radicalization (Tannock&Sukarieh, 2016). The education sector has taken a big hit as a result of the rising number of terrorist attacks, which have resulted in the deaths of both teachers and students, as well as the disruption of learning programs

(MoE, 2017). Increased protests and demonstrations in schools are a result of a radicalisation process that, if not tested in time, could lead to extreme violence..

2.3 Strategies Implemented to address the emerging threat of recruitment and radicalisation among students

In 2008, HSI published a radicalization report to see what steps the Dutch government was taking to avoid and fight radicalization (Schmid, 2013). It became clear that the Netherlands was grappling with an increasing problem of radicalization, especially among its youth. Based on those results, it was agreed to revisit the issue in the Netherlands, with a particular emphasis on the radicalization of school-aged children.Early on in the process of investigating terrorist organizations, it became clear that many of them were using the Internet to reach out to a large number of potential recruits or supporters (Weimann, 2004). Similarly, it became clear that some young people – particularly those living outside of areas where terrorist organizations were active – had self-recruited or self-radicalized using online materials and connections. As a result, the use of the Internet by terrorist groups and young people as a means of recruitment and radicalization was added to the list of topics to be researched further (Weimann, 2004).On March 19, 2009, OSDFS and HSI co-hosted a one-day Youth Recruitment and Radicalization Roundtable (Worldwide Terrorist Activity, 2009). The aim of the meeting was to bring together a small group of people to discuss what could be learned from what was going on around the world in terms of youth recruitment and radicalisation; to discuss potential implications for the United States; and to figure out what, if any, role the education system could play in preventing youth recruitment and radicalisation or promoting resilience among young people.

About 300,000 children were fighting in the war. To prevent and discourage the recruitment of minors by "naming and shaming" individuals and organisations who are likely to use minors in acts of aggression and conflict. Make it more difficult to obtain guns that are technologically "easy" for young people to use, including pursuing "wartime entrepreneurs" who distribute these weapons to conflict zones; Develop and implement legal legislation requiring those who use child soldiers to face war crime charges (Worldwide Terrorist Activity, 2009).This will involve group leaders as well as others who empower them in order to break the cycle of violence and reverse the pattern by establishing the requisite social services and support structures, providing economic assistance, and assisting the children in reintegrating into society (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002). It was decided that services should include the community in order to help children reintegrate into society. As a result, the children will have more choices and will be less likely to revert to aggressive behavior (Singer, 2009).

In Kenya, school-aged children are the primary targets of violent extremist radicalization. The Kenyan government, according to The Standard (2016), launched a national strategy to combat violent extremism. Since social media is one of the primary means by which young people become radicalized, a Cyber unit task force was created and is well trained to detect and reduce extremist radicalization. Investment in technology, expertise, and creative ways to fight radicalisation has increased as a result of the funds received. Religious leaders from around the world have initiated a campaign to combat student radicalization (El-Said, 2012).To prevent and control extremism radicalization around the world, it is critical to combat extremist radicalization. The aim of the study is to evaluate the tactics that school administrators may use to prevent student radicalization in secondary schools.

Kenyan nationals have become internal jihadists, according to Odhiambo, Onkware, and Leshan (2015), after carrying out a series of recent terrorist attacks in Kenya, with many of them receiving military training from Al-Shabaab in neighboring Somalia. In addition, radical clerics in mosques in Kenya's Coast, North Eastern, and Nairobi counties have recruited youths for militancy.Since 2016, there have been an increase in arson cases in public high schools, causing countering violent extremism (CVE) to gain traction among policymakers and educators (MoE, 2017). The Kenyan Ministry of Education developed mechanisms to combat violent extremism in schools, but this study discovered that they were ineffective due to a lack of capacity-building materials in schools.In Kenya's public secondary schools, discipline frameworks for learners that foster a peaceful learning atmosphere, the relationship between student wellbeing and the emergence of violence in schools, and the involvement of communities in addressing emerging forms of violence in schools are still lacking.

Government measures for curbing violent extremism are many but are not operationalised, such as the development of admissions guidelines for registration of noncitizens into the schools; sanctioning of the transfer cases; vetting of all teaching and learning materials going to schools; use of national drama and music festivals with themes for countering violent extremism; partnership with security agents and law enforcers; implementation of Child-Friendly School initiatives; Peace Education; development of guidelines for the formation of Peace Clubs at school level and the ongoing review of the curriculum to integrate prevention of violent extremism in schools.

Countering violent extremism, training of teachers, BOMs, parents, support staff and students on the identification of early warning signs is important (MoE, 2017).

Providing alternative discipline mechanisms in handling violent cases, parenting skills, key security measures, and guidance of learners have failed to curb radicalisation in schools hence arson and increased indiscipline cases. There is also a need to build the capacity of schools in managing student's welfare issues. Strengthen guiding and counselling. The secondary schools could manage the encroaching radicalisation menace by offering guidance and counselling services to students, integration of violence prevention in life skills lessons and into co-curricular activities, use of peer counsellors, foster parenting and engagement of motivational speakers from the community.

2.4   Challenges faced in countering radicalisation toward violent extremismin public secondary schools in Kenya

Radicalization, according to a recent perspective, is a complex and non-linear operation. Recruitment cannot be treated as a rational chain reaction since the reasons underlying radicalisation are personal and psychological (McCauley &Moskalenko, 2011). If there is no single or even primary motive for radicalization, it does tend to follow the "natural" motivational variables (Didier, et. al., 2014).Although it is proposed that most young radicals fall into one of two categories: well-educated undergraduates and people with degrees in engineering and IT, or school drop-outs, often with criminal records, the lack of a single profile makes a targeted answer difficult (Tahir,2007). However, because these people have been triggered by socioeconomic, psychosocial, ideological, or political factors, they can't be included in a single preventive plan. As a result, profiling of radicalisation dimensions, methods, and mechanisms could be a more appropriate method (ECGE, 2008).

Role of social ties – For joining and staying linked, radicalisation processes depend on

social networks. Bonding of various kinds is essential, but since trust is so important, close networks based on friendship, kinship, and ethnicity are preferred (Didier et. al.,2014). Recruiters are mostly charismatic leaders who know how to tap into emotional causes like anger, vengeance, and frustration. Direct interaction with people who have fought in war zones such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, or Iraq, as well as Al-Qaeda figureheads, can have a powerful effect (Daniela, 2012).

Online propaganda is critical for legitimizing radical beliefs, exposing both actual and imagined grievances, amplifying conflicts between 'believers' and the 'enemy,' and fostering a sense of community (Kemboi, 2015). Although film, audio recordings, books, magazines, and speeches are all used, the internet is now the primary tool (Daniela,2012). In particular, social media has gained traction as a useful tool for recruiting and indoctrination. Terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda and its allies, use YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and other social media platforms because they provide convenient access to a large target audience (Weimann, 2014; Nacos, 2016).They take advantage of the fact that, unlike conventional networks, they can now reach out to their audience rather than waiting for individuals to come to the terrorists. Terrorist organizations will study their recruits' online profiles and select the best way to handle them. They may also use 'narrowcasting' to target their recruits on the pages (Gabriel, 2014).

Censorship and filtering have been used by governments to try to stop this process. For example, on March 15, 2015, the French government blocked five websites suspected of containing jihadist propaganda (Bowyer, 2015). The measure has already been criticized, not only for its lack of legality (administrative blocking occurs without recourse to the courts), but also for its ineffectiveness (sites blocked in France

may reappear at different addresses or hosts outside France) (Monde,2015).According to a 2014 government study on online extremism in the United Kingdom and France, negative measures like censorship are not only ineffective, but also counterproductive, while constructive measures like publishing counter-extremist material and fostering the battle against radicalism are more successful at challenging extremist views (Ghaffar&Marie,2009). While it is undeniable that the internet is used for recruitment and propaganda, it is argued that it should not be overestimated (Didier et. al.,2014). Before being more indoctrinated online, most people seem to have had some kind of encounter with extremism.

For more than a decade, radicalization in schools and higher education institutions has been a source of concern (McCauley &Moskalenko, 2011). The Obin Study, presented to the French Minister of Education in 2004, exposed the spread and effect of "Islamization" in public schools in France, as well as the dangers it poses to national cohesion (Ousman, 2012). With reports of convicted extremists entering UK universities, some of whom already held extremist views before enrolling, and others being radicalized during their studies, the UK government discussed the problem in universities in its'Prevent Strategy' study (Brown &Saeed, 2015).Someextremistorganizationsand radicalpreachershavebeenknownto target specific universities, notablythosewithlargenumbers ofMuslimstudents.

A declaration on fostering citizenship and the universal values of equality, tolerance, and non-discrimination through education was adopted on 17 March 2015 at an informal meeting of the EU's Education Ministers to highlight the fact that schools need more help in preventing intolerance and combating radicalisation (Tan, 2010). According to a 2007 report, extremists can regard mosques as a "legitimizing place"

for recruitment.While religious community leaders opposed to violent extremism can stymie the process, mosques attract extremist recruiters based on benefits analysis (Mirahma et al., 2016). According to a 2009 study, Dutch officials now claim that from 1997, Imams in four Sala fist mosques in the Netherlands permitted suspected foreign terrorists to frequent their premises and recruit followers.

The challenges that those fighting radicalisation face are real, and they present a challenge to the fight against radicalisation in our community and schools today. It could be difficult for schools to combat radicalization without a thorough understanding of these issues. The aim of this study is to look at the obstacles that school administrators face in their attempts to combat violent radicalization in their schools.

Kenya government through its MoE have challenges addressing the accruing radicalisation menace in secondary schools into violent extremism, especially the public secondary schools in Kenya. The inadequate capacity of schools in prevention and management of emerging forms of violence; inadequate capacity by teachers to spot and offer guidance and counselling services; lack of guidelines and capacity building materials in prevention and management of emerging forms of violence; weak partnerships between the schools and communities; non-conducive social environment; the presence of religious and other actors in schools with minimal supervision by the county; and weak monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (MoE, 2017).

2.5 Conceptualisation of Conceptual Framework

2.5.1 The Contagion Theory of Terrorism

The Contagion Theory of Terrorism will be used in this research. The thesis that terrorism is "contagious" is a significant version of the psycho-sociological research tradition. A number of studies have shown that terrorist attacks are far from random, and that there is a clear pattern in the incidence of terrorist attacks, or waves of terrorism, that follows a periodical cycle (Peter, 2001).

A spike in terrorism in one month is likely to be followed by a month with few events, implying that terrorist groups' decisions to launch attacks are motivated by similar attacks elsewhere, hence the term "contagion." The willingness of terrorists to ensure newsworthiness and, as a result, media access can explain these periodic "waves" of terrorism. There is "accumulating empirical evidence pointing to the contagiousness of terrorism" in terms of the timing of terrorist attacks..

The contagion hypothesis often applies to the phenomenon that high levels of terrorism in one nation are often correlated with increased instances of terrorism in neighboring states in the region, whether perpetrated by the same party, "second-generation" parties, international sympathizers and coalition partners, or simply by imitators 1980. Lai finds support for the hypothesis that "the greater the amount of terrorism in a state's area, the greater the amount of terrorism a state is likely to experience the next year" in a cross-country quantitative study focused on the International Terrorism Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) dataset for all countries from 1968 to 1977.'

Terrorist groups learn from one another, and active operations in one country are imitated by groups in other countries, according to a third aspect of terrorism's contagiousness. For example, from the late 1960s onwards, the spread of skyjacking and other high-profile hostage-taking incidents was in no small part a product of the

new Palestinian groups' stunning achievements in gaining worldwide attention through their use of terrorism (Hoffman). It inspired a wide range of leftist-nationalist organizations to use similar strategies. Only after new security measures such as metal detectors were introduced at airports around the world did the surge of hijackings come to an end.The September 11th attacks, which marked the next quantum leap in airborne terrorism, were immediately followed by a slew of copycat events. In January 2002, an American teenager crashed a Cessna 172 plane into the 42-story Bank of America Plaza building in Tampa, Florida, leaving behind a handwritten note praising al-activities Qaida's and claiming to be working on their behalf.

2.5.2 Moghaddam's Staircase Theory

Individuals progress up to five hypothetical "steps" on a staircase, starting on the ground floor and finishing on the fifth stair – the terrorist act itself, according to Moghaddam (2005). Perceived inequality, symbolic threat to group identity, and relative deprivation are all determinants of the likelihood of adopting extreme right-wing attitudes and behaviors, according to the model (Doosje et. al., 2012).

The rate of youth radicalization are put into perspective by Moghaddam's theory. When the components intersect in a given situation, the transition from one floor to the next is considered linear, and the stairs are "components" of the radicalisation process, with an increased risk of terrorism. This is also the starting point for several other models, some of which only partially explain the radicalisation process, some of which concentrate on the best approach to radicalisation, and some of which place it in a broader social context.Although none of these methods are insignificant in any way, their scope makes them unsuitable for direct use by TERRA. They can be used to draw some important conclusions, mostly based on Christmann's summary (2012).

Moghaddam's work aids in the understanding of the radicalisation process, while De Wolf and Doosje's work offers a critical theoretical context. It can be concluded that (i) responses should be tailored to the stage of a radicalisation process; intervening too early or too forcefully can exacerbate the issue. ii) Ideology and religious searching should be addressed as a dimension of the identity and social processes that are taking place, rather than as a stand-alone situation.. iii) Young men's attraction to radical groups may also be influenced by thrill-seeking and fame-seeking behavior. (iv) We should consider the role that catalyst events, such as a traumatic or violent incident, extreme injustice, or the death of a loved one, can play. (v) Friends and kin who are involved in radical movement can be considered a serious risk factor (vi) Most models show that as the radicalisation process progresses, the effect of community and context grows. At the same time, we must remember that 'the method' is not rigid or one-directional, but rather a mixture of psychological and social processes that do not necessarily occur in the same order as the staircase model suggests..

Figure 2.1 illustrates the independent variables, intervening variables and dependent variables.

INDEPENDENT

DEPENDENT

Preparedness levels of secondary schools
1. **Knowledge on factors inducing students to violent radicalisation.**
   - Philosophical,
   - Religious ideologies,
   - Political
   - Ideological
2. **Strategies for addressing emerging student radicalisation threat**
   - Strengthen competency and skills
   - Integrate different viewpoints into student's personal thinking
   - Provision of ant-ethnic awareness
   - Built students resilience to online radical extremism propaganda
3. **Challenges faced by the school management in countering violent radicalisation.**
   - Socio-political interference
   - Discrimination
   - Inadequate Technological Know-how
   - Psycho-sociological

INTERVENING

- Governance
- Education
- Inferiority complex
- Deprivation
- Inequalities
- Frustration
- Socioeconomic discontent
- Unemployment

Countering radicalization into violent extremism

- Commitment by school management
- Parent involvement in student's affairs
- Protection of intellectual materials (electronic and print media)
- Equality and inclusivity of all students in school affairs.
- Religious beliefs
- Early intervention on radical warning signs
- Community Empowerment
- Social media

Figure 2.1: The Conceptual Framework for the Preparedness Levels of Secondary School and Countering Radicalisation into extremism.

2.6 Chapter Summary

The region's security climate is increasingly being defined by Africa's burgeoning youth population. Simultaneously, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) continue to operate in the region and have expanded their presence in a number of areas. Despite the fact that violent radicals in Africa follow a variety of philosophies, the tactics they

use to recruit youth are always the same. Radical groups recognize and exploit a confluence of political realities, social influences, and personal attributes that make youth vulnerable.

According to the report, social scientists and policymakers in East Africa have consistently underestimated the strength of agendas and strongly held beliefs as key reasons for various types of violent extremism. Many violent extremists are motivated by self-interest, personal grievances, the desire for influence or money, or the desire to pursue a political agenda. You won't understand what really pushes many young people to violent extremism until you know the strength of these ideals – the passions, emotions, and intense feelings of loyalty and dedication they provoke.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the research methodology, which covers the research design, study area, study population, sample and sampling techniques, data collection instruments, validity and reliability of research instruments, data collection procedures, data analysis procedure, ethical consideration and study limitations.

3.1 Research Design

The descriptivesurveydesignwas used explicitlyto determinetheeffectiveness of public secondary schools' preparedness in countering radicalisation toward violent extremism in Kajiado County,Kenya.A descriptivesurveydesign wasusedinpreliminaryandexploratorystudiesto allowa researchertogetherinformation,summarise,presentandinterpretforclarification(Nardi, 2018).Patten and Newhart (2017) notedthatdescriptivesurvey researchintends toproduce statisticalinformationaboutaspects ofthepopulationthatinterestpolicymakerswithout manipulatinganyvariables.The choiceofthedescriptivesurvey researchdesignwas pickedin accordance with thestudy outcome.Theirsearchwasinterestedinthestateof affairs alreadyexistinginthefieldandnovariablewasmanipulated.

3.2 Study Area

The study was conducted in Kajiado County – focusing on Kajiado North and Isinya Sub-Counties. The county was chosen due to its proximity to Nairobi City County that has had a series of terrorist attacks by the Al-Shabaab radical group. Besides, in other counties that have experienced terror attacks, security measures have been

heightened thus it was obvious for the terrorist use Kajiado County which neighbours Nairobi as sleeper cells.

Kajiado County is located in the former Rift Valley Province of Kenya. The county coversan area of 21,292.7 square km. It borders Nairobi City County to the North and extends to the Tanzania border further south. The county is headquartered at Kajiado Town. However, the largest town in the county is NgongTown.Ngong Town is located in Kajiado North Sub-county.It is a cosmopolitan Sub-county that has a spill-over effect from Nairobi City County. The majority of the Maasai community (natives)are not likely to detect the infiltration of radicalisation. Kajiado County is expansive and depending on the socio-economic engagement of the natives, the entrance of immigrants exposes them to vulnerabilities to new ideologies and norms. This makes the natives at high risk of radicalisation by radical extremist groups.

Kenya has witnessed an upsurge in cases of insecurity since the promulgation of the Kenyan Constitution of 2010 (National Council for Law Reporting, 2010). Extreme radicalisation has been at the centre stage of the most insecurities experienced in Kenya. Mandera County, Kwale County, Mombasa County, Lamu County and Nairobi County have been majorly hurt by these extremist terrorist actions in Kenya since 2010 (Boga, 2016). Kajiado County in the recent past has experienced an upsurge inthe population in search of land and work. Increased population, however, brings with it increased political, economic and social risks such as extreme radicalisation and terrorist acts. The easy targets to radicalisation are youths who can easily be swayed by other people's ideologies pertaining to a particular course of action. The vulnerability of the youth informed this study on the radicalisation of students in secondary schools in Kajiado County.The county has not experienced

extremist radicalisation.Nevertheless, the upsurge of the immigrants might catalysethe violent extremist groupsto radicalise the youths especially school-going youths in the county. Figure 3.1 illustrates the geospatial arrangement of Kajiado County.

Figure 3.1: The Map of the Study Area – Kajiado County

3.3Study Population

Kajiado County has a population of 687,312.The target population for this study was all public secondary schools (head-teachers, teachers, students), Sub-county Director

of Education and Chiefs. According to the Ministry of Education (2016), Kajiado County has 158 public secondary schools, therefore, there are 158 headteachers, 2,078teachers, students' population is 22,351, 5 Sub-county Education Officers and 61chiefs. This in totalwas made up target population of 24,653participants.

3.4Sampling Strategy

A subset of the entire population was used to gather data from the general population. According to the data by the Ministry of Education, Kajiado County has a total number of 158 secondary schools. There are 5 Sub-counties in Kajiado County– Kajiado North, Isinya, Mashuru, Kajiado Central and Loitokitok. The study populationincludedpublic secondary school headteachers (158), teachers (2078),chiefs (61), Sub-countyEducation Officers (5), and student (22,351). The study was limited to Kajiado North and Isinya Sub-counties that were purposive. Kajiado was preferred in this study because it neighbours Nairobi, which has experienced a series of terror attacks and has heightened its security measures thus obvious the terrorists use Kajiado as a sleeper cell.

3.5Sample size and determination

Simple random sampling wasused to sample headteachers, teachers, students and Chiefs. Purposive sampling was used to sample the Sub-county Director of Education (SCDE). These sampling techniques were based on Mugenda & Mugenda (2003) formulastating that 10% to 30% of the study population is a representation enough for the study. Kothari (2017) notes that to enhance efficiency, representativeness, reliability and flexibility, it requires the use of a small random sample which is suitable and much superior to a larger but badly selected sample. Table 3.1 illustrates the sampling frame.

Table 3.2: Sampling Frame

Respondents	Target Population	Ratio	Sample Size	Sampling method	Data collection method
Head-teachers	158	0.1	16	Simple Random	Questionnaire
Teachers	2078	0.1	207	Simple Random	Questionnaire
Students	22351	(16 x7)	112	Simple Random	FGD guide
Chiefs (KII)	61	0.1	6	Simple Random	Interview Schedule
Sub-County Director of Education (KII)	5		2	Purposive	Interview Schedule
Total	**24,648**		**343**		

The ratio was obtained from the Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) formula that supports that a sample made up of between 10% and 30% is sufficient to conduct the research. Therefore, the study utilised a total sample size of 172 subjects for Kajiado North and Isinya Sub-counties in Kajiado County.

3.6 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

This section covers the inclusion and exclusion criteria for respondents in the study.

3.6.1 Inclusion

Public secondary schools, senior students, headteachers,teachers, Chiefs, and Sub-County Education Officer from Kajiado North and Isinya Sub-counties were the only participants in the study. Public secondary schools in and near high volume areas were preferred for the study.

3.6.2 Exclusion criteria

Primary schools in Kajiado County were excluded from the study.Mashuru,Kajiado Central and Loitokitok Sub-counties were excluded from the study.

3.7 Data Collection Tools

The study used questionnaires, interview schedules and a Focus Group Discussion guide for data collection. The questionnaires were considered suitable due to their versatility andserve a large group of respondents. Interviews schedules were essential as they facilitatedone on one interaction with the key informants. Interview schedules are adaptable and questions can be restructured as per the context in real-time. The observation was utilised to complement both questionnaires and interview schedules.

3.7.1 Interview Schedule

An interview schedule is a set of questions with structured answers meant to guide the respondent (Jacob & Furgerson, 2012). They are essential tools for gathering detailed information on workplace discrimination for the study. The gesture during the interview provides crucial hidden information that could otherwise not be easy to acquire. The researcher during interviewing can tailor a question based on the existing circumstances. Key informant interviews (KII) were conducted for the Sub-CountyDirector ofEducation and the chiefs. KII is essential as they have pertinent data on the status of student extreme radicalisation in schools. The researcher thus acquired important data onstudent extremist radicalisation that is starting to encroach in secondary schools in Kajiado County.

3.7.2 Questionnaires

According to Rea & Parker (2014), a questionnaire is a research instrument consisting of a series of questions and other prompts to gather information from respondents. Questionnaires are practical and provide space to collect a large amount of information from a large group of people. The results obtained from the questionnaire can easily be quantified and analysed scientifically. The questionnaires were administered to headteachers and teachersthat were sampled for the study.

3.7.3 Focus Group Discussion

Focus Group Discussion was essential for obtaining first-hand information from the participants (students) -one on one discourse of radicalisation in schools. Through the FGD, the researchers were to interact at a personal level with students to whom radicalisation affects the most. The tool was appropriate due to the sensitivityof the matter being studied thus with a one-on-one discourse and group energy; the students were confident to share on the matter. Besides, the tool helped researchers to study behaviours of the students on possibilities of some of them already being or were in the process of radicalisation. Students were placed in a focus group by teachers as a grown representative to obtain their knowledge and opinion on radicalisation toward violent extremism.

3.8Sources of data

Data sources involvedboth primary and secondary.

3.8.1 Primary Data

Primary data involved raw data directly obtained from the sources (respondents). The methodinvolved questionnaires, interview schedules and FGD guides.This was first-hand data obtained from the headteachers, teachers, students, chiefs and sub-county education officers).

3.8.2 Secondary Data

Secondary data sources involved document analysis of mainly published and unpublished books, journals, research reports and newspapers on student radicalisation in schools. The material for the literature review was obtained from the University Libraries, Kenya National Libraries Service (KNLS) and academic publications.

3.9 Piloting of the Research Instruments

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), reliability measures the degree to which a research instrument yields consistent results or data after repeated trials. Validity is the degree to which results obtained from the analysis of the data represent the phenomenon under study. The researcher carried out a pilot study in Kakamega County to pre-test and validate research tools. The pilot study enabled the researcher to identify items that required modification, which helped the researcher correct inconsistencies that arose from the instruments. Kakamega County can also provide a haven for sleeper cells to thrive. Nyaga (2017) study on youth radicalisation in Kenyan universities, which showed that youth especially in universities were prone to radicalisation who related with this public secondary schools might enhance the vice and opportunity for sleeper cells just like Kajiado. The finding from the pilot test validated the tool for data collection. The reliability test scores a Cronbach Alpha of .78, which was above the required Cronbach score of .7.

3.10 Data Management and Analysis

The study collected both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data were coded and analysed by IBM version 25.0 Statistical Package for the Social Scientist (SPSS). Analysis of quantitative data is the numerical representation and

manipulation of observations to describe and explain the phenomena (Ary *et al.*, 2013). Data were analysed at the 0.05 significance level. This allowed testing of statistical significance on student radicalisation in public secondary school in Kajiado County in Kenya. The resulting frequencies and percentages were presented using tables and figures. Qualitative data were indexed and coded in order to infer in line with the research objectives. Key informant interview data were transcribed and used to triangulate the observed trends in quantitative data. The measurable variables, research designs and method of analysis for the objective are provided in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Summary of statistical techniques

Specific Objectives	Data collection technique	Data analysis method
Objective 1: Assess the level of knowledge by teachers on factors inducing students to violent radicalisation	Questionnaire, Interview &FGD	1. Descriptive statistics 2. Kruskal-Wallis H test,
Objective 2: Evaluatethe strategies that have been implemented to address the emerging threat of recruitment and radicalisation among students	Questionnaire, Interview &FGD	1. Descriptive statistics (tables and figures) 2. Inferential statistics (Kruskal-Wallis H test)
Objective 3: Examine the challenges faced by the school management in their efforts to counter violent radicalisation	Questionnaire, Interview &FGD	1. Descriptive statistics (tables and figures) 2. Inferential statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation)

3.11 Limitations of the Study

Some of the respondents did not have a complete understudying of the whole study, which required proper orientation by the researcher. The study was limited by the fact that it relied substantially on the data collected from public secondary schools. There existed logistic challenges brought by the expansiveness of the County, hence the researcher prepared in advance to counter challenges of school accessibility and reachability by developing a guidance map.

3.12 Ethical Consideration

The study involved obtaining information from people, which involved the establishment of ethical rules to protect the source of information.

The researcher obtained permission from the School of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance of the Masinde Muliro University of Science and the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) to carry out the study so as to guard against ethical issues. Confidentiality of information and anonymity of data recording was assured using a written consent on every questionnaire. Sensitive secondary data were synthesised before the release of the study.

The researcher sought consent from the participants before commencing data collection. The participants were not required to write their names and contacts on the questionnaire or reveal their private home address. The participant's views were treated with the utmost confidence and only appear in this report. The principal investigator made sure that the data acquired from secondary sources did not bring any damage and distress.

3.13 Summary of the chapter

The study area was Kajiado County that was selected due to its neighbouring Nairobi County; there is an obvious the presence of sleeper cell within its boundary. The descriptive survey design was used in this study. The study focused on two sub-counties: Kajiado North and Isinya. The study population was made up of school principals, teachers, students, sub-county director of education and chiefs, who formed the unit of analysis. Likert-scale data were analysed using the Kruskal-Wallis

H test to infer and test the research hypothesis. Results were presented in table and figures.

CHAPTER FOUR

LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE BY TEACHERS ON FACTORS INDUCING STUDENTS TO RADICALISATION TOWARD VIOLENT EXTREMISM

This chapter presents the results on the level of knowledge by teachers on factors inducing students to radicalisation toward violent extremismin Kenya. Besides, it also covered demographic information, students' radicalisation toward violent extremism, signs of radicalisation, causes of student radicalisation, the susceptibility of students to radicalisation and students' drop-out rate in relation to radicalisation.

There was considerable political and academic interest in studying radicalisation toward violent extremism. A review of scholarly work on the level of knowledge by teachers on factors inducing students to radicalisation toward violent extremism. Violent extremist organisations (VEOs) remain active in Kenya. They have extended their influence in a number of areas (schools, worship centres and even non-profit organisations). Homegrown terrorism has complicated the fight against terrorism.

4.1Socio-Demographic Information

The socio-demographic characteristic of a population being investigated was an important component for this study.

4.1.1 Participant demography

This subsection covered the demographic characteristics for this study (Principals, teachers, students, Chiefs and the Sub-County Education Officers) in Kajiado County. Table 4.1 illustrated the participant demography.

Table 4.1: The participants' demography

Participant's demography		Kajiado North and Isinya Sub-counties	
		Frequency (%)	
		Male	*Female*
Principals		11	5
Teachers		91	116
Students		60	52
Chief		5	1
Sub-County Director of Education		1	1
Religion of students	Christian	87.9%	
	Muslim	4.9%	

Secondary school principals and teachers gave their responses by filling in the questionnaires. Chiefs and Sub-County Director of Education were interviewed. The students'participants gave their responses through aFocus Group Discussion, which was made up of sevenstudents per school from the16 schools selected (16x7=112=*n*) in Kajiado North and Isinya sub-counties.

The participant in Focus Group Discussion (FGD) – students -, the majority were aged between 17 – 19 years. Christian faithful made 87.9 per cent while the Muslim faithful made 4.9 per cent. The study considered this demographic characteristic because globally, studies show that schools and learning institutions have become a mundane recruitment ground for terror networks. The most vulnerable group of school-going children for recruitment into the violent groups were the young people from the age of 9 to 25 years; boys being the main targetof these radical groups (MoE, 2017). According to El-Muhammady (2018) Essay, in Malaysia students radicalised have been converted into radical extremists while pursuing their education. El-Muhammady (*ibid*) further pointed out that teachers/lecturers and religious leaders were recruiting these students to join the ranks of the terrorists.Basing on these findings, the researcher investigated the role of teachers in countering radicalisation in

public secondary schools in Kenya. Besides, teachers spent a lot of time with students and were required to be able to read the signs and protect students from potential sleeper cells within their environment that might lead to deleterious radicalisation toward violent extremism.

4.1.2 Knowledge of radicalisation into violent extremism by students

By the count, the majority of the FGD participants (100, *n*=112) knew about radicalisation into violent extremism. In addition, the majority of the participants rejected (90, *n*=112)the existence of radicalisation into violent extremism. However, 55 (34.5%) of the students who accepted that radicalisation existed though on a low profile.Globally, students are the main target for recruitment by the extremist radical groups, hence it was paramount to understandtheirknowledge level onthe radicalisation of students toward violent extremism.

4.2 The level of knowledge by teachers on factors inducing students to radicalisation toward violent extremism

The researcher investigated the level of knowledge by teachers on student radicalisation toward violent extremismin public schools.

4.2.1 Student radicalisationtoward violent extremism

The study investigated the level of knowledge by teachers on factors inducing students to radicalisation toward violent extremism. Figure 4.1 illustrates the findings.

Figure 4.1: Student being radicalised towards violent extremism

The results in Figure 4.1 showed that 76 (36.1%) of teachers acknowledgedthe existence of radicalisation toward violent extremism amongst students. However, 107 (52.8%) of teachers failed to acknowledgethe existence of radicalisation toward violent extremism in their schools. Moreover, 24 (11.1%) of teachers were not sure whether students were experiencing radicalisation towards violent extremism.

The Pearson Chi-square test of goodness-of-fit was conducted to test whether teachers knew the students were being radicalised (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2: Student radicalisation

Test Statistics

	Students being radicalised
Chi-Square	9.500[a]
Df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.009

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 12.0.

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Teachers (*n*=207) were sampled to determine whether those who knew about student radicalisation towards violent extremism (*n*=76) was equal to those who did not (*n*=107) and those who were not sure of the existence (*n*=24). A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit was performed.The null hypothesis was rejected. The teachers' knowledge on student radicalisation toward violent extremism was not equally distributed in the population, χ^2 (2, N = 207) = 9.50, *p*= .009. More than a third (1/3) of the teachers acknowledged the existence of radicalisation toward violent extremism in their schools.

Schools' environment has become mundane places for students' recruitment to join terrorism (O'Neill & Daltom, 2010). Kenya insecurity was exacerbated by the incursion of the Kenya Defence Forces into Somalia as was corroborated by (Odhiambo *et al*., 2015). The youth are the main target of the radical elements that have a big desire to achieve their political end (McChesney, 2015). The current social trends have led to many risky exposures to children andstudents toward violent extremism. The slightest hint of radicalisation toward violent extremismshould be treated with utmost urgency to eliminate any potential impending terror acts. Teachers are important facets in societies whose roles are significant and valuable. Teachersbeing part of students' development, they instil discipline and build students personality. Teachers influence students' behaviour which was why the researcher opted to determine their knowledge level on factors inducing the student to radicalisation toward violent extremism. According to Agnew (2018), young people were more at risk of joining terrorist groups or being arrested for terrorist offences. In line with the findings by Agnew, the youths (students) in Kenya were profiled as predisposed to a higher risk of radicalisation toward violent extremism by terror

groups operating within and or without Kenyan borders. Thestudent Focus Group

Discussion Forum showed that there existed radicalisation as was stated that:

> …students in public secondary, quite a good number of them have been compromised and yes, radicalisation toward violent extremism exists. Here in Kajiado County, the students are no exception.

Moreover, SCDEkey informants stated that:

> …secondary-going school individuals are gullible and can easily stray and follow the wrong group that exposes them to extremist violent groups.

4.2.2 Signs of radicalisation

The study established the signs of radicalisation among students in public schools in

Kajiado County. Table 4.3 illustrated the findings.

Table 4.3: Observing signs of radicalisation toward violent extremism (n=207)

Signs of radicalisation	Agree or Strongly Agree	Moderate	Disagree or Strongly Disagree
In contact with extremist recruiters	6.5%	9.7%	83.9%
Accessing violent extremist websites	22.6%	19.4%	58.1%
Accessing violent extremist literature	9.4%	25.0%	65.6%
Using extremist narratives to explain personal disadvantage	18.8%	12.5%	68.8%
Justifying the use of violence to solve societal issues	19.4%	12.9%	67.7%
Joining or seeking to join extremist organisations	9.4%	28.1%	62.5%

The results in Table 4.3 showed the various signs of radicalisation that could be

related to student's behaviour regarding radicalisation towards violent extremism. The

signs of radicalisation towards violent extremism were influenced as follows: access

to violent websites 48(22.6%), justifying the use of violence to solve societal issues

40(19.4%), use of extremist narratives to explain personal disadvantages 36(18.8%),

accessing extremist literature 20 (9.4%), seeking the join extremist organisations 20(9.4%) and being in contact with extremist recruiters 12(6.5%).

The Kruskal Wallis H test was conducted by the researcher to establish the differences between the knowledge on radicalisation toward violent extremismaccording to years worked by the teachers in the school. Table 4.4 illustrated the Kruskal Wallis H test statistics.

Table 4.4: Kruskal Wallis H test on teachers' knowledge of radicalisation

Variables	Kruskal-Wallis H	df	Asymp. Sig.
In contact with extremist recruiters	6.892	3	.075
Accessing violent extremist websites, especially those with a social networking element	9.877	3	.020
Possessing or accessing violent extremist literature	4.724	3	.193
Using extremist narratives and a global ideology to explain personal disadvantage	9.427	3	.024
Justifying the use of violence to solve societal issues;	20.557	3	.000
Joining or seeking to join extremist organisations	7.023	3	.071

The results showed that there were no statistically significant differences between being in contact with extremist recruiters, possessing and accessing violent extremist literature and joining or seeking to join the extremist organisation and the years worked in the school: $H(3) = 6.89$, $p = .08$), $H(3) = 4.72$, $p=.193$, $H(3) = 7.02$, $p=.07$ respectively. The researcher conducted post hoc tests to test pairwise comparisons as illustrated in Figure 4.2.

Hypothesis Test Summary

	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of Accessing violent extremist websites, especially those with a social networking element is the same across categories of How long have you been in the school.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.020	Reject the null hypothesis.
2	The distribution of Using extremist narratives and a global ideology to explain personal disadvantage is the same across categories of How long have you been in the school.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.024	Reject the null hypothesis.
3	The distribution of Justifying the use of violence to solve societal issues; is the same across categories of How long have you been in the school.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.000	Reject the null hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

Figure 4.2: Kruskal-Wallis H Post Hoc test on teachers' knowledge on radicalisation

A Kruskal Wallis 1-Way ANOVA post hoc was conducted to compare the signs of radicalisation on secondary school students. It revealed that there were statistically significant differences between accessing the violent website (social network), using extremist narratives and ideologies to explain personal disadvantage and justifying the use of violence to solve societal issues; $H(3) = 9.88.$, $p = .02$, $H(3) = 9.43$, $p = .024$ and $H(3) = 20.56$, $p < .001$ respectively. The null hypothesis was therefore rejected. These results suggested that there were signs of radicalisation towards violent extremismin schools. Specifically, it informed the school management of encroaching vice of radicalisation towards violent extremismin schools.

Determination of the role of education – teachers' knowledge– was relevant to this study.Teacher's knowledge empowers students to become self-sufficient and not easily radicalised toward violent extremism(Pels & de Ruyter, 2012; Botha, 2013). The ability to identify and intervene in signs of radicalisationtowards violent

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extremism was critical for this study regarding the management of the vice. The growing terror acts have had a major blow in the education sector due to loss of lives for both teachers and students and disruption of learning programs (MoE, 2017). The Increased riots and demonstration in schools was a product of radicalisation process that eventually matured to extreme violence. The teachers' knowledge on this paradigm shift helps intervene and provide the solution and counter-radicalisation toward violent extremism in schools. The school managementsare able to look into these variables that act as a conduit through which radical groups use to reach vulnerable students.According to Bhylls Acre Primary School, Wolverhampton, the objectives of the school management are to ensure that staff are fully engaged in being vigilant about radicalisation (Tannock & Sukarieh, 2016). Modern technologies and lifestyle are some of the main attracting forces leading to increased radicalisation in learning institutions. According to the Chief KII, it was stated that:

> …signs of students' radicalisation toward violent extremism aretaking place in the secondary schools in Kajiado County.

In line with this finding, Borum (2014), noted that radicalisation signs began to show when an individual started to withdraw him/herself from others and became secretive. SCDE KII stated that:

> …Students displaying signs of disconnect from society and its norms, begin to devalue people and tend to lean towards extreme violence.

Therefore, these aspects had started emerging in secondary schools in Kajiado County which was indicative of extreme radical minds popping up.

4.2.3 Causes of student radicalisation

The study investigated the causes of student radicalisation into violent extremism. Table 4.5 illustrates the findings.

Table 4.5: Causes of student radicalisation into violent extremists

Causes of student radicalisation	Agree or Strongly Agree	Moderate	Disagree or Strongly Disagree
Marginalisation influences radicalisation	24.2%	36.4%	39.4%
Poverty influences radicalisation	60.0%	17.1%	22.9%
Unemployment influences radicalisation	57.1%	22.9%	20.0%
Radicalisation influenced by religious justification	22.9%	31.4%	45.7%
Political change influences radicalisation	12.1%	33.3%	54.5%
Securing income opportunities influences radicalisation	42.9%	25.7%	31.4%

n=207

The results in Table 4.5 illustrated that poverty had the most influence on radicalisation with a score of 60 per cent. Unemployment influenced radicalisation with a score of 57.1 per cent. Securing income opportunities influenced radicalisation with a score of 42.9 per cent. Marginalisation influenced radicalisation with a score of 24.2 per cent. Religious justification influenced with a score of 22.9 per cent. Finally, political change was found to influence radicalisation with a score of 12.1 per cent.

The Kruskal-Wallis H test was performed to ascertain the differences between the causes of radicalisation toward violent extremismaccording to the years working in the school. Table 4.6 illustrated the Kruskal Wallis H test statistics.

Table 4.6: Kruskal Willis H test for causes of radicalisation in schools

Variables	Kruskal-Wallis H	df	Asymp. Sig.
Student radicalisation into violent extremist is largely influenced by marginalization	7.440	3	.059
Student radicalisation into violent extremist is largely influenced by poverty	4.442	3	.217
Student radicalisation into violent extremist is largely influenced by unemployment	3.214	3	.360
Students' radicalisation into violent extremist is purely based on religious justification	5.688	3	.128
Student radicalisation into violent extremist is largely influenced by political change	.044	3	.998
Students' radicalisation into violent extremism is a form of securing income opportunities	3.514	3	.319

The results found that there were no statistically significant differences between marginalisation, poverty, unemployment, religious justification, political change and income security and the years worked at the school: $H(3) = 7.44$, $p = .26$, $H(3) = 4.44$, $p = .22$, $H(3) = 3.21$, $p = .36$, $H(3) = 5.69$, $p = .13$, $H(3) = .04$, $p = 1$, and $H(3) = 3.51$, $p = .32$ respectively.

The radicalisation process was enabled by the structural factors, the motivating factors and the facilitating factors. The structural factors - poverty, marginalisation and unemployment - created an enabling environment that cultivated secondary school students to join radical groups that might eventually subject them to becomeviolent extremists. It was established in a number of studies that the majority of radical political leaders (motivating factors) used politics to enhance the radicalisation of youths toward violent extremism. They target vulnerable young people in learning institutions. Internet usage and religious beliefs were the facilitating factors that played a major role in enhancing radicalisation toward violent extremism. It was stated by SCDE and Chiefs key informant that:

> …among the key targets for radical violent extremist,there are individuals whose political grievances cannot be channelled into an existing political system. So, they decide to use violence to pass their message to the government. They, therefore, need soldiers within their ranks to executive these terror acts. By doing so, students are targeted.

A member from FGDstated that:

> …the kind of politics being exercised in Kenya that promotes tribalism and encourages corruption has impoverished the country. This has made it possible for radical terror groups to thrive in the country. These outlawed groups are providing an alternative to many marginalized individuals in the country, thus, promoting their ideas to violence.

According to the report by the Counter Extremism Project (2018), there was an increasing number of Kenyans converts into Islam joining Al-Shabab forces totalling around 10 per cent of the force. The converts were young overzealous individuals that had been exposed to extreme radicalisation by poverty (Kamali, 2015; DuBois & Alem, 2017; Ruteere & Mutahi, 2018). Al-Shabaab terror group was the main cause of four major terror attacks in Kenya that saw a score of people dead – Westgate Shopping Mall Attack (68), Mpeketoni Attack (60), Garissa University College Attack (148) and Nairobi Dusit D2 Complex Attack (22. The loss of parents, physical punishment, support by the parents and peer pressure had been attributed to causing youths and school-going children to be exposed to the ideas of joining violent extremist groups (Angus, 2016). Exposing children to hardship and the lack of love and provision of good role modelling was and will always lead to encroachment of radicalisation in learning institutions. Nyaga (2017) revealed that poor political propagation by some politician influenced radicalisation among university students through sponsoring a few to carry out radical behaviours. Young slum dwellers in Kenya were easy prey for terrorist recruiters from al-Shabaab and ISIS; good politics should protect the youth from radicalisation towards violent extremism (Hellsten,

2016). The incursion of Kenya Defence Forces into Somalia motivated Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda and they will continue to attack Kenya as a way of retaliation (Odhiambo et al., 2015). Garissa University was attacked by this outlawed outfit – Al-Shabaab as a way to have KDF leave Somalia, which was quite unfortunate to 148 lives – sons and daughters maimed out of castigation of terrorism that had a bearing of students' collusion (Hellsten, 2016). Potentially, unemployment and escalating poverty contributing towards the radicalisation process even toward violent extremism(Hellstein, 2016; Nyaga, 2017); with reference to Nairobi Dusit D2 Drive Complex Hotel. A drug abuser was also a group of youths that were vulnerable to joining organised illegal radical groups as alluded to by Nyaga (2017). Therefore, students left unchecked and unattended by teachers and the community become a ticking time bomb that might go off at a snap of a finger. Teachers' role at this early stage of radicalisation was essential in its management before it takes off.MoE (2017) found that there had been an emergence of youth embracing violent extremism in secondary schools; organized criminal groups that advocate violence or conduct violent activities. School-children carrying weapons to schools; reference of 2021 reports on a student from Kisii High School who attacked his teacher with a knife and injured him.

4.2.4 Susceptibility of student radicalisation

The study examined the susceptibility of subjecting students to extreme radicalisation. Figure 4.2 illustrated the findings.

Figure 4.2: Factors enhancing the susceptibility of students to radicalisation

The results in Figure 4.3 showed that most students' vulnerabilities were caused by students questioning their place in society, their difficulty in interacting socially and lacking empathy and them having low self-esteem which scored 60 per cent each. It was found that experiencing traumatic events influenced vulnerabilities with a score of 57.1 per cent. There was evidence of students struggling with a sense of identity which scored 54.3 per cent. Students' vulnerability was subjected by them becoming distanced from their cultural and or religious backgrounds (51.4%). Some students experienced ethnicity and or discrimination that exposed them to culprits of extreme radicalisation (12.1%).

The Kruskal-Wallis H test was performed to establish the differences between the susceptibilities exposing students to radicalisation toward violent extremismaccording to years working in the school. Table 4.7 illustrated the Kruskal-Wallis H test statistics.

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Table 4.7: Kruskal-Wallis H test for the susceptibility of students to radicalisation into violent extremists

Variables	Kruskal-Wallis H	df	Asymp. Sig.
Struggling with a sense of identity	1.481	3	.687
Becoming distanced from their cultural or religious background	.564	3	.905
Questioning his/her place in society	6.451	3	.092
Experiencing traumatic events	1.189	3	.756
Experiencing ethnicity or discrimination	2.907	3	.406
Being difficult in interacting socially and lacking empathy	1.256	3	.740
Having low self-esteem	2.689	3	.442

The results showed that there were no statistically significant differences between struggling with sense of identity, distance from cultural and or religious background, questioning their place in society, traumatic experience, discrimination, difficulty to interact socially & lack of empathy and having low self-esteem to the years worked at the school: $H(3) = 1.48$, $p = .69$, $H(3) = .56$, $p = .91$, $H(3) = 6.45$, $p = .09$, $H(3) = 1.19$, $p = .76$, $H(3) = 2.91$, $p = .41$, $H(3) = 1.26$, $p = .74$, and $H(3) = 2.69$, $p = .44$ respectively.

Susceptibility for radicalisation was mostly based in the education sector that amplified frustrated ambition among individuals who then found gratification in taking extremist attitude and/or actions. The vulnerabilities of students in Kenya were the best cultivating factor that could be utilized easily by extremist radical recruiters to recruit secondary school-going youths. According to Pretch (2007), the key requirement to recruitwasfor the recruiter to have charismatic characteristics to persuade potential candidates in schools. Borum (2014), posited that extremist radicalisation always begins when an individual felt aggrieved, discriminated against, lacked a sense of identity and was exposed to a lot of traumatic events. Schmid (2016) stipulated that the exposure level to terrorism followed a dichotomous worldview by

acceptance of an alternative focal point of the conventional political order as it was no longer legitimate.

Globally, there is a steady increase in violent extremist organisations (VEOs) that have found it easier to radicalise young individuals exposed to potentially vulnerable conditions. The radical groups were cultivating an extreme culture to cause panic and chaos as a way to express their grievances to the governments. The behaviour was the same between the developed and the developing countries. The target population for promoting the vice of radicalisation toward violent extremismwere students (youths) who were found to be gullible and easily convinced to join their course. In 2007, the UK government intervened a serious children recruitment (as young as thirteen years) into violent extremist terror groups: community members reported to the government (parents, imams, religious leaders and teachers). In 2008, saw youths in Kenya moving to Somalia to join Al-Shabaab a terrorist group (NCTC). Boys and young men living in the slums were often approached by al-Shabaab or ISIS recruiters, because of the little hope of education and good jobs are particularly easy prey (Hellsten, 2016).

The most vulnerable group for recruitment were the young people from the age of 9 to 25, boys being the main target (MoE, 2017).Nyaga (2017), found out that university students were most susceptible to radicalisation with male students dominating the scene. This begged the question if more informed students could be an easy target to radicalisation, what about the secondary school-going children? In 2019, there was an attack at Nairobi Dusit D2 Complex Attack, where Kenyan youth were involved in the attack which claimed the life of 22 innocent persons and 5 attackers.

Unemployment in Kenya especially for most graduates was worse, therefore, the majority of youths tend to join the outlawed groups to make ends meet.

4.2.5 A student drops out of school in relation to radicalisation

The study investigated whether any existing relationship between students dropping out of school to radicalisation toward violent extremism violence. Figure 4.3 illustrated the findings.

Relationship of Student drop out and radicalisation

Figure 4.3: The relationship between the student's dropout and radicalisation

The results in Figure 4.3 showed that 33 (16.1%) of the participants were of the opinion that the continuous scenario of student dropout was related to radicalisation toward violent extremism. However, the majority of 174 (83.9%) of participants were of the opinion that there was no relationship between student dropout and radicalisation towardsviolent extremism. Terrorism is a distractive venture that leads to instability in the social, economic, political and environmental spheres. The small

relationship that might exist between students dropping out of school to join terror networks must be dealt with swiftly. The study found that atleast there was a connection between dropout rate to radicalisation toward violent extremism.Table 4.8 summarisedthe Pearson Chi-Square test of goodness-of-fit that was conducted to establish the relationship between the dropout rate of students to radicalisation toward violent extremism.

Table 4.8: Dropping out rate in relation to radicalisation

Test Statistics

	Continuous Student dropout
Chi-Square	14.226[a]
Df	1
Asymp. Sig.	.000

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 15.5.

Teachers ($n=207$) were sampled to determine whether would agree to the dropping out of students from the school had a statistically significantto radicalisation toward violent extremism (16.13%) was equal to those who disagreed (83.87%). A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit was performed. The null hypothesis was rejected. The teachers' knowledge to student radicalisation was not equally distributed in the population, χ^2 (1, N = 207) = 14.23, p < .001). A significant percentage (13%)of teachers agreed that the dropout of students was attributed to student radicalisation toward violent extremism.

A member from FGD stated that: "there is a relationship between the rate of students dropout to radicalisation." The SCDE key informant stated that:

> … there is a particular trend that had been observed where the majority of secondary school students tend to drop out in form three. This is an indicator of radicalisation influencing them to drop out of school.

An FGDparticipant stated that:

> ...recruiters, who are within the school system tend to start recruitment in form two where they sell the ideologies of joining a radical group and the benefits therein. In form three an individual is fully convinced of the ideologies of the terror group and is now ready to make a move.

Chief's key informant stated that:

> ...children are prone to follow new ideas easily. The recruiter(s) existing within the school system is quite dangerous for the security of the students.

Radicalisation is a complex phenomenon and the reasons for joining extremist organisations vary between social groups: poverty and promise for money and material rewards, jihadist ideologies and dysfunctional politics (Hellsten, 2016). Therefore, susceptible school-going children would find it easy to chase the promise for a better life and commit treason in the end. Understand the changing behaviours of the students is paramount by the teachers and the school guiding and counsel in charge for haste management of the case.

CHAPTER FIVE

STRATEGIESIMPLEMENTED TO ADDRESS THE EMERGING THREAT OF RECRUITMENT AND RADICALISATION AMONG STUDENTS

The chapter covers the strategies implemented for addressing the emerging threats of secondary school-going students' recruitment to joining radical terror groups. The focus is placed on the measures taken to prevent radicalisation toward violent extremismin Kenya, counter-radicalisation measures and school management involvement in countering radicalisation

The strategies used to address threats of radicalisation were critical due to increased cases of radicalisation among students in learning institutions. The study established the strategies that were undertaken by the governments in Kenya (national and county) in addressing the emerging threats of secondary school students' recruitment into violent extremists. The section focused on the measures taken to prevent radicalisation, counter-radicalisation measures and school management involvement in managing radicalisation.

5.1 Measures are taken to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism in Kenyan Schools

The researcher determined the preventive measures taken to reduce violent extremism among secondary school students in Kajiado County in Kenya. Table 5.1 illustrates the findings.

Figure 5.1: The preventive measures for radicalization into violent extremists (n=207)

According to Fig. 5.1, the mostpreventive measure employed by schools to address radicalisation of students toward violent extremism were that: students were being engaged in academic and career goals to mitigate against brainwashing and jihad (68.18%), introduced external speakers to the school to deal with possible extremism violent extremism among students (53.82%), school management rebutted students found to sympathise with terrorism (39.85%), schools introduced welfare, pastoral care, chaplain supports that provided sufficient care for vulnerable learners (39.08%), teachers were being trained to identify signs that would draw students into violent extremism(37.31%), stern actions were being taken against school staff members that demonstrated unacceptable views (29.07%) and online safety measures were being enforced to protect against students accessing dangerous and or illegal sites (28.79%).

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The Kruskal-Wallis H test was performed to establish the differences between the measures of students' radicalisation toward violent extremismaccording to teachers' years working in the school. Table 5.1 illustrated the Kruskal-Wallis H test statistics.

Table 5.1: Kruskal-Wallis H test on the measures for radicalization in secondary school students

Variables	Kruskal-Wallis H	df	Asymp. Sig.
Students are being taught towards academic engagement and career goals away from brainwashing terror and jihad	7.107	3	.069
Introduction of welfare, pastoral care, chaplain supports to provide sufficient care and support for vulnerable learners	7.554	3	.056
Introduction of external speakers to schools in order to deal with possible instances of extremism	.856	3	.836
Online safety measures are taken such as blocking access to dangerous or illegal sites by filtering and using a firewall system	7.988	3	.046
School management rebut those students found to sympathise with terrorism	9.185	3	.027
Established standards of ethics and behaviours for teachers regarding extremism that enables schools to take stern actions against staff who demonstrate unacceptable views	9.209	3	.027
Teachers are trained to help identify and refer to relevant agencies, students whose behaviours suggest they are being drawn into terrorism and extremism ideology	12.647	3	.005

The results showed no statistically significant differences between students training away from brainwashing terror and jihad, the introduction of welfare, pastoral care, chaplain supports to provide sufficient care and support for vulnerable learners and the introduction of external speakers to schools in order to deal with possible instances of extremism and years working at the school: $H(3) = 7.11$, $p = .07$, $H(3) = 7.55$, $p = .06$, $H(3) = .86$, $p = .84$ respectively. However, this preventive measure can be effective in the management of the radicalisation menace in learning institutions in

Kenya. The study finds that the missing link in the learning institution to fully incorporate the preventive measures to radicalisation is deterring it from eradicating radicalisation into violent extremism.

The researcher conducted post hoc tests to test pairwise comparisons as illustrated in Figure 5.2.

Hypothesis Test Summary

	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of Online safety measures are taken such as blocking access of dangerous or illegal sites by filtering and using firewall system is the same across categories of How long have you been in the school.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.046	Reject the null hypothesis.
2	The distribution of School management rebut those students found to sympahise with terrorism is the same across categories of How long have you been in the school.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.027	Reject the null hypothesis.
3	The distribution of Established standards of ethics and behaviours for teachers regarding extremisn that enables schools to take stern actions against staff who demostrate unacceptable views is the same across categories of How long have you been in the school.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.027	Reject the null hypothesis.
4	The distribution of Teachers are trained to help identifyt, and refer to relevant agencies, students whose behaviours suggest they are being drawn into terrorism and extremism ideo;ogy is the same across categories of How long have you been in the school.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.005	Reject the null hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

Figure 5.2: Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way ANOVA Post Hoc test for preventive measures

There was statistically significant for online safety measures taken such as blocking access to dangerous or illegal sites by filtering and using firewall system, school management rebutting students found to sympathise with terrorism, establishing standards of ethics and behaviours for teachers regarding extremism that enables schools to take stern actions against staff who demonstrate unacceptable views and teachers trained to help identify and refer to relevant agencies students whose behaviours suggest they are being drawn into terrorism and extremism ideology according to years of working by teachers in the school; $H(3) = 7.99$, $p = .05$, $H(3) = 9.19$, $p = .03$, $H(3) = 9.21$, $p = .03$, and $H(3) = 12.65$, $p = .01$ respectively. Taken together, these results suggest that these preventive measures have proven to be applicable in mitigating against radicalisation toward violent extremism in schools.

Students are vulnerable due to their teenage anatomical and morphological characteristics or features that may expose them to risks. Preventing radicalisation from encroaching in schools is the best way to address radical extremist organisation from reaching and recruiting the youths.The two key drivers of terrorism are conducive structural context (lack of socio-economic opportunities, marginalisation and discrimination, poor governance, unresolved conflicts) and radicalisation processes (motivation, grievances and victimisation, political ideologies, cultural differences and poor leadership). To prevent radicalisation, understanding the factors that compel youth to join is paramount. Osman (2013), assumed that deprivation and alienation of individuals are predictors of radicalisation into extremist groups. Ooko (2014), corroborates this study finding that the scholars have not struck a balance on the typology that determines what prompts the youths to accommodate radical ideas for terrorism. Besides, the terror cells are compost of learned individuals with various

skills, therefore, justifying the reason as to why they tend to join outlawed groups is still a paradox as supported by Nyaga (2017).

Kenya's Eastleigh area in the City of Nairobi has had a number of terror attacks. The town is dominated by integrated Somali refugees, who might have been the main reason for easy attacks. Rahimi and Graumans (2015) stipulated that a popular explanation for radicalisation that leads to terrorism is rooted in the failure of multiculturalism and integration.SCDE key informant stated that:

> …in my opinion, I feel that the Kenyan non-Muslims who have been radicalised were working in Eastleigh, which made them easy targets for radicalisation

Since 2016 there has been increasing cases of arson in public secondary schools, which led to countering violent extremism (CVE) gaining prominence among policymakers and practitioners in schools (MoE, 2017). The Ministry of Education put in place mechanisms to address violent extremism in schools in Kenya, but this study found they were not operational due to lack of capacity building materials to schools. Discipline mechanisms for learners that promote a conducive environment for peaceful learning, the relationship between student welfare and the emergence of violence in schools, and the role of communities in addressing emerging forms of violence in schools still lack in public secondary schools in Kenya.

5.2 Counter-radicalisation measures

The studyexamined the counter-radicalisation measures being used by secondary schools in Kenya. Figure 5.3 illustrated the findings.

Figure 5.3: Counter-radicalisation

The results in Figure 5.2 showed that counter-radicalisation measures had been effective in your school at 36 (68.8%), that the school management has been involved in countering radicalisation in partnership with the government 10 (18.8%), that some of the counter-radicalisation measures by the school and the government have led to counter-productive outcomes that have exacerbated radicalisation in secondary schools in Kenya 20 (37.5%) and that there is a need to adopt a multi-sector approach in countering radicalisation in Kenya 20 (37.5%).

The researcher computed the Kruskal-Wallis H test to establish the differences between the counter-radicalisation measures by the schools and other agencies on students' radicalisation toward violent extremism according to teachers' years working in the school. Table 5.2 illustrated the Kruskal-Wallis H test statistics.

Table 5.2: Kruskal-Wallis H test for counter-radicalisation measures

Variables	Kruskal-Wallis H	df	Asymp. Sig.
Counter-radicalisation measures have been effective in your school	2.634	3	.452
The school management has been involved in countering radicalisation in partnership with the government	1.735	3	.629
Some of the counter-radicalisation measures by the school and the government have led to counter-productive outcomes that have exacerbated radicalisation in secondary schools in Kenya	3.144	3	.370
There is a need to adopt a multi-sector approach in countering radicalisation in Kenya	8.187	3	.042

The results established that there were no statistically significant differences between counter-radicalisation measures effectiveness in the schools, the school management involvement in countering radicalisation in partnership with the government and counter-productive outcomes exacerbated by the cooperation between school management and the government on radicalisation eradication in secondary schools according to the years worked by teachers at the school: $H(3) = 2.63$, $p = .45$, $H(3) = 1.74$, $p = .63$, $H(3) = 3.14$, $p = .37$ respectively.

The researcher conducted post hoc tests to test pairwise comparisons as illustrated in Figure 5.3.

Hypothesis Test Summary

	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of There is need to adopt multi-sector approach in countering radicalisation in Kenya is the same across categories of How long have you been in the school.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.042	Reject the null hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

Figure 5.3: Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way ANOVA Post Hoc test for the countermeasures of student radicalisation

The null hypothesis was rejected. The study established that there was a statistical significance between the need to adopt a multi-sector approach in countering radicalisation in Kenya $H(3) = 8.19$, $p = .04$. The study showed that it was important for the school management to adopt a multi-sectoral approach as a counter-measure to eradicating the radicalisation of students by radical terror groups operating within or without Kenya. This approach would be crucial to managing the menace of radicalisation in the learning institutions in Kenya.

A multi-sectoral approach to countering radicalisation is an acceptable strategy endorsed by the schools to eliminate the radicalisation of students by radical extremist groups. The school management in collaboration with the government agencies fighting student radicalisation must be appreciated at all times. The strategy of countering radicalisation has worked for some schools in Kajiado County, Kenya. Learning institutions, in particular, are a significant meeting point, trigger or birthplace of radicalisation (Brown & Saeed, 2015). Radical groups are in most cases motivated by political-ideological that fuels their objectives to harm others. It has been noted by many scholars, the terrorists always hide behind religion so as to

appear relevant (Rausch, 2015; Nacos, 2016; Juergensmeyer, 2017). The radical leaders use religion to further their courses of created chaos, harm and instabilities in a country. Moreover, Botha (2014a), finds that religious rhetoric has always been used as a method of legitimizing their politically motivated actions and lure the Muslim society.

Kenya has a lot of western interests, investments, installations, diplomatic corps and headquarters to international agencies (Cannon, 2016). In addition, Kenya enjoys close ties with Israel. The attack of Nairobi Dusit D2 complex Hotel was claimed to have been caused by the United States of America government proposing the relocation of the Capital City of Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The terrorists (Al-Shabaab) did not appreciate the proposal hence the attack. The socio-political landscape of Kenya's communities serves as a recruitment point. Addressing the radicalisation requires a concerted effort from the schools, communities, religious participation and the government agencies to counter the scourge of terrorism. The underlying causes for radicalisation into violent extremism should be dealt with swiftly: poverty, unemployment, political marginalisation, discrimination, tribalism, religion-based violence, media and globalisation, control weapon access and funding security. The youth population is high in Kenya; however, employment opportunities are few exposing the highly learned youth to poverty and hardship. There is a high poverty index, which increases the vulnerabilities of the youth to join or subscribe to terrorist ideologies.

Watheka (2015), radicalism is mainly driven by the socio-political agenda, that exploits youths and students' vulnerabilities to recruit them. According to Dearden, (2017), an analyst from the Oasis Foundation observed that issues of identity, poverty

and religious literacy are not being properly tackled as push factors driving young people towards terror groups. SCDE$_1$stated that:

> …Religion is the opium of the people. It is the best avenue to recruit weak and vulnerable students to join radical terror groups.

It was further corroborated by an FGD participant who stated that:

…the majority of attackers in Kenya have had religion justification.

SCDE$_2$key informant stated that:

> … some of the religious leaders are exploiting the innocence of the congregants to further their grievances. Youths are at higher risk of this exploitation because of the promises of better lives.

5.3 School management involvement in countering radicalisation

School management performs important roles in schools. They are in charge of overseeing other teachers, student's welfare and make and enforce policies in schools. The management is key in providing the landscape that is viable and determinesa new curriculum by setting standards.The study sought to examine the role of school management in countering radicalisation vices in schools. Table5.3 illustrates the findings.

Table 5.3: School management involvement in countering radicalisation (n=207)

School Management	Agree or Strongly Agree	Moderate	Disagree or Strongly disagree
Provide relevant education of good quality to counter violent extremist ideologies and acts of proliferation.	81.3%	0.0%	18.8%
Enforce policies that directly and indirectly address the specific drivers of violent extremism	75.0%	6.3%	18.8%
Teachers to pay attention to the personal challenges of students to manage signs of radicalisation	75.0%	6.3%	18.8%
Create a safe and supportive school environment	75.0%	6.3%	18.8%
To engage other key players in education to manage radicalisation in schools	75.0%	25.0%	0.0%

The results in Table 5.3 showed that the school management was crucial at the provision of relevant education of good quality to counter violent extremist ideologies and acts of proliferation 42 (81.3%), that enforcing policies that directly and indirectly address the specific drivers of violent extremism 39 (75.0%), that teachers should pay attention to the personal challenges of students to manage signs of radicalisation 39 (75.0%), that there should be the creation of a safe and supportive school environment 39 (75.0%), and that they should engage other key players in education to manage radicalisation in schools 39 (75.0%).

The researcher performed the Kruskal-Wallis H test to establish the differences between the school management involvement in the prevention of radicalisation in schools according to teachers' years working in the school. Table 5.4 illustrates the Kruskal-Wallis H test statistics.

Table 5.4: Kruskal-Wallis H test on the school management involvement in the prevention of radicalization in schools

Variables	Kruskal-Wallis H	df	Asymp. Sig.
Provide relevant education of good quality to counter violent extremist ideologies and acts of proliferation.	2.692	3	.442
Enforce policies that directly and indirectly address the specific drivers of violent extremism	3.829	3	.281
Teachers to pay attention to the personal challenges of students to manage signs of radicalisation	3.829	3	.281
Create a safe and supportive school environment	2.260	3	.520
To engage other key players in education to manage radicalisation in schools	2.500	3	.475

The results showed that there were no statistically significant differences between the provision of relevant education of good quality to counter violent extremist ideologies

and acts of proliferation, enforcement policies that directly and indirectly address the specific drivers of violent extremism, teachers to pay attention to the personal challenges of students to manage signs radicalisation, create a safe and supportive school environment and to engage other key players in education to manage radicalisation in schools according to the years worked by teachers at the school: $H(3) = 2.69$, $p = .44$, $H(3) = 3.83$, $p = .28$, $H(3) = 3.83$, $p = .28$, $H(3) = 2.26$, $p = .52$ and $H(3) = 2.5$, $p = .46$ respectively.

It was established that the school management was actively involved in the mitigation of radicalisation into extremist violence in schools. The radical extremist groups globally have used learning institution as a conduit for recruiting naïve youths. According to Wanzala (2017), terrors and criminal gangs have infiltrated primary and secondary schools; in Mombasa, criminal gangs and terrorists were using the schools as recruitment grounds. In line with this, the United Kingdom faced an unrelenting terrorist threat from student recruits (Dearden, 2017). To counter the vice of radical extremism, the young individuals in Great Britain are taught the importance of identifying signs of radicalisation by terror groups.

Schools are key to foster, strengthen resilience and prevent the students from subscribing to terrorist ideologies (Nordbrush, 2016). Education is leveraged as a conduit to radicalise and deradicalize youths. Teachers are an important facet to the growth and development of student's personality. Secondary schools in Kenya should integrate anti-terrorism into the curriculum. The education should be of good quality to foster nationalism and peacebuilding to addressing long-term peaceful coexistence. Policies on countering radicalisation should be enforced to contain any potential loopholes in the education system in Kenya. Students come from different

background and with different socio-economic status: teachers should pay close attention to their personal challenges to mitigate against radicalisation by extremist terror groups.

Quality of education provided in education prepares a student to realities of the world and enables him/her to reason rationally. Education should foster diversity across culture, religious background and geography. Teacher-student close relationship empowers students against the feeling of discrimination: effective support structures are paramount. The FGD participant stated that:"*… teachers should be trained to identify radicalisation and manage it before it grows further*. The Chief KII stated that: "*… some teachers are sympathisers of the terror networks operating in Kenya.*" SCDE$_1$stated that:

> … the conditions that make the radical extremist thrive in Kenya are poverty,marginalisation, tribalisation, corruption, nepotism and discrimination.

Therefore, countering violent extremism by offering training to teachers, BOMs, parents, support staff and students on the identification of early warning signs; coming up with alternative discipline mechanisms in handling violent cases, parenting skills, key security measures, and guidance of learners (MoE, 2017). The school management to encourage teachers and Muslim chaplains to be involved in students' welfare and challenge extremist views in schools. Clubs in school are important avenues to counter radicalisation, therefore, the school management should encourage clubs to talk and learn about the harm of radical terror groups to the stability of a country. Considering Odhiambo, Onkware and Leshan (2015) stipulated that Kenyan nationals were becoming internal terrorists with many of them receiving military training from Al-Shabaab in neighbouring Somalia, this must be cut off school management becoming proactive and pilled. Moreover, school management to avoid

inviting radical clerics who propagate hate and extreme violence recruiting youths to join radical militancy.

CHAPTER SIX

CHALLENGES FACED BY SCHOOL MANAGEMENT IN THEIR EFFORTS

TO COUNTER VIOLENT RADICALISATION

The chapter covers the challenges faced by the school management in their quest to counter the violent radicalisation of the students in their respective schools. Moreover, the chapter provides results and discussions on the policy adjustments to effectively counter radicalisation toward violent extremismof students.

6.1 Challenges of countering violent radicalisation by the school management

Radicalisation toward violent extremismis perceived to be a result of socio-economic, psychosocial, ideological or poor political engagement. It draws from social networks that play a major role in influencing individuals (students) to join. Eradicating radicalisation toward violent extremismrequireda concerted effort by the governments (national and county), schools and the security agencies. However, radicalisation in schools is a major concern in Kenya. Schools are faced with a horde of challenges of curbing the radicalisation of their students toward violent extremism.

Due to the increasing challenges faced by schools to manage radicalisation toward violent extremism, the researcher sought to examine the challenges faced by the school management in countering radicalisation into extremist violence. Table 6.1 illustrates the findings.

Table 6.1: Challenges of countering violent radicalisation by the school management (n=207)

Variables	Agree or Strongly Agree	Undecided	Disagree or Strongly Disagree
Lack of parental support	42.3%	15.4%	42.3%
Bad political influence on the youths leading to exposure to extremism	28.8%	42.3%	28.8%
Inadequate institutional support on the management of radicalisation in schools	51.9%	21.2%	26.9%
Insertion of a teacher or a student to facilitate recruitment	28.8%	26.9%	44.2%
Lack of the government to address the inherent poverty	44.2%	30.8%	25.0%
Religious beliefs on justification on the usage of violence to address grievances	38.5%	13.5%	48.1%
Corruption has become a cause to radicalisation into extremism	46.2%	17.3%	36.5%

The findings in Table 6.1 showedthat there were factors that contributed to the radicalisation of students toward violent extremism: the lack of parental support 88 (42.3%), bad political influence on the youths lead to exposure to violent extremism 60 (28.8%), inadequate institutional support on the management of radicalisation in schools 107 (51.9%), insertion of a teacher or a student to facilitate recruitment 60 (28.8%), the lack of the government to address the inherent poverty 91 (44.2%), religious beliefs on justification on the usage of violence to address grievances 80 (38.5%), and the corruption had become a cause to radicalisation toward violent extremism 96 (46.2%).

The Kruskal-Wallis H test was performed to determine the differences between the challenges experienced by the school management in the fight against radicalisation

toward violent extremismaccording to the teachers' years working in the school. Table 6.2 illustrated the Kruskal-Wallis H test statistics.

Table 6.2: Kruskal-Wallis H test for challenges faced by the school management to deracialize students

Challenges for curbing radicalisation in schools	Kruskal-Wallis H	df	Asymp. Sig.
Lack of parental support	1.380	3	.710
Bad political influence on the youths leading to exposure to extremism	4.819	3	.186
Inadequate institutional support on the management of radicalisation in schools	13.719	3	.003
Insertion of a teacher or a student to facilitate recruitment	.449	3	.930
Lack of the government to address the inherent poverty	3.724	3	.293
Religious beliefs on justification on the usage of violence to address grievances	5.836	3	.120
Corruption has become a cause of radicalisation into extremism	3.466	3	.325

The results established that there were no statistically significant differences between lack of parental support, bad political influence on the youths leading to exposure to extremism, insertion of a teacher or a student to facilitate recruitment, lack of the government to address the inherent poverty, religious beliefs on justification on the usage of violence to address grievances and corruption causing radicalisation into extremism according to the years worked by teachers at the school: $H(3) = 1.38$, $p = .71$, $H(3) = 4.82$, $p = .19$, $H(3) = .45$, $p = .93$, $H(3) = 3.72$, $p = .29$, $H(3) = 5.84$, $p = .12$ and $H(3) = 3.47$, $p = .33$ respectively.

The researcher conducted a post hoc test to test whether to reject or retain the hypothesis on pairwise comparisons as illustrated in Figure 6.1.

Hypothesis Test Summary

	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of Inadequate institutional support on the management of radicalisation in schools is the same across categories of How long have you been in the school.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.003	Reject the null hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

Figure 6.1: Kruskal-Wallis 1_Way ANOVA Post Hoc test for the challenges of radicalisation

The null hypothesis was rejected. There was a statistical significance between inadequate institutional support on the management of radicalisation in schools and the teachers years working in the school; $H(3) = 13.72$, $p= .01$. Specifically, the study finds that radicalisation has been impeded by inadequacies in institution support with regards to the fighting radicalisation of youths in Kenya: students.

The results indicated growing concern over the radicalisation of violent extremism; that there was a problem in the education system and that of the political system in the country (Kenya). The cases of radicalisation toward violent extremismwere potential threats to national security; decaying the national values of Kenya. The incidence of radicalisation toward violent extremismwas attributed to a lack of parental support to the student. The members in an FGD stated that:

> …some parents do not care about the welfare of the child. Some students are not provided for; they become vulnerable to new ideas that might be destructive. Some parents encourage their children to join terror networks.

Bad political ideas have been established to influence youths to join extremist terror groups (Al-Shabaab). $SCDE_1$ stated that:

> …Through divisive politics, radical leaders in Kenya have formed outlawed groups (Mungiki and Mombasa Republican Council etc) to further their political agenda.Such outfits justify to the community that extreme violence is not a bad thing.

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The kind of generation brought up under the guise of outlawed groups become vulnerable and easy candidates to radical extremist groups.

The inadequacy of institutional support to manage radicalisation in schools exposed the learning institution to higher risks of inserting a teacher(s) or a student(s) to facilitate recruitment for radical terror groups. Poverty in Kenya could not be wished away, therefore, it was a problem the government should deal with to promote the welfare of its people. Religion was a conduit of radicalisation as in the case of Mombasa Church attacks where Al-Shabaab sympathisers vowed to avenge the deaths of Muslim Sheikhs linked to Al-Shabaab. Disparities in resource allocation and praising corruption and corrupt leaders had led to increased radicalisation. Corruption deniedthe youths opportunities to grow, therefore, they became susceptible to joining other ventures (terrorism) as a means of survival. A report by the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) (2018), postulated that curbing corruption could contribute to preventing violent extremism: it was the cause and consequence of governance deficit that fuelled violent extremism among the youths.

Kenya government through its MoE have had challenges addressing the accruing radicalisation menace in secondary schools toward violent extremism, especially the public secondary schools in Kenya. These challenged emanated fromthe inadequate capacity of schools in prevention and management of emerging forms of violence; inadequate capacity by teachers to spot and offer guidance and counselling services; the lack of guidelines and capacity building materials in prevention and management of emerging forms of violence; weak partnerships between the schools and communities; non-conducive social environment; the presence of religious and other actors in schools with minimal supervision by the county; and weak monitoring and

evaluation mechanisms (MoE, 2017). The government through the Ministry of Education and Internal Security should work hand in hand with the school management to provide preventive measures to radicalisation by extremist radical groups. The lack of the government to address the inherent poverty, religious beliefs and justification on the usage of violence to address grievances, corruption had become a leading cause to radicalisation towardviolent extremism.

6.2 Policy Adjustment

Policy for combating terrorism or any act of terror was not clear in most governments and the responding agencies. However, some exist such as the practice of preparedness, use of military tactics, advancement in intelligence gathering and response. The school systems in Kenya, lack proper guideline to curb the encroaching radicalisation toward violent extremism. Therefore, the researcher examined the importance of policy adjustment to manage increasing radicalisation and terror networks in Kenya. The study focused on the need for policy adjustment and its measures adopted to effectively counter-radicalisation of students in secondary schools in Kenya.

6.2.1 Need for Policy Adjustment

The researcher determined whether there was a need for policy adjustments. Figure 6.2 illustrated the findings.

Is there need for any policy reforms and adjustment to effectively prevent and counter radicalisation

Figure 6.2: Need for policy adjustment

The results showed that the majority of the respondents' supported policy reforms in secondary schools in countering radicalisation. The policies in the radicalisation of the youths had been shaped by cultural beliefs, political and historical factors. The trend was changing to an evidence-based approach.

6.2.2 Policy measures adopted to effectively counter-radicalisation

The measures adopted for countering radicalisation were importantfor mitigating radical extremist groups from encroaching secondary schools in Kajiado County, Kenya. Radicalisation was a slow process that had a deleterious effect on the socio-economic and potential stability and development of a country, Kenya. Therefore, the study determined the policy measures adopted for fighting radicalisation in school. Table 6.3 illustrated some of the policies on countering radicalisation in Kenya.

Table 6.3: Adopted policies to counter-radicalisation in secondary schools

Policies to Counter radicalisation	Agree or Strongly Agree	Moderate	Disagree or Strongly Disagree
By the involvement of local authorities for early recognition of signs of radicalisation and take preventive action.	76.9%	9.6%	13.5%
By focusing on prevention of online radicalisation and recruitment armed conflicts	63.5%	25.0%	11.5%
By mobilising parental involvement in a student's affairs and enhance more outreach activities	78.8%	5.8%	15.4%
By enhancing the close relationship with the security organs to foster prevention of extreme radicalisation	70.0%	28.0%	2.0%
By integration of prevention of violent extremism through the educational curriculum in Kenya	80.8%	5.8%	13.5%
By enforcing multisectoral partnerships between the education sector and other communities	82.7%	11.5%	5.8%

The results in Table 6.3 showedthatthe involvement of local authorities for early recognition of signs of radicalisation and take preventive action 159 (76.9%), focusing on prevention of online radicalisation and recruitment armed conflicts 131 (63.5%), mobilising parental involvement in a student's affairs and enhance more outreach activities 163 (78.8%), enhancing the close relationship with the security organs to foster prevention of extreme radicalisation 145 (70.0%), integration of prevention of violent extremism through the educational curriculum in Kenya 167 (80.8%), and enforcing multisectoral partnerships between the education sector and other communities 171 (82.7%), were some of the policy measures that were utilised by schools to address student radicalisation.

The researcher computed the Kruskal-Wallis H test to determine whether policy adjustment influenced radicalisation toward violent extremism. Table 6.4 summarised the inferential statistics.

Table 6.4: Kruskal-Wallis H test summarising policy adopted to mitigate against radicalisation

Test Statistics[a,b]

	Policy
Kruskal-Wallis H	7.676
Df	2
Asymp. Sig.	.022

a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: Is there a need for any policy reforms and adjustment to effectively prevent and counter-radicalisation?

The results established that there were statistically significant differences between policy adopted to mitigate against radicalisation according to the need for any policy reforms and adjustment to effectively prevent and counter-radicalisation. $H(2)=7.68$, **$p=.022$**.The null hypothesis was, therefore, rejected. The result was illustrated in Fig. 4.3.

Figure 6.3: Kruskal-Wallis 1_Way ANOVA Post Hoc test for the policy adoption to mitigate against radicalisation.

That the policy measures adopted by the national government to combat the radicalisation of secondary school-going students toward violent extremismwere widely accepted by the secondary schools' management, the community and the county government agencies. Kenya suffered a massive terrorist act linked to Al-Qaeda in 1998 August seventh. Since then, terror acts increased as discussed in the

document. The Garissa University College Attack in 2015 April Second, where the terrorists targeted students showed a lack of preparedness by the management of learning institutions. This was followed up by the 2019 January fifteenth attack at Nairobi Dusit D2 Complex Attack, where a student(s) was involved in the preparation and actualisation of the act.

The increasing cases of terrorism, especially from Al-Shabaab, led to a change of policies and laws to deal with terrorist acts and terrorist organisation. There is a law on Prevention of Terrorism Act, Security Law (Amendment) Act that saw the formation of a number of agencies to deal with specific terror acts: anti-terrorism police unit, bomb disposal unit, cyber forensics investigative unit in addition to Kenya Defence Force involvement (Mwangi, 2018). There are a number of screening systems all over Kenya's entry points and ports to manage terrorism.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This chapter presents the summary of the study, conclusion, recommendation and suggested areas for further studies.

7.1 Summary of the results

The section summarised the findings of the study objective-wise.

7.1.1 The level of knowledge by teachers on factors inducing students' radicalisation

The study determined that 19 (36.1%) of teachers were in agreement with the presence of radicalisation in public secondary schools in Kajiado County. The signs of radicalisation into extremist violence were associated with access to violent websites 12 (22.6%), the justification to use violence to solve societal issues 10 (19.4%), use of extremist narratives to explain personal disadvantages 36 (18.8%), access of extremist literature 9 (18.8%), intention to join extremist organisations 5 (9.4%) and being in contact with extremist recruiters 3 (6.5%). The causes of radicalisation amongst school-going individuals were associated with unemployment 30 (57.1%), securing income opportunities 22 (42.9%), marginalisation 13 (24.2%), religious justification 12 (22.9%) and poor and divisive politics 6 (12.1%). The study determined that the susceptibilities to radicalisation by students were associated with a lack of societal support, lack of empathy and displaying low self-esteem by the students 31 (60%) respectively, experiencing traumatic events 30 (57.1%), struggling with a sense of identity 28 (54.3%), impaired cultural and or religious backgrounds 27 (51.4%) and ethnicity and discrimination 6 (12.1%). The continuous scenario of

students dropping out of school has the potential of being a result of radicalisation 8 (16.1%).

7.1.2 Strategies implemented to address the emerging threat of recruitment and radicalisation

The study summarises findings on strategies implemented to prevent radicalisation into violent extremist that, there should be the provision of chaplains and welfare supports to vulnerable learners 39 (75%), invite external speakers to address students against radical groups 39 (75.1%), focus teaching away from brainwashing and jihad 33 (62.6%) and rebut students found to be radicalised 26 (50%). The study also found that the multisectoral approach to countering radicalisation is an acceptable strategy endorsed by the schools to eliminate the vice of radicalisation of students to radical extremist groups. The school management in collaboration with the government agencies to fight student radicalisation must be appreciated at all times. The strategy of countering radicalisation has worked for some schools in Kajiado County, Kenya. Religion was found to be the opium of the people thus itis mainly used to enhance radicalisation in Kenya. The school management is essential to prevent radicalisation by averting the radical terror elements from using the schools as a recruitment camp.

7.1.3 Challenges faced by the school management in the effort to counter violent extremists

The findings showed that there is a problem in the education system and the political system in Kenya. Cases of radicalisation is potentially a threat to national security, which is decaying the national values of the country. The incidence of radicalisation into extremist violence is attributed to a lack of parental support for the student. The policies are essential for promotingde-radicalization in school. The findings showed

that the majority of the respondents' support policy reforms for secondary schools in countering radicalisation. That the local authorities involvement for early signs recognition of radicalisation and take preventive action 40 (76.9%), prevent online radicalisation and recruitment by armed conflicts 33 (63.5%), mobilise parental involvement in a student's affairs and enhance more outreach activities 41 (78.8%), incorporate security organs to foster prevention of extreme radicalisation 36 (70.0%), integrate prevention of violent extremism in the educational curriculum 42 (80.0%) and enforce multi-sectoral partnerships between the education sector and other communities 43 (82.7%).

7.2 Conclusion

Public secondary school students were being radicalised in Kajiado County, Kenya; students were justifyingthe use of violence as a meansto solve their issues. Causes of radicalisation among the students were poverty, marginalisation and unemployment and were susceptible to radicalisation toward violent extremismthat is amplified by frustrated ambitions among individuals who then find gratification in taking extremist attitudes and/or actions.

The strategies that were established by the MoEin 2017 to counter radicalisation were not operational hence school management was not able to effectively counter radicalisation among their students.

Lack of parental support, inadequate institutional structures, lack of the government addressing inherent poverty, divisive religious ideologies and ever-increasing corruption in the country have led to the formation of radical terror groups that have enhanced the radicalisation of youths and school-going children in Kajiado County,Kenya.

Preparedness levels of secondary schools regarding the radicalisation of students towards violent extremism is still a problem in public secondary schools.

7.3 Recommendation

The study recommended as follows:

The teachers should be trained as stipulated in the counter violent extremism report of 2017 by the Ministry of Education, to prevent, mitigate and prepare against radicalisation into violent extremism in schools in Kenya. Teachers and the school community are key in fostering, strengthening resilience and preventing the students from subscribing to terrorist ideologies.

The strategies developed by the Ministry of Educationon Countering Violent Extremism should be fully operationalised to prevent, mitigate and promote preparedness against radicalisation in schools.

Challenges faced in preventing radicalisation to be addressed by the MoE, the Ministry of Interior and National Coordination, the Ministry of Information Communication Technology, the school management and other stakeholders to identify positive values and strengths to understand the importance of a healthy relationship.

Public secondary schools' preparedness levels in countering student radicalisation into violent extremism are wanting, hence the national government and the counterparts – county government should enforce Counter Violent Extremism of 2017 by the Ministry of Education to mitigate radicalisation of students in schools.

7.4 Suggested areas for further studies

The researcher suggested further studies in the contribution of religion towardthe radicalisation of youths into violent extremism in Kenya. Besides, the research suggests a study on the influence of the integrated Somali refugees on Kenyan youth radicalisation toward violent extremism in Kenya.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Interview Schedules for Sub-County Education Officer

SECTION A. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

1. Gender ………………………………
2. Age……………………………
3. Residence………………………………………

SECTION B: FACTORS INDUCING STUDENTS TO VIOLENT RADICALISATION

4. Have there been reports received by your office student radicalisation into violent extremism?
5. Are there terror networks within or without Kajiado County, which are currently radicalising students into violent extremist?
6. In the absence of a clear definition of student radicalisation into violent extremism in public secondary schools in the County, what preparedness measures have you taken?
7. . Is it necessary to engage in the prevention of violent extremism in secondary school where there is no apparent threat of violent extremism in Kajiado County?
8. In your own observation, what are some of the causes of student radicalisation in secondary schools in Kenya?
9. What is the knowledge level of factors inducing student radicalisation into violent extremism in Kajiado County?
10. Most acts of terrorism and radicalisation into violent extremist had their origin from religious ideologies. Does religion contribute to radicalisation in your opinion? (Please explain)
11. Does politics contribute to student radicalization into violent extremism in secondary schools in Kajiado County?

SECTION C: COUNTER RADICALISATION MEASURES AND STRATEGIES

12. Is the government of Kenya aware of student radicalisation in secondary schools?
13. What measures is the government taking to help secondary school management in fighting radicalisation?
14. Who is responsible for driving change and making schools free from radicalisation?
15. Are you aware of the strategies that have been implemented to address the emerging threat of recruitment and radicalisation among students in Kenya?
16. Should religious education be part of strategies to prevent violent extremism through education?
17. How can schools provide a safe and open platform for dialogue and discussion on issues related to violent extremism that are considered politically sensitive by the community or the country?

SECTION D: CHALLENGES FACED BY THE SCHOOL MANAGEMENT TO COUNTER VIOLENT RADICALISATION

18. Has your office succeeded in the fight against student radicalisation into violent extremism in Kajiado County?

19. What are the challenges faced by your office in their efforts to counter violent radicalisation in secondary schools in Kajiado County?
20. In your opinion, how can the above challenges be addressed?
21. What needs to be done to reinforce multisectoral partnerships between the education sector and other communities in managing student radicalization into violent extremism?

SECTION D: POLICY ADJUSTMENT

22. Is there a need for any policy reforms and adjustment to effectively prevent and counter-radicalisation into violent extremism in secondary schools in Kenya?
23. In your own understanding of the radicalisation process, what are some of the policy measures that can be used to prevent the vice of radicalisation of students in schools?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME

Appendix II: Interview Schedules for Chiefs
SECTION A. **DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS**

1 Gender ………………………………
2 Age……………………………
3 Residence……………………………………

SECTION B: FACTORS INDUCING STUDENTS TO VIOLENT RADICALISATION

4 Have there been reports received by your office on possible student radicalisation into violent extremism in Kajiado County?
5 Are there terror networks operating within or without Kajiado County, which are currently radicalising students into violent extremism?
6 In the absence of a clear definition of student radicalisation into violent extremism in public secondary schools in the County, what preparedness measures have you taken to curb vice in future?
7 . Is it necessary to engage in the prevention of violent extremism in secondary school where there is no apparent threat of violent extremism?
8 In your own perception, what are some of the causes of student radicalisation in secondary schools in Kenya?
9 What is the knowledge level of factors inducing students to violent extremism radicalisation in Kajiado County?
10 Does religion contribute to radicalisation? (Please explain)
11 Does politic contribute to student radicalization into violent extremism in secondary schools in Kajiado County?

SECTION C: COUNTER RADICALISATION MEASURES AND STRATEGIES
12 Is the government of Kenya aware of student radicalisation in secondary schools?
13 What measures is the government taking to help secondary school management in fighting radicalisation into violent extremism?
14 Who is responsible for driving change and making schools free from radicalisation?
15 Are you aware of the strategies that have been implemented to address the emerging threat of recruitment and radicalisation among students in Kajiado County and Kenya?
16 Should religious education be part of strategies to prevent violent extremism through education?
17 How can schools provide a safe and open platform for dialogue and discussion on issues related to violent extremism that are considered politically sensitive by the community?

SECTION D: CHALLENGES FACED BY THE SCHOOL MANAGEMENT TO COUNTER VIOLENT RADICALISATION
18 Has your office succeeded in the fight against student radicalisation into violent extremism in Kajiado County?
19 What are the challenges faced by your office in their efforts to counter violent radicalisation in secondary schools in Kajiado County?
20 In your opinion, how can the above challenges be addressed?

21 What needs to be done to reinforce multisectoral partnerships between the education sector and other communities in managing student radicalization into violent extremism?

SECTION D: POLICY ADJUSTMENT

22 Is there a need for any policy reforms and adjustment to effectively prevent and counter-radicalisation into violent extremism in secondary schools in Kenya?
23 In your own understanding of the radicalisation process, what are some of the policy measures that can be used to prevent the vice of radicalisation of students in schools?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME

Appendix III: Questionnaires for School Principal

SECTION A: RESPONDENTS INFORMATION

1. Age

<= 25 years ( ) 26 to 35 years ( ) 36 to 45 years ( ) 50 years ( ) Above 51 years ( )

2. Sex

   Male ( )   Female ( )

3. Religion

Protestant ( ) Catholic ( ) Muslim ( ) ADC ( ) Hindu ( ) Atheist ( )

4. What is your highest level of education?

   University ( )   College ( )   Secondary ( ) Primary ( )   None ( )

5. How long have you been in this school?

   Less than 1 year ( )   1-3 years ( ) 4-6 years ( ) above 6 years ( )

SECTION B: RADICALISATION OF STUDENTS IN SCHOOLS

6. Are students currently being radicalized by terror networks in your school?

   Yes ( )   No ( )

   If yes what are the common level of radicalisation? (*Rank based on priority levels*)

   Personal and group grievance causing radicalisation

   Slippery Slope for gradual radicalisation

   Love connecting violent extremists

   Poverty levels influencing radicalisation

   Isolation leading to radicalisation

   If **NO,** indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to the absence of a clear definition of violent extremism, have your students participated. (Scale 1= Strongly agree 2= Agree 3= Moderate 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree)

Statement	Level of agreement				
	1	2	3	4	5
In contact with extremist recruiters					
Accessing violent extremist websites, especially those with a social networking element					
Possessing or accessing violent extremist literature					
Using extremist narratives and a global ideology to explain personal disadvantage					
Justifying the use of violence to solve societal issues;					
Joining or seeking to join extremist organisations					

7. Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to the causes of the radicalisation of students in your school. (Scale 1= Strongly agree 2= Agree 3= Moderate 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree)

Statement	Level of agreement				
	1	2	3	4	5
Student radicalisation into violent extremist is largely influenced by marginalization					
Student radicalisation into violent extremist is largely influenced by poverty					
Student radicalisation into violent extremist is largely influenced by unemployment					
Students' radicalisation into violent extremist is purely based on religious justification					
Student radicalisation into violent extremist is largely influenced by political change					
Students' radicalisation into violent extremism is a form of securing income opportunities					

8. Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to what makes students more susceptible to recruitment into terror groups. (Scale 1= Strongly agree 2= Agree 3= Moderate 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree)

Statement	Level of agreement				
	1	2	3	4	5
A student struggling with a sense of identity					
The student becoming distanced from their cultural or religious background					
Student questioning his/her place in society					
A student experiencing traumatic events					
A student experiencing ethnicity or discrimination					
Student being difficulty in interacting socially and lacking empathy					
A student having low self-esteem					

9. Do you think a continuous scenario of students dropping out from public secondary schools an indicator of student radicalization in Kajiado County?

Yes ( )   No ( )

SECTION C: COUNTER RADICALISATION MEASURES AND STRATEGIES

10. The following are measures being taken to prevent students from radicalization. Please indicate the extent to which each of the measures is being taken. **1** -**High, 2 -Moderate, 3 -low, 4- Not at all**

Statement	1	2	3	4
Students are being taught and advised towards academic engagement and career goals away from brainwashing terror and				

	1	2	3	4	5
jihad					
Introduction of welfare, pastoral care, chaplain supports to provide sufficient care and support for vulnerable learners					
Introduction of external speakers to schools in order to deal with possible instances of extremism.					
online safety measures are taken such as blocking access to dangerous or illegal sites by filtering and using firewall systems.					
School management rebut those students found to sympathise with terrorism					
Established standards of ethics and behaviours for teachers regarding extremism that enables schools to take stern actions against staff who demonstrate unacceptable views					
Teacher are trained to help identify and refer to relevant agencies, students whose behaviours suggest they are being drawn into terrorism and extremism ideology					

11. Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to measures of counter-radicalisation. Scale (1= Strongly Agree 2= Agree 3= Average 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree)

Statement	Level of agreement				
	1	2	3	4	5
Counter-radicalisation measures have been effective in your school					
The school management has been involved in countering radicalisation in partnership with the government					
Some of the counter-radicalisation measures by the school and the government have led to counter-productive outcomes that have exacerbated radicalisation in secondary schools in Kenya					
There is a need to adopt a multi-sector approach in countering radicalisation in Kenya					

12. Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to how best can the school management be involved in countering radicalisation among students in Kajiado County. Scale (1= Strongly Agree 2= Agree 3= Adequate 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree)

Statement	Level of agreement				
	1	2	3	4	5
By the provision of relevant education of good quality can help create the conditions that make it difficult for violent extremist ideologies and acts of proliferation.					
By providing education policies and practices that must, directly and indirectly, address the specific drivers of violent extremism					
By teachers paying attention to the personal challenges of students as they struggle with issues of wellbeing, identity and meaning					
By creating a safe and supportive school environment					

By school management developing mutual understanding, cooperation and trust with different sectors of the community that plays an educational role				

SECTION D: POLICY ADJUSTMENT

13. Is there a need for any policy reforms and adjustment to effectively prevent and counter-radicalisation?

    Yes ( )   No ( )

14. Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to what policy measures can be adopted for effective prevention and countering student radicalisation in Kajiado County. Scale (1= Strongly Agree 2= Agree 3= Moderate 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree)

Statement	Level of agreement				
	1	2	3	4	5
By the involvement of local authorities for early recognition of signs of radicalisation and take preventive action.					
By focusing on the prevention of online radicalisation and recruitment armed conflicts					
By mobilising parental involvement in a student's affairs and enhance more outreach activities					
By enhancing the close relationship with the security organs to foster prevention of extreme radicalisation					
By integration of prevention of violent extremism through the educational curriculum in Kenya					
By enforcing multisectoral partnerships between the education sector and other communities					

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME

Appendix IV: Questionnaires for Teachers

SECTION A: RESPONDENTS INFORMATION

1   Age

<= 25 years ( ) 26 to 35 years ( )36 to 45 years (   ) 50 years (   )   Above 51 years ( )

2   Sex

Male ( )   Female (   )

3   Religion

Protestant ( ) Catholic ( )   Muslim ( )   ADC (   )   Hindu ( )   Atheist ( )

4   What is your highest level of education?

University (   )   College ( )   Secondary ( )Primary ( )   None ( )

5   How long have you been in this school?

Less than 1 year ( )   1-3 years ( ) 4-6 years ( ) above 6 years ( )

SECTION B: RADICALISATION OF STUDENTS IN SCHOOLS

6   Are students currently being radicalized by terror networks in your school?

Yes ( )   No ( )

If **YES** what are the common level of radicalisation? (*Rank based on priority levels*)

Personal and group grievance causing radicalisation

Slippery Slope for gradual radicalisation

Love connecting violent extremists

Poverty levels influencing radicalisation

Isolation leading to radicalisation

If **NO,** indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to the absence of a clear definition of violent extremism, have your students participated Been. (Scale 1= Strongly agree 2= Agree 3= Moderate 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree)

Statement	Level of agreement				
	1	2	3	4	5
In contact with extremist recruiters					
Accessing violent extremist websites, especially those with a social networking element					
Possessing or accessing violent extremist literature					
Using extremist narratives and a global ideology to explain personal disadvantage					
Justifying the use of violence to solve societal issues;					
Joining or seeking to join extremist organisations					

7 Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to the causes of the radicalisation of students in your school. (Scale 1= Strongly agree 2= Agree 3= Moderate 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree)

Statement	Level of agreement				
	1	2	3	4	5
Student radicalisation into violent extremist is largely influenced by marginalization					
Student radicalisation into violent extremist is largely influenced by poverty					
Student radicalisation into violent extremist is largely influenced by unemployment					
Students' radicalisation into violent extremist is purely based on religious justification					
Student radicalisation into violent extremist is largely influenced by political change					
Students' radicalisation into violent extremism is a form of securing income opportunities					

8 Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to what makes students more susceptible to recruitment into terror groups. (Scale 1= Strongly agree 2= Agree 3= Moderate 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree)

Statement	Level of agreement				
	1	2	3	4	5
A student struggling with a sense of identity					
The student becoming distanced from their cultural or religious background					
Student questioning his/her place in society					
A student experiencing traumatic events					
A student experiencing ethnicity or discrimination					
Student being difficulty in interacting socially and lacking empathy					
A student having low self-esteem					

9 Do you think a continuous scenario of students dropping out from public secondary schools is an indicator of student radicalization in Kajiado County?

    Yes ( )   No ( )

SECTION C: COUNTER RADICALISATION MEASURES AND STRATEGIES

10 The following are measures being taken to prevent students from radicalization. Please indicate the extent to which each of the measures is being taken. **1 -High, 2 -Moderate, 3 -low, 4- Not at all**

Statement	1	2	3	4
Students are being taught and advised towards academic engagement and career goals away from brainwashing terror and jihad				
Introduction of welfare, pastoral care, chaplain supports to provide sufficient care and support for vulnerable learners				
Introduction of external speakers to schools in order to deal with possible instances of extremism.				
online safety measures are taken such as blocking access to dangerous or illegal sites by filtering and using firewall systems.				
School management rebut those students found to sympathise with terrorism				
Established standards of ethics and behaviours for teachers regarding extremism that enables schools to take stern actions against staff who demonstrate unacceptable views				
Teacher are trained to help identify and refer to relevant agencies, students whose behaviours suggest they are being drawn into terrorism and extremism ideology				

11 Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to measures of counter-radicalisation. Scale (1= Strongly Agree 2= Agree 3= Average 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree)

Statement	Level of agreement				
	1	2	3	4	5
Counter-radicalisation measures have been effective in your school					
The school management has been involved in countering radicalisation in partnership with the government					
Some of the counter-radicalisation measures by the school and the government have led to counter-productive outcomes that have exacerbated radicalisation in secondary schools in Kenya					
There is a need to adopt a multi-sector approach in countering radicalisation in Kenya					

12 Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to how best can the school management be involved in countering radicalisation among students in Kajiado County. Scale (1= Strongly Agree 2= Agree 3= Adequate 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree)

Statement	Level of agreement				
	1	2	3	4	5
By the provision of relevant education of good quality can help create the conditions that make it difficult for violent extremist ideologies and acts of proliferation.					
By providing education policies and practices that must, directly and indirectly, address the specific drivers of					

	1	2	3	4	5
violent extremism					
By teachers paying attention to the personal challenges of students as they struggle with issues of wellbeing, identity and meaning					
By creating a safe and supportive school environment					
By school management developing mutual understanding, cooperation and trust with different sectors of the community that plays an educational role					

SECTION D: POLICY ADJUSTMENT

13 Is there a need for any policy reforms and adjustment to effectively prevent and counter-radicalisation?

Yes ( )   No ( )

14 Indicate your level of agreement with the following statement relating to what policy measures can be adopted for effective prevention and countering student radicalisation in Kajiado County. Scale (1= Strongly Agree 2= Agree 3= Moderate 4= Disagree 5= Strongly disagree)

Statement	Level of agreement				
	1	2	3	4	5
By the involvement of local authorities for early recognition of signs of radicalisation and take preventive action.					
By focusing on the prevention of online radicalisation and recruitment armed conflicts					
By mobilising parental involvement in a student's affairs and enhance more outreach activities					
By enhancing the close relationship with the security organs to foster prevention of extreme radicalisation					
By integration of prevention of violent extremism through the educational curriculum in Kenya					
By enforcing multisectoral partnerships between the education sector and other communities					

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME

Appendix V: Focus Group Discussion (Students)
SECTION A: FACTORS INDUCING STUDENTS TO VIOLENT RADICALISATION

1. Do you know what radicalisation means?
1. In your understanding, what is radicalisation into violent extremism?
2. Are students currently being radicalized by terror networks in your school?
3. Can you list some of the common levels of radicalisation?
4. What are some of the causes of the radicalisation of students in your school?
5. Students are susceptible to radicalisation. Can you name some of the factors that make students more susceptible to recruitment into terror groups?
6. Do you think a continuous scenario of students dropping out from public secondary schools is an indicator of student radicalization in Kajiado County?

SECTION C: COUNTER RADICALISATION MEASURES AND STRATEGIES
7. Is your school aware of student radicalisation in secondary schools?
8. What are some of the measures being taking to eradicate radicalisation in your school?
9. Are you aware of the strategies that have been implemented to address the emerging threat of recruitment and radicalisation among students in your school?
10. Should religious education be part of strategies to prevent violent extremism through education?
11. How can schools provide a safe and open platform for dialogue and discussion on issues related to violent extremism that are considered politically sensitive by the community or the country?

SECTION D: CHALLENGES FACED BY THE SCHOOL MANAGEMENT TO COUNTER VIOLENT RADICALISATION
12. Has your school succeeded in the fight against student radicalisation into violent extremism?
13. What are the challenges faced by your school in its efforts to counter violent radicalisation?
14. In your opinion, how can the above challenges be addressed?
15. What needs to be done to reinforce multisectoral partnerships between the education sector and other communities in managing student radicalization into violent extremism?

SECTION D: POLICY ADJUSTMENT

16. Is there a need for any policy reforms and adjustment to effectively prevent and counter-radicalisation into violent extremism in your schools?
17. In your own understanding of the radicalisation process, what are some of the policy measures that can be used to prevent the vice of radicalisation of students in schools?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME

Appendix VI: Research Permit

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

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NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: **699669**

Date of Issue: **10/October/2019**

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